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DDilegge
12-17-2005, 05:23 AM
Moderator's Note

This thread is the result of several threads being merged.

There is a separate thread on the USMC's experience @ Fallujah (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1008) which maybe worth checking.(Ends).


I had the opportunity to attend the Joint Urban Operations Senior Leadership Seminar on 15 December. The AFPS article about this event is posted below. While this article reads more like an official press release, I found it heartening that much of the senior DoD leadership "got" the fact that urban operations are about people over technology, tactical in nature and an interagency and coalition affair. These themes were hammered in during the discussions that followed each JFCOM briefing.

Senior Leaders Focus on Urban Fight
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, Dec. 15, 2005 – Senior defense and government leaders gathered at Fort McNair here today to consider challenges the U.S. military faces operating in urban environments and to discuss strategies to make them as effective in cities as in open terrain.

The Urban Operations Senior Leader Review, sponsored by U.S. Joint Forces Command, focused on better ways to fight an enemy that's increasingly moving into urban areas to plan and launch its attacks.

"Military operations in urban terrain," or MOUT, has been part of the military vernacular for decades. But traditionally, MOUT involved attacking a city from the outside and moving on, not conducting extensive operations within that city, explained David Ozolek, director of the Joint Urban Operations Office. Similarly, traditional MOUT operations viewed local populations more as obstacles to work around rather than partners in the fight.

"Five years ago, the thought was that we were never going to do urban operations. The idea was basically that you'd blow up the city or go around it," said Duane Schattle, deputy director of the Joint Urban Operations Office. "But the war on terror changed that. The enemy knows they can't compete against us in the open, so they are moving to the cities."

Cities offer terrorists an environment in which they can blend easily with the local population as they plan and carry out attacks, explained retired Army Brig. Gen. Mike Hall, a senior concept developer for the Joint Urban Operations Office.

All indications are that the type of enemy U.S. troops face today and are likely to face for the foreseeable future will continue using cities as their battlefields of choice, Hall said. Joint Forces Command is shepherding DoD's efforts to ensure troops engaged in urban operations have the best equipment, tactics and intelligence they need to carry out their mission. Today's session brought together people involved in developing these assets and policies with the decision makers who will ultimately get them to people operating in an urban setting, said Janet Tucker, chief of strategic engagement for the Joint Urban Operations Office.

But operating in build-up areas requires "more than just better gadgets and mousetraps," Hall said. "We need to learn to think differently."

Today's session focused on improving battle-space awareness and visualization to help troops "find the enemy faster than he can find us," Ozolek said.

Leaders also considered better ways to encourage local residents to help support military operations under way in their cities, either actively, by helping advise U.S. troops, or passively, by not interfering with their operations, Ozolek explained. That includes figuring out how to make munitions more precise and using them with the proper amount of firepower so they don't inflict excessive collateral damage that angers local residents, he said.

Today's seminar also included discussions about ways to improve coordination among U.S. agencies and allied militaries to better support urban operations. Representatives from NATO's Allied Command Transformation and numerous coalition militaries participated in the session.

Many of the concepts discussed today are already in use in Iraq or on the drawing boards, being readied for implementation. "We're trying to move as quickly as possible so we can get these developments to the guys in the theater," Schattle said.

GorTex6
01-14-2006, 03:21 AM
An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments (http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4670.1/), Brian Michael Jenkins(Rand 1972!)

SWJED
01-28-2006, 04:10 PM
Air Force Operations in Urban Environments (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usafsab.pdf). US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report, August 2005. Full report at link, summary of conclusions and recommendations below.


The team assessed Urban Operations in all stages; namely, Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate and Transition (USECT). Findings from the panels were consolidated and vetted through vignettes generated by the SC&I panel. Generally, these findings could be viewed as capability shortfalls, or gaps, in the current Air Force. The team next created visions of Air Force capabilities with all of those gaps resolved and then looked at what steps in capability would get to those capabilities. Those steps became the study recommendations.

General Conclusions

There were some very clear and fundamental conclusions that became evident as the study progressed. Those conclusions were as follows:

a) Urban Operations (Urban Ops) is a three dimensional scenario,
b) The USAF brings a critically important vertical dimension to Urban Ops,
c) The USAF is essential in all five USECT phases of Urban Ops,
d) The USAF has some “star performers” (AC-130 Gunship and Predator/Hellfire) that are highly regarded and frequently requested by Ground Commanders,
e) Unit size for typical ground maneuvers is typically small, either a platoon (40 personnel) or a squad (8-13 personnel),
f) Air support in Urban Ops is not a lesser included case of Conventional Close Air Support (CAS),
g) The desired response time to a call for support from a ground maneuver unit should be in single digit minutes (ideally, one to two minutes),
h) Communications and some forms of ISR are considerably less effective in urban environments because of obscuration, multipath and interference in dense signal environments,
i) While rapid response time in support of ground maneuver units is critical, the number of aircraft (A/C) capable of delivering the desired effects in the airspace over an urban area is severely constrained by airspace management procedures, and
j) When the USAF is able to upgrade capabilities for Urban Ops, many of those capabilities will also enhance other missions (Urban Ops is the “most stressing case” for several capabilities).

Recommendations

As the study progressed through the stages of analyzing shortfalls and generating visions,
the team was then able to identify some specific recommendations that are near term, quantitative steps toward an ultimate capability. Those recommendations are summarized below:

a) Support Joint CONOPS, TTPs and training—At this time, there are no USAF or Joint
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or Tactic, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Urban Ops. There are “practices” that have evolved as Urban Ops continue, but it is extremely important to generate CONOPS and TTPs and make them a part of the overall structure of the Air Force. When those are in place, Urban Ops should be incorporated into the training curriculum and we will then be able to send both Air Force and Joint command personnel to the field fully trained in Urban Ops.

b) Lead Development of a Joint Automated Control Capability (JACC)—To resolve the procedural limitation of the number of A/C over an urban area and to dramatically reduce timelines for delivering effects when called for by ground maneuver units, the team recommends that the USAF lead an effort aimed, in the long term, at an automated, man-on-the loop system that performs airspace management, ISR platform positioning/sensor management, management of an integrated “information system”, weapon-target pairing and modeling and simulation based planning/rehearsal. In the near term, the team recommends that the Air Force work jointly with the Army to integrate real time USAF weapon platform data into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to enhance joint fires capability. Another near term recommendation is to define the JACC architecture as a first step toward implementation of JACC.

c) Augment Mobile ad hoc Urban Ops network—To resolve many of the communications problems for ground maneuver units, the team recommends that the USAF build on existing USAF Roll-On Beyond-line-of-sight Enhancement (ROBE) communications node capability by expanding the functionality to include key waveforms used by the ground forces. Then as ground forces transition to more advanced waveforms, the ROBE system can be upgraded correspondingly. In the near term, the team recommends that the Air Force select a platform for this communications node capability and begin upgrading ROBE for this application.

d) Deliver Urban-Tailored ISR—To enable progress toward a multi-sensor Joint Battlespace Information Enterprise Service (JBIES) system the team recommends that the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) be viewed as a point of departure. By utilizing data from DCGS, we can evolve toward an accessible all-source information database and we will have enhanced near term capability that will provide valuable experience in serving various echelons of users in a responsive manner. The team further recommends that all USAF sensors be upgraded to have autonomous geo-registration capability so the information they provide can be properly registered in an all-source database. Further, the team recommends that the on-going Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sensor management system address cordoning as an important function of a sensor platform. Additional recommendations are to proceed with three dimensional (3-D) mapping capability for urban areas using active laser technology and to proceed with the next phase of “staring ISR” as being developed at Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).

e) Improve Operations via Modeling, Simulation and Training (MS&T)—The team observed that current efforts in the area of MS&T, particularly as it relates to Urban Ops, are quite dispersed among and between the services and generally not well coordinated. Therefore, the team recommends that the Air Force take a proactive role in ensuring that urban MS&T is pursued as a Joint R&D Development Activity, and that special emphasis be placed on incorporating realistic urban infrastructure models and cultural/social/behavioral models. It is reasonable to expect that capabilities will evolve as spirals and they should be incorporated in operational systems as they become available. Models should be designed to be adaptive and responsive to feedback so they can be used operationally in a “learning” mode. MS&T will also be extremely useful for training/rehearsals, for prediction of outcomes and for evaluations of various courses of action (COAs).

f) Develop weapons tailored for Urban Ops—Legacy USAF weapons are typically highly lethal but, in many cases, are inappropriate for use in urban environments where limiting collateral damage is vitally important and where friendly forces and non-combatants may be nearby. The urban environment is ideal for non-lethal weapons and the team recommends them whenever they can be effectively employed; but, there is still a clear need for kinetic weapons with yields considerably lower than currently available. The team recommends development of a low yield, precision weapons that can be used effectively against targets within 150 meters of friendly forces or non-combatants. The team also recommends that AFRL look at techniques for achieving a cockpit-selectable yield weapon and for a maneuverable air dropped munition capable of vertical decent at low speed into urban canyons. Continued work on non-kinetic weapons such as Directed Energy, Laser and Information Operations (IO) are also important and should be institutionalized so they are considered by a warfighter or planer on an equal footing with more conventional weapons.

g) Develop Joint Urban Ops S&T Plan—For each of the capability visions addressed in the study, there are key technologies required to enable their implementation. As a part of the study, the team worked with AFRL and determined that 30 development areas apply to Urban Ops and that three of AFRL’s eleven future long-term challenges also apply to Urban Ops. The team recommends that AFRL coordinate with the other services and development agencies to develop a Joint Urban Ops Science and Technology (S&T) strategy.

SWJED
07-07-2006, 08:09 PM
7 July Associated Press - Israel Has Edge Over U.S. in Urban Combat (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/07/AR2006070700906.html) by Thomas Wagner.


In waging urban warfare, Israeli soldiers in Gaza and U.S.-led troops in Iraq use some of the same battlefield tactics, but Israel is less likely to get bogged down in prolonged combat.

The Israelis are fighting a temporary offensive in a tiny area with a limited objective _ winning the release of a soldier captured by Palestinian militants - while the Americans are pursuing the complex task of building a nation while fighting a widespread insurgency.

There are differences, too, in the threat of casualties even though both forces are far better armed than their opponents.

Israel's army often keeps its casualties to a minimum by using heavily armored tanks and troop carriers, while the Americans rely mainly on Humvees and trucks to patrol as they try to build up trust among Iraqi civilians.

Douglas A. Macgregor, a former American colonel who helped draft the concept for the U.S. advance to Baghdad, said the limited objectives of Israel's generally brief military missions don't require its troops to get out among the Palestinian people...

Israel also has an edge in preventing suicide attacks after years of intelligence gathering in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli forces obtain far more information about planned attacks by Palestinians than U.S. or Iraqi troops get about Sunni Arab and foreign insurgents in Iraq.

Such intelligence often allows Israel's air force to kill suspected Palestinian militants who are driving in cars or its ground forces to raid houses where they are hiding...

In Iraq, U.S. and Iraqi leaders are working hard to gather more intelligence about insurgent groups, such as by offering rewards for information. But they haven't had the time it takes to painstakingly build up intelligence networks.

Still, like the Americans in Iraq, Israeli soldiers face a complex mix of militant groups that have sometimes competing agendas but who are all determined to drive out a force they consider an occupier.

In Iraq, that commitment means suicide bombers often attack U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians in marketplaces, city centers and even mosques.

In Gaza and the West Bank, it means Israeli troops fighting militants in populated areas often find young Palestinian boys joining the battle, sometimes armed only with stones...

Strickland
07-07-2006, 09:09 PM
I could not disagree more with this piece. As for the protection tanks and APCs afford Israeli troops, the PLO demonstrated in the Battle of Jenin that small hunter-killer or RPG teams could negate this. Urban combat is made easier when you (the Israelis) follow the Russian model in Grozny. Everything is made easier when you perceive all persons (civilians, women, children, military aged males, etc.) as enemy combatants.

I assume that the reference to Doug MacGregor is one to the same individual that proposed rushing to Baghdad with a brigade and nothing else in 2002?

SWJED
07-07-2006, 09:14 PM
I could not disagree more with this piece. As for the protection tanks and APCs afford Israeli troops, the PLO demonstrated in the Battle of Jenin that small hunter-killer or RPG teams could negate this. Urban combat is made easier when you (the Israelis) follow the Russian model in Grozny. Everything is made easier when you perceive all persons (civilians, women, children, military aged males, etc.) as enemy combatants.

... but the author would not come out and say "exactly" why the claimed edge exists.

If you understand urban operations, the differences in the political and military situations between Gaza and Iraq and between the IDF and Coalition forces you can read / understand what is implied throughout the article. To the casual reader this piece could be implied that we need to be following the IDF lead in tackling the sit in Iraq. That would be a very bad thing indeed.

SWJED
07-07-2006, 09:16 PM
I assume that the reference to Doug MacGregor is one to the same individual that proposed rushing to Baghdad with a brigade and nothing else in 2002?

That would be the man... Breaking the Phalanx...

Jedburgh
07-07-2006, 09:19 PM
:mad: I also strongly disagree with this piece. We've discussed the false analogy of the US in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue before on this board.

Tom Odom
07-10-2006, 01:30 PM
The real difference is that Israel does not engage in what we call COIN. The IDF operates as a purely punitive/containment force; there is no such thing as CMO, IO as we call it, or fight for a population's loyalties.

They did not do COIN in Lebanon. They did not do COIN in Gaza and they do not do COIN on the West Bank.

Tom

SWJED
08-30-2006, 12:46 PM
29 August Marine Corps Times - DVD Offers Different Approach to Urban Combat (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2064876.php) by Christian Lowe.


It isn’t exactly like watching Black Hawk Down, but maybe if the Rangers and Delta Force soldiers who were caught in that film’s deadly ambush had been able to watch this video before they deployed to Somalia, that tragedy might have been avoided.

When most people think of urban operations, they think of blind alleys, rooftop snipers and roadside ambushes — much like the fatal warrens of Mogadishu. But a new DVD presentation produced by the Marine Corps Wargaming Division may better prepare Marines and soldiers to fight on the increasingly complex urban battlefield and prompt new thinking about how to approach the city fight...

“It had always been stressed when you go into urban combat it’s all about the urban structures,” says one Marine commander on the DVD. “The epiphany I had was that the buildings and the streets and the physical landscape really weren’t nearly as important as that political landscape. … Because the city’s most dense asset is the people.”

Developed over the last six months, the video — titled “New Challenges for Military Operations in the 21st Century: Emerald Express Insights and Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom” — is a combination of combat footage from Iraq, picture montages and interviews of experienced Marine, Army and coalition Iraq veterans giving their take on what’s tough about an urban fight and how to work there effectively...

While the video focuses on Iraq, Marine war-gaming experts say the lessons imparted in the video transcend any specific war zone. As an Australian officer interviewed on the DVD says, winning the urban fight isn’t so much about immediate action drills as it is about being intellectually nimble.

