The Indian role in Afghanistan (new title)

[SWJED]

12 June The Australian - Indian Troops to Fight Taliban (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21890061-31477,00.html) by Bruce Loudon.


India is doubling its deployment of highly trained commandos to combat the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

The commandos, from the crack Indo-Tibetan Border Police force that specialises in high-altitude operations in the Himalayas, are being sent to guard about 300 Indian road builders working on the 218km Zaranj-Delaram highway, which will connect Afghanistan's second city, Kandahar, with the Iranian border.

The highway, part of an Indian aid project, traverses the heart of the Taliban badlands and engineers working on the project have been the target of frequent attacks.

The new deployment meant almost 400 commandos would be in the area to combat Taliban attempts to halt construction of the highway, Indian news agency PTI reported...

[davidbfpo]

I do not recall much reporting on the Indian involvement in Afghanistan, so apologies if 'old news'.

When the Taliban government dominated Afghanistan the Northern Alliance, led by General Dostum, there was a small Indian military advisory team, much to the annoyance of the Pakistanis. Less certain now, the advisers provided artillery expertise and assisted the American intervention. After Kabul fell the Indian advisers went low profile.

So Indian has para-military police in Western Afghanistan, I wonder how ISAF manages that relationship?

davidbfpo

[Ray]

India had offered troops when the operations had begun, but this was not taken on so as to not upset the Pakistanis, from whom a greater cooperation was required since the terrorists were launching from the safety and bases in Pakistan.

The Indo Tibetan Border Police are para military personnel. They are being sent to guard the General Reserve Engineer Force (India) that is building the Highway in Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

The Indian contractors building the highway have finished, so have the Indian protectors left? Or is there another contract? I note a Chinese contractor is present somewhere and with US Army protection.

davidbfpo

[Brian Hanley]

http://www.esamskriti.com/essay-chapters/Conquering-Afghanistan~-What-the-West-can-learn-from-India-1.aspx

Conquering Afghanistan- What The West Can Learn From India
By Rakesh Krishnan Simha , [ rakeshmail@gmail.com]

Chapter : 1
The western media says no country has ever conquered Afghanistan, but the fact they conveniently forget is that not too long ago the Indians conquered and ruled Afghanistan, an episode of history that is carved into the recesses of the Afghan mind.


... But first a flashback to the past. Afghanistan had always been a part of India; it was called Gandhar, from which the modern Kandahar originates. It was a vibrant ancient Indian province that gave the world excellent art, architecture, literature and scientific knowledge. After Alexander’s ill-fated invasion in the 4th century BC, it became even more eclectic – a melting pot of Indian and Greek cultures, a world far removed from today’s Taliban infested badlands.

It was an Indian province until 1735 when Nadir Shah of Iran emboldened by the weakness of India's latter Mughals ransacked Delhi. ...

... Nadir Shah’s successor Ahmad Shah Abdali had been launching repeated raids into Punjab and Delhi. To check this Ranjit Singh decided to build a modern and powerful army with the employment of Frenchmen, Italians, Greeks, Russians, Germans and Austrians. In fact, two of the foreign officers who entered the maharaja’s service, Ventura and Allard, had served under Napoleon. Says historian Shiv Kumar Gupta: “All these officers were basically engaged by Ranjit Singh for modernization of his troops. He never put them in supreme command.”

After conquering Multan in 1818 and Kashmir in 1819, Ranjit Singh led his legions across the Indus and took Dera Ghazi Khan in 1820 and Dera Ismail Khan in 1821. Alarmed, the Afghans called for a jehad under the leadership of Azim Khan Burkazi, the ruler of Kabul. A big Afghan army collected on the bank of the Kabul river at Naushehra, but Ranjit Singh won a decisive victory and the Afghans were dispersed in 1823. Peshawar was subdued in 1834.

[omarali50]

I will be the first to say that the unconquerable Afghanistan myth is a myth. Afghanistan has been conquered MANY times, usually by conquerors passing through on their way to better real estate. But this particular article is really silly and very very superficial. Ancient Afghanistan was on the periphery of Ancient India and if we are talking about the Mahabharata, we are in the realm of myth, not in the realm of proper historiography. (again, I am a fan of the Mahabharat and highly recommend the simplified short English version by RK Narayan, but lets not get carried away).
In "historical times", Afghanistan has more often been the source of people who raided or even conquered the Indian plains and not the other way round (which, to my mind, is neither here not there as far as present times are concerned as the whole notion of genetically unconquerable and conquerable people is false, so I am not reading too much into that either).
For example, the writer states that until 1735, Afghanistan was an Indian province. Since the ruling dynasty in India (the Moghuls) advertised themselves first and foremost as "Taimuris" (descendants of Tamerlane) and were from central asia and ruled Afghanistan BEFORE they ruled India, and their predecessors (the Lodhis) were actually pathans who had moved into India as part of conquering Afghan armies, this is a bit too clever an assertion.
Ranjit Singh did indeed capture what is now the Pakistani part of traditional Pathan lands (which is why those parts are IN Pakistan...they became British when the British defeated Ranjit Singh's incompetent successors) but that is hardly the same thing as conquering Afghanistan. A case can be made that he COULD have taken Kabul if he wanted, but what exactly does that prove? that a superior military led by a superior leader can defeat a weaker nation?
Ranjit Singh's successful subjugation of his Pathan subjects does tell us that there is nothing inherently unconquerable about these tribes (or any other tribes). Is that news?
btw, Hari Singh Malwa conquered Hazara in what is now Pakistan's Hazara division, which has nothing to do with the Afghan Hazarajat. That whole paragraph makes no sense whatsoever.

[Steve the Planner]

Omarali is on point.

If you follow all the threads, however, Afghanistan has been a relatively well-flipped pawn since the dawn of civilization.

Reading history from the British Durand Line days is sure to obscure the functional human and economic geography at play.

Gwandar was NOT afghanistan, nor was it Pakistan. It was it's own functional region from Kwandar to Khandahar.

I recently read a supposedly authoritative piece wherein the author was waxing poetic on the great accomplishments of Afghanistan, with a little disclaimer that it was "in the area now known as Afghanistan." Actually, it was the area then known as Gwandar."

The below reference is a little hard to read (English as second language) but it does a good job of opening the door of possible alternative histories of India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and IRAN, and the cultures and civilizations which sprang up along the sea coast and extended inward by either river valleys or terrain.

http://www.ranajitpal.com/dream.html

India itself was, and in part, remains a hodgepodge of "Empires" which they are still internally trying to sort out into functional states.

Steve

[omarali50]

Sorry, i mis-wrote Nalwa as Malwa.
Btw, since Hari Singh is supposedly the 534th person in history who has been used by mothers to quiet their crying children, can anyone cite an actual occasion when ANY mother anywhere has used the name of any general to shut up her crying child? I am beginning to suspect this story is no more true than the legend of Santa Claus...

[Steve the Planner]

Sure. I would routinely use the name of Field Marshall Goering to frighten my daughter to sleep. Right.

Things are also said to "sell like hotcakes," but I can never recall seeing any hotcakes for sale anywhere....

The problem we have with so much of this stuff is that myths and wive's tales can start to substitute for genuine information.

I started with Iraq and Afghanistan back in about 6,000 BC. From that, it seems pretty obvious that the myth that Iraq was a made up country was just myth. It's core boundaries and the concepts of Iraq are well-established and documented---Gertrude Bell didn't make them up.

Instead, however, history suggests that if any "country" were actually made up (and badly), I would put Afghanistan at the top of the Made-Up-O-Meter, stumbling into existence in its present context by a collection of 1893 to 1950 accidents.

The Rulers of Kabul, the Rulers of Khandahar, The Rulers of the major towns along the Silk Road, go back in time, and they all had a different focus and purpose... Afghanistan goes back in decades.

Although I haven't quantified it, I would guess that most of what now constitutes Afghanistan has been under occupancy or foreign dominion more than it has been "free."

In most cases, as with Ranjit Singh, there were substantial mutual benefits that flowed from their affiliation and/or subjugation. That's when stability existed.

Steve

PS- Got any hot cakes?

[SJPONeill]

Although I haven't quantified it, I would guess that most of what now constitutes Afghanistan has been under occupancy or foreign dominion more than it has been "free."

Exactly and if you also consider that the many of the residents of the geographic area known as Afghanistan have 73 higher loyalties (to tribe, family, etc) before even considering themselves possibly citizens of Afghanistan, the conquering of the country is largely moot...I wonder if many of the tribes at the time got the memo that they had been conquered by India...?

[davidbfpo]

This the nearest hospitable place for this report.

Apparently Prime Minister Putin this week in a statement after a new arms deal with India commented that Russia shares India's concerns over the Taliban in Afghanistan.

After a search I did find this on an arms & nuclear power deal: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8561365.stm and a suggestion that they did share concerns: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Putin-here-will-discuss-India-role-in-Afghanistan/articleshow/5673201.cms

How the Afghan state will react to such 'shared concerns' is not clear, especially as the Pakistani reaction maybe to label this as strategic encirclement and exert their own response. I'm puzzled that Russia even considers the Afghan peoples will accept their help - assuming 'concern' becomes a reality.

[davidbfpo]

Cross reference added as this subject IMHO deserves it, to a SWJ Blog notice:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10787

[Tukhachevskii]

Not sure what the fallout from this will be geopolitically (Indo-Pak relations may worsen with Pakistan given a pretext, if it needed one, of further destabilisation in India although from India's persepctive might actually be an attempt to payback Pakistan by playing in a territory considered by Pakistani strategists as affording them strategic depth)...but given our travails I suppose the more the merrier!

According to India & Afghanistan: Charting the Future (http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/system/files/Related+Resource+-+SR69-Final.pdf)
India's reasons for intervention/participation are fourfold;
1. Denying the ISI strategic depth to train terrorists to attack India;
2. breaking the narco-terrosim nexus; &
3. secure Afghanistan as a trade/resource hub regarding hydro-carbons; &
4. tapping Afghanistans oil potential (?)
Sounds like classical geopolitical encirclement to me.

&

And the Pakistani take...Afghanistan-Evolving an Indo-Pak Strategy: Perspectives from Pakistan (www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB123-Ploughshares-Salma.pdf)

&

The CSIS's take India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sport (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam117.pdf)

&

A paper outlining India's strategy with regards for foriegn aid, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The India Case (www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12441474461Case_of_India.pdf), which also ties India's assistance to Afghanistan as an attempt to tie them into a pro-India sphere of influence thus tacitly breaking Afghanistan's tie to Pakistan (from whom it gets nothing worth writing home about.)

&, finally,

A useful backgrounder from the Council on Foreign Relations, India-Afghanistan Relations (www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html)

[Ray]

As a background info

The “Strategic Partnership” Between India and Iran

http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/WWICS/perspex-wwics-stategicpartnership-0404.pdf

[Ray]

AFGHANISTAN: INDIA'S CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR "THE DAY AFTER"


Strategic objectivity would suggest that India's preference should be for a sustained United States embedment in Afghanistan till such time political democracy takes roots and the Afghan National Army is built upto at least 500,000 strong to take charge of Afghanistan’s security.

Strategic realism would also suggest that India recognize that American commitment to Afghanistan’s stability is dependent on the vagaries of compulsions of United States domestic politics......

United States exit from Afghanistan is not a question of “if” but is a question of “when” Pakistan as the “regional spoiler state” of South Asia and a “proven destabilizer of Afghanistan” could boil over the situation in Afghanistan to contrive an American exit from Afghanistan.

India has wrongly shied away from a military commitment in Afghanistan for two major reasons. The first was the American reluctance to permit Indian military involvement in Afghanistan out of deference to Pakistan Army sensitivities. The second reason was the political and strategic timidity of India's political leadership who have yet to recognize that being a big power would involve shouldering military responsibilities to reorder in India's favor the security environment in South Asia.....



This Paper intends to briefly examine the following related aspects to offer some recommendations for India's contingency planning on Afghanistan:

Strategic Realties Which Should Prod India's Contingency Planning.

India's Contingency Planning: The Political Initiatives Recommended.

India's Contingency Planning: The Strategic Steps Recommended.

India's Military Contingency Plans for Afghanistan on "The Day After".


http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3576.html

[Dayuhan]

As a background info

The “Strategic Partnership” Between India and Iran

http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/WWICS/perspex-wwics-stategicpartnership-0404.pdf

Since this article was published in 2004, it's worth asking whether any of the predictions in it have actually come true, and to what extent. Rhetoric and speculation aside, what is the actual extent of Indian-Iranian involvement today, and what impact does it have on the region?

