All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

[Granite_State]

Looking for any books, articles, or even websites on Greys Scouts, the horse-mounted infantry used in Rhodesia in the Sixties and Seventies. Any other information on the use of horsed cavalry in post-WWI small wars would also be welcome. Contrasting cavalry with early mechanization in small wars and trying to determine if there was much of a place for cavalry in small wars once tank and automobile technology became pretty dependable in the Thirties.

[taldozer]

I have a few articals on Greys Scouts. I need to scan/pdf them so give me time. I also opened pandoras box on getting information out people so I am a little backed up.

Cheers.

[Erick]

taldozer-

If you have those scanned, may I impose and ask for them? Looking for background on Grey's Scouts as I've encountered a former member who also has experience in the current fight. I'd like as solid a background as possible when I sit down with him.

[davidbfpo]

Granite,

Try starting on: http://www.jrtwood.com/default.asp

A bit off topic, may lead elsewhere. Is there not a book on the Grey Scouts already. I am sure seen one on a Rhodesian website, cannot recall which one!

davidbfpo

A consolidated thread on Rhodesian COIN is at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

[Jslade0]

Howdy,

I'm doing a masters thesis on the idea of comparing Rhodesia's Training and Tactics to the current US. How did a little country with no resources manage to fight a COIN and train for a HIC fight so well, while the US appears to be only trying to train for one or the other.

From what I've gathered so far, the Rhodesians trained 70% of the time on force on force threats, fearing one of their many neighbors were going to eventually attack in force. So they trained for HIC, but practiced COIN, fairly successfully. (with almost every contact resulting in enemy killed).

Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.

[jmm99]

Try a PM to JMA (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=4412) - once upon a time, Rhodesian Light Infantry and all that stuff.

Cheers

Mike

[Kiwigrunt]

Howdy,

I'm doing a masters thesis on the idea of comparing Rhodesia's Training and Tactics to the current US. How did a little country with no resources manage to fight a COIN and train for a HIC fight so well, while the US appears to be only trying to train for one or the other.

From what I've gathered so far, the Rhodesians trained 70% of the time on force on force threats, fearing one of their many neighbors were going to eventually attack in force. So they trained for HIC, but practiced COIN, fairly successfully. (with almost every contact resulting in enemy killed).

Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.

If you haven't seen them yet, try these threads on Rhodesia. They should keep you entertained for a bit:)

link (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090&highlight=rhodesia), link (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10742&highlight=rhodesia) and link (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=868&highlight=rhodesia).

There are also plenty of external links in them.

[William F. Owen]

From what I've gathered so far, the Rhodesians trained 70% of the time on force on force threats, fearing one of their many neighbors were going to eventually attack in force. So they trained for HIC, but practiced COIN, fairly successfully. (with almost every contact resulting in enemy killed).

a.) The "Train high, to fight low," is a product of post WW1 British Army training. What you are saying about the Rhodesians applied exactly to British across 20-odd insurgencies and rebellions they fought from 1919-1978. The IDF has, post 2006, gone back to training to fight high-end to be prepared for low end. It's normal. It's obvious. Why folks DO NOT do it, needs enquiry.

b.) What you see in Rhodesia is close what you see in Oman or Dhofar, where you have imaginative British trained officers freed from senior over sight. Point being the idea is not uniquely "Rhodesian."

c.) While the Rhodesians were uniquely skilled at the sub-unit level, I very doubt that they had the resources or training to fight effectively at the formation level. If you could find documented proof that they did train and resource this level of operation, and how they aimed to do it, that would be an extremely important find.

d.) JMA may have a conflicting or additional view point.


Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.
Cannot tell. You never stated what your thesis was.

[Cavguy]

Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.

I would simply note that there is no country named Rhodesia today.

Makes ya think.

[Jslade0]

I understand there were a few incidents where either the SAS or RLI encountered armored units. And while fighting camps with populations in the low thousands, wouldn't it be fair to say there were at least vs. company sized engagements going on?

My thesis is roughly that the US should try learn several lessons from the Rhodesian Security Forces, mainly don't train whole brigades in COIN while neglecting HIC, keep cadre fresh from the fight, focus on Small unit tactics (like start printing 7-8 again), scouting is important to COIN, and again, scouting is important to COIN.

[William F. Owen]

I understand there were a few incidents where either the SAS or RLI encountered armored units. And while fighting camps with populations in the low thousands, wouldn't it be fair to say there were at least vs. company sized engagements going on?
As I said, "Sub-unit." Units are Battle Groups or Battalions. Do you have a military background? If not this would be an extremely challenging area for you to study. Challenging. Not impossible. Does your supervisor have a military background?


My thesis is roughly that the US should try learn several lessons from the Rhodesian Security Forces, mainly don't train whole brigades in COIN while neglecting HIC, keep cadre fresh from the fight, focus on Small unit tactics (like start printing 7-8 again), scouting is important to COIN, and again, scouting is important to COIN.
So the US should learn sub-unit tactics from the RLI? Sorry, but my opinion is that you should train to fight as a Brigade (Formation.) Formation level skills are essential. You cannot fight a bunch of clowns like Hezbollah without them.

Sub-unit Tactics are easy. It's a couple of weeks of Coy level training. It's all skills and drills stuff. This is extremely important, but it's cheap and easy to become proficient in this area - IF you know what you are doing to begin with.

Fighting at the Formation level is a whole game up, and the one most folks cannot do.

[William F. Owen]

not just their Light Infantry battalion (as you state RLI), was an integration of police, civilian, intelligence, regular and irregular combat units?
Well that's not tactics. It's Policy and Strategy. Those are all direct products of the British "Committee system". You may also want so study how the Committee system was used in Malaya, and Northern Ireland.


If all the basic rifle platoon is asked to do, is this easy stuff you say, what is going on in a brigade sized exercise? just them practicing those skills and drills over and over again? it seems that your recommendation means we should only worry about training a brigade staff, in some sort of rigorous tocx. I don't understand.
Sorry, but you are very mistaken. Formation level skills are about practising fighting as a formation. You can be very skilled at the Company level and utterly fall down at the Formation level.

Yes, a well trained brigade staff is essential. For example, the IDF has allocated considerable resources to training Brigade Staffs since 2006. You cannot do without them. - and CPX's (TOC-X?) do not cut it, when it comes to doing a Battle Group passage of lines to launch another Battle Group, into an opposed obstacle crossing. - and plan and execute that in < 4 hours. You actually need to go and get cold and wet out on the ground, and know how long it takes to move the bridging kit from the hide area into the launch site, and who moves when and where.

[davidbfpo]

Apart from scouring the various threads on SWC, their links and recommendations I would recommend a PM to those who have studied Rhodesian training, or undergone it.

Then I'd look at the literature written after 1980, by those who did serve; I say after 1980 as it will cut out the Soldier of Fortune material and the PR.

Have a look at some of the well known texts: Reid-Daly on the Selous Scouts, the two tomes on the RLI and RAR. Then 'No Mean Soldier' by Peter McAleese, a British professional NCO who served there.

I expect Rhodesian training was far more than a local variant on UK training, for example what was the impact before 1974 of the Portuguese? Plus South Africa, where after 1965 I expect much of the higher training took place.

Quite a few here would be interested in seeing the end product.

[Chris jM]

Interesting question, I'd be interested in reading your views on it as the topic progresses.

I think I have an e-copy of Rhodesian COIN doctrine somewhere, if that would be of benefit.

[The Westphalian Post]

... see 'Counterinsurgency in Africa: the Portuguese way of war, 1961-1974' by John P. Cann.


Ian Smith's regime was supported primarily by Portugal and Portugal had to fight in three different theatres in Africa.

[SteveMetz]

I would simply note that there is no country named Rhodesia today.

Makes ya think.

Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?

[Jslade0]

Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?


While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.

To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

[Cavguy]

While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.

To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

To take up Wilf's earlier point - you haven't articulated a thesis, you've articulated a topic. You still have to do that before we can truly critique you. Also, for an academic paper, you seem starting with a conclusion and looking backwards for evidence to justify it rather than observing the evidence and drawing a conclusion.

Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.

[Ken White]

Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.

In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.

All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.

In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...

If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.

[JMA]

Howdy,

I'm doing a masters thesis on the idea of comparing Rhodesia's Training and Tactics to the current US. How did a little country with no resources manage to fight a COIN and train for a HIC fight so well, while the US appears to be only trying to train for one or the other.

From what I've gathered so far, the Rhodesians trained 70% of the time on force on force threats, fearing one of their many neighbors were going to eventually attack in force. So they trained for HIC, but practiced COIN, fairly successfully. (with almost every contact resulting in enemy killed).

Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.

I'm travelling at the moment so not on here every day but will certainly assist you where I can. In addition I am able to put you into contact with the (surviving) senior officers and men who were involved with policy relating to training in Rhodesia right up to the end. Due to age some are more willing than others to get involved with such commuications. Anyway, good luck with your project.

As you no doubt have noted from some of the comment below discussing this project here may be a mixed blessing. Just as you will be accussed of selecting the outcome before starting your project (as you already have been) you will find your critics may well have fixed positions on this matter and will not find any information forcing a rethink to be welcome.

I offer two quotes to deal with those who approach your task from this position:

‘Minds are like parachutes — they only function when open.’
and

A closed mind is not only closed to outside thoughts, it is often closed to itself as well. It is closed to new thoughts and anything that threatens the status quo. But if you can open the doors, maybe just a crack at first, the ideas that have been patiently waiting at your gates will flood in.

I suggest that you challenge these critics to explain their positions and not allow them to sit back and take pot-shots at your position/assertions/contentions. In other words push the boundaries.

[Rex Brynen]

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

Actually, as I've argued elsewhere, I think it can be argued that Rhodesia's remarkable tactical and operational successes actually were strategically disadvantageous—obscuring, as it were, the inevitable political writing on the wall.

[JMA]

a.) The "Train high, to fight low," is a product of post WW1 British Army training. What you are saying about the Rhodesians applied exactly to British across 20-odd insurgencies and rebellions they fought from 1919-1978. The IDF has, post 2006, gone back to training to fight high-end to be prepared for low end. It's normal. It's obvious. Why folks DO NOT do it, needs enquiry.

