Thomas P.M. Barnett - Army America needs versus the wars Americans prefer to wage

[jonSlack]

When Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling recently published “A Failure of Generalship” in the Armed Forces Journal, a tipping point was reached in the long-brewing fight between the U.S. military’s “big war” and “small wars” factions.

The big-war crowd wants to write off Iraq as an aberration, preferring instead to focus on conventional war with rising powers like China. The small-wars faction envisions a future in which messy insurgencies are the norm.

The initial clash naturally involves issuing blame for Iraq because, from that dominant strategic narrative, all future ones must flow. Yingling’s small-wars faction points accusingly to a generation of senior officers who should have logically foreseen the emergence of such intra-national warfare as the primary threat to global stability in the post-Cold War era. All the signs were there, including a plethora of U.S. military interventions across the 1990s that involved such conflict.

Thomas P.M. Barnett - Army America needs versus the wars Americans prefer to wage (http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/jul/08/army-americaneeds-versus-the-warsamericans-to/)

[T. Jefferson]

I agree with Barnett’s basic point that our military is optimized for traditional, decisive conflict. In truth we need to be setup for both kinds of war. The majority of our efforts over the next several decades will most likely be small wars, yet history guarantees we will see another major conflict in the not real distant future. In fact our ability or lack thereof in dealing with insurgencies may well determine if we get drawn into another major war.

I would also point out that the strong preference for decisive conflict is far more than an American way of war. This strategic preference goes back at least to Classical Greece (http://www.amazon.com/Western-Way-War-Infantry-Classical/dp/0520219112).

[Lastdingo]

Hmm, I would say that the American style of war dates back to 1917 when the French educated the American officers on modern warfare, including their point of view on firepower and battle plans (wow, some americans will hate me for this!).

Drawing the line back to Ancient Greece does not really help, as the USA was coined by a Europe that had lost the characteristic of waging decisive wars in the meantime (especially in the 16th and 18th century) in favour of rather limited warfare.

Classical Greece wasn't coined by decisive warfare anyway before the Peloponnesian War and later on the even more violent Philipp II./Alexander the Great makedons. They most often only marched a day or two, aligned into a Phalanx, marched to each other and the war was over without pursuit or capturing of cities once one phalanx broke in battle and fled.

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.
It's also correct in my opinion that mroe small wars will break out with western participation, although I consider that as easily avoidable.

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

So the big war faction is in my opinion correct. Neither counter-insurgency campaigns nor amateurish peacekeeping missions without real mandate like Bosnia are unavoidable.
And in fact it would be quite possible to keep the whole NATO out of conventional conflicts for decades if our people and political elites truly wanted that.
But that won't happen. Wel'll see more peacekeeping about five to ten major wars with NATO country participation till the end of the century and a bit less large counter-insurgency campaigns, the next one at the latest around 2040 when the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.
Well, that's my guess - based on my feeling and on a look into 20th and 19th century history.

[tequila]

Note also that the "decisive battle" noted in Classical Greece often had little in the way of actual decision. Very rarely were the city-states involved decimated or otherwise critically harmed during phalanx battle. The incessant and endemic warfare during that timeframe testify to the remarkable indecisiveness of classical Greek warmaking, which as in all warfare also involved far more usage of skirmishing and raiding than portrayed in the classical texts, which were written by and for hoplite elites.

Decisive war had to wait for the Macedonians.

[whsieh]

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.


In terms of ground warfare, I find it far more plausible in the next 10-15 years that US land forces have to deal with stabilizing a collapsed Pakistani or North Korean state, while attempting to secure both regimes' nuclear weapons, than any sort of conflict that would require high-end "conventional" operations.

I mean, who exactly are we going to fight a conventional ground war with massed armor formations with? Worst case scenarios in the Taiwan Strait would lead to air and naval combat, along with maybe a modest (and light) expeditionary force of Marines and the most mobile Army forces to defend the island. Does anyone actually think we are going to invade China? Or that the Russians will roll into Poland?

But in addition to North Korea and Pakistan, there are all sorts of ramshackle states the United States may find itself having to deal with at some point. Whatever happens in Iraq, Afghanistan is still a live issue, along with chunks of Africa. Whether or not it's wise to intervene in an individual failed state depends on each individual circumstance, but I can think of cases where important US interests will lead to some kind of intervention.

WH

[Rob Thornton]

Seems to me he has this question right:


This intra-military debate should focus America's attention on the real question at hand: Do we see a future world full of messy Iraqs and Somalias and Haitis? Or should we pull back from that long war focus and prepare for conventional conflict with China?

Given the course of events since 9/11, which pathway seems more realistic to you?

However, how about these as follow ons:

What kind of role should the United States play over the next 25 years in order to provide security to its citizens at home and abroad?

Why do many of us say we must think differently about security?

Must the United States be involved on a global scale in order to achieve
those ends?
What should be the shape of that commitment?