[Dayuhan]

Strategic objectivity would suggest that India's preference should be for a sustained United States embedment in Afghanistan till such time political democracy takes roots and the Afghan National Army is built up to at least 500,000 strong to take charge of Afghanistan’s security.

LOL, actually and literally.

This article seems based on the premise that Taliban/Pakistani control of Afghanistan would pose an unacceptable threat to India. That premise, however, is not supported. What threat would a Taliban-led Afghanistan pose to India that does not already exist?

Also unaddressed here is the potential cost to India of sustaining a prolonged military occupation of Afghanistan, especially with the access limitations that would be posed by a hostile Pakistan. Attempts to pacify and stabilize Afghanistan are notoriously prolonged, expensive, and unsuccessful... why would one expect India to succeed where the Soviets and Americans failed?

Aside from the very substantial cost, isn't it possible that the risks to India's security posed by military involvement in Afghanistan, including the possibility of escalation to war with Pakistan, would exceed the risks posed by a Taliban return?

Certainly India would love to see the US stay in Afghanistan: the U presence gives the jihadi community both a distracting target and an incentive to keep their heads down, and if the US pulled out the jihadis would likely turn more of their attention to India. I'm not sure it makes sense for the US to stay there for that reason though... and the likelihood of democracy taking root any time in the near future has got to be pretty low.

[Ray]

The aim behind the link was not to give the latest situation of the Indian Iran relationship.

It is as I have clearly stated is background information.

It is only to assist those who are interested as to how the strategic situation is playing out in the region and its interse relationship with the various developments taking place.

Very little has been achieved owing to US pressure on India to not deal with Iran.

The IPI was about to fructify thanks to the effort of the then Petroleum Minister, Mani Shakar Aiyer, who has a very independent way of looking at issues and is also left wing.

He was removed under US pressure (it was believed then and now confirmed by Wikileaks) and replaced by a pro very US chap, Murli Deora and so the IPI is in the doldrums, and TAPI is in the news (Apr 2010 meeting).

As all are aware, the Bush administration stated clearly that if India voted against the February 2006 U.S. motion on Iran at the IAEA, Congress would likely not approve the Indo—U.S. nuclear agreement. In fact, Tom Lantos categorically stated that India ‘‘will pay a heavy price for a disregard of U.S. concerns vis-a`-vis Iran.’

This link would help to know the latest:

http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Pant.pdf

[Ray]

This article seems based on the premise that Taliban/Pakistani control of Afghanistan would pose an unacceptable threat to India. That premise, however, is not supported. What threat would a Taliban-led Afghanistan pose to India that does not already exist?

The same as it was in the earlier phase of the Taliban.

I presume it would be known that the threat posed by a Taliban Govt in Afghanistan is different from the Taliban sponsored fundamentalist terrorist variants in India.

[Ray]

LOL, actually and literally.

This article seems based on the premise that Taliban/Pakistani control of Afghanistan would pose an unacceptable threat to India. That premise, however, is not supported. What threat would a Taliban-led Afghanistan pose to India that does not already exist?

Answered in the preceding post.


Also unaddressed here is the potential cost to India of sustaining a prolonged military occupation of Afghanistan, especially with the access limitations that would be posed by a hostile Pakistan. Attempts to pacify and stabilize Afghanistan are notoriously prolonged, expensive, and unsuccessful... why would one expect India to succeed where the Soviets and Americans failed?

One cannot for sure state that India will succeed where the USSR and USA failed.

But one thing is for sure, the Indian approach will not be like on the lines of the missionaries of yore which the US and the USSR adopted of trying to 'bring civilisation to the savages'!

US imposing her ideas of democracy and modernity on the lines of the West and the USSR her ideas of governance on a Communist model.

Since India does not have any ideological agenda, that itself would be a headstart.

If one is keen to know one may check on the Somalia comparison of Indian effort and the US effort and that would be adequate to understand the difference in psyche and approach.

Example of Indian manner of approach.


What adds to the annoyance of the Taliban and Pakistan is that India's involvement in Afghanistan - unlike that of other countries there - is winning it support among people.

India is Afghanistan's fifth-largest bilateral donor and is involved in an array of projects in the country. It is constructing roads and setting up power transmission lines, sinking tube wells and building schools, hospitals and public toilets. It is constructing the Afghan parliament building and is engaged in repair and construction of the Salma dam project in Herat province. It has gifted Afghanistan with buses and is providing food assistance. It has trained civil servants and police and is extending scholarships to Afghan students to study in India.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD24Df03.html


It is important that one gives assistance based on what the Afghans want and not what Think Tanks abroad feel what should be done for Afghanistan.

Modernity can be brought to Afghanistan but it cannot be based on a superimposed model. Democracy cannot be imposed on a Nation that has no idea of democracy in the western sense. It has to be based on the Afghan model, where there is intrinsic democracy, but based on autocracy and tribal leadership at the regional level.

Further, India has an advantage that the Americans and the Russians did not have. There are and were many Indians in Afghanistan and there are and were many Afghans in India. Therefore, the interactivity would be smoother.


Aside from the very substantial cost, isn't it possible that the risks to India's security posed by military involvement in Afghanistan, including the possibility of escalation to war with Pakistan, would exceed the risks posed by a Taliban return?

Maybe.

Before entering Afghanistan, India would surely enter into agreements with other interested powers and countries since it would not make sense to be the sole knight in shining armour!

There are many around the periphery who would not want Islamic fundamentalist around them, and then there are those who are suspicious of Pakistan.


Certainly India would love to see the US stay in Afghanistan: the U presence gives the jihadi community both a distracting target and an incentive to keep their heads down, and if the US pulled out the jihadis would likely turn more of their attention to India. I'm not sure it makes sense for the US to stay there for that reason though... and the likelihood of democracy taking root any time in the near future has got to be pretty low.

India can handle jihadis, but the nub is can the West take on another 9/11?

The main target of jihadis will not be India, it will always be the US and the West more so, after the knocking of their larger than life icon, OBL.

[Dayuhan]

The same as it was in the earlier phase of the Taliban.

So I gather... but what exactly was it then, and what exactly is it now? Vague reference to unspecific threats are unhelpful: what exactly do Indian strategists fear would happen to India if the US withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban took over again?

From the article you cited:


Although actively discouraging India from assuming a higher profile in Afghanistan, for fear of offending Pakistan, the United States has failed to persuade Pakistan into taking Indian concerns regarding terrorism from Pakistani soil more seriously. So long as Afghan territory is not being used to launch attacks onto U.S. soil, the United States may have no vital interest in
determining who actually governs in Afghanistan, but it is important to India. If Washington were to abandon the goals of establishing a functioning Afghan state and seeing a moderate Pakistan emerge, that would put greater pressure on Indian security.

I understand the concern over terrorism emanating from Pakistan, but what has that to do with Afghanistan? How would Pakistan-based terrorists pose a greater threat if Afghanistan were under Taliban control? Would that threat be severe and immediate enough to justify the enormous expense, and the potential for war with Pakistan, implicit in an Indian attempt to deny Afghanistan to the Taliban?

I'm not sure "the goals of establishing a functioning Afghan state and seeing a moderate Pakistan emerge" really mean much, since neither the US nor India has the capacity to achieve those goals.


One cannot for sure state that India will succeed where the USSR and USA failed.

But one thing is for sure, the Indian approach will not be like on the lines of the missionaries of yore which the US and the USSR adopted of trying to 'bring civilisation to the savages'!

Can't discuss success and failure until you know what the goal is. What would be the purpose of an Indian operation in Afghanistan, other than denying Pakistani or Taliban control. We know what India doesn't want, but what would they try to install in its place?


Example of Indian manner of approach.


India is Afghanistan's fifth-largest bilateral donor and is involved in an array of projects in the country. It is constructing roads and setting up power transmission lines, sinking tube wells and building schools, hospitals and public toilets. It is constructing the Afghan parliament building and is engaged in repair and construction of the Salma dam project in Herat province. It has gifted Afghanistan with buses and is providing food assistance. It has trained civil servants and police and is extending scholarships to Afghan students to study in India.

It is important that one gives assistance based on what the Afghans want and not what Think Tanks abroad feel what should be done for Afghanistan.

Using aid projects and scholarships as bribes is actually a very American approach. It's not universally successful.


Further, India has an advantage that the Americans and the Russians did not have. There are and were many Indians in Afghanistan and there are and were many Afghans in India. Therefore, the interactivity would be smoother.

If y'all want to take the job over, I say go for it. Not like there's anything in it for us. I suspect you might find it less congenial and more complicated than you seem to expect!


Before entering Afghanistan, India would surely enter into agreements with other interested powers and countries since it would not make sense to be the sole knight in shining armour!

No country will go into Afghanistan except to advance their own interests... would those interests be compatible with India's? Would their approaches be compatible with India"s? You know what they say about too many cooks spoiling the soup... and I don't think too many powers would want to be involved in Afghanistan in any event. It's not the sort of place people want to get involved, and there's not much there that anyone wants.


India can handle jihadis, but the nub is can the West take on another 9/11?

The main target of jihadis will not be India, it will always be the US and the West more so, after the knocking of their larger than life icon, OBL.

Of course, but that's of limited relevance to Afghanistan. The US presence in Afghanistan is a recruiting tool and a propaganda weapon for the jihadis, and really doesn't constrain them that much. Another 9/11 is as likely to be planned in Yemen or the Netherlands as on the Af/Pak frontier.

Any discussion of potential "day after" involvement by India in Afghanistan would have to involve specific assessment of the following, all of which were markedly absent from the discussion linked to:

1. What would be the goal? What end state would India seek to achieve in Afghanistan, and by what means and with what probability of success?

2. What would be the costs and risks? Given that supply of forces in Afghanistan would require use of Pakistani airspace (yeah, right) or a very complex arrangement with the Iranians, whose goals may be quite different from India's, there's a lot of potential for trouble, up to and including the possibility of war with Pakistan.

3. What would be the benefits? Exactly what would India gain, and exactly what threat would be averted?


The IPI was about to fructify thanks to the effort of the then Petroleum Minister, Mani Shakar Aiyer, who has a very independent way of looking at issues and is also left wing.

He was removed under US pressure (it was believed then and now confirmed by Wikileaks) and replaced by a pro very US chap, Murli Deora and so the IPI is in the doldrums, and TAPI is in the news (Apr 2010 meeting).

Also from the article you cited:


sections of the Indian government have suggested that India’s participation in the gas pipeline deal might not be strategically advantageous to India, given the very low quantity (30 million standard cubic meters per day) of gas involved. Moreover, it appears that the Iranian gas is not the lowest-priced option for India today.

This also struck me, in the same piece:


The Indian strategic community has never been in favor of the pipeline proposal anyway, as in their opinion, it gives Pakistan too much leverage over India’s energy security.

That concern would of course also apply to TAPI... given the state of relations between India and Pakistan there would have to be significant risk to India in embracing any pipeline project that would have to pass through Pakistan, and given the instability and potential for security problems in both Iran and Afghanistan, neither would be a desirable source or conduit for energy supplies.

The article also has a good discussion of how Indian-Iranian relations are constrained not only by American dislike for Iran, but with India's rapidly evolving ties with the GCC, which are very real (as opposed to the rather hypothetical nature of discussions of projects involving Iran and Afghanistan) and involve very large energy and investment deals. he GCC and the Iranians are of course not the best of friends.

[Ray]

So I gather... but what exactly was it then, and what exactly is it now? Vague reference to unspecific threats are unhelpful: what exactly do Indian strategists fear would happen to India if the US withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban took over again?

The strategic threat, be it any form of Govt that is pro Pakistan, would affect India. You are well versed on Afghanistan and the strategy of all involved including bystanders, therefore, I will leave it to you to make your own deductions.

Let's put it in another way. China is far away from the US shores. So, why is the US so China centric in Asia and elsewhere?


From the article you cited:



I understand the concern over terrorism emanating from Pakistan, but what has that to do with Afghanistan? How would Pakistan-based terrorists pose a greater threat if Afghanistan were under Taliban control? Would that threat be severe and immediate enough to justify the enormous expense, and the potential for war with Pakistan, implicit in an Indian attempt to deny Afghanistan to the Taliban?

