4GW & Other Myths

[Jedburgh]

Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB632.pdf)

...there is no reason to reinvent the wheel with regard to insurgencies—super or otherwise—and their various kin. A great deal of very good work has already been done, especially lately, on that topic, to include the effects that globalization and information technologies have had, are having, and are likely to have, on such movements. We do not need another label, as well as an incoherent supporting logic, to obscure what many have already made clear. The fact that 4GW theorists are not aware of this work, or at least do not acknowledge it, should give us pause indeed. They have not kept up with the scholarship on unconventional wars, nor with changes in the historical interpretations of conventional wars. Their logic is too narrowly focused and irredeemably flawed. In any case, the wheel they have been reinventing will never turn.

[Uncle Scary]

Hello Jedburgh,
I wasn't that familiar with 4GW until I scanned the link that you provided.
Here's an excerpt from the abstract.

"In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four
generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver,
and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available
networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an
opponent’s decisionmakers unachievable or too costly."

Does the notion of 4GW look as fatally flawed as the author believes? I haven't read the whole link, so I can't speak intelligently about the theory or the author's opinions. But from what I gathered in the abstract, he believes that supporters of the 4GW theory believe that war has gone through 4 evolutions through history, and that modern day insurgents are now employing a "4th Gen" of war. The author believes that this theory is flawed, but I didn't get to the reasons why he believed this. Any opinions?

[Jedburgh]

...from what I gathered in the abstract, he believes that supporters of the 4GW theory believe that war has gone through 4 evolutions through history, and that modern day insurgents are now employing a "4th Gen" of war. The author believes that this theory is flawed, but I didn't get to the reasons why he believed this. Any opinions?
Simply put, this method of warfare has been around as long as war itself. However, in modern military doctrine it has been "relabled" over and over again (i.e. guerrilla war, partisan war, small wars, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, etc). Now calling it 4GW and engaging in pseudo-intellectual discussions over its relevance in the current operational environment doesn't change the fact that the basic principles of this type of warfare have held true for centuries.

[GorTex6]

Simply put, this method of warfare has been around as long as war itself.
You are absolutely correct! (http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/neither_shall_the_sword.ppt#259,5,The “generations of war” model From the viewpoint of Core states and nuclear powers) However, it is now at the forefront and compounded with information technology(faster organizational OODA loops and vast exposure toward the global mass) and state failures from globalization(a borderless planet, economic vulnerabilities).


However, in modern military doctrine it has been "relabled" over and over again (i.e. guerrilla war, partisan war, small wars, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, etc).
It is not a relable but an alternative perspective. There is more than one way to skin a cat......


Now calling it 4GW and engaging in pseudo-intellectual discussions over its relevance in the current operational environment doesn't change the fact that the basic principles of this type of warfare have held true for centuries.
This is why the US military is still looking for their bag-of-what-da-####. Do they give frontal lobotomies at staff colleges/war colleges/officer re-education camp? Dumbasses think this war is "assymetrical", as though it is breaking all the rules. :rolleyes: Idiots

[GorTex6]

I wasn't that familiar with 4GW

Here (http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm) and here (http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/4gw_continued.htm)

the original paper from Oct 1989 (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm)

Col. Hammes with greater detail, Sept 1994 (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm)

[DDilegge]

This is why the US military is still looking for their bag-of-what-da-####. Do they give frontal labotomies at staff colleges/war colleges/military re-education camp? Dumbasses think this war is "assymetrical", as though it is breaking all the rules.

I sincerely believe that many within the DoD and "think-tank" communities are attempting to reinvent the wheel in terms as discussed here.

What I object to is a blanket condemnation of "all" institutions - especially our school houses. I know that our PME institutions are adapting their curriculum. One example is contained here - Concept Paper For CSC Master Thesis Project (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/toolan.doc). Beyond the thesis, the USMC Command and Staff College has completely revamped its curriculum in an attempt to better educate our future Small Wars Leaders. Like COIN, education and training takes time for actions to produce results.

[GorTex6]

I know that our PME institutions are adapting their curriculum.