Walter Isaacson wrote a great OP/ED in the Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/) today
Excerpt

Now we are again faced with a new and dangerous global threat, the rise of jihadist terrorism. But more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, we have not yet responded with the creativity displayed at the outset of the Cold War. Instead, we are either disparaging Cold War institutions or, at best, tinkering with them to make them play a role for which they were never designed.

With a presidential election approaching, we should push the candidates to provide some imaginative ideas and a vision that match the creativity exhibited 60 years ago. Here, for example, are proposals they could explore:

I think he is on the mark.
Regards, Rob

[whsieh]

Must the United States be involved on a global scale in order to achieve
those ends?
What should be the shape of that commitment?


Regards, Rob

As a major beneficiary of the current way the world is more or less setup, I think the United States has to be involved on a global scale. So much of our general day-to-day world is dependent on a global economy that is in turn dependent on relative stability, which has to be safeguarded against destabilizing forces like Jihadism and the like, never mind the whole issue of physical security. And before people think this is just about the West's addiction to mass-consumption economies, I find it hard to believe how developing world economies can be lifted out of poverty without a reasonably stable system of international markets that allows them to exploit advantages in comparative advantage and the like. This is not to say that the current scheme of "globalization" is perfect, but I don't see any positive alternatives to take its place if the whole system were to, say, collapse, due to a catastrophic geopolitical disaster in the Middle East that led to an unprecedented energy shock.

The devil is obviously in the details, though. Even if we stipulate a commitment has to exist, what shape it takes is open to debate.

WH

[Merv Benson]

One of the reasons few people are willing to challenge us in "conventional" warfare is that they do not think they can beat us. We need to get to that point with insurgency warfare. If we do not, we will see it used much more.

[Granite_State]

In terms of ground warfare, I find it far more plausible in the next 10-15 years that US land forces have to deal with stabilizing a collapsed Pakistani or North Korean state, while attempting to secure both regimes' nuclear weapons, than any sort of conflict that would require high-end "conventional" operations.

I mean, who exactly are we going to fight a conventional ground war with massed armor formations with? Worst case scenarios in the Taiwan Strait would lead to air and naval combat, along with maybe a modest (and light) expeditionary force of Marines and the most mobile Army forces to defend the island. Does anyone actually think we are going to invade China? Or that the Russians will roll into Poland?

But in addition to North Korea and Pakistan, there are all sorts of ramshackle states the United States may find itself having to deal with at some point. Whatever happens in Iraq, Afghanistan is still a live issue, along with chunks of Africa. Whether or not it's wise to intervene in an individual failed state depends on each individual circumstance, but I can think of cases where important US interests will lead to some kind of intervention.

WH

Good post. Our enemies aren't stupid, they've all seen what happens when a state challenges us conventionally, as in Iraq (twice). Nuclear weapons have also changed the rules of the game, as Martin Van Creveld pointed out. We should be regarding small wars and non-state adversaries as the main challenge of the next century.

[BScully]

We should be regarding small wars and non-state adversaries as the main challenge of the next century.

I suppose the challenge this presents is developing a sufficient capability to deal with small wars and non-state adversaries without weakening our conventional capabilities to the point that nation's believe they can challenge us conventionally again. Is this doable? And if it is doable, the real question is how?

My opinion is that this is not doable right now because it is not a military solution or fix. It will require a whole of government fix and the rest of government isn't ready to move in this direction yet.

Brian

[Tacitus]

The big-war crowd wants to write off Iraq as an aberration, preferring instead to focus on conventional war with rising powers like China

Let's suppose some American president gets it into his head that the situation in China demands "regime change", "democracy", or whatever, requiring an invasion of the Chinese mainland. With a naval supply line stretching all across the Pacific ocean, you put an expeditionary force of 150,000 troops ashore. That seems to be about all we can muster, since a draft is off the table. Okay, now what? China covers a vast area. Are we supposed to occupy the place? There's only about 1.3 billion people in China. They could lose 100,000,000 people and might then think it was safe to eliminate their one-child policy.

If I was a Chinese general, why would I even attempt to fight a "big war" in such a scenario? Better to follow a Russian strategy to retreat to the vast interior, harassing an invader along the way, threatening his supply lines. Then just wear him down through attrition. And we're not even bringing up the subject of nuclear weapons in such a war. Rather than offer decisive battle somewhere, they could just start guerilla operations when the first GI steps ashore, and stick with it. If we're having this much trouble keeping a lid on Baghdad, Basra, Ramadi and the rest of these places, can you imagine what it would take for Peking, Shanghai, and the rest of Chinese coastal areas?

As Merv and Granite State point out, we (and any other Western style army) are going to see this kind of fight (at least in part) until we can show we can deal with it. It is many times cheaper to train and equip a guerilla force than build huge armored formations, a modern air force, navy, etc.