“You are better off investing your training time into issues of how to think, rather than templated solutions of what to think,” he explains...

“If people can grasp this and understand the environment that we talk about in this video, I think half the battle is won,” said Dave Dilegge, action officer for the Wargaming Division’s Emerald Express and Joint Urban Warrior projects...

jcustis
08-30-2006, 12:57 PM
Mr. Dilegge,

If you could kindly set aside a copy for Co D, 4th LAR, I'll try to swing by and pick it up later this week.

Tom Odom
08-30-2006, 01:45 PM
see Dr. Roger Spiller's monograph for a historical discussion of the population as a critical element in Urban Warfare.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#sharp

Great Job, Dave!

best

Tom

SWJED
08-31-2006, 10:08 PM
The Marine Corps Times has posted a very small segment from the EE OIF video - Urban Operations (http://mfile.akamai.com/21772/wmv/gannett.download.akamai.com/21772//streaming/wmv/urban3091106.asx). Not sure, but they may post several more...

bismark17
09-01-2006, 07:39 AM
Is there any way for local Law Enforcement to obtain this?:)

HeavyRecon
09-03-2006, 09:00 PM
Is there a way an AD US Army NCO can get a copy of this? Always looking for insight. Thanks.

SWJED
09-03-2006, 10:58 PM
Is there a way an AD US Army NCO can get a copy of this? Always looking for insight. Thanks.

E-mail here - wargaming@usmc.mil - best from a .mil address, include rank, name, unit and official mailing address.

SWJED
09-03-2006, 11:02 PM
Is there any way for local Law Enforcement to obtain this?:)

I don't do the distro nor decide who beyond the military can get the DVD. Best I can say is request it from the official source - wargaming@usmc.mil

SWJED
09-03-2006, 11:12 PM
The Marine Corps Times has posted several more brief clips from the video.


Sneak Peak:

View previews from the DVD “New Challenges for Military Operations in the 21st Century: Emerald Express Insights and Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

• Maj. Philip Shepherd-Walwyn: (http://mfile.akamai.com/21772/wmv/gannett.download.akamai.com/21772/streaming/wmv/urban1091106.asx) SA2 Fire Support, Land Warfare Centre of Tactical Doctrine, United Kingdom

• Lt. Col. Andrew Ross: (http://mfile.akamai.com/21772/wmv/gannett.download.akamai.com/21772/streaming/wmv/urban2091106.asx) Former Company Commander, British Royal Marines

• Col. Chris Conlin (http://mfile.akamai.com/21772/wmv/gannett.download.akamai.com/21772/streaming/wmv/urban3091106.asx): Former Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., 7th Marines, OIF I

selil
09-20-2006, 09:35 PM
I’m looking for information (unclassified, not sensitive, able to be discussed with foreign nationals, etc...)…..

The scenario is facilities, and or training locations that can support a variety of missions and unit sizes for training in urban warfare (MOUT). I know about the facilities being built or used at MCAGCC 29 Palms California for the Marines, and the facility for the Army at Fort Lewis. I also know about places like www.urbanwarfarecenter.com. Are there any other large or larger facilities? Fort Polk only has about 40 buildings and I’m researching facilities that can simulate a small city or town.

sgmgrumpy
09-21-2006, 02:01 PM
Alot of information Some sites have already been updated.



MOUT Training Facilities:

The Urban Target Complex (UTC) - "Yodaville" (Major Floyd Usry - "Yoda")
Yodaville - Urban Close Air Support (CAS) Bombing Range (Marine Corps Gazette)
Yodaville - USMC Urban Bombing Range at Yuma (San Diego Union-Tribune)
Yodaville - Urban Bombing Range at Yuma (The Arizona New Republic)
Camp Lejuene MOUT Facility Familiarization (Images)
JRTC MOUT Facility (Fort Polk, LA)
Shughart-Gordon (Article)
Fort Pickett MOUT Assault Course
Combat Maneuver Training Center (MOUT facility at Hohenfels, Germany)
Urban Training Complex at the RCTA (MOUT City)
Camp Ripley (Minnesota)
McKenna MOUT Site (Fort Benning, GA)
McKenna MOUT Facility Flythrough (3D Visualization - STRICOM)
McKenna MOUT Site (VRSG overhead image, commercial site)
Mounted Urban Combat Training Site (Fort Knox)
It Takes a Village for Urban Combat.....and Fort Knox is Getting One (Armor)
F/X for Urban Warfare (Soldiers - special effects at Fort Knox)
Copehill Down - UK FIBUA Training Facility (NATO Instructors' FIBUA Course)
Reconfigurable MOUT Training Site
Ft. Leonard Wood Maneuver Support Center Briefing Slides (U.S. Army Engineer Center - future home of the MP and Chemical Schools)]


http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/unitsimagesa.html

Tom Odom
09-21-2006, 02:31 PM
Fort Polk only has about 40 buildings and I’m researching facilities that can simulate a small city or town.

Not true. The number of towns and villages in the box is much greater. Shughart-Gordon remains the main MOUT site due to instrumentation.

Not sure what size you are going for with "small city or town". The CTCs look at the brigade fight; the MOUT sites meet those needs.

Tom

selil
09-21-2006, 11:48 PM
400 to 500 building 10 to 15 square miles, something that a system comparable and substantially better than DIT's would support.

max161
09-22-2006, 01:24 PM
Recommend you check out the Rand web site and look for a book by Dr. Russ Glenn. In the last year or so he did a very comprehensive study on urban training facilities. I think his list of facilities is probably the most detailed.

jcustis
09-22-2006, 04:05 PM
400 to 500 building 10 to 15 square miles, something that a system comparable and substantially better than DIT's would support.

I recommend that you Google Alan Brosnan and the Olive Security Training Center. Brosnan is in the midst of expanding his facilities to include a large MOUT-type complex. There are already evasive driving tracks, shoot houses, sniper ranges, and explosive breaching structures, so live-fire can be integrated pretty seamlessly with blanks/simunitions. And considering that his is a commercial enterprise, he is looking for most bang for the least buck...

SWJED
10-06-2006, 06:26 PM
Some of you know that I am a skeptic when it comes to modeling and simulation of a Small Wars scenario - especially in an urban environment. I have no idea how an intelligent agent (if and when one might ever exist) can model and simulate human behavior to include the intentions of an asymmetric foe, the actions and reactions of a local population, our actions and reactions in a COIN environment that relies on the human behavior of our tactical units - and all the second and third-order effects associated with the kinetic and non-kinetic actions and reactions of all the “players” mentioned above. I could very well be wrong – won’t be the first time – but I would like someone to explain to me in “layman’s terms” why I am so off-base here.

Posted below is the latest JFCOM press release on Urban Resolve – any comments, thoughts, musings, etc. (especially by participants) would be most appreciated. I’ll keep an open mind and stand corrected if proved that my knowledge of the capabilities of M&S of Small Wars is lacking…



Urban Resolve 2015 Leaders Meet with the Media

By Robert Pursell
USJFCOM Public Affairs

(SUFFOLK, VA. - Sept. 20, 2006) -- U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9) and its partners show a behind-the-scenes look at Urban Resolve 2015 (UR 2015) to the media today at the Joint Futures Laboratory here.

The Urban Resolve series helps improve the warfighters' ability to operate and control the urban environment, isolate the adversary, and maintain urban stability by denying the enemy access to physical or information resources from which he could conduct de-stabilizing operations.

J9 Director Rear Adm. James Winnefeld explained the mission of UR 2015 and why the focus is on the urban environment.

"In Urban Resolve, we're trying to find ways to operate more safely and more effectively in that very complex terrain called the urban environment. It's very difficult. It's a crowded place. It's a complicated place. It's not like working out in the middle of the desert. So there are a lot of different problems that we have to try to solve to try to do this job correctly," he said.

Army Col. Mike Postma, the experimentation lead for UR 2015, said the experiment's focus was "to isolate the adversary and control key pieces of the urban environment. It's the major mission of what we're trying to do."

Because the event uses one of USJFCOM's facilities, many of the modeling and simulation tools are available. This allows participants to simulate the scenarios from a room full of laptops, instead of experimenting out in the field. Postma explained the importance of this.

"Nobody's life is at risk inside the experiment. This is the environment that enables you to look at those things without getting anybody hurt," he said.

Winnefeld said the participants of UR 2015 include USJFCOM, Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, the services, and other U.S. and multinational agencies. He explained the importance of the multinational presence.

"We get a tremendous benefit from working with international allies. One of the principal thrusts of what we do out here in the Joint Futures Lab is working with our multinational partners," said Winnefeld.

pcmfr
10-06-2006, 07:27 PM
You would be surpised at how well computer models can simulate social situations. Basically, any knowledge that can be put in a book, such as how a population would react to certain military or civil-military actions, can be simulated in an expert system. I'm not suggesting that JFCOM's model is perfect -- far from it, in my experience working with them. I do think that any exercise, in the field, or in a computer model, that gets senior military leadership thinking about COIN is a good thing.

Then again, rereading it, does the press release actually say they are trying to simulate a COIN scenario, or does are they just trying to simulate combat in an urban environment? Having worked with JFCOM's simulations in the past, I'd guess it would be the latter.

SWJED
10-06-2006, 08:43 PM
You would be surpised at how well computer models can simulate social situations. Basically, any knowledge that can be put in a book, such as how a population would react to certain military or civil-military actions, can be simulated in an expert system. I'm not suggesting that JFCOM's model is perfect -- far from it, in my experience working with them. I do think that any exercise, in the field, or in a computer model, that gets senior military leadership thinking about COIN is a good thing.

Then again, rereading it, does the press release actually say they are trying to simulate a COIN scenario, or does are they just trying to simulate combat in an urban environment? Having worked with JFCOM's simulations in the past, I'd guess it would be the latter.

My take-away is that you believe that the real value of COIN / Small Wars M&S is "getting senior leadership thinking about COIN." I would submit that if our senior leadership has not been seriously thinking about this in light of current and projected operations then they need to find a new line of work. Should we really invest millions in M&S when the real experimental venue is happening every day in Iraq, Afghanistan, HOA, PI and elsewhere?

slapout9
10-07-2006, 10:21 PM
Dave, I don't know if this helps, but since I retired from LE I am now a security manager at a large hospital. This is how LE has adapted the CARVER targeting process. It is now called CARVER+SHOCK. It talks of agents and
2ND and 3RD order effects, but most importantly it is designed to get you think like the enemy. the attached pdf link shows it being applied to a food a processing plant.


At the hospital we have an infection control nurse who monitors out breaks of strange illnesses all over the country/world. As you recently saw Spinach was in the news, it is not yet known if this was an accident, a failed attack or a test run to judge our response capabilities. One scenario is that it was an attack by migrant workers because of immigration and border control.

Link http://www.ngfa.org/pdfs/Carver_Shock_Primer.pdf

SWJED
10-07-2006, 10:37 PM
I will take a look at the doc and you caught my attention with the "spinach scenario" - but that might be a different thread in the "2 Shop" section. Interesting stuff, and scary, to say the least.

That said, M&S seems to be great for phenomena that has a “signature” – either “tech” or say biological as in the out-break and spread of an infectious disease. The first, “tech”, can be modeled for intentions because parameters are often known. The second, biological, also can (more like monitored) because many parameters are also known.

When it comes to COIN the parameters of human behavior of the insurgents (and terrorists) as well as the local populace are not known in such a detail as to be of any value in an automated system – M&S won't solve our problems here.

SWJED
10-20-2006, 03:25 AM
19 October American Forces Press Service - Joint Forces Experiment Looks at Gaps in Urban Warfare (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1700). (Reposted here in full per DoD guidelines).


Joint Forces Experiment Looks at Gaps in Urban Warfare
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 19, 2006 – The U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the midst of the most important and complex experiment the command has conducted since Millennium Challenge in 2002, officials said here yesterday.

The experiment is Urban Resolve 2015 and is designed to test solutions for that most complicated warfighting task: combat in cities.

Dave Ozolek, executive director of the Joint Futures Lab at the command, said the experiment is designed to examine solutions for current and future gaps in warfighting capabilities.

He said the experiment is enabling the command to get inside two concepts. First, how does the U.S. military operate in the new urban environment? “Ten years ago, we saw the (military) operating space as the great plains of Europe and the deserts, and we basically avoided operating in the urban environment,” Ozolek said. “That’s no longer possible. That’s where the fight is, that’s where the enemy is, that where the center of gravity for the whole operation is.”

This is more than the old military operations in urban terrain that the armed forces practiced for years. “We need a new approach, because the environment is not only terrain, it’s infrastructure, it’s culture, it’s governance, it’s rule of law, it’s legality, food, water, fire and safety and all of those things that make up a complex environment of a city,” he said.

The military must make the urban environment “toxic” to the enemy and achieve success in ways other than trying to hunt them down one at a time and kill them, he said.

The second concept is stabilization operations. How does the military stabilize the situation in a city, transition to local control and rebuild a shattered economy? “How do we bring safety and security to the city without destroying it?” Ozolek asked.

The experiment takes place in Baghdad, but it could be any urban environment. The scenario is five days of major combat operations, followed by 30 days of stability operations. An insurgency arises that requires a joint task force. The joint task force now faces the threat.

More than 14,000 people around the United States have worked on and operated the experiment. The main place is the command’s Joint Experimentation Directorate in Suffolk, Va., but the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have integrated their systems into the U.S. Joint Forces Command system for it. Representatives from 12 nations are participating, as well as members of other federal agencies, such as the State Department, Commerce and Justice.

The experiment is testing seven solutions for urban operations capability gaps, according to Air Force Col. Terry Kono, head of experimentation and design at the command.

The population is the center of gravity for any urban operation, Kono said. “The urban operations concept breaks into two ideas: isolating the adversary, controlling the urban environment,” he said.

The experiment plugs the seven solution sets into the scenario. The first is a Joint Command Post of the Future. The experiment will examine ways to improve joint force collaboration and provide the tools needed for commanders and their staffs to operate in the environment.

A second solution is the Communication Strategy Board. This enables commanders to develop a coherent communications strategy using information operations, public affairs, special staffs and other to influence public opinion and keep all populations informed.

A third solution is the Joint Intelligence Operations Center. This is essentially a merger of an intelligence center and an operations center. Divisions in Iraq are already moving in this direction and are integrating the two separate staffs into one.

A fourth solution is the Joint Urban Operations Surveillance System. These are network-controlled, long-duration, unmanned aerial vehicles that can be used for continuous and persistent surveillance. It could, for example, backtrack a vehicle used in a car bomb attack.

Fifth, Predictive Analysis. This is modeling that commanders can use to assess decisions.

Sixth, Integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense. The year is 2015 and the predictions are that a terror group would possess a chemical or biological weapon. The U.S. military needs to understand what it has to do to protect a city under such a threat.