....and it took how long? :eek: - proof that the enemy has a steeper organizational learning curve(faster OODA loop). Our massive heirarchic "up the chain" command structure is vulnerable and inefficient when compaired to the enemies decentralized structure and open sourced methods. This is covered by 4GW theorists BTW..... :cool:


Dumbasses think this war is "assymetrical", as though it is breaking all the rules.

Who's got the bankrupt theory? :rolleyes:

[Merv Benson]

Archer Jones in his [I]The Art of War in the Western World[I] breaks strategies into two different categories, raiding and combat persisting. Since the end of "major combat operations" in Iraq, we have gone from fighting in the combat persisting mode to fighting a raiding strategy. While there has been more emphasis on intelligence in this war, we are finally in a position to employ the operations that have been traditionally used to defeat the raiding strategy. Historically, raiders have been defeated by employing enough force to space to cut off the raiders ability to manuever and retreat. Raiders generally rely on the superiority of retreat to pursuit. With enough manpower you can cut off the raiders ability to manuever. The raider is most vulnerable when moving.

The raider also relies on the amiguity of the time and place of his attacks. That is one reason why the enemy could not effectively attack during the election. The time and place of his target was known and adequate defensive measures were in place to deal with it. In Iraq the enemy is unusually weak. He is totally ineffective at attacking a defended position. With the Iraqi troops providing the man power to meet the force to space requirement needed, the number of attacks has dropped dramatically. I believe the US strategy of waiting for the trained Iraqis was based on the perception that employing US troops in that role would generate greater resistance to "occupation." I also believe they needed to do a better job of explaing this strategy.

Another aspect of defeating a raiding strategy is denial of sanctuaries. Recent operations in Western Iraq appear to be effective in doing that. This includes a focus on weapons manufacturing and supply. By focusing on taking out the bomb makers and the human bomb ordinance as well as weapons caches we have effected the enmy's ability to pursue his strategy. Another unusual aspect of the war in Iraq is the enemy's inability to effect the ability of US forces to operate in the battle space. While all raiders general avoid direct battle if possible, the enemy in Iraq has focused his attacks on non combatants that has no effect on the corelation of forces. While his forces have been attrited, he has not been able to effectively attrite US forces. His strategy has been aimed more at gaining a victory by appealing to the antiwar movement in this country and its political allies who do not have the will to win. That is an area where the current administration has only recent reengaged.

There are many in the anti war movement who are very invested in opposing the use of force in general. These neo quagmirest are quick to suggest that anytime an enemy uses a raiding strategy the US should just give up and retreat before it becomes "bogged down." Defeating an enemy who uses a raiding strategy robs them of their quagmire argument. I think that is why many of them appear to be rooting for a US defeat and a hasty retreat from victory in Iraq.

It is my opinion that Fourth Generation warfare is just another name for the oldest military strategy--the raiding strategy.

[Bill Moore]

I wonder what Echevarria’s agenda was in writing 4GW and Other Myths? His comments were extremely arrogant; the same type of arrogance that led to poor strategic planning for the Vietnam War and the initial stages of OIF. Although he made some sound arguments, he lost credibility with me when he wrote "everything" on war has already been written. That mind set has persisted throughout history, and it has always been proven wrong. That doesn’t mean that 4GW theorists are right. We have a terrible record of predicting the future. There are always several variables we never calculate for, and then in hind sight they seem so obvious we wonder why we missed them.

There were several areas of 4GW that Mr. Echevarria failed to address, and one that I would like to address is the assumption that the Nation State is steadying losing power, while non-state actors are becoming more powerful. Most folks today hear non-state actors, and they automatically think Al-Qaeda, but the definition extends far beyond this realm of actors. Consider the following:

1. Globalization (economic model, not political) equals increasing power of multinational corporations that make their own foreign policy and have increasing large security apparatuses. There is much concern on how to control them, while some argue not controlling them will actually lead to more stability, because the nation’s economies will be too interdependent to allow waging war upon one another. Hopefully this isn’t wishful thinking.

