Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[kaur]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT277.pdf

[Michael Shannon]

I noticed both here in Iraq and Afghanistan several flaws in the creation of local forces. The first was the failure to build a local leaders cadre first. In both campaigns we'd have been better off creating junior officer training units with programs of instruction at least as long as the equivilant courses in the west (i.e. one year for an infantry platoon commander) than running 3-4 week basic training courses taught by foreigners through poorly skilled translators. These very short courses left the graduates under trained or even resentful of our efforts.

Secondly we under paid recruits resulting in too many village idiots joining the colours while the pick of the litter stayed at home guarding opium.
In Afghanistan we could have cornered the market on the best troops available if we had simply paid as little as $300 per month.

Lastly, there is a tendancy, not doubt because the trainers are usually infantrymen, to ignore logistics and communications at anything more than a rudimentary level. With hindsight the first unit formed in the Afghan National Army should have been the leadership battalion and the second a logistic battalion. The Iraqi Army like the ANA, has been formed of almost nothing but various types of infantry and couldn't support itself without MNFI backing. Under this condition how could the US ever leave? The IA will distintegrate as soon as the US departs.

[tequila]

Tony Cordesman's latest on Iraqi security forces: Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070328_iraqiforces.pdf).

[Jedburgh]

Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress (http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT277.pdf')
Olga Oliker is a RAND associate, but this isn't a RAND pub; it's a transcript of her testimony to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on 28 Mar 07. Cordesman's report that Tequila linked to was also presented. Here's the other two:

Robert Perito, USIP: Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI032807/Perito_Testimony032807.pdf)

Frederick Kagan, AEI: Iraqi Security Forces: Status and Prospects (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI032807/Kagan_Testimony032807.pdf)

[Jedburgh]

Edit: Here's the latest (10 May 07) update to Cordesman's report:

The Critical Problems The US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Do the Job (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070510_iraqforcesupdate.pdf)

Also, here are more House hearing transcripts; this time from the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing on The Use of Contractors in Training, Equipping, and Sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces:

Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Patterson_Testimony042507.pdf)

Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Swartz_Testimony042507.pdf)

Joint testimony of Gary J. Motsek, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support), and Colonel Anita M. Raines, Chief, Logistics Services Division, J4 Directorate, Joint Staff (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/MotsekRaines_Testimony042507.pdf)

Deborah Avant, Professor, Political Science and International Affairs Director, Institute for Global and International Studies, GWU (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Avant_Testimony042507.pdf)

Doug Brooks, President, International Peace Operations Association (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Brooks_Testimony042507.pdf)

Gerald F. Burke, Major, MA State Police (Ret), Former Senior Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Burke_Testimony042507.pdf)

[slapout9]

Burke's report on the Police situation is absolutely outstanding!!

This is my friend Bubba and I have asked and asked and asked again for him to join the SWC but he is rather bitter about what he saw over there and the opportunities that were wasted. I can not speak for him, but what is in this report is almost a carbon copy of some of are conversations. This is a link to his resume and I think you will see he is pretty qualified.

http://www.mahaneylaw.com/page3.html

[tequila]

CNN report on Iraqi Army (http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/04/30/riminton.iraqtroops/index.html?section=cnn_topstories&eref=yahoo)training.




...

This is Camp Besmaya, a training facility for Iraqi army volunteers outside of Baghdad. The bugle welcome is for the head of the Iraqi ground forces, Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed.

He and U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, have come to watch final training exercises for 1,500 Iraqi soldiers, who within days will be deployed in Baghdad.

In teams of five, the Iraqis practice clearing houses of insurgents. They kick in doors and fan out through the rooms. Their eagerness fails to disguise a clumsy lack of practiced drilling.

Some of the men are gray-haired; some are overweight. But they do work together, a rare thing in a nation racked with murderous sectarian fault lines.

"It's definitely a motley crew," says U.S. Army Capt. Mark Tomola.

"I think these guys have more capabilities than we give them credit for sometimes," Tomola says. "At the same time, I'd say we need to make sure we aren't pulling out prematurely and leaving these guys without 'Big Brother' to back them up from time to time."

Trainer Jerry Massey, a 21-year U.S. Army veteran who now works as a civilian contractor, has a bleak view of the proficiency of his duties. To speed the soldiers into the field, they get less than half the time he thinks is ideal for his course. Still, it is better than nothing.