Is this what he meant?

I read his position as being that fighting a counter insurgency war while holding the ability to switch to HIC (convention warfare) should the circumstances change was the plan.


b.) What you see in Rhodesia is close what you see in Oman or Dhofar, where you have imaginative British trained officers freed from senior over sight. Point being the idea is not uniquely "Rhodesian."

There is still a war in Dhofar? Thought that wound up in 1975? (Rhodesians were actively recruited for the Oman forces after 1980)


c.) While the Rhodesians were uniquely skilled at the sub-unit level, I very doubt that they had the resources or training to fight effectively at the formation level. If you could find documented proof that they did train and resource this level of operation, and how they aimed to do it, that would be an extremely important find.

The best we could put together were a number of battle groups which could operate independently or I suppose if there was a concentrated threat as a brigade. Certainly the RLI exercised as a battle group in 1979 when there was much talk of possible ZIPRA invasion from Zambia.

Also if you read up on Operation Quartz brigade orders were issued (I was the scribe for one of the brigades orders - as a GSO3 Ops - under direction of the Brigade Major) which were a series of attackes on insurgent Assembly Places which if looked at natonally could be seen as a divisional action.

Then if you read up on the history of the war in 1979 you will find that as the insurgent bases (in Zambia and Mozambique) became better defended (thanks to Russian and Cuban advisors) the actions against these bases became more conventional in nature. So one day the whole battalion would be gathered for these camp attacks (using conventional tactics) and a few days later sub-units were back to operating in four man "sticks". The ability to switch instantaneously between the two became second nature.


d.) JMA may have a conflicting or additional view point.
Indeed.

[JMA]

I would simply note that there is no country named Rhodesia today.

Makes ya think.

What exactly does it make you think?

...that poor little Rhodesia could stand up to Russian and Chinese supported and supplied insurgents but not also against Jimmy Carter and Andy Young?

[JMA]

I understand there were a few incidents where either the SAS or RLI encountered armored units. And while fighting camps with populations in the low thousands, wouldn't it be fair to say there were at least vs. company sized engagements going on?

My thesis is roughly that the US should try learn several lessons from the Rhodesian Security Forces, mainly don't train whole brigades in COIN while neglecting HIC, keep cadre fresh from the fight, focus on Small unit tactics (like start printing 7-8 again), scouting is important to COIN, and again, scouting is important to COIN.

I suggest that one should learn to differentiate between HIC and COIN in that HIC is fought by battle groups and formations while in COIN it becomes a "corporals war" except where through risk aversity no operations are carried out in less than platoon strength.

Units should have the ability to switch from one form of warfare to the other without having to undergo training or a refit.

[JMA]

As I said, "Sub-unit." Units are Battle Groups or Battalions. Do you have a military background? If not this would be an extremely challenging area for you to study. Challenging. Not impossible. Does your supervisor have a military background?


So the US should learn sub-unit tactics from the RLI? Sorry, but my opinion is that you should train to fight as a Brigade (Formation.) Formation level skills are essential. You cannot fight a bunch of clowns like Hezbollah without them.

Sub-unit Tactics are easy. It's a couple of weeks of Coy level training. It's all skills and drills stuff. This is extremely important, but it's cheap and easy to become proficient in this area - IF you know what you are doing to begin with.

Fighting at the Formation level is a whole game up, and the one most folks cannot do.

Not sure a I agree that it is more difficult to operate at formation level. For whom would that be? Only for the brigade commander ... for the rest it is IMHO easier.

Sub-unit operations down to fire team level (four men) is not easier for the Brit forces. Corporals and Lance Corporals are not trained to apply the required degree of operational leadership and discretion that is required for such independent operations. How a typical US fireteam would perform independently on a (say) five day patrol I can't say.

[JMA]

Well that's not tactics. It's Policy and Strategy. Those are all direct products of the British "Committee system". You may also want so study how the Committee system was used in Malaya, and Northern Ireland.


Sorry, but you are very mistaken. Formation level skills are about practising fighting as a formation. You can be very skilled at the Company level and utterly fall down at the Formation level.

Yes, a well trained brigade staff is essential. For example, the IDF has allocated considerable resources to training Brigade Staffs since 2006. You cannot do without them. - and CPX's (TOC-X?) do not cut it, when it comes to doing a Battle Group passage of lines to launch another Battle Group, into an opposed obstacle crossing. - and plan and execute that in < 4 hours. You actually need to go and get cold and wet out on the ground, and know how long it takes to move the bridging kit from the hide area into the launch site, and who moves when and where.

I'm sure now you have missed the plot. Brigade staff don't carry out patrols and ambushes.

Why would you need bridging kit to facilitate a 4-man fireteam crossing a river? They can float it (watermanship) or get dropped by chopper.

[JMA]

Apart from scouring the various threads on SWC, their links and recommendations I would recommend a PM to those who have studied Rhodesian training, or undergone it.

Then I'd look at the literature written after 1980, by those who did serve; I say after 1980 as it will cut out the Soldier of Fortune material and the PR.

Have a look at some of the well known texts: Reid-Daly on the Selous Scouts, the two tomes on the RLI and RAR. Then 'No Mean Soldier' by Peter McAleese, a British professional NCO who served there.

I expect Rhodesian training was far more than a local variant on UK training, for example what was the impact before 1974 of the Portuguese? Plus South Africa, where after 1965 I expect much of the higher training took place.

Quite a few here would be interested in seeing the end product.

The Rhodesian Training evolved to meet local circumstances and was certainly based on British TTPs. Trained Brit soldiers who joined up were required to attend the "COIN phase" of recruit training (the last 7 weeks of the 19 weeks core training programme) the first 12 weeks being what we termed "conventional warfare" training which which the Brits knew all about.

The Portuguese taught us much about the basics of fire force operations as they had gunships with side mounted 20mm canons and were conducting heli bourne sweeps. We adopted those but realised that unless you have a stop line or cut-off groups that you sweep the insurgents into the sweep exercise is pointless (hence mowing the lawn futility in Afghanistan).

Also operating with the Portuguese and independently in Mozambique honed the fighting skills the SAS, RLI and the RAR would need later when the war came home.

South Africa's value was that Rhodesians attended their Command and Staff College (as did some Israelis), and they provided training in armour, artillery training and attached airforce choppers and crews and allowed use of strike craft and submarines for insertion of small teams into Mozambique up the coast. And in fact in late 1979 they had battalions in the South of the country operating and doing fire force ops. They were great friends (mostly) until the US (Carter) got them to sell Rhodesia out.

[JMA]

Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?

Cute soundbite.

Are you talking about military strategy or political?

[Jslade0]

So one day the whole battalion would be gathered for these camp attacks (using conventional tactics) and a few days later sub-units were back to operating in four man "sticks". The ability to switch instantaneously between the two became second nature.

1) I have not written the paper. I am in the very early stages of it, thats why I came to this body, to ask for advice, and direction.

2) I've not gotten any conclusions already, but there are a few facts that I see as pretty telling.

3) As just having gone through standing up a US army brigade, and its now apparently ready to fight, I'm very curious as to the training done by other successful forces. Most interesting to me is the Rhodesia experience.

JMC, thanks for your input. What strikes me most is the "ability to switch". I've seen staff officers who have no idea what maneuver warfare is. Intel officers who don't know how to analyze terrain. Captains. Because thats not what they're being taught. Basic training doesn't even teach squad attack anymore, its all traffic control check points, search detainees etc. I never dug a fog hole, (and no one in my company did either) in my semi-recent experience at basic. It seems, which I seek to get a clearer picture of, that the US army is slow to change, but when it does, it's total.

The ability to balance COIN with conventional seems to be pretty interesting, and I don't know of many armies in the world that did it as well has the Rhodesians. Maybe it's not true; but I hope whatever research I come up with will give me a clearer idea about it.

[Jslade0]

This paper isn't an analysis of Rhodesian COIN fighting. That's been done plenty. I think the Rand Corp did a fairly authoritative study on it. It's comparing the Rhodesian ability to train HIC and COIN to the US's ability to balance both today.

Some interesting things I found out so far:
-Training cadre spent cycle breaks at the front.
-All Officers had to be NCOs first.
-Scout makes intel, which drives ops. US seems to understand Intel drives ops, but where does it come from?
-Rhodesians won almost every contact without support of Field Artillery.
-Combat tracking is an essential skill in COIN.

These are interesting facts, (maybe JMC or others could dispell some of them as untrue) and I'm curious to see what they could mean in a broader context, specifically as contrasted to the US army training and doctrine production machine.

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine? how often was it updated? What were battle drills that were trained? Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?

[JMA]

Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.

Yes in that it was indeed an existential war. Remind me of some other existential wars?


In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.

Maybe


All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.

Studied by whom?

Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?


In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...

Every aspect deserves study as competence is required at every level. Regardless of Carter's success in defeating Rhodesia politically any tactical lessons as there may be still stand.


If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.

"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.

[JMA]

Actually, as I've argued elsewhere, I think it can be argued that Rhodesia's remarkable tactical and operational successes actually were strategically disadvantageous—obscuring, as it were, the inevitable political writing on the wall.

Where have you aruged this?

[Ken White]

Studied by whom?Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?
Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too? ;)
"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.

You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.

[JMA]

Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?

Must have.

You see I am researching for a book on the RLI right now and have found there are very few published sources on this topic. I should be forgiven for asking what source documents they are using for this study?


No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too? ;)

Well what you may have missed was that when I arrived in Rhodesia in 1973 most weapons were carried on the shoulder (hunting style) and the RLI operated in shorts and t-shirts with no camo cream. Once the war got hotter and the casualty rate increased and the dots were connected we moved into full camo with all exposed skin camo'd. There were some hold outs who insisted on wearing shorts and Tshirts and camo'd their legs and arms.

And of course the weapons moved to the ready at all times. (Daily "pokey drill" was done when in camp to strengthen the required muscles in this regard.)


It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.