2. Transnational criminal organizations becoming increasingly sophisticated and capable of influencing significant political influence through infiltration, bribery, threats, and terrorism. The Italian mob is now the babes in the woods compared to Russian, Chinese, and Latin American gangs. I would throw the Aryan Nation under this group and their ilk under this group also.

3. Large sections of the world are defaulting back to tribal and other undesired political organizations because the State (no longer supported as a proxy in the cold war) doesn’t have the power to control the majority of their population, throughout much of sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, etc.

4. Ability of NGOs/PVOs to influence the international audience and force states and non-state actors to act.

5. The growing power of religious organizations. We have our own version of the Taliban in the U.S. thumping the bible and advocating non-state sponsored action against abortion clinics, and in some cases calling for separation from the State (Aryan Brotherhood).

In short our world is changing and so is the nature of conflict. Are the 4GW theorists right? I don’t know, but I disagree strongly with Echevarria’s view that all we need to know has been written already.

GorTex is right, unconventional warfare (in varying degrees) has been around throughout the history of man (it brought Rome to its knees), and that our military institutions have been slow to adapt to the reality on the street. Vietnam was a perfect example of a failed PME beginning with a non-functional West Point Culture that generated officers more concerned about maintaining traditions than dealing effectively with our nation’s security issues. However, I think everyone gets it now.

[DDilegge]

....and it took how long? :eek: - proof that the enemy has a steeper organizational learning curve(faster OODA loop). Our massive heirarchic "up the chain" command structure is vulnerable and inefficient when compaired to the enemies decentralized structure and open sourced methods. This is covered by 4GW theorists BTW..... :cool:

Who's got the bankrupt theory? :rolleyes:

Eek, eye roll and cool avatars aside...

My experience is with USMC PME so I'll mainly address that. The Marine Corps school-houses have addressed Small Wars issues for years... This includes the captain's course (AWS – now EWS), the major’s course (CSC) and the lieutenant colonel's course (USMC War College).

I offered up the new CSC curriculum as an example of how the USMC CSC is adapting even more to our Small Wars environment. All that said, I would opine that the other services’ PME institutions have been and are currently doing the same. This last statement is based on the student papers, thesis, and monographs that these schools have produced.

Whether “good ideas” and “spot-on” research and recommendations translate to actionable items in the operating forces is another issue.

I would submit that we need to give our military professionals more credit… Small Wars, by nature, has a heavy political element that does not necessarily translate to efficiency and often puts the cabash on the “good ideas”.

[GorTex6]

The Art of War in the Western World (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0252069668/qid=1135416976/sr=8-1/ref=pd_bbs_1/002-2955298-0985648?n=507846&s=books&v=glance)

[Bill Moore]

I would submit that we need to give our military professionals more credit… Small Wars, by nature, has a heavy political element that does not necessarily translate to efficiency and often puts the cabash on the “good ideas”.

Your comment about our military professionals is spot on with the possible exception of Vietnam under GEN Westmoreland's lead. Undoubtedly he faced he faced an incredible challenge on the hill. Maybe his policy of total war against N. Vietnam would have worked if he wasn't impeded by President Johnson who was famously quoted they won't bomb an outhouse unless I give them permission to. While I think the war of movement in Vietnam was probably the wrong approach, and on that we can only speculate with the benefit of hindsight.

Almost all officers I have spoken with from Lts through GO's have an understanding of insurgencies and unconventional warfare. They may all have different recommendations on strategy, but as a whole they're a ray of hope. The bottom line is that the military can’t always translate bad policy into a successful mission. While I think the so called Powell Doctrine was unrealistic, I can definitely understand why many in the military embraced it. We can’t count on our nation to do well in these abstract conflicts, because we do a poor job of educating those we need support from throughout the DIME, which we can discuss in the DIME forum.

You’re right, across the board we have a very professional force that America can and should be proud of.

[Merv Benson]

After their Tet offensive failed, the communist insurgency was never able to threaten conquest of South Vietnam. It had been defeated for all practicle purposes. The Hanoi leadership recognized this and eventually won using a "convential" or combat persiting strategy that was successful when the Congress denied the South Vietnamese the air support we had earlier promised them.