And finally, Tags. These are radio frequency vehicle tags, personnel identification and invisible tags that can be used to track critical targets and activities.

The experiment ends Oct. 27, but the analysis should be very quick to turn around, Ozolek said. Urban Resolve 2015 took about a year and $25 million to set up. Millennium Challenge, conducted in 2002, took about three years to set up and cost about $250 million.

selil
10-20-2006, 03:48 AM
Please tell me they are going to be using RFID.....


Tags: A method for the enemy to completely inventory your movement to battle and prepare a defense.

Sorry my cynicism is showing. Have people forgotten about radio silence and passive versus active emissions, and further that passive just like old submariners will tell you is just as bad as active?

SWJED
11-16-2006, 07:16 PM
15 November post at the Secrecy News blog - Army Doctrine on Urban Operations (http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/11/army_doctrine_on_urban_operati.html).


The conduct of military operations in urban areas is the subject of a new Army doctrinal manual.

"Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found elsewhere [due to its] intricate topography and high population density."

The hazards and threats posed by the urban environment, and the spectrum of potential responses to mitigate or exploit them, are considered at length in the 315-page unclassified manual.

See "Urban Operations," U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-06, (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-06.pdf) 26 October 2006 (a large 14 MB PDF file).

CPT Holzbach
11-17-2006, 09:34 AM
This comes from RAND, written by Brian Michael Jenkins, 1972. Couldnt find it in the library here, so here ya go. Nothing revolutionary, but it succinctly states a variety of important principles. Short, easy read.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P4670.1.pdf

slapout9
11-19-2006, 02:41 PM
Capt. Holzbach, just finished reading the paper you posted. There was an statement made by the author that I thought was interesting. He thought effective COIN campaigns are more like Political campaigns. That is an interesting way to look at it. Maybe military commanders should work on political campaigns as part of their training. It would definitely get them familiar with effective propaganda campaigns.

Jimbo
11-19-2006, 05:50 PM
I am with you on that slapout. Galula, Trinquier, Mao, and the rest would make the same arguement as well. The problem is that as soon as we label anything "warfare", it becomes a military problem. The military is only one tool. Regretably, many people lose the bubble on this concept.

CPT Holzbach
11-20-2006, 12:55 PM
Maybe military commanders should work on political campaigns as part of their training. It would definitely get them familiar with effective propaganda campaigns.

Now that would be an interesting experience. I think it would cause problems and a bit of outcry, because the military is supposed to be apolitical. And of course, then you have to decide which campaigns to work in, and you would have to be fair, balancing left and right blah blah blah. Its an interesting idea that the military could make work. But skell politicians would sink it fast.

SWJED
05-22-2007, 10:18 AM
Liveblogging: Joint Urban Warrior 07 (http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2007/pa052107.html)


Chris Hoffpauir from U.S. Joint Forces Command Public Affairs blogged live all day May 21 from Joint Urban Warrior 07. Co-sponsored by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory at the Bolger Center in Potomac, Md., the latest iteration of the Joint Urban Warrior series of wargames focuses on how actions in a tactical urban environment affect operations across the whole spectrum of conflict...

sullygoarmy
05-22-2007, 02:00 PM
...hope that didn't suck up too much bandwidth! Oh that's right, he can blog since he's not in a combat zone! :D

Maximus
05-22-2007, 03:48 PM
Dave,

This sounds great. I'd argue there's few if any more important issues for us to figure out than how to improve our role in the IO fight in the 21st Century. Very much look forward to reading/hearing more about it. Semper Fi, Scott

marct
05-25-2007, 12:30 PM
Nice bit of coverage, Dave. Could you talk a bit about your impressions of how the topic was talked about and received?


The old adage "freedom of the press belongs to the one who owns the press" is no longer true.

Thanks to the Internet, anyone who wants his or her voice heard can simply rent time on a computer at an Internet cafe and post their musings on any number of Web sites. If they're willing to spend a few dollars more, they can post podcasts and vodcasts, the Internet equivalent of radio and television.

Like it or not, new media is here, not to be ignored.

I spoke with Dave Dilegge, a consultant at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's wargaming division, about how the military is looking at new media. He's uniquely qualified to discuss the topic because in his off-time he's the editor-in-chief of the Small Wars Journal (SWJ), an Internet publication that takes full advantage of the freedom the medium offers. SWJ features an electronic magazine, a blog, a message board, an electronic reference library and an extensive list of links.

Jedburgh
05-26-2007, 03:20 PM
RAND, May 07: "People Make the City", Executive Summary
Joint Urban Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG428.2.pdf)

Ongoing operations in the villages, towns, and cities of Afghanistan and Iraq offer the first real test of the United States’ first-ever joint urban operations doctrine, which was published in 2002. This executive summary provides a top-line synthesis of joint urban operations observations and insights taken from thousands of pages of hard-copy and online material and from 102 interviews relating to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Whenever an individual is quoted or otherwise associated with particular remarks, it is with the individual’s explicit permission to be recognized for those contributions. This monograph should provide rich source material for tailoring the new doctrine, as presented in Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, and for the training, acquisition, and force structure initiatives that together must constantly adapt if they are to prepare U.S. forces properly for urban challenges yet to come.

The time frame for the study corresponds to two collection phases. Phase I was conducted from October 2003 to April 2004, while phase II was conducted during three months, from July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2004. The results of a third phase of the study are published under separate cover.
Note: This "executive summary" is an 86 page pdf document.

SWJED
08-13-2007, 07:53 AM
The Coming Urban Terror (http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_urban_terrorism.html) - John Robb, City Journal.


For the first time in history, announced researchers this May, a majority of the world’s population is living in urban environments. Cities—efficient hubs connecting international flows of people, energy, communications, and capital—are thriving in our global economy as never before. However, the same factors that make cities hubs of globalization also make them vulnerable to small-group terror and violence.

Over the last few years, small groups’ ability to conduct terrorism has shown radical improvements in productivity—their capacity to inflict economic, physical, and moral damage. These groups, motivated by everything from gang membership to religious extremism, have taken advantage of easy access to our global superinfrastructure, revenues from growing illicit commercial flows, and ubiquitously available new technologies to cross the threshold necessary to become terrible threats. September 11, 2001, marked their arrival at that threshold...

davidbfpo
08-13-2007, 09:07 AM
John Robb writes well, citing examples of the 'new urban terror' in Latin America, notably Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

If you look at 'Old' Europe wayback in the C19th, especially after the French Revolution, the danger posed by urban mobs and revolutionares was well known. The streets of Paris weere laid out so artillery could sweep them; Austria-Hungary built forts around its cities to dominate them and in the UK we invented a civilian police force.

Cities can be anonymous, but local culture can be very invasive - many Europeans accept far greater regulation than elsewhere, e.g. Belguim.

Modern legend is that the state has a monopoly on force, well the state would want to claim that, but I have my doubts. Even before drugs organised crime had an extensive reach, e.g. the Mafia in Italy.

Groups, whatever their motivation, that prey on the public and challenge the state need to be confronted, not always by force. Retaining public support and confidence is the key. High visibility operations, so favoured in counter-terrorism alerts, must be far outweighed by a "ground cover" of contacts able to report. Building on the "cover" are informants who can penetrate the groups.

All too easy to slip into the "police state", careful now Napoleon is back!

Davidbfpo

Hellbilly Soldier
08-19-2007, 08:08 PM
We're certainly seeing a projection of power by non-state actors never really seem before in history. In looking at the number of open terrorism cases by the FBI, Scotland Yard, etc. (as were noted after the UK Doctor Bombers episode), there is no doubt about the certainty of activity by cells at work.

In another thread here on SWJ, the question was brought up about "what if they (the terrorists) were more compentent?" And that goes right along with much of the analyses we see from various think tanks around the world. If they were more competent, imagine the destruction we might see?

My question--which I'm sure I'm not alone--why haven't we seen more competent attacks? The recipe has been supplied many times over by the Washington Post, New York Times, RAND, Brookings Institute, etc. What is the limiting factor that keeps these cells from wreaking the kind of havoc that journalists, pundits, and experts keep telling us about?

selil
08-19-2007, 08:19 PM
Basic human nature is to be very positive and constructive in society? You only truly become corrupt when you become a politician.

RTK
08-19-2007, 08:21 PM
My question--which I'm sure I'm not alone--why haven't we seen more competent attacks? The recipe has been supplied many times over by the Washington Post, New York Times, RAND, Brookings Institute, etc. What is the limiting factor that keeps these cells from wreaking the kind of havoc that journalists, pundits, and experts keep telling us about?


It's rare to see the synchronization necessary to pull off a spectacular event.

If you'll notice the cells that have been broken up in the past few years, they're ultra-spread out with a lot of moving parts. Consequently, there's a greater chance for error.

You'll notice, as well, that when they are brought down they're still a few steps away from an operational plan. They may have an end and motive, but rarely the means.

The lack of synchronization, a viable and feasible plan, and the quest for the "biggest, largest, or most impressive" attack makes it easier to defeat before culmination, especially since 2001 (whether others want to admit the Patriot Act works or not).

jonSlack
08-20-2007, 10:12 AM
William Langewiesche's City of Fear (http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-30277488_ITM)

May ask for an email, nearby library, and a zip code in order to access the article. Other than that, the article is freely available.

Ski
08-21-2007, 12:32 PM
I honestly think Occam's Razor can be applied here.

The 9/11 attacks took a lot of time and resources, and a good bit of luck, to pull off successfully. It led to the US attacking Afghanistan and Iraq, which seems to have been OBL's strategy.

It's a heck of a lot easier to fight the US in the Middle East/Central Asia if one looks at the situation from a AQ perspective. You've successfully drawn the US into two wars, both of which are nowhere near ending, and have bloodied the nose of the US at the same time. While AQ has been mangled quite badly, they are still around, and have grown new offshoot organizations simply by not being eradicated. You can draw more manpower, more weaponry, and more resources from the Middle East to fight in the Middle East - it's simply easier to sustain and maintain.

They really don't need to hit the US again - we're pretty much engaged full throttle with our military, and our spending is going through the roof. The wars have costs $758B since 01 according to the GAO, and that would equal the GDP of the 16th largest country in the world as of 2006. The AQ strategy has always been to weaken the US economy, and while there haven't been any major economic disasters since 9/11, the economy certainly isn't as good as it could be. Plus we still have a massive national debt that is going to have to be serviced at some point in the future...

Jedburgh
01-08-2008, 02:13 PM
Australian Defence College, 20 Oct 07 (Thanks to SSI for posting it up yesterday):

City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/of-interest-7.pdf)


....In this timely Occasional Paper, Dr Michael Evans, formerly Head of the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre (http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/) and now the Australian Defence College (http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/) Fellow, gives us an insightful and comprehensive review of urban military operations. He has traced the subject’s origins and development to give us an up-to-date operational-strategic analysis of the significance of urban operations into the 21st century. In particular, Dr Evans makes a piercing historical link with Fall’s work (http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Archives+and+Manuscripts/fa_fall.htm) on rural insurgency in South-East Asia by calling his study City Without Joy—a play on Fall’s title that captures the complexity and challenges of contemporary military operations in cities.

Dr Evans informs us that, while in the past it was often possible for commanders to bypass pitched combat in cities, that era has now passed. For a variety of demographic and operational reasons, the role of cities in 21st century war has begun to change. I was strongly reminded of this changing reality when in 2004, I assumed the position of Deputy Chief of Operations in the Headquarters, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I). Faced by the second year of the Iraqi insurgency, we in MNF-I, developed a pro-active ‘cities strategy’ initiative designed to counter the spread of urban-based insurgency. At times, some 15 major Iraqi cities were designated as part of our city strategy. Yet, we soon discovered the uncomfortable truth that enemy forces are not constrained by their adversary’s strategic planning. Insurgents attacked Coalition forces in cities that were not on our list. And, of course, the most violent urban battle of all occurred in Fallujah—a city in the Sunni Triangle—that was not even part of the Coalition’s original city strategy.

What this Occasional Paper demonstrates convincingly is that at the tactical level of warfighting there is not much that is new in fighting in cities, but that it remains absolutely necessary for us to continue re-learning old lessons. Again, with respect to learning lessons in war, Iraq is instructive. Prior to the second battle of Fallujah, Coalition planners were given very wise advice on how to fight in cities by US Vietnam veterans who had fought in Hue in 1968 (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/Block/chp5_Block%20by%20Block.pdf) during the Tet Offensive. Indeed, one Fallujah ‘after action report’ stated that the ebb and flow of the fighting in the city had been almost exactly as the Hue veterans had earlier described.....
Complete 69 page paper at the link.

Mike Innes
01-24-2008, 10:04 PM
Paul Torrens, a geographer at the University of Arkansas, posted some visuals of a geosimulation he's put together modeling urban crowd behavior in response to a car fire/explosion. His site's been swamped with hits since the thing was mentioned on a few blogs and the word spread. Take a look at the video, which is limited but suggests some interesting possibilities for computer sims for urban warfare. He's got some other groovy sims on the site, too, worth looking at.

You can find the crowd simulator at http://www.geosimulation.org/crowds/

Ron Humphrey
01-25-2008, 12:55 AM
Paul Torrens, a geographer at the University of Arkansas, posted some visuals of a geosimulation he's put together modeling urban crowd behavior in response to a car fire/explosion. His site's been swamped with hits since the thing was mentioned on a few blogs and the word spread. Take a look at the video, which is limited but suggests some interesting possibilities for computer sims for urban warfare. He's got some other groovy sims on the site, too, worth looking at.

You can find the crowd simulator at http://www.geosimulation.org/crowds/

I have to look and find it again but I remember finding Crowd model work in the last two years where they not only have all the rendering capabilities worked out but some good work in interactions amoung random groups.

Random patterns established with reactivity to stimuli of verying intensity in order to allow for more than less than fear or attraction among the entities.
As the model continues running the entities begin to develop ties to each other based on the number of times they encounter one another and thus begin grouping into smaller subsets as time goes by.

There was also supposed to be friend vs foe recognition and subsequent reactions accordingly bad guy = move away big bad guy run away etc.

I ll look for it

William F. Owen
01-25-2008, 01:28 AM
Take a look at the video, which is limited but suggests some interesting possibilities for computer sims for urban warfare. He's got some other groovy sims on the site, too, worth looking at.

You can find the crowd simulator at http://www.geosimulation.org/crowds/

Land Warfare simulation is a potential war winner. The Aussies currently leas the way wit the USMC coming a long second. The UK has yet to switch on. LWS allows you teach and learn stuff that is simply impossible wandering around the training area. It's an excellent tool.

...but AI is a huge problem, so this may have some merit.

Norfolk
01-25-2008, 04:24 AM
Very interesting Mike.:cool: I seem to recall that a similar (or perhaps an early version of this) program was used recently to model the passage of elements of Lee's army through Gettysburgh in the hours leading up to the main battle. As Wilf says, even given the present status of AI, this is a tool with real and vast potential.