It is obvious.

One of the factions of the Taliban is the Haqqani faction. It's origins are with the Hizbe Islami Gulbuddin. As all are aware, Haqani maintains a wide and diverse relationship with terrorists, to include AQ, Uzbej, Chechen and Kashmiris.

The AQ and Taliban influence in fomenting terrorism in India is well known.

Pakistan based Taliban terrorists would migrate to Afghanistan if the situation improved, more so, if there was a government under the Talibans. It would also open up non traditional routes for them to India.

Expenses to fight terrorism will always be enormous. There can be no escape from it.

The expense of the Western forces is enormous since they fight a high tech war with a low tech 'enemy'. That would not be the way India would possibly approach the issue as mentioned in my earlier post. While air attacks and artillery may be prudent for 'economy of effort', the collateral damage and killing of bystanders only adds to the terrorist figures.

The undermentioned would indicate one aspect of the 'low tech' approach and the Kashmir model to keep the area relatively less hostile so that these type of low tech mode could be applied.

In the years since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, India's presence in Afghanistan has grown dramatically. India does not have a military presence in Afghanistan, but it does play a significant role in the country's reconstruction and has won support across Afghanistan's ethnic groups. India's proximity to the Hamid Karzai government and growing India-Afghanistan cooperation has raised hackles among the Taliban and in Pakistan.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD24Df03.html


It must be understood, that though the Afghans are well versed in warfare of their type, yet the are also human beings and also prefer peace and having basic amenities. One has to open up a life for them as per their desires. For instance, if some requires a water filter in his house for clean water and you give him a hi tech water filter that he does not know how to operate and more so, to maintain, it will be of no use to him! So, give him something low tech and he will be happy. You cannot make a USA out of Afghanistan. It is not Instant coffee.

We have faced many insurgencies and some are still on going. They are not boiling over to cause a serious security concern. We do have some experience in the matter, and our actions have been in the realm of low tech and they work. It is not that countries that are not flush with funds are not capable of the 'high tech' COIN, they are. Sri Lanka is an example. However, pounding a fly with a sledge hammer does not always give the results desired. Who knows what foretells for Sri Lanka.


Can't discuss success and failure until you know what the goal is. What would be the purpose of an Indian operation in Afghanistan, other than denying Pakistani or Taliban control. We know what India doesn't want, but what would they try to install in its place?

Install?

I wonder if India wants to install anything or anybody. Karzai is fine for India. In fact, it is for the Afghans to decide.

If you had notice as to why India built the Chahbahar and the Zaranj-Delaram highway, the answer would be crystal clear.


I'm not sure "the goals of establishing a functioning Afghan state and seeing a moderate Pakistan emerge" really mean much, since neither the US nor India has the capacity to achieve those goals.

What is functioning Afghan state?

Is Pakistan a functioning State? A country where everyone is a Kalifa. Where there are three different centres of power - The Govt, the Army and the ISI and a hardcore spoiler - the TTP! A country that survive on US Aid, financial and mililtary and cannot even pay the interest on the borrowing from the IMF and WB! A country which sends a Minister to Saudi Arabia requesting for monies to shore up the Pakistan Nation Budget! A country that asks the US Drone attacks and cannot face up to its population to state that it is they who want the Drones and instead blames the US!! A country that breeds and harbours terrorists so as to destabilise other countries since they themselves are in the dumps and wants others to be in the same slot!

Therefore, the word 'functioning' and 'moderate' are merely subjective, meaningless and mere rhetoric!


Using aid projects and scholarships as bribes is actually a very American approach. It's not universally successful.

They are not bribes, if you ask me.

If imaginatively applied, they swing the popular support to the country that is giving such aid.

Patrice Lumumba University changed the students to be pro Soviet, China is funding scholarships for foreign students who are all quite pro China, likewise because now in every middle class family in India there is at least one who has had a US education or has worked there, the mindset has changed from pro USSR to pro US.

If the US companies themselves undertook the projects and their work observed by the locals, it would give a totally different meaning as compared to giving the money to Afghans to do as they like. It leads to corruption and the projects don't have the desired end result. The blame goes to the US. Of course, some top chaps in such projects and also some unskilled workers should be Afghans so that they learn the American way of working as also it would build a correct US Afghan relationship.


If y'all want to take the job over, I say go for it. Not like there's anything in it for us. I suspect you might find it less congenial and more complicated than you seem to expect!

We offered. The US found it not suited to their approach.

As I said insurgency is nothing new to India.

Been there, done that!!



No country will go into Afghanistan except to advance their own interests... would those interests be compatible with India's? Would their approaches be compatible with India"s? You know what they say about too many cooks spoiling the soup... and I don't think too many powers would want to be involved in Afghanistan in any event. It's not the sort of place people want to get involved, and there's not much there that anyone wants.


The spread of Islamic fundamentalist is a core issue with all countries except the Muslim countries. Even China is worried as reported in their newspaper, The Global Times.

Because you live in SE Asia, you would not understand it in the same way as those who live in the neighbourhood. A fundamentalist Islamic regime in Afghanistan would be worrisome to the CAR (even though they are Muslim), Russia, India and Iran.

In case you have reservation about Iran, it requires no elaboration about the sectarian hate the Shias have for the Sunnis and vice versa. Bahrain is live example. Further, they are most concerned about a Sunni regime leaning onto its borders as also of the Jundallah threat that is aided by Pakistan.



Of course, but that's of limited relevance to Afghanistan. The US presence in Afghanistan is a recruiting tool and a propaganda weapon for the jihadis, and really doesn't constrain them that much. Another 9/11 is as likely to be planned in Yemen or the Netherlands as on the Af/Pak frontier.

Therefore, one should not let it fructify.

[Ray]

Any discussion of potential "day after" involvement by India in Afghanistan would have to involve specific assessment of the following, all of which were markedly absent from the discussion linked to:

1. What would be the goal? What end state would India seek to achieve in Afghanistan, and by what means and with what probability of success?

2. What would be the costs and risks? Given that supply of forces in Afghanistan would require use of Pakistani airspace (yeah, right) or a very complex arrangement with the Iranians, whose goals may be quite different from India's, there's a lot of potential for trouble, up to and including the possibility of war with Pakistan.

3. What would be the benefits? Exactly what would India gain, and exactly what threat would be averted?


I think I have generally given the answer. But once again:

The goal would be to have a non fundamentalist Afghanistan that is allowed to function on their own compulsions and not forced to adopt a foreign model.

What one forget is how the British handled these difficult tribes not only in the NW but also the NE of India. They made them accept the British as overlords, but gave them total independence to run their areas the way they liked. In spite of the historical antecedent, people are re-inventing the wheel.

If India has to go into Afghanistan, it would be with the concurrence and active support of those who supported the Northern Alliance. It is also obvious that if India has to go into Afghanistan, then the US reservations over Iran would not come into play and there would be no complex arrangement with Iran. In fact, Iran and India have convergence of interests in Afghanistan.

If India was proactive, then it would cause innumerable headaches for Pakistan. The Afghans do not recognise the Durand Line. Even the pro Pakistan Taliban did not recognise the Durand Line. Thus, there is ample scope to for the Pashtunistan issue to be agitated. In will be recalled that Waziristan too is Pashtuns except the Saidgis.

Success is a relative term.


Also from the article you cited:



This also struck me, in the same piece:



[QUOTE]That concern would of course also apply to TAPI... given the state of relations between India and Pakistan there would have to be significant risk to India in embracing any pipeline project that would have to pass through Pakistan, and given the instability and potential for security problems in both Iran and Afghanistan, neither would be a desirable source or conduit for energy supplies.

That is one of the issue regarding the IPI. India insists that it will pay only for the "landed" goods in India through the pipeline. I presume, such a clause could be cranked in to ensure that Indian interests are protected.

TAPI is not a life and death issue for India. If it works out, it will help. If it does not, then some of the shortages in the Indian requirement, India will have to learn to live with.


The article also has a good discussion of how Indian-Iranian relations are constrained not only by American dislike for Iran, but with India's rapidly evolving ties with the GCC, which are very real (as opposed to the rather hypothetical nature of discussions of projects involving Iran and Afghanistan) and involve very large energy and investment deals. he GCC and the Iranians are of course not the best of friends.

From the standpoint of development, the GCC is preferable.

Strategically, Iran is preferable.

[carl]

Very interesting discussion between Ray and Dayuhan.

What I gather from the discussion is this. India knows what it doesn't want, and that can be be a pretty strong basis for action. Rational analysis of costs, benefits and probabilities may not count for much because the emotional outlook of the Indian citizenry, for good or ill, is involved. From what I gather they will not put up with another Mumbai so India will do what it must to lessen the probability of that happening.

If those suppositions are true, India will get heavily involved in Afghanistan if we abandon the place.

[Dayuhan]

It is obvious.

One of the factions of the Taliban is the Haqqani faction. It's origins are with the Hizbe Islami Gulbuddin. As all are aware, Haqani maintains a wide and diverse relationship with terrorists, to include AQ, Uzbej, Chechen and Kashmiris.

The AQ and Taliban influence in fomenting terrorism in India is well known.

Pakistan based Taliban terrorists would migrate to Afghanistan if the situation improved, more so, if there was a government under the Talibans. It would also open up non traditional routes for them to India.

I'm sorry, but that's less than obvious to me. The Taliban and the other jihadis already have bases and protection in Pakistan, right on India's border. How would they become more dangerous to India by moving to Afghanistan? They'd still have to go through Pakistan to get to India. What "non-traditional routes to India" exist from Afghanistan, a landlocked nation not bordering India and possessing very limited links to other countries?

I'm sure one could come up with a scenario, but again the question is one of scale. Is that threat severe and imminent enough to justify the enormous risks and costs of going to war in Afghanistan? Isn't there a real possibility that Pakistan-based jihadis would step up attacks on India to try and break India's will to persist in Afghanistan?

Again, such a proposition would, one hopes, be accompanied by a clear assessment of costs and benefits. What, exactly and specifically, is the threat to be averted? How sever is it? Is it severe enough to justify the costs and risks of war, which is an expensive and risky enterprise?

Is that calculation being discussed in public, anywhere? I figure if anyone would have a link, it would be you :wry:


We have faced many insurgencies and some are still on going. They are not boiling over to cause a serious security concern. We do have some experience in the matter, and our actions have been in the realm of low tech and they work.

Managing your own insurgencies and managing someone else's are very different kettles of fisdh.


I wonder if India wants to install anything or anybody. Karzai is fine for India. In fact, it is for the Afghans to decide.

Karzai may be fine for India, but what if he isn't so fine for Afghanistan? And what if the Afghans decide something that isn't so fine for India, as is quite likely to be the case?


What is functioning Afghan state?

Is Pakistan a functioning State? A country where everyone is a Kalifa. Where there are three different centres of power - The Govt, the Army and the ISI and a hardcore spoiler - the TTP! A country that survive on US Aid, financial and mililtary and cannot even pay the interest on the borrowing from the IMF and WB! A country which sends a Minister to Saudi Arabia requesting for monies to shore up the Pakistan Nation Budget! A country that asks the US Drone attacks and cannot face up to its population to state that it is they who want the Drones and instead blames the US!! A country that breeds and harbours terrorists so as to destabilise other countries since they themselves are in the dumps and wants others to be in the same slot!

Therefore, the word 'functioning' and 'moderate' are merely subjective, meaningless and mere rhetoric!

Absolutely. From the US perspective a "functioning state" in Afghanistan would be a state that does not require US occupation and does not pose any threat to the US. The rest of it doesn't matter. It sounds like India's perspective is much the same.


They are not bribes, if you ask me.

If imaginatively applied, they swing the popular support to the country that is giving such aid.

Do they really? Have they ever, except among a few individuals? If so, where?


If the US companies themselves undertook the projects and their work observed by the locals, it would give a totally different meaning as compared to giving the money to Afghans to do as they like. It leads to corruption and the projects don't have the desired end result. The blame goes to the US. Of course, some top chaps in such projects and also some unskilled workers should be Afghans so that they learn the American way of working as also it would build a correct US Afghan relationship.

US companies undertaking the projects themselves is an excellent way for the US government to give US tax money to US companies. It was done that way for a long time, but it didn't work very well. The point of the exercise, remember, is not to get Afghans to like the US, it's to try to get them to like a government that the US can live with.