Competence at every level is meaningful. For the private soldier skill at arms and combat competence are the most important thing for him and his mates. All armies should provide the training at that (and all levels) which will allow their soldiers to have the skill at arms edge over the enemy of the day.

That said the political issues may be a whole lot more complicated and problematic but that does not diminish the personal skill of the soldiers nor the combat effectiveness of fire teams/sections/platoons.companies/battalions when viewed separately and specifically.

I will leave the comment on the geopolitics as the Rhodesian military can be studied with only limited reference to the political mistakes and who screwed who...


You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.

There was a wide variation in quality between the regular units, the national service (conscripts), the Territorial units (reserves), the police and the various militias. Everyone can carry a weapon but not everyone makes a good fighting soldier. Yes, when going the extra mile is directly motivated by keeping families, wives, children and the lot safe (when they live an hour or twos drive from the "operational area") it is not too difficult to get the troops up for that.

Having a low grade enemy also helped.

[Rex Brynen]

What exactly does it make you think?

...that poor little Rhodesia could stand up to Russian and Chinese supported and supplied insurgents but not also against Jimmy Carter and Andy Young?

I suspect he means that efforts to delay or avoid black majority rule were ultimately doomed to failure.

As Steve said:


Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?

Quite right. Nor can it substitute for a lack of realism at the national level about what is, or is not, achievable.

[Ken White]

Competence at every level is meaningful. For the private soldier skill at arms and combat competence are the most important thing for him and his mates. All armies should provide the training at that (and all levels) which will allow their soldiers to have the skill at arms edge over the enemy of the day.

That said the political issues may be a whole lot more complicated and problematic but that does not diminish the personal skill of the soldiers nor the combat effectiveness of fire teams/sections/platoons.companies/battalions when viewed separately and specifically.Totally agree on both counts. That we -- the US -- do not really provide such competence in peacetime is to an extent an indictment of the politicians and senior military leadership who preclude better training. In their defense, the anti-military tradition in the anglosphere generally is huge part of that problem. That is likely not going away. :mad:

Your comment on the political issues not taking away from the performance of the troops is spot on.

On the topic of what sources were used in the study of Rhodesion tactics and methods, the RAND study (LINK / .pdf) (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R3998.pdf) has a bibliography. You may have already seen the report or parts of it. The bibliography cites Cilliers, Cocks, Moorcraft, Venter, Reid-Daly and Stiff. As for the US Army and the Infantry school, a combination of FAOs, Defense Attaches from RSA and other neighboring nations and probably dispatched observers at the time. While paying attention to events there was not politically correct at the time, the Army's been known to cheat on policies emanating from D.C. Serving in the US Army at the time, I can recall great interest in what was being done and how you were operating at all levels. Mostly, reliance at the time was on media reports, though I can recall seeing a Benning printed copy of a manual purporting to be, IIRC, the Rhodesian Forces Counterinsurgency and Anti-Terrorist Operations (or something like that) shortly before I retired in '77. You've probably seen and may recall these LINK (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/counterinsurgency_in_rhodesia.htm), LINK / .pdf (http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat). They came later but the interest at the time was significant. Still is...

[William F. Owen]

Is this what he meant?

I read his position as being that fighting a counter insurgency war while holding the ability to switch to HIC (convention warfare) should the circumstances change was the plan.
If so, then correct. The default setting for all UK training from 1919 (till very recently) was major combat operations. "COIN" was seen as a "restriction" of violence, with other skills thrown in.

There is still a war in Dhofar? Thought that wound up in 1975? (Rhodesians were actively recruited for the Oman forces after 1980)
Dhofar ran from 62/63. Point being it ran almost concurrently with Rhodesia, and mirrored it in many ways, as concerns UK training and doctrine. Point being folks say "Look at Rhodesia," and I agree, but also "look at Dhofar." As concerns tactical and operational skill, they have common routes.


Also if you read up on Operation Quartz brigade orders were issued (I was the scribe for one of the brigades orders - as a GSO3 Ops - under direction of the Brigade Major) which were a series of attackes on insurgent Assembly Places which if looked at natonally could be seen as a divisional action.
I would submit that this would be very good evidence of the Rhodesian Army operating at the formation level, or at least planning to.

[William F. Owen]

Sub-unit operations down to fire team level (four men) is not easier for the Brit forces. Corporals and Lance Corporals are not trained to apply the required degree of operational leadership and discretion that is required for such independent operations. How a typical US fireteam would perform independently on a (say) five day patrol I can't say.

Formation level operations require practising skills to that have a major flow down effect. For the fire team, there may not be a lot of difference, but for Coy Commanders on up, there will be, and very little can be adequately practised doing a CPX.

EG: A Formation level passage of lines, at night to launch to one battle group into an opposed obstacle crossing.

Training fire teams is cheap and easy. Training formations is vastly expensive and very complicated.


Why would you need bridging kit to facilitate a 4-man fireteam crossing a river? You need bridging kit for all the vehicles, plus you need multiple bridging sites

[JMA]

I suspect he means that efforts to delay or avoid black majority rule were ultimately doomed to failure.

Circa. 1960 to delay was the (historically proven) intelligent approach but to avoid would have been futile.

Perhaps your attention (and that of a few others around here) should be drawn to the Southern Rhodesia proposed Constitution 1961 where the "Europeans" (meaning whites) accepted a qualified franchise system which would have led to an "African" (meaning black) majority in parliament within 7-8 years (soonest) or 10-15 years (more likely).

But the Brits - Alec Douglas-Hume and his flunky Duncan Sandys (Commonwealh and Colonial Secretary) - being led by the nose by that other "great" African democrat and champion of one-party elections Julius Nyerere - whose country (Tanzania) under his "enlightened" leadership went from the largest exporter of agricultural products in Africa to the largest importer of agricultural products - demanded that one 5 year term of parliament leading to a one-man-one-vote... once ... was the best they could offer and the best that - "great" body of democrats and human rights activists - the Commonwealth would accept.

In addition those two liberal authors (by the US definition) of Rhodesian military history - Moorcraft and McLaughlin - state in the preface of their 2008 edition:


... Nevertheless, after nearly three decades, and in the light of the near-total destruction of the state by Robert Mugabe, many will look back and reflect that the Rhodesian rebellion, although doomed, was perhaps not so damned.

That make one think?

[JMA]

Totally agree on both counts. That we -- the US -- do not really provide such competence in peacetime is to an extent an indictment of the politicians and senior military leadership who preclude better training. In their defense, the anti-military tradition in the anglosphere generally is huge part of that problem. That is likely not going away. :mad:

Glad we agree on this.

I can only hope that the US can somehow maintain a core cadre of competent NCOs to pass on the skill at arms until this is once again needed on a grand scale.


Your comment on the political issues not taking away from the performance of the troops is spot on.

I got bitten twice (Rhodesia and South Africa) and promised myself I would never trust a politician - any politician - again. How many times in the average military career do US servicemen get bitten by the politicians? Must be damn infuriating.


On the topic of what sources were used in the study of Rhodesion tactics and methods, the RAND study (LINK / .pdf) (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R3998.pdf) has a bibliography. You may have already seen the report or parts of it. The bibliography cites Cilliers, Cocks, Moorcraft, Venter, Reid-Daly and Stiff. As for the US Army and the Infantry school, a combination of FAOs, Defense Attaches from RSA and other neighboring nations and probably dispatched observers at the time. While paying attention to events there was not politically correct at the time, the Army's been known to cheat on policies emanating from D.C. Serving in the US Army at the time, I can recall great interest in what was being done and how you were operating at all levels. Mostly, reliance at the time was on media reports, though I can recall seeing a Benning printed copy of a manual purporting to be, IIRC, the Rhodesian Forces Counterinsurgency and Anti-Terrorist Operations (or something like that) shortly before I retired in '77. You've probably seen and may recall these LINK (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/counterinsurgency_in_rhodesia.htm), LINK / .pdf (http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat). They came later but the interest at the time was significant. Still is...

Thank you. The first pdf I had not yet seen. Am reading at this moment. The other two I have seen and also the references you mention.

Likewise I tried to read as much stuff out of Vietnam as I could. Too much happened there for a soundbite comment.

Good heavens... been retired for 32 years! What did you do with all that time?

[JMA]

Formation level operations require practising skills to that have a major flow down effect. For the fire team, there may not be a lot of difference, but for Coy Commanders on up, there will be, and very little can be adequately practised doing a CPX.

EG: A Formation level passage of lines, at night to launch to one battle group into an opposed obstacle crossing.

Training fire teams is cheap and easy. Training formations is vastly expensive and very complicated.

You need bridging kit for all the vehicles, plus you need multiple bridging sites

Having spent time as a staff officer (GSO3-Ops) at a brigade HQ I have to agree fully with you that the potential for a mark one c*ock-up threatened where the staff had not been exercised live and often.

That said I believe if I understand the context of this thread correctly it is the dexterity of the soldier in his ability to switch from a conventional operation to COIN ops without having to undergo training. I believe we got fairly close to this in the RLI and again the key to success was the understanding at corporal level.

[Ken White]

Glad we agree on this...I can only hope that the US can somehow maintain a core cadre of competent NCOs to pass on the skill at arms until this is once again needed on a grand scale...How many times in the average military career do US servicemen get bitten by the politicians? Must be damn infuriating.Yes, yes and YEEeessss! :wry:

If I run across any other Rhodesian related tomes or papers I'll send you a link.

Good heavens... been retired for 32 years! What did you do with all that time?Spent the first 18 working as a civilian for the Army in intel, ops and training -- I think that's called masochism... :eek:

As a result of being overpaid at that, have been able to spend the last 15 or so doing as little as possible and looking for good Bourbon -- with some success in both areas. :D

[Tuberk]

Hello all at SWC,

I am new to the community and the level of discussion, so hay.

This post caught my eye. I agree with the proposition that you may find most of Rhodesia’s innovative tactics have been incorporated into modern COIN, maybe with the exception of some of the more adventurous partnering operations with ‘turned’ enemy carried out by the Scouts.