Iraq is on "the brink of anarchy," he says.

"If we leave, look at the guys who died here, who lost their limbs. What does it say about what they gave?" Massey says.

Some Iraqi troops don't get paid

There are about 330,000 trained Iraqi security forces, including 120,000 in the Iraqi army and 135,000 police force members, according to the U.S. Defense Department. But, according to a Defense Department report in March, "The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave and attrition."

At Camp Besmaya, Iraq's Ghiran-Majeed admits some of his soldiers don't even get paid.

The Iraqi army's administration has not kept up with its recruitment. Some units don't want to be deployed away from their home districts. On any day, one-quarter of the force is on vacation; soldiers get one week off in every four.

Also compared with a contracted, professional army, Iraqi soldiers are hired as if it's for any job, and they are free to leave whenever they wish. Many do, officials say.

In combat, without American forces present, the Iraqi soldiers have no medical evacuation capacity and no air support. They rely on the U.S.-led coalition for equipment, training and supplies.

...

In Sunni west Baghdad, Abdul Salaam criticizes a passing U.S. patrol, complaining the nearby patrol base has cut off electricity to his neighborhood.

"We have a lot of problems here," he says.

His neighbor complains that the additional U.S. troops in Baghdad mean he feels even more under occupation, but at the same time he reluctantly acknowledges his neighborhood feels more secure.

And as much as the majority of Iraqis say they loathe the American presence, they also fear its end.

Near a Sunni-Shia dividing line in northwest Baghdad, a U.S. patrol pays a visit to a small security hut at a power station. The guard, Jassim Mohammed, welcomes the Americans with glasses of sweet black tea.

He was once one of more than 40 guards at the site. Now all but two have fled and he and a comrade share rolling, six-hour shifts seven days a week. His protection is a battered AK-47 and a new blue British armored vest.

"If the Americans leave," he says, "it will be like this."

His hands make a gesture of powerful collision, the fingers interlocking.

...

Pittard is counted a rising star in the U.S. military, a thoughtful man devoid of swagger. His experience includes a year commanding troops in Diyala province, which has recently descended into bloody chaos.

He is frank in assessing the Iraqi military.

"The Iraqi Security Forces cannot take the fight to the enemy without our assistance at this point," he says.

He says an American withdrawal, like many in Washington are pushing for, "would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq would take advantage of. We cannot leave Iraq in disarray."

"We came here in 2003. We cannot leave this nation as a failed state," he says.

A failed state is what almost everyone in Iraq predicts if the Americans go too early. It is one of the very few points of agreement here.

[roger29palms]

I've never been able to understand why what was once the 4th largest military in the world, as it was described before the Gulf War, cannot attract more recruits with prior experience. Especially since the employment situation is so dismal in Iraq.

[SWJED]

15 May NY Times - Iraqi Military Faces Hurdles in Its Quest to Take Charge (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/world/middleeast/15embed.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) by Alissa Rubin.


... General Pittard, who oversees training for the Iraqi Army, elite police and border guards, travels five days out of seven, tracking the progress of Iraqi forces as they prepare to eventually take charge of the country’s defense...

Of the Iraqi Army’s 10 divisions, eight are under Iraqi control. Only two, the Fifth Division in Diyala and the Seventh Division in western Iraq, are still under American control.

The Fifth Division is well equipped now and almost at full strength, but it has had a tough fight...

[SWJED]

9 June National Journal - The Thin Iraqi Line (http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm) by James Kitfield.


Even to the trained eye, Iraq is a land of deep shadow and blinding light. And shades of moral ambiguity are as infinite as the ever-changing russet tones of the desert. Look closely past the bright smiles and pleasantries of some Iraqis in uniform and you will find dark deeds and blood-soaked hands, just as many a stern visage hides acts of courage and selfless patriotism. Each day, U.S. commanders in Iraq try to decide where between those extremes lies the true face of the Iraqi forces they are constantly training...

[davidbfpo]

Excellent description of the Iraqi 'thin line' and particularly the police. One sad part about two American advisers falling victim to an IED at a deserted Irqai Army checkpoint. Note, no recommendations or solutions made.

davidbfpo

[SWJED]

13 June Washington Post - Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/12/AR2007061202179.html?hpid=topnews) by Walter Pincus and Ann Scott Tyson.