Aid is a two-edged sword, it can help and harm. It is no panacea, and its use as a counterinsurgency tool, despite a long history of effort, is spotty at best. Has India discovered some magic bullet that will change all that?


The spread of Islamic fundamentalist is a core issue with all countries except the Muslim countries. Even China is worried as reported in their newspaper, The Global Times.

Because you live in SE Asia, you would not understand it in the same way as those who live in the neighbourhood. A fundamentalist Islamic regime in Afghanistan would be worrisome to the CAR (even though they are Muslim), Russia, India and Iran.

.Southeast Asia has Muslims too, remember?

Yes, lots of people would be worried. Again, though, these powers would be assessing costs and benefits themselves. Is a Taliban Afghanistan a great enough threat to them to make them want to stick their faces into the graveyard of empires? I suspect you'd get much encouragement and little help.


Therefore, one should not let it fructify.

Certainly not. The question is whether fructification can be prevented by engagement in Afghanistan, which is arguably as likely to encourage another 9/11 as to avert one. Let's not forget that the whole point of 9/11 was to force the US to invade and occupy Muslim lands, a situation that AQ is ready and able to exploit.

[Dayuhan]

The goal would be to have a non fundamentalist Afghanistan that is allowed to function on their own compulsions and not forced to adopt a foreign model.

And if their own compulsions are fundamentalist?

It sounds like the goal is an "independent" Afghanistan that will do what you want, much the same trap that the US has fallen into.


If India has to go into Afghanistan, it would be with the concurrence and active support of those who supported the Northern Alliance.

And with the opposition of those who support the Taliban, and those who simply object to foreign interference. Is this not also the case with the US effort?


It is also obvious that if India has to go into Afghanistan, then the US reservations over Iran would not come into play and there would be no complex arrangement with Iran. In fact, Iran and India have convergence of interests in Afghanistan.

If India was solely dependent on Iran for access to supply its forces in Afghanistan, there would be a complex relationship, with or without the US involved. What do you figure the quid pro quo on that would be? Don't you think it would subject India to all kind of manipulation down the line... and isn't it much the same nasty situation that the US has gotten into with Pakistan?

Iranian and Indian interests in Afghanistan may converge in some ways, but they are likely to diverge in others. Iran is not the most reliable of partners, and going into a venture as risky and complex as an occupation of Afghanistan in the position of complete dependence on Iran... well, I ain't India but I'd think two or three times first. I'd rather stick needles in my eyes.


That is one of the issue regarding the IPI. India insists that it will pay only for the "landed" goods in India through the pipeline. I presume, such a clause could be cranked in to ensure that Indian interests are protected.

You overlook the fundamental liability of pipelines. They are not flexible; they only run from one place to another. Typically power stations and processing facilities are built at the head end of a pipeline; it's easier to transport electricity and processed product than raw product. If the pipeline is shut down, those facilities become useless, If the pipeline shuts, you have to scramble for quick buys on the spot market, which is expensive. All in all, if a pipeline is going to be inherently unreliable, why invest in it, and in the associated infrastructure? India is buying its gas from Qatar now, and getting good deals from a supplier that knows how to do business without letting politics get in the way. Why would they want to have to deal with Pakistan?


TAPI is not a life and death issue for India. If it works out, it will help. If it does not, then some of the shortages in the Indian requirement, India will have to learn to live with.

No, of course not... not a life and death issue, and not worth fighting over, not for India and still less for America.


From the standpoint of development, the GCC is preferable.

Strategically, Iran is preferable.

What is the goal of strategy, if not development? What strategic goal does a connection to Iran serve that is not served by connection to the GCC?

Strategy is the servant of policy. What's the policy?

[Ray]

I'm sorry, but that's less than obvious to me. The Taliban and the other jihadis already have bases and protection in Pakistan, right on India's border. How would they become more dangerous to India by moving to Afghanistan? They'd still have to go through Pakistan to get to India. What "non-traditional routes to India" exist from Afghanistan, a landlocked nation not bordering India and possessing very limited links to other countries?

I'm sure one could come up with a scenario, but again the question is one of scale. Is that threat severe and imminent enough to justify the enormous risks and costs of going to war in Afghanistan? Isn't there a real possibility that Pakistan-based jihadis would step up attacks on India to try and break India's will to persist in Afghanistan?

Again, such a proposition would, one hopes, be accompanied by a clear assessment of costs and benefits. What, exactly and specifically, is the threat to be averted? How sever is it? Is it severe enough to justify the costs and risks of war, which is an expensive and risky enterprise?

Is that calculation being discussed in public, anywhere? I figure if anyone would have a link, it would be you :wry:

Let’s go down the way step by step.

Maybe you would refresh your mind as to why Russia, India, Iran and the US supported the Northern Alliance.

If they did so then, there would have surely been good reasons.

Taliban was dangerous then to them.

Have those reasons changed?

If so, you could elucidate.

I fail to understand what is this ‘enormous risk and cost’ that you keep mentioning. Do expand so that I can understand the ‘enormous risk and cost’.

I have tried to explain that much of this ‘enormous cost’ that the ISAF is accruing is because it is fighting a low cost operation with high cost technology and because they are attempting to superimpose a foreign construct of democracy and governance, through costly schemes that have no immediate value to be observed.

To explain it in simple terms, a hungry stomach cannot wait for a lavish meal being prepared at the Moulin Rogue by the world’s finest chef. It reminds me of Marie Antoinette’s misquoted phrase, “if they have no bread, give them cake’!!

The people want to ‘see’ and ‘experience’ ‘progress’. They want the basic needs and not wait for Taj Mahals and other wonders of the world to come their way when they are old, and some gone! To understand, though only superficially, the Afghan plight, one could read ‘Kite Runner’ by Khaled Husseini.

Did the Mumbai carnage terrorist come by the ‘traditional route’? Because they did the unexpected, the results were catastrophic. It is but a tenet of war – surprise!!

Why should India go to war with Pakistan, just because India makes a mark in Afghanistan? It would be foolish to do so. Let Pakistan attack first. Let her be in the international doghouse. Hold her to the borders and strike elsewhere where it matters to India.

It is not that Pakistan planners are sleeping. They are handing over large swathes of Kashmir to the Chinese!!

Once again, if indeed, and it is a big ‘if’, India goes into Afghanistan, it would not be a solo.

The cost is not in the public domain, if indeed, it has been calculated.




Managing your own insurgencies and managing someone else's are very different kettles of fisdh.

Not quite right, actually.

We are facing the same Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Afghans and others in Kashmir! Do you really think that the terrorists in Kashmir are Kashmiris? Some are, but they are mostly used as ‘guides’. The actual work is done by those who operated in Afghanistan including the foreign fundamentalists.
Therefore, we are versed in their ways.

Unlike westerners, the Afghans are not very ‘far out’ from the Indian ways. They have their singular traits, but then since so many of them are around in India, they are not quite an enigma.





Karzai may be fine for India, but what if he isn't so fine for Afghanistan? And what if the Afghans decide something that isn't so fine for India, as is quite likely to be the case?

Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah and those in the run, are quite acceptable to India.

What is not acceptable, to not only India but to many others, is a Taliban terrorist.

Do you really think that these leaders are not without the huge financial backing of their mentors – the very same people who encourage corruption and then complain!

You must visit the ‘other Asia’ and see the ‘fun and games’!


Absolutely. From the US perspective a "functioning state" in Afghanistan would be a state that does not require US occupation and does not pose any threat to the US. The rest of it doesn't matter. It sounds like India's perspective is much the same.

I take it that means that you and the US are quite comfortable with Pakistan, which does not require US occupation (though their forces are embedded with the Pakistan Army operating in KP), but continue to be a womb of terrorism and can launch another 9/11?

India sure would be most comfortable with a ‘functioning’ (I would say relatively stable) Afghanistan, though that prospect appears very bleak.


Do they really? Have they ever, except among a few individuals? If so, where?

Guess?

India!!!!!!

Sympathetic to the USSR and its successor Russia, is totally pro US. Wikileaks confirm the same as to how India has become pro US.

A few years ago, India would not have bothered about US warning over not going through with the IPI or voting with the US over Iran and its nuclear ambitions. Or stop short twice – attack on the Parliament and Mumbai! Not only the Govt, but a vast majority of Indians are ready to accept the US point of view.

Why?

Because every middle class family has someone who has been educated or has worked in the US. Even our good Prime Minister’s daughter is ensconced in the US.

Now, just for debate's sake you don’t want to see the reality, what can one do?



US companies undertaking the projects themselves is an excellent way for the US government to give US tax money to US companies. It was done that way for a long time, but it didn't work very well. The point of the exercise, remember, is not to get Afghans to like the US, it's to try to get them to like a government that the US can live with.

Aid is a two-edged sword, it can help and harm. It is no panacea, and its use as a counterinsurgency tool, despite a long history of effort, is spotty at best. Has India discovered some magic bullet that will change all that?

Now, why did it not work out that US companies failed to deliver? I thought that they are the ones on which modern management and industrial practices the world over is replicated!

The point of the exercise precisely to get the Afghans to LIKE the US, or at least, APPRECIATE what the US is doing for them and disabuse them from believing the canard that the US is the ‘Great White Satan’!

If that was not so, then the US is pouring money and having their soldiers killed for merely ‘fun and games’?

What was the aim during the Cold War – bringing civilisation to natives running naked in the bush?

I daresay, you sincerely believe that I am that naïve!

Aid is not a double edged sword. Aid given with condescension with an air of saving mankind is what is detested. Further, aid that only benefits the elite is hardly going to warms the cockles of the heart of those who are actually deprived!

[Ray]

.Southeast Asia has Muslims too, remember?

Yes, lots of people would be worried. Again, though, these powers would be assessing costs and benefits themselves. Is a Taliban Afghanistan a great enough threat to them to make them want to stick their faces into the graveyard of empires? I suspect you'd get much encouragement and little help.

So does China.

I am not aware which part of the Orient you are in, because if you informed, I could explain the issue of Muslims in your parts, better.

The Islam upto Pakistan is different as one goes further East. Compare even Bangladesh and Pakistan, if you will. There is a vast difference!

Since you are in the SE, you feel that India would get ‘much encouragement and little help’. Be in the midst of a few bombings and see the corpse littered all over and you will realise what it is all about.

Experiencing is worth volumes of theoretical knowledge and armchair postulations.

History does indicate that Afghanistan was a graveyard for Imperialists! They came to conquer and subjugate – that is the subtle difference.

Observe the anger in Pakistan over US Drones and the OBL episode. The US did not come to conquer, and yet they are furious. Why? Because the Pakistanis feel that their Govt, Army and the ISI has sold their souls.

Right now, Karzai is seen as a puppet and rightly so since at every step he is being manipulated. Therefore, his credibility is zero. Give him his space and he will appear as a different man.

Even in the Liberation of Bangladesh, India did not hang around. They gave the reins to Mujibur instantly. However, power went to his head.



Certainly not. The question is whether fructification can be prevented by engagement in Afghanistan, which is arguably as likely to encourage another 9/11 as to avert one. Let's not forget that the whole point of 9/11 was to force the US to invade and occupy Muslim lands, a situation that AQ is ready and able to exploit.

Success cannot happen if the Afghan Govt appears to be a handmaiden of the US, nor can it happen by use of airpower and artillery. These are area weapons and they are devastating and there will be innocents killed.

What I find most interesting is that I have to mention how to fight insurgency to Americans! It is like carrying coals to Newcastle! Our insurgency doctrines are all based on the US doctrines of yore, with modifications along the way. And these US doctrines has held us in good stead and surprisingly, the US has forgotten what they taught themselves!!

No matter how much you may say whole point of 9/11 was to force the US to invade and occupy Muslim lands, no one will believe that. Those who have observed the US in various foreign forays are well aware that while the US may appear impetuous, they have a method in the madness. It is not a question that they get up from their bed and sniff the air and say - Hey, lets go and attack just because I don't like OBL and his antics! Even many US commentators don't buy such a simplistic explanation.

OK for discussion's sake we accept your explanation about why the US went to war in Afghanistan. Could you explain, why the US suddenly forgot about the mission in Afghanistan and went whole hog in Iraq instead?