A few years back I tried to explain in a short essay why South Africa was successful in stopping an insurgent war from developing in its own territory, which was the government’s major preoccupation once it became clear Rhodesia would fall. This was interesting because not only did SA have some innovative ideas on how to treat the local population, which differed from Rhodesia’s great failure to protect or win over its own population, but there was also some interesting kinetic COIN tactics in the border regions if I remember. I think they took the best of Rhodesia’s men, ideas and tactics after they fell and remembered not to beat on the population. Obviously, there are many other factors contributing to the outcome in Rhodesia's case, isolation being a major one, but it may prove interesting to you.

[Jslade0]

i got no answers earlier, so I'll try again...

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine?
how often was it updated?
What was the best way for passing around lessons learned?
Was the school house training useful? or was field experience the primary trainer?
What were battle drills that were trained?
Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?

[JMA]

A few years back I tried to explain in a short essay why South Africa was successful in stopping an insurgent war from developing in its own territory, which was the government’s major preoccupation once it became clear Rhodesia would fall.

Is this essay of yours available online?

[William F. Owen]

Having spent time as a staff officer (GSO3-Ops) at a brigade HQ I have to agree fully with you that the potential for a mark one c*ock-up threatened where the staff had not been exercised live and often.
....and not only. If BG staffs have never had to plan a relief in place, and the Coys never done a proper hand-over it all goes to rats very quickly. A lot of of the really challenging stuff really only happens at the Formation level, where Battle Group Staffs have to liaise and co-operate.


That said I believe if I understand the context of this thread correctly it is the dexterity of the soldier in his ability to switch from a conventional operation to COIN ops without having to undergo training. I believe we got fairly close to this in the RLI and again the key to success was the understanding at corporal level.
I would broadly concur, but almost always you can get time to train. Deployed Units even trained during WW1, 10 miles back from the trenches.
Yes, if you get it right at the platoon and Company level, almost all else will fall into place a great deal more easily than if not.

[William F. Owen]

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine?
...and what if they did? Generally that makes no difference. Doctrine is merely "what is taught." What they did in practice is what is relevant.

Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?
Hopefully not. That was a very poor concept, poorly articulated. At best it just said, "we're not very good, and we need to be." That was the bit most people missed.

[JMA]

i got no answers earlier, so I'll try again...

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine?
how often was it updated?
What was the best way for passing around lessons learned?
Was the school house training useful? or was field experience the primary trainer?
What were battle drills that were trained?
Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?

I suggest you start with the Rhodesian COIN manual (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian_coin_manual.htm) first.

Then we can take it from there.

[JMA]

Hopefully not. That was a very poor concept, poorly articulated. At best it just said, "we're not very good, and we need to be." That was the bit most people missed.

Let me know what I missed again please.

[William F. Owen]

Let me know what I missed again please.

a.) You cannot have a "Strategic Corporal." Everything a Corporal does is tactical. Yes, tactics must serve strategy, but that's true for everybody. Did anyone ever say "Strategic Soldier?" No? Why? Cos it would be dumb to say it.

b.) At best you have a Corporal who "does not undermine Policy by doing something stupid." - my favourite example being the sinking of the Lusitania - OK, not a Corporal but an example of minor tactical action that changed Policy, and had strategic implications, but its actually very hard to find good examples of where decisions by NCO's have ACTUALLY changed Policy and had a real strategic effect. It's extremely rare at best.

c.) Poor concept because it explicitly aimed to put an un-realistic burden on the Corporal, when what it was really meant to do was raise the bar to a useful minimum level. - so "We have to be a lot better." - or "Doing stupid stuff, will always be stupid." The implications for training men to believe that their every action might weigh on Policy was and is horrendous.

The British Army never took it seriously - at least no one I know. BUT Gen. Krulack, did do some good stuff with the "Three Block War." I used to "um and err about that", but actually the idea can be made into something useful.

[davidbfpo]

A question often posed by historians and many others. This post refers to 1978-1979 in Southern Africa, with Rhodesia as the key focus. For complicated reasons I have long had an interest in the history of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and visited once for a holiday in 1985.

Tonight a BBC Radio Four documentary 'Document' in a programme entitled 'Did UK warn Mugabe and Nkomo about assassination attempts?' reveals the facts behind:
Successive British governments have accused Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe of brutal, corrupt and incompetent rule, but new evidence suggests that without British help, he might not have lived long enough to come to power.

Link to BBC News summary, a podcast will be available tonight after the broadcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14311834

Some Rhodesians have blamed 'perfidious Albion' having access to Rhodesia's inner secrets, in particular using traitors and one Ken Flowers, the CIO Director (Rhodesia's external intelligence agency). So this will reinforce their suspicions, citing the British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen can clear up that mystery too:
The head of Rhodesian Intelligence, Ken Flowers, was also on our side. So I was well aware of what Ken Flowers was claiming was being done, and I used to read the reports.

Ken Flowers is deceased, as are many of those he worked with and those who suspected him.

[JMA]

A question often posed by historians and many others. This post refers to 1978-1979 in Southern Africa, with Rhodesia as the key focus. For complicated reasons I have long had an interest in the history of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and visited once for a holiday in 1985.

Tonight a BBC Radio Four documentary 'Document' in a programme entitled 'Did UK warn Mugabe and Nkomo about assassination attempts?' reveals the facts behind:

Link to BBC News summary, a podcast will be available tonight after the broadcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14311834

Some Rhodesians have blamed 'perfidious Albion' having access to Rhodesia's inner secrets, in particular using traitors and one Ken Flowers, the CIO Director (Rhodesia's external intelligence agency). So this will reinforce their suspicions, citing the British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen can clear up that mystery too:

Ken Flowers is deceased, as are many of those he worked with and those who suspected him.

David, thanks for the tip, I will certainly be listening tonight.

It needs to be said that Rhodesian counter-intelligence was poor generally.

On the positive side it should be noted that while the target was not at home when the boys arrived at least there was no "reception committee" in waiting.

[Gigalocus]

Hi all,

Just posting as I've been referred here in my search. Basically for a University assignment I'm looking at studying the Rhodesian Bush War, but the assignment relies heavily on primary sources, and so I was wandering about whether relevant sources availability to me. I can't travel to the Zimbabwean national archives for example, though some of the British archives could perhaps be doable.

But more useful to me would be online sources that deal with the War or military of Rhodesia, specifically foreign involvement in the conflict. Any involvement, not just governmental but also foreign volunteers for example. But any sources that are accessible to me that deal with the Rhodesian military would be fantastic, so if anyone knows where these types of sources could be found, I would massively appreciate it.

Thanks,
Gigalocus

[BayonetBrant]

Start here.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15803

After spending 2 hours reading that thread, you can start emailing the authors for more info.

:)

[JMA]

Hi all,

Just posting as I've been referred here in my search. Basically for a University assignment I'm looking at studying the Rhodesian Bush War, but the assignment relies heavily on primary sources, and so I was wandering about whether relevant sources availability to me. I can't travel to the Zimbabwean national archives for example, though some of the British archives could perhaps be doable.

But more useful to me would be online sources that deal with the War or military of Rhodesia, specifically foreign involvement in the conflict. Any involvement, not just governmental but also foreign volunteers for example. But any sources that are accessible to me that deal with the Rhodesian military would be fantastic, so if anyone knows where these types of sources could be found, I would massively appreciate it.

Thanks,
Gigalocus

If you could be much more specific as to your exact information needs it would be helpful... then I could possibly be helpful ;)

[Condor]

Moderator's Note: thread created to help JMA and gain hopefully responses (ends)


I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here).

Responses will be much appreciated.

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

[davidbfpo]

From JMA:
A little personal research...I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here). Responses will be much appreciated.

This RFI appeared on the long running, popular Rhodesian COIN thread, but a new thread may attract more attention and responses. Link to thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

[davidbfpo]

My own interest, which may have been touched upon before, is not how the white Rhodesians fought, which is well covered in the main thread. Rather how and why those who were captured could switch sides and fight for Rhodesia.

What is remarkable from my armchair is how Rhodesia retained substantial black African support in the rural areas (where the vast majority of them lived) till the mid-1970's.

[JMA]

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

Thank you for the comment. Taken onboard.

One of a very books written from the airforce side (all aviators were airforce) is:

DINGO FIRESTORM: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War (http://www.amazon.com/DINGO-FIRESTORM-Greatest-Battle-Rhodesian/dp/1909384127/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1390574509&sr=1-1&keywords=Dingo+firestorm)

Also available on Kindle.

Ian Pringle has done that operation justice with this book and sat the same time providing an unique airforce / aviator perspective.

Prior to the war army officers were sent on FAC courses which involved the use of ground panels etc. During the war this fell away. Effectively all jet FAC (except for small teams operating externally in Zambia and/or Mozambique) was done by the ubiquitous piston engined Lynx (Cessna 337) either by 'talk-on' or target marking with rocket smoke or what ever.

We the ground troops, used a simplified form of FAC - called GAC (Ground Air Control). Simply put this was to mark FLOT (forward line of own troops) with smoke then indicate target with a flare (normally a pencil flare as distances were close - hence the term close air support). When the pilot announced he was 'turning in live' the ground troops gave covering fire to distract the enemy sufficient to minimise the ground fire.

The only time we pulled back was when there was to be a jet strike. There was no safety distance for a gun run (twin 30 Brownings), while SNEB rockets were used at any range if there was a need. The 15 gallon Frantan (Napalm) was used as a pinpoint weapon on rocky areas and small caves and the fireball at close range was spectacular (and troopies needed to warned to keep a tight a..hole ;)

Being a small military we got to know all the pilots - helos and fixed wing - personally and by name as we (the RLI) based with them at the airfields and had beers together if we recovered back to base at night. So, importantly, we knew them, they knew us as we worked together all the time. This allowed for a great degree of flexibility on the ground.

GAC training was given down to stick commander level - lance corporal but clearly not all were capable of that. On fire force ops when there was a gunship (with senior pilot and army commander onboard) overhead it (they) would talk on the fixed wing and instruct the troops on the found to mark their positions etc. Dust from 20mm HE from the gunship would usefully generate dust to mark the target as well.

