New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

[SWJED]

Latest from Dave Kilcullen at the SWJ blog - New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/new-paradigms-for-21st-century/).


I asked the SWJ to pass along that I’ve been continuously in the field of late and haven’t posted to the blog as much as I would have liked to. I am still very much engaged in the Small Wars Journal community and will be posting here again soon. In the meantime I offer up this article (http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm) published in the June 2007 issue of the Department of State’s eJournal. I might add that there are some excellent articles in this issue of eJournal (http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/welcome.htm) – well worth following the link and taking a look around.

New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

By David J. Kilcullen

Despite our rather rosy hindsight view of World War II, there was considerable dissent at the time about the war's aims, conduct, and strategy. But virtually no one disagreed that it was indeed a war or that the Axis powers were the enemy/aggressors.

Contrast this with the war on terrorism. Some dispute the notion that the conflict can be defined as a war; others question the reality of the threat. Far-left critics blame American industrial interests, while a lunatic fringe sees September 11, 2001, as a massive self-inflicted conspiracy. More seriously, people disagree about the enemy. Is al-Qaida a real threat or a creature of Western paranoia and overreaction? Is it even a real organization? Is al-Qaida a mass movement or simply a philosophy, a state of mind? Is the enemy all terrorism? Is it extremism? Or is Islam itself in some way a threat? Is this primarily a military, political, or civilizational problem? What would "victory" look like? These fundamentals are disputed, as those of previous conflicts (except possibly the Cold War) were not.

In truth, the al-Qaida threat is all too real. But ambiguity arises because this conflict breaks existing paradigms—including notions of "warfare," "diplomacy," "intelligence," and even "terrorism." How, for example, do we wage war on nonstate actors who hide in states with which we are at peace? How do we work with allies whose territory provides safe haven for nonstate opponents? How do we defeat enemies who exploit the tools of globalization and open societies, without destroying the very things we seek to protect?...

[SteveMetz]

Latest from Dave Kilcullen at the SWJ blog - New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/new-paradigms-for-21st-century/).


Dave--if you're reading this. I have something to add to the "it's a small word" category. I'm sponsoring the International Fellow from Singapore for the U.S. Army War College class of 2008 and it turns out he's an old mate of yours--Wang Kit Ng. He wants to get in touch with you so I'm giving him your email. He'll be over at my house for his formal introduction to slow smoked Southern style barbeque in a few hours.

[Rob Thornton]

Great article. The problems of fielding the right structure and capabilities seem to be the ones that we are having difficulty discussing and finding consensus on. The paradox is that while the spending is one sided, no other existing agency has the demonstrated capability to absorb or create the functions that DoD can (albeit painfully).

Hence the call for identification of strategic services, and the creation of capabilities.

The question then I guess is what is the best path for change? Do you create those capabilities/services from within an existing agency, or do you create something new, but based on concepts drawn from relevant historical examples?

The problems with the former are competition from within the agency, resistance to change, and perspective drawn from institutional bias. The problems of creating from scratch are title infringement, recruitment of personnel from limited, existing pools, justification of a budget, and generating desired capabilities. The former will almost certainly take longer and not meet the full intent; the latter will be more painful up front and receive criticism for what are perceived to be failures or shortfalls until it gets itself sorted out . The latter will certainly require truly talented leadership that can articulate a vision, drive the organization, testify before congress and the American people, and must possess the courage and fortitude commensurate to the task. These are some the risks of the two paths. MacGregor/Murray/Knox did some great work on inter-war change, but I think this may even be a greater challenge in some ways.

If it is a zero sum gain (meaning it will compete for a portion of the budget already identified and allocated), then it requires strategic leadership and vision at the national level to provide the direction and impetus to make it happen. Who gets less, and what is the cost? Existing agencies and services can help or hinder. It starts by challenging our own assumptions about our relevancy and our ability to not only meet current demands, but to succeed. We must ask ourselves are we willing to sacrifice part of our self interests in order to field the types of capabilities/strategic services that are currently beyond us. We must step out of our biases and prejudices about how we have traditionally justified our roles. If existing agencies are unwilling to help, if the leadership is not present to arbitrate or direct, then any new service/agency or component of an existing service/agency will not only have to address the enemy from without, but the tripping and back stabbing from the enemies within.

I think that is the only way we can identify what resources can be redirected and where we can take risk. That we must assume risk is guaranteed, we cannot be good at everything. We must decide what is most important and doing this means building a clear consensus and understanding of what is the consequence of not fully addressing this dangerous and likely threat, vs. those that are more vague and unlikely. This is going to be hard and uncomfortable; after all those in the security services get paid to be skeptical and paranoid.

The military is charged with preserving and defending the constitution – this makes for a conservative culture. The only way to address this may be by fundamentally revisiting our notions of security. Self-reliance for everything is an American hallmark. Since WWII our participation in alliances and collective security arrangements have never prevented us from pursuing the means to protect our interests outside of those arrangements. A move to balance the focus on conflict prevention (outside of sheer military deterrence) and conflict termination (winning the peace) vs. one that invests disproportionately on conflict resolution is a major national strategic culture change.

As you point out, we must also ask what it means to be "decisive" today and tomorrow? Is the word "decisive" a limiting adjective outside of our own culture. Does it suggest an expectation that the problems we face can be permenantly addressed quickly, vs. the need to remain involved and perform a kind of long term maintenance. Managing expectations will have allot to do with how we acknowledge and address capability gaps.

Personally, I believe your description of our way forward warrants involvement. It may be the most efficient and effective means to move forward in an age of indefinite conflict with the conditions / environment you have outlined in your essay. I only hope we don't require another catalyst on the scale of 9/11 to move forward.

Thank you sir for a very thoughtful essay.
R/S Rob

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Sir,

I have read and then carefully re-read you with marked interest.

I cannot but confess that all this you and Mr. Max Boot say about this idea of creating a new structure based upon the OSS model sets me wondering whether suited units and services do not exist already. If ever, then Mr. Max Boot and you certainly mark a point, nonetheless, when you complain that existing structures tasked to fight terrorism are challenged by terrorists organizations on the ground of adaptability to quick changes and evolutions.

I assume they are, possibly.

Then, while trying to imagine what might be an “OSS II” in the XXIth century I remembered that someone has previously had a very similar idea in 2003; or earlier according to all likelihood. I name the popular novelist Tom Clancy, who made this idea the central theme of a novel he titled The Teeth of the Dragon. The methodology and policy of this fictional special operations service the author christens “The Campus” favors hasty ways of doing things, if I may say so.

Well, all this did seem unlikely to me at first glance; until I seriously wondered whether it shouldn’t suit the exceptional circumstances since they are as exceptional as they were in 1942, indeed.

Now, media and public opinion during WWII bore little resemblance with what they are today. That’s why we might reasonably hazard the guess that were the existence of such a service be brought to public knowledge at some point, then it would make a bit of a fuss.

That’s probably why, in The Teeth of the Dragon, Tom Clancy made The Campus an "off the books" intelligence agency freed from the shackles of Congressional oversight.

Please, take this comment as a mere remark in passing.

Best regards.

[SWJED]

Interesting reading in the blog comments (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/new-paradigms-for-21st-century/#comments) section of New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict.

[SteveMetz]

Sir,

I have read and then carefully re-read you with marked interest.

I cannot but confess that all this you and Mr. Max Boot say about this idea of creating a new structure based upon the OSS model sets me wondering whether suited units and services do not exist already. If ever, then Mr. Max Boot and you certainly mark a point, nonetheless, when you complain that existing structures tasked to fight terrorism are challenged by terrorists organizations on the ground of adaptability to quick changes and evolutions.

I assume they are, possibly.

Then, while trying to imagine what might be an “OSS II” in the XXIth century I remembered that someone has previously had a very similar idea in 2003; or earlier according to all likelihood. I name the popular novelist Tom Clancy, who made this idea the central theme of a novel he titled The Teeth of the Dragon. The methodology and policy of this fictional special operations service the author christens “The Campus” favors hasty ways of doing things, if I may say so.

Well, all this did seem unlikely to me at first glance; until I seriously wondered whether it shouldn’t suit the exceptional circumstances since they are as exceptional as they were in 1942, indeed.

Now, media and public opinion during WWII bore little resemblance with what they are today. That’s why we might reasonably hazard the guess that were the existence of such a service be brought to public knowledge at some point, then it would make a bit of a fuss.

That’s probably why, in The Teeth of the Dragon, Tom Clancy made The Campus an "off the books" intelligence agency freed from the shackles of Congressional oversight.

Please, take this comment as a mere remark in passing.

Best regards.

You raise a very important point. The big question is whether the current threat is, in fact, on a magnitude of 1942. If so, then restrictions of civil rights and government openness might be required. If not, then we certainly don't want a government organization that operates outside the normal rules of transparency and oversight.

I myself am of the school that we are not at this point, but may be in the future. See, for instance, this little essay (http://www.nationalstrategy.com/index_files/Page2214.htm).