If our government intends to ignore how to fight and win a guerilla war because of THIS scenario, then somebody needs a psychiatric evaluation. Seriously, how would you fight the U.S. if it's armed forces show up on your shores for whatever reason, and you have only modest conventional abilities?

Of course, it might be better to think long and hard before you choose to get into one of these small (or not-so-small) wars in the first place, but that is a different post altogether.

[tequila]

No U.S. general (or that of any other country today) would ever contemplate a full-scale invasion and occupation of China. As noted, the nuclear weapons alone make such a scenario a non-starter --- never mind the enormous geographical and population scale issues.

[wm]

No U.S. general (or that of any other country today) would ever contemplate a full-scale invasion and occupation of China. As noted, the nuclear weapons alone make such a scenario a non-starter --- never mind the enormous geographical and population scale issues.

While the above is probably true, it is equally true that, in the 20th Century at least, the US was traditionally dragged into wars as an initially unwilling ally of other countries subjected to invasion. If we want to consider options other than the COIN-type events or small wars that are at one end of the spectrum, I suggest that the right answer is more on the lines of mid-level wars where the US intervenes after the fact to try to redress the injustice/balance of power caused by two "less than super" powers getting into a micturating contest. I submit we are more likely to get involved in a conventional war along the lines of DS/DS rather than a heavyweight slugfest like what was envisioned in our war planning for post WWII European conflicts.

Some possible scenarios--
--Assistance to RoK or Japan in NEA should a regime change occur with the death of Kim Jong Il and a muscle flexing by his successor or an invasion by the Chinese to establish his successor.
--A range possible actions in any of the less stable South or Central American countries--our response should, for example, Colombia decide it wants to supplement its cocaine income with oil income from Venezuela or Peru decide it wants to reestablish the Incan Empire by conquering Bolivia and/or Ecuador.
--A host of various alternatives in Africa, ranging from humanitarian interventions to stop brutal suppression of tribal seccessions (Nigeria vs. Biafra Round II, circa 2010) to overt grabs for resources (and these could be as simple as more water and arable land) among various African countries in the sub-Saharan regions. We are already avoiding the Darfur regional problem, dabbling in the Somilia problem again, and might have others (like Robert Mugabe's experiment as a national leader) to attract our attention sooner rather than later.

There should be plenty to entertain our military futurists and we need to have a range of force options not an "either/or" military that hopes it has gotten the "crystal-balling" right.

[RTK]

Some possible scenarios--
--Assistance to RoK or Japan in NEA should a regime change occur with the death of Kim Jong Il and a muscle flexing by his successor or an invasion by the Chinese to establish his successor.


I'm not convinced Japan and RoK would be on the same page in that scenario.

[wm]

I'm not convinced Japan and RoK would be on the same page in that scenario.

And were that the case, what would the US do? Would we feel compelled to act in a conflict between the islands and the peninsula? Which side would we support, if either?

We could probably conduct conventional maneuver warfare across the Korean Peninsula with our current force structure. But how well could we sustain it if we did not have Japan as a forward basing option?
We might be hard pressed to conduct meaningful maneuver operations on the Japanese islands. I think the problems that were foresee for WWII's Operations Downfall, Olympic, and Coronet and that were used to justify the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would come back to haunt us rather quickly.

[LawVol]

If I was a Chinese general, why would I even attempt to fight a "big war" in such a scenario? Better to follow a Russian strategy to retreat to the vast interior, harassing an invader along the way, threatening his supply lines.


Rather than offer decisive battle somewhere, they could just start guerilla operations when the first GI steps ashore, and stick with it. If we're having this much trouble keeping a lid on Baghdad, Basra, Ramadi and the rest of these places, can you imagine what it would take for Peking, Shanghai, and the rest of Chinese coastal areas?

If waging small wars is a tool of the weak against the strong, would China really resort solely to a small war in any conflict with the US? Unless I am mistaken, China sees itself as a major power; if not completely on par with the US then at least close and working to create parity. If this is indeed the case, wouldn't a resort to an insurgent strategy present a completely different picture of China to the world?

Moreover, if this were the strategy, why Cina's increasing interest in force projection (deep water navy, 5th gen fighters, anti-satellite capability, etc.)? Is it possible that China may employ a hydrid war that blends conventional and unconventional tactics and strategy?

[Lastdingo]

Mainland China doesn't need insurgent tactics against heavy forces. It can simply resort to significant quantities of light infantry as it did in the Korean War.
Such troops would be very tough to fight in many Chinese landscapes.
Their setbacks in the 1979 punitive expedition against Vietnam told them that they need a more professional army than before.

Its attempts to gain modern, heavy weaponry and force protection/amphibious capabilities can easily be explained as regional hegemon aspirations. It's the traditional role of China to dominate its neighbours and I believe there's little that can be done about it unless you form formal alliances to counter that.

