Is Iraq the Next Gaza?

[AdmiralAdama]

Ralph Peters on Gaza anarchy/jihadists and the future of Iraq

http://www.nypost.com/seven/06142007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/in_gazas_shadow_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm?pa ge=0



IN GAZA'S SHADOW
IRAQ & THE ARAB SUICIDE CULT
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June 14, 2007 -- WONDER what Iraq would look like if we left to morrow? Take a look at Gaza today. Then imagine a situation a thousand times worse.

We need to stop making politically correct excuses. Arab civilization is in collapse. Extremes dominate, either through dictatorship or anarchy. Thanks to their dysfunctional values and antique social structures, Arab states can't govern themselves decently.

We gave them a chance in Iraq. Israel "gave back" the Gaza Strip to let the Palestinians build a model state. Arabs seized those opportunities to butcher each other.

The barbarity in Gaza has become so grotesque that not even the media's apologists for terror can ignore it (especially since Islamist fanatics began to target journalists)...

[SteveMetz]

Ralph Peters on Gaza anarchy/jihadists and the future of Iraq

http://www.nypost.com/seven/06142007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/in_gazas_shadow_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm?pa ge=0

We were discussing that at work today. I have some reservations about drawing the overarching conclusion that "Arabs can't govern themselves" from Gaza. When I read Ralph's column, I was reminded that the apartheid regime in South Africa drew the same conclusion because of the crime and violence in the black parts of that country. But when people are in subhuman conditions, they behave subhumanly. Heck, no one drew the conclusion that "Europeans can't govern themselves" during the centuries of conflict, war, genocide, and inquisition there. Jordan, Morocco, and even the smaller Gulf states govern themselves OK. Or at least they aren't the sorts of morass that Palestine is.

[AdmiralAdama]

Just because "apartheid leaders" made comments about blacks that weren't correct doesn't mean that we can't make any observations about how cultures are doing. In the Arab world, certainly, there are no functioning democracies, and the choice seems to be between authoritarian govts and anarchy leading to jihadist takeover. Of course, this could change, but we see precious little evidence that this is occuring. Note failure of Iraqi "reconciliation", Lebanese civil wars, Gaza anarchy, etc. The argument that "when people are in subhuman conditions, they behave subhumanly" doesn't seem to do justice to the Jihadist ideology and the Arab tribalism which is motivating some of these conflicts.

[SteveMetz]

Just because "apartheid leaders" made comments about blacks that weren't correct doesn't mean that we can't make any observations about how cultures are doing. In the Arab world, certainly, there are no functioning democracies, and the choice seems to be between authoritarian govts and anarchy leading to jihadist takeover. Of course, this could change, but we see precious little evidence that this is occuring. Note failure of Iraqi "reconciliation", Lebanese civil wars, Gaza anarchy, etc. The argument that "when people are in subhuman conditions, they behave subhumanly" doesn't seem to do justice to the Jihadist ideology and the Arab tribalism which is motivating some of these conflicts.

I didn't say anything about commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of cultures. I have long agreed with Ralph on that. I just think he pushes the argument so far that it almost becomes a caricature. As mentioned, nations like Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco might not be democracies like ours, but they are stable and they are democratizing. They aren't purely democratic, but they aren't really authoritarian either. I just don't think you can draw overarching conclusions about a culture from its worst cases.

[Tacitus]

Gentlemen,
I can't figure our what Peters wants done.

On the one hand, he says Arabs can't govern themselves. In which case, it would seem our democracy project is doomed from the start, and we might as well just leave now.

But then he says if we leave, Iraq will be many times worse than Gaza.

So are we supposed to stay, but give up on the idea of self-government in Iraq? Find a strongman and just put him in charge? Or something else?

Peters needs to clarify this for his readers. It sounds to me like he is just ranting, which while psychologically healthy for a release (I do it periodically, myself!), doesn't contribute much to the debate on what should be done.

[AdmiralAdama]

I think he's setting up a "fight as hard as possible right now, but if we lose let's blame Arab rejectionism/tribalism/crazyism" argument

Re: Democracy and the Arabs

Jordan, Kuwait, and Morroco are authoritarian and "democratization" seems like a lot of window dressing. Can you imagine a party OPPOSED to the current power-holders coming to rule democratically in those countries. I can't. I think it's quite possible that Arab tribalism and Islamic fundamentalism is playing a large role in creating obstacles to stable democracies in the area. Indeed, it is quite revealing that there are no Muslim democracies in the world, with the arguable exception of Indonesia.

[Tacitus]

...it is quite revealing that there are no Muslim democracies in the world, with the arguable exception of Indonesia.