[zenpundit]

Rob Thornton wrote:


"The problems with the former are competition from within the agency, resistance to change, and perspective drawn from institutional bias. The problems of creating from scratch are title infringement, recruitment of personnel from limited, existing pools, justification of a budget, and generating desired capabilities. The former will almost certainly take longer and not meet the full intent; the latter will be more painful up front and receive criticism for what are perceived to be failures or shortfalls until it gets itself sorted out "

The original OSS acheived its successes ( and many failures) under Donovan because for a time General Donovan and his agents were outside the normal chain of military command and "Wild Bill" himself encouraged initiative and experimentation. Even when the OSS was subordinated to the military later in the war, some theater commanders like Eisenhower found giving OSS teams a wide degree of autonomy proved to be a "win-win" situation. Not every commander was so wise and after the war, Army and Naval intelligence, along with J.Edgar Hoover, successfully lobbied for the dissolution of the OSS. Such bureaucratic opposition should again be expected for what Boot proposes.

Maybe what is needed here is not a new agency but autonomous, multidisciplinary, teams with decision authority and independent budgets, whose experienced members' careers/future promotion are judged not by bureaucratic superiors back home, eager to retaliate, but by a neutral metric related to the task at hand. When the mission is over, the team is dissolved and the members moved on to something else.

Perhaps this can be a souped-up variation on what the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 intended to accomplish but never quite did with SES level officials, cross-bred with an updated Goldwater-Nichols type motivation to create interagency " jointness". You would get fluid, networked ( or at least modular), structure rather than a hierarchy that could be quickly assembled based upon skills and experience rather than rank.

Congress would still have oversight and bureaucracies would still train their people in specialties but at a certain point their " stars" are removed from the control of empire-building, institution-defending, senior managers and freed to work on high priority tasks free of inside the beltway obstructionism.

[walrus]

Zenpundit:


Congress would still have oversight and bureaucracies would still train their people in specialties but at a certain point their " stars" are removed from the control of empire-building, institution-defending, senior managers and freed to work on high priority tasks free of inside the beltway obstructionism.

The counter argument to this revolves around risks and resources. Taking the "Stars" out of institutions reduces the perfomance of the institution.

The question, debated since WWII, and probably still debated for all I know in army circles, is whether the cost, in terms of unit performance, of removal of good junior leaders from "line" units for special forces, and the high level of logistics and other support required by these special units is justified by results.

As for bureacratic oversight, there have been many previous examples of "rogue" programs of questionable legality and effectiveness, as a result of lack of bureaucratic oversight. The Iran-Contra affair comes to mind....

[Rob Thornton]

Unless we get a foreign policy that focuses on the use of power to treat the causes of problems vs. the symptoms of problems I'm afraid not much will change. That would be the mechanism that reworked the NSS and identified the required means and capabilities to fulfill that policy. Without it, there will probably be little serious change. Several former SecStates were quoated in an article in the Washington Post this morning about foreign policy recommendations.

As Zen and some others have pointed out - without legislation there is no forcing mechanism.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Metz,
the essay you published on the National Strategy Forum brings certain things back to their true respective values; and you do present them in a sound manner likely to bring anyone back to earth about the subject of our exchange.
Since I have the sentiment that we share the same opinion about the ethical question and possible negative consequences of such undertakings in term of image, this previous remark addresses especially the economic dimension of our efforts against Al-Qaeda as you presented it in an opportune and no-nonsensical manner.

I feel obliged to admit that I missed to weight my words when I wrote that circumstances are as grave as they were in 1942.

Coincidence makes that I have just been attempting to consider Muslim terrorism and insurgency under a new angle since some days. Although it would be too early to express myself about my first finds at this point I can hardly resist the desire to say that I spotted some points I hold as significant shortcomings in the rhetoric and “policy” of Al-Qaeda and other non-state Muslim terrorist groups; shortcomings that might constitute the germs of their own disease I ever my deductions are correct. A disease that is likely to be fatal on the long term, in that last case.

I am sorry not to elaborate and not to be as explicit as I would like but just let’s say that we, people of the occidental world, have deliberately resorted to rhetoric very similar to this Al-Qaeda uses today, indeed.
We did it during WWI, to be precise, in our endeavor to foster emulation among youth; and it worked well at that time in France and in Germany, more especially.

I am talking here about notions such as: The Myth of War Experience as George L. Mosse called it in Fallen Soldiers; the love of the grandiose and the pathetic; and about the Christian notions of worship of the fallen and death as sacrifice and resurrection.

All these Romantic notions reached their firmament during WWI. But they failed to work as well in the aftermath; albeit quite so during the Spanish War and with numerous foreign recruits of the German army during WWII. For, death toll during the trenches warfare reached an unprecedented and concerning level. That’s mainly why this rhetoric faded in the occidental world thereafter, and even totally disappeared from the whole world after WWII; but it born again in the Arabic world since the coming of Nasser on the political stage.

It was something we “experimented”, if I may say so, as those Muslims are “experimenting” it since some years.

Meanwhile, for wants of an OSS II can we assist, in one way or another, a faster fading of the Romantic period in the Arabic world?

Best regards,

[zenpundit]

Walrus wrote:


"The counter argument to this revolves around risks and resources. Taking the "Stars" out of institutions reduces the perfomance of the institution.

The question, debated since WWII, and probably still debated for all I know in army circles, is whether the cost, in terms of unit performance, of removal of good junior leaders from "line" units for special forces, and the high level of logistics and other support required by these special units is justified by results."

Indeed, that is the historical counter-argument against elite units. The counter-counter argument would be that the elite units are not designed npot simply "better" in terms of performance but "different", to do things regular units cannot do well at all. That would be the case here in that, to paraphrase John Arquilla, it takes a network to defeat a network.

Left to their own devices, our hierarchical, Washington-based bureaucracies cannot react fast enough to keep pace with our decentralized adversaries.


"As for bureacratic oversight, there have been many previous examples of "rogue" programs of questionable legality and effectiveness, as a result of lack of bureaucratic oversight. The Iran-Contra affair comes to mind...."

Iran-Contra no more proves that legally established networks would be less amenable to Legislative oversight than Watergate would suggest that tape-recorders are bad. Hierarchies and networks are simply organizational structures that are excel at some tasks over others. Hierarchies have a lot of advantages but outmanuvering elusive networks isn't one of them.

Rob Thornton wrote:


"- without legislation there is no forcing mechanism."

Absolutely. Budget and decision authority has to go to those closer to the problem than the banks of the Potomac

[Rob Thornton]

Had to do up a position paper on Army or Joint strategic issues for BSAP (along w/ Sen LDR talking points) - since we've been talking about this allot its been sticking in my mind. I thought it would serve as another point for brainstorming - we do allot of that here and its good. Well-back to the books- Regards, Rob

Establishing Standing Joint Nation Building Task Forces

PURPOSE:

• To provide the COCOMS with a pool of nation building capabilities in a modular package based on needs defined by JIM (Joint, Inter-Agency, Multi-Nat’l) coordination and objectives.

DISCUSSION:

• Much attention has recently been generated in regards to nation building type capability gaps identified through OIF, OEF, CJTF-HOA, and the Philippines. The gaps occur between the spectrum of providing security and stability. Arguably, the desired role of the military prior to OIF was limited to security, and the providing of assistance toward stability only insofar as establishing those conditions which might allow host nation institutions to re-establish their pre-conflict roles. The pre-OIF scale of the problem was ideally limited, and the assumption was that the need could be addressed by NGOs, OGAs and regional partners. OIF & OEF have challenged that assumption by linking absent capabilities to strategic shortfalls.

• As the United States redefines its strategy with missions such as CJTF-HOA it raises several questions:

o Is U.S. strategy moving toward conflict prevention as a means to defeat violent extremism?

o What role is American military power to play in shaping the environment and ensuring stability?

o What capability gaps can be addressed within the U.S. military and which ones must be outsourced to OGAs, NGOs, Private Contracts & Regional and Global Partners?

o What are the risks and benefits in using U.S. military assets in conflict prevention roles (other then deterrence)?

• Historical Shift

o Prior to OIF most of the Nation Building functions undertaken by the U.S. Military were limited to security, humanitarian support such as the transportation and distribution of supplies, treatment of casualties, coordination of disaster relief and other functions that were seen as natural relationships between war-fighting missions and tasks and missions other then war. The periodic, but temporal missions themselves were often seen as an opportunity to exercise the military in real world missions and enhance U.S. prestige abroad.

o In OIF the U.S. military operates in an environment that is both a security and a stability challenge. It is a long term commitment. It is not benign and as such many capacity building organizations can not or will not operate there. In fact, a major component of the enemy’s strategy is designed to dissuade traditional NGO, Multi-National partner, and Host Nation initiatives from stabilization efforts such as judicial reform, economic vitality and social pluralism. This has placed the burden on the United States military as U.S. OGAs are not staffed to go out and conduct the level or type of field work in this environment.

o The U.S. recognizes that Iraq is becoming a model for the enemy on how to destabilize nation states where insurgents and terrorists are bred. The enemy uses the appearance of ineffectual government to convert populations to extremist views which facilitate the terrorist ideology. To combat this growing threat means developing new capabilities and organizations that can not only assist in securing targeted nations, but can develop host nation capacity for stability. While ideally OGAs would take on this role, they lack the expeditionary framework and capabilities for doing so. This is the crux of the paradigm shift, the enemy has identified where the dividing lines exist between the elements of U.S. power and seeks to create situations where our strengths can be used against us.