[Tacitus]

If waging small wars is a tool of the weak against the strong, would China really resort solely to a small war in any conflict with the US? Unless I am mistaken, China sees itself as a major power; if not completely on par with the US then at least close and working to create parity. If this is indeed the case, wouldn't a resort to an insurgent strategy present a completely different picture of China to the world?

Moreover, if this were the strategy, why China's increasing interest in force projection (deep water navy, 5th gen fighters, anti-satellite capability, etc.)? Is it possible that China may employ a hydrid war that blends conventional and unconventional tactics and strategy?

China has alot of options to resist any invader. A Navy to attack supply lines across an ocean, or get in the way of any Normandy style landing.

Look, I'm just saying that they could take a page out of the Russians' play book assuming somebody chose to make a landing on the mainland. They wouldn't need to mirror US forces to come out ahead in such a fight. Retreat inwards, wearing down the invader through a multi-million strong infantry army, organizing guerilla operations in the rear of the invader. Maybe they retreat to a place of their choosing and fight conventionally, as the Russians did at Borodino. Then harass the invader every step of the way back to the coast. An invader might see the whole spectrum from guerilla operations on up. It is merely an option.

Who said guerilla warfare had to be used only by a weak country against a strong one, anyway? You can make your own call on how weak the USSR was on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and afterwards. It certainly got stronger as the war went on in the east. They used a partisan army in the rear to cause trouble, in conjunction with building up large conventional forces in the front. Any Eastern Front experts out there could chime in on how many forces they tied down, but just from looking at maps in books, it seemed to have been a considerable amount that could have been used elsewhere.

But back to the topic, at hand. I have a question. Assuming Iraq is an aberration, and you are preferring instead to focus on conventional war with rising powers like China. What would that change about how the U.S. armed forces looked before we invaded Iraq? How do you plan to organize, outfit, and conduct a war with China, even if is a conventional only fight?

[LawVol]

But back to the topic, at hand. I have a question. Assuming Iraq is an aberration, and you are preferring instead to focus on conventional war with rising powers like China. What would that change about how the U.S. armed forces looked before we invaded Iraq? How do you plan to organize, outfit, and conduct a war with China, even if is a conventional only fight?

I am not advocating a focus on conventional war. I do believe that we will continue to face situations that will require COIN skills, including regime change, humanitarian efforts that go awry, etc. However, I do not think we can focus on COIN skills to the exclusion of our conventional advantage.

We have clearly mastered conventional war and I believe we can master COIN as well. However, I sense an undercurrent of doubt when it comes to preparing for a peer competitor in many things I've read. If our enemy (whomever it may be in the future) seeks to capitalize on our weakness, are we doing him a favor by overly focusing on COIN to the detriment of conventional capabilities? Rather than assuming the next war (or some future war rather than the very next one) will be like Iraq, or Korea, or WWII, couldn't it be a blend of the two? And if this scenario is realistic, should we be capable of fighting both types of war simultaneously?

Maybe this line of thinking is way off-track, but I can't help but notice that most of what I read falls into one camp or another. If I'm not making sense, my apologies.

[Xenophon]

I don't think anyone is saying that we need to focus on small wars to the absolute exclusion of conventional wars. That would be just as folly as our current void in small wars capability. But even the "Iraq is an aberration" crowd has to admit that we are lacking the small wars area and future small wars will happen. Therefore, whether the future brings more small wars or more large wars, we need to be prepared for both, as Merv Benson has pointed out in this thread.

While Barnett and Yingling are both correct, the situation is not as dire as it seems. The Marine Corps is small and adaptable enough to shift its focus to small wars and counterinsurgency and has a storied history in such conflicts, although mostly forgotten until recently. I believe the Marines can take on a greater focus in counterinsurgency without losing too much capability to conduct expeditionary warfare from the sea. In fact, the traditional expeditionary mindset and missions of the Marine Corps lend themselves to a counterinsurgency mission. The Army, meanwhile, can maintain its traditional superiority in conventional land warfare that its size, budget, and technologically-focused mindset are more suited to deal with.

[Tacitus]

I am not advocating a focus on conventional war. I do believe that we will continue to face situations that will require COIN skills, including regime change, humanitarian efforts that go awry, etc. However, I do not think we can focus on COIN skills to the exclusion of our conventional advantage.

Maybe this line of thinking is way off-track, but I can't help but notice that most of what I read falls into one camp or another. If I'm not making sense, my apologies.

I don't disagree with you, Xenophon, or anybody else around here, really. I think perhaps people are talking past each other.

I'm just a little shocked that anybody would be making an argument about treating Iraq as an aberration, whereas China is the REAL threat. China is exporting billions of dollars worth of products a year to us. Why they would perpretrate an act of war against their best customer is a question that perhaps deserves its own thread. What interest would that serve?

If I was pulling a paycheck that required me to plan the structure and training with an eye towards likely foes:
1. The vice president threatened / warned / saber rattled in the direction of Tehran from the deck of an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf last month,
2. The President of Pakistan has somehow survived serveral assassination attempts. Who the hell knows who would take over there and what their intentions are, should Musharraf's luck run out?