And guess what? The Islamic world goes one step beyond - they believe that the US themselves did it to themselves!! Crazy an idea, but it is quite popular amongst them. You could even read this book by a Bangladeshi Muslim, enjoying the fruits of the West and going hammer and tongs at the hand that feeds him - The Great Deception (Nafeez Mossadeq Ahmed).

[jmm99]

I'm reduxing the thread, Defending Hamdan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6118), because it lays out the constitutional and diplomatic history of Astan from the US viewpoiint - which equals what the US Executive branch says it is.


from Ray
Maybe you would refresh your mind as to why Russia, India, Iran and the US supported the Northern Alliance.

My mind is refreshed.

Pick up my boring slog from here, Constitutional History of Afghanistan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=57908&postcount=17), and trot forward (please read all of my posts and the sources) to here, US & Afghan Positions 1996-2001 - part 1 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=58340&postcount=25). And, then please read my posts and sources to the end.

The point is that the US recognized NO government in Astan from 1997-2001 (9/11/2001 was the tipping point, but the Northern Alliance was not recognized as the goverment by the US - it was a co-belligerent pursuant to the 2001 AUMF). If I'm wrong on material facts or law, please advise.

Russia, India and Iran pursued a separate path from the US - and, today, are entitled to do the same. That would not bother me in the least.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I am not aware which part of the Orient you are in, because if you informed, I could explain the issue of Muslims in your parts, better.

I am in the Philippines. Your offer is kind, but unnecessary. I am aware of the issues of Muslims in my parts.


Since you are in the SE, you feel that India would get "much encouragement and little help". Be in the midst of a few bombings and see the corpse littered all over and you will realise what it is all about.

Experiencing is worth volumes of theoretical knowledge and armchair postulations.

I am aware of the value of experience. I've not been up close to a bombing. I have observed both insurgency and counterinsurgency at close range... of the sloppy sort, devoid of such polite constructs as rules of engagement and consideration of human rights.

It is rarely wise to make assumptions about what others need explained, or what they have or have not experienced. I've noticed that this is particularly the case on SWJ, where the range of experience and knowledge is at times surprising.

I still believe that an Indian effort in Afghanistan would get "much encouragement and little help", in large part because involvement in places like Afghanistan increases, rather than reduces, risk of terror attack. Exactly what sort of help do you think India would have, and from whom?


History does indicate that Afghanistan was a graveyard for Imperialists! They came to conquer and subjugate – that is the subtle difference.

And what would India mean to do there that is any different from the US purpose?


Observe the anger in Pakistan over US Drones and the OBL episode. The US did not come to conquer, and yet they are furious. Why? Because the Pakistanis feel that their Govt, Army and the ISI has sold their souls.

I don't suppose Pakistanis would be terribly delighted at an Indian presence in Afghanistan. I do expect, though, that the Pak Army/ISI crowd would be absolutely delighted to see India try to take over from the US. What could be better for them than to have their great enemy positioned for the slow bleed, a strategy at which they have long practice? On what other battlefield could Pakistan have reasonable hope of defeating India?


Right now, Karzai is seen as a puppet and rightly so since at every step he is being manipulated. Therefore, his credibility is zero. Give him his space and he will appear as a different man.

That sounds a fairly ambitious assumption. Have you any evidence to suggest that it would be so, other than wishing it so?


Success cannot happen if the Afghan Govt appears to be a handmaiden of the US, nor can it happen by use of airpower and artillery. These are area weapons and they are devastating and there will be innocents killed.

What I find most interesting is that I have to mention how to fight insurgency to Americans! It is like carrying coals to Newcastle! Our insurgency doctrines are all based on the US doctrines of yore, with modifications along the way. And these US doctrines has held us in good stead and surprisingly, the US has forgotten what they taught themselves!!

You seem very confident that you could do it better. An easy thing to believe, from the sidelines. I hope for India's sake that you don't decide to try it out, as I suspect you'd find the reality less congenial than the theory.


No matter how much you may say whole point of 9/11 was to force the US to invade and occupy Muslim lands, no one will believe that. Those who have observed the US in various foreign forays are well aware that while the US may appear impetuous, they have a method in the madness. It is not a question that they get up from their bed and sniff the air and say - Hey, lets go and attack just because I don't like OBL and his antics! Even many US commentators don't buy such a simplistic explanation.

You can hear as much nonsense as you choose to listen to from US commentators.

No US President can allow an attack on US soil to pass without a direct attempt to attack those responsible. It is politically unacceptable. Bush had to attack Afghanistan. Not much point in it beyond revenge, no economic or strategic advantage to be gained, enormous risk and expense... but domestic politics forced it. Sticking around, was, IMO, a huge mistake, as it exposed us to all the cost and risk for no real gain, but it was done, also largely for domestic political reasons.


OK for discussion's sake we accept your explanation about why the US went to war in Afghanistan. Could you explain, why the US suddenly forgot about the mission in Afghanistan and went whole hog in Iraq instead?

A very different set of reasons, and IMO a very bad set of reasons, though still closely linked to domestic politics. It is very difficult to explain American political decision-making to non-Americans, and truthful explanations often seem quite illogical to those not steeped in the oddities of US domestic politics. The West's misunderstanding of the East is often equaled or exceeded by the East's misunderstanding of the US.


And guess what? The Islamic world goes one step beyond - they believe that the US themselves did it to themselves!! Crazy an idea, but it is quite popular amongst them. You could even read this book by a Bangladeshi Muslim, enjoying the fruits of the West and going hammer and tongs at the hand that feeds him - The Great Deception (Nafeez Mossadeq Ahmed).

People believe all sorts of silly things about the hands that feed them. Are you familiar with the political writings Noam Chomsky? There are many other examples...

[Ray]

I am in the Philippines. Your offer is kind, but unnecessary. I am aware of the issues of Muslims in my parts.

I am sure you are aware, but then it is different when you live amongst them - not the handful representation, but as a community almost equal in numbers.

Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago are where the Moros are active. How frequent are their bombings/ suicide attacks elsewhere?


I am aware of the value of experience. I've not been up close to a bombing. I have observed both insurgency and counterinsurgency at close range... of the sloppy sort, devoid of such polite constructs as rules of engagement and consideration of human rights.

It is rarely wise to make assumptions about what others need explained, or what they have or have not experienced. I've noticed that this is particularly the case on SWJ, where the range of experience and knowledge is at times surprising.

The vast experience and knowledge that one experiences here is what attracts me to the SWJ.

However, that in no way should inhibit anyone of stating what he has to say including trying to explain one's point of view, in case one feels that the other has not quite got the point one is trying to make.

I, for one, would read posts of those who have been in Iraq and in combat. Their experience would be of immense value to me. Yet, I will ask them many a pointed questions, so that I could compare the same with the experience we are having out here. I would not dismiss their views perfunctorily.

That the Afghan insurgency would not be a totally new experience for Indians is what I was stating. It sure will be a new experience for any Westerner. The psyche and ethos is totally different. It is not so for the Indian, even the insurgency modes, since we have seen it applied in Kashmir for many years.


I still believe that an Indian effort in Afghanistan would get "much encouragement and little help", in large part because involvement in places like Afghanistan increases, rather than reduces, risk of terror attack. Exactly what sort of help do you think India would have, and from whom?

You are entitled to your opinion. I merely gave mine.

Terror attacks is the staple of insurgency and terrorism. If one has to fight them, then one has to take the risk. I think because the Indian soldier has gone through years of insurgency from the NE to Kashmir, he has become impervious to the risks involved. He is aware of the risk, but he has become a fatalist.

I, myself, am off to Kashmir to an insurgency active area, if the permission comes through. Many think it is foolish, since I am not longer active. But then, the thrill to be back where the action is, is what makes one go for it!

As for the type of help, it will depend on the situation prevailing prior to any change of responsibility. From whom? Those that supported the Northern Alliance and it cannot be that it will be an Indian show alone.


And what would India mean to do there that is any different from the US purpose?

I thought I was explaining that all along.

In short. approach the issue in a low tech way, allow them to govern themselves the way they have been doing through centuries and have projects that have small gestation time. Once, the confidence has been built, then go in for high end projects.


I don't suppose Pakistanis would be terribly delighted at an Indian presence in Afghanistan. I do expect, though, that the Pak Army/ISI crowd would be absolutely delighted to see India try to take over from the US. What could be better for them than to have their great enemy positioned for the slow bleed, a strategy at which they have long practice? On what other battlefield could Pakistan have reasonable hope of defeating India?

That Pakistan will not be delighted is obvious.

India is already being bled by their policy of a 1000 cuts.

If Pakistan were to be delighted to have India in Afghanistan and do another 1000 cuts, then why are they hell bent that India does not even undertake non military tasks such as re-construction?

I don't think Pakistan has any chance of defeating India or India defeating Pakistan. I have explained the rationale earlier.


That sounds a fairly ambitious assumption. Have you any evidence to suggest that it would be so, other than wishing it so?

Have you any evidence to suggest it otherwise?


You seem very confident that you could do it better. An easy thing to believe, from the sidelines. I hope for India's sake that you don't decide to try it out, as I suspect you'd find the reality less congenial than the theory.

Confidence is the first step to success. Approaching any problem with a half hearted resolve can never help.

I am no one to decide what should be tried. It is for the Govt of India to take the call.

No insurgency is congenial. It is not through theory I speak but having been for about 37 years in various forms of insurgency and in various states of intensity.

The fact that has to be understood is that the common soldier anywhere, be he an American or an Indian, is a brave man and he is ready to rough it out for his Country and his Flag. Success is dependant, not only on the soldier, but more so on the Planners be they in or not in uniform.


You can hear as much nonsense as you choose to listen to from US commentators.

No US President can allow an attack on US soil to pass without a direct attempt to attack those responsible. It is politically unacceptable. Bush had to attack Afghanistan. Not much point in it beyond revenge, no economic or strategic advantage to be gained, enormous risk and expense... but domestic politics forced it. Sticking around, was, IMO, a huge mistake, as it exposed us to all the cost and risk for no real gain, but it was done, also largely for domestic political reasons.

A very different set of reasons, and IMO a very bad set of reasons, though still closely linked to domestic politics. It is very difficult to explain American political decision-making to non-Americans, and truthful explanations often seem quite illogical to those not steeped in the oddities of US domestic politics. The West's misunderstanding of the East is often equaled or exceeded by the East's misunderstanding of the US.

I am aware that Bush had to attack Afghanistan. I do not dispute that.

However, do explain that if Afghanistan was for revenge, did the US achieve it? If they did not, then why did they swing to Iraq without feeding their revenge? This issue you have failed to answer.

I am not aware that Saddam also was a kingpin in the 9/11 carnage.


People believe all sorts of silly things about the hands that feed them. Are you familiar with the political writings Noam Chomsky? There are many other examples...

Yes I am familiar with Chomsky, but I am not totally impressed by his views, even though he is taken to be an intellectual by some.

Have you read The Great Deception by NM Ahmed. I assure you that you, if you are an American, you would not be able to go through the first few pages itself. It took me immense patience to go through the book.

[Ray]

India left standing in Afghan musical chairs
By Peter Lee

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME21Df01.html

Uncertainty is the only certainty there is, and knowing how to live with insecurity is the only security.
John Allen Paulos

As I said it is the GoI's call.

And on another thread I spoke of Indian timidity, which was hotly contested!

Compare the Indian mindset with that of Pakistan, which has overcome all odds against them including international scorn and ridicule.

And you will realise that I was not totally incorrect when I gave the rationale for Indian timidity.

[davidbfpo]

I'd missed the fact that the Indian Prime Minister visited Kabul days after the OBL raid, yes a scheduled visit.

This column is perhaps a shade optimistic on how to get better Indo-Pak relations via the civil sector, but worth a read:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/public-diplomacy-will-help-smoothen-ties-with-pak

Something we may miss, unless watching closely is:
We should also study India's "South Asia Terrorism Portal" on comparative terrorism data. Pakistan experienced 10,268 civilian deaths between 2003 and 2011 because of religious bigotry or terrorism. During the same period, India suffered 7,744 civilian deaths that included 1,829 fatalities caused by Maoist violence.

[Ray]

On the Indian PM's visit to Afghanistan.

Comments from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (an Indian think tank)


Unlike in Pakistan, Osama’s killing has been welcomed in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai described the killing of Osama as “punishment for his deeds” and, without directly mentioning Pakistan, he reiterated that “the fight against terrorism is not in Afghanistan’s villages” or “in the houses of poor and oppressed Afghans,” but rather it “is in its sanctuaries, in its training camps and its finance centres.” However, other Afghan leaders were more explicit in their criticism of Pakistan’s role in hiding Osama for almost a decade......