JNBC Recommendations – A way forward

• First look for more ways in which existing capabilities can be innovatively adapted from military missions to nation building tasks, then grouped to provide COCOMs a standing capability that is robust enough to meet the emerging needs prevalent in a nation building environment
o While capabilities are currently resourced to meet limited COCOM needs on a case by case basis, a strategy that focuses on conflict prevention and building capacity in target nations would benefit from having that suite of capabilities under a JTF with the resources and authority that go with it.

• Second identify capability gaps and provide concurrent educational and training opportunities that cross train individual Joint service members for deployment on one year teams.
o Current examples of this are the evolving advisory efforts (MiTTs, PTTs, and PRTs), however those are formed on an ad-hoc basis. This process may benefit from adopting a modular approach which would identify personnel skills sets and place them in a cue that involved Advanced Civil Schooling in a needed Nation Building area, internships with OGAs, and finally a train up and deployment in a JNB-TF - for a list of desirable skills consider UNICEF, US AID and other relative OGA and NGOs.

• Third consider how much of the Joint force to apportion the cyclic mission of Nation Building based on projected needs that cannot be fulfilled by a combination of HN, regional/global partners, NGOs and OGAs
o Providing JTF-NBs with the capabilities and skills required to perform the spectrum of complex nation building tasks will require a 2.5 to 3 year commitment per JTF. 1 year to obtain individual education and unit specific training, 6 months to 1 year to train to unit proficiency, and a 1 year deployment. However since the personnel draw is across the Joint spectrum, the impact on any one service will be lessened; additionally, once individuals are educated in their additional NB skill, that requirement can be waived the next time they are assigned to a JTF-NB.

• Provide Inter-Agency reach back, or connectedness
o It is beyond the current OGA capacity to field the depth and range of personnel to meet US needs in Nation Building, however using IT a HSOC (Home Station Operation Command) where limited OGA members could resolve problems or provide Inter-Agency throughput.

RISKS & RISK MITIGATION
• The #1 risk is the allocation of a large percentage of the Joint Force being allocated and configured to Nation Building vs. being templated against traditional war time roles & missions. There is no real way to mitigate this risk vs. the expansion of the Joint Force. However, recent experience suggests that the military will inherit more of those nation building tasks. Since this effort requires not only dedication of personnel and equipment, but continued education and internships, a significant portion of the Joint force will be committed.

Senior Leader Briefing Card Comments:

Establishing Standing Joint Nation Building Task Forces

• OIF has raised the issue about U.S. capability gaps in Nation Building

• The environment where nation building occurs today and tomorrow is unlikely to be a benign one

• US OGAs do not have the capacity or capability to meet large scale need

• The capacity resides in the U.S. military, however developing capabilities will require effort and commitment

• There is risk in apportioning some of the Joint Force to dedicated nation Building

Message: The enemy has taken advantage of globalization and the populations of impoverished nations to create safe havens for his organizations, and recruit additional foot soldiers. Unless the conditions that lead to destabilization are addressed, we will expend greater resources in conflict resolution and termination.

[goesh]

"Message: The enemy has taken advantage of globalization and the populations of impoverished nations to create safe havens for his organizations, and recruit additional foot soldiers. Unless the conditions that lead to destabilization are addressed, we will expend greater resources in conflict resolution and termination.[/QUOTE]"

Part of this problem is the dilemma of jihadist commanders, organizers and financiers coming from non-impoverished nations with their education, worldliness, affluence and sophisticated IO, bearing messages of liberation and spiritual purity via the gun and jihad. Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and some of the 9/11 hijackers are classic examples of this. What guarantee is there that if upon teaching a man to fish and feed himself, instead of simply giving him fish to eat, that said man will still not be receptive to the ideology of fundamentalist jihad? The alleviation of poverty and deprivation IMO does not create immunity from this. We have no clue as to how much money average Muslims living in non-impoverished nations are giving to the jihadist cause(s). We know some money is given but that to a degree contradicts our premise that material contentment eliminates the need for radicalism and violence. Something is afoot, that those living with plenty would support acts of violence directly aimed at Muslim civilians. Clothes, food, medicine, advisors, books, equipment, etc. in any large amount are not being funneled into impoverished nations, yet cash is being given to the radicals. From my own Peace Corps experience, I learned that from the perspective of recipients, the ideology behind humanitarian development is pretty much divorced from the implementation of goods and services. I was often asked why I left the good life with electricity, running water, cars and good food to come live in the bush. It was impossible for them to understand why I was there. Though I was always respected and never experienced any animosity, I was told more than once that Allah would provide what was truly needed. This is a tough nut to crack and I would agree that alleviating poverty certainly diminishes the tactical ability of radicals but it is not a panacea. If we look at the reality of Iraq and agree that Iraq posed no immediate strategic threat to America, we have to ask what gives us high enlistment rates and generates volunteerism amongst our young men, and women, that they would willingly face death and injury? Certainly not the food and pay and the chance to live in sand and heat and be shot at. I simply think there are many counterparts out there who come to Iraq and the Pakistan frontier and places like Chechnya and Kasmir for the same reasons. I just don’t think we have yet achieved a comprehensive understanding of the ideological drive of our foes. There are significant differences of opinion as to what really makes them tick and it transfers over to the application of doctrine and tactics and keeps both in too much flux. There is an esoteric divergence in our defense forces that the average citizen does not see and is not privy to. The fact that the COIN camp in particular is reaching out for new alliances, new input and insight from civilians clearly demonstrates this esoteric divergence.

Something has to give. With .5+ trillion spent, roughly 4,000 KIA and 4+ years on two fronts, we don’t have much on the ground to show for it. Somebody has to step up to the plate because IMO our foes are capitalizing most on this divergence.

[Rob Thornton]

Goesh,

I just don’t think we have yet achieved a comprehensive understanding of the ideological drive of our foes.

I think that is why you see so many non-descriptive adjectives used to describe security challenges - words like - vague, nebulous, grey, etc.

Trying to understand non-western motivations from a (our) philosophical point of view where there is a reasonably defined line between church and state and where pluralism is seen as a strength is tough to do.

Empathy only gets you so far. Even defining the conditions that lead to destabilization must be placed in local or regional context - is there a universal context?

I guess the best we can do is create enough flexibility to allow for it to be addressed on the ground - what you hope though is that no one will be led to believe that just because what might work in one place is applicable in whole to the next.

One thing I do believe is that the divergence is probably a good sign. It shows that we are at least acknowledging that our off the shelf solution which kind of generalized responses are inadequate when considering that even small changes in geography or culture may require uniqueness in approach.

It will be an interesting couple of decades at least.

[120mm]

I, too, have strong suspicions that poverty and violence are correlational, not necessarily causal. Even if it WERE causal, the foundations of poverty are NOT the lack of material goods; poverty has political/social foundations that cannot be addressed by "programs" and "financial aid", and I doubt sincerely that we could effectively eliminate it, worldwide, through the theft of taxpayers' money and redistribution to "the poor".

Oddly enough, those who propose the strongest that material goods will stop violence are the first to accuse those who disagree with them of being "materialistic."

[Steve Blair]

Once again I think we're seeing echoes of the terrorist groups from the 1970s and 1980s when it comes to some levels of motivation. If you look at the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (later the Red Army Faction), only one of their original members could claim to be of the working class they were supposed to be representing (and he gave himself up rather quickly). The rest were from reasonably comfortable backgrounds but with personal problems. Some of the early personalities in the Italian Red Brigades also came from reasonably prosperous backgrounds.

Often it takes frustrated people with no real material wants but a need for a "mission" in life. Once they find that "mission" they become the hardest ones to deal with, because you can't really fill their needs.

And that's my ramble for the morning. Now off for coffee.

[Rob Thornton]

Are there (at least) 2 different types of terrorism to be concerned about? If we're talking about indig terror that is not facillitated by the state it is operating in, or if we're talking about a HN population that does not facillitate it as an alternative to functioning govt, or a group that is incapable of using state resources to aquire greater means - does that make a difference?

I did up the paper because DR Kilcullen's piece was a kind of a challenge - that asks a question about not only the causal nature of terror, but how to mitigate it. It raises the possibility that there might be a pro-active vs. a reactive way to approach it. I confined the proposal pretty much to the military side - which has all kinds of down sides (bunches of headaches and rislks) - but because its mostly military would make it more streamlined, or to some degree lessen the overhead.

The question is not only about the motivation of terrorist groups, but the way in which they are able to accelerate their growth and gain access to means they would not otherwise have.