A senior U.S. military commander said yesterday that Iraq's army must expand its rolls by at least 20,000 more soldiers than Washington had anticipated, to help free U.S. troops from conducting daily patrols, checkpoints and other critical yet dangerous missions.

Even then, Iraq will remain incapable of taking full responsibility for its security for many years -- five years in the case of protecting its airspace -- and will require a long-term military relationship with the United States, said Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who until recently led the U.S. military's training effort in Iraq...

[Jedburgh]

The House Armed Services Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee received testimony on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces on 12 Jun 07:

LTG Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI061207/Dempsey_Testimony061207.pdf)

Mark Kimmitt, the Dpty Asst SecDef for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs also testified. However, the transcript of his testimony doesn't appear to be available.

[Ski]

One of the dichotomies I've noticed with both Iraq and Afghanistan is the call for bigger armies, police forces, security forces, etc...

It would be interesting to see the desertion rates from the beginning of the Afghan National Army and the Iraq Army by year to date, and then extrapolate the size of these two forces would be without any desertion or miniscule desertion rates, like 5%. I'm sure it's all classified...

But both armies would probably be quite large without the desertions. So calling for larger forces is somewhat of an exercise similar to pissing in the wind...

[Tacitus]

Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.

Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.

I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.

[Granite_State]

Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.

Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.

I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.

Here's my question: is this true? Virtually everything I've read leads me to believe it is, the words of two friends who have served there (one USMC, one PMC) seemed kind of ambivalent. Would love to hear from guys who are or have been over there recently on this, it's probably the central question of the whole war.

[SWJED]

25 June NY Times - U.S. Generals Doubt Ability of Iraqi Army to Hold Gains (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/middleeast/25iraq.html?ref=world) by Alissa Rubin.


Iraq faced more troubles on the military and political fronts on Sunday: some American commanders expressed doubts about the ability of Iraqi troops to hold the gains made in areas north of the capital last week, and two Sunni Arab blocs boycotted a Parliament session, demanding the reinstatement of the speaker...

The American commander in Baquba, Brig. Gen. Mick Bednarek, and his counterpart south of Baghdad, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, pointed to a variety of problems with the Iraqi forces, including a shortage of trained troops and a lack of basic supplies like ammunition, radios and trucks.

“They’re not quite up to the job yet,” General Bednarek said in an interview with The Associated Press in Baquba.

American troops are at the forefront of the offensive in Diyala Province, north of Baghdad, which has become a haven for Al Qaeda. Baquba is the provincial capital. But the understanding has always been that Iraqi troops would hold the ground as the Americans leave.

Commanders have repeatedly voiced concerns that there are insufficient well-trained Iraqi troops and say that many units remain undersupplied...

[SteveMetz]

Apologies if this has already been linked, but here (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI_ISFreport062707/OI_Report_FINAL.pdf) is the HASC report on building Iraqi security forces. I just killed half a forest printing it.

[Jedburgh]

GAO, 31 Jul 07: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07711.pdf)

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces.

DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books.....

[tequila]

Lack of equipment hampers Iraqi Army (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mosul28aug28,1,6654046,print.story?coll=la-headlines-world)- LATIMES, 28 Aug.


Although Washington has made the readiness of Iraqi forces a key benchmark of progress, the Baghdad government is still failing to supply Iraqi commanders in this northern city with adequate equipment to go it alone, U.S. commanders say.

Equipment shortages are a major concern in Mosul and other areas as U.S. offensives in Anbar province in the west and belts of cities surrounding Baghdad drive Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters and other militants north.

"Bottom line, things are just not getting here," said Lt. Col. Stephen Twitty, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division ...

[Rob Thornton]

First a couple of corrections to the LA Times article - Its not LTC Twitty, but COL Twitty; its not a BKC, but a PKC and Wathiq is not an IP (Iraqi Police) SGM, but the IP General over all IP forces in Mosul.

You also have to understand there is a difference in the IP and IA in terms of how they are structured and how they are supplied. IA get their supplies from MOD (Ministry of Defense), the IP get their supplies through the MOI (Ministry of Interior). This is fundamental to the problem.