Preparations for the invasion of mainland China would fall somewhere down on the bottom of my list of things to do.

Both Iran and Pakistan have some conventional ability, but I bet that could be overcome. How you cope with Pakistan's nuclear capability is the elephant in the room. Occupy either one, however, and you still face a real threat of guerilla warfare.

If I may invoke a sports analogy, as it stands now, we are like a football team with a high octane passing game that can score points in a hurry. We're dealing with an opponent, however, that is playing ball control with a 3 yards and a cloud of dust offense. We can't get the ball back from these guys, and to make matters worse, we seem to have never thought to practice recovering an onsides kick. They are just running out the clock on us, while our great skill position players can't get in the game. We might have some tough road games ahead of us on this schedule, so this is cause for alarm. Unless they are just a bunch of morons (a dangerous assumption to make about any adversary), they are watching this and can be expected to attack this weakness, if their preferred strategy fails.

So what do you do? Figure out how to shore up your deficiencies? Or work to become still more explosive on offense? Every coach I ever played for wanted to deal with an exposed weakness ASAP because your opponents will want to know right away if you have corrected it, or not.

Every platoon sergeant, company and battalion commander I ever served under wanted to identify and correct any deficiencies pronto, as well. It would be tragic if this inclination can not make its way up the chain of command above the men who have to get it done in the field, for whatever bureaucratic or ideological reason. Our brave fighting men deserve an honest assessment and corrective action for any problems in doctrine, equipment or training which reveal themselves...not for them to be assumed out of the enemy's playbook because it complicates training exercises, or whatever reason was offered up after Viet Nam.

I yield the balance of my time to the next "small war Senator" to take the floor.:p

[Granite_State]

I don't disagree with you, Xenophon, or anybody else around here, really. I think perhaps people are talking past each other.

I'm just a little shocked that anybody would be making an argument about treating Iraq as an aberration, whereas China is the REAL threat. China is exporting billions of dollars worth of products a year to us. Why they would perpretrate an act of war against their best customer is a question that perhaps deserves its own thread. What interest would that serve?


Solely that of certain breeds of pundits and foreign policy folks who are trapped in a Cold War mindset. Oh, and a huge chunk of the defense industry. There are hundreds of billions of dollars of weapons, sensors and other technology in the pipeline that are only necessary to deter a "future peer competitor," where China is the only real possibility. F-22, FCS, a new bomber, the list goes on. There are huge vested interests who need to keep the idea of a war with China more plausible than it is. And I'm sure the same thing is true over there.

We should be handling China's rise the way Britain did ours a century ago. The Communists aren't going to be in power forever, regardless of how much they lean on nationalism and prosperity.

[LawVol]

Tacitus: Maybe it was the football analogy, but I'm tracking now.:D I don't disagree with the need to focus on COIN-related skills. In fact, I sincerely believe that my Air Force could play a larger role in this (do not read lethal role). That being said, I just fear that we will let our conventional capabilities deteriorate. To go back to your football analogy, the coach may place an renewed emphasis on defense to get that ball back, but he's not going to neglect that dynamic passing offense.

In our world that passing offense equates to some very expensive technology; stuff that is at times very hard to justify when it isn't being used in the current fight. Some advocate placing those expensive items on the backshelf to pay for Iraq, but don't realize that to have this stuff in 10 or 20 years, we need to spend the money now because research takes time. Maybe we just need a bigger pie rather than arguing over the size of each piece, I don't know.

Anyway, I do have issues with the vision of the next "big war." Given China's interconnectivity with the global economy, I agree that it would be a bad move on their part (win or lose). However, nations do not always act rationally. That being said, I do not see a Chinese equivalent of a Cold War ruch through the Fulda Gap, so I ask: what will it look like if it comes? Will it blend elements of COIN and conventional war so that we'll need to exercise both skill sets simultaneously?

Perhaps your Tehran scenario would equate to this. I don't know much about Iran's military capabilities, but could a fight with them begin as a much tougher version of OIF I while we deal with insurgents at the same time?

[Adrian]

Perhaps your Tehran scenario would equate to this. I don't know much about Iran's military capabilities, but could a fight with them begin as a much tougher version of OIF I while we deal with insurgents at the same time?

Iran's force planning has focused on favorable (to them) assymetries. For instance, anti-ship cruise missiles for which we currently have no real defense (at least, none that I would stake my life on), ballistic missiles for deterrence, maritime mines, quiet diesel submarines, and the Pasdaran sabotage/insurgency units.

Their conventional units are weak. While they have a few thousand tanks, those tanks are spread out across their infantry units and are used more as bureaucratic bargaining chips than as warfighting machines. Likewise for a lot of their other conventional weapons systems. If any conflict between Iran and the US looks like Desert Storm (limited aims, limited war, conventional technology, 4D battlespace, no electronic countermeasures, no sabotage, no occupation), we would probably win pretty handily, provided we could somehow protect our carriers or use only land-based airstrips. This is based on net assessments I've done. However, Iran's strategy will likely be to exploit the assymetries I mentioned above.