I'm sort of working through this, but I do beleive that transnational groups beleive that some groups are more respondant to their message then others - impoverished states with lack of governance in total or in areas (grey spaces) are more permissive for them. How do you counter that - is it better to be reactive or proactive? Which is more efficient in the long or short of it? What are the alternatives? What are the risks and benefits? I'm pretty sure AQ and like groups have done the cost benefit analysis - but I'm not sure we have. Our traditional options & strengths may have caused us to overlook options, and may have even pre-cluded us from some - condsider the multitude of reasons why states in N.Africa are uncomfortable with the idea of hosting AFRICOM. Even using the military in a more internationally perceived "humanitarian" role may only be seen as realist opportunism - depends on how you go about it.

Regards, Rob

[Lastdingo]

I, too, have strong suspicions that poverty and violence are correlational, not necessarily causal. Even if it WERE causal, the foundations of poverty are NOT the lack of material goods; poverty has political/social foundations that cannot be addressed by "programs" and "financial aid", and I doubt sincerely that we could effectively eliminate it, worldwide, through the theft of taxpayers' money and redistribution to "the poor".

Oddly enough, those who propose the strongest that material goods will stop violence are the first to accuse those who disagree with them of being "materialistic."

Getting out of poverty requires income, that's already almost all. With income you can pay for what you need.
The Black African tragedy is that even if one state suceeded in prospering, it would be drowned in the overall poverty around as there are few trade opportunities, too many diseases spilling over the borders and last but not least migrants that would fill any emptied slum quickly.
Look at Sierra Leone - they were just a normal African country till the Liberian Civil War factions had burned their land's resources and moved on to the next one just like the mercenaries lived off Germany in the 17th century's 30 years war.

[Rob Thornton]

What are the things that are going to effect the operational environment?

Which ones are conditions which cannot be changed, but just have to be acconted for, and which ones are problems that exist in those conditions?

Global warming for example is probably a condition - its getting warmer (not the "why" thread) and that is going to have an effect on people that will create some problems.

Is poverty a condition or problem?

How about Pandemics?

Is terrorism a condition or a problem?

My point is that solutions can be engineered to address a problem, but I'm not sure they apply to conditons.

With conditions you mitigate effects - the condition does not really go away.

That does not mean you can't do anything about a condition, particularly if its going to have an adverse effect that keeps you from doing what you need or want to do.

[SteveMetz]

What are the things that are going to effect the operational environment?

Which ones are conditions which cannot be changed, but just have to be acconted for, and which ones are problems that exist in those conditions?

Global warming for example is probably a condition - its getting warmer (not the "why" thread) and that is going to have an effect on people that will create some problems.

Is poverty a condition or problem?

How about Pandemics?

Is terrorism a condition or a problem?

My point is that solutions can be engineered to address a problem, but I'm not sure they apply to conditons.

With conditions you mitigate effects - the condition does not really go away.

That does not mean you can't do anything about a condition, particularly if its going to have an adverse effect that keeps you from doing what you need or want to do.

Funny you should mention that. I'm currently preparing comments on an HQDA concept paper that is trying to fit those things into the idea of "persistent conflict."

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Often it takes frustrated people with no real material wants but a need for a "mission" in life. Once they find that "mission" they become the hardest ones to deal with, because you can't really fill their needs.

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Blair,
coincidence makes that I am attempting to refine a behavioral approach of terrorism of my own and I find your assumptions attractive.

My comment would be pages long if I attempted to express myself as clearly as I would like about that. But let’s say that it all bears upon a frustration/action relationship; when inhibition does not take precedence over action as it happens in a majority of cases.

Most among us who are interested in that problem tackle it in wondering first why people become terrorists because we, who are not terrorist and unlikely to yield to similar behavior, are emotionally inclined to ask this question thus way.

My point is that since it proved to be fruitless until then, might it not be more enlightening to turn the question upside down?
That is, given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for terrorism, or “root causes,” the triggering factors and catalysts--both for religious and political mobilization--that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that so few people actually become terrorists?

When violent death within a relatively short lap of time is the likely outcome of action, then it is logical that inhibition will take precedence over action because survival (as drive originating in our Reptilian Brain) is theoretically much more powerful than unfulfilled endeavor or expectations in life. This seems explaining why terrorists are not more numerous.

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,

Have you read Marc Sageman's book on this issue?

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Metz,
no, but coincidence (once more) makes that I recently ordered his Understanding Terror Networks, on Amazon; and also Knowing the Enemy, by Mary Habeck (if ever you did read this other book). Given the branch and field of Mr Sageman I expect much from that book. Amazon says I'll receive them on early July. Subsequently, I am unable to talk about it for now.

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Metz,
no, but coincidence (once more) makes that I recently ordered his Understanding Terror Networks, on Amazon; and also Knowing the Enemy, by Mary Habeck (if ever you did read this other book). Given the branch and field of Mr Sageman I expect much from that book. Amazon says I'll receive them on early July. Subsequently, I am unable to talk about it for now.

He also starts with the idea that many people are exposed to the "root causes" of terrorism, but only a small number become terrorists. He attributes it mostly to social network dynamics

[Lastdingo]

The Red Army Faction terrorists did not fit such descriptions.

They bacame terrorists while having no lower class background, but many finally became disappointed that their strategy failed and some even entered a peaceful, civilian life in their final sanctuary DDR. They apparently weren't allowed to leave again for terrorist acts, so settling down in the DDR seems to have been a kind of retirement for the RAF terrorists until the reunification.

[Steve Blair]

Therefore, if unfulfilled expectations are the cause of the initial frustration before a person become a terrorist--and I believe as you do that they are in many cases—then they are unlikely to be the cause any longer once this same person is indeed become a terrorist. A change powerful enough to take precedence over the “rules” of the Reptilian Brain happened between these two events, if ever the solution lies here. But how might we “technically,” if I may say so, envisage it?

Regards,
Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

He also starts with the idea that many people are exposed to the "root causes" of terrorism, but only a small number become terrorists. He attributes it mostly to social network dynamics

Mr. Metz,
Sorry to be that long.

Testimonies and assessment previously made by some experts show us that causes of terrorism—I mean, in that case, how a normal person like you and me comes to be a fanatic—may be dramatically different according to locations and narratives. We find some common features at some point, of course; but, for example, there is a nationalist terrorism in Palestine whereas al-Qeada’s terrorism is very different, in my own opinion. Thus it will be inescapably misleading to generalize, as Mr. Steve Blair suggests it in answer he just sent to me. I am not sure to correctly interpret the meaning you give to social network dynamics, but the two possible ways I see are:

-a given person is likely to be influenced in his choice and opinion by its social middle, sometimes from infancy on. When it comes to terrorism this definition applies to Palestine, or example.

- a given individual is likely to be influenced in his choice and opinion by its perception of the social middle it lives, sometimes from infancy on. The subtlety I introduce in this second case—in using the word “perception”—put the accent on the passive form of social networks dynamics by opposition to active in the former case. In the former the person is invited to belong, whereas it is not necessarily the case (not to say the contrary) in the later. The case of second generation Arabic immigrant living in European suburbs and dormitory cities relates to this second case.

Things are likely to be still different in the case of a Saudi living in his country, for example.

But all I see is that it is easier to frame the Palestinian terrorist than the Arabic terrorist born and living in Europe since we fail to correctly and accurately identify the step during which one frustrated individual is going to find the terrorist channel and to follow it while another individual will rot in its inhibition mood or, at best, will limit his action to stealing cars or selling narcotics in his neighborhood.

I am rather focusing my efforts on al-Qaeda and on the former case, to be precise.

In “Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy,” criminologist Franco Ferracuti has noted that there is “no such thing as an isolated terrorist--that's a mental case.”

So my question is that while it is easy for a Palestinian living in Palestine to find the terrorist channel, it is hard to believe that the young second generation immigrant living in France or in Germany will find the terrorist channel at the next street corner. And since al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are very demanding in their choice of recruits the prerequisite for them is that they have to enjoy access to good intelligence while looking for the “right individual”. The task is as difficult as most of those Arabic immigrants do not use Internet. Terrorist recruiting cells in Europe—I ever we may call them like that—face exactly the same difficulties we do; they have to accurately profile the candidate, and we know how difficult and hazardous it is for state agencies we enjoy much more means and intelligence than them. Do you see my point?

P.S.: by the way, I just received Marc Sageman and Mary Habeck’s books this morning. It is much earlier than what Amazon said.
How strange it is that each time I order a used book via Amazon it needs three weeks to arrive in France whereas a new one claims a one week travel or so to do so?

Thanks you for your answers. I feel honored to collect your attention since I use to read the interresting essays you release on SSI.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Poirier,

My personal opinion is that it takes two or three defining events to push a person into the terrorist spiral. One is, as I mentioned, the unfulfilled expectations. Another is a strong sense of personal betrayal by "the system" (this was seen in many of the RAF members, especially among the Baader-Meinhof "First Generation"). A third defining event is the need for revenge. This last need becomes more common as the terrorist cycle of violence increases (i.e., after the first generation of most groups is either killed or put in prison). The second generation then has the motive of either seeking vengeance or freedom for their comrades who have been "taken by the system." I also feel that once a group become driven primarily by the third motive they become almost beyond reach when it comes to negotiations.