The AIF understand that the IP are poorly equipped and paid less then the IA. As such they are a more tempting target and routinely are out-gunned and out manned. IP stations often are the primary targets of assaults and VBIEDs. Where the IA have some up armored HMMWVs mostly LVL II 998s and 1025s (but they are starting to get some 1114s), and are outfitted, organized and paid better, the IPs mostly have Ford or Chevy PUs with minimal, homespun ballistic protection.

I disagree with the admiral's observation, IMHO I don't think he understands the situation on the ground at every single location throughout Iraq - this is a staff problem of not being able to effectively communicate problems and needs so that the ADM can take action and influence his Iraqi peers to rectify deficiencies. I dealt with this allot trying to get M76 rifles and Ammunition so that the IA could conduct sniper overwatches of Tier 1 IED sites and counter sniper operations. You have to explain the rational as though the person who approves what should already be there by MTO&E is a million miles away, because if you are in Mosul and they are in Baghdad, that is often the case.

However, for all they lack I have some some incredible acts of bravery and some major scores by the IPs in Mosul - often my IA counterparts and I would lament over the IPs situation. I'd also add that while the IA have dedicated TTs that offer more thorough coverage, COL Twitty's BCT (when I left in MAR) did not have the resources to provide the same level of coverage to the IPs. This is important because unless you have some dedicated TT members who can identify and articulate the problem (hopefully the type of staff work that IDs a potential problem before it becomes a show-stopper) so that it gets up the CoC and is understood and addressed, you wind up with no clear cause and effect that allows you to fix shortfalls in performance.

I'd say the IPs and IA I know in Mosul are further beyond the tribal loyalties we typically generalize them to be - however, tribal society is a fact of life in the Middle East. The more senior IA and IP officers I knew want and understand the need for a stronger central government in Iraq - this went for Arab & Kurd) - because they have a grasp of regional politics. The few I knew who did not and pursued their own agenda were asked to retire.

With the IA its a little different. These guys are aggressive in going after AIF. I absolutely mean that. COL Twitty remarks about the drawdown of CF forces in Mosul - the IA can be credited with that. It really started about the time we got them up-armored HMMWVs, started evacuating them to our CSH, and got them some good training - much of this can be credited to the efforts of the BCTs and TTs in Mosul, but some credit should go to the MOD generals who came down and interviewed IA BN CDRs, TT members, CF partners and went out on patrols.

The biggest problem here is CL IX flow and major end item replacement. Since the IA are more aggressive, they are taking more casualties and more of their hMMWVs are being blown up and not repaired. Creating a LOG system in the middle of a war is hard work.

The IA and IP do many of the same tasks, but they are controlled by different ministries. MOD does a better job of meeting the needs of the war Iraq is in. Somehow the wall that separates the 2 ministries needs to be breached until such a time that the Army can do Army missions, and the IP police missions - until then, they are both doing kind of a para-military mission to combat the gamut of terrorists, insurgents and organized crime (and I might add in foreign support and interests). Take a look at the article in VOL 8 I did up about building Indig Sec Forces - I tried to explain in more depth the challenges faced by the Iraqis there. I'd also add that at least some of the IA and IP BNs/BDEs, and stations have established relationships with their counterparts to provide support.

COL Twitty nails the problem - until ISF can conduct continuous operations independent of CF assistance, our presence will be what sees them through the rough spots. The biggest hurdles to realizing this are 1) bringing the IPs up to the standard of the IA in terms of effectiveness - which means better equipment, better pay, better training and more advisers; 2) Establishing a LOG system for all ISF which allows them to anticipate their needs and support an operational tempo which allows them to retain the initiative.

Hope that clarifies things some, Best Regards, Rob

[tequila]

Mixed marks for Iraqi security forces (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-na-usiraq31aug31,1,1549038,print.story?coll=la-middleeast) - LATIMES, 31 Aug.


The Iraqi National Police will need an overhaul to rid the ranks of sectarian bias, according to an assessment of the Iraqi security forces to be released next week.

The report -- commissioned by Congress and headed by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones -- gives relatively good marks to the Iraqi army, according to an administration official briefed on the report. It says the army has been well-equipped and -trained and is now conducting operations effectively, the official said.

Its assessment of the police is far more pessimistic. The report suggests starting over with the National Police, possibly by reconfiguring it as a smaller force.

The Iraqi National Police, under the Ministry of Interior, number about 25,000. The report does not recommend such an overhaul of the 325,000 local and provincial police ...

