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Rifleman
07-09-2007, 01:31 PM
The following article is from Carlton Meyer's g2mil site:

http://www.g2mil.com/Fall2007.htm

Let me say up front that I don't agree with most of it; and many other things Meyer writes as well. But what I found intriguing was his assertion that small scale tactical parachute operations - sort of a fireforce type operation, I guess you could say - could be safer and more effective in some cases than landing large helicopters in hot LZs.

As for the whole thing about landing on top of buildings.....well, what's possible for an ODA is one thing, but obviously Meyer has never done a night mass tactical operation before.

jcustis
07-09-2007, 02:43 PM
I can't remember the details of Meyer, but he was a Reserve Marine corps Captain back in the early 90's. It would seem that he didn't learn much at The Basic School, and despite being provocative ideas, they fall short when meeting reality. As a case in point, I love how he says we should break the Rangers down into company-sized elements just so the battalion staff can be removed...Haha, that's the moment when I have to say, "Put that darn test tube pipe down buddy, before you hurt yourself."

Seems he is in league with Mike Sparks. Mentioning his name around these parts could easily get your tongue cut out. :wry:

I wouldn't call his work controversial, but rather...constipated.

Jedburgh
07-09-2007, 02:55 PM
The amount of abject ignorance evident in that short piece is amazing. Meyer is clearly a leg of the worst sort. In any case, as an author he has zero credibility - he is known not just for writing assertively on things of which he has no knowledge, as in the piece linked above, but also for just plain ol' making stuff up to justify his position.

Tom Odom
07-09-2007, 04:48 PM
The amount of abject ignorance evident in that short piece is amazing. Meyer is clearly a leg of the worst sort. In any case, as an author he has zero credibility - he is known not just for writing assertively on things of which he has no knowledge, as in the piece linked above, but also for just plain ol' making stuff up to justify his position.


Suggesting that steerable canopies allow roof toop landings is fantasy island stuff. While a couple of highly skilled ram air pilots can do such landings, they are a far cry from tactical assaults with steerable round canopies. Doing them at night would only add to the carnage. I made my very first night jump as a demonstration jump into a lighted dirt race track with a 40 foot fence and light poles all the way around it. It was small to me even though it was a quarter mile track. My canopy was round but it was far more maneuverable than an MC1-1 steerable. I cannot imagine trying to hit a rooftop, especially under combat conditions.

Tom

sgmgrumpy
07-09-2007, 05:44 PM
I remember seeing a similar article in Infantry Magazine years ago but cannot seem to find it. I think it was titled "US Airborne Forces Obsolete." Or something to that title.

Did find this article though: ARTICLE (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac/milreview/download/English/MayJun01/insights.pdf)


The Airborne Division in 2010
Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., US Army

For almost six decades US Army airborne forces have been key to worldwide US military operations. Usually manned at full strength, well equipped and well trained, flexible and adaptive airborne units have remained in demand even during times of downsizing and reduced funding.

Because of their unique capabilities, airborne troops will remain the centerpiece of the Army’s rapid reaction, strategic-intervention capability.
Nevertheless, advanced technologies and new organizational concepts suggest that the airborne division must evolve to meet the challenges of 2010.

Ski
07-09-2007, 05:55 PM
Ahh! A Mike Sparks comment! Please make it stop, mom! I'll be good! Stop the pain!

Sparks is a mouthbreather of the highest order.

Jedburgh
07-09-2007, 06:02 PM
I remember seeing a similar article in Infantry Magazine years ago but cannot seem to find it. I think it was titled "US Airborne Forces Obsolete." Or something to that title....
Archives for Infantry Magazine from 1982 through the present (with the exception of 2001) are available here (https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/content/past_years.htm) for anyone with an AKO log-in. The archive isn't searchable, and I don't have the time to look through'em all for the article myself.......

Bill Moore
07-09-2007, 06:24 PM
When I read the critiques I initially thought the article couldn't be that bad, but after finishing it there was no doubt that the author is an idiot. When I read his last sentence, "
Today's paratroopers are adrift, and need pathfinders to show them a meaningful role", I was ready to grab this clown by the head and slam by knee into his face a few times, but the moment passed.

He has a warped view of history, we have a better air delivery capability now than we did during WWII, and we can definitely mitigate surface to air threats more effectively. Airborne assualts are generally short in duration, such as the airfield seizures in Grenada, Panama, and Western Iraq, so logistics isn't the huge concern he makes it out to be.

I just loved his comment about making only one Bn per Bde in the 82d ABN qualified, and the remainder Air Assault. First he doesn't understand the alert cycle, and second I would love to see his logistical plan for "rapidly" deploying the helicopters that are going to insert these 2 bns. That is assuming we can find an intermediate staging base within range of the helicopters, or perhaps this idiot thinks all helo's are air refuelable, or that opening a FARP is no major issue in a combat environment. Yes everyone in the 82d jumps because it builds espirit corp, and the guys and gals willing to go that extra step are generally better Soldiers. I'm beginning to think some Airborne Sergeant ran off with this clown's girlfriend, and I'm sure she is better off.

You guys already addressed the building top landings and his reference to the Golden Knights ability to execute precision landings, I about fell out of my chair when he compared the Golden Knights to most of us who are pretty happy just to hit the drop zone. The majority of the Army doesn't have the time to reach that level of airborne proficiency. Also this clown simply ignores the weather issues related to Airborne operations. Yea baby, 24/7 we can drop a platoon of paratroopers anywhere into the mountains of Afghanistan to reinforce anyone in duress regardless of the winds, ceiling, and of course the whole world is a drop zone. I'm sure we won't have 50% casualties on the jump if this great pathfinder leads the way. I would like to take him up on his proposals and actually see him demonstrate how we should do them.

sgmgrumpy
07-09-2007, 06:35 PM
Archives for Infantry Magazine from 1982 through the present (with the exception of 2001) are available here (https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/content/past_years.htm) for anyone with an AKO log-in. The archive isn't searchable, and I don't have the time to look through'em all for the article myself.......

Noooo. Jed, you had to go and drop that on my plate:D

Thank god I don't have to navigate BCKS I might get lost in those forums:rolleyes:

Lastdingo
07-09-2007, 08:31 PM
Oh guys, why do you beat Meyer so much? Did he assault anyone of you? Let's stick to the text itself, please. Neither biography nor person are interesting, just the idea itself. A man should be rated for his ideas, not his ideas be rated for the man. (I hope I got that translated to something that'll be understood...)

I disagree on the accuracy problem as mentioned by Tom Odom. It's at least not that large.
Technical equipment with GPS navigation is able to land a bomb as accurate as is demanded in the paper for parachutists.
Similar technology has proven 100 ft CEPs many years ago.
So unless somebody is really involved in those developments and can tell us about the accuracy achieved at present and about the one expected for the near future, we should not rule out the possibility of precision landings.