President Karzai has initiated moves to reconcile with the Taliban, but these have not made much headway. India remains concerned at reconciliation with the Taliban and their possible return to power in Kabul. Interestingly, there are deep concerns within Afghanistan as well on the possibility of a deal with the Taliban.....


or the moment there is not much scope for a regional initiative in Afghanistan, although India remains in favour of it. Pakistan, on the contrary, is looking to enhance its influence in Afghanistan as the Western troop withdrawal begins. In April, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and Army Chief General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani visited Kabul for discussions with President Karzai and his government. The two sides agreed to establish a two-tier joint commission to cooperate with each other on reconciliation-related issues.......

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Kabul is meant to reassure President Karzai of India’s sustained support. However, the underlying message of the visit is to convey to Pakistan, the US and the others that India has strategic interests in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Singh will buttress this message by assuring sustained engagement and further enhancement of Indian aid to Afghanistan. India has taken a bold step to enhance its relevance in Afghanistan.


Very muted.

What is the bold step that Indian has to take to stay relevant in Afghanistan?

Is the present Indian Govt up to it?

http://www.idsa.in/node/7462/3043

Maybe if Omarali could link B Raman's (an analyst) article from where he came to the conclusion that the right wing in India has lost its narratives and that the Indian GHQ was not in this world, maybe a better analysis of the options could be done.

[Dayuhan]

What is the bold step that Indian has to take to stay relevant in Afghanistan?

Is the present Indian Govt up to it?

Possibly the Indian Government believes that the risks and costs of "staying relevant in Afghanistan" exceed the benefits? Is that timidity or common sense?


Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago are where the Moros are active. How frequent are their bombings/ suicide attacks elsewhere?

Actually there's very little activity on Palawan, and bombings/suicide attacks aren't the tactics of choice for the primary insurgent groups.


That the Afghan insurgency would not be a totally new experience for Indians is what I was stating. It sure will be a new experience for any Westerner. The psyche and ethos is totally different. It is not so for the Indian, even the insurgency modes, since we have seen it applied in Kashmir for many years.

Does India's logistic support for its forces in Kashmir have to pass through Iran? Just one difference among many. You may of course do as you will, but I would hesitate to assume that the two cases will be similar.


As for the type of help, it will depend on the situation prevailing prior to any change of responsibility. From whom? Those that supported the Northern Alliance and it cannot be that it will be an Indian show alone.

What you expect and what you get can be very different. Unwise to assume that you will have substantial assistance from others. If it comes, wonderful, but if you're going to take on that role the basis of planning should be that you will act alone. The world being what it is, the contributions of others are likely to be token and ephemeral.


I thought I was explaining that all along.

In short. approach the issue in a low tech way, allow them to govern themselves the way they have been doing through centuries and have projects that have small gestation time. Once, the confidence has been built, then go in for high end projects.

You are describing method; my statement referred to purpose. The purpose of the intervention you describe is identical to the American purpose: install or maintain a government that suits the interests of the intervening power. Many of the subsequent issues derive not from method, but from that purpose.

If we'll discuss method, I suspect that you place far too much faith in the capacity of aid projects to resolve insurgency, but I've said that before.


If Pakistan were to be delighted to have India in Afghanistan and do another 1000 cuts, then why are they hell bent that India does not even undertake non military tasks such as re-construction?

Of course the Pakistanis will vocally and vehemently object to any Indian presence in Afghanistan. That's part of the charade, and it doesn't mean that Pak GHQ wouldn't be quite happy to have the ability to target Indian forces by proxy, in a position where the Indians are out on a limb with a shaky supply route and occupying a largely hostile territory. It's the sort of place one like to see one's antagonist. The US objected strenuously to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but in the long run they were able to use that situation to weaken their adversary fatally. Why wouldn't Pakistan secretly welcome the opportunity to do the same to India?


I don't think Pakistan has any chance of defeating India or India defeating Pakistan. I have explained the rationale earlier.

Certainly there is a possibility that Pakistan could force India to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving their objectives, if India were to take over the effort to "stabilize" Afghanistan. That would constitute a defeat, not defeat on an absolute scale, but a defeat nonetheless.

The question is whether the benefit to India of trying to stabilize Afghanistan justifies taking that risk.


Have you any evidence to suggest it otherwise?

The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?


Confidence is the first step to success. Approaching any problem with a half hearted resolve can never help.

A blunt and realistic assessment of the challenge is also critical to success. It is easy for will to evaporate when a task proves harder than expected. Better to assume the worst... political will never becomes a problem when a task proves easier than expected.


No insurgency is congenial. It is not through theory I speak but having been for about 37 years in various forms of insurgency and in various states of intensity.

That is why you shouldn't fight insurgencies unless you have to. Do you have to? Why repeat the US mistake and enter a war of choice against a notoriously intractable insurgency?


However, do explain that if Afghanistan was for revenge, did the US achieve it? If they did not, then why did they swing to Iraq without feeding their revenge? This issue you have failed to answer.

I am not aware that Saddam also was a kingpin in the 9/11 carnage.

Iraq, as I said, involved a whole different set of reasons and decisions, one with no direct relevance to this thread... and if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less.

[Ray]

Possibly the Indian Government believes that the risks and costs of "staying relevant in Afghanistan" exceed the benefits? Is that timidity or common sense?

I believe Einstein had said 'Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen'.

The Indian Government has had no Minister (except one Major of post independence vintage and one Prince who was a TA officer) with military service and hence find petrified at the thought of armed conflicts.

The economist in the PM can only calculate the Rupees and Paisas and yet he still comes a cropper!

Therefore, is it common sense or sheer timidity?

The manner in which India is being bled by Pakistan and Indian Govt remains a docile spectator spewing pious platitudes is a sign of common sense or sheer timidity and paralysis to face the reality?

It requires the US courts and enforcement agencies to ferret out the ISI connection to the Mumbai blast instead of getting its act together on its own, is that common sense or timidity?

Given the way this Govt is performing, maybe they will follow your line of thought of staying out of 'harm's way' and tomtom it as 'common sense' and let Indian strategic and economic interests be sold out!!

Take the occupation of Tibet. In 1950s, China was preoccupied with the US in Korea and yet our pacifist Prime Minister, the world acclaimed leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, sold out the Tibetans to the Chinese and a part of India too!!

Some may call it 'common sense' and some would contest that it is not timidity as was stated in another thread.

I, for one, would construe this pacifism that yields no result but sells off Indian interests as timidity (I could have used stronger terms, but for the sake of decency, am giving it the go by).

It is time to take stock and not merely go by the Biblical injunction - And unto him that smiteth thee on the [one] cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not [to take thy] coat also. (Luke 6:29 )


Actually there's very little activity on Palawan, and bombings/suicide attacks aren't the tactics of choice for the primary insurgent groups.

From open sources, it appear that the United States has provided the Philippines with military "advisers" to support its campaign against al Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/3681069/Army-battles-al-Qaeda-militants-in-Philippines.html

I take it that AQ tactics depends heavily on suicide bombers and their like.

However, you would be the best judge.


Does India's logistic support for its forces in Kashmir have to pass through Iran? Just one difference among many. You may of course do as you will, but I would hesitate to assume that the two cases will be similar.

The issue to which you have answered was the psyche and ethos, where I had stated that Indians were conversant with the Afghan psyche and ethos, unlike the Westerner.

Therefore, the logistic support issue is not understood.

Notwithstanding, it is obvious that the logistic support to Kashmir does not cross Iran.

However, to assume that going through Iran is something insurmountable and dangerous would not be a correct analysis.

What exactly would be the problems of the Iran logistic route that would deter the use?

The logistic support was not safe in the formative days, but now that there is no disturbance to the logistic support, does speaks volumes as to the success of the Indian Army and the Govt in controlling foreign supported insurgency to a real low intensity.

In fact, it is only today, the Hurriyat (the Pak supported pressure group and pro terrorist organisation) has called for the Hurriyat themselves to parley with the Govt of India rather than the Govt always asking them to come for talks!!


Hurriyat leader prod for talks

Srinagar, May 23: A senior leader of the moderate Hurriyat faction has asked the group to offer talks to New Delhi and not wait for an invite, a proposal that amounts to an about-turn from the separatists’ traditional stand.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110524/jsp/nation/story_14022345.jsp



What you expect and what you get can be very different. Unwise to assume that you will have substantial assistance from others. If it comes, wonderful, but if you're going to take on that role the basis of planning should be that you will act alone. The world being what it is, the contributions of others are likely to be token and ephemeral.

One makes assumptions.

Then closer to time, the assumptions are tested for its credibility based on the interaction and the environment.

Plans are based on assumptions since one cannot predict the outcome in minute details. Therefore, one has contingencies also cranked in

For instance, in a battle one may have a brilliant plan, but once it is launched, there has to be flexibility to cater for the situations arising. The one who has the contingency catered for, wins.

While it is correct that contributions are likely to be token and ephemeral, one would not embark on a dangerous mission merely on promises.

[Ray]

You are describing method; my statement referred to purpose. The purpose of the intervention you describe is identical to the American purpose: install or maintain a government that suits the interests of the intervening power. Many of the subsequent issues derive not from method, but from that purpose.

Out of the Purpose evolves the Method.

I believe the United States’ “goal in Afghanistan is to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.”
http://www.lanaturnerjournal.com/online/48-books/130-in-and-out-of-afghanistan?92f5ee08911f163036a8a5033e8594bc=8da27 5d30d869bbd8a973caebf11ebe2

I think that would be the purpose of anyone operating in Afghanistan.

My comments were in reply to your contention of it being cost prohibitive for India.

Afghanistan is costly because the win ability is based on a high tech and so high cost method. Terrorists are like protoplasm. They recreate themselves out of the debris of collateral damage caused by air attacks and artillery and other area weapons (all of which is costly in terms of finance). They also believe in Revenge.

Afghans have the warrior instinct. But it would be wrong to assume that they are dolts and blood thirsty beyond reason. Limit their justification for 'Revenge' and the it becomes a better win-able situation.

A low cost approach along with the projection of 'soft power' will not be that expensive, except maybe in terms of casualties.

Merely to state a purpose and not have a compatible method that suits the environment would possibly not give the correct and desirable result.


If we'll discuss method, I suspect that you place far too much faith in the capacity of aid projects to resolve insurgency, but I've said that before.

Maybe I do place faith in aid projects. If one has aid projects that are visible (in a short span of time) in giving results to the common man, I presume it will have its affect. It has worked in our insurgencies. It will not resolve the insurgencies as such, but would work to wean away the recruiting base to a great degree.

For instance, if I may give an example. In Kashmir, the Indian Army would build projects for local use. They would use them but not really care for them since they knew that if the item fell apart from disuse or terrorist action, because of their 'blackmail' power, it would be rebuilt by the army. When we told them that we would give the material but they would have to build it themselves, there was immense dissatisfaction from not only their ranks, but also from our superior HQs.

Notwithstanding, we made them build their own (it was a mosque). They ensured that it stood, come hail or high water or terrorist. Possibly because it was their labour of love and possibly because if it was destroyed, they themselves would have to build it again!! Bottom line learnt from the Americans - there is no such thing as a Free Lunch!!

It worked.


Of course the Pakistanis will vocally and vehemently object to any Indian presence in Afghanistan. That's part of the charade, and it doesn't mean that Pak GHQ wouldn't be quite happy to have the ability to target Indian forces by proxy, in a position where the Indians are out on a limb with a shaky supply route and occupying a largely hostile territory. It's the sort of place one like to see one's antagonist. The US objected strenuously to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but in the long run they were able to use that situation to weaken their adversary fatally. Why wouldn't Pakistan secretly welcome the opportunity to do the same to India?

You base your assumptions on (a) a shaky supply route and (b) largely hostile territory.

Now, what makes one conclude the supply route to be shaky? I see that it is fraught with the same dangers as it would be in any insurgency and not something extraordinarily different. However, if you could point out the dangers that I have not seen, it would help.

It is wrong to assume that Indians face a hostile Afghan environment. It does not. In fact, Indians are not taken as interlopers.