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.

It is an interesting problem, and one that has distinct repercussions for COIN activities.

Mr Blair,
I express my point and my questions in my last answer to Mr. Steve Metz, actually. Also, your last statement fits my personal assumptions when you say “I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.” For, they are likely, indeed, to find the network channel while they fight with other insurgents somewhere in the world, whereas they are much less so to do so before.

It is less a matter of personal will than a matter of opportunity, I conclude. Would you agree with me on that last detail?

All this brings us back to my initial question: how can they be targeted and channeled and converted to the utmost forms of violence while living in peaceful areas or, if you prefer, much outside places where open insurgency exist? Are al-Qaeda talent spotters that numerous in Europe or in other countries where there is no open conflicts?

Once more I agree with you about the rest you wrote. Now I seize this opportunity you just provide me in order to ask another question which does not really calls for an answer but, instead, for further reflection.

Of which origin was the assistance and help the RAF and affiliated cells and individuals enjoyed? Did they act entirely by themselves, in perfect autonomy?

[Steve Blair]

With the terrorist groups, I don't think they need spotters as much as they do general organizers. In this they have learned from the anti-globalization groups that network loosely via the Internet and then operate in an almost autonomous manner until they are called together for a large protest or action. One of the dangers for law enforcement of a cellular organization is that they can reproduce through networks of "fellow travelers" and affiliates over a wide area.

With the B-M Gang/RAF, they began networking with other terrorist groups through PLO training camps if memory serves. Over time they began working with the IRA (providing safehouses in Europe in exchange for bomb-making training, for example) and other groups. Soon enough you would see "actions" mounted on the Continent by the RAF showing solidarity with the IRA. The RAF's organization model was cell-based, but I also believe they exercised a certain level of central planning.

This model has changed, based I believe on the success others have seen the various environmental, anti-globalization, and radical animal rights groups achieve with a "central goal-decentralized planning and execution" model. By this I mean that there is one "vision" for the movement as a whole (say stopping whaling in a particular area). Once that vision goes out, the smaller cells (which may never communicate and in fact have different sub-goals from the main vision) will stage their own protests or actions in that area in support of the main vision. This way you get centralized action (which may not always be what the organizers hoped for) based on a decentralized planning model that is very difficult to trace back to those who provided the basic message.

Hopefully that made at least some sense and answered part of your question. This is something I'm starting to bash together so it's still a work in progress.

[Merv Benson]

Steve,

Doesn't this organizational structure lend itself to being infiltrated by law enforcement or intelligence organizations? If so, why hasn't it been done more often?

[Steve Blair]

I don't think the loose ones do, because they are centered more around small cells of "fellow travelers." And even if they can be infiltrated, you only take down one small part of a very large, loose whole. By that I mean you can't infiltrate or track up to the next link in the chain because there often isn't one, at least in the conventional sense. In the old model you could take out one cell and then trace its comms back to another cell or a higher link. With the "vision-directed" networks you often don't have a higher link...just a pointer to a web site or blind mailing list that serves to send out general thoughts and comments.

I think this might be what we're seeing with the various terror cells in the US and UK (especially the UK). They are small, self-contained units that are "fellow travelers" with AQ in the sense that they have attached themselves to the same goals but are not necessarily part of a larger plan or game plan. We're conditioned to taking down one cell, and then following the trail of crumbs to another cell. With this model...there are no crumbs to follow.

This is where I see the internet having the biggest impact. It allows the rapid distribution of audio and visual messages...motivation tapes for the masses, if you will. Fellow travelers can access huge amounts of target information, operational data, and even training materials without ever having to link back to the main group or receive a single order from them.

[Rifleman]

I also make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists. This has more do to with what I see as differences in their motives and objectives. I don't feel that a pure terrorist group can make the switch to an insurgency, but it is very possible (and even common) for insurgents to slide into terrorist groups.


That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

[SteveMetz]

That's an interesting point. It reminds me of Civil War guerrillas. Some groups started out as guerrillas dedicated to a cause and later became terrorists.

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do have with single malt scotch rather than word games) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

[Mark O'Neill]

In my own writing, I stress that insurgency is a strategy and terrorism is a tactic or method. From this perspective, I don't think it's worth killing too many gray cells (of which I don't have many to spare, and have elected to kill those that I do with single malt scotch) trying to decide whether a given group or given individual is an insurgent or a terrorist. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as a tactic. Some groups which do not utilize a strategy of insurgency also use terrorism as a tactic.

To quote my old Mozambican oppo " I full agree, you are deadly right".

In my research reading I am heartly sick of all of the lame definitions of both insurgency and terrorism that abound - some of them are pathologically stupid.

I actually think Tom Mockaitis' treatment of this debate up front on his recent book, The New Terrorism is spot on.

[SteveMetz]

To quote my old Mozambican oppo " I full agree, you are deadly right".

In my research reading I am heartly sick of all of the lame definitions of both insurgency and terrorism that abound - some of them are pathologically stupid.

I actually think Tom Mockaitis' treatment of this debate up front on his recent book, The New Terrorism is spot on.

Speaking of Mozambique, I remember when I was a fresh-out-of-grad-school, young professor eagerly awaiting the first time I'd see myself cited somewhere. At the time, I was writing on security in Southern Africa. I picked up a new book on that topic at my university's library, skimmed the endnotes and there it was! A citatition that said, "For instance, see Steven Metz....." So then I went to the text itself to see what the citation referenced. The text said (and I quote), "Many American academics have been duped by Mozambican misinformation." And *I* was the best example they could think of.

I was still happy--better to be a cited dupe than an unduped unknown.

[Bill Moore]

In general I concur that insurgency is a strategy and that terrorism is a tactic, but as I think most of us agree our current lexicon and structural models describing insurgency and terrorism are entirely inadequate to accurately express what we're experiencing.

Although not new, I think the extent of using terrorism as a personal or group expression is much greater than it has been previously. I read an interesting study recently that explored some of the psychological and sociological factors that influence individuals to consider joining terrorist organizations, or simply conducting a terrorist attack without joining a terrorist group (and I'm confident that many of the same factors apply to why individuals join gangs, insurgencies, etc., with the exception of the economic status. I "think" most foot soldiers in gangs and insurgencies are from the lower economic class).

The greatest factor seemed to be identity. The majority of recruits into Muslim extremist groups were in their young 20's to 30's, lower to upper middle class, educated, and experienced a recent life change such as the loss of a loved one. This recent change served to alter their perception of the world fundamentally, so now they begin a new search for meaning. These searchers were easily identified in Mosques, Madrassas's, etc., and they would be befriended and gradually led down the path of becoming a devote Muslim to Extremist. Of course this happens in Christian organizations also, we have all seen the lost kids who have all the sudden seen the light, and are easily manipulated by their new mentors.

I can't help but think that terrorism for "many" of these individual terrorists is simply a form of expression of being dissatisfied and/or frustrated with the world. Perhaps this pushes many attacks into the criminally insane areana, but these criminals are frequently mobilized and given direction by savvy strategists in this case, so their criminal act ends up serving a larger strategy. Now that we're in the information age, jihadists (and other groups) can use the internet to radicalize lost souls globally, thus you have emergent lone wolfs and terrorist cells world wide that are home grown, and no longer a part of the Afghan/USSR war alumni.

The psychological factors that make people vulnerable to this type of manipulation is increasing at an alarming rate due to social and psychological disruption due to globalization, the Iraq war, etc. Globalism is upsetting social norms (isn't this the underlying reason that Al Qaeda exists? They want to free their holy lands from these emergent norms that are not in step with their views of how a muslim should live), which sets many people on a new path searching for meaning (we had drugs and free sex in the 60s during our social upheaval, the Muslims have jihad). Proliferating violence equals more casualties, which in turn equals more potential recruits. The world wide web and sattelite TV reaches out to a global audience, part of which consists of potentially frustrated individuals who are looking for a way to express themselves. The media has allowed terrorist attacks to become a new norm for the angry man to express himself, and to a lesser extent the angry woman. The frequency of the attacks has lessened the moral reluctance to engage in such an act, as indicated by a recent of poll of American Muslims where several thought terrorist attacks were an acceptable act. In other words, it is gaining momentum, much like rap music did in the recent past as a means of expression world wide (I'm attempting to show a parallel of where a paticular behavior initially considered undesirable by those in the fold, starts gaining acceptance by those outside the fold, and before you know it young kids from Lebanon, Peru, and Japan are into rap, ugly clothes, wearing pants that don't cover the crack in their butt, etc. as the means for their generation to express themselves, what is especially interesting is national/nationalism norms are becoming less important).

Obviously my arguments are not well thought out or intellectually supported at this point, but I wanted to throw them out to the council in rough form as food for thought. I think if we continue to wage this conflict as a war, rather than a social/cultural issue, we'll continue to feed the beast and create a problem set that will become unsolvable.