[tequila]

Many Trainees are Complicit with 'Enemy Targets' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/03/AR2007090301478_pf.html)- Washington Post, 4 Sep.


The platoon of American soldiers was pinned down in an alley outside the holiest Shiite shrine in western Baghdad's Kadhimiyah neighborhood. Machine-gun fire sprayed from apartment windows and rooftops with a deafening clatter. The troops were 15 yards from their Humvees (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/AM+General+Humvee?tid=informline), but they didn't know if they could survive the dash.

Less than a mile away, a powerful Shiite parliament member stood inside an American military (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Armed+Forces?tid=informline) base, in the office of the Iraqi army brigade commander responsible for Kadhimiyah. The Americans had called for Iraqi army backup, but according to the brigade commander and American officers, the lawmaker would help ensure that no assistance arrived from the Iraqis that crucial day.

"No Iraqi army unit, of the 2,700 Iraqi security forces that are in Kadhimiyah, no Iraqi army unit would respond," said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, a deputy brigade commander based in this Shiite enclave of 200,000 people on the western shore of the Tigris River. "It shows you how difficult it is to root out the militia influence when they've got political top-cover."

The two-hour firefight under the golden domes of the Musa al-Kadhim shrine on April 29 left at least eight Iraqis dead. While no Americans were injured, it marked the start of the deterioration of security in Kadhimiyah, once one of Baghdad (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Baghdad?tid=informline)'s safest neighborhoods. It also made plain -- "the first time the complicity was staring us right in the face," as one American soldier put it -- that the Iraqi army's problem in the area was about more than just being under-trained or ill-equipped ...

[ali_ababa]

I actually thought the Iraqi army was getting a bit better but after reading some of the reports here - most of all my optimicism has been crushed :).

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 13 Nov 07:

Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry of the Interior So Hard? (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071113_fixingiraq.pdf)

In September 2007, retired US Marine Corps General Jim Jones led an independent commission to evaluate the state of the Iraqi security forces. His team concluded that:

“The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.”

Given that an effective and law-abiding interior ministry will be critical to Iraq’s future security environment and political evolution, this stark conclusion is disturbing. Moreover, it raises the question of why the heavy Coalition investment in recruiting, training, and equipping the Iraqi civil security forces and advising the Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2003 has apparently not had a more positive impact.

This paper examines the charge laid out in the Jones report (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf), explains why institution building and reform at the MOI have proved so difficult, and notes flaws in the international capacity building effort that need to be addressed. The central argument is that Iraq’s political dynamics, combined with the unprecedented burdens being placed upon the MOI, will continue to make institutional development and reform terribly difficult. However, assessments such as the Jones report ignore the fact that the ministry is more functional than it may at first appear. Furthermore, there are signs of incipient, MOI-led reforms; these provide hopeful pointers. In order to take advantage of these incipient reforms, the international assistance effort needs to significantly raise its game. If this can be achieved, then, gradually and painfully, the ministry could become a more positive force in Iraqi society. However, even if technical institutional reforms are successful, it will be important to understand that the ministry will reflect Iraq’s political make-up; it cannot stand above national politics.....

[Jedburgh]

GAO, 30 Nov 07: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08143r.pdf)

...Although DOD has, in multiple reports, stated that a certain number of ISF units are either “independent” or “fully independent,” it is unclear how DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First, since spring 2006 the process that Coalition transition teams use to assess ISF units does not allow the option of giving a rating of independent or fully independent; according to Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s (MNC-I (http://www.mnci.centcom.mil/)) Transitional Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update, the highest rating any ISF unit can attain is “capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.”8 Second, in each of the reports in which DOD asserts that a certain number of ISF units are independent or fully independent it apparently contradicts this assertion by appending significant qualifiers to the achievement of ISF independence. For example, DOD reported in June 2007 (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf) that a certain number of MOD units were either “in the lead with Coalition enablers” or “fully independent” but then added the qualifying statements that fielded MOD forces “often do not get the support they require without substantial Coalition assistance” and “MOD’s continued limited logistics and sustainment capacity is a key hindrance to Iraqi forces’ ability to assume missions from the Coalition.” Third, the MOD and MOI have yet to develop those support capabilities by which they can logistically sustain their forces, effectively command and control their forces, and provide intelligence to their forces—all of which are inherent to independence. As a result of DOD’s lack of clarity, Congress and other decision makers may not obtain a clear picture of the progress of the ISF and whether it is becoming capable of truly conducting its operations independently, i.e., without Coalition assistance and support. Therefore, we recommend that DOD clarify its use of the terms “independent” or “fully independent” as they relate to the assessed capabilities of ISF units, and particularly as they relate to the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those units. We also recommend that it clarify the process it uses to make this assessment......
Complete 33 page report at the link.