When I saw your name Mike, I thought it was vaguely familiar, and now I see that you were from that other English-speaking regiment; welcome to the SWC. Haven't you published in the CAJ and a few other places already?

jcustis
01-25-2008, 02:25 PM
Someone I know loosely from the Lightfighter.net board is a computer graphics animation guy who works on Hollywood production, and is a CA Reservist with time in Iraq. I mentioned this thread to him and he replied with the link, which appears to be software he and his kin use to create environments and characters.

http://www.massivesoftware.com/whatismassive/

Is there a difference between crowd modelling and animation?

selil
01-25-2008, 02:52 PM
Someone I know loosely from the Lightfighter.net board is a computer graphics animation guy who works on Hollywood production, and is a CA Reservist with time in Iraq. I mentioned this thread to him and he replied with the link, which appears to be software he and his kin use to create environments and characters.

http://www.massivesoftware.com/whatismassive/

Is there a difference between crowd modelling and animation?

There is a difference between the two. The animation stuff is the representation of the mathmatics behind the crowd modeling. There a variety of epidemiology simulations that show infection rates (you see them in the bad sci-fi movies poorly showing density and infection rates). A lot of the crowd modeling software follows infection rates only the infection is an idea or emotion. There are a lot of other factors that go into the "what" of the animation.

Thinking about bad sci-fi movies and patterns of movement. In the bad sci-fi movies they show infection spreading rapidly as a wave form across the nation. That is usually far from the truth. Reality is you get corridors of infection following road systems between large city centers, and jumps from air travel to the hub cities. Not take a look at crowd dynamics.

A crowd must follow physical ground paths. So waves and other patterns aren't going to work. Hydraulic theories of pressure and concentration help to inform crowd movement theorist though. Other things that help in imagining what needs to be animated are issues such as incident, obstructions, distance to injury ratio's, and even things like mental state. A good simulation allows you to easily adjust those parameters like in the infection simulations you can adjust regions of the map for population distance, technology level, etc (All those hofstedder elements).

I don't know if that helps at all, but there is some GIS stuff coming from Google that is supposed to mimic these type of questions pretty close.

Rex Brynen
01-25-2008, 03:28 PM
There is a difference between the two. The animation stuff is the representation of the mathmatics behind the crowd modeling. There a variety of epidemiology simulations that show infection rates (you see them in the bad sci-fi movies poorly showing density and infection rates). A lot of the crowd modeling software follows infection rates only the infection is an idea or emotion. There are a lot of other factors that go into the "what" of the animation.

There has been substantial attention to this in the computer/video gaming industry too, especially in SIM-type games which require mass crowd interactions. An amusement park simulation game, for example, might model client routing through the park, ride selection (and the deterrent effects of long lines and ride pricing), consumer expenditure (food, drinks--with the later sometimes linked to the saltiness of the former), propensity to vomit (really! and often linked to food intake and the severity of the ride), proximity of washrooms, cleanliness (a function of janitorial staff numbers and routines), littering, crime rates, crowding, and "contagion" effects from the satisfaction/dissatisfaction of the crowd.

Although there are a lot of invisible shortcuts and cheats involved (a lot of game AI doesn't really predict/respond, but peeks at information that ought to be realistically hidden from the agent), it is sophisticated stuff nonetheless.

Mike Innes
01-25-2008, 07:45 PM
Very interesting Mike.:cool: I seem to recall that a similar (or perhaps an early version of this) program was used recently to model the passage of elements of Lee's army through Gettysburgh in the hours leading up to the main battle. As Wilf says, even given the present status of AI, this is a tool with real and vast potential.

When I saw your name Mike, I thought it was vaguely familiar, and now I see that you were from that other English-speaking regiment; welcome to the SWC. Haven't you published in the CAJ and a few other places already?

Not me. There was at least one other Mike I serving in 1 PPCLI at the same time. Thanks for the greets. Nothing in CAJ, but just published Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9212) (sorry, shameless plug), along with a few articles in SCT and Civil Wars.

Mike Innes
01-25-2008, 07:52 PM
Is there a difference between crowd modelling and animation?

I'm pretty sure that Torrens demonstrates the how behind it - if you watch through the video on his site, there's a segment that demonstrates the sort of motion capture technology used to create characters for the big screen, using live models wired up to sensors.

Mike Innes
01-25-2008, 08:36 PM
but there is some GIS stuff coming from Google that is supposed to mimic these type of questions pretty close.

Interesting point. I'm not a GIS specialist, but I see it increasingly being used for conflict modeling. Where things get tricky, at least for this technoramus, is figuring which tools to use for which environment. I keep harping about terrain complexity, but I don't think there's any avoiding the issue - developing some sort of framework understanding of it is the whole point of what we want to do with the Terrain Complexity Lab (http://www.terraplexic.org).

To wit, from the new COIN FM (p. B-10):


Terrain analysis in COIN includes the traditional examination of terrain’s effects on the movement of military units and enemy personnel. However, because the focus of COIN is on people, terrain analysis usually centers on populated areas and the effects of terrain on the people. Soldiers and Marines will likely spend a great deal of time in suburban and urban areas interacting with the populace. This is a three dimensional battlefield. Multistory buildings and underground lines of communication, such as tunnels or sewers, can be extremely important. Insurgents also commonly use complex natural terrain to their advantage as well. Mountains, caves, jungles, forests, swamps, and other complex terrain are potential bases of operation for insurgents.

But this is the really interesting one (p. 3-15):



Insurgents often seek to use complex terrain to their advantage. Collection managers do not ignore areas of complex terrain. In addition, insurgents use “seams” between maneuver units to their advantage. (Seams are boundaries between units not adequately covered by any unit.) Collection managers must have a means of monitoring seams in order to ensure the enemy cannot establish undetected bases of operation.

And finally, from he who guided the crafting of the COIN FM, Gen. David Petraeus:


We used to just focus on the military terrain... now we have to focus on the cultural terrain.


Battlefield sim, or battlespace sim, would have to take into account all these esoteric considerations and operating planes. Theoretically, there are all sorts of postmodern perspectives that have poked at this - witness Foucault, Virilio, Baudrillard, Der Derian. Interesting to see the technology, at least bits and pieces of tech innovation, evolving and accumulating to the point where a "closed world" (imagine all this shiny digital kit applied, but in a surveillance society or global COIN context) becomes increasingly possible. These sims aren't the same as tracking technologies, but as predictive tools, they precede the tracking, and would therefore facilitate it.

Mike Innes
01-25-2008, 08:50 PM
I'm a boob. Paul Torrens is at Arizona State University, not the University of Arkansas, as I'd mentioned in the thread-opener post. My apologies to Torrens, my high school geography teacher, and my parents for embarrassing our ancestors.

selil
03-04-2008, 02:35 PM
Interesting article on military operations urban terrain

Link to story (http://www.govexec.com/features/0308-01/0308-01s3.htm)


This year marks a milestone in human history: For the first time, more than half the world's population will live in cities. A June 2007 report by the United Nations Population Fund said this "decisive shift from rural to urban growth" marks a change in "a balance that has lasted for millennia."

Not coincidentally, Army Chief Gen. George Casey recently gave a blunt assessment of how the United States would wage wars in the future: "We're going to fight in cities."

During his three years as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Casey tried to come up with a way to fight an adaptive, largely ur-ban insurgency. That he never developed a fully effective approach explains, in part, his replacement by Gen. David Petraeus in early 2007. Petraeus' strategy of moving U.S. troops off huge bases and into local neighborhoods has tamped down violence in much of the country. Whether it will work in the long run remains to be seen.

Cities - from Stalingrad to Moga-dishu to Fallujah, Iraq in 2004 - have long played host to history's major battles. In a 2005 speech in Quantico, Va., Marine Gen. Michael Hagee said, "In my opinion, Fallujah is . . . not a bad example of what we're going to fight in the future, and not a bad example of how to fight it. . . . It is about individual Marines going house to house, killing."

The city as battlefield is partly a function of the city as the hub of modern commercial, educational, financial, social and political activity - a trend accelerated by globalization. Densely packed cities are where transportation arteries converge. Troops moving along the path of least resistance, such as paved roadways linking together major urban areas, are at some point bound to bump into opposing troops.

Meanwhile, the urban explosion is accelerating: By 2020, the number of city dwellers will swell to 60 percent of the world's population, and by 2030, it will reach 80 percent. The most rapid growth now is occurring in Asia and Africa, where the ranks of city dwellers increases by a million people every week.

Megacities - those with more than 10 million inhabitants - continue to expand. The U.N. says the wave of urbanization in the developing world could lead to continued unrest and conflict as the growth in population taxes the ability of cities to deliver security and basic services. It also will tax the ability of the U.S. military to adapt to a very different kind of war than it has traditionally waged.

Much more at the LINK (http://www.govexec.com/features/0308-01/0308-01s3.htm)

William F. Owen
03-04-2008, 03:22 PM
This is the same old stuff that's been doing the rounds now for 20 years.

It's always the same angle, which is 'Future wars will be urban because,..." and then cite 5 or 6 facts that bear no relation to the argument.

Question 1: Which of the worlds top 50 armies is optimised to conduct combat more in urban terrain than rural? - answer none.

Question 2: How do armed forces and criminal gangs benefit from Urban terrain? - now take the answers to that question and relate them to the 5 or 6 facts.

Question 3: How does urban terrain hinder armed forces and criminal gangs?

I wish I was a senior military officer. I could express opinions without having to think about them before hand! :mad:

wm
03-04-2008, 05:15 PM
I think forces that have chosen to stake their campaigns on capturing/defending cities have tended to be the big losers in historical campaigns. It represents a variation on the "hunker down in a FOB" theme that we have acknowledged wasn't working in the current AOR.

I can think of no good reason from a tactical perspective to fight in cities. Seems to me that there are two ways to do MOUT well--1)clearing buildings from the top down or 2)surrounding/bypassing cities, cutting off their denizens' access to critical infrastructure (like water, fuel, and electricity), and letting the occupants starve themselves into submission. The first imposes significant risk to one's own forces and the second has severe limitations from a humanitarian perspective.

SteveMetz
03-04-2008, 06:54 PM
I think forces that have chosen to stake their campaigns on capturing/defending cities have tended to be the big losers in historical campaigns. It represents a variation on the "hunker down in a FOB" theme that we have acknowledged wasn't working in the current AOR.

I can think of no good reason from a tactical perspective to fight in cities. Seems to me that there are two ways to do MOUT well--1)clearing buildings from the top down or 2)surrounding/bypassing cities, cutting off their denizens' access to critical infrastructure (like water, fuel, and electricity), and letting the occupants starve themselves into submission. The first imposes significant risk to one's own forces and the second has severe limitations from a humanitarian perspective.


I've been arguing for years that MOUT is the environment where nonlethality and robotics could make a substantial difference. Clearing buildings and, more importantly, keeping them cleared are perfect tasks for robots equipped with nonlethal systems.

Mike Innes
12-02-2008, 07:53 PM
All - sincere apologies for long absence from this forum, and for showing up now, only to toot our own horn.

I wanted to call your attention to an upcoming book discussion (http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2008/11/30/booklab-the-scientific-way-of-warfare.html) that's going to be held at CTlab (http://www.terraplexic.org/review), from 5-8 December. The author is Dr. Antoine Bousquet, and the book, about to be published with Hurst & Co Publishers in the UK and COlumbia University Press in the US, is entitled The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-70078-8/the-scientific-way-of-warfare).

We already held a public lecture last week at University College London, entitled "Feral Cities and the Scientific Way of Warfare (http://www.terraplexic.org/newsevents/2008/11/13/feral-cities-and-the-scientific-way-of-warfare.html)". It's the first in the Battlespace/s Public Lecture Series; it mixed architectural speculation and Bousquet's ideas. Streaming video of that event'll be available within a few days, and an interview with Bousquet has been posted to the CTlab website here (http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2008/12/2/authorlab-dr-antoine-bousquet.html), in preparation for the discussion. Quicklinks for the symposium can be found at top right of the main CTlab blog page.

CONFIRMED PARTICIPANTS:

Kenneth Anderson (http://opiniojuris.org/2008/11/29/ctlab-online-discussion-of-the-scientific-way-of-warfare/) – Law (American University)
Josef Ansorge – International Relations (Cambridge University)
John Matthew Barlow (http://spatialitism.wordpress.com/) – History (Concordia University)
Antoine Bousquet - Politics & Sociology (Birkbeck College)
Martin Coward – International Relations (University of Sussex)
Armando Geller – Conflict Analysis (Manchester Metropolitan University)
James Gibson – Sociology (California State University, Long Beach)
Derek Gregory – Geography (University of British Columbia)
Craig Hayden (http://intermap.org/) –International Communications (American University)
Charles Jones –International Relations (Cambridge University)
Jason Ralph – Politics and International Studies (University of Leeds)
Julian Reid – War Studies (King’s College London)
Martin Senn (http://www.martin-senn.info/) – Political Science (University College London)
Marc Tyrrell (http://marctyrrell.com/) – Anthropology (Carleton University) [yes, OUR MarcT]
Tony Waters (http://www.ethnography.com/about/) – Sociology (California State University, Chico)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

We're all looking forward to it, and I'd be interested to see the discussion extend to this part of the ether, as well. All feedback on form + content is welcome. Ping me direct with any questions/comments/suggestions.

120mm
12-04-2008, 12:36 PM
Thanks for the heads-up, Mike. Marc told me about this, and I plan on reading the book as soon as I can get my grubby paws on it.

However, there is one thing; I am unable to go to your site at work. Any idea why my local DOIM would block it? Unless there is something wrong with your end, I plan on pushing the issue to get access.

Rex Brynen
12-05-2008, 02:10 AM
All - sincere apologies for long absence from this forum, and for showing up now, only to toot our own horn.

Well worth tooting, Mike--you've done great things with the site, and the book and discussion look very interesting indeed.

Mike Innes
12-05-2008, 03:27 AM
@Rex: Well, then, toot. :) I have to thank Dave D for being a good web-friend about this, too. A lot of time and effort's gone into putting it together, and mostly just saving money be learning all the webwork from scratch (which obviously means huge costs in terms of time and energy).

Anyway, I hope it fills a gap, can serve as a useful companion to what's going on over here.

@120mm: I assume the message I got offline was from you, so I think we got that sorted. Some institutional filters might block it as a blog, which is too bad. Thanks for the good words.

SNW
01-19-2009, 12:41 PM
Sorry for the short notice, the ministry just sent this out:

http://www.geopolitics.ch/en/colloque_urban_conflit.html

No affiliation on my part, just passing it along.

William F. Owen
06-15-2009, 07:05 PM
Has the US Solved the Urban Combat Problem (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/has-the-us-solved-the-urban-co)

So was the 2008 battle for Sadr City a one-off, the result of unique circumstances? Or is it a model for future U.S. MOUT operations? If U.S.-led coalition forces can dominate urban terrain almost as cleanly and cheaply as open terrain, what are the consequences for irregular adversaries? And how might they adapt?