[Bill Moore]

Merv,

You have provided several thought provoking ideas, and I'm undecided if I agree with your analysis on what you are calling failed attacks. I think you're right reference Vietnam, because the TET offensive was an attempt to defeat us militarily, but the enemy noted an unintended effect on the American population (eroded our will), so they kept pushing that button to pressure us out of Vietnam. What a different world we could be living in today if the press actually reported the battle results accurately as a major defeat for the communist forces. It can be argued we left Vietnam as winners with a relatively secure S. Vietnam, but one that wasn't capable of repulsing a conventional N. Vietnam offensive without our promised help. Our help didn’t arrive because their previously failed attacks effectively eroded our will to stay in the fight, so it can be argued that their failed attacks worked so in the end I still remain undecided.

In Iraq I don't think the enemy has any intention of defeating us militarily and all of their attacks are directly focused on America's will to stay in the fight, so whether they're successful from a tactical stand point or not isn't the true measure of effectiveness. Rather it is their effect on the intended audience. I think the terrorists grossly underestimate the will of the American people to stick it out, but then again that national will must be stoked by effective leadership in the White House. Our President’s recent speeches admitting mistakes seem to be working with the American public. Now he is a gladiator in the arena instead of a by stander making statements that just didn’t ring true with the American public. If he can keep rebuilding his support base, I think we’ll do fine.

[War Hammer]

Some weaknesses of 4GW are:

(1): Misrepresentation of Clausewitz and Clausewitz's followers

“Unlike Clausewitzian warfare, which envisions war as an act of policy in a contest between states, 4GW more resembles a boxer versus a viral infection.”

Clausewitz is generally depicted as describing only state vs. state conflicts. The adherents of Clausewitz are then depicted as “state-centric” warriors who only can only deal with state to state conflicts.

However many Clausewitzians believe On War is a descriptive work not a prescriptive one. It describes war as it is, in its universal nature, rather than how it ought to be. They apply Clausewitz to non-state actors as well as state actors. They argue the trinity of primordial violence, blind chance and reason are conceptual and apply to any warfighting entity (i.e. non-state actor or state). They are not focused on state vs. state wars nor do they believe that Clausewitz was focused on state vs. state conflicts.

Colin Gray being an example:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/gray.htm

(2): Misrepresentation of Mao

If Mao is the epitome of 4GW, Eastern Warfare and Sun-Tzu why did he frame his perception of warfare within the paradigm of the Clausewitzian Trinity? Why did Mao insist that all wars were political in nature? Why did he argue that there was never a war that was not political? Mao’s insistence that war is nothing but politics with bloodshed is in stark contrast to the 4GW theory as set out by William Lind:

“Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war, and they will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.”

[Merv Benson]

Bill,

I agree with you on the importance of maintaining the national will and I am glad that Bush has reengaged on this aspect of the war. I think the commanders also should be educating the public on the significance of events. If you recall during the first Gulf War, Iraq captured a small town in Saudia Arabia while the coalition was still in the "shaping the battlespace" phase, i.e. the preinvasion bombing. Gen. Schwartkoph was emphatic in stating that the attack on Kafje was not important and would not divert the plan of attack on liberating Kuwait. As I recall the Iraqis were eventually driven out by the Saudi National Guard troops, because the Saudis thought it was significant. My point is that the General did a good job of shaping perceptions and he was in a much better position to do so than the President. Unfortunately in Iraq the briefings are no longer making a splash on the news back in the states. Perhaps Gen. Pace can command a larger audience. Getting accurate information to the public is clearly an important aspect of this war and unfortunately the media is not likely to cooperate.

[DDilegge]

Kafji was insignificant to a point. The fact that the Iraqi's crossed into Saudi Arabia had the potential to influence the perceptions of the Muslim members of the coalition. The SANG took back Kafji with substantial U.S. support and went a long way in building up the confidence level of the SANG and other coaltion partners who had no previous combat experience or extensive training in the type of operations that were about to be conducted.