[carl]

I am interested in I guess the human factor. In the US we seem to be all about machines. Back then Rhodesian didn't have recourse to machines so much so it seems to me that they had to make up for that with imagination.

Another thing is how bush skills came into it, tracking and things like that, though that may have been covered elsewhere.

Also what David said, about retention of loyalty of the black population and turning people.

And, it seems to me the Rhodesian gov lost the public relations fight for world opinion. That was of vital importance. Was that seen as important as it turned out to be? Did it influence the war at the sharp end? Was there much thought given to how to fight that particular fight?

[Biggus]

I am another who is interested in the human factors.

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

It's a pretty good case study for fighting a war on a miniscule budget with very little external support. It's also an excellent case study on how easily world opinion can be manipulated.

[JMA]

I am another who is interested in the human factors.

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

It's a pretty good case study for fighting a war on a miniscule budget with very little external support. It's also an excellent case study on how easily world opinion can be manipulated.

If you haven't already read this, here is a start point:

The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier - by Dr J.R.T. Wood (http://www.jrtwood.com/article_pookie.asp)

The key was this: "The net result was that ZANLA would stop laying landmines on roads regularly swept by the Pookie and lay them elsewhere in the hope that they would not be found before they could achieve their objective."

[davidbfpo]

Cited in part:
The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

There are a couple of books on vehicle development. Rhodesian contacts were proud of their record and as part of the relationship with South Africa gave the SADF full access, even one example of each vehicle. After 1980 IIRC they were amazed to see how much the SADF had developed the concepts further, usually putting them into service in SW Africa (Namibia now) and annoyed they had not been updated.

[Biggus]

If you haven't already read this, here is a start point:

The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier - by Dr J.R.T. Wood (http://www.jrtwood.com/article_pookie.asp)

The key was this: "The net result was that ZANLA would stop laying landmines on roads regularly swept by the Pookie and lay them elsewhere in the hope that they would not be found before they could achieve their objective."

That's a thoroughly interesting link.

I'd previously only read Dr Wood's Helicopter Warfare: 1962-1980 article and found it very informative. I found it an excellent bit of further reading after Chris Cocks' Fireforce.



There are a couple of books on vehicle development. Rhodesian contacts were proud of their record and as part of the relationship with South Africa gave the SADF full access, even one example of each vehicle. After 1980 IIRC they were amazed to see how much the SADF had developed the concepts further, usually putting them into service in SW Africa (Namibia now) and annoyed they had not been updated.

I'm not surprised at how amazed the Rhodesians would have been at seeing what the South Africans had accomplished. When you consider how quickly things seemed to progress from looking at Pookie prototypes to developing the Bosvark, the Buffel and then the Casspir, it's an incredible achievement. Then to consider how successful both the Buffel and the Casspir have been over the last three decades or more, it's really quite remarkable. They've been quite long-lived vehicles.

[JMA]

Moderator's Note: thread created to help JMA and gain hopefully responses (ends)

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

Condor, further to my first response here is a further comment from elsewhere from Peter Petter-Bowyer:

-----------------------------

Background to FAC and GAC
By Peter Petter Bowyer

Then Rhodesian forces of Federal days had an obligation to Britain to support her Baghdad Treaty obligation in any conflict in the Middle East. In addition British interests in Africa were to be supported, when needed, by Rhodesia.

Therefore the Federal Army and the RRAF (Royal Rhodesian Air Force) trained for conventional operations based on British military systems which were themselves based on WW ll principles. In this regard the RRAF trained Army battalion and sub unit commanders in the methods necessary to effectively direct air strike pilots against enemy targets visible to their own forces. This was essentially an RAF systems known as Forward Air (Strike) Control or FAC.

After some cock-ups experienced during Operation Cauldron (1968) it was necessary to adopt totally different techniques for counter insurgency operations in bushveld conditions. So a home-grown method of FAC was developed by the Rhodesian Air Force in co-operation with RLI Commando Commanders and SAS. We called this method of Ground to Air Control of air strikes, GAC. Once developed and proven, most army units were trained for GAC.

---------------------------

Group Captain Petter-Bowyer has published an extremely interesting autobiography - "Winds of Destruction" (http://www.amazon.com/Winds-Destruction-Autobiography-Rhodesian-Combat-ebook/dp/B0094JTPD6/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1390727348&sr=1-1&keywords=winds+of+destruction+the+autobiography+of +a+rhodesian+combat+pilot)

Only possible in a very small airforce 'PB' was involved in most of the developments in the Rhodesian Air force and the war - importantly the home grown weapons development.

[BayonetBrant]

Personally, I think the Rhodesians got screwed, and the rest of the world is loath to admit it, because of the inevitable screams of 'racism' that will inevitably accompany anyone attempting to voice support for a post-colonial nation that had a white-skinned head of state resisting an "opposition" of black-skinned terrorists.


I'm interested in the lessons of Rhodesia at least in part to help avoid future catastrophes where superficial narratives obscure much deeper ethnic problems (paging Dr Kosovo!) and that the "public" solution often ends up being far worse than even status quo. Is Zimbabwe/Rhodesia really better off after 30 years of "self-determination" (read: "mugabe"-determination) than they would've been under the government that existing in 1974?


Additionally, the individual tales are, quite frankly, a riot to read.

[Condor]

JMA,

I appreciate the suggestions and I will try to pick up a copy of each. I believe it was member jcustis who made a statement something along the lines of "I don't think we [the US] are utilizing our rotary wing assets as efficiently or effectively as we could be". As a former US Marine helicopter pilot with a couple of tours in OIF, it struck me like a sledgehammer to the forehead that a fellow Marine (and ground pounder to boot if I am reading between the lines correctly) would say such a thing about his fellow brothers in the air. We have always prided ourselves (within the Marines) as providing our brothers on the ground with the best possible air support one could expect when the going gets rough. With that being said, after much self-reflection I believe there was some elements of truth to his claim. While I am no longer serving, I do think there is much to be gleaned from other air forces around the world and how they have operated and been successful (or failed). Some of what I have read recently on this topic piqued my interest so I have been trying to spend what little free time I have reading about the subject. While no doubt the size, uniqueness and intimacy that the Rhodesian Air Force enjoyed probably helped contribute to its successes (and the fact it was fighting for its very existence) one must wonder why there seems to be so little study on this subject? Politics aside, I do think there is a lot to learn from this period and with budget realities starting to hit the US Military maybe there will be some movement to start thinking creatively while retaining capable, effective and reliable aviation assets without breaking the bank. Unfortunately, I feel us Americans always want to buy the Ferrari rather than the Ford when it comes to military aircraft. Maybe that day is soon coming to an end. I've always argued we need more A-10 and CH-53E type aircraft and less F-35 and MV-22 type aircraft.

[JMA]

I'm not surprised at how amazed the Rhodesians would have been at seeing what the South Africans had accomplished. When you consider how quickly things seemed to progress from looking at Pookie prototypes to developing the Bosvark, the Buffel and then the Casspir, it's an incredible achievement. Then to consider how successful both the Buffel and the Casspir have been over the last three decades or more, it's really quite remarkable. They've been quite long-lived vehicles.

Development in South Africa was parallel where the SAP (police) and the military worked separately with the military retaining the conventional chassis with its suspension system (the Buffel) while the SAP developed the monocoque design used by Konchel in Rhodesia on the Leopard further (into the Casspir).

It should be noted that while Rhodesian vehicles were designed to travel on roads and tracks the South Africans developed vehicles with cross country capability to avoid roads and tracks that could be mined.

Book to read:

Taming the Landmine - by Peter Stiff (http://www.amazon.com/Taming-Landmine-Peter-Stiff/dp/0947020047/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391254243&sr=1-1&keywords=taming+the+landmine)

[JMA]

Personally, I think the Rhodesians got screwed, and the rest of the world is loath to admit it, because of the inevitable screams of 'racism' that will inevitably accompany anyone attempting to voice support for a post-colonial nation that had a white-skinned head of state resisting an "opposition" of black-skinned terrorists.

I'm interested in the lessons of Rhodesia at least in part to help avoid future catastrophes where superficial narratives obscure much deeper ethnic problems (paging Dr Kosovo!) and that the "public" solution often ends up being far worse than even status quo. Is Zimbabwe/Rhodesia really better off after 30 years of "self-determination" (read: "mugabe"-determination) than they would've been under the government that existing in 1974?

Additionally, the individual tales are, quite frankly, a riot to read.

The world is not yet ready or mature enough to discuss such matters rationally - as evidenced by the recent thread in the Journal. And that was arrogant yet totally ignorant Americans.

Better one looks to the current CAR and South Sudan for - once again - graphic proof of how thin the veneer of civiliazation really is. Have just spent a year in West Africa you can pull more examples from there. Not to mention Rwanda.

Disclaimer - before some luntic clown points a finger and screams racism at me I need to place on record that the Bosnia example proves (as did the Germans 70 years ago) how thin that veneer of civiliazation is universally.

But here we talk of Africa.

Xenophobia to the extent where people from different tribes/religions will be killed at a drop of a hat - if they stray into the wrong area - still exists as evidenced in many examples from across Africa on an almost daily basis (as it does in gang areas in LA and elsewhere).

The problem is that many Africans deny the existence of tribalism on the basis that it makes Africans look uncivilised and undeveloped ... and sadly there are idiots out there who believe this.

I had an experience in Mozambique about 20 years ago where at a program meeting which was attended a senior (female) USAID person (the donor) we all were told by her that there was no tribalism in Mozambique. I dared to ask her how she had arrived at this position and she responded - I kid you not - that her driver had assured her of this. (she was shagging her driver).

I realised at that moment that if relatively senior US decision makers on the loose in Africa were that gullible/ignorant then all was lost.

Twenty years on it has - in my humble opinion - got worse.

[Biggus]

Taming the Landmine - by Peter Stiff (http://www.amazon.com/Taming-Landmine-Peter-Stiff/dp/0947020047/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391254243&sr=1-1&keywords=taming+the+landmine)

Thank you for the tip.

[flagg]

My interest lies largely with the back to the wall innovation displayed by Rhodesian forces.