[Rob Thornton]

I also agree that we have a deficient lexicon. Somehow insurgency doesn't seem to line up with the AQ strategy - it almost seems like they use it as an operational phase - but different then say Mao. I know it fits in the regard of being a strategy of the weak, but that is not how AQ professes it. Terrorism would seem inadequate as well and I think is better used to describe the tactic.

Can you use the idea of Jihad in some context? Is the reason we don't include use it because we lump it under insurgency? Are we mirror imagin our western definitions onto something that needs it own?

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Mr. Moore,
I find your comment is interesting, indeed; and I fully agree with you. I do not have much more to add, at that point.
I just began to read Marc Sageman’s book yesterday; Understanding Terror Networks. Though I am not finished I find this book very interesting in the sense that it is written by a serious and trustworthy person who approachrs things in a cold scientific manner.

Since I do not bring much contribution to your pertinent comment I remedy to this gap in reporting about a peculiar story--a priori unrelated to al-Qaeda in particular and to Muslim terrorism in general--which I believe is thought-provoking. Doubtless, you will not express any difficulty in finding where its interest lies.

On Monday June 22, 2007, in Britany, France, two young men and a young woman, respectively aged 20, 20 and 21, have been arrested by the French police on charge of burning the chapel de Loqueffret, a religious monument built during the XVIth century. They were part of a larger group of seven members suspected of having perpetrated multiple other related acts of vandalism against invaluable century old Christian religious symbols and monuments in the same region. While under interrogation the three young said that they acted entirely by their own and that what they did was a form of protest against “a monopolistic religious dominance” exereted by western Christianity that unjustly overthrew pagan religions in Europe, centuries ago (!). They claim to be themselves adept and practitioners of paganism and they expect a revival of paganism in Europe.

Here is the link, if ever you read French language:
http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/france/faits-divers/0,,3474327,00-sept-personnes-placees-garde-vue-pour-profanation-.html

The three criminals do not belong to any religious organization of any sort, and they never received any instruction or exterior assistance.

This case doesn’t differ much from Islamist violence and intolerance, in my own opinion, but because what they did was unrelated to Islam the news of their arrest collected little interest, both from the media and the public.

Personally, I find this story interesting in the sense that it exemplifies that acts of violence and destruction done on behalf of religious claims can spontaneously occur in the most unexpected manner and for the most unexpected reasons. What else these three young men would have done if ever they had been smarter and more cautious? Other Church burnings, doubtless. Killings? Probably not, however. For they were unlikely to find exterior support, indoctrination and training on behalf of a Pagan religion in France.

However one may be tempted to hazard the guess that things would have been likely to turn otherwise if, instead of Paganism, they have expressed interest toward Islam. In all cases, we cannot but hold that they unmistakably belong to a category of persons we use to call religious fanatics; event though they didn’t kill or hurt someone. They did burn down one chapel and destroyed with sheer savagery numerous Christian monuments and painted some slogans and religious symbols of their own on many others; all marks of religious violence.

This case is no exception or singularity. It is the latest of a long list of exactly similar others perpetrated elsewhere in France during the last decade. But, according to the media, all attempts to find any link or relationship of any sort between their perpetrators proved to be fruitless. For, there is none, and there is no underground and organized pagan movement but some chitchats and mutual emulation on Internet. That’s all, and that’s why Church and chapel burnings and other forms of religious violence of this sort limit to isolated and sporadic cases unconnected each with others.

Is the mind of those perpetrators similar to this of a Muslim fanatic?

[SteveMetz]

Mr. Moore,
I find your comment is interesting, indeed; and I fully agree with you. I do not have much more to add, at that point.
I just began to read Marc Sageman’s book yesterday; Understanding Terror Networks. Though I am not finished with it, I find this book very interesting in the sense that it is written by a serious and trustworthy person who approach things in a cold scientific manner.

Since I do not bring much contribution to your pertinent comment I remedy to this gap in reporting about a peculiar story, a priori unrelated to al-Qaeda in particular and to Muslim terrorism in general, which I believe is thought provoking. Doubtless, you will not express any difficulty in finding its interest.

On Monday June 22, 2007, in Britany, France, two young men and a young woman, respectively aged 20, 20 and 21, have been arrested by the French police on charge of burning the chapel de Loqueffret, built during the XVIth century. They were part of a larger group of seven members suspected of having perpetrated multiple other acts of vandalism against invaluable century old Christian religious symbols and monuments in the same region. While under interrogation the three young said that they acted entirely by their own and that what they did was a form of protest against “a monopolistic religious dominance” that unjustly overthrew pagan religions in Europe, centuries ago (!). They claim to be themselves adept and practitioners of paganism and they expect a revival of paganism in Europe.

Here is the link, if ever you read French language:
http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/france/faits-divers/0,,3474327,00-sept-personnes-placees-garde-vue-pour-profanation-.html

The three criminals do not belong to any religious organization of any sort, and they never received any instruction or exterior assistance.
This case doesn’t differ much from Islamist violence and intolerance, in my own opinion, but what because what they did was unrelated to Islam the news of their arrest collected little interest.
I find this story interesting in the sense that it exemplifies that acts of violence and destruction done on behalf of religious claims can spontaneously occur in the most unexpected manner and for the most unexpected reasons. What else these three young men would have done if ever they had been smarter and more cautious? Other Church burnings, doubtless. Killings? Probably not, however. For they were unlikely to find exterior support, indoctrination and training on behalf of a Pagan religion in France.

However one may be tempted to hazard the guess that things would have been likely to turn otherwise if, instead of Paganism, they have expressed interest toward Islam. In all cases, we cannot but hold that they unmistakably belong to a category of persons we use to call religious terrorists; event though they didn’t kill or hurt someone. They did burn down one chapel, destroyed with sheer savagery numerous Christian monuments and painted some slogans and religious symbols of their own on many others; all marks of religious violence.

This case is no exception or singularity. It is the latest of a long list of exactly similar others perpetrated elsewhere in France during the last decade. But, according to the media, all attempts to find any link or relationship of any sort between their perpetrators proved to be fruitless. For, there is none, and there is no underground and organized pagan movement but some chitchats and mutual emulation on Internet. That’s all, and that’s why Church and chapel burning and other forms of religious violence of this sort limit to isolated and sporadic cases unconnected each with others.

Is the mind of those perpetrators similar to this of a Muslim fanatic?

Hey--I have something in French (http://www.ifri.org/files/politique_etrangere/PE_1_03_METZ.pdf) for you!

[Dominique R. Poirier]

Hey--I have something in French (http://www.ifri.org/files/politique_etrangere/PE_1_03_METZ.pdf) for you!

Mr. Metz,
That’s the IFRI, with which Mr. Olivier Roy works, it seems to me.

In a past that begins to get remote I have had the opportunity to meet some Frenchs and other folks dealing with counterterrorism. I have even been member of a French Senate sponsored group studying terrorism. As far as I can remember I didn’t see any American during our meetings.
Well, it’s past and I put a definitive end to all relationships with those people for personal reasons, since long alrdeay.

What do you think about these statements of Olivier Roy?

“(….) the Western Muslim world. I don't buy this term "the West." In France we have many people demonstrating against American influence. Where is the West?”

“One year ago, when Mr. de Villepin was Minister of the Interior, he asked for a working breakfast with some experts like me, and he asked us to give him tips on how to curb Islamic unrest in the housing projects. I said, "One thing we can do is to reroute the Marxist extreme Left to the projects." The head of the police was next to the minister. He was not amused. But it's exactly what Villepin is doing now. He took my idea. He is now giving a new start to the extreme Left and, in a sense, many of the young who are trying to do something might not join al Qaeda but find a better perspective. These guys would have gone anywhere to do something.”

I found them in an interview of Olivier Roy done by Joanne J. Myers on March 30, 2006 at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.

Here is the link directing to the full text, just in case:
http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5334.html

Well, I acknowledge there is an obvious need to collaborate on counterterrorism; for wants of a wider collaboration. But since France is no longer assimilated to the West…

[Mark O'Neill]

Speaking of Mozambique, I remember when I was a fresh-out-of-grad-school, young professor eagerly awaiting the first time I'd see myself cited somewhere. At the time, I was writing on security in Southern Africa. I picked up a new book on that topic at my university's library, skimmed the endnotes and there it was! A citatition that said, "For instance, see Steven Metz....." So then I went to the text itself to see what the citation referenced. The text said (and I quote), "Many American academics have been duped by Mozambican misinformation." And *I* was the best example they could think of.

I was still happy--better to be a cited dupe than an unduped unknown.

Ouch!

That is gold - the original "well, there is good news, and there is bad news..."

Rob, regarding your point about introducing the term "jihad". I think that is problematic as it deliberately introduces a qualifier regarding terrorism / insurgency that reduces the universality of any subsequent definition or theory. Not all insurgent / terrorist Muslims in the world are fighting for what we might associate as a 'jihadist' cause. And, as we all know, not all terrorists or insurgents are Muslim. We have to be very careful about defining these terms (insurgency and terrorism) merely in terms of extreme Islamist behaviour just because that is what appears most problematic at the moment.