Iran has foregone defending territory and instead chosen the route of deterrence and counter-offense - trying to make sure any attack on them would be extremely costly. That's how I see it.

[whsieh]

Tacitus:

Anyway, I do have issues with the vision of the next "big war." Given China's interconnectivity with the global economy, I agree that it would be a bad move on their part (win or lose). However, nations do not always act rationally. That being said, I do not see a Chinese equivalent of a Cold War ruch through the Fulda Gap, so I ask: what will it look like if it comes? Will it blend elements of COIN and conventional war so that we'll need to exercise both skill sets simultaneously?



I'm not a China expert, but my guesstimate is that any conflict with China would combine "conventional" air/sea warfare, with asymmetrical efforts to degrade our advantages in technology--attacking communications and GPS satellites, hacking computers, etc. And even on the more "conventional" side of the ledger, I would assume the PRC will try to use subs and anti-ship cruise missiles to defeat our carrier battle groups.

The only real friction between the US and China is the Taiwan strait, and any potential conflict over that is going to be a straight air and sea fight. Rationally, the fight shouldn't come for any of the three parties involved there, but as you point out, people aren't always rational, but any sort of COIN effort related to China is most certainly out of the cards.

I think it's important to maintain our conventional capabilities, but one natural way to do that is through service specialization--air and information superiority in a technological sense (better communications, electronic warfare, etc.)--is now the keystone of high-end nation state warfare, as opposed to boots on the ground with cultural knowledge you need in COIN. And there's plenty to do on the conventional side, because "asymmetrical" methods go beyond suicide bombs and insurgencies, such as the attacks on communications structure I mentioned before, or even the use of quiet conventionally powered submarines. Let the Air Force and Navy run and maintain the traditional power projection/air superiority part of the game, and the Army and Marine Corps specialize in large part on COIN. There will of course still be a lot of overlap between the two, but we do have different services for a reason in my opinion.


WH

[SteveMetz]

The only real friction between the US and China is the Taiwan strait, and any potential conflict over that is going to be a straight air and sea fight.

I wouldn't go that far. There are potential conflicts in Central Asia, policy toward North Korea and Pakistan, the Chinese role in Africa and the Americas. I think it's accurate to say that the Taiwan issue is the only one that, in the short term, has the potential to turn violent.

By the way, I'm recruiting an Asia security specialists if you know of any who are looking.

[Ken White]

Hmm, I would say that the American style of war dates back to 1917 when the French educated the American officers on modern warfare, including their point of view on firepower and battle plans (wow, some americans will hate me for this!).

. . .

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.
It's also correct in my opinion that mroe small wars will break out with western participation, although I consider that as easily avoidable.

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

So the big war faction is in my opinion correct. Neither counter-insurgency campaigns nor amateurish peacekeeping missions without real mandate like Bosnia are unavoidable.
And in fact it would be quite possible to keep the whole NATO out of conventional conflicts for decades if our people and political elites truly wanted that.
But that won't happen. Wel'll see more peacekeeping about five to ten major wars with NATO country participation till the end of the century and a bit less large counter-insurgency campaigns, the next one at the latest around 2040 when the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.
Well, that's my guess - based on my feeling and on a look into 20th and 19th century history.

In order :

Actually it dates back much further in the History of European involvement in the North American Continent and reached a nadir of sorts during our Civil War which was the gestation point of the education of the French (who did not pay attention), British (who had too many small wars going on to get around to it) and Germans (who did pay attention) in 'modern' warfare. By the time of WW I, everyone was learning from everyone and one thing the Etats Uniens determined to do was to avoid trench stalemates...

That a major war will occur is correct and I agree with your hypothesis with one exception. The small Wars will break out but they won't be easily avoidable because "There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion." while correct, too easily dismisses the stupidity of politicians. So we can, in the end, somewhat agree.

Thus, the US needs to be prepared for total spectrum warfare with a near term emphasis on the low intensity capabilities simply on the basis of probability.

[Presager]

Seems to me that there is the distinct possibility of Pakistan going fundamentalist. We would then have a truly horrendous scenario, which India would also be sucked into. How India would treat a fundamentalist Pakistan I do not know, but the likelihood of war between those two nuclear powers would then greatly increase.

The West could surely not afford to allow the existence of a fundamentalist, basically Al-Qaida inspired nuclear Pakistan. So I envisage a future where the West (even including our foot-dragging German and French brethren) and India wage war against Pakistan. This promises to be a fairly apocalyptic affair. Meanwhile, expect to see a regional Mid-East conflict once the U.S. and Britain have withdrawn their troops from Iraq. Perhaps Council members don't see an imminent (within 18 months at most) withdrawal of the majority of U.S. forces from Iraq as likely. However, that is certainly the majority view here in Britain, where there is certainty that British forces will be withdrawn some time before those 18 months are up, indeed before 12 months are up. As you know, areas of the British sector are being handed over to the Iraqi government, and British troops withdrawn, in an almost covert but nonetheless exponential manner already.