My greatest interest lies in Selous Scouts/Special Branch, SAS, and RLI operations....most specifically with external operations conducted by SAS and Selous Scouts.

There have been some great books out in recent years about the conflict.

A recent couple of titles seem well regarded but VERY hard to come by, such as Pittaway's book series on SAS and Selous Scouts:

http://dandy.co.za/

Unfortunately, out of print.

I'd just about sell my soul if I could find a copy of Pittaway's SAS: The Men Speak and especially Selous Scouts: The Men Speak

Recently read Viscount Down and was quite impressed with the book to go along with Ron Reid Daly's Selous Scouts book and Barbara Cole's The Elite.

Just lined up Dennis Croukamp's Bush War book next and waiting for a book on Rhodesian Special Branch.

I wonder how relevant the paramilitary merge between Selous Scouts and Special Branch is in today's climate and the likely future climate?

[JMA]

My interest lies largely with the back to the wall innovation displayed by Rhodesian forces.

My greatest interest lies in Selous Scouts/Special Branch, SAS, and RLI operations....most specifically with external operations conducted by SAS and Selous Scouts.

There have been some great books out in recent years about the conflict.

A recent couple of titles seem well regarded but VERY hard to come by, such as Pittaway's book series on SAS and Selous Scouts:

http://dandy.co.za/

Unfortunately, out of print.

I'd just about sell my soul if I could find a copy of Pittaway's SAS: The Men Speak and especially Selous Scouts: The Men Speak

Recently read Viscount Down and was quite impressed with the book to go along with Ron Reid Daly's Selous Scouts book and Barbara Cole's The Elite.

Just lined up Dennis Croukamp's Bush War book next and waiting for a book on Rhodesian Special Branch.

I wonder how relevant the paramilitary merge between Selous Scouts and Special Branch is in today's climate and the likely future climate?

Hi Flagg,

Had breakfast with Jonathan Pittaway this morning and sadly there are no immediate plans for additional print runs for his SAS and Selous Scouts books. Keep your eyes out on e-bay.

Don't forget the RLI book (proceeds to the Regimental Association):

Africa's Commandos: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (http://alturl.com/u58ib)

Other books can be found on facebook group: Rhodesian War Books (https://www.facebook.com/groups/329912373706110/) including fiction.

[McArthur]

My interest is in the use of pseudo-operations during the Rhodesian Bush War.

Reading about the Selous Scouts prompted me to begin studying pseudo ops, and I've been working (albeit slowly :o ) on the project for the past year.

- Mac

[davidbfpo]

My interest is in the use of pseudo-operations during the Rhodesian Bush War. Reading about the Selous Scouts prompted me to begin studying pseudo ops, and I've been working (albeit slowly :o ) on the project for the past year.

- Mac

Mac,

You are not alone in this interest. At one stage quite a few books often with a more military emphasis referred to such tactics aka "dirty tricks", then there was a pause and IIRC a book by an ex-BSAP officer, Ellert being the author, added a lot more. I don't think we know much today, if records existed they have gone and now Rhodesian memories are fading away. In my reading I have yet to encounter the views of the targets, the liberation fighters.

The Ellert book was published in 1989:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Rhodesian-front-war-Counter-insurgency-Zambeziana/dp/0869224360/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391698803&sr=1-1&keywords=ellert+%2B+rhodesia

[JMA]

Condor,

From the book Africa's Commandos comes this quote:

“Fire Force was the end product of a philosophy, a philosophy that ignored the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, convention, rank, petty rule books and personal agendas so prevalent in the behaviour of the modern military. Fire Force was a manifestation of an ethos that like-minded commanders of all ranks and of all arms needed to combine their considerable talents in a collective effort to constantly evaluate the battlefield, to be self-critical in all analyses, and to strive to work for the greater good.” - NIGEL HENSON

Henson's article on fire force with superb diagrams in the book is a must read for those wishing to explore this aspect more.

I have been told by Brits and many from different US forces that this philosophy is not achievable in their systems due to interservice rivalry and other internal BS.

Would you agree?




JMA,

I appreciate the suggestions and I will try to pick up a copy of each. I believe it was member jcustis who made a statement something along the lines of "I don't think we [the US] are utilizing our rotary wing assets as efficiently or effectively as we could be". As a former US Marine helicopter pilot with a couple of tours in OIF, it struck me like a sledgehammer to the forehead that a fellow Marine (and ground pounder to boot if I am reading between the lines correctly) would say such a thing about his fellow brothers in the air. We have always prided ourselves (within the Marines) as providing our brothers on the ground with the best possible air support one could expect when the going gets rough. With that being said, after much self-reflection I believe there was some elements of truth to his claim. While I am no longer serving, I do think there is much to be gleaned from other air forces around the world and how they have operated and been successful (or failed). Some of what I have read recently on this topic piqued my interest so I have been trying to spend what little free time I have reading about the subject. While no doubt the size, uniqueness and intimacy that the Rhodesian Air Force enjoyed probably helped contribute to its successes (and the fact it was fighting for its very existence) one must wonder why there seems to be so little study on this subject? Politics aside, I do think there is a lot to learn from this period and with budget realities starting to hit the US Military maybe there will be some movement to start thinking creatively while retaining capable, effective and reliable aviation assets without breaking the bank. Unfortunately, I feel us Americans always want to buy the Ferrari rather than the Ford when it comes to military aircraft. Maybe that day is soon coming to an end. I've always argued we need more A-10 and CH-53E type aircraft and less F-35 and MV-22 type aircraft.

[JMA]

Mac,

You are not alone in this interest. At one stage quite a few books often with a more military emphasis referred to such tactics aka "dirty tricks", then there was a pause and IIRC a book by an ex-BSAP officer, Ellert being the author, added a lot more. I don't think we know much today, if records existed they have gone and now Rhodesian memories are fading away. In my reading I have yet to encounter the views of the targets, the liberation fighters.

David,

From the Rhodesian forces there has been restraint on writing about the 'dirty tricks' stuff. In those days much of what was done was considered to be smart innovation - which could be/would be viewed differently in todays world.

There is detail starting to come out with other stuff waiting for the right moment to be released. When that will be I'm not sure.

For instance A book by Ed Bird who was with SB has published a book based on the SB Diary which he took out of the country with him after the war. Disarming honesty. I know Ed, he lives down the coast a few hours and told me he was not censoring anything for the book.

Special Branch War: Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush. Southern Matabeleland, 1976-1980 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Special-Branch-War-Slaughter-Matabeleland/dp/1909982342/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391688927&sr=1-1&keywords=Special+Branch+War)

I too am in search of content from 'the other side'. Yet to find anything that seems vaguely honest. For example I bought a kindle book from a then child who was used to spy on troop movements and the like. When in his first chapter he wrote about the idyllic life experienced befor the colonists arrived I stopped reading.

Anyone with any historical knowledge would be aware of the inter clan wars and the invasion of the area some 50 years before the arrival of the colonists by the Ndebele in the 1830s made the area less than idyllic and peaceful as this liar maintains.

Another book by a female had a long piece about a supposed ambush on the Salisbury/Kariba road after which it took the Rhodesian forces three day to recover the bodies of their casualties. Nonsense, complete nonsense.

Then we have that piece - based on a doctoral thesis - published in the Journal which again was utter garbage.

It may take sometime and certainly until after the collapse of the Mugabe regime for the truth from that side to start coming out. In the meantime as per my Orwell quote below in the case of Zimbabwe it is a case of "He who controls the present controls the past."

[Firn]

@JMA: Ordered the book by Ed Bird. The fact that he took with him the SB diaries and based the book mostly on them sold it for me, apart from your approval of course. ;)

Some time ago I listened to a podcast (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vfbjxZ_BlVc) of the highly respected Christopher Browing in which he talked about the summary execution of twenty Jewish prisoners by fellow Jewish prisoners during a transfer by train.* This had been common knowledge among the survivors but only became public some twenty years ago. In other cases the dominant media narrative has slipped aspecific event into the collective memory of those survivors which never happened.

Your point about the difficulties to get 'content' from the other angle is likely a very valid one. If we consider the lenght and degree players on the other side were exposed to a rather unified narrative a lot of stuff must have been impressed and changed the memory. This is why old documents not intended for propaganda could be so important. We will see.

*Ironically similar things happened on trains bringing German POW home from the SU for similar reasons. Obviously still today is also practically only remembered that 'it' happened.

[Condor]

JMA,

First, before I answer your questions, let me say something and you can take it anyway you want. How you respond is up to you. I would appreciate it if you stop using a broad brush to paint all Americans as "arrogant and stupid". While no doubt America has it's fare share of "useful idiots" as you so like to throw out, I'd argue that there is a silent majority of Americans who are smart and hard working people who on top of all that would be willing to hand you the shirt off their back if you were in need. To continue to talk that way is an insult to the many fine people in this country. I'm sure you would take offence (<-- proper Queen's English for those so inclined) if I continually painted all former white Rhodesian's as racists and I'm sure you know that isn't correct right?

Now, back to what this thread and specifically your questions in regards to the philosophical differences of how you and your fellow Rhodesians were forced to operate and innovate as compared to the large, highly funded, culturally diverse branches of the US armed forces currently operate.

First, smaller can sometimes be better as the Rhodesian military so aptly demonstrated in its operations during the Rhodesian Bush War (if that is not the proper term you prefer to use I am listening and more than willing to correct myself). While you made it quite clear that you were unhappy with the Journal's publishing of that article about Rhodesia, the fact is that if it hadn't been for that article my thoughts and interests about your conflict may very well have stayed dormant in my memory banks forever. I was a small child living very far from that conflict when it was winding down so my first hand knowledge is pretty much non-existent except for all those Soldier of Fortune articles I read when I was young. With that being said, especially after jcustis made his remarks about how the US Marines has employed its aviation assets and specifically its rotary wing assets over the last decade plus, this entire subject has piqued my interest tremendously.