While it has its political problems at the moment, Turkey is without doubt a Muslim country. I wouldn't say it is NOT democratic at all. The Turkish army has periodically overthrown elected governments if it judged the government was in conflict with the secular policies implemented by Ataturk, among other reasons. But I'm sure some Turks, and other observers, would say they are at least as democratic as Indonesia, perhaps more.

Perhaps you just overlooked Turkey because they are not Arabs, and originally the question was whether or not Arabs could govern themselves.

[AdmiralAdama]

Turkey has def'ly been an interesting country to watch. It's important to remember that its "democratization" has come hand in hand with a ruthless "de-Islamicization" campaign started by strongman Ataturk.

As Islamism rears its head in the country, we shall see what occurs.

Turkey is also a real nation, as is Egypt. The rest of the arab states are really false states, created by mapmakers in 1917 and more a collection of tribes.

[SteveMetz]

Gentlemen,
I can't figure our what Peters wants done.

On the one hand, he says Arabs can't govern themselves. In which case, it would seem our democracy project is doomed from the start, and we might as well just leave now.

But then he says if we leave, Iraq will be many times worse than Gaza.

So are we supposed to stay, but give up on the idea of self-government in Iraq? Find a strongman and just put him in charge? Or something else?

Peters needs to clarify this for his readers. It sounds to me like he is just ranting, which while psychologically healthy for a release (I do it periodically, myself!), doesn't contribute much to the debate on what should be done.

It doesn't really come out in this essay, but does in his other writings (and in conversations with him). At the risk of oversimplifying, Ralph basically says write off the wahabi/Arab element of the Islamic world right now, and solidify our ties with the other parts--India, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. He is a great fan of the Kurds and believes strongly the U.S. should remain their protector.

While I haven't discussed it with him recently, I think he's conflicted on the Iraq conflict writ large. He is certainly takes more of a "mailed fist"/Roman/German/Luttwak approach to counterinsurgency. Personally, I think that illustrates the great bifurcation of thinking on counterinsurgency today: Ralph, Ed Luttwak, etc. believe it is, in fact, war, and that we hurt ourselves by stressing "hearts and minds." The other school, descended from the British and French approaches of the 20th century, believe that the combat component is secondary and stress legitimacy and "hearts and minds."

Increasingly, I don't fall into either camp. I don't think the United States can be very good at either approach. The first takes a bloodlust we simply don't have (and which would destroy our leadership among the rest of the world as other nations increasingly loath and fear us). The second takes a degree of cultural acuity and patience that we do not posses. Thus I favor a strategy which says we will do FID/hearts and minds in those very rare cases where it is likely to work with a reasonable degree of effort and within our short attention span (e.g. El Salvador). Otherwise, we should either participate in a multinational trusteeship if the world has the stomach for it; otherwise, simply contain and cauterize insurgencies.

[SteveMetz]

I think he's setting up a "fight as hard as possible right now, but if we lose let's blame Arab rejectionism/tribalism/crazyism" argument

Re: Democracy and the Arabs

Jordan, Kuwait, and Morroco are authoritarian and "democratization" seems like a lot of window dressing. Can you imagine a party OPPOSED to the current power-holders coming to rule democratically in those countries. I can't. I think it's quite possible that Arab tribalism and Islamic fundamentalism is playing a large role in creating obstacles to stable democracies in the area. Indeed, it is quite revealing that there are no Muslim democracies in the world, with the arguable exception of Indonesia.

Well, if you define "democracy" as an American style, multiparty system, then there are none in the Arab world and not all that many others. (Remember that even our Founding Fathers did not consider a multiparty system part of the definition of democracy). If you define democracy as a system of rule by law and popular participation in policymaking, then there are some in the Muslim world that are either there or well along the path.

[Steve Blair]

It doesn't really come out in this essay, but does in his other writings (and in conversations with him). At the risk of oversimplifying, Ralph basically says write off the wahabi/Arab element of the Islamic world right now, and solidify our ties with the other parts--India, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. He is a great fan of the Kurds and believes strongly the U.S. should remain their protector.

While I haven't discussed it with him recently, I think he's conflicted on the Iraq conflict writ large. He is certainly takes more of a "mailed fist"/Roman/German/Luttwak approach to counterinsurgency. Personally, I think that illustrates the great bifurcation of thinking on counterinsurgency today: Ralph, Ed Luttwak, etc. believe it is, in fact, war, and that we hurt ourselves by stressing "hearts and minds." The other school, descended from the British and French approaches of the 20th century, believe that the combat component is secondary and stress legitimacy and "hearts and minds."