The casualties Indians have faced in their various projects should be an indicator. The casualties that have occurred are based on Pakistan guided activities since the Indian presence to make a positive contribution, while Pakistan embarked on destruction, has Pakistan worried.

A very marginal ITBF (paramilitary) presence protect the workers from attacks.

It is worth noting if Pakistan has made any effort to reconstruct the war torn Afghanistan.

Afghans can be labelled to be anything, but they are not blind!


Certainly there is a possibility that Pakistan could force India to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving their objectives, if India were to take over the effort to "stabilize" Afghanistan. That would constitute a defeat, not defeat on an absolute scale, but a defeat nonetheless.

The question is whether the benefit to India of trying to stabilize Afghanistan justifies taking that risk.

If India is in Afghanistan,(Big IF) then I wonder if Pakistan can make India withdraw.

Let us look at it another way on the issue of 'stabilisation'.

How many Western troops are involved in UN military missions? Where are the troops coming from?

Would the UN military missions be successful without the backing (moral and financial) of those powers who are interested in bringing peace through these UN Mission?

Who finally benefits when peace (or quasi peace) is brought through these UN Missions? Obviously those nations which can invest in the nations where peace or quasi peace is obtained.

There lies the 'usefulness' of India!

As they say, there is no Free Lunches. It is a Quid Pro Quo and there is enough interest to hand over the body bags problem to those who take it as a matter of course in a day's work.


The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?

Nothing in life is a cakewalk. To assume so, is the first step to disaster.

Nobody is doing it wrong. Everybody in Afghanistan is doing it as suggested by their psyche and approach to issues.

None should even attempt to 'occupy' or 'pacify'. That would be imposing one's own interpretation to solving an issue. It is where those who have the 'missionary's zeal' of bringing 'civilisation to the savages' go wrong. It is better to do it the British way - let the savages be savages, so long it works in our favour! Never forget, a handful of British ruled a whole Empire of 'savages'!!

It is my experience that one should give the broad outline and the tools (that they desire and not what one think they should have) and let the people involved solve it their way. My experience shows that if one allows those involved in a task the liberty to do it their way, most of the times they will pleasantly surprise you with their solutions.


A blunt and realistic assessment of the challenge is also critical to success. It is easy for will to evaporate when a task proves harder than expected. Better to assume the worst... political will never becomes a problem when a task proves easier than expected.

Indeed a blunt and realistic assessment is the answer. And, believe it or not, one prepares for the worst case scenario.

No task in an insurgency will ever be easy. A war is easier to conclude, but not an insurgency. Insurgency follows no rules or mode of tactics. It is mostly personality driven.

The first casualty to any success in an insurgency is the political will.

If there was not the issue of a second election for the US President, maybe things would have been different. Notwithstanding, the US has so far held its own; inspite of domestic compulsions and a fluid insurgency that is operating from safe havens which for good reasons cannot be addressed in the classical manner.


That is why you shouldn't fight insurgencies unless you have to. Do you have to? Why repeat the US mistake and enter a war of choice against a notoriously intractable insurgency?

No country goes willingly to fight an insurgency. They do so to protect their national interests.

India obviously has interests or else they would not be squandering money for reconstruction work in Afghanistan. Indian interest in Afghanistan is known and maybe I have mentioned it too.

[Ray]

Iraq, as I said, involved a whole different set of reasons and decisions, one with no direct relevance to this thread... and if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less.

Of course, Iraq has relevance to the thread.

By stating that nd if anything this discussion needs more focus, not less won't wish away the issue.

It was said that the Oriental people do not understand the psyche of the Americans and hence do not understand that Revenge is a reason to go to war. I concede that.

If Revenge was the raison d'etre for going into Afghanistan, then the rational to leave it simmering and take on Iraq is indeed confounding.

Let us even concede that Revenge was the reason to go into Iraq, but militarily, one does not spilt the Selection and Maintenance of Aim or squander on the Principle of Concentration of Force or fail to adhere to the principle of Economy of Effort. I daresay that the US Army is one of the finest led Armies of the World. Much of the contemporary military thinking is from US Doctrines!! Therefore, would it be too much to believe that the US Army knows what they do? While the political head honchos have their own compulsions that are not so easily understood?

The thread is on Afghanistan and the ending of the insurgency and bringing stability to Afghanistan.

Therefore, it is very much relevant to wonder if it was the aim to take Revenge and in the process smash the AQ and bring stability to Afghanistan, then what prompted in the wavering of the Aim and moving the bulk from the US to Iraq?

[Dayuhan]

Revenge is a reason to go to war. It's not the only reason. Different wars, different reasons.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

If the Indians, or maybe when the Indians, take over in Afghanistan, they are likely to have a very great advantage over us. They will recognize from the beginning who their primary enemy is, the Pak Army/ISI. They won't feed the cat that is clawing at their leg.


The evidence would lie in the experience of everyone who has ever tried to occupy and pacify Afghanistan. Sure, maybe they were all just doing it wrong, and if you do it right it will be a cakewalk... but are you prepared to go in with that assumption?

I never understand this contention. Lots of people have beaten up an occupied Afghanistan. The famously truculent Nuristanis were forcebly (sic) converted to Islam. The Brits never really wanted the place as more than a buffer that they could manipulate and they mostly achieved that. The Russkis got kicked out by American and Saudi money. The Afghans never could have done it on their own. Where does this idea that the Afghans are ten feet tall come from.

[ganulv]

The Afghans never could have done it on their own. Where does this idea that the Afghans are ten feet tall come from.

I think you answer your own question. Afghanistan sits astride historic trade routes and borders contemporary nations who are mistrustful of one another so the chances of finding an outside investor, as it were, have been and continue to be pretty good.

[Dayuhan]

I think you answer your own question. Afghanistan sits astride historic trade routes and borders contemporary nations who are mistrustful of one another so the chances of finding an outside investor, as it were, have been and continue to be pretty good.

I tend to doubt it. Worth noting that between the Soviet withdrawal and 9/11 nobody wanted anything to do with Afghanistan. There may have been trade routes of significance there once upon a time, but there aren't now. Economically, the significance of Afghanistan is close to nil. I doubt that intervention in Afghanistan if the US withdraws would rank very well on anyone's cost-benefit analysis.

It's not about the Afghans being ten feet tall, more about the place being a royal pain in the posterior that requires more effort and cost to pacify than any prospective gain from pacification justifies. The brave and the bold may be willing to risk great pain to seek great gain, but Afghanistan doesn't rank very well on anyone's scale of prospective gain. Why would anyone bother?

[carl]

I guess you can appear to be 10 feet tall if you are standing on somebody else's shoulders.

Nobody cared about about Afghanistan from the time the Russkis left until 2001 and that not caring resulted in some bad things happening. Various countries may not care again but I doubt it. The world has changed a lot in 10 years and a lot of countries seem to care now. If we lose interest I suspect they will keep on caring.

[Dayuhan]

The world has changed a lot in 10 years and a lot of countries seem to care now. If we lose interest I suspect they will keep on caring.

I can't see that it's about caring or not caring. It's more about costs and benefits. Who has enough at stake to want to take on the costs and risks of an attempt to pacify Afghanistan?

[ganulv]

Worth noting that between the Soviet withdrawal and 9/11 nobody wanted anything to do with Afghanistan.

Except al-Qaeda, of course.


Who has enough at stake to want to take on the costs and risks of an attempt to pacify Afghanistan?

Pakistan does. I won’t defend the Pakistani government but their nation faces a real security threat from India.

I don’t know why any nation needs to pacify Afghanistan rather than just pay out enough to keep the right people happy (it’s not like the United States hasn’t done that before). When the British cut off the money Elphinstone’s army met its end and when the Americans cut off the money al-Qaeda found a safe haven. I’m guessing both would like to take that one back.

[JMA]

I never understand this contention. Lots of people have beaten up an occupied Afghanistan. The famously truculent Nuristanis were forcebly (sic) converted to Islam. The Brits never really wanted the place as more than a buffer that they could manipulate and they mostly achieved that. The Russkis got kicked out by American and Saudi money. The Afghans never could have done it on their own. Where does this idea that the Afghans are ten feet tall come from.

Good observation. As the operation is being conducted currently by the time the ISAF forces start to scale down in a year or so they will have risen to twelve feet tall. The incompetence of your enemy (strategy and/or troops) increases your stature.

[Ken White]

The incompetence of your enemy (strategy and/or troops) increases your stature.That's true. :wry:

[davidbfpo]

The main focus is on India, but there's always a Pakistani angle too:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/june/indias-role-in-afghanistan/

Three items I noted:
...it is not clear that India would wholeheartedly support all attempts at political reconciliation. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signalled a significant shift in US policy in February when she said that the 'red lines' for talks with the Taliban – the renunciation of violence, abandonment of an alliance with al-Qaeda and abidance by the Afghan Constitution – were 'necessary outcomes' rather than preconditions. India may not support this move towards negotiations with the Taliban without preconditions.


Yet despite being the largest regional donor in Afghanistan,and the fifth largest internationally, India finds it increasingly difficult to operate in Afghanistan.... Since 2001, 20 Indian nationals have been killed....Crucially, no new major construction project has started in the past two to three years.


The possibility of a Pakistan-brokered endgame between hardline elements of the Taliban and the Afghan government, along with the potential destabilisation of existing Afghan governance structures, remains of concern to India. India enjoys broad public support in Afghanistan, because its reconstruction efforts have been spread throughout the country and benefited all ethnic and tribal groups.

[Ray]

India commits to help Afghan security forces


Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony "conveyed the government of India's willingness to work with the Afghan government in building the capabilities of Afghan security forces," a statement said.

His Afghan counterpart Abdul Rahim Wardak is on a three-day visit to India accompanied by a seven-member team.

Afghan-Indian ties have raised hackles in Islamabad, where the Pakistani government and military establishment has long considered Afghanistan its own strategic asset to offset the perceived threat from India in the east.

India last month pledged $500 million in fresh aid to Afghanistan, raising New Delhi's contribution to $2 billion, to be spent mainly on development projects.

India's military assistance has so far been limited to training Afghanistan's security personnel and investing in small infrastructure projects.

Any greater involvement of Indian forces in Afghanistan would likely face objections from Pakistan, India's regional adversary.


http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gHkeLfpd1BnFDh1N13SYHaweSkZA?docId=CNG.120fa 1f2fe8a6418a984e764a7553e16.af1

[davidbfpo]

Not surprisingly some Indian commentators oppose the much-talked about "talks" with the Afghan Taliban:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/us-should-not-talk-peace-with-brigands

A reported negotiator actually being in Pakistani custody and Germany / Qatar 'good offices' being used.

[Bob's World]

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/06/03/indias_role_in_afghanistan_99541.html

This is a nicely balanced discussion of the implications of a growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. I think the author does a fair job of describing the perspectives, interests and motivations of the various parties, as well as potential consequences.

Personally I see no good that can come from a US enabled growth of Indian Influence in Kabul. The Indian position that "they have no exit strategy" should be chillingly telling as to how they see the opportunities of the current situation.

Bob

[carl]

The Indians will do as they think they must in Afghanistan. We can influence them hardly or not at all.

[Dayuhan]

Personally I see no good that can come from a US enabled growth of Indian Influence in Kabul. The Indian position that "they have no exit strategy" should be chillingly telling as to how they see the opportunities of the current situation.

Like Carl, I don't see how the US is "enabling" Indian influence. The Indians will do what they want, and look after their perceived interests, without any help or enabling from us.

Their lack of an exit strategy does seem a bit of trouble... for them. If their desire to increase their influence gives the US an exit strategy, that may not altogether be a bad thing... for us. I personally think the Pakistanis would love to see the Indians mired down and draining themselves in Afghanistan, and that the Indians would be foolish to put themselves in that position, especially given the logistic complications... but what I think doesn't matter at all.

[Bob's World]

What Indians do of their own accord is of no concern of mine.

What a US desperate for allies to support us in a misconceived mission does to overcome past obstacles to a major Indian presence in Afghanistan, creating long term major problems in an effort to help cure our short-term minor problems is.

We have already disrupted the natural balance in the region in ways we will not fully appreciate for generations, if ever. To add sins to address sins is no solution.

[carl]

Oh I don't know. Lining up with a functioning though flawed democracy that will soon be the most populous country in the world and has a growing, dynamic economy and doesn't kill our people; rather than a collapsing police state with a lousy economy that takes our money and uses it to kill us, may be strategically advantageous to us in the long run.