Readers, I welcome your comments.

Happy to comment. In my opinion it's a one off, because context is everything.
Sadr City is only 6 x 5 km laid out on a near perfect grid, and the US held all the cards, as concerns when and where to act.
Going by what was said at CNAS, what happened in Sadr City is what should happen if you prepare properly for that type of operation. Nothing the US did there was new, or original. It's all urban operations best practice from the last 10 years.

To try and draw lessons across to other circumstances may not give any useful insight, unless the same level of resources and preparation can be applied to circumstance that is substantially similar.

To assume that coalition forces can dominate urban terrain as cleanly and cheaply as open terrain, would be grossly misleading based on the quality of evidence to hand.

slapout9
06-16-2009, 04:51 AM
1-I would try and hi-jack some of the US vehicles and use them against them.

2-IED's are just land mines to me and they could be exploited a lot further than they have been without having to use any type of remote or electronic ignition.

3-Animal/insect delivered bio-agent.

4-Scorched earth/ burn the place down since I couldn't get out alive.

5-A lot of off the shelf security technology could be altered/used to give me some of the same benefits you would have.

6-Hand held guided missiles that could be built locally, pretty much by hand.

Schmedlap
06-16-2009, 05:39 AM
- Figure out how they gather their intelligence and then feed them information that leads them to conclude that raids or airstrikes must be conducted at x school or y mosque or z children's clinic. Then invite the media for the after-party.

- Sabotage or infect the water supply at the start of summer, creating a humanitarian disaster to blame on the occupiers

- Have 10-year-olds fire mortars and dare the US to fire counterbattery.

- Arrange outdoor meeting places for women only, where even the most conservative women could feel comfortable walking about unveiled only around other women and then accuse the US of using their UAVs to spy on the women to satisfy their perversions.

- Conduct peaceful demonstrations demanding that the US leave; turn it into a media circus where unarmed civilians shout at armed US Soldiers and throw shoes and rocks at them

- Arm insurgents with reflective belts

Ken White
06-16-2009, 06:08 AM
- arm insurgents with reflective belts. :d

Fuchs
06-16-2009, 12:03 PM
So the 900 pound gorilla has finally learned how to hit a squirrel without hurting himself too much?
I doubt that this would work against another gorilla.

It's possible to adapt. Camouflage, concealment and deception would work just fine.

The army may have learned to copy police methods (police helicopter support) on larger scale. That's no solution, it's just some support.


Airpower has played an important role in urban warfare before without being a great solution.
http://www.personaldefenceweapons.com/Volkssturm%20Fahrrad%20Panzerfaust.jpg
(picture is on MY webspace)

Ken White
06-16-2009, 02:27 PM
it would work against even a reasonably sized Rhesus Monkey, much less a Gorilla...

Schmedlap
06-16-2009, 04:49 PM
It's possible to adapt. Camouflage, concealment and deception would work just fine.
Yup. The best form of camouflage is the populace. We've gotten better at spotting insurgent activity when they think that they're safe from detection, let their guard down, and don't use camouflage. There's a fix to that. Call the people out into the streets and smuggle weapons through the market places or emplace IEDs while surrounded by crowds. All that the UAV is going to see is a mass of people. Likewise, fire your mortars and rockets from crowded open-air markets. What are we gonna do about it? Shoot back and kill everyone in the market place? We're seeing the blowback from that in Pakistan. Looks like the Taliban pretty much figured out what the Shia militiamen didn't.

I also disagree with the author's assertion that we are doing things "cleanly and cheaply." There is nothing cheap about multiple UAVs, air weapons teams, armored vehicles, etc. There is also nothing clean about taking 5 years to gather the necessary intelligence and develop the techniques and procedures necessary to "dominate" a unique piece of terrain. I also dispute that we are dominant - as opposed to having an advantage that could slip away - and I think it is worth emphasizing again that the terrain that we are allegedly dominating is unique and it has taken us too long to figure out how to be more successful on that unique piece of terrain. Our slow climb up the learning curve is a frightening indicator of our ability to apply our craft in areas outside of that few square miles of ground. Rather than patting outselves on the backs, we should be asking why it took us so long to get to this point.

The Cuyahoga Kid
06-17-2009, 01:28 AM
Looking for some clarification here.

Are the article and associated comments referring to the multiple challenges caused by urban terrain during COIN and low intensity operations specifically, challenges caused by urban terrain during conventional warfare and high intensity conflict specifically or challenges caused by urban terrain during both?

Also, there are a variety of disadvantages to operating in urban terrain while engaged in a counter insurgency which previous posters have mentioned, including collateral damage, use of civilian areas by enemy forces and a restrictive operating environment. But are there any advantages which urban terrain offers to the COIN forces while conducting a counter insurgency campaign?

Jones_RE
06-18-2009, 01:13 AM
I'll bite. The urban environment offers a concentrated population which may make providing security easier - i.e. you don't have dozens of scattered villages to protect. It may also simplify some of the logistics of delivering humanitarian aid. Cities tend to grow up in accessible areas. However, I'd bet that overall the urban environment makes things harder.

charlyjsp
06-24-2009, 02:23 PM
As always, thank you for highlighting these events that us not in the U.S. miss. Btw, are we assuming the urban area is cleared of people or not?

On the question, alas, no solution. To my limited understanding, Sadr City involved luxurious amounts of ISR and time, and in its own way was a 'brute force' approach (throw as many ISR, firing platforms and other assets at the problem as possible), a bigger less defined and multi-layer urban area would require exponentially more assets. I suggest it's possible to learn from Sadr City, not copy it - but that is what I'm guessing Gen. Petraeus meant.

In any case, brief thoughts on #2,4 & 5:

2) No need for coalition ground forces to go house-to-house, wrecking the city in the process,

Unless there is some magic to tell me what people living in houses are thinking, or indicate prepositioned explosives (mines etc), I would still want to go house to house. Whether or not going house to house necessarily means wrecking the city is up to all combatant actors.

4) Much reduced non-combatant casualties and refugee flows, resulting from persistent observation and precision fires,

Persistent observation theoretically exists in CCTV systems, but even there it's hard to (in advance) know what is in a bag, car etc. From the description provided, overhead observation of Sadr City was not persistent in the way CCTV potentially is...so many ways to not see what the adversaries are actually doing (seconding Ken White's decoys, deceptions line of thought). The main problem, to me, is how it is possible to (pre-) identify targets, or positively post-identify them (make sure you know the guy about to be shot is the same person who shot at you).

5) Perhaps most important, no climactic drama and resulting media attention.

I understand the broader point of this, but surely for the population (residents in Sadr City) there was drama, that will be remembered (positively or negatively). This would then have an effect on how the population responds to further combat/aid etc.

On potential adaptations, they are surely location-culture specific, but if the U.S. can see above ground, going underground seems logical (ok, this may apply mainly to cities with water-sanitation infrastructure that is underground, or where digging tunnels is possible.)

Massengale
08-05-2009, 08:27 PM
Sadr City 08 was a result of having plentiful and accurate ISR. Not exactly a one-off since if you can get the assets in those numbers (and even more importantly, the people who know how to use them), you can do it again...to the extent you have the resources. That's the rub.

Massengale
08-05-2009, 08:28 PM
I wouldn't assume that the defenders going underground makes much of a difference...it might even make things worse...for them.

Ken White
08-05-2009, 08:50 PM
Sadr City 08 was a result of having plentiful and accurate ISR. Not exactly a one-off since if you can get the assets in those numbers (and even more importantly, the people who know how to use them), you can do it again...to the extent you have the resources. That's the rub.Perhaps even a great deal more.

As I often found out in earlier times, I'm also sure the plentiful and accurate ISR only told them of some of the problems they might face. Regrettably, that knowledge does not help much in dealing with those who object to your presence... :wry:

Nor does it help in digging out the large number who survive the fire and other support poured upon them -- above or below ground. :(

goesh
08-06-2009, 02:00 AM
I'm not surprised kids got mentioned early in this thread. I'm not sure what role kids played in Iraq other than being light mules, Intel and spotters. Did they engage like the Palestinian kids did? If not, why not? What are the protocols for young teens engaging in non-lethal contact? If I were an enemy commander, I certainly would be exploiting kids more than they are.

Opinion: IDF empowered a whole new generation of Palestinian fighters by using rubber bullets and tear gas. The young teen Palis were psychologically blooded IMO. What rock chucker didn't go home and brag to his sisters and neighbors and mother that he had taken out an eye of an IDF trooper or knocked one down, when in truth he was probably hiding a bruise from a rubber bullet. Said kids after their first 'fight' fully realized that but in a few short years, they would have an AK in their hands and not some rocks. Can the unconventional take this edge way on the ground in real time and stay within the limits of Law? How do you identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits? My hunch is that the Military is more open to this than they have been in a long time.

jmm99
08-06-2009, 03:12 AM
goesh
Can the unconventional take this edge way [away?] on the ground in real time and stay within the limits of Law? How do you identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits? My hunch is that the Military is more open to this than they have been in a long time.

I'd be interested in the view of the "Military" here (most of the folks here) on these questions, because the answers would inform my thoughts on the LOAC and ROE/RUFs, etc.

Ken White
08-06-2009, 03:48 AM
toward innovation and a more free flowing, less structured but still well disciplined bunch of units that need to have a common operating methodology and goal set but are not only allowed but encouraged to pursue various approaches and to allow subordinates to make decisions. Haven't been able to say that for over 35 years...

My personal belief is that it is great that is occurring and that not only the Armed Forces but the nation can benefit.

As I understand your question and the basis therefor, I think the answer is that there will be efforts to identify personnel who have the knack for bending the unconventional to the upper limits and staying legal in the process. The down side of that is that there will be errors as people overshoot.

The reaction of the leadership, the media, the politicians and yes, the lawyers, to such errors will determine whether or not the willingness to allow some sensible freedom of action continues -- and real lasting benefit accrues.

William F. Owen
08-06-2009, 05:23 AM
Opinion: IDF empowered a whole new generation of Palestinian fighters by using rubber bullets and tear gas. The young teen Palis were psychologically blooded IMO. What rock chucker didn't go home and brag to his sisters and neighbors and mother that he had taken out an eye of an IDF trooper or knocked one down, when in truth he was probably hiding a bruise from a rubber bullet.
... but rubber bullets and tear gas get used by police and military all over the world. Those weapons don't have that effect on other populations. The other option is 5.56mm ball. That causes a lot more upset.

goesh
08-06-2009, 12:48 PM
Action Specific: A crowd of teens throwing rocks at a check point manned by a squad, they are close enough to inflilct personal damage, 30-40 in number and they've got a dozen 4-5 yr olds out in front of them as human shields, a small crowd of adults has gathered cheering and laughing.

Conventional: Up comes a Hummer with teargas and rubber bulletts are issued, an Iraqi response team is delayed, their Commander is on the phone because his wife is sick and may need a doctor, but nobody is going to gas some 4 yr olds or allow them to get hit with rubber bullets. The rocks are flying, 2-3 men have been ordered to drop any teen that pulls a gun, some barrels are leveled, tunnel vision and adrenalin our side, fun and aggression on their side and the teens are winning and sending a powerful message to mom and pop back home, cell phones are documenting it all.

Unconventional: Up comes the oldest and ugliest beater of pickup truck obtainable manned by several GIs. This is coming at them at their level, no superior high techery shock and awe, which is what the teens expect and must have to win the psychological battle. They want to fight the Hummer. The GIs have an improvised, giant sling shot and water balloons filled with feminine colored, non-toxic dye to splatter the punks with, including the human shields and they cut loose and splatter them rapid fire with pink and orange dye. About then the Iraqi cops show up and thump a few on the legs with night sticks and its over. Young Ahmed goes home colored like a woman and his bravado is gone, he is shamed and not hurt and Mom and Pop are glad they are not burying him or taking him to the hospital. They might even tell him to quit messing with the Americans.
This is no different than the GIs at Normandy who improvided those gouging shields on tanks to get through the hedgerows with - it just happened, out of box, jumping a dimension, a technical break in the chain of command set things in motion.

What are the risks associated with this example of out of the box thinking, specifically, could there be internal repercussions for some LT or Senior NCO for so ordering this action?

tankersteve
08-06-2009, 05:27 PM
For this specific instance, the ramification for using an unauthorized and unarmored vehicle, contrary to force protection standards (possibly the biggest obstacle when it comes to U.S. forces and their innovation and effectiveness) may be a really loud counseling by the unit commander to the PL, if the CO had not been previously briefed on the plan.

In general, a lawyer and safety officer might want to weigh in on the potential for blinding a child with the balloon, the toxicity and environmental impact of the balloon dye, and where balloons fit within the escalation of force and the ROE. Big Army weapon managers would want to evaluate the rate of fire and reliability in arctic conditions, establish the maximum and effective range, and determine if the Lighthouse for the Blind could build a knockoff for .50 cents less than the regular commercial manufacturer. And the division commander would want to ensure the color of the dye is standardized across the AO, and the pink and orange color are not the same shade as our pink and orange VS-17 panels, used to mark friendly troops.

While I am being slightly cynical, this was the result of only about 5 minutes of brainstorming to come up with the typical U.S. Army bureaucratic response. I think the idea of shame and embarrassment employed would be effective and the troops who do the timeless 'ask for forgiveness, not permission' get a lot further with initially employing these kind of techniques.

I always encouraged my troops to improvise with different ideas, mainly with modifying current equipment or techniques. We used the long-range voice-mitters with MP3 players to stop traffic at highway overwatch positions to allow U.S. convoys to cross with less risk. We also modified smoke grenade launchers to fit on the gun shields to provide directional obscuration. One technique worked, the other needed refinement, and the decentralized nature of the AO prevented any higher from ever taking notice. Note that I didn't come up with either idea, my junior NCOs did.

Tankersteve

Ken White
08-06-2009, 05:42 PM
Too true in some respects...

Rex Brynen
09-22-2009, 06:00 PM
September 25, 2009
Cities and the New Wars (http://cgt.columbia.edu/events/cities_and_new_wars/)

Time Friday, 1:00 pm
Type Conference
Location Avery Hall, Wood Auditorium, Columbia University



The conference addresses two major subjects:

The multiple meanings of the new urban wars: asymmetric armed conflict, US Army training for the "urban enemy," forms of economic violence that kill, cities and urban space as a technology for war, reapropriating the city of fear, civil war refugees and their flight from and to cities, measuring human rights violations during war.

The limits of power and of war: the role of the civic, war and law, the growing global web of interdependencies -- all can contest the most powerful states and all can undermine the idea of victory in war. Conditions under which powerlessness becomes complex and transcends mere victimhood.