But that's a minor point of the article anyway.

I agree with him that a division-sized air assault is unlikely, and a brigade-sized air assault in unsecured terrain is unlikely as well for the next couple of years.
This has some relevant implications, as for example no specialist airborne artillery is necessary - heavier standard equipment instead of white elephants like M777 could be used for the more conventional ground combat missions.

Tom Odom
07-09-2007, 08:45 PM
I disagree on the accuracy problem as mentioned by Tom Odom. It's at least not that large.
Technical equipment with GPS navigation is able to land a bomb as accurate as is demanded in the paper for parachutists.
Similar technology has proven 100 ft CEPs many years ago.
So unless somebody is really involved in those developments and can tell us about the accuracy achieved at present and about the one expected for the near future, we should not rule out the possibility of precision landings.

Lastdingo,

Unless you have actually jumped from an aircraft using current US military technology, what you offer is at best uniformed opinion.

My last jump was in 97 using state of the art parachutes for the sky diving industry. I work with a unit that is on jump status.

As for GPS delivery, the article was not about GPS. It was about use of steerable canopies that use technology from the 1960s. My office mate has tested GPS delivery systems and they do work. That is fine for cargo delivery on a fairly open DZ.

It is however an entirely different matter when it comes to hitting a target as small as a rooftop while accounting for wind direction and strength, cloud cover, and visibility.

All of this so far is regards to a single parachutist; when you add more the issues grow exponentially. It was for that reason that the 82d largely stopped using steerable canopies in the late 70s (at least for a while). When you have 500 troops in the air, steerable canopiies create as many problems as they solve.

Tom

jcustis
07-09-2007, 08:45 PM
Lastdingo, I mean no slight here, but if I said I had an idea that I could build a manned spaceship that would carry me to Mars, you'd call me an idiot right?

Same thing with Meyers...It's just that Meyers and Sparks have had delusions for over ten years now. Don't get me wrong, he can write, as evidenced by his published articles in Proceedings and the MCG. I think it's easy to get published when you're trying to be provocative...it doesn't mean your thesis holds any water.

As for the CEP issue, I'll share with you that several parachute supply drops were made to my task force by the high-altitude steerable delivery system. It did not have a CEP of 100ft., and certainly couldn't deliver the accuracy to put a man on a rooftop. Is it technically feasible in the future? Sure, why not, but why the hell would you want to land on a rooftop with all of your force, cut off from the ground. Top-down MOUT entries are not doctrine anymore. I think the 3/5 AAR sealed that up.

For those who have suffered through reading his rants, I think we are happy that Meyer and Sparks have a limited sphere within which they can sell stupid. It's nothing against Rifleman for posting the link, but in my case, it just reminded me of what fingernails on chalkboard sound like.

Meyer is more than welcome to come to the Council and join me in a discussion to prove to me otherwise.

Lastdingo
07-09-2007, 09:08 PM
There are several points that one can disagree with in the article.
But what astonishes me is that here and in another forum a couple of days ago the people focused so much on the rooftop landing stuff and largely ignored the assertion that division-sized air assaults are quite illusionary.

I mean that this assertion is more worth a debate and that such a debate would be much more interesting.

TTPs need to be sorted out in exercises and not in forum discussions anway.

Jedburgh
07-09-2007, 09:23 PM
Oh guys, why do you beat Meyer so much? Did he assault anyone of you? Let's stick to the text itself, please. Neither biography nor person are interesting, just the idea itself. A man should be rated for his ideas, not his ideas be rated for the man....
No one on here has been bashing Meyer for the type of person he is - he is being slammed for what you just said - for the content of the article, and clear trends in previous work that demonstrate his utter lack of credibility, if not integrity.

As regards your other statement, achieving accuracy with GPS-guided bombs does not even approach being comparable to achieving accuracy with a small team on a combat jump. False analogy. As others have brought up, current JPADS capabilities with cargo drops are a better comparison.

In any case, there is much in the article at the top of the thread that open to derision besides the matter of accurate landings.

FM 3-05.211 Special Forces Military Free-Fall Operations (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-211.pdf), dated 6 April 2005

jcustis
07-09-2007, 09:28 PM
But what astonishes me is that here and in another forum a couple of days ago the people focused so much on the rooftop landing stuff and largely ignored the assertion that division-sized air assaults are quite illusionary.

Touche. Let's discuss that then. The Brts recently scaled back their parachute training regimen, and on another board it was discussed at length pro and con. I'll concede that the conditions have to be just about perfect for a large scale assault, across a wide specturm of threat environment, mission, logistics, etc., but it is still one of the quickest ways to put a lot of firepower on the ground in a short period of time.

slapout9
07-09-2007, 11:06 PM
Tom,I spent 3 years in the 82nd and You where their for awhile and not once did we ever practice a PLF(parachute landing fall for you straight legs) on roof tops. Did you ever do that Tom??? Did ever even hear anybody even suggest such a thing?? There was an expression I saw on hear once about Crack Smoking Stupid ......seems to have a lot in common with the article.

Tom Odom
07-09-2007, 11:06 PM
But what astonishes me is that here and in another forum a couple of days ago the people focused so much on the rooftop landing stuff and largely ignored the assertion that division-sized air assaults are quite illusionary.

That would be division-size airborne operations and the article really goes beyond that by stating that a single battalion would be needed in a brigade with the remaining battalions as "air assault", a term which implies helicopter assault. Division level airborne operations may be a thing of the past; the capability of mounting them is quite a card to hold, especially when it comes to remote areas and the need to put lots of troops on the ground in a short time, especially when airfields are limited.

Tom

RTK
07-09-2007, 11:15 PM
largely ignored the assertion that division-sized air assaults are quite illusionary.

I mean that this assertion is more worth a debate and that such a debate would be much more interesting.



Air Assaults/Airmobile operations and Airborne operations are not the same. Let's try to use the correct terminology. It's like saying a Abrams and Bradley are alike because they both have tracks. What we're talking about is Airborne operations.

Have you ever heard of DRB status? A DRB is the equivalent of the fire brigade. THey're deployable anywhere in the world within hours of notification. I'm not sure Meyer's proposal, but unless he's going to screw over a brigade's worth of people for 3 years at a time, the Army isn't going to can the contingency valve.

The problem is that people like Meyer forget that once Iraq is through we have a very real possibility of becoming involved in a high-intensity conflict scenario again. All things being equal, since we scaled down to the 10 division concept we haven't left ourselves a whole lot of margin for error. Airborne operations are excellent for massing conventional firepower behind the FLOT/FEBA and disrupting logistical lines of communication. Having that option alone may require a potential adversary to hold more in reserve than orginally factored in.