[Merv Benson]

It was certainly more significant than any action initiated by the enemy since the end of major combat operations in the second Gulf War. However Schwartzkoph was determined not to let it be a distraction to his plan to liberate Kuwait, and he took action with the media to make certain that they did not turn it into something it was not. I think commanders in Iraq need to be more proactive in explaining the significance and insignificance of events. It is clear to me that the media does not comprehend the difference.

[War Hammer]

The number one thing that 4GW lacks is basis in primary source documentation. For example, the claim that Mao is a paragon of 4GW warfare. How can a paragon of 4GW warfare say things like this:

"War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character.” Mao-Tse Tung

From Lin Biao

"The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, i.e., the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement ot its weapons and equipment and its mlilitary technique, but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons and technque, it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of the the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses."

If Mao and Lin-Biao analyzed warfare today, they would still comment that 21st century warfare is still an extension of politics. Because that belief was at the heart of their worldview and war planning strategy. Hardly 4GW archetypes.

[War Hammer]

We also hear from the 4GW that the U.S. Army is so state centric that it is unable to deal with non-state actors. The 4GW further blames this on Clausewitz. How is it Clausewitz's fault if the U.S. military is geared to fighting states? Why would be Clausewitz's fault if some in the U.S. military misread his work and believed that all conflicts are state centric?

Clausewitzian critics have often accused him of being the granddaddy of "total war" or "absolute war." However, "absolute war" was a conceptual tool that Clausewitz used to show how real war is an extension of politics. He used "absolute war" to show how why war does not have its own logic. Clausewitz never advocated "absolute war" because he did not believe it existed.

4GW authors have argued jthat war is governed by its own logic and that it is separated from politics. The British military historian and anti-Clausewitzian John Keegan has also argued that war has its own logic.

Clausewitz anticipated and argued against theorists who contend that war has its own logic. Clausewitz devised the concepts of “absolute war” and “real war” to show why warfare can never be isolated from the politics that drives it. “Absolute war” is an abstract description of how warfare would operate in a state where it is disconnected from politics. “Real war” is how war actually operates as an extension of politics. Absolute war is divorced from politics and guided by its own logic of three reciprocal extremes. Each side in war is compelled to meet its opponent’s action reciprocally which in turn causes war, in theory, to be pushed to extremes. The first reciprocal law of “absolute war” is violence driven to the utmost extreme. During “real war” the amount of violence and effort committed to ending a war is determined and limited by the political objective. The second reciprocal law is the complete disarming of the enemy. In “real war” the disarming or complete defeat of the enemy is not the only way to victory. Clausewitz stated, “...that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent’s outfight defeat.” The third reciprocal law is that opponents in war will exert the most extreme effort and resources in destroying each other. In “real war” logistics, geography, the uncertainties of combat and political objectives will limit a state’s effort and commitment of resources. Clausewitz uses “absolute war” as a vehicle to show how politics describes the behavior of real war.

[GorTex6]

4GW – Myth, or the Future of Warfare? A Reply to Antulio Echevarria (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/sayen_4gw_reply.htm)


Critics of the Fourth Generation: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_10_06.htm)

[Strickland]

Please excuse my ignorance with 4GW; however, it appears as if several others are asserting that what Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, or Tamil Tigers do is not an extension of politics or political in nature, due to the fact they are not State entities? I would argue that these groups follow an obvious extension of politics as Mao or Clausewitz understood it.

[GorTex6]

4GW, Pro and Con
(http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2006/01/17/4gw-pro-and-con/)

ZenPundit (http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2006/01/counterinsurgency-is-doable-series-4gw.html)

John Robb (http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2006/01/validity_of_4gw.html)

[zenpundit]

For the mention Gortex6. :)

[Stratiotes]

Please excuse my ignorance with 4GW; however, it appears as if several others are asserting that what Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, or Tamil Tigers do is not an extension of politics or political in nature, due to the fact they are not State entities? I would argue that these groups follow an obvious extension of politics as Mao or Clausewitz understood it.