Whatever obstacles there are to a major Indian presence in Afghanistan, the Indians will overcome on their own. They don't need us.

[Dayuhan]

Lining up with a functioning though flawed democracy that will soon be the most populous country in the world and has a growing, dynamic economy and doesn't kill our people; rather than a collapsing police state with a lousy economy that takes our money and uses it to kill us, may be strategically advantageous to us in the long run.

I don't see that we need to line up with anybody in that particular mess. We can resolve our problems with Pakistan by scaling back or removing our presence in their neighborhood: not like there's any great gain to be had for us there in the first place. If we don't like the way they spend the money we send, we should stop sending it.


Whatever obstacles there are to a major Indian presence in Afghanistan, the Indians will overcome on their own. They don't need us.

True. The Indians will do what they will do, and reap the consequences on their own. No need for us to be taking sides or trying to manipulate that situation. It will be easier (and more likely) for us to make it worse than better.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

I tend to agree with you in the short term. If we were to "line up" it would be because the cabal of genius that is the Pak Army/ISI has forced us into an either/or situation.

In the long run I don't see how we can't get closer and closer to India. We need each other and are similar in some important ways.

[Dayuhan]

I tend to agree with you in the short term. If we were to "line up" it would be because the cabal of genius that is the Pak Army/ISI has forced us into an either/or situation.

The only thing that's forced us into anything is the cabal of not quite genius in DC that decided we have to transform Afghanistan. Not that the Pak army/ISI haven't exploited that particular piece of stupidity, but people will do that, if we insist on making bad decisions.


In the long run I don't see how we can't get closer and closer to India. We need each other and are similar in some important ways.

Closer to India is fine. Taking sides in their regional conflicts is less fine. I don't see much percentage in that for us.

[Ray]

Mod's Note

Due to the amount of details on India's role contained here, this was copied here from another thread 'Winning in Afghanistan'.


Road building isn't state building. If you try to install, cultivate, or protect a government in another country, especially one where control of patronage is a major source of individual prosperity and power, you are going to upset people and generate opposition, no matter what you do.

I mentioned the Road building project since anyone conversant with Counter Insurgency operations would know that while it is comparatively easy to defend point targets, it is not easy to defend a widely dispersed area target like constructing a highway where the engineering assets and manpower is widely spread without fortifications. Further the construction had to be done against a timed target and so were constructed in various segments and then linked up.

That the Indian construction team did not have the protection of any Army or air assets since it was not permitted by the US, lest it upset Pakistan and yet could construct with minimal initial casualties because of Pakistani based terrorists, I think would elicit praise being remarkable.

That the attacks by the terrorist were not mounted thereafter does indicate the goodwill and rapport that the Indian team had built up with the locals.

In passing the road is not the only thing done by the Indians. And it must be remembered that India had no stake in the invasion of Afghanistan wherein they would be burdened with some obligations to set right things.

Since it appears that you are not aware India's contribution, if one goes by your posts, I take this opportunity to inform you that India has played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

The annual assistance is over US$ 100 million and, in addition, has pledged recently an additional assistance of US$ 100 million, thus, making the total amount of our assistance over US $ 750 million. Of this, US$ 400 million have already been disbursed so far.

India has undertaken projects virtually in all parts of Afghanistan, in a wide range of sectors including hydro-electricity, power transmission lines, road construction, agriculture and industry, telecommunications, information and broadcasting, capacity development, humanitarian assistance, education and health, which have been identified by the Afghan government as priority areas for development.

All the projects are undertaken in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), and in alignment with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and with focus on local ownership of assets.

Major projects include: Construction of Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a sub-station at Kabul under the North-East Power System project which will bring power from neighbouring countries to Kabul; humanitarian food assistance of 1 million tons of wheat in the form of high protein biscuits under School Feeding Programme in Afghanistan supplied through World Food Programme; construction of 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram that will facilitate movement of goods and personnel from Afghanistan to Iranian border; reconstruction and completion of Salma Dam Power Project (42 MW) in Herat province; construction of Afghanistan’s Parliament Building; reconstruction of Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health in Kabul in various phases including reconstruction of surgical ward/ polyclinic/ diagnostic centre; reconstruction of Habibia School; digging of 26 tube wells in north west Afghanistan; gifting of vehicles (400 buses, 200 mini-buses, 105 municipality and 285 army vehicles); setting up of 5 toilet-cum-sanitation complexes in Kabul; telephone exchanges in 11 provinces to connect them to Kabul; national TV network by providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals; rehabilitation of Amir Ghazi and Quargah Reservoir dams, solar electrification of 100 villages, etc

Skills development and capacity building has been identified as another key area of priority, expected to become the vanguard in tackling the mammoth challenge of institutional building in Afghanistan. In furtherance of this, the Government of India (GoI) has offered 500 Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) long-term university scholarships and 500 short-term Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) training programmes for Afghan nationals annually from 2006-07 onwards. 30 Indian civil servants are also being deputed under the GoI/GoA/UNDP Tripartite MoU for Capacity for Afghan Public Administration programme envisaged to build capacity in various Afghan Ministries. Other major skills development projects include CII project for training 3,000 Afghans in the trades of carpentry, plumbing, welding, masonry and tailoring, as well as SEWA project for technical assistance to Women’s Vocational Training Centre in Bagh-e-Zanana. Since 2002, around 2215 Afghans have trained/studied in India under the various GoI sponsored training programme. India is training the Afghan police and the army.

India is also implementing numerous community-based, small development projects in the fields of agriculture, rural development, education, health, vocational training, water and sanitation etc. These projects, with short gestation periods, have direct and visible impact on community life, and focus on local ownership and management

On the issue of patronage in Afghanistan, I daresay neither the US nor anyone is there as missionaries who are bringing civilisation to the savages! In other words, it is the first mistake - superimposing western ethics in a hurry, as if it were Instant Coffee being served!

While I am not condoning corruption, but ‘patronage’ as you see it, is a historical convention, even practised in ancient West. It is bringing gifts to the ruler! It was also prevalent with the British in India, who used to get dolis which they accept with élan. If you are conversant with British Indian history, you will recall the rationale for the impeachment of the Governor General Warren Hasting of India. Education in India over about 300 years of colonial rule inculcated British ethics and hence the custom of Mughal nazrana fell by the way and was taken to be bribes............. but then Afghanistan never had the benefit of English education and customs or ethics since they were never conquered.

Neither are they aware of the English phrase Beware of Greeks bearing gifts.

[blueblood]

First of all, a large Indian military presence is highly unlikely. India had it's share of unfortunate adventures in Sri Lanka.

India is the country which is supposed to lose the most if taliban returns to power bar the Afghanistan itself. What do you think these thousands of trained jihadis will do after that? A 9 to 5 job is not my guess. It will be 1988 Kashmir redux for India. Energy and minerals security too will vanish into thin air.

For example:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Airlines_Flight_814

If (a big if) India enters Afghanistan, then it has some advantages which Americans never had.

1) Common culture between Indians and Afghans.
2) Historically good ties and goodwill.
3) Rich experience in fighting insurgencies and as Brig. Ray mentioned a "low tech approach". In the last 23 years of fighting insurgency in Kashmir, 84mm Carl Gustav is the heaviest weapon used. Thus, minimum logistics required.
4) A different approach of dealing with locals. Not bringing the civilization to the savages. If an Afghan wants to beat his wife, let him do it.
5) Support from Iran, another stakeholder.

For the logistics.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/8862583/India-plans-worlds-most-dangerous-railroad-from-Afghanistan-to-Iran.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chah_Bahar#Chabahar_Port

Large Indian contingent is probably a stupid move but I think it's better than to sit on one's hands and then regret.

[Ray]

I am not conversant with the strategy or tactics adopted to take on the terrorists in Afghanistan beyond what is known from open sources.

To beat the terrorists at their game could be like what India has done in Kashmir.

Deployment on the Border to 'seal' (it can never be 100%) with a second line where there is an anti Infiltration obstacle system.

And thereafter there are troops to include para military in bases to operate against those terrorists who have infiltrated and reported to be in location by the locals.

It requires adequate troops and one wonders if the US and ISAF would commit that many troops or paramiltiary.

The advantage the US and ISAF is that they are cleared to use the air force and artillery. That would make a great difference.

One requires to defeat or contain the terrorists and send a message that it won't work before any political measures can be put in place successfully.

[davidbfpo]

At the recent IISS briefing on Afghanistan it was pointed out that India had made no actual investments in Afghanistan for two years, nor were there any Indians training the ANSF in country and there were signs that the ISI -v- RAW competition had eased.

Then I found a link by Australia's Lowy Institute, starting with:
India Today recently reported that a high-level Indian delegation quietly signed a series of new infrastructure deals in Tehran in late November 2011. The big ticket item was a new railway from Iran's Chah Bahar port, which India also promised to help upgrade, to the Hajigak region of eastern Afghanistan, where Indian firms have interests in iron ore.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/01/16/Iran-Decision-time-looms-for-India.aspx

Note the Lowy comment extends to India's position on Iran, which to this faraway observer is well, different.

[Ray]

Pak is wary of Indian influence in Afghan: Pentagon

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pak-is-wary-of-indian-influence-in-afghan-pentagon/944029/0

[carl]

The report cited by the article says this:

"The year 2011 saw the first ever over year decline in nationwide enemy-initiated attacks in five years. These trends have continued in 2012,".

Does anybody know offhand if they mean enemy initiated attacks against ISAF forces or attacks against everybody to include Afghan civilians and gov officials?

[davidbfpo]

Within a broader strategic article by Paul Rogers are these two paragraphs:
The first factor is pressure from the Pentagon to get India greatly to expand its military aid to Afghanistan (see Rahul Bedi, "US asks India to increase Afghan military assistance", Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 May 2012 (behind an obstacle, but available here:http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/184511-us-asks-india-increase-afghan-military-assistance.html).

A substantial team of US government officials had meetings in Delhi on 17-18 May; the officials sought multi-layered assistance from the Indian government that would go far beyond India's current limited role in military training, its training of the Afghan judiciary, and involvement in numerous engineering projects.

The US's wish-list includes direct Indian financial aid for Afghanistan's national-security forces (ANSF); the provision of training to 25,000 ANSF personnel (including up to 500 officers) at bases in India; and the supply of tanks, field-artillery, rocket-launchers, mortars, communications equipment and other materials.

I was bemused to read the USA would want India to supply the ANSF with T-90S & T-72 tanks.

Link to original cited article:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/america-india-pakistan-china-next-game

[omarali50]

So presumaly NATO cannot ship supplies via Iran, but India can? Am I correct?
What if NATO buys from India and India ships stuff in via Iran?
Just curious.

[davidbfpo]

Question numbers added
1) So presumably NATO cannot ship supplies via Iran, but India can? 2) Am I correct?
3) What if NATO buys from India and India ships stuff in via Iran?
4) Just curious.

1) I have long suspected that certain European nations do ship supplies overland to Afghanistan via Iran's railways to their rail terminal close to Herat.

2) Yes given India's relationship with Iran - which mar jar with the USA - it can easily use a Gulf port and the overland routes north.

3) Goods in transit to Afghanistan no problem.

4) Keep being curious. You may one day understand this re-run of the 'Great Game'.

[davidbfpo]

On 5th November IISS have an Indian diplomat speaking on this theme:
On the eve of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to India, H.E. Ambassador Rakesh Sood, a former Ambassador of India to Afghanistan, will talk about India’s relations with Afghanistan, past and future.

India has also engaged in a series of trilateral and multilateral regional and international initiatives on Afghanistan. Yet, at the same time, there is concern in New Delhi over Afghanistan’s stability and security to 2015 and beyond.

HE Ambassador Rakesh Sood was appointed India’s Ambassador to France in August 2011. He served as Ambassador of India to Afghanistan from January 2005 - January 2008...

A podcast usually appears shortly afterwards, so I shall endeavour to add that.

[davidbfpo]

In July 2013 Ajit Doval was an Indian think tank director, now he is the new Indian government's national security advisor and so his speech on the prospects for Afghanistan become useful:http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/september/2/moderate-and-balanced-afghanistan-imperative-for-regional-security

Ajit Doval is a former Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief, till 2005. IB is IIRC the internal security agency, with a strong police emphasis, whereas external intelligence is the domain of RAW.