The 'West' made a similar error during the Cold War when we associated many nationalist or liberation movements with communism and the Soviet Bloc, rather than seeing their true nature. This in turn prolonged many conflicts, perhaps pointlessly.

My observation would be that the threat from radical Islam appears to have the same effect on rational strategic decision making that the 'threat' of communism had in a previous era. That is not to say that a threat does not exist, just that the nature and extent of it are often greatly mis-appreciated or exaggerated.

I, for one, am still trying to work out the reasoning behind the rhetoric that AQ is trying to, or will, 'destroy our way of life'. Seriously, how can a group of stateless individuals, half of whom are allegedly hiding in a cave somewhere on the Pakistan / Afghanistan border 'destroy' functioning liberal democracies such as ours, no matter how many bombs etc are let off?

The only answer I can even begin to see makings sense would be through our own disproportionate reaction to this perceived threat they offer. That is, our government's reactions through legislation, controls and actions that are enacted to counter the 'threat' actually could end up changing the way of life and liberties that our societies have now.

In effect, such an outcome could be interpreted, at least at one level, of 'destroying' our way of life - and we would have done it to ourselves. Now suppose that was AQ's intent all along? By reacting to the symptoms and manifestations of Islamic terrorism, rather than the recognising the true nature of the threat, are we in fact being suckered in by an abstract ' rope a dope' scheme?

Now that would be a 'premium' indirect strategy that both Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart would have approved of....

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, we cannot even agree on definitions of the 'threat'.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Mark,
I heard CNN's Christina Quala Lampur interviewing the "face of Britain’s radical Islam" this morning (there is a special on it this evening). I'll paraphrase his comments probably but, "the only hope of Great Britain is the adoption of Sharia". When asked if he believed in Democracy (he is a lawyer in London, not a cleric) for the England, the state he lives in, he sounded off a resounding "no - there is but one way man should live, and that is the Sharia".

Now, I don't contest that in a pluralistic society we should allow people the opportunity to pursue their beliefs, however when they apply their beliefs to all others, and use the term "jihad" to describe the means to achieve it, what are we left to think. You could go with rationalizing that they are limiting it to "intellectual jihad", but is that a western "mirror imaging" of our own beliefs? I don't know.

I'm not sure AQ & like extremist organizations believe they have to have the means currently at their disposal, or that they must have milestones that are laid out in linear fashion. They seem to be much more event driven and believe that it is both their spiritual duty and thus moral/physical obligation to persevere in jihad. In their world the process matters as much as the end state. So while they may not be able to destroy the U.S. in a cataclysmic event, striking at the U.S. whenever, wherever, and however possible is still part of the process - God will provide the cataclysm when his followers on other demonstrate their spiritual purity and resolve sufficiently by carrying jihad to the unbelievers.

Meanwhile, they can still inflict a great deal of damage, both on the economy, our persons and our institutions. Their belief that the process matters is important since we tend to look at the process as something to get to an end.

That is why I'm unsure if insurgency fits well. Insurgencies work towards the constitution of a new state as the insurgents see it (steve is that fair?). While world Sharia could be described as an end state, I'm not sure AQ sees it that way based on how the Taliban behaved in Afghanistan - spiritual pursuits don't end with conquest, or they stagnate. Spiritual propagation is never ending unless for some reason the religion fundamentally changes (maybe like Zoroastrianism) - Marc T could make much better sense of this then me - I'm still trying to sort it out:D

[Merv Benson]

A former Muslim extremist writing about the recent activity in the UK said (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2007/06/terrorist-theology.html):


When I was still a member of what is probably best termed the British Jihadi Network, a series of semi-autonomous British Muslim terrorist groups linked by a single ideology, I remember how we used to laugh in celebration whenever people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and 7/7 was Western foreign policy.

By blaming the government for our actions, those who pushed the 'Blair's bombs' line did our propaganda work for us. More important, they also helped to draw away any critical examination from the real engine of our violence: Islamic theology.

...

... what drove me and many of my peers to plot acts of extreme terror within Britain, our own homeland and abroad, was a sense that we were fighting for the creation of a revolutionary state that would eventually bring Islamic justice to the world.

How did this continuing violence come to be the means of promoting this (flawed) utopian goal? How do Islamic radicals justify such terror in the name of their religion? There isn't enough room to outline everything here, but the foundation of extremist reasoning rests upon a dualistic model of the world. Many Muslims may or may not agree with secularism but at the moment, formal Islamic theology, unlike Christian theology, does not allow for the separation of state and religion. There is no 'rendering unto Caesar' in Islamic theology because state and religion are considered to be one and the same. The centuries-old reasoning of Islamic jurists also extends to the world stage where the rules of interaction between Dar ul-Islam (the Land of Islam) and Dar ul-Kufr (the Land of Unbelief) have been set down to cover almost every matter of trade, peace and war.

What radicals and extremists do is to take these premises two steps further. Their first step has been to reason that since there is no Islamic state in existence, the whole world must be Dar ul-Kufr. Step two: since Islam must declare war on unbelief, they have declared war upon the whole world. Many of my former peers, myself included, were taught by Pakistani and British radical preachers that this reclassification of the globe as a Land of War (Dar ul-Harb) allows any Muslim to destroy the sanctity of the five rights that every human is granted under Islam: life, wealth, land, mind and belief. In Dar ul-Harb, anything goes, including the treachery and cowardice of attacking civilians.

...

When people search for the answer of why these people are attacking they rarely look at the inherent religious bigotry of the terrorist. In a recent online poll of the reasons for the attacks this was not included in any of the nine choices.

I think there is another aspect of Shari'a that drives the proponents to terrorism. It is a code that bases compliance on corporal punishment, whether it is beatings or dismemberment. The greater the transgression the more the corporal punishment is ratcheted up. It is easy with that background to rationalize inflicting a terrorist effect to insure submission and compliance.

[Mark O'Neill]

G'Day Rob and Merv,

I think your points are well made about those who seek the universal implementation of Sharia. However, I have several issues arising from the way in which we (the 'west') approach this:

1. We ignore the fact that their ability to achive this is about on par with my ability to get an NBL contract - zero. Yet we conflate the threat posed to an existential one. I agree with your point regarding the fact that they might yet cause a whole lot of destruction and damage - but, as bad as that could be, that is not going to end our state system. Yet we carry on as if it will.

2. Not all Muslims who are insurgent want Sharia. In my part of the world many of them are seeking ethnic or sub- nationalist agendas. If 'sharia' is actually on the list of demands it is a low order one.

3. Not all insurgents are Muslim, what good defining insurgency or terrorism in terms of Jihad if you are trying to counter the LTTE, FARC, ETA or the OPM? I perceive a real danger to our wider world view and policy formulations if we let the preoccupations that some nations ( mine included) have with Islamic terrorism obscure the true nature of the problem that regional and local insurgencies, of all flavours, pose to States in the globalised era. (And I am not talking about the obvious association with violence).

I am arguing for a more measured approach than what we have seen to date. The hysteria that has been whipped up about radical islam and jihad within the west makes Macarthyism seem balanced.

I am not saying we ignore the problem. Yes, we need to do something; yes we should not tolerate the development of such movements that seek to attack our people and yes , we should be proactive in pursuing them. But we need to do so with a clear vision and perspective about the true nature of the problem and its actual ability to threaten (and what it can threaten).

This is something that seems to have been lacking, and to my mind, remains lacking. And we are not helped by those who mistake polemicism for insight, and rhetoric as a subsitution for well thought through and enacted plans.

regards

Mark

[SteveMetz]

Hey Mark,
I heard CNN's Christina Quala Lampur interviewing the "face of Britain’s radical Islam" this morning (there is a special on it this evening). I'll paraphrase his comments probably but, "the only hope of Great Britain is the adoption of Sharia". When asked if he believed in Democracy (he is a lawyer in London, not a cleric) for the England, the state he lives in, he sounded off a resounding "no - there is but one way man should live, and that is the Sharia".

Now, I don't contest that in a pluralistic society we should allow people the opportunity to pursue their beliefs, however when they apply their beliefs to all others, and use the term "jihad" to describe the means to achieve it, what are we left to think. You could go with rationalizing that they are limiting it to "intellectual jihad", but is that a western "mirror imaging" of our own beliefs? I don't know.

I'm not sure AQ & like extremist organizations believe they have to have the means currently at their disposal, or that they must have milestones that are laid out in linear fashion. They seem to be much more event driven and believe that it is both their spiritual duty and thus moral/physical obligation to persevere in jihad. In their world the process matters as much as the end state. So while they may not be able to destroy the U.S. in a cataclysmic event, striking at the U.S. whenever, wherever, and however possible is still part of the process - God will provide the cataclysm when his followers on other demonstrate their spiritual purity and resolve sufficiently by carrying jihad to the unbelievers.

Meanwhile, they can still inflict a great deal of damage, both on the economy, our persons and our institutions. Their belief that the process matters is important since we tend to look at the process as something to get to an end.