I have ben following this topic for sometime on the web and still not sureI have a solid grasp of 4GW myself. One problem is that it seems to mean different things to different people. Most would probably point to Bill Lind as the "guru" of 4GW and he usually points to a misunderstanding of 4GW even among proponents of it. One common misconception Bill points to is how it is generally confused with insurgency/counterinsurgency but his point is that it is not marked by that - it is a reference to non-state entities being the primary combatants as opposed to state-sponsored militaries. His definition seems to be that 4GW is the end of state monopoly on war. He points to a time prior to the beginning of state monopoly as analogous to today - so it has been around a long time indeed but was almost extinct until more recent times. I think that in one of the links above Mr. Lind suggests Barb Tuchman's book, _Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century_ for a good understanding of what we are returning to.

[GorTex6]

The Bad (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_20_06.htm)

[SWJED]

SWC's Zenpundit (http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2006/01/lind-on-barnett-sort-of-updated.html)...


William Lind has posted a scathing attack on the work of Thomas P.M. Barnett at Defense & The National Interest as part of a series of responses to critics and commenters on 4GW theory...

[Strickland]

In my opinion, Thomas Barnett's books, Blueprint for Action and The Pentagon's New Map, are the two best books I have read, along with Kepel's War for Muslim Minds , in a VERY long time. Yes, I have read Huntington, Freidman, and Fukuyama, and believe Barnett provides a much more compelling argument as to the future. Just my humble opinion.

[Stratiotes]

In my opinion, Thomas Barnett's books, Blueprint for Action and The Pentagon's New Map, are the two best books I have read, along with Kepel's War for Muslim Minds , in a VERY long time. Yes, I have read Huntington, Freidman, and Fukuyama, and believe Barnett provides a much more compelling argument as to the future. Just my humble opinion.

I just went over to the library website and found the Blueprint for Action presentation on DVD so I requested it. Interesting what one can find thru the library now. I started to read one of Barnett's books before and got sidetracked for some reason - it didn't catch my attention so I forgot about it. I'm going to check it out based on such high praise. Thanks Major.

[GorTex6]

....The Ugly (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_25_06.htm)

[SWJED]

....The Ugly (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_25_06.htm)

...for a bit of an introduction or excerpt to blind links... Again, thanks in advance.

[GatorLHA2]

4th Gen Warfare is not new. A serious study of the American Revolution will show that the "Founding Fathers" used 4GW. They used conventional military forces; irregular military forces; insurgency; information warfare; effective local, state and national political networks; social factors; economic boycots; attacks against economic targets; and international diplomacy to win the war.


Hello Jedburgh,
I wasn't that familiar with 4GW until I scanned the link that you provided.
Here's an excerpt from the abstract.

"In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four
generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver,
and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available
networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an
opponent’s decisionmakers unachievable or too costly."

Does the notion of 4GW look as fatally flawed as the author believes? I haven't read the whole link, so I can't speak intelligently about the theory or the author's opinions. But from what I gathered in the abstract, he believes that supporters of the 4GW theory believe that war has gone through 4 evolutions through history, and that modern day insurgents are now employing a "4th Gen" of war. The author believes that this theory is flawed, but I didn't get to the reasons why he believed this. Any opinions?

[GorTex6]

4th Gen Warfare is not new.

Insurgency is not new. The theory of warfare as it is has evolved in the past couple of centuries is new- this is 4GW.

[GatorLHA2]

Insurgency is not new. The theory of warfare as it is has evolved in the past couple of centuries is new- this is 4GW.

My point exactly, 4GW is NOT a new form of warfare. Only the theory is NEW? It's like old wine in new bottles, the same old thing with new lables.

[GorTex6]

My point exactly, 4GW is NOT a new form of warfare. Only the theory is NEW? It's like old wine in new bottles, the same old thing with new lables.

No. It's like saying "home-made wine is now more popular than cheap wine-in-a-box"...I guess

Clear as mud? (http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/evolution_of_conflict.ppt)

[Martin]

I don't think the founding fathers would agree with this "4GW", and the USA was founded after the treaty of Westphalia.