SWJED
07-06-2010, 01:27 PM
Need some help and expertise here in regards to urban military operations. While much work has been done over the last decade (as well as a whole lot of operational experience) to improve our capabilities to operate in an urban environment I need to get a handle on what still needs to be done and what we really need to be examining in future concept and doctrinal work as well as in experimentation. I know it is tough to separate urban into tactical and operational bins – but my request is to focus on operational / joint capabilities. But don’t that limit the discussion. Thanks in advance. Dave D.

GI Zhou
07-06-2010, 02:32 PM
Interestingly the Chinese are wrestling with this very thing at the moment. They are in awe of US joint operational capability to hit targets using manned fixed and rotary wing aircraft and helicopters, UAS (or whatever UAV/RPVs are called this week), attacking with precision guided munitions (especially ones that create less collateral damage), and most importantly the speed in which US forces can get it brought in. I'm reading Chinese material on it at the moment. I can help that way but am writing a paper which I have to keep closed until late October.

The Chinese initiated a series of trials in the early years of the this century on high altitude and urban warfare. The two things of note in their force structure were:

a. The increase from three to four infantry veehicles in the mechanized infantry platoon. A dedicated HQ vehicle allowed for a smal engineer or fire control team to included in the platoon; and
b. an armoured comand vehicle at the company level to handle all the information and data expected on the modern battlefield.

The only thing I am concerned about, is a shortage/lack of armoured engineer vehicles, and bridge layers in many countries which become vital in urban warfare. The old Centurion AVRE and M728 had a lot going for them. The USMC Assault Breacher Vehicles based on the Abrahms may be too big for many streets and the infrastructure in developing countries.

Also in Vietnam, the 84mm/20pdr on the Centurion (and by association the 90mm on the M48) was found to be able to deal with most targets in villages and towns and still have a sizeable ammunition load. An M1, Challenger etc may not have sufficient onboard ammunition load and is too big for many urban infrasrtructures in the developing world. Is an AEV based on a medium tank chassis survivable in modern warfare?

Seahorse
07-06-2010, 02:41 PM
It is my recommendation that experimentation consider adopting a failed (mega-)city scenario for future research rather than the current concentration on failed and failing states. It is my personal intuition that sees a large failed city as a higher potential threat and required national response which would invlove greater military requirements and capabilities, including whole of governement responses than most current concept development and emphasis.

These failures could arise from several causes such as natural (Haiti, New Orleans), resource based (oil, water, food), conflict (war, ethnic cleansing, religion, tribal), crime (Mexican border disputes), financial or demographic etc.

Such analyses may also go a long way towards informing pop-centric COIN strategies for more localized action and tailoring in places such as Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with these insurgencies which have demanding local variances.

Fianally, a failed mega-city scenario would likely impell governments to act more directly and immediately than a potential failed or failing state scenario.

slapout9
07-06-2010, 06:26 PM
This is a different idea....evacuate to a new city and let the old one die as opposed to fighting over it. The author thinks the idea is new but Buckminster Fuller talked about it years ago. It is sometimes easier and cheaper just to build a new city as opposed to fixing the old one.

H/T to Zenpundit for finding this.
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/paul_romer.html

SWJ Blog
09-09-2011, 04:40 PM
Urban Black Holes (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/urban-black-holes)

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SWJ Blog
09-13-2011, 06:11 PM
Sadr City 2008: a new model for urban combat? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/sadr-city-2008-a-new-model-for-urban-combat)

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SWJ Blog
09-26-2011, 06:50 AM
Command of the Cities: Towards a Theory of Urban Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/command-of-the-cities-towards-a-theory-of-urban-strategy)

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SWJ Blog
10-17-2011, 01:01 PM
Urban Land Use by Illegal Armed Groups in Medellin (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/urban-land-use-by-illegal-armed-groups-in-medellin)

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SWJ Blog
01-02-2012, 09:44 AM
Rural versus Urban Insurgency: How We Missed the Enemy's Center of Gravity in Iraq and Why It's Important (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rural-versus-urban-insurgency-how-we-missed-the-enemys-center-of-gravity-in-iraq-and-why-it)

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SWJ Blog
07-30-2012, 01:01 AM
Meet An Urban Planner For Cities That Don't Yet Exist (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/meet-an-urban-planner-for-cities-that-dont-yet-exist)

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SWJ Blog
09-25-2013, 09:30 PM
The Future of Warfare Will Be Urban, Coastal, and Irregular (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-warfare-will-be-urban-coastal-and-irregular)

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SWJ Blog
09-27-2013, 09:40 PM
We Were Young, and Urban Once (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/we-were-young-and-urban-once)

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SWJ Blog
09-30-2013, 12:16 AM
Westgate Mall Attacks: Urban Areas Battleground of the 21st Century (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/westgate-mall-attacks-urban-areas-battleground-of-the-21st-century)

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SWJ Blog
10-06-2013, 03:40 PM
What Happens When Cities Fall Apart? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/what-happens-when-cities-fall-apart)

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SWJ Blog
10-10-2013, 05:02 PM
Into the Cities; Dark, Dense, and Dangerous (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/into-the-cities-dark-dense-and-dangerous)

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SWJ Blog
11-24-2013, 07:55 AM
The ‘New’ Playbook? Urban Siege in Nairobi (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-%E2%80%98new%E2%80%99-playbook-urban-siege-in-nairobi)

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SWJ Blog
12-20-2013, 03:03 PM
Film Review: Narco Cultura – A Tale of Three Cities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/film-review-narco-cultura-%E2%80%93-a-tale-of-three-cities)

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SWJ Blog
01-12-2014, 06:59 AM
Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/out-of-the-mountains-the-coming-age-of-the-urban-guerrilla)

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SWJ Blog
01-23-2014, 09:33 PM
Mega Cities, Ungoverned Areas, and the Challenge of Army Urban Combat Operations in 2030-2040 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mega-cities-ungoverned-areas-and-the-challenge-of-army-urban-combat-operations-in-2030-2040)

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SWJ Blog
04-14-2014, 05:30 PM
The Emergence of Feral and Criminal Cities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-emergence-of-feral-and-criminal-cities)

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SWJ Blog
04-21-2014, 02:43 PM
A Proposed Framework for Appreciating Megacities: A US Army Perspective (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-proposed-framework-for-appreciating-megacities-a-us-army-perspective-0)

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SWJ Blog
06-11-2014, 01:11 PM
On Megacities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/on-megacities)

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SWJ Blog
06-12-2014, 04:14 AM
Military Operations in the Growing Urban Landscapes of the Future (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/military-operations-in-the-growing-urban-landscapes-of-the-future)

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SWJ Blog
07-20-2014, 06:53 AM
Intelligence Challenges in Urban Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/intelligence-challenges-in-urban-operations)

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SWJ Blog
08-31-2014, 05:00 AM
US Army Sees 'Megacities' As the Future Battlefield (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-army-sees-megacities-as-the-future-battlefield)

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SWJ Blog
09-26-2014, 10:52 AM
Employing Armor Against the Islamic State: The Inevitable Urban Combined Arms Fight (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/employing-armor-against-the-islamic-state-the-inevitable-urban-combined-arms-fight)

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jcustis
11-24-2014, 06:17 AM
You'd be surprised what people run search queries for around these parts.

No commentary, but posted because we will need the information again in the future...and someone has already done some of the heavy lifting.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/dimarco.pdf

There will come a time when the junior leaders who fought at the tactical level of the squad, platoon and company become further removed from the echelons where they learned their trade through blood, sweat, and tears. Those who follow should not be forced to relearn lessons the hard way.

Majormarginal
11-24-2014, 06:58 AM
I will read this. thanks.

SWJ Blog
02-09-2015, 12:05 PM
Urban Combat Will Test US Strategy in Iraq (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/urban-combat-will-test-us-strategy-in-iraq)

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davidbfpo
04-16-2015, 07:19 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this article, which starts with:
Operation Protective Edge demonstrated both the tactical challenges and strategic threat posed by subterranean warfare (i.e. tunnels), which is likely to proliferate in the coming years as weaker combatants seek to evade detection and targeting by air assets.
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/preparing-for-warfares-subterranean-future/?singlepage=1

davidbfpo
07-12-2015, 11:16 AM
A short newspaper article by Zoha Waseem, a Karachi student studying @ Kings College War Studies:http://tribune.com.pk/story/919102/policing-in-the-time-of-urbicide/

Her outlook is global, not Karachi-bound.


From the realm of urban security studies emerge three relatively young frameworks for understanding conflicts in cities: urban securitisation, new military urbanism and urbicide.

(Later) It is imperative that we reorient our internal security policies towards the urban citizen and prioritise citizen security

SWJ Blog
08-04-2015, 07:50 PM
City As a System Analytical Framework: A Structured Analytical Approach to Understanding and Acting in Urban Environments (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/city-as-a-system-analytical-framework-a-structured-analytical-approach-to-understanding-and)

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SWJ Blog
08-17-2015, 01:13 PM
Report: Latin American Governments Fail to Tackle Booming Urban Slums (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/report-latin-american-governments-fail-to-tackle-booming-urban-slums)

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SWJ Blog
10-27-2015, 01:28 PM
More Migrants Heading to Cities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-migrants-heading-to-cities)

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SWJ Blog
11-19-2015, 08:41 PM
Islamic State Becoming Urban Guerrilla Threat (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/islamic-state-becoming-urban-guerrilla-threat)

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davidbfpo
12-19-2015, 04:04 AM
David Betz has two articles on this topic this month. First on WoTR a review of training offered by the IDF acting as a catalyst for his thinking, which starts with:
I traveled recently to Israel to visit a state-of-the-art military training facility in the southern Negev Desert opened by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) last year. The facility, at the Tze’elim army base, is meant to simulate urban operations of the kind the Israelis have so often faced in their conflicts with Palestinian and Lebanese militants. Though the degree of emphasis the IDF has placed on military operations in urban terrain has waxed and waned, since the mid-1980s at least it has maintained an extensive training infrastructure for this purpose...
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/peering-into-the-past-and-future-of-urban-warfare-in-israel/

(added) Vice News has a 11 minute video report, from July 20154, on the IDF training facility:https://news.vice.com/video/war-games-israeli-urban-warfare

Curiously he notes the Bundeswehr were training there.

On Kings of War a longer article, with some historical sketches to enhance the arguments:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2015/12/thinking-about-war-underground/?

davidbfpo
12-22-2015, 08:34 PM
A hour long voice only podcast on the IISS You Tube channel explained as:
This webinar with Antnio Sampaio, IISS Research Associate for Security and Development, analyses the conduct of recent stability operations within large and mega-cities, with a particular emphasis on Latin America. Cities such as Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Medelln (Colombia) have developed an innovative response involving law enforcement, military and development tools for urban security.
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNZFRnepKaA

SWJ Blog
12-23-2015, 09:52 PM
Mad Scientist Conference: Megacities and Dense Urban Areas (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mad-scientist-conference-megacities-and-dense-urban-areas)

SWJ Blog
01-18-2016, 05:30 PM
Urban Combat in Iraq: Ramadi Civilians Force Adjustment in Fight Against Islamic State (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/urban-combat-in-iraq-ramadi-civilians-force-adjustment-in-fight-against-islamic-state)

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davidbfpo
01-21-2016, 07:13 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this article. Urban warfare features here regularly, e.g David Killcullen has argued the USA must prepare for operations in mega-cities. One aspect of such operations is having intelligence and the author argues:
America’s enemies see the advantages of the seemingly impenetrable clutter that dominates the modern city. The Army’s current approach to learning about this environment is to seek the diamonds scattered amidst this clutter. What we are missing, though, is that the clutter itself is the jewel. Enormous amounts of readily available data can reveal more about a city, its population, and the nefarious actors residing there than we could have imagined before. To truly understand this environment the Army must fundamentally change its approach to understanding the environment: It must adopt a holistic approach enabled by big data analytics.Link:http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/bringing-big-data-to-operations-in-mega-cities/?

I don't doubt there is data in such places as Lagos, Nigeria, but how can the fullest picture be created? Mobile / cell phone data is one part and given the level of governance how much data exists that can be accessed and in a format that the USA and others can use?

Here is one passage on phone data:
There are currently almost 7 billion mobile subscriptions worldwide (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014-e.pdf), nearly overtaking the world’s population. While access to the data that this brings can be useful in rural areas, it is truly invaluable in large urban environments where aggregate data can reveal social trends, groupings, and fault lines that give leaders significant clarity about the social and physical landscape. If used correctly, it’s like handing the commander what MIT’s Sandy Pentland (http://web.media.mit.edu/%7Esandy/) calls a “socio-scope” that allows him to see and track things in real time that he could never see before.The article has many links; one is for this SWJ piece:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-proposed-framework-for-appreciating-megacities-a-us-army-perspective-0

There is another thread of vale: Intelligence, data and COIN http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5149

SWJ Blog
01-26-2016, 10:08 PM
Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Study of Urban Conflict and Multinational Operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/bosnia-and-herzegovina-a-study-of-urban-conflict-and-multinational-operations)

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SWJ Blog
02-04-2016, 07:10 PM
Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban Environments (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unmanned-systems-in-support-of-future-medical-operations-in-dense-urban-environments)

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SWJ Blog
02-09-2016, 11:00 AM
Operational Environment Implications of the Megacity to the US Army (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/operational-environment-implications-of-the-megacity-to-the-us-army)

This is a Journal article.

SWJ Blog
02-12-2016, 11:40 PM
Technical Challenges for Simulation and Training in Megacities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/technical-challenges-for-simulation-and-training-in-megacities)

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SWJ Blog
02-17-2016, 12:31 PM
Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/megacities-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly)

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SWJ Blog
02-17-2016, 12:31 PM
Megacities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/megacities-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly)

This is a Journal article.

SWJ Blog
02-18-2016, 06:29 AM
How to Hold or Take a Big City -- Seven Lines of Effort (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-to-hold-or-take-a-big-city-seven-lines-of-effort-0)

This is a Journal article.

SWJ Blog
02-19-2016, 06:32 PM
Mad Scientist Speaker Series: Megacities and Dense Urban Areas (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mad-scientist-speaker-series-megacities-and-dense-urban-areas)

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SWJ Blog
02-22-2016, 10:12 PM
U.S. Army Mega City Operations: Enduring Principles and Innovative Technologies (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/us-army-mega-city-operations-enduring-principles-and-innovative-technologies)

This is a Journal article.

SWJ Blog
02-23-2016, 09:15 PM
Megacities and Dense Urban Environments: Obstacle or Opportunity? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/megacities-and-dense-urban-environments-obstacle-or-opportunity)

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SWJ Blog
02-24-2016, 08:30 PM
Communications in Sub- and Superterranean Structures (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/communications-in-sub-and-superterranean-structures)

This is a Journal article.

SWJ Blog
02-26-2016, 09:34 AM
Anticipating Megacity Responses to Shocks: Using Urban Integration and Connectedness to Assess Resilience (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/anticipating-megacity-responses-to-shocks-using-urban-integration-and-connectedness-to-asse)

This is a Journal article.