As for Meyer's track record, just thumb through his other idiotorials. He's had an axe to grind against the Army for a long time. Few, if any, of his posts have anything good to say about the Army. Keep this in mind - Meyer is the same tool who said that the CIA has done better at unconventional operations than SOCOM and therefore SOCOM should be eliminated. They should revoke his internet access....

RTK
07-09-2007, 11:17 PM
That would be division-size airborne operations and the article really goes beyond that by stating that a single battalion would be needed in a brigade with the remaining battalions as "air assault", a term which implies helicopter assault. Division level airborne operations may be a thing of the past; the capability of mounting them is quite a card to hold, especially when it comes to remote areas and the need to put lots of troops on the ground in a short time, especially when airfields are limited.

Tom

It took me too long to post. Glad to know I'm thinking on the same wavelength as Tom Odom.... :D

Bill Moore
07-10-2007, 12:32 AM
In most cases I would agree with your comment that we should address the ideas, not the person writing them, but after the author wrote the paratroopers are lost and they need a pathfinder to lead them I lost all respect for the author and his poorly researched article. The bottom line is the guy projected himself as an expert in a field he obviously knows very little about. If he wrote it as a series of questions, or even offered up it would be nice to develop an all weather, pin point accuracy, troop air drop capability I could accept it. Then we could discuss the merits of his thoughts, but that wasn't the tone of the article.

I'll address your question, since it was relevant. Why do we need an airborne division? We don't have an ABN Div so we can do division size Airborne Assaults, but to facilitate having one Brigade (BDE) on alert at all times. The other two are in various stages of training or taking leave. A 3-1 ratio allows a good training program and allows the Soldiers to take a needed rest, because you can't stay in the short notice mode month after month, year after year. One doesn't equal one, it takes three to equal one.

Having that capability in one division allows the Army to save considerable money, since most of the Airborne specific training required is centralized. You don't have to recreate DZs, Airborne training apparatus, training areas unique to airborne, etc. The bottom line (at least before GWOT) is that one Airborne Division allows us to have one Abn Bde combat ready. Within the Bde that is on alert the Bns are on different status, so one can get out very quickly and the others shortly behind it, whether they jump in, or land on a secure airfield.

Dropping a Bn behind enemy lines, especially with our technological capabilities today, is one hell of a capability. In many situations Airborne Assault or Airborne infiltration is the only viable option. Consider a crisis in central Africa somewhere that is too far inland for the Marines to get to (assuming they're in the area), we can relatively quickly dispatch a Bn or more of paratroopers to create a safe zone, or conduct combat operations. There are a number of other uses for Airborne units also, but I think I made my point.

I would like to see more effort developed towards modernizing the air drop capability, but we do not have a capability to replace it at this time, so it is definitely needed.

jcustis
07-10-2007, 01:11 AM
I'll also offer up what I picked up from a Corporal in the 3d Royal Australian Regiment just a week ago while participating in Exercise Talisman Saber 07. His company performed a twilight jump of 60+ troops into a DZ opposed by LAR Marines I was OCing for. We crossed paths at the end of ex and he stated that the jump would have been larger, but the remainder of his already understrength company (roughly 50 folks) were either injured from previous training or transferring.

Morale of the story is that a Golden Knight can do many things, but once loaded down with a fighting load, pack, weapon, and reserve chute, the physics of a controlled fall from the sky change drastically.

Rifleman
07-10-2007, 02:58 AM
But what astonishes me is that here and in another forum a couple of days ago the people focused so much on the rooftop landing stuff and largely ignored the assertion that division-sized air assaults are quite illusionary.

I mean that this assertion is more worth a debate and that such a debate would be much more interesting.

Lastdingo,

That may be true but remember that the U.S. dropped six infantry battalions, plus support, - three ranger battalions and a brigade combat team from the 82nd Airborne Division - in the Panama operation.

That the Panama operation might have been successful without a large airborne operation is irrelevant, I think. A large night mass tactical drop was the best way for a rapid buildup of combat power.

I didn't agree with about 90% of Meyer's article. The one part I did find interesting was his idea of small scale tactical airborne operations - something akin to fireforce operations, if you will. Most of the world isn't Rhodesia, so it won't be feasible in many areas. But then again it might in some. And rough terrain jump gear, unlike rooftop landings, is probably not beyond the capability of a basic parachutist.

Lastdingo
07-10-2007, 04:54 AM
OK, I buy it that the diversion effect of large-scale airborne capabilities is useful in conventional war. The enemy needs to keep reserves far to the rear.
That's not exactly what you want him t do when you intend to do some old school maneuver warfare, but in other cases it's desirable.

The other point that many seem to raise is the deployability by air and the virtue of having a brigade ready for immediate deployment to everywhere.

Well, that's not a requirement that only an airborne (sorry about mixing the terminology, wouldn't have happened in my native language) can fulfill. 101st and 10th should be able to do that as well. It was even quite what was proposed in the Stryker brigade concept.
Anyway, 82nd is still ill-prepared forf that role as far as I know for it lacks foreign language negotiation capabilities and heavy weapons for both irregular as well as regular warfare missions immediately after deployment.
Operations in english or spanisch speaking countries with ill-equipped/ill-trained opponents are within its abilities (basically carribbean adventures).
Again, as far as I know.

Well, my own feeling about airborne forces is that they should prepare for airborne operations of battalion to slightly smaller than brigade sizes. They should not have heavy weapons like M777 in such actions as air support should be assured if you were able to use transport planes in the first place. Quick reinforcement with heavy or air deployable units should always be assured.

The other orientation that I'd propose is being especially proficient in forest and urban combat. They could be added as motorized units to heavy divisions which certainly lack infantry component in several possible terrain types.

Finally, they could be used as air-deployable forces (as well as other forces should be air-deployable to a really high degree, up to two divisions overall in the case of the USA, imho). In that case, they can make good use of an air-deployable but not airborne support element. Artillery like truck-mounted Caesar, for example (not HIMARS because of its logistical inefficiency). This would be the classical tripwire and ally reassurance mission, or without much fire support a very quick reaction force for cases like Rwanda genocide.

jcustis
07-10-2007, 05:14 AM
The other orientation that I'd propose is being especially proficient in forest and urban combat. They could be added as motorized units to heavy divisions which certainly lack infantry component in several possible terrain types.

Do you realize that when the 1st Marine Division went back into Iraq in 2004, that it relieved the 82nd AB in Al Anbar, where they had been operating for some time without parachutes?