Martin

[Tom Odom]

There many studies, histories, or articles written about an "American Way of War." Indeed our adherence to doctrine as a base plate for our operations documents that we as a military continually evaluate, test, and rethink how we define our approach to warfare. FM 3-0 Operations is the Army's "bible" on the conduct of warfare. But looking at this issue from a longer perspective, certain trends or characteristics emerge. I cite the following four:

· Preference for Fire Power over Manpower

· Preference for Offense over Defense

· Preference for Technologically Complex over Simple

· Preference for Speedy Resolution over Extended Operations

These four "preferences" drive our approach to military operations. Raising the idea of doing a cultural IPB on oneself, consider those four longstanding American preferences from an enemy's perspective. Then you will start to see US strategic, operational, and tactical weaknesses.

Best

Tom

[M. J. Dougherty]

Gentlemen,
I think we can all agree that 4GW does not represent the advent of a new unprecedented way of war. It is more a cyclical, evolving response by weaker adversaries and nonstate actors to the development of strategic capabilities of modern states. Yet we should conceed that modern forms of insurgency are characterized by unique trends in adversarial capabilities and TTPs that have not been seen before. Part product of technological proliferation and part product of adaptive doctrine, insurgent forces are developing tailored responses to U.S. and allied (mostly Western) global dominance. In particular, insurgent adversaries are developing longterm strategies to shape the strategic environment in their favor for a conflict with the U.S. at a particular time and place of their choosing.

[Sonny]

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.

On War, Carl von Clausewitz

I think that one of the things that can weigh us down in dealing with today's conflicts is an unnecessary attachment to a single theory or doctrine of war, be it EBO, NCW, or 4GW. No single theory or perspective can explain the totality and all the phenomena associated with what is perhaps the most complicated of human endeavors: war. In science, no single theory can't explain all aspects of a phenomenon (e.g. general relativity, quantum mechanics); the same applies for warfare. Neither the generational warfare model, nor EBO or NCW, represent, by themselves, a "theory of everything" regarding war.

It can be beneficial to study the concepts pertaining to each theory, but getting married to a single theory can prove to be detrimental. They way I see it, as warfighters we really have no dog in this academic fight. We should be fighting the war, not the doctrine. The concepts we learn studying the different theories live in our minds (not necessarily in our hearts), but ultimately when it comes time to take action we should try what suits each occasion best, regardless of whether it conforms to a theory or another. We have all this concepts in our toolkit, and that's precisely what these concepts are: tools for understanding certain aspects of warfare. No single tool is appropriate for every job.

The generational model of war, of which 4GW is a part, is more a representation of a different viewpoint than a reinvention of the wheel. What we now call insurgency has been a part of warfare since antiquity. 4 GW looks at insurgency, and war as a whole, from a different standpoint. The 4GW proponents added another layer to the discussion of war. If nothing else, they revitalized the concept. Whether you agree with 4GW or not, the discussions generated by the theory at least are getting us to talk about a topic long neglected by the military: insurgency and unconventional warfare.

Globalization has changed many aspects of our lives; commerce, politics, and or course, the way human beings wage war. Technology also changes how we fight, whether we like it or not. Even the "low-tech" insurgents and terrorists adapt technologies to their advantage.

In his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman talks about the democratization of technology, finance, and information: "three fundamental changes-changes in how we communicate, how we invest and how we learn about the world."

Fareed Zakaria in The Future of Freedom adds, "We often read during the roaring 1990s that technology and information had been democratized. This is a relatively new phenomenon. In the past, technology helped reinforce centralization and hierarchy. For example, the last great information revolution--in the 1920s involving radio, television, movies, megaphones-had a centralizing effect."

The democratization of technology and information along with the weakening of the state has contributed to what Zakaria calls the democratization of violence. To those factors, I add the post-Cold War resurgence of ethnic and religious conflict. 4GW is growing on fertile ground.

Peaceful and hostile non-state actors have benefited from these democratizations. You can get in touch with anyone across the world cheaply and exchange news, make arrangements for your latest cocaine shipment, or put the finishing touches on your terrorist attack. The fact that governments can intercept some of these communications will not stop a determined adversary. They have ways to go around that.

The discussion on 4GW and insurgencies will remain front and center for a long time. Neither 4GW, NCW, or EBO deserve a blanket disapproval. Each perspective offers something useful in understanding certain, but not all, aspects of warfare.