Increasingly, I don't fall into either camp. I don't think the United States can be very good at either approach. The first takes a bloodlust we simply don't have (and which would destroy our leadership among the rest of the world as other nations increasingly loath and fear us). The second takes a degree of cultural acuity and patience that we do not posses. Thus I favor a strategy which says we will do FID/hearts and minds in those very rare cases where it is likely to work with a reasonable degree of effort and within our short attention span (e.g. El Salvador). Otherwise, we should either participate in a multinational trusteeship if the world has the stomach for it; otherwise, simply contain and cauterize insurgencies.

I've always been rather intrigued with what Peters REALLY thinks as opposed to some of his rather exaggerated writings.

I happen to agree with you about the United States not being especially suited for either approach to COIN. Part of it, perhaps, boils down to our political system, which has never been known for cultivating patience. With a low-scale revolution every two years, the majority of elected policy makers just don't focus on one thing long enough.


It's important to remember that its "democratization" has come hand in hand with a ruthless "de-Islamicization" campaign started by strongman Ataturk.

And AA, Ataturk was a "strongman" to the Turks in the same sense that Washington was a "strongman" to the United States. Tom's written some about this before, but to classify him as a "strongman" does not even begin to capture what he means to Turkey in general and the military's role in that nation in particular. And one could also argue that France's "democtratization" came with a ruthless "de-Royalist" campaign headed by a number of people. I believe the roots of Britain's democracy is also littered with a fair number of corpses. Our own beginnings also involved a certain amount of activity against Loyalist elements within the colonies.

History is not black and white in most cases, no matter how much we may wish that it was so. Quite often the blacks and whites are hidden by multiple shades of gray.

[AdmiralAdama]

The question -- and it's a timely one -- is whether Islamic states are conducive to democracy. Is it Arab tribalism that is the problem, or is something about Islam which is creating trouble? Is it a combination, or are the assumptions of the question wrong -- that the problem lies elsewhere, such as in oil-rich states creating dependency, the Israel problem (an old chestnut) etc. With all the problems "creating" democracies in the Arab world, is this a proper strategy for the US to take post 9/11?

What lessons, exactly, are we supposed to take away from France's battle with Royalists? Not sure how enlightening the comparison is. The comparison with Turkey is much more enlightening, although N=1 ,they seem to have had to enforce severe restrictions on Islam in order to democratize.


And one could also argue that France's "democtratization" came with a ruthless "de-Royalist" campaign headed by a number of people. I believe the roots of Britain's democracy is also littered with a fair number of corpses. Our own beginnings also involved a certain amount of activity against Loyalist elements within the colonies.


I think the following is quite sharp. Although I'd like to ask what the board thinks about use of proxy forces, such as Ethiopians in Somalia, and perhaps the Kurds in the ME. This seems like a grand way of fighting Jihadists without bringing political or media pressure to bear on the States.


I don't think the United States can be very good at either approach. The first takes a bloodlust we simply don't have (and which would destroy our leadership among the rest of the world as other nations increasingly loath and fear us). The second takes a degree of cultural acuity and patience that we do not posses. Thus I favor a strategy which says we will do FID/hearts and minds in those very rare cases where it is likely to work with a reasonable degree of effort and within our short attention span (e.g. El Salvador). Otherwise, we should either participate in a multinational trusteeship if the world has the stomach for it; otherwise, simply contain and cauterize insurgencies.

[Tom Odom]

I think the following is quite sharp. Although I'd like to ask what the board thinks about use of proxy forces, such as Ethiopians in Somalia, and perhaps the Kurds in the ME. This seems like a grand way of fighting Jihadists without bringing political or media pressure to bear on the States.

Suggest that you do a search and you will find we have discussed this on here. As for Ethiopians in Somalia, we have played both sides of that coin and we have consistently lost. Getting involved in that particular conflict only made some sense when dealing with the Cold War and the need to maintain control of key sea passages and thei littorals.

As for the Kurds, again we have done this and then abandoned the Kurds when the need arose. They have not forgotten, nor should they. The Kurds are hardly an anti-Islamic group to begin with; ther martial traditions hinge on the role of Salah ad-Din. Finally the Kurds are not a monolith--Talabani and Barzani have been fighting each other as long as they have been fighting the Iraqi Arabs, the Iranians, and the Turks.