Lastdingo
07-10-2007, 05:25 AM
Do you realize that when the 1st Marine Division went back into Iraq in 2004, that it relieved the 82nd AB in Al Anbar, where they had been operating for some time without parachutes?

I know that 82nd was used several times in the Iraq occupation as normal infantry division, but fail to understand why you mention that.

RTK
07-10-2007, 12:32 PM
OK, I buy it that the diversion effect of large-scale airborne capabilities is useful in conventional war. The enemy needs to keep reserves far to the rear.
That's not exactly what you want him t do when you intend to do some old school maneuver warfare, but in other cases it's desirable.

If I plan within the enemy's capability without him afforded an airborne option, then I can more easily mass forces where I expect him to operate. Airborne operations can take place anywhere, even thick jungle. My operational and intelligence estimates are then out the window.


Well, that's not a requirement that only an airborne (sorry about mixing the terminology, wouldn't have happened in my native language) can fulfill. 101st and 10th should be able to do that as well. It was even quite what was proposed in the Stryker brigade concept.

How do you think Strykers get where they need to be? They need a secure airfield. One of the METL missions for both the 82nd and 75 Ranger Regiment is airfield seizure. It gives us the inherent ability to use any airfield out there for our own logistical resupply.


Anyway, 82nd is still ill-prepared forf that role as far as I know for it lacks foreign language negotiation capabilities and heavy weapons for both irregular as well as regular warfare missions immediately after deployment.
Operations in english or spanisch speaking countries with ill-equipped/ill-trained opponents are within its abilities (basically carribbean adventures).
Again, as far as I know.

Look, I'm not going to give you lessons in economics. Please extend me the same courtesy in my trade. You don't need to know the operational limitations or strengths of our Divisions. They're perfectly capable. Thanks for your concern.


Well, my own feeling about airborne forces is that they should prepare for airborne operations of battalion to slightly smaller than brigade sizes. They should not have heavy weapons like M777 in such actions as air support should be assured if you were able to use transport planes in the first place. Quick reinforcement with heavy or air deployable units should always be assured.

Speaking as someone who's commanded in combat, I'm skeptical of those who wish to handcuff a ground commander by taking away his indirect fire support. Especially someone who doesn't have to do my job. Your last name isn't Kennedy, is it?


The other orientation that I'd propose is being especially proficient in forest and urban combat. They could be added as motorized units to heavy divisions which certainly lack infantry component in several possible terrain types.

We've got people that do this. No one who has worked with the 82nd will question their abilities in urban combat.


Finally, they could be used as air-deployable forces (as well as other forces should be air-deployable to a really high degree, up to two divisions overall in the case of the USA, imho). In that case, they can make good use of an air-deployable but not airborne support element. Artillery like truck-mounted Caesar, for example (not HIMARS because of its logistical inefficiency). This would be the classical tripwire and ally reassurance mission, or without much fire support a very quick reaction force for cases like Rwanda genocide.


How is the Caesar going to be more efficent logistically than the HIMARS? The HIMARS is on a common chassis to other vehicles in the Army inventory. The Caesar is not. I doubt the artillery community would want the Caesar if the rounds were different, so the logistical footprint for the Caesar would be about the same as it would for the HIMARS. I'm not sure where you figured this one out.

Lastdingo
07-10-2007, 09:59 PM
"How do you think Strykers get where they need to be? They need a secure airfield. One of the METL missions for both the 82nd and 75 Ranger Regiment is airfield seizure. It gives us the inherent ability to use any airfield out there for our own logistical resupply."

An airfield secured by a battalion or brigade is no logistical hub in conventional war as it's easily in range of artillery. There's no way how paratroopers could control a 80+ km diameter circle around the airfield.
If otherwise the threat isn't that bad, it doesn't need a whole division at all, a couple of companies could seize an airfield until air-deployable reinforcements arrive. The lack of a need for large airborne unit deployment was part of the topic here.

"How is the Caesar going to be more efficent logistically than the HIMARS? The HIMARS is on a common chassis to other vehicles in the Army inventory. The Caesar is not. I doubt the artillery community would want the Caesar if the rounds were different, so the logistical footprint for the Caesar would be about the same as it would for the HIMARS. I'm not sure where you figured this one out."

Rocket artillery is generally less efficient in logistical terms than guns of comparable sophistication. The physics of the propellant are inherently less efficient concerning volume and weight. 155mm munition + propellant provides more firepower per ton than MLRS sixpacks do.
The responsiveness to different missions (different munitions) is also better, and accuracy is better for unguided munitions. Minimum range is smaller.
I meant this for the 30 km range, without BB or RAP.
By the way, Caesar uses standard NATO 155mm calibre, compatible to M777.
Finally, I mentioned Caesar as an example. It's a quite simple job of a couple of weeks to adapt the system to another 6x6 truck.

"Speaking as someone who's commanded in combat, I'm skeptical of those who wish to handcuff a ground commander by taking away his indirect fire support."

Well, there are still mortars. A larger quantity of incomparably lighter 120mm mortars is less prone to be the victim of Murphy's law in airborne operations than few heavy guns that don't outrange enemy artillery anyway, are as unable to shoot & scoot as the mortars and generally less responsive to battalion's needs than organic mortars (especially in disorderly operations such as airborne operations were in history).
I've seen the M777. It's a stupid design for a division that would in case of an airborne operation need 360° coverage. Even old D-30's and gun models of the mid to late 40's are better in that regard.


It's interesting to see this repeating pattern everywhere. Uniformed personnel of armies that hadn't to fight first-grade enemies for decades tend to be really confident in their army's capabilities and proficiency (even when it's failing in the meantime and despite in a clash between two first-grade armies there can only be one superior).
The French general in charge of an infantry division at Sedan in may 1940 was very confident in his troops and dismissed the remarks of a shocked congressman as layman's incompetence, for example. Just a few days later his division was routed by an attack that didn't involve much more than air attacks and a regiment crossing the river with force.
Such stories are available on a scale that cannot be considered as anecdotical anymore.
Being inside is no guarantee for always knowing better. It only offers a better information base.

Heck, I've even encountered Swiss soldiers that thought their army was up to date and combat experienced just because of some peacekeepers somewhere.

RTK
07-10-2007, 10:43 PM
An airfield secured by a battalion or brigade is no logistical hub in conventional war as it's easily in range of artillery. There's no way how paratroopers could control a 80+ km diameter circle around the airfield.
If otherwise the threat isn't that bad, it doesn't need a whole division at all, a couple of companies could seize an airfield until air-deployable reinforcements arrive. The lack of a need for large airborne unit deployment was part of the topic here.