One of the problems we arrogant Americans continually make is that we want to continue to fight the large naval and amphibious battles of the Pacific, the air campaign over Nazi Germany, the rapid blitzkrieg across France and western Europe or the grinding frontal assaults of the Civil War. What I think we tend to lose focus on is the small wars, the ones we have continually been fighting since we took our independence from the Brits (no offence towards my fellow Brits who are reading this). In fact, I wouldn't be on this site if it wasn't for my interest in small wars. From these small wars there is a wealth of information to be learned, the hard part is knowing where to find it. That is what I like about this site, it helps point you in the right direction when a particular subject catches your eye.

Getting back on track, I feel that there is A LOT of tactical and operational levels to be learned from the Rhodesian Bush War. I think the Rhodesian use of aviation assets could be very beneficial for lots of militaries around the world, especially ones who are fighting "insurgents/freedom fighters/guerrillas" in some lonely long forgotten piece of land. The problem we Americans have is that we are used to abundance and in a military that spends the equivalent of many countries yearly military budgets one weapon system like a B-2 stealth bomber or a nuclear powered aircraft carrier it can be hard to be innovative. Between our gluttonous appetite for expensive weapon systems and our ever increasing technology addiction we tend to forget that the greatest asset is the person. The less a person has the more innovative they will have to become in order to achieve success when faced with challenging circumstances. So from a pure "doing more with less" mentality most of the US and its military are poor examples of that. The one traditional exception to this role has been that of the US Marines but over the last 20 years I'm starting to believe that even Marines are becoming addicted to the "large expenditure/ fancy weapon systems" crowd. Classic examples of this are the Corps primary replacement aviation assets of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft. Both of these aircraft are tremendously expensive and I'm still skeptical of how useful they really would be in a conflict such as the one Rhodesia found itself in. I believe aircraft like the H-60 and A-10 would be much more useful, appropriate, survival and most importantly cheap, like REALLY cheap compared to the MV-22/F-35. When you take into account the increase in night vision device technology (which itself can practically be bought off the counter now) and small cheap UAVs these things could be integrated into lethal utility without high overhead costs. You made mention about how the Rhodesian Air Force was pretty much "grounded" at night due to limitations of available night vision devices, can you image how much they would have changed the picture if your air force had access to these back then?

In regards to inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc I think this becomes a two way street. First, I think inter-service rivalry can be healthy as it breeds competition and this competition can force people to take pride in their unit/organization and to push themselves to be better. At the local level, I've worked with every branch of the US armed forces including the Coast Guard and all of them have had their share of go-getters and a few turds sprinkled in here and there. I think the problems were are seeing today within the US have to do with leadership but I have faith that if a large enough crisis came about the cream would actually rise to the top and we'd see a completely different military than what we are seeing right now. I'm kind of a Churchill student in the sense that I have faith in my fellow citizen when the time comes for the hard work to be done. When it's easy going, the sloths seem to appear and take over (no offense to the animal).

Yes, I think vested interests, rules and the like can be bad especially if they become self serving and take away from the greater good. I'm an idealist when it comes to the greater good, I always hope people will set aside their petty differences to do what's RIGHT for the big picture. Unfortunately, this is often not the case as some of us well know.

Your war was unique in many ways and much of what Rhodesia went through will never apply or carry over to the US. I'm sure fighting for your very existence gives one plenty of incentive to put their heart and soul into it and equally devastating when it doesn't work out. Remember, the US went through a Great Civil War many decades ago. I often think about what it must have been like for those people back then whenever I read about the US Civil War. The thought of taking up arms against men who I had previously served with in combat is unfathomable to me but remember this was the norm when the Civil War broke out. Men who had come into the service together, went through schooling together, fought in other wars together, then woke up one day, switched uniforms (if they went with the South) and then engaged in mortal combat with their former brothers-in-arms. People can say what they want about General Robert E. Lee, but here is a guy who fought and served the US and when war broke out between the states, he had to make the decision which side he would take. When he took it, it meant fighting against the very country he had served all the while throwing the lives of thousands of his (Southern) countrymen into the cauldron of fire. When defeated he laid down his arms and asked that his men join him in defeat and not to continue the hate against their former enemy (who had once been their former countrymen-talk about a mind trip).

So in closing, the truth is a strange animal. I think there are many things about the experiences in Rhodesia that are worth studying and remembering. I also know that the innovation and approach to some of the issues you all dealt with will never apply to the US. However, for the man who is willing to dedicate his life to the profession of arms to dismiss another conflict because of its differences is a grave mistake. It is only with open discourse and rigorous study can someone become a better rounded person who can help find his way when things start to become dark. Hubris, arrogance, and complacency are sure to get you killed no matter how big a stick you carry.

[JMA]

JMA,

First, before I answer your questions, let me say something and you can take it anyway you want. How you respond is up to you. I would appreciate it if you stop using a broad brush to paint all Americans as "arrogant and stupid". While no doubt America has it's fare share of "useful idiots" as you so like to throw out, I'd argue that there is a silent majority of Americans who are smart and hard working people who on top of all that would be willing to hand you the shirt off their back if you were in need. To continue to talk that way is an insult to the many fine people in this country. I'm sure you would take offence (<-- proper Queen's English for those so inclined) if I continually painted all former white Rhodesian's as racists and I'm sure you know that isn't correct right?

Condor let me respond in this manner.

What I am continually led to believe through the international media (and privately from individual Muslims) is that the jihadists are a small minority and not representative of the so-called ‘silent majority’ of the Muslim community.

My response to them (the individuals) and anyone else who asks is that it is surely up to this supposed silent majority to ‘deal with’ the vociferous minority, yes?

In the case of the Muslim jihadists this craven ‘silent majority’ do clearly not have the balls to suppress them (what ever that entails).

Now apply that to the US.

You have no doubt heard of the “Ugly American”. Sadly the American ‘silent majority’ continues to elect the most reprehensible arrogant narcissists to national office who in turn dispatch equally arrogant (and most often ignorant) people (I’m being kind here) out to represent the nation in the world.

It should be obvious to all in the US that as a result the reputation of the US is at an all time low globally.

So what are the ‘silent majority’ doing about this?

Zip.

When last has anyone heard, “ hey you shut up… you are making Americans look bad”?

The vast majority of Americans are indeed fine people but like the majority of Muslims they don’t have the balls to deal with the arrogant a..holes who give all Americans a bad name.

OK… let’s move on.

[JMA]

Now, back to what this thread and specifically your questions in regards to the philosophical differences of how you and your fellow Rhodesians were forced to operate and innovate as compared to the large, highly funded, culturally diverse branches of the US armed forces currently operate.

Firstly, I am a South African who after my National Service in South Africa volunteered to serve in the Rhodeisan Army. But yes, I fought the Rhodsesian war and afterwards returned South to serve again there for a while before packing my webbing away for the last time.

The main difference is that Rhodesians were fighting in and for their own country... and as such have an emotional component which few outsiders can understand or share. Here very specifically I would include US expeditionary forces who, rather like me, had a safe home to return to if things went belly up.


First, smaller can sometimes be better as the Rhodesian military so aptly demonstrated in its operations during the Rhodesian Bush War (if that is not the proper term you prefer to use I am listening and more than willing to correct myself).

The term "Rhodesian Bush War" is the least emotive as oppossed to Chimurenga 2 or the 'War of Liberation' (the second of which is like a bad joke to the Zimbabwean people after their experiences of the last 30 odd years of 'liberation').


While you made it quite clear that you were unhappy with the Journal's publishing of that article about Rhodesia, ...

It wasn't an article, it was a paper based on a thesis for a masters or doctorate to some fourth rate university... and it was garbage.

His principle argument was that all the Rhodesian forces did were atrocities and the all the killings carried out by the insurgents were justifiable.

My comment was "I guess I am surprised that there has been such a limited reaction to this deliberate attempt to deceive and sanitize depraved killers. This is the great tragedy."

Obviously I am not attempting to claim that the Rhodesian forces did not commit any 'atrocities' (this needs to be defined) but I continue to be outraged that the Journal saw fit to publicise the lie that the insurgents were guiltless. The publishing of the paper unfortunately displays the naivet and gullibility that comes from media and politically correct conditioned ignorance of the situation.

(But on the lighter side it did bring muscle mouth Richard B out of the woodwork who despite his claim to being an expert on matters Rhodesian was unable to answer the question as to what happened in 1974 which was the turning point in the war. Here's one for your list of arrogant yet ignorant Americans.)

A year or so earlier the MR review had published another piece of garbage on Rhodesia again an extract of a masters thesis:

Quote from #296 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=131495&postcount=296)of the Rhodesian COIN thread:

"The Military Review published a paper by one Marno de Boer in its November / December 2011 English edition: Rhodesia's Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing'.

One wonders how he was able to defend such drivel first at thesis stage and then manage to slip it past the editorial committee of the Military Review. Quite appalling. This reflects very badly on the Military Review of course."

Another case, this time from the editorial staff of the MR, for your list of incidences of US ignorance.

In the RLI we were mainly on heliborne/parachute Fire Force operations. For the three year I was a troop commander on constant operations we were contstanly reminded of the importance of captures from an intel point of view. We killed thousands, but we also captured many... but I never allowed my troopies to be placed at risk in order to effect a capture... neither did I ever allow gratutitious killing.

To allow the people and forces of Rhodesia to be labled through the publishing of this garbage is like supporting the media lie of the time that every soldier in Vietnem was a 'baby killer'.


...the fact is that if it hadn't been for that article my thoughts and interests about your conflict may very well have stayed dormant in my memory banks forever. I was a small child living very far from that conflict when it was winding down so my first hand knowledge is pretty much non-existent except for all those Soldier of Fortune articles I read when I was young. With that being said, especially after jcustis made his remarks about how the US Marines has employed its aviation assets and specifically its rotary wing assets over the last decade plus, this entire subject has piqued my interest tremendously.

jcustis commented as follows (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=124531&postcount=281) in the Rhodesian COIN thread:

"There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days."

Now compare that with that quote I posted:

Fire Force was the end product of a philosophy, a philosophy that ignored the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, convention, rank, petty rule books and personal agendas so prevalent in the behaviour of the modern military. Fire Force was a manifestation of an ethos that like-minded commanders of all ranks and of all arms needed to combine their considerable talents in a collective effort to constantly evaluate the battlefield, to be self-critical in all analyses, and to strive to work for the greater good. - NIGEL HENSON

I am left hoping that it is not the 'philosophy' which Henson describes that jcustis believes is unattainable in the US military.