[Ron Humphrey]

GAO, 30 Nov 07: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08143r.pdf)

Complete 33 page report at the link.

I am going to read through the entire report, but in so much as my own personal grain of salt that I take everything with I would ask this.

Considering how often we here in US tend to establish metrics to the umteenth degree for accepting anything as complete or finished, wouldn't it already be acceptable to believe that unless every single unit, with every little soldier had every little thing down to the extra pair of shoe laces, That those at the GAO would not consider them independant.

I couldn't say for sure but I'll bet 40 to 50 guys with weapons, leadership, and direction for a operation can be quite effective despite not having their complete standard issue.

From my own mil history I honestly remember almost never having everything I was supposed to , yet somehow I got the job done and so did others around me.

I for one will take what the commander on the ground tells me about their capabilities before I necessarily rely on check the bloc stuff from folks who aren't there.

Just another take on it...

[Xenophon]

I actually thought the Iraqi army was getting a bit better but after reading some of the reports here - most of all my optimicism has been crushed

Not yet. A lot of these reports are old. I've been attached to an IA battalion for about a week now, and the IA are pretty good to go. The biggest problem is, of course, logistics and outfitting. But they're getting by. They're not starving or running out of ammo, and more often than not they have fuel. The differences in how they operate and how we operate are strictly superficial. What an American sees as "wrong" is not necessarily wrong, it's just not how we would do things.

Best of all they are motivated as hell. They've got a pretty brutal operational tempo, in my opinion, and are handling it just fine. I wouldn't want to go up against these guys, and I feel very secure patrolling with them every day.

I'll have to let you know what I think of the IP when I have more contact with them. I live/hang out with the IA so I'm getting more exposure to them. All I've seen of the IP are their positions and occasionally a patrol.

[Rex Brynen]

Not yet. A lot of these reports are old. I've been attached to an IA battalion for about a week now, and the IA are pretty good to go. The biggest problem is, of course, logistics and outfitting. But they're getting by. They're not starving or running out of ammo, and more often than not they have fuel. The differences in how they operate and how we operate are strictly superficial. What an American sees as "wrong" is not necessarily wrong, it's just not how we would do things.

Interesting insight. What's the level of ethnic/religious integration in your unit, and how does that relate to their area of deployment and primary targets? (In other words, does the motivation stem from a predominately Shi'ite or Kurdish unit operating in/against primarily Sunni targets, or does it appear to have gelled as a "national" military unit?)

If you can comment at all, you might prefer to do so in an email or PM.

[Jedburgh]

17 Jan 08 HASC testimony of LTG James Dubik (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC011708/Dubik_Testimony011708.pdf), Cdr MNSTC-I, on Iraqi Security Forces.

....Just one final word about perspective here, if I may. When I was in command out at Fort Lewis, I was tasked to grow three Stryker Brigades. I encountered four main problems in doing so. It’s hard to produce leaders as fast as you stand up a unit. It’s hard to synchronize arrival of those leaders with soldiers. It’s hard to synchronize the training of those soldiers with the delivery of their equipment. And it’s a whole lot easier to build units than it is to build bases.....

[Presley Cannady]

Out of curiosity, does anyone know of any effort by the US and host nation to arm, train and supply communities of the internally displaced and minorities? With a pool of some 2 million people who voted with their feet not to participate in the insurgency, seems a bit of a waste to wait for some number of enterprising sheikhs to make good on the idea first.

[Jedburgh]

Out of curiosity, does anyone know of any effort by the US and host nation to arm, train and supply communities of internally isplaced persons? With a pool of some 2 million people who footed with their feet not to participate in the insurgency, seems a bit of a waste to wait for some number of enterprising sheikhs to make good on the idea first.
I don't believe that you can categorize the majority of IDPs as "voting with their feet not to participate in the insurgency". Most are simply families who were forced out of where they orginally lived by one sectarian militia or the other - or fled due to the violence brought down upon them by the presence of insurgents or foreign terrorists in their midst. If the violence had not come home to them, they were actually less likely to end up as members of any one of the spectrum of armed organizations that make up the insurgency.