It's called a foothold. It's a basic principle of warfare. And why would they have to secure 80km? We don't need runways that long. Fundamentals of reconnaissance and security in addition to engagement area development would never necessitate something like that. Again, if this is one of the large sticking points, revist the two or three posts about maintaining a readily deployable Brigade sized element 24/7/365 over a period of years. This argument is pointless. It's much the same as saying the Marines don't need a capability for beachhead operations anymore.



It's a quite simple job of a couple of weeks to adapt the system to another 6x6 truck.

With the politics involved in aquisitions I'm fully confident the Army could drag that process out at least a year or two.


Well, there are still mortars. A larger quantity of incomparably lighter 120mm mortars is less prone to be the victim of Murphy's law in airborne operations than few heavy guns that don't outrange enemy artillery anyway, are as unable to shoot & scoot as the mortars and generally less responsive to battalion's needs than organic mortars (especially in disorderly operations such as airborne operations were in history).

A 120mm mortar system is exactly easy to breakdown in the dismounted mode. Remember that the artillery pieces in the Airborne aren't dragged around the battlefield by 15 soldiers hooked up to it like pack mules. And you're restricted by the amount of round you carry around. I'm not going to build my indirect fire plan around that for a prolonged period.


I've seen the M777. It's a stupid design for a division that would in case of an airborne operation need 360° coverage. Even old D-30's and gun models of the mid to late 40's are better in that regard.

I'd agree, if we were dumb enough to point them all the same direction. Have you ever seen a well trained light artillery battery shoot gunnery?


It's interesting to see this repeating pattern everywhere. Uniformed personnel of armies that hadn't to fight first-grade enemies for decades tend to be really confident in their army's capabilities and proficiency (even when it's failing in the meantime and despite in a clash between two first-grade armies there can only be one superior).

No different than the pattern of armchair quarterbacks with no operational experience. Plus I've seen how we do at Bright Star, Fowl Eagle, and any number of multi-national exercises against a bunch of armies that still fight with white light in the dark. If the insinuation is that we lost our ability to fight the high intensity conflict, I'd invite you to NTC any given week. Or see one of our many tank ranges here at Fort Knox.

slapout9
07-10-2007, 11:27 PM
Lastdingo,During the period that I was in 72-75 we practiced many of the operations that you say can not be done as a matter of routine procedure. The establishment of an "Airhead" or Foothold as RTK said is Airborne Warfare 101. For all 3 years we had a Combined Arms Exercise called the "Exotic Dancer" series where the 82nd would jump about 20 miles inland and the Marines would land at Onslow Beach and we would link up to establish what is known as a "Salient" (secured and defended area)to allow for heavy follow on forces.
We jumped with our own DIVARTY 105mm and we also had what was known as TAC air support assigned to us. At that time we also had a light Armor capability. Plus and this was where I met a lot of Marines who had what they used to call ANGLICO's or something like that, they were ARTY forward observers for Naval gunfire....big gun fire. 18th Airborne Corps also has big guns 155mm. Defending an airfield would not be a problem for an Airborne Brigade. That was just one of our bread and butter type jobs. I was also what was called fully climatized meaning my unit the 2/504 had been trained in Cold weather Ops, Desert Ops,and Jungle Ops.

Lastdingo
07-10-2007, 11:51 PM
The problem in defending an airhead such that an air force would dare to send lots of transport aircraft to land on that airfield is the artillery threat.

I don't know why exactly you trained that, but certainly not for conventional warfare with medium to high force densities.
Aircraft are extremely vulnerable on ground and the mere possibility that an enemy shoots a rocet salvo over 50km distance that scatters ICM on the whole airfield would let the air force generals veto such a plan.

It's possible against lesser enemies, btu even then you need to assume that this enemy is incapable to hold the airfield or at least an area nearby. You basically assume that the enemy fails to do his job. That's overly optimistic against competent enemies.

Well, you could of course just attack practically defenseless countries and end up with COIN warfare.

By the way, artillery range was much lower in the 70's, effective artillery range of mainstay guns has almost doubled in the meantime and longer-range tactical missiles are no longer exotic equipment.

There's no way how shoot & scoot missile artillery can be suppressed - even in fancy RMA scenarios in desert areas you end up with the capability to destroy them AFTER they shot their salvo, compromising their identity as MRL and not standard logistical or civilian trucks.

I'm waiting for an air force guy to describe what AF officers would think about sending C-130 or C-17 onto an airfield that's periodically hit by ICM.
They could for example say that dud removal from the runway alone would require minutes after each single incoming rocket - if several several specialist mineclearing vehicles were flown in early and not lost to air defense or artillery.

jcustis
07-11-2007, 12:09 AM
The problem in defending an airhead such that an air force would dare to send lots of transport aircraft to land on that airfield is the artillery threat.

I don't know why exactly you trained that, but certainly not for conventional warfare with medium to high force densities.
Aircraft are extremely vulnerable on ground and the mere possibility that an enemy shoots a rocet salvo over 50km distance that scatters ICM on the whole airfield would let the air force generals veto such a plan.

It's possible against lesser enemies, btu even then you need to assume that this enemy is incapable to hold the airfield or at least an area nearby. You basically assume that the enemy fails to do his job. That's overly optimistic against competent enemies.

Well, you could of course just attack practically defenseless countries and end up with COIN warfare.

By the way, artillery range was much lower in the 70's, effective artillery range of mainstay guns has almost doubled in the meantime and longer-range tactical missiles are no longer exotic equipment.

There's no way how shoot & scoot missile artillery can be suppressed - even in fancy RMA scenarios in desert areas you end up with the capability to destroy them AFTER they shot their salvo, compromising their identity as MRL and not standard logistical or civilian trucks.

I'm waiting for an air force guy to describe what AF officers would think about sending C-130 or C-17 onto an airfield that's periodically hit by ICM.
They could for example say that dud removal from the runway alone would require minutes after each single incoming rocket - if several several specialist mineclearing vehicles were flown in early and not lost to air defense or artillery.


LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

RTK
07-11-2007, 12:34 AM
LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree to say it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than would an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

J,

You got the fight. I'm breaking contact and bypassing.

Lastdingo
07-11-2007, 12:39 AM
LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree to say it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than would an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

OK, one after another.

- Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Algeria, North Korea, Colombia, Venezuela, Brasilia, Chile, Peru, Mexico. Just to name a few. It doesn't take more than standard artillery and motivated men.