That is why I'm unsure if insurgency fits well. Insurgencies work towards the constitution of a new state as the insurgents see it (steve is that fair?). While world Sharia could be described as an end state, I'm not sure AQ sees it that way based on how the Taliban behaved in Afghanistan - spiritual pursuits don't end with conquest, or they stagnate. Spiritual propagation is never ending unless for some reason the religion fundamentally changes (maybe like Zoroastrianism) - Marc T could make much better sense of this then me - I'm still trying to sort it out:D

A few points:

--I think the idea of "global sharia" is a minority one event among the small minority of Muslims who would be considered extremists. But, look at it this way: we talk all the time about spreading liberal democracy, that the world will never really know peace until it is composed solely of liberal democracies. Is that really different?
--I often argue that the idea that insurgents want to create a new state--which shows up in doctrine--is one example of us extrapolating Cold War era communist insurgency to a universal model. Some insurgents do, some don't. Insurgency is a strategy adopted by a wide array of groups with diverse objectives. I personally don't think we can ever understand AQ if we view them through the prism of the fundamentally political insurgencies of the Cold War. What they want is piety, justice, and morality (as they define them). To distort al Qaeda into the type of enemy we know and understand—a Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam Hussein who can be defeated by military means—may be emotionally appealing, but it does not reflect reality. And by pretending that the challenge from Islamic extremists is something it is not, we are less able to deal with the threat that it is.

[goesh]

I'm no longer convinced that all these sucide actions, in particular the actions of the bunglers, have any earthy conceived end and plot and intent laden with ideology and political goals. I'm beginning to think there is no great ascription to the AQ/jihadist ideology and dreams of Shariah land, that with some it is more an act of total rejection of that which can no longer be tolerated and altered, despite one's best efforts to the contrary. In a sea of sin and corruption and with maximum efforts extended to end or at least minimize said conditions, what options are left? Is the logical extension of Tazkiyyat an-Nafs, the way of heart cleansing, to gamble that Allah's mercy will find a place in paradise if some of the evil forces are cleansed in the process? The prohibition against suicide in Al Qu'ran is trumped by Allah's willingness to forgive (ar-Rahim). The concept of Istirhama, begging for mercy, may be more at play here than some nefarious alliance with AQ. Does the AQ ideology simply aid and abet these people and not actively groom and condition them? We may need to look to the Sufis for answers and allies if my hunch is right. I have no doubt the background on many of these characters/bunglers will show no great irrationality and deviance from the norm of Islamic life, that the course of their everyday affairs will be bland with consistency and obedience.

[Rob Thornton]

I remember sitting down with our PRT and discussing what they were trying to accomplish and how we might be able to help. The PRT Chief said they were there to build capacity - so other then sharing information with them, there was not much they could help with.

Today I had a chance to re-engage Capacity Building in a role playing excersices - I got to play the USAID rep in a mock PCC discussing theoretical policy actions:eek:

So I went fishing for a position to take based on USAID's long term perspective in the country at hand. I'm hoping one of our SWC members can tell me if I'm even in the ball park. I put it under this thread because building capacity is a big part of bringing stability, and bringing stability (or preventing instability) is part of this thread on the new paradigm of the 21st Century.

Capacity as I described it is about making (assisting the HN govt with planning and allocating resources to) something both attractive and exportable. Attractive so that it attracts both the indigenous population and investment (foreign or domestic) and exportable so that as a model, it can be stood up elsewhere in the state as security permits.

Capacity might be infrastucture such as physical roads, airports, ports, trains etc. to move trade or people, it might also be telecommunications, IT, education pools (needed to attract companies looking to out source or off shore), Public Works, health care, Agriculture, courts and municipalities, Security Force assist, banking, markes, elections or manufacturing.

The idea was sort of modeled on what I think the PRT in our neighborhood was trying to accomplish, but in this particular country the word "reconstruction" may not have been correct. It might have been more along the lines of CDT or Capacity Development Team since this was not a failed state, but one that had requested assistance before it failed.

The excercise was pretty good. One it brought up the issue that states are not a "one-size fits all" so the assistance we might provide must be tailored not only to our goals, and perceptions, but must take into account that state's goals and and its political realities (funny you should bring it up that afternoon Steve, because we had a similiar experience this morning) - it is a partnership.

I think the topic of "capacity building" is at least one we need exposure to regardless if we (green suiters) are tasked to do it, or if we are only taksed to facillitate it. I think it is a part of the 21st Century Paradigm.

So, who has a good way to look at capacity building?

[Beelzebubalicious]

Just started monitoring this site and am posting for the first time. I've been working in the international development business most of my career, mainly on USAID contracts, including some work in Iraq. Thought I might give your question a try. Here goes:

From my experience with USAID, they have traditionally looked at "capacity building" as strictly building the skills and capacity of Cooperating Country Nationals (CCNs). In the past especially, but also now, this involved a lot of training. More recently, it includes "empowering" people or "creating an enabling environment" as USAID has realized you can train the hell out of people, but if they have no personal power, influence or enabling environment, they're just a lot of people with good skills and no way to make use of them. It also doesn't help to take a person out of their environment/culture, train them and then drop them back into that environment, especially if it doesn't support what you've trained them to do.

The other element of capacity building is a shift from human capacity building to institutional or organizational capacity building. It's along the same lines as above. An individual has a limited potential to implement change, but an institution has greater influence and sustainability. Still, it's building the human capacity within institutions, not so much the infrastructure. However, USAID understands that you can't just build human capacity w/out the supporting infrastructure. You have to build a school before you train teachers (or at least do them at the same time).

Regarding Iraq and PRTs, I think the key concept is shifting from us doing it for them to them doing it themselves. It's a basic concept to understand, but much more difficult to implement. In war time and in absence of any local authority (or identifiable, trusted authority), you need to make decisions. But, earlier rather than later, you need to find capable people to trust, step back and trust them to make decisions and manage things. You don't just hand over the reigns and walk away, but train, mentor, advise and support - constantly reinforcing, monitoring and guiding and always stepping back as they step up (hopefully). Unfortunately, it takes a long time and a lot of patience and it requires one to allow local counterparts to make decisions and manage things in their own way (even if you don't agree with it).

It's not about sitting on the council, like we did with PRDCs, making decisions. That's not legitimate and that won't last. It's also not about making decisions, then going down to meet the local sheikhs to inform them of the decision and seek their buy-in (after the fact). It's more about supporting a process. How does a provincial council member seek the input of citizens and make decisions based on their input? How does a council member exert his/her authority when it's not clear to anyone what his/her authority is?

I hope that helps. I realize I strayed off topic into my own personal philosophy, so take it with its own dose of salt. I think it is a decent representation of how the soft power people think....

[Rob Thornton]

Beelzebubalicious,
That does help. I just returned from an Inter-Agency staff ride in D.C. and there is much of the same type of thought regarding "capacity building". There are allot of energetic and talented people from across the agencies who are working hard and have an amazing grasp of understanding the challenges, but are also adept at articulating the argument for change. I'm going to put some thoughts together based off of this week then post them. OVerall, I'd have to say that some of the executive directives regarding SSTRO and capacity building are starting to take root.
Best Regards, Rob

[Beelzebubalicious]

I agree that there are a lot of talented and bright people working these issues (and thinking about them). I've been to a few symposiums and such and always come away impressed by how people are tackling the issues. Getting past the language, culture and politics of the agencies, I think most people are on the same page.

I'd be interested to hear what's new. Thanks!

[Beelzebubalicious]

Rob, you mentioned you'd put some thoughts down on your recent trip. I would be interested in hearing more. In the meantime, the special inspector general for iraq reconstruction has come out today with its quarterly report to congress. Lots' of talk about capacity development, including a section on page 61. If I knew how to copy text from a PDF, I would paste here, but otherwise, you can go to:

http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul07/pdf/Report_-_July_2007.pdf

[Rob Thornton]

Sorry, I've been tied to BSAP classroom requirements and trying to get in some family time as well:D

In a nutshell, the folks we met on our Inter-Agency staff ride from: DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stability, some folks from thinks tinks, the NCTC (National Counter-Terrorism Center), DHS, etc. all semed to get it. That these are folks from inside the beltway physically if not culturally impies to me that they recognize the need and are taking documents like NSPD-44 seriously.

These are talented folks - the guy from DOS was sharp and had a firm understanding of Army Doctrine - he was not, nor had ever been a green suiter, but he had been on a PRT in Afghanistan.

If its starting to permeate D.C., and talented people are working it hard, that gives me some hope that we will do what is needed first, then hopefully it will be codified as an after-fact. Allot of the folks I've met here at the AWC who have come down as guest speakers for BSAP from the PKSOI and other departments have been heavilly involved in helping the Joint and Inter-Agency work through the issues associated with meeting the demands of SSTRO. The leaders returning and going back to OIF/OEF are bringing with them their imprints on the future Army, Joint and Inter-Agency processes and systems.

While this is not a very detailed trip report - it should indicate to folks that although it often feels like we're on geological time, quality change (more the .ppt deep) at the grass roots is happening.