As Reagan once remarked, 'you ain't seen nothing yet.'

[Ken White]

the Islamists doing some significant over reaching and arousing Europe and thus beginning a segue into a minor apocalypse is too possible.

[SteveMetz]

Seems to me that there is the distinct possibility of Pakistan going fundamentalist.

I can't resist the urge to quibble in the name of accuracy. Technically, a "fundamentalist" is someone who believes that their religious script is complete and the unerring word of God. By definition, all Muslims are fundamentalists (but not all Christians are). Personally, I think "extremist" is a more accurate word to describe what we fear Pakistan becoming.

[cjmewett]

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.
It's also correct in my opinion that mroe small wars will break out with western participation, although I consider that as easily avoidable.

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

So the big war faction is in my opinion correct. Neither counter-insurgency campaigns nor amateurish peacekeeping missions without real mandate like Bosnia are unavoidable.
And in fact it would be quite possible to keep the whole NATO out of conventional conflicts for decades if our people and political elites truly wanted that.
But that won't happen. Wel'll see more peacekeeping about five to ten major wars with NATO country participation till the end of the century and a bit less large counter-insurgency campaigns, the next one at the latest around 2040 when the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.
Well, that's my guess - based on my feeling and on a look into 20th and 19th century history.
In order :

Actually it dates back much further in the History of European involvement in the North American Continent and reached a nadir of sorts during our Civil War which was the gestation point of the education of the French (who did not pay attention), British (who had too many small wars going on to get around to it) and Germans (who did pay attention) in 'modern' warfare. By the time of WW I, everyone was learning from everyone and one thing the Etats Uniens determined to do was to avoid trench stalemates...

That a major war will occur is correct and I agree with your hypothesis with one exception. The small Wars will break out but they won't be easily avoidable because "There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion." while correct, too easily dismisses the stupidity of politicians. So we can, in the end, somewhat agree.

Thus, the US needs to be prepared for total spectrum warfare with a near term emphasis on the low intensity capabilities simply on the basis of probability.
I must admit that I'm a bit stunned by your agreement here. Beyond the simple suggestion that "history shows there will always be conventional wars," what reason is there to believe that the United States will be involved in one any time soon? Does it not seem far more likely that, in an age of unquestioned American (conventional) superiority and proliferation of nuclear weapons to several regional powers, great power war is a thing of the past?
It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.Can you give an example of how this might go, or why? Is three years just an arbitrary number?
I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.It's ironic that this sentiment should be expressed in a thread centered around the work of Barnett. One could argue -- and he does, convincingly -- that there is no greater threat to American interests in the modern age than anti-globalist, rejectionist, even nihilist fringe groups sabotaging their countries' attempts to connect to the American-led global political and economic system. While one might contend that such groups and conflicts aren't a direct threat to the lives of American citizens, they are certainly a threat to American prosperity and economic interests. Further, if such groups are successful in their attempts to establish polities that are "off the grid" so to speak, they certainly threaten American security by creating un-governed or under-governed areas from which physical threats to American life can originate (see pre-2001 Afghanistan, modern Iraq, Pakistan's northwest frontier, the horn of Africa, the Colombian interior, etc).

I won't attempt to provide Barnett's entire rationale here, but I think you're expressing an outmoded approach to national interest and sensible foreign/security policy. The idea that better national leadership consists of "avoiding stupid adventures" is certainly correct, but it's worth considering whether your definition of "stupid adventures" is a useful one.

This is, of course, a question of grand strategy above all. But how else can we approach reorganization of the military (and the entire interagency apparatus that supports uniformed forces in postconflict situations) than by trying to understand our national priorities? There's a bigger question than "how do we win the wars that happen?," namely "how do we decide what wars we need to fight?"

I think most people in this community understand and acknowledge that victory in the Long War doesn't simply mean killing a lot of terrorists, but dramatically reshaping the terrain on which current conflicts are being fought. This will continue to be necessary long after the bulk of American troops have left Iraq. It seems to me that America's future wars will largely be a question of asserting control over un- and under-governed territory, supporting the forces of government and establishment, and combating rejectionist insurgencies. These realities won't go away simply because we ignore them, or because someone's definition of political wisdom can be summed up along the lines of "we don't do nation-building."

*I should note here that the quoted passages I've referenced specifically are not Ken White's, and that the way I've formatted this message might be somewhat confusing. By quoting Ken White's reply I meant to show that I disagree with the consensus reached by the two cited posters, though lastdingo's original sentiments are what I've chosen to respond to specifically.