- The South African Valkiri is a MRL that cannot be recognized as MRL in travel mode. Towed versions of BM-21 MRL could easily be camouflaged as normal trailer. The military components of a BM-21 can be removed and put onto a civilian truck in a backyard repair shop. It's easy to cover that launcher.
Long-range MRL can be scattered over such a large area and still reach out to the airfield that securing the Iraqi borders is easy in comparison to finding such a vehicle.
It's also not that difficult to aim with a MRL. All you need is your position and the airfield position on a 1:50,000 map plus a meteological rocket shot into the air and observed with optics as well as a bit meteorological information that helps you guess the wind between the MRL and the airfield in the relevant altitudes. That's no high-tech, it's barely Korean War level tech.

The U.S. military knew that Iraq had no functioning Scuds left in 2003. The whole rocket fuel issue prevented that. The fuel degrades within weeks, and they had no supply for years. Besides that the U.N. had found almost all examples and documented their destruction.

- ICM dud neutralization is not difficult once they're spotted, but that's something different if stones from nearby explosions are scattered over the runway as well and if you want to clear a runway of almost a km length and 30+ m width within less than the couple of minutes as I mentioned. Artillery ICM is also usually much smaller than bomb submunitions are.
And even if you simply shot the dud with a .50cal, you would likely still be required to clear the runway of sharp metal fragments. One such fragment is no problem, dozens on every take-off or landing are a problem.


The whole idea that C-17 alike aircraft would land on an airfield that's only secured with a safety distance of a couple of miles is simply unrealistic. That's good for very nice propaganda pictures when congress needs to be convinced to pay for the C-17, but no air force in the world would do that, not even the Russians.

Lastdingo
07-11-2007, 02:16 AM
80 km = 40 km to left and 40 km to the right, enough safety distance to most enemy artillery. That's where 80 km diameter comes from. Of course nobody needs 80km runway. But just securing an airfield to use it while under artillery fire is BS.

M777/LW155 batteries (why batteries in the first place with modern tech?) set up facing in different directions. The gun has a traverse of +/-400 mils, 360° is for Americans 640 mils, so you'd need 8 batteries (guns) to cover all 360°, probably 7 if some range is wasted and emplacement optimized for traverse coverage.
Anything beyond that +/-400mils traverse requires to move the spade out of the ground (never gets stuck, of course!), turn with manpower, ram it again into the ground and fire. Requirement for that was 2-3 minutes. For an action that some other towed gun designs do in 10-20 seconds since about sixty years.

[/quote]And I thought MRL systems were Korean War-simple, yet you make them out to be inefficient as it suits you:


The responsiveness to different missions (different munitions) is also better, and accuracy is better for unguided munitions. Minimum range is smaller. I meant this for the 30 km range, without BB or RAP.
Are you reading all of this out of your copy of Jane's, or a Tom Clancy novel?[/quote]

I don't read Clancy, and I don't need Jane's A&A for such fundamentals.
Artillery aiming is relatively simple in comparison to much of today's other military activities, unobserved indirect artillery fire is more than 100 years old. A target like a long runway can easily be hit and even more easily be threatened.
Yet at the same time rocket artillery cannot as quickly respond to different missions as howitzers and mortars, as you cannot simply in a couple of seconds unload the DPICM rockets to load WP and switch to HE for some cratering or else. A military professional should not doubt such facts.
But maybe you can actually prove that anything in above quote (well, my part of the quote) was wrong instead of resorting to polemic?

Well, anyway. Why should I care. As long as it's not my people I shouldn't care if other armies try missions like seizing an airhead and using it with 250 million $ airplanes loaded with dozens of soldiers while under artillery fire.

Airfield operation under artillery fire has been done before. It eliminated much of the Luftwaffe's transport aircraft inventory in winter 1942/1943 near Stalingrad.
Of course, no enemy that the USA will attack in the next years will be as sophisticated as the Red Army in 1942/43...operating rocket artillery is too challenging... the enemies are too dumb... Murphy's Law doesn't exist... no one would emplace mines below the runway to blow it up in time... U.S. presidents have the guts to send thousands of relatively lightly armed troops behind enemy lines... no one would simply build some concrete obstacles on the runway or blow it up in advance as the own air force cannot use it anyway... no one would pre-register artillery or even mortars on possible infiltration points...howitzers have a longer minimum firing distance than a MRL...MRL unguided rockets have less dispersion than howitzer rounds...HIMARS is fine for obscuration missions...whatever. I learned a lto today. :rolleyes:


I'll tell you something. All I'd need to make any airfield useless and unacceptable for forced entry missions is to cover parts of it with garbage. Ah, and I'd set up some snipers with IR sights and passive IR movement sensors to cover it.
The uncertainty if the runway could be made usable in time and if it's even left or already blown up would make the whole airfield useless for the planners.

Sorry for double posts, the forum first showed me page 3 as last page and I bet one post of double length wouldn't be an easier read.

jcustis
07-11-2007, 02:23 AM
I'll tell you something. All I'd need to make any airfield useless and unacceptable for forced entry missions is to cover parts of it with garbage. Ah, and I'd set up some snipers with IR sights and passive IR movement sensors to cover it.
The uncertainty if the runway could be made usable in time and if it's even left or already blown up would make the whole airfield useless for the planners.

By all means Napoleon, have at it. You win! You sunk my battleship!?!:wry: Maybe I'll trump your sniper with my AC-130 Spectre? Oh wait, I forgot that those snipers will be wearing their invisibility cloaks...no...aw crap, that's the Harry Potter stuff...

Gotta remember to take my eldest to the midnight freakshow at Borders so she can pick up her copy.

Lastdingo
07-11-2007, 02:29 AM
OK, then we quit both. This is not going to convince anyone anyway.

The article wasn't great and no better than an ordinary forum post somewhere in the vast internet and it's not worth to argue like this about details.

RTK
07-11-2007, 04:08 AM
Check it out. For guys like me and JCustis, this isn't our hobby.

This is our job.

Let go of our ears. We know what we're doing.

Rifleman
07-11-2007, 08:51 AM
I never meant for this to turn into a flame war. I just thought it was basically a goofy little article, poorly thought out and articulated, with only one (to me) interesting point: greater possible use of small scale tactical parachute operations.

People were sounding the death knell of the Airborne way before I graduated jump school in 1984. Yet, just post Vietnam we've seen Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, northern Iraq, and one operation called off in Haiti where the invasion force had already gone "wheels up." Now throw in numerous small operations in Africa conducted by the French, Belgians, Rhodesians, and South Africans. Mass tactical airborne operations are far from "no longer relevant."

Let's Go, Falcons!

slapout9
07-11-2007, 12:02 PM
Rifleman, you forgot the Yom Kippor war in Israel where the USSR threatened to send in troops to support Egypt. I was 1 hour away from boarding the aircraft to go to the ME. When the USSR found this out they backed down. It was largest 82nd alert outside of the 1962 missile crisis at the time. This all happened during the backround of the first Arab oil embargos. They were interesting times to say the least.