Tom

[goesh]

"The question -- and it's a timely one -- is whether Islamic states are conducive to democracy. Is it Arab tribalism that is the problem, or is something about Islam which is creating trouble?" (AdmiralAdama)

I've thought about this for several years too and though I'm inclined to think Democracy and Islam are very much at odds, too many examples to the contrary exist that show degrees and forms of representative rule and Law that are significantly devoid of a heavy, Islamic influence. Gambia, West Africa comes to mind, a country that is roughly 90% Muslim. It is a Republic with elections and Consitutional Law that does carry with it components of Islamic jurisprudence but in no way could Gambia be called an Islamic nation. Though tiny and poor and insignificant, it is essentially Democratic.

[SteveMetz]

"The question -- and it's a timely one -- is whether Islamic states are conducive to democracy. Is it Arab tribalism that is the problem, or is something about Islam which is creating trouble?" (AdmiralAdama)

I've thought about this for several years too and though I'm inclined to think Democracy and Islam are very much at odds, too many examples to the contrary exist that show degrees and forms of representative rule and Law that are significantly devoid of a heavy, Islamic influence. Gambia, West Africa comes to mind, a country that is roughly 90% Muslim. It is a Republic with elections and Consitutional Law that does carry with it components of Islamic jurisprudence but in no way could Gambia be called an Islamic nation. Though tiny and poor and insignificant, it is essentially Democratic.

I still contend that all depends on what you mean by "democracy." If you mean Western, liberal, secular, multiparty democracy, then perhaps not. If you mean a system that works on consensus and some form of participation, perhaps.

I do agree with Ralph, though, that Islam as a culture seems unlikely to produce states that are economically, technologically, or culturally competitive on a global scale, and politically stable without repression. The predominantly Islamic states which have been the most successful (Turkey, Malaysia) do by not becoming "Islamic" states. So I think Ralph and I would both say, "You can be an Islamic state or you can be a successful, stable, competitive state. You choose. But don't blame me for the results of your choice."

(Ralph and I often agree but I tend to do a lot less flame throwing. I was once described at a conference as a "kinder, gentler Ralph Peters." I took that as a compliment.)

[Steve Blair]

I still contend that all depends on what you mean by "democracy." If you mean Western, liberal, secular, multiparty democracy, then perhaps not. If you mean a system that works on consensus and some form of participation, perhaps.

I do agree with Ralph, though, that Islam as a culture seems unlikely to produce states that are economically, technologically, or culturally competitive on a global scale, and politically stable without repression. The predominantly Islamic states which have been the most successful (Turkey, Malaysia) do by not becoming "Islamic" states. So I think Ralph and I would both say, "You can be an Islamic state or you can be a successful, stable, competitive state. You choose. But don't blame me for the results of your choice."

(Ralph and I often agree but I tend to do a lot less flame throwing. I was once described at a conference as a "kinder, gentler Ralph Peters." I took that as a compliment.)

This was to me one of Peters' more interesting observations about the state of Islam as seen from a Western viewpoint. If memory serves it was his contention that they were stagnating because they never experienced the equivalent of a Reformation (going off memory here, so I may be mis-stating what he wrote).

Turkey is a very interesting case; an example of a failed empire that managed to remake itself.

[Tacitus]

It doesn't really come out in this essay, but does in his other writings (and in conversations with him). At the risk of oversimplifying, Ralph basically says write off the wahabi/Arab element of the Islamic world right now, and solidify our ties with the other parts--India, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. He is a great fan of the Kurds and believes strongly the U.S. should remain their protector.

While I haven't discussed it with him recently, I think he's conflicted on the Iraq conflict writ large.

Otherwise, we should either participate in a multinational trusteeship if the world has the stomach for it; otherwise, simply contain and cauterize insurgencies.

Hello SteveMetz,
Perhaps Mr. Peters just ran out of space. I didn't count the words is his essay, but I'm guessing they give him a word limit. There are only so many wars you can deal with in a short essay! It is not his responsiblity to devise and implement a policy for Iraq, anyway.

But it IS the responsibility of the President, Congress, and the military. Being conflicted on the conflict seems to have resulted in a policy of just fighting to stave off a potential disaster, because we don't know what else to do. If the intensity of the insurgency can be reduced a little, then some sort of political reconciliation in Iraq will just happen. Somehow.

Although completely different in character, this Iraq war feels a little like trench warfare in WWI. Sporadic, inconclusive combat, with no significant territorial gains. Each side in a battle of attrition, just trying to wear down the opposing side. After being declared the victor in WWI, it sure didn't feel like much of a victory to the Allies; certainly the postwar situation didn't seem to be worth the price paid. With all the talk about previous counterinsurgencies, I don't know why WWI seems to creep into my thoughts. Maybe just anxieties that there could be some larger, more deadly conflict bookended behind this war?