[reed11b]

So how does Russia resurgent (or at least re-aggressive) affect this discussion?:confused:
Reed

[Ken White]

I must admit that I'm a bit stunned by your agreement here...I have no idea who he's talking to in that statement. He ends with this:
*I should note here that the quoted passages I've referenced specifically are not Ken White's, and that the way I've formatted this message might be somewhat confusing. By quoting Ken White's reply I meant to show that I disagree with the consensus reached by the two cited posters, though lastdingo's original sentiments are what I've chosen to respond to specifically.Nor do I understand all I know about this statement of his...:confused:

Apparently his argument was with lastdingo, not me -- but who knows. He was absolutely correct in saying "...the way I've formatted this message might be somewhat confusing." Probably just as well I missed it earlier, who needs me erupting all over the screen... :D

However, to get up to date, on Reed11b's question; beats me -- time will tell... :wry:

[AmericanPride]

Forgive my inexperience, but I would like to know how we can possibly call our current "small wars" small wars at all, given the cost and burdens placed upon the services and the nation politically and economically. The terminology seems misleading and somewhat disingenuous because the type of conflict (conventional or not) does not seem to have any relation whatsoever with the scope of the conflict (which is what the terminology implies). Another poster stated the US needs to continue "dramatically reshaping the terrain" in its small wars. So is Iraq a "small" war? Is/was the Russian campaign in Georgia a "big" war? Seems to me there's an inverse relationship between the type (big/small) of war and the objectives sought? I understand the necessity of expert groups to invent or redefine terms for their own use, but I'm not sure if the terminology is actually useful? Clausewitz talked about a culminating point of victory in big wars -- is there a similar concept in small wars where our objectives become so numerous, complex, and detailed that they become burdensome to waging the war? I'm not yet certain its about the dichotomy of conventional/unconventional war because I do not yet think the distinction is sufficient to actually alter the nature of war itself. I admit my insight in this subject is simple because of my lack of hands-on experience with it, and I'm tempted to continue returning to On War as my war bible, so I'll defer to the experts. I want to believe! :D

[Ken White]

comments may not muddy the water too much...
The terminology seems misleading and somewhat disingenuous because the type of conflict (conventional or not) does not seem to have any relation whatsoever with the scope of the conflict (which is what the terminology implies).While that is true, on balance the net commitment of troops and effort to these wars is relatively small compared to most previous wars -- to include Korea which was mostly conventional but still a small war not requiring a major mobilization.

With respect to:
...given the cost and burdens placed upon the services and the nation politically and economically.Personally, I don't see any great political burden; the economic cost is, while quite large, easily affordable and far less than the commitment of national resources required for such 'big' wars as the Civil War, WWI and WW II. the burden on the services is thus commensurately larger due to the lessened expenditure -- and, of course, the far smaller Armed Forces than those other wars required or had available. When one compares the regrettable but quite small casualty rates with any of those wars (or Korea or Viet Nam for that matter), these are emphatically small wars.

This is also true with respect to the cost, compared to percentage of GDP or other benchmarks, the dollar cost of this war is less than Viet Nam (a mid-size war) and Korea (a small war with medium intrusions in spots).
So is Iraq a "small" war? Is/was the Russian campaign in Georgia a "big" war?Yes to the first; a qualified no to the second.
Clausewitz talked about a culminating point of victory in big wars -- is there a similar concept in small wars where our objectives become so numerous, complex, and detailed that they become burdensome to waging the war?Depends on the type of conflict. Basically, if a COIN effort is involved, there is not going to be a culminating point (In Herr C's day, there could be by killing them all; can't do that today, the BBC gets upset...). If an insurgency is entailed, the best one can achieve is an acceptable outcome. Even if not (see Korea), a limited national objective may mean there is no culminating point.
I'm not yet certain its about the dichotomy of conventional/unconventional war because I do not yet think the distinction is sufficient to actually alter the nature of war itself.It doesn't alter war; it can alter warfare (i.e. the way the war is fought -- and ended).
I admit my insight in this subject is simple because of my lack of hands-on experience with it, and I'm tempted to continue returning to On War as my war bible, so I'll defer to the experts.In inverse order, an Expert is an EX, a has been, and a 'spert' is a drip of water under pressure. There are no experts and opinions are a dime a dozen. Mine are no more worthy than yours, others will have opinions that differ from both ours -- and that ought to be okay; there are no hard and fast answers. All the experience in the world still leaves one with more questions than answers...

All bibles are written by men, translated by other men and read by yet others -- that's three possibilities for error. No one is infallible and again, there are no hard and fast answers and there is absolutely no Grand Guru who is invariably correct.

[BayonetBrant]

So is Iraq a "small" war? Is/was the Russian campaign in Georgia a "big" war?

Yes to the first; a qualified no to the second.

How about "yes" and "not yet", respectively? ;)

[Ken White]

How about "yes" and "not yet", respectively? ;)I keep getting nicked for always saying "...too early to tell." ;)