Jedburgh
07-11-2007, 01:52 PM
General Orders No. 10
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 25 September 2006

UNITS CREDITED WITH ASSAULT LANDINGS (http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/go0610.pdf)

I—GENERAL.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 600-8-22, paragraph 7-25, the units listed in section II below were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater operations as having participated in a parachute (to include free fall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.

2. When entering individual credit on the Enlisted Record Brief or Officer Record Brief, this general orders may be cited as authority for such entries for Soldiers who were present for duty as a member of or attached to a unit listed herein and actually participated in a combat parachute jump, free fall combat jump, helicopter assault landing, combat glider landing, or amphibious assault landing at the place and time during the period indicated. A Soldier must actually exit the aircraft or landing craft to receive assault landing credit.

3. Under the provisions of AR 600-8-22, paragraph 7-25, the designation of a combat assault landing is determined and approved by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations. Eligibility of individuals to wear the bronze arrowhead on the designated campaign medal (Global War On Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Iraqi Campaign Medal, or Afghanistan Campaign Medal) is established by this approval. This approval also authorizes eligible Soldiers to affix a bronze service star to their Parachute Badge or the Military Free Fall Parachute Badge, denoting completion of a combat parachute jump or combat free fall jump.

II—LIST. The following units were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations as having participated in a parachute (to include freefall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.

....

b. Helmand Desert, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1845Z-0014Z hours, 19 October 2001 to 20 October 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C, Detachment

c. In the vicinity of Alimarden Kan-E-Bagat, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1800Z-2334Z hours, inclusive, 13 November 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

d. Near Chahar Borjak, Nimruz Province, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1345Z-1445Z hours, inclusive, 25 February 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company C, Detachment
504th Infantry, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

.....

w. Bashur Drop Zone in Northern Iraq (Parachute), 1700Z to 1737Z hours, inclusive, 26 March 2003.

1st Special Forces, 10th Special Forces Group, 2d Special Forces Battalion, Detachment
74th Infantry, Detachment
173d Airborne Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
173d Support Company
250th Medical Detachment
319th Field Artillery, Battery D
501st Support Company
503d Infantry, 2d Battalion
508th Infantry, 1st Battalion
4th Air Support Operations Squadron (United States Air Force)
86th Contingency Response Group (United States Air Force)

x. Northwestern Desert region of Iraq, in the vicinity of the town of Al Qaim, near the Syrian border (Parachute), 1830Z to 2230Z hours, inclusive, 24 March 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

y. At H1 airfield in western Iraq, west of the Haditha Dam and the town of Haditha (Parachute), 1835Z to 1200Z hours, 28 and 29 March 2003.

27th Engineer Battalion, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

z. Southeastern region of Afghanistan (Free Fall), 1735Z to 1800Z hours, inclusive, 3 July 2004.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Team 3

120mm
07-12-2007, 05:27 AM
Not that I WANT to get "piled on", but someone has to do it, I suppose:(, to what extent do you suppose that airborne operations are conducted because of airborne's presence and influence within the Army as a whole? I would suggest that especially in the case of OIF, airborne ops "may" be conducted in order to say that airborne ops were conducted.

I would suggest that while Airborne Operations are a valid, and possibly even vital tool in the Army "toolbox", that Airborne, and Airborne Operations wield an influence way out of proportion of their/its importance. And this is not necessarily Good For The Army. It's kind of like a guy who's only tool is an Airborne Brigade; Everything starts looking like a combat drop.;)

To be sure, Airborne does a good job of IO campaign within the Army, and one of their key tactics is to make Airborne wings into a merit badge for young officers. Where their influence becomes less of an "interesting" thing, and more of a "seriously damages the Army" thing, is when the Airborne mafia tries to forces "C-130 deployable" on each and every piece of equipment's specification chart. This reduces equipment capability, adds unnecessary cost, and hardly ever results in a "C-130 deployable" piece of equipment.

I am now digging my hole and putting up 18 inches of overhead cover in preparation for the inevitable counter-battery fire. :o

Mike Spight
07-12-2007, 02:33 PM
Until SGM Grumpy forwarded the link to Meyer's webzine, I didn't know (or care) who he was. After reading the article (and his previous issue in which he stated that the creation of USSOCOM was a bad idea) I did care.

As most eveyone here has stated, he's clearly a moron...ill equipped to comment on a capability and community in which some of us have spent many years.

I exchanged emails with Meyer but will not post here. Let's just say that his defensive, wise assed response to my courteous query regarding his military credentials was exactly what I expected and spoke volumes.

ATW,

Mike

Steve Blair
07-12-2007, 02:40 PM
Actually I think this is a valid tangent question. I don't know enough about the more current drops to comment on them, but the drops during the latter part of the Korean War and certainly the drop of a battalion of the 173rd during Junction City in Vietnam have been called unnecessary by many historians. The drop in Vietnam is especially worthy of note in this regard, since they lifted the remainder of the brigade in by helicopter later the same day.

The airborne mafia has been a fixture in the Army since the end of World War II. I happen to think that airborne forces have an important place in any army's toolkit, but I also do think that it's easy to exaggerate their importance and too easy for some to misuse them or assume they're capable of things that they are not.

Mike Spight
07-12-2007, 02:54 PM
Steve,

No argument from me on your last paragraph...misuse of conventional Airborne and SOF is well known...

And as a former boss of mine once said: "Never mistake enthusiasm for capability".

ATW...

Mike

RTK
07-12-2007, 03:00 PM
Until SGM Grumpy forwarded the link to Meyer's webzine, I didn't know (or care) who he was. After reading the article (and his previous issue in which he stated that the creation of USSOCOM was a bad idea) I did care.

As most eveyone here has stated, he's clearly a moron...ill equipped to comment on a capability and community in which some of us have spent many years.

I exchanged emails with Meyer but will not post here. Let's just say that his defensive, wise assed response to my courteous query regarding his military credentials was exactly what I expected and spoke volumes.

ATW,

Mike

I e-mailed the SOCOM article to a retired SF officer. His response was extremely appropriate; "Clearly someone with an opinion without all the facts." A good outlook that can be applied to just about any of his essays on that site.

Welcome to the forum, Sir!

Mike Spight
07-12-2007, 03:09 PM
Thanks RTK; it's been a while since I've visited and it's good to be back.

ATW...