The majority of unemployed unattached males of military age among the IDPs have already chosen to either serve with one of the opposition militias or with the ISF. Recruiting efforts for the ISF certainly reaches these people, although I can't state how effective it is. But I don't see the wisdom of recruiting, arming and training a militia made up solely of IDPs. Those who wish to exact revenge for their plight have already joined the opposing militia (more emotionally satisfying than ISF duty) - establishing such an entity under government sponsorship would appear to be counterproductive.

[Presley Cannady]

I don't believe that you can categorize the majority of IDPs as "voting with their feet not to participate in the insurgency". Most are simply families who were forced out of where they orginally lived by one sectarian militia or the other - or fled due to the violence brought down upon them by the presence of insurgents or foreign terrorists in their midst. If the violence had not come home to them, they were actually less likely to end up as members of any one of the spectrum of armed organizations that make up the insurgency.

No argument here.


The majority of unemployed unattached males of military age among the IDPs have already chosen to either serve with one of the opposition militias or with the ISF. Recruiting efforts for the ISF certainly reaches these people, although I can't state how effective it is. But I don't see the wisdom of recruiting, arming and training a militia made up solely of IDPs. Those who wish to exact revenge for their plight have already joined the opposing militia (more emotionally satisfying than ISF duty) - establishing such an entity under government sponsorship would appear to be counterproductive.

As I understand it, their choices are to fight for revenge wherever their militias ranges, to fight for the central authority where Baghdad chooses, or fight for spots in camps for the displaced. With the ISF, they can hope to remain in the same governorate for a long period of time, although this doesn't seem to me a guarantee that they'll ever play a part in retaking their homes and communities. With the militias, they can hope for the chance that regional will see things their way and make a stand against the opposing insurgents who forced them out in the first place--and that's only if the group they sign up with has the muscle to bring about that day. Given the anemic state of the provincial police forces, isn't there a fourth option available for these IDPs? Are there enough able bodies to organize municipal militias under the the national flag to return and push back the invaders?

[sullygoarmy]

Hey All,
Its been a while since I've been in SWJ...I promise to do a better job!

I've been doing some reading on how we organized our "Ministry of Defense" before, during and after WWII. When you look at the amount of time it took to get the DoD to where its (semi) functional, its almost no wonder there are so many issues trying to get the Iraqi ministries up to speed. Throw in the fact that after living under a dictatorship for decades, you are trying to overcome numerous obstacles. As good as our SF teams are, there really aren't any military units trained to get ministries up to speed. Heck, where are they in the federal government?

That being said, while you are seeing on the ground improvements at the IA battalion and BDE levels, until you get the ministries both functional and effective, its still a band-aid solution.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 28 May 08: Iraqi Force Development 2008 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080527_isf_report.pdf)

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remain very much a work in progress, and MNF-I reporting continues to sharply exaggerate the real-world readiness of Iraqi Army units, and the ability of the ISF to takeover security responsibility in given governorates. Congress and outside observers, however, need to recognize that very real progress is being made and that the exaggerations and flaws in MNF-I and US government reporting do not mean that the ISF cannot steadily reduce the need for US and allied forces over time. The development of the ISF faces a number of uncertainties:

Battle of Basra: The poor performance of some elements of the ISF in Basra should come as no surprise. Even the most capable force needs adequate preparation and planning.....

Performance outside Basra and in Baghdad: The ISF performed better in smaller operations outside of Basra in southern Iraq. The ISF did not, however, initially perform well in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. Only US forces were ready to deal with the threat posed by the Mahdi Army (JAM).....

The Battle of Mosul: The city of Mosul, and parts of Ninewah province, are the last major stronghold of AQI. There are relatively few US forces located in Mosul, and operations to destroy this stronghold are being led largely by the ISF. There are also almost no Sons of Iraq groups in Mosul, so the IA and IP must face AQI largely by themselves. Progress in launching the battle was slow although AQI remained on the defensive.....