SWJ Blog
02-26-2016, 01:41 PM
Using the Internet of Things to Gain and Maintain Situational Awareness in Dense Urban Environments and Mega Cities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/using-the-internet-of-things-to-gain-and-maintain-situational-awareness-in-dense-urban-envi)

This is a Journal article.

davidbfpo
03-06-2016, 11:26 AM
Readers will know I am skeptical about the value of big data in future operations in mega-cities, so it was interesting to read this civilian project's use of mobile phone data in the Yemen to assess the impact of he Arab Spring.

There is a podcast on I-Tunes, behind a registration "wall".

Backed by highlights in an article:http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-we-can-learn-about-drone-strikes-from-10-million-yemeni-cell-phones/

A fuller article is in Foreign Policy, behind a registration "wall":https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-07-06/yemen-calling

SWJ Blog
03-11-2016, 01:06 PM
An Analytic Framework for Operations in Dense Urban Areas (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-analytic-framework-for-operations-in-dense-urban-areas)

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SWJ Blog
03-11-2016, 08:23 PM
A Look at Urban Warfare in the Syrian City of Aleppo (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-look-at-urban-warfare-in-the-syrian-city-of-aleppo)

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SWJ Blog
03-15-2016, 12:54 AM
Assessing Physiological Response to Toxic Industrial Chemical Exposure in Megacities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-physiological-response-to-toxic-industrial-chemical-exposure-in-megacities-0)

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davidbfpo
03-24-2016, 06:34 PM
Discovered a website today on the "peace walls" in Belfast, Northern Ireland which once separated communities and were intended to reduce violence. Urban barriers, a polite term for urban military architecture, appeared in Iraq on a massive scale awhile back. Though I cannot recall a thread on them.

The website has a collection of photos and links:http://www.peacewall-archive.net/ On their Twitter there is much more, including a few photos in the grim years of the 1970's with fortified army bases:https://twitter.com/Peacewalls (ttps://twitter.com/Peacewalls)

This thread may fit in the thread on Urban / Cities Warfare:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=310

SWJ Blog
04-05-2016, 07:30 PM
TED Talk: How Megacities Change the Map of the World (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ted-talk-how-megacities-change-the-map-of-the-world)

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AdamG
04-07-2016, 04:49 PM
"New".* DDilegge and I started talking about this in 1998 or 1996, IIRC.


The nearly five-year civil war in Syria has exposed some of the difficulties that military forces have conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance against terrorists and insurgents in crowded urban environments. These challenges, while not insurmountable, will continue to plague even the most advanced military forces, including the United States, as migration out of rural areas and into cities continues unabated.

For the foreseeable future, deterring and countering near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China will undoubtedly remain at the forefront of American grand strategy. But in addition to meeting the challenges associated with traditional and well-known state-based threats, the U.S. military will be expected to combat an array of violent non-state actors — a blanket term that includes well-established groups like Islamic State, al Qaeda and the transnational criminal gang MS-13 but also countless other and less well-known militias, insurgent groups and terrorist organizations.

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/04/06/is-the-u-s-military-prepared-to-fight-in-megacities/

See also
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=23805&highlight=megacities

*
http://media.tumblr.com/tumblr_m81iz6Artd1qdbcn8.jpg

SWJ Blog
04-13-2016, 02:41 PM
‘Mad Scientist’ Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Conference (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/%E2%80%98mad-scientist%E2%80%99-megacities-and-dense-urban-areas-conference)

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davidbfpo
06-08-2016, 09:16 AM
Just discovered this 2007 Australian paper by Professor Michael Evans, of the Australian Defence College, which was reviewed on SWJ Blog in 2008 by General Jim Molan (SWJ Blog link now redundant).

Jim Molan's Foreword ends with:
As this fine Occasional Paper demonstrates, fighting in cities is a tough proposition, but it is not an impossible task for modern armed forces. What is required above all else is preparation and forethought. Dr Evans’ comprehensive study represents a valuable and important analysis of an area of the military art that is likely to exercise our minds increasingly in coming years. This is a publication that deserves a wide readership and I commend it to fellow military professionals.Link to article:http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/publications/occasional/publcnsoccasional_310310_citywithoutjoy.pdf

Link to SWJ Blog:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/city-without-joy

In the Spring 2015 Parameters Michael Evans responded to other authors on megacities, in 'The Case against Megacities':http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/Spring_2015/Parameters_Spring%202015%20v45n1.pdf

I expect the two articles are best read together.

Finally Professor Evans and I have been friends since 1985, when he was in Zimbabwe, with the ZDF.

SWJ Blog
08-13-2016, 07:49 PM
The Role of Network Science in Analyzing Slums in Rapidly Growing Urban Areas (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-role-of-network-science-in-analyzing-slums-in-rapidly-growing-urban-areas)

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SWJ Blog
08-24-2016, 09:26 PM
Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Compendium (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mad-scientist-megacities-and-dense-urban-areas-compendium)

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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

AdamG
10-08-2016, 09:58 PM
Even as the Army continues to sharpen its core warfighting skills inside tightening, unpredictable budgets, the service also must look to the future to prepare for a quickly changing, increasingly volatile battlefield, the Army’s top general said.

“We prioritized the present, and we mortgaged the future,” said Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley. “Frankly, the biggest challenge is having a predictable, steady stream of money to work with industry, [science and technology], and research and development, to accelerate, advance and explore these opportunities and options for the future.”


To start, the world is “rapidly urbanizing,” Milley said. Today, between 50 percent and 60 percent of the world’s population live in urban areas, he said. By 2050, Milley predicts that will jump to 80 percent to 90 percent.

“You’re seeing a massive growth right now, as we speak, of megacities,” Milley said. “Today, an example of a megacity is Seoul, South Korea, with 27 million people, that has urban sprawl essentially from the [demilitarized zone] all the way south of Seoul, and it is this massive urban belt and complex.”

The Army has been designed, manned, trained and equipped for the last 241 years to operate primarily in rural areas, Milley said.

“In the future, I can say with very high degrees of confidence, the American Army is probably going to be fighting in urban areas,” he said. “We need to man, organize, train and equip the force for operations in urban areas, highly dense urban areas, and that’s a different construct. We’re not organized like that right now.”

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/army-chief-soldiers-must-be-ready-to-fight-in-megacities

SWJ Blog
10-22-2016, 07:50 AM
Islamic State Expected to Fall Back, Wage Urban Warfare in Mosul (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/islamic-state-expected-to-fall-back-wage-urban-warfare-in-mosul)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/islamic-state-expected-to-fall-back-wage-urban-warfare-in-mosul) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

AdamG
10-29-2016, 05:13 AM
The year is 2030. Forget about the flying cars, robot maids, and moving sidewalks we were promised. They’re not happening. But that doesn’t mean the future is a total unknown.
According to a startling Pentagon video obtained by The Intercept, the future of global cities will be an amalgam of the settings of “Escape from New York” and “Robocop” — with dashes of the “Warriors” and “Divergent” thrown in. It will be a world of Robert Kaplan-esque urban hellscapes — brutal and anarchic supercities filled with gangs of youth-gone-wild, a restive underclass, criminal syndicates, and bands of malicious hackers.
At least that’s the scenario outlined in “Megacities: Urban Future, the Emerging Complexity,” a five-minute video that has been used at the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations University. All that stands between the coming chaos and the good people of Lagos and Dhaka (or maybe even New York City) is the U.S. Army, according to the video, which The Intercept obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.

https://theintercept.com/2016/10/13/pentagon-video-warns-of-unavoidable-dystopian-future-for-worlds-biggest-cities/

Windows97
10-30-2016, 01:16 AM
I don't get it (then again I don't get a lot of things (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YRAGyCW328)) but I still don't see or, rather, cannot envisage, why a military would want to operate in cities. I can understand a domestic COIN / Law enforcement operation or counter-terrorism mission but seriously if you are an invading army why not just isolate a city and exhaust the offending inhabitants. No city can survive without a hinterland. Hell, if it worked for Caesar why not now? All I read and hear is a regurgitation of attritionist fetishes.

Windows97
10-30-2016, 01:21 AM
Dr. Russell Glenn, Australian National University, presents, "Megacities: The Good; The Bad and the Ugly" during the 2016 Megacity Mad Scientist Conference at Arizona State University April 21-22, 2016


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgWm9BOVT3E

AdamG
10-31-2016, 06:59 AM
I don't get it (then again I don't get a lot of things (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YRAGyCW328)) but I still don't see or, rather, cannot envisage, why a military would want to operate in cities.

Because the enemy always gets a vote, particularly on where the game is played.

davidbfpo
10-31-2016, 09:37 PM
Windows 97,

Thanks and cited in part:
Dr. Russell Glenn, Australian National University, presents, "Megacities: The Good; The Bad and the Ugly"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgWm9BOVT3E

Having watched most of Dr Glenn's talk I do wonder if sufficient attention has been paid to relatively recent 'Third World' conflicts in large cities, I exclude the Soviet / Russian experience which has been looked at.

Two civil wars come to mind, one with significant external intervention and the second with IIRC with none. The fighting for years in Beirut, in the Syrian Civil War being the first; secondly the civil war in Congo Brazzaville:
Congo's democratic progress was derailed in 1997 when Lissouba and Sassou started to fight for power in the civil war (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_the_Congo_Civil_War). As presidential elections scheduled for July 1997 approached, tensions between the Lissouba and Sassou camps mounted. On June 5, President Lissouba's government forces surrounded Sassou's compound in Brazzaville and Sassou ordered members of his private militia (known as "Cobras") to resist. Thus began a four-month conflict that destroyed or damaged much of Brazzaville and caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths.
Link:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_the_Congo

Yes mega-cities are 'talent magnets', surely they are also "poor people magnets"?

I expect anyone who ends up fighting in most 'Third World' cities will strive to reduce any uncontrolled electronic communications - if only to prevent global media reporting. No imagery, no news. Presumably some are watching what media lessons there are with the Syrian Civil War.

SWJ Blog
11-05-2016, 02:26 AM
Blood, Dirt and Bombs: Battle for Mosul is Fierce Urban War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/blood-dirt-and-bombs-battle-for-mosul-is-fierce-urban-war)

AdamG
11-07-2016, 07:05 PM
CNN journalist discovers what it's like to be on the wrong side of a sophisticated MOUT ambush.
http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2016/11/07/trapped-isis-mosul

AdamG
11-15-2016, 11:58 PM
How Russia Responds to Cities That Rebel The flattened city of Grozny in Chechnya evokes Aleppo’s siege today


A trip to Grozny is an exercise in forgetting. This southern Russian city—the capital of the republic of Chechnya—was flattened in a government military offensive that began in late 1999. The aim was to return the breakaway, Muslim-majority region to Moscow’s control, and the block-by-block fight left no neighborhood untouched. U.N. monitors who arrived with humanitarian aid in late February 2000 described Grozny as a “devastated and still insecure wasteland,” where only about 21,000 civilians remained.
Today, Grozny is a thriving city of more than 283,000—and a flashy, Dubai-style showcase for Moscow’s ability to rebuild. Minutka Square, once the scene of a gruesome ambush, is now a big-box shopping center. The downtown, which had been leveled by artillery fire and Russian bombing, has been rebuilt with wide boulevards and a neon-lit center that features glass-and-steel skyscrapers and a glitzy high-rise hotel called Hotel Grozny City.
One man has presided over Grozny’s reconstruction: Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen president and trusted local strongman of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. Mr. Kadyrov remade Grozny and, in the process, created a cult of personality for himself. His image adorns billboards and posters in the city; a recent nightly news broadcast featured 21 straight minutes of footage of Mr. Kadyrov as he inspected security forces and held a meeting, plus a reading from his Instagram feed.
With the Russian military now poised to resume airstrikes on the Syrian city of Aleppo, Grozny also remains international shorthand for Russia’s destructive firepower and willingness to use scorched-earth tactics. As Secretary of State John Kerry said on Oct. 16, “There are still deep beliefs in a lot of people that Russia is simply pursuing a Grozny solution in Aleppo and is not prepared to truly engage in any way.”
www.wsj.com/articles/how-russia-responds-to-cities-that-rebel-1478811150

AdamG
11-18-2016, 01:26 PM
As the operation to retake Mosul enters its second month on Thursday, Iraqi forces are preparing for prolonged, grueling urban combat.

They have slowed the tempo of their operations, advancing just a few hundred meters at a time. Iraqi forces have gathered troops many times the estimated 5,000 IS fighters in the city.
But hundreds of thousands of civilians still remain in the city. And the ferocity and magnitude of IS counterattacks and defenses in Mosul is unlike anything Iraqi forces have confronted in the fight against the militant group so far. As a result, overwhelming force can't bring swift victory, and the campaign is likely to take weeks

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-iraq-battle-for-mosul-20161117-story.html

SWJ Blog
01-26-2017, 09:30 PM
U.S. General: Liberation of Mosul Involves ‘Hardest’ Urban Combat in Recent History (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-general-liberation-of-mosul-involves-%E2%80%98hardest%E2%80%99-urban-combat-in-recent-history)

SWJ Blog
03-14-2017, 06:54 PM
Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/reimagining-the-character-of-urban-operations-for-the-us-army)

AdamG
03-23-2017, 06:13 AM
The Army's chief of staff said Tuesday that in about 10 years, the service must be ready to fight in megacities, a type of warfare that will require future units to resemble today's special operations forces.
Speaking at the Future of War Conference 2017 hosted by New America in Washington, D.C., Gen. Mark Milley said that the character of warfare will likely go through a fundamental shift over the next decade.
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/03/21/chief-army-will-need-smaller-units-for-megacity-combat.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+militarydotcom%2Fdailynews+%2 8Military.com+News%29

SWJ Blog
03-25-2017, 04:31 PM
On the Likelihood of Large Urban Conflict in the 21st Century (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-the-likelihood-of-large-urban-conflict-in-the-21st-century)

SWJ Blog
03-25-2017, 09:21 PM
Urban Operations: Battle in Mosul Halted as High Civilian Death Toll Investigated (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/urban-operations-battle-in-mosul-halted-as-high-civilian-death-toll-investigated)

SWJ Blog
06-02-2017, 03:00 PM
Objective Metropolis: The Future of Dense Urban Operational Environments (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/objective-metropolis-the-future-of-dense-urban-operational-environments)

SWJ Blog
06-27-2017, 02:14 PM
Urban Terrorism Returns to Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/urban-terrorism-returns-to-colombia)

SWJ Blog
06-30-2017, 05:49 PM
Urban Warfare, Then and Now (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/urban-warfare-then-and-now)

SWJ Blog
07-07-2017, 11:22 AM
Complex Cyber Terrain in Hyper-Connected Urban Areas (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/complex-cyber-terrain-in-hyper-connected-urban-areas)

SWJ Blog
07-12-2017, 08:19 PM
Cyber Operational Considerations in Dense Urban Terrain (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyber-operational-considerations-in-dense-urban-terrain)

SWJ Blog
07-18-2017, 02:14 PM
Fixing the Way the Army Trains for Urban Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fixing-the-way-the-army-trains-for-urban-warfare)

davidbfpo
08-03-2017, 12:32 PM
This may have appeared elsewhere, so apologies if a duplicate. No time to open and read yet.