Mike

Bill Moore
07-12-2007, 03:20 PM
Is there an Airborne Mafia? Yes. Is there an Armor Mafia? Yes Is there a Stryker Mafia? Yes. Is the Marine Corp one big Mafia? Yes Does each mafia look after the family business? Yes

I think many of us in this council have been on planning teams for numerous contingencies, and we have all experienced every service, and sub-elements of the services trying to get in on a mission, whether their particular capability fit our not. You go to joint schools and then work in joint commands you quickly learn that the best plan isn't the best plan, but rather the most purple plan is the best plan. Jointness has become a mantra that has over rode common sense. Our entire system is flawed, and yet we hear more call for more jointness! Jointness is good when it facilitates needed dovetailing, but it is evil when it forces illogical combinations. We seem to have a some sort of perverted combination of a socialist and capitialist mentality in the military, where our socialist side begs for equal participation, and our capitialist side urges us to compete with our fellow American Warriors for a key position in the fight. Everyone gets to take credit for it, and everyone can use Operation Whatever to justify future budget requests. I'm not sure there is a solution, maybe one service? If that was the case it should clearly be led by a combination of the Army Airborne and SOF :)

120mm you're clearly wrong, there is no more important capability than the Airborne! :)

RTK
07-12-2007, 03:25 PM
Is there an Airborne Mafia? Yes. Is there an Armor Mafia? Yes Is there a Stryker Mafia? Yes. Is the Marine Corp one big Mafia? Yes Does each mafia look after the family business? Yes

I think many of us in this council have been on planning teams for numerous contingencies, and we have all experienced every service, and sub-elements of the services trying to get in on a mission, whether their particular capability fit our not. You go to joint schools and then work in joint commands you quickly learn that the best plan isn't the best plan, but rather the most purple plan is the best plan. Jointness has become a mantra that has over rode common sense. Our entire system is flawed, and yet we hear more call for more jointness! Jointness is good when it facilitates needed dovetailing, but it is evil when it forces illogical combinations. We seem to have a some sort of perverted combination of a socialist and capitialist mentality in the military, where our socialist side begs for equal participation, and our capitialist side urges us to compete with our fellow American Warriors for a key position in the fight. Everyone gets to take credit for it, and everyone can use Operation Whatever to justify future budget requests. I'm not sure there is a solution, maybe one service? If that was the case it should clearly be led by a combination of the Army Airborne and SOF :)

120mm you're clearly wrong, there is no more important capability than the Airborne! :)

The Airborne Mafia has never had a problem when the Armor Mafia shows up when they're in contact...:D

Bill Moore
07-12-2007, 03:56 PM
That is true, a brother in need never turns down a helping hand. That reminds of the Airborne Mafia poster, that shows a lone paratrooper with his rifle at Bastonge (I believe), and the caption read something like, they're not going any further, I'm airborne, or something like it. Hell, that is almost as good Marine propaganda. :)

tequila
07-12-2007, 04:03 PM
That is true, a brother in need never turns down a helping hand. That reminds of the Airborne Mafia poster, that shows a lone paratrooper with his rifle at Bastonge (I believe), and the caption read something like, they're not going any further, I'm airborne, or something like it. Hell, that is almost as good Marine propaganda. :)

Easy there, crazy! Next thing you're going to be saying that the Germans didn't really call us Teufel hunden, or that every Marine isn't really a rifleman. :eek:

Tom Odom
07-12-2007, 04:30 PM
That is true, a brother in need never turns down a helping hand. That reminds of the Airborne Mafia poster, that shows a lone paratrooper with his rifle at Bastonge (I believe), and the caption read something like, they're not going any further, I'm airborne, or something like it. Hell, that is almost as good Marine propaganda. :)

I have that on my office wall....

We are not a Mafia, we are a clan :wry:

Jedburgh
07-12-2007, 06:11 PM
That is true, a brother in need never turns down a helping hand. That reminds of the Airborne Mafia poster, that shows a lone paratrooper with his rifle at Bastonge (I believe), and the caption read something like, they're not going any further, I'm airborne, or something like it. Hell, that is almost as good Marine propaganda. :)
As an American tank was withdrawing under fire from the German advance through the Ardennes Forest, it came across a lone paratrooper digging his fox hole. It stopped next to him. The tired and cold paratrooper yelled to the tank, "Looking for a safe place? Well, pull your tank in behind me! I'm the 82nd Airborne and this is as far as those bastards are going!"

http://img394.imageshack.us/img394/2849/82dposterphotobyg3uo2.gif (http://imageshack.us)

That poster is in damn near every Company area at the Deuce, and is proudly posted on the walls of many a paratrooper no longer at Bragg.

120mm
07-13-2007, 07:14 AM
You know, I'm a committed "Leg" but that poster is some Good ####(tm).

As an old DIV CAV guy, I'll be the first to admit that the ACR CAV mafia hasn't done the Army any favors. Way too much emphasis on using CAV as stabbers/shooters, and they've lost the bubble completely on Intel gathering. Even to the point of letting MI have the UAS mission. And, frankly, I've not met an MI guy yet that understood how to use their UAS's.

I would guess that is the problem with all the "mafias." Style moves in to replace substance.

Ken White
07-13-2007, 07:21 PM
Smiled a lot and one of the biggest came at Last Dingo's suggestion of the eleventy ton Cesar replacing the M777. That led me to ponder the benefit of replacing one externally manned 155 for another -- with a weight penalty.

Can't for the life of me figure why he didn't recommend the Bofors Archer, no exposed troops and a higher rate of fire, far quicker in and out of action time...

Now, I must go refill my bourbon glass and ponder rooftop PLFs or even a standing landing with an MC4 --and four Ranger Companies running amok with no Battalion to support and defend, Not to mention changes in Ranger and 82d missions that the negatonians seem to blissfully be unaware of...

Oh, and for he who posited the combat drops occurred late in the Korean War, actually, they occurred early in the war. One was probably important, the other got caught and made less critical by the speed of ground advance -- and that's a plus. :cool:

Junction City drop wasn't a total waste, friend of mine got to get close to Catherine Leroy who jumped with 'em. ;)

Ken White
07-13-2007, 07:29 PM
You know, I'm a committed "Leg" but that poster is some Good ####(tm).

As an old DIV CAV guy, I'll be the first to admit that the ACR CAV mafia hasn't done the Army any favors. Way too much emphasis on using CAV as stabbers/shooters, and they've lost the bubble completely on Intel gathering. Even to the point of letting MI have the UAS mission. And, frankly, I've not met an MI guy yet that understood how to use their UAS's.

I would guess that is the problem with all the "mafias." Style moves in to replace substance.

In order:

Leg is passe, not PC, you know. However, Earthlings need love too, so we of the Anointed forgive you ... ;)

ACRs do both missions by design; speaking as an old 19D among other things, Cav of any echelon is flexible enough to do both as you know and emphasis depends upon mission demands made by the situation, I think...

Only if the bosses let it. Good Commanders don't.