Localization of Security in the forces of the MoD and the MoI: The regular Iraqi armed forces seem to be gradually becoming a more national force, with fewer highly Kurdish and Shi‘ite elements, and fewer problems with Sunni officers. This progress, however, is slow and uncertain. No such progress is taking place in the regular police.....

Iraqi Police Force: Progress in developing the IP is extremely uncertain. There has been little useful official reporting on the progress of the Iraqi Police Force.....

Slow Progress in the Local Rule of Law: There has been some progress at the highest levels in establishing courts and some rule of law. Yet the central government lacks an effective presence in many areas, and the criminal justice and courts system is unable to support the police.....

National Police: Until 2007, the National Police acted largely as a Shi‘ite force within the MOI, and were responsible for much sectarian violence against Sunnis. Far from being a central-government run nationwide police force, they more often resembled a government funded tool of sectarian intimidation. MNF-I instituted a massive reform program in the NP in 2007.....

Sons of Iraq: This large mostly Sunni and tribal force is supposed to be temporary, and the ultimate destination of the over 90,000 men in these units is a major uncertainty. While MNSTC-I believes that 20-25% of the Sons of Iraq will be absorbed into the ISFii, progress has been slow in this area. What will become of the other 75-80% of these heavily armed men, accustomed to their relatively high salaries, is also a major concern....

Political and militia influence in the ISF: The "competition among ethnic and sectarian communities" that Gen. Petraeus believes is at the heart of conflict in Iraq includes the struggle for control of the MOD and MOI.....

Intelligence: Iraq‘s intelligence apparatus remains divided between a CIA-supported "official" agency (the Iraqi National Intelligence Service or INIS) and a Shi‘ite-run agency (under the auspices of the minister of state for national security, Shirwan al-Waely).....

Provincial Powers Law: The balance of power between the central and Provincial governments remains undecided. How power shifts between the provinces and Baghdad will affect the ISF is also unclear.....

Equipment and Logistics: The ISF has made significant progress in the areas of logistics and equipping forces in the field. However, many units, especially in the IP, remain critically short of equipment.....

Metrics: MNF-I and the GOI continue to provide misleading and optimistic public reporting and metrics on ISF performance. The ISF is making progress in many areas, but MNF-I and GOI reporting and metrics sharply understate the real-world timelines and efforts needed to deal with problems and delays in shaping credible force plans, getting proper training facilities and throughput, embedding competent advisors, providing effective equipment, getting competent Iraqi leaders and force retention, and dealing with ethnic and sectarian issues. Official reporting on the MOI and the IP in particular is extremely misleading.
Complete 71 page paper at the link.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 11 Sep 08: How Soon is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and Conditions-Based US Withdrawals (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080916_isf_report.pdf)

No one can be certain whether setting a timeframe for US withdrawals that ends in 2011 will lead to instability in Iraq, or that such a timeline will lead the US to hand over responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces before they are able to do the job. There also is nothing wrong with setting broad goals for withdrawing US forces from Iraq. The US wants to leave as soon as this is feasible, and at least since 2004, Iraq's Kurds have been the only group in Iraq that showed a consistent desire for the US to stay.

It also is impossible to be certain that the risks of early withdrawal will really be greater than the risks of trying to stay longer than Iraqi politics permit. There are good reasons to extend the US military and advisory presence at steadily diminishing levels until Iraq has developed security forces that are fully ready to take over key missions without US support, and Iraq has achieved a greater degree of stability.

It is at least possible that setting early timelines will force Iraqis to move towards political accommodation, to take hard decisions, and to develop security forces that are more effective. In fact, if all goes well in Iraq, deadlines like 2011 may prove practical – particularly if such deadlines do not preclude a large number of US military advisors. Moreover, the US ―occupation‖ is so controversial and unpopular that the cost of staying long enough to do every job right could be far higher in terms of Iraqi resentment and political backlash than the security benefits would be worth.

At the same time, it is not a good idea to bet a country -- and the outcome of a war -- on the strategic equivalent of filling an inside straight. Political rhetoric often makes such "bets on the outcome;" it also often loses the bet. Iraq still faces a large number of risks and problems where a US military presence does more to stabilize the situation than destabilize it, and where both Iraqi and US leaders will need to be careful and realistic about how quickly they can move......
Complete 166-page document at the link.