The introduction:
For more than a decade now, Israel has clashed with Hamas in Gaza, in cycles of violence defined by periods of intense fighting followed by relative lulls. This report covers a five-year period of this conflict — from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 to the end of Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Drawing on primary and secondary sources and an extensive set of interviews, it analyzes how an advanced military fought a determined, adaptive, hybrid adversary. It describes how the Israel Defense Force (IDF) operationally, organizationally, and technologically evolved to meet asymmetric threats. Most broadly, this report details the IDF's increasing challenge of striking a delicate balance between the intense international legal public scrutiny and the hard operational realities of modern urban warfare. In this respect, this report's title — "From Cast Lead to Protective Edge" — captures more than just the names of the two operations that chronologically bracket its scope; it also describes the tension the IDF confronted between the military necessities driving maximalist uses of force and the political imperative for more restrained operations. This report draws a series of lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force: from the importance of armored vehicles and active protection systems to the limitations of airpower in urban terrain and of conventional militaries to deter nonstate actors.Link:http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1888.html? (http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1888.html?adbsc=social_20170803_1698111&adbid=892974313896263681&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453)

Hat tip to WoTR where the RAND author has a commentary:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/five-lessons-from-israels-wars-in-gaza/

SWJ Blog
09-13-2017, 02:16 PM
A Better Approach to Urban Operations: Treat Cities like Human Bodies (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-better-approach-to-urban-operations-treat-cities-like-human-bodies)

SWJ Blog
10-23-2017, 01:40 AM
The Cipher Brief Threefer on Urban Conflict, Trends & Environment (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-cipher-brief-threefer-on-urban-conflict-trends-environment)

SWJ Blog
10-27-2017, 12:19 AM
Marawi Insurgents Used 'Rat-Like' Tactics, Including Tunnels to Sewers, During Urban Warfare Against Philippine Troops (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/marawi-insurgents-used-rat-like-tactics-including-tunnels-to-sewers-during-urban-warfare-agains)

davidbfpo
01-03-2018, 05:10 PM
Twenty three threads have been merged in today, all bar one from SWJ Blog. Prompted by the next post.

davidbfpo
01-03-2018, 05:14 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this article https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/old-dogs-new-tricks-urban-warfare-turkeys-war-pkk/ which dissects what happened when the PKK opted to fight in Turkish cities (it will be cross-posted elsewhere).

The authors have observations on the wider impact on urban operations, for strategy and operations. Near the end:
This dynamic suggests armed groups might choose to target cities even when their chances of military success are slim, that is, if they believe that they can frame the urban battle in ways that will help them achieve their long-term strategic objectives.

davidbfpo
01-12-2018, 03:44 PM
From Army University Press and on open access, except for the post-Mosul report. Citing their introduction in part:
Army Press has compiled a selection of articles from Military Review, publications from the Combat Studies Institute, monographs from students at the Command and General Staff College, and other publications. This primer on urban operations should not be viewed as the textbook on the subject, but rather as a starting point for renewed study and conversation.Link:ww.armyupress.army.mil/Online-Publications/Primer-on-Urban-Operations/#5?platform=hootsuite (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/ww.armyupress.army.mil/Online-Publications/Primer-on-Urban-Operations/#5?platform=hootsuite)

SWJ Blog
01-13-2018, 01:59 AM
Lessons to Be Learned: The Employment of Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devises in the Islamic State’s Defense of Mosul (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessons-to-be-learned-the-employment-of-suicide-vehicle-borne-improvised-explosive-devises-)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessons-to-be-learned-the-employment-of-suicide-vehicle-borne-improvised-explosive-devises-) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
01-29-2018, 09:01 PM
Jason Burke, a journalist with The Guardian and writer on terrorism, has this very well-timed article, which draws on history and seeks to explain why terrorists know attacks in cities matter.

Here is a "taster":
f the urban environment offers practical assistance to the aspirant terrorist – a degree of anonymity, ease of sourcing components or funds, proximity to others in a network, communication facilities, transport – it also offers a wealth of targets. The nature of these virtually guarantees what all terrorists seek: attention.He ends with:
The history of terrorism is thus the history of our cities. The history of our cities, at least over the last 150 years or so, is in part the history of terrorism. This is a deadly, inextricable link that is unlikely to be broken anytime soon.Link:https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jan/29/cities-terror-attacks-brutal-relationship-terrorism?

In today's mailbox was a - startling for me - WoTR article on the Tet 1968 offensive in South Vietnam; which had an urban focus. A military failure for the NVA / VC, but a strategic victory. Worth a read.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/importance-vietnam-wars-tet-offensive/

Reading these articles and the coverage on the very recent, brutal Taliban / ISIS attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan, could GIRoA and its allies be in danger of repeating the Tet offensive?

davidbfpo
02-10-2018, 06:44 PM
RUSI held a day, closed conference last week and have now published the programme and three other items, one a short paper. Plus a podcast by the opening speaker, ret'd General Mungo Melvin (till 33:45) and the historian Antony Beevor.

Link:https://rusi.org/event/urban-warfare-past-present-future

There are three PPT, alas slides only by:Peter Mansoor, David Kilcullen and a British brigadier.

The paper refers to a re'd UK General Tony Newton's experience of how the British Army lost sight of urban fighting and has a section on Operation Agile Warrior that appears earlier in this thread.
Link:https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-s3-closing_remarks-newton.pdf

davidbfpo
02-19-2018, 09:32 PM
An app created using a map seized from Islamic State was a "game changer" in the battle to defeat the extremists in Raqqa, a British man who fought the murderous group has said....Speaking to the Press Association, the 30-year-old said he understands the app was put together by the Americans using a very detailed map of Raqqa that was captured from IS: "I would be walking down the street and would take fire from a building or I would see enemy movement or a tank, all I'd have to do is move my dot, get the grid coordinates and call it in."Link:https://www.forces.net/news/anti-isis-fighters-used-game-changing-app-retake-raqqa

SWJ Blog
03-06-2018, 09:53 PM
The Future Battlefield: Army, Marines Prepare for ‘Massive’ Fight in Megacities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-battlefield-army-marines-prepare-for-%E2%80%98massive%E2%80%99-fight-in-megacities)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-battlefield-army-marines-prepare-for-%E2%80%98massive%E2%80%99-fight-in-megacities) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).

SWJ Blog
03-07-2018, 02:28 PM
Preparing for the Urban Future of Counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/preparing-for-the-urban-future-of-counterinsurgency)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/preparing-for-the-urban-future-of-counterinsurgency) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).

Windows97
04-16-2018, 01:05 AM
Every so called urban training area I've seen looks more like a small village with neatly spread out buildings. When I think of Urban warfare, FIBUA or MOUT, I hink of central London or the Brazilian favelas. Maybe someone should contact the Japanese Gov and lease Hashima island (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hashima_Island) also, for a more atmospheric look see here (http://www.hashima-island.co.uk/). At Least it looks like a slice of a city! Also it's out in the ocean so no noise concerns...5571

davidbfpo
04-23-2018, 09:59 AM
This paper The Worst of Both Worlds: An analysis of urban littoral combat by Dr Dayton McCarthy is from Australia. I have only skimmed the introduction and the papers itself is 5Mb. The intro's key passage:
This is a paper about fighting in cities on coastlines – the contemporary topic of the combat in the ‘urban littoral’. This paper argues that urban littoral combat is the ‘worst of both worlds’ and brings together two of the most difficult forms of warfare – urban and amphibious operations.
Link:https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/australian-army-research-centre/australian-army-research-centre-publications/army-25

davidbfpo
05-06-2018, 06:38 PM
A pointer to the Modern War Institute's Urban Warfare Project collection of articles:https://mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-project/

AdamG
05-17-2018, 08:52 PM
(CNN)The coming decades will see the growth of colossal megacities as the world's population increasingly moves into urban environments, a new United Nations report predicts.
Today, 55% of the world's population is urban, a figure which is expected to grow to 68% by 2050, with the addition of 2.5 billion new city residents, according to projections by the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
By 2030, there will be 43 megacities around the world with populations of over 10 million, up from 33 similarly sized urban centers today and just 10 in 1990.
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/16/world/world-population-cities-un-intl/index.html

davidbfpo
06-26-2018, 11:55 AM
A short article from Australia. Which opens with:
This systems-of-systems configuration is referred to as the Survivability Onion (http://www.eodc.ca/products/products-and-services/survivability-onion-description/). Layers of the onion include: don’t be seen, don’t be hit, don’t be penetrated and don’t be killed. Each onion stratum features specific technologies to safeguard an AFV and its crew. However, AFV survivability is not just the sum of discrete defensive systems, but rather it is their collective integration that generates superior protection.
Link:https://groundedcuriosity.com/shades-of-grozny-anti-tank-drones-and-the-yom-kippur-effect/

Curious to see the Vulcan 20mm cannon back again, once more atop a M113.

Didn't the IDF deploy such a system years ago, possibly for another purpose: ATGM, not drones?

davidbfpo
11-05-2018, 12:22 PM
A sixteen pgs. paper from MWI @ West Point and near the start a passage:
At the most basic level, however, there is an obvious, but neglected tactical problem in city fighting:simply crossing the street.
The amount of damage and numbers of casualties in fighting in recent years in Raqqa, Aleppo, Marawi, and Mosul show how rudimentary urban warfare tactics remain, as well as the highly destructive nature of combat in cities. Without new tactics and tools for dealing with some of the basic challenges of urban combat, military units are forced to employ extremely destructive methods to reclaim cities from entrenched defenders.
Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/crossing-the-street.pdf

I noted a reference to Hue Citadel in 1968, with 90mm tank cannon being found to be useless; my understanding is that the USMC realised only the "big guns" could breach the walls, so called up 155mm & 8" guns to batter a hole in the walls. When the ARVN mounted an assault the NVA/VC had left. Less certain is the tale that the USMC in Hue after a few days called the USMC Library @ Quantico, where a librarian explained how siege warfare had worked and so they reverted to those methods.

Plus the reference to defenders who were willing to die, citing ISIS in Mosul as an example. Yesterday I watched a YouTube documentary on the Canadians assaulting the walled city of Ortona, Italy in 1943 held by German paratroopers, as relevant today as it was then.
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SO7MoWh48g

AdamG
12-19-2018, 12:55 AM
The perfect petri dish.


In 1998, as the setting for his election celebrations, Chávez chose the balcony of the Teresa Carreño, a spectacular, brutalist style cultural centre. Built during the 1970s oil boom and reminiscent of London’s Queen Elizabeth Hall, it has hosted stars such as Dizzy Gillespie, George Benson, Ray Charles and Luciano Pavarotti, and epitomised the country’s new ambition. “Venezuela is reborn,” Chávez declared.

Twenty years after that upbeat address, an economic cataclysm experts blame on ill-conceived socialist policies, staggering corruption and the post-2014 slump in oil prices has given Caracas the air of a sinking ship.

Public services are collapsing, businesses closing and residents evacuating on buses or one of a dwindling number of flights still connecting their fallen metropolis to the rest of the world.

https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/dec/18/the-fallen-metropolis-the-collapse-of-caracas-the-jewel-of-latin-america

davidbfpo
12-28-2018, 02:33 PM
Discovered via a WW2 blog site and the first article concludes:
During the battle for Ortona, the Canadians innovated, improvised, and successfully exploited the effects of their personal weapons and supporting arms under largely unforeseen circumstances. Following a week of fighting in Ortona, the Canadian division became Eighth Army’s acknowledged street-fighting experts. In serving notice upon the Allies to expect further such battles, Ortona also carried implications. In Britain, armies composed mostly of untried formations waited to open the main ‘second front’ in northwest Europe, where they could expect an equally stubborn and desperate German defence. Ortona therefore merited close study, and received it from training staffs throughout the Allied armies.Canadian assessments figured highly, and they remain an instructive case study in the evaluation of battle experience.
Link:http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no4/gooderso-eng.asp

Amazing that the Canadians learnt so quickly.

The second article in part explains the learning:
The Canadians, recognizing that following standard doctrine would result in heavy casualties, swiftly indulged their tactical creativity, devising methods to make them more effective. The most notable of their solutions was the advent of mouse-holing, whereby soldiers would blow a hole in the wall separating two back-to-back buildings, either with explosive charges or the man-packed PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank) launcher, in order to avoid entering the streets and exposing themselves to fire. This inventiveness gave the Canadians a substantial advantage at Ortona, as the German forces were not only surprised by the switch from conventional tactics, but failed to adequately counter the improvised warfare, instead having to rely on conventional counterattacks, usually under the cover of night.
Link:https://www.seaforthhighlanders.ca/stories/470

The original website thread has other links, which include videos.
Link:http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/lessons-in-urban-warfare-ortona.55293/

davidbfpo
01-23-2019, 09:37 PM
An Australian Army commentary that aims to:
describe the key tactical lessons the Australian Army can learn from the AFoP’s urban siege of Marawi City. Consideration of these lessons may inform and improve the Australian Army’s current approach to the force generation of close combat, combined-arms capabilities. It will identify the key tactical lessons learned by the AFoP fighting an intelligent, determined, disciplined and well-equipped terrorist threat in the extraordinarily difficult, intense and complicated terrain.

Not to overlook this:
The fighting drove over 400,000 people from their homes.
Link:https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/article-the-battle-of-marawi-small-team-lessons-learned-for-the-close-fight/

Bill Moore
01-26-2019, 07:22 PM
An Australian Army commentary that aims to:

Not to overlook this:
Link:https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/article-the-battle-of-marawi-small-team-lessons-learned-for-the-close-fight/

I think the Aussies have this right.


Combat shooting, battlefield fitness, small team TTPs and battle craft are more important than any other skill, and must be prioritised. Above all else, the Australian Army must have the ability to deliver small combined arms teams to the fight who are capable of shooting faster and more accurately than their enemy out to 200 metres by day and by night; who can dominate and control complex spaces more rapidly and with fewer casualties; and who can operate seamlessly with other small teams or supporting elements in joint and coalition environments.

High levels of combat fitness, shooting skills, then tactical maneuver skills, and of course communication to facilitate coordination. (Shoot, move, and communicate)

Later in the article, they talked about the need for leadership that enables tactical innovation at the lowest levels.

Then add the game changing technology as the nation can afford it, night vision devises, explosive breaching, etc. A lot of good insights that validate much of the existing urban warfare doctrine.

davidbfpo
03-23-2019, 09:11 PM
Another MWI paper (58 pgs), the author being Margarita Konaev; though this time id'd via Twitter and published by a French "think tank".
Link:https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/konaev_urban_warfare_megacities_2019.pdf