One of the problems we arrogant Americans continually make is that we want to continue to fight the large naval and amphibious battles of the Pacific, the air campaign over Nazi Germany, the rapid blitzkrieg across France and western Europe or the grinding frontal assaults of the Civil War. What I think we tend to lose focus on is the small wars, the ones we have continually been fighting since we took our independence from the Brits (no offence towards my fellow Brits who are reading this). In fact, I wouldn't be on this site if it wasn't for my interest in small wars. From these small wars there is a wealth of information to be learned, the hard part is knowing where to find it. That is what I like about this site, it helps point you in the right direction when a particular subject catches your eye.


Much of what was done in Rhodesia is not directly transferable to another war... but what is of value is the mindset which explored all the options and allowed commanders on the ground to innovate and develop new concepts and methods.

[JMA]

Getting back on track, I feel that there is A LOT of tactical and operational levels to be learned from the Rhodesian Bush War. I think the Rhodesian use of aviation assets could be very beneficial for lots of militaries around the world, especially ones who are fighting "insurgents/freedom fighters/guerrillas" in some lonely long forgotten piece of land. The problem we Americans have is that we are used to abundance and in a military that spends the equivalent of many countries yearly military budgets one weapon system like a B-2 stealth bomber or a nuclear powered aircraft carrier it can be hard to be innovative. Between our gluttonous appetite for expensive weapon systems and our ever increasing technology addiction we tend to forget that the greatest asset is the person. The less a person has the more innovative they will have to become in order to achieve success when faced with challenging circumstances. So from a pure "doing more with less" mentality most of the US and its military are poor examples of that. The one traditional exception to this role has been that of the US Marines but over the last 20 years I'm starting to believe that even Marines are becoming addicted to the "large expenditure/ fancy weapon systems" crowd. Classic examples of this are the Corps primary replacement aviation assets of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft. Both of these aircraft are tremendously expensive and I'm still skeptical of how useful they really would be in a conflict such as the one Rhodesia found itself in. I believe aircraft like the H-60 and A-10 would be much more useful, appropriate, survival and most importantly cheap, like REALLY cheap compared to the MV-22/F-35. When you take into account the increase in night vision device technology (which itself can practically be bought off the counter now) and small cheap UAVs these things could be integrated into lethal utility without high overhead costs. You made mention about how the Rhodesian Air Force was pretty much "grounded" at night due to limitations of available night vision devices, can you image how much they would have changed the picture if your air force had access to these back then?

Yes there are many modern technology innovations that would have been very valuable to us back then - 1st generation night vision was in use back then but we did not have it - but I suppose the Russians would have made weapons available to them too - thinking mainly anti aircraft - which would have made attacks on their external bases more difficult or impossible. So what I am saying is that technology itself does not ensure victory. It is how it is applied that makes the difference.


In regards to inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc I think this becomes a two way street. First, I think inter-service rivalry can be healthy as it breeds competition and this competition can force people to take pride in their unit/organization and to push themselves to be better. At the local level, I've worked with every branch of the US armed forces including the Coast Guard and all of them have had their share of go-getters and a few turds sprinkled in here and there. I think the problems were are seeing today within the US have to do with leadership but I have faith that if a large enough crisis came about the cream would actually rise to the top and we'd see a completely different military than what we are seeing right now. I'm kind of a Churchill student in the sense that I have faith in my fellow citizen when the time comes for the hard work to be done. When it's easy going, the sloths seem to appear and take over (no offense to the animal).

But the US does not fight wars where the national interest is sufficient to override the the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc.


Yes, I think vested interests, rules and the like can be bad especially if they become self serving and take away from the greater good. I'm an idealist when it comes to the greater good, I always hope people will set aside their petty differences to do what's RIGHT for the big picture. Unfortunately, this is often not the case as some of us well know.

Perhaps this is jcustis was alluding to here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=131495&highlight=Military+Review#post131495) when he said:

"There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days."


Your war was unique in many ways and much of what Rhodesia went through will never apply or carry over to the US. I'm sure fighting for your very existence gives one plenty of incentive to put their heart and soul into it and equally devastating when it doesn't work out.

This failure by US forces to put themselves in the position of the combatants (especially those they side with) in foreign wars is the principle weakness.


Remember, the US went through a Great Civil War many decades ago. I often think about what it must have been like for those people back then whenever I read about the US Civil War. The thought of taking up arms against men who I had previously served with in combat is unfathomable to me but remember this was the norm when the Civil War broke out. Men who had come into the service together, went through schooling together, fought in other wars together, then woke up one day, switched uniforms (if they went with the South) and then engaged in mortal combat with their former brothers-in-arms. People can say what they want about General Robert E. Lee, but here is a guy who fought and served the US and when war broke out between the states, he had to make the decision which side he would take. When he took it, it meant fighting against the very country he had served all the while throwing the lives of thousands of his (Southern) countrymen into the cauldron of fire. When defeated he laid down his arms and asked that his men join him in defeat and not to continue the hate against their former enemy (who had once been their former countrymen-talk about a mind trip).

If you can get your head arround that you can start to figure out the ultra complex issues around wars and insurgencies around the world.


So in closing, the truth is a strange animal. I think there are many things about the experiences in Rhodesia that are worth studying and remembering. I also know that the innovation and approach to some of the issues you all dealt with will never apply to the US. However, for the man who is willing to dedicate his life to the profession of arms to dismiss another conflict because of its differences is a grave mistake. It is only with open discourse and rigorous study can someone become a better rounded person who can help find his way when things start to become dark. Hubris, arrogance, and complacency are sure to get you killed no matter how big a stick you carry.

Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.

However, superficial study is worse than no study.

Thank you for taking the time to respond in detail. Much appreciated.

[jmm99]

Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in Algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.

I "recalled" the same "memory", but the "halibut" was not "recalling" in which SWC thread. Initially, France's war in Algeria: telling the story (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15864), seemed the likely candidate - it begins with A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=808&postcount=1). Your comment caused me to read through the thread (only 7 pages), which includes for 2010 over a dozen posts by each of such as Wilf (William F. Owen), JMA and jmm99 - some have actually stood the test of time. :)

The thought occurs that compilations of some "interactive" SWC threads (which often involve "peer review" plus) would be more useful to the practitioner than an equal number of SWJ articles - but, I digress (well, not too much).

"Alas", in the Algeria thread, I found no idiot ("useful" or otherwise) whose equation was "French resort to torture in Algeria = Nothing to be learned from that conflict".

Perhaps, however, this post by you in another thread, Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=104635), is what we remember (#116 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=104635&postcount=116)), which was your negative review of Demarest, Let's Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of US COIN Doctrine. (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100831_art006.pdf) (2010; in Military Review !).

Your BLUF on that was:


Study the Algerian war and read what Galula and Trinquier have to say and then figure it all out from there. Because it was a brutal war (from both sides) and where torture was the order of the day does that necessarily detract from other measures adopted such as the quadrillage system?

Why does it have to come down to selecting one person's idea and trying to force fit it into every insurgency situation you experience? The strategy options should be like a set of golf clubs. Pick what club you need for the shot you face.

Which is a good point, but you make another one:


I really don't understand the US military. They had McCuen and it seems he was as good as you get and he was a product of the US system speaking the same language and sharing the common culture but he was all but ignored.

Yeah, Jack McCuen was (r.i.p.) a Troll from below the Mackinac Bridge and I'm a Yooper; but that's not a good reason to ignore him (besides, ya gotta watch them Trolls from Lower Michigan). :D

That led me to ask how often McCuen has been mentioned on SWC.

"McCuen" has been mentioned only 75 times on SWC, with a limited number of people doing the mentioning and discussing him substantively:

jmm99 - 34 posts

JMA - 17 posts

Cavguy - 6 posts

Ken White - 4 posts

The balance of the remaining 14 posts include McCuen only in quotes, or are one-timers.

"McCuen's" adds 16 posts; 1 isolate and:

jmm99 - 11 posts

JMA - 2 posts

Cavguy - 2 posts

I suspect that McCuen is generally ignored because of ignorance of his concepts (the book isn't read); but then there may be some slam dunk argument that debunks him. I've yet to see it.

Of course, McCuen can enter the discussion without his explicit mention. E.g., here's a conversation in the Algeria thread (not based on Algeria, but generalized from Country "X") that Wilf and I had, where my take on the concurrent "military struggle" (Wilf) and "political struggle" (jmm99) was largely based on Jack McCuen (at least in my mind) - #79 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100617&postcount=79), #81 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100654&postcount=81), #82 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100656&postcount=82), #83 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100658&postcount=83), #86 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100688&postcount=86), #87 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100720&postcount=87), #88 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100766&postcount=88), #89 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100772&postcount=89). Our conversation ended there - obviously, it could have gone on from novella to novel. Wilf always wanted to steal "my" Special Branch. :)

Just some of my generalized thoughts, hopefully not extraneous here.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I "recalled" the same "memory", but the "halibut" was not "recalling" in which SWC thread. Initially, France's war in Algeria: telling the story (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15864), seemed the likely candidate - it begins with A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=808&postcount=1). Your comment caused me to read through the thread (only 7 pages), which includes for 2010 over a dozen posts by each of such as Wilf (William F. Owen), JMA and jmm99 - some have actually stood the test of time. :)

The thought occurs that compilations of some "interactive" SWC threads (which often involve "peer review" plus) would be more useful to the practitioner than an equal number of SWJ articles - but, I digress (well, not too much).

"Alas", in the Algeria thread, I found no idiot ("useful" or otherwise) whose equation was "French resort to torture in Algeria = Nothing to be learned from that conflict".

Spent a good few minutes looking for that offending post myself. Closest I came was this one in the Journal:

Galula Relevant Anymore? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/galula-relevant-anymore)

My comment was:


by JMA (not verified) | November 16, 2010 - 8:42am
Why the attempt to narrow the field of study? If anything students of war should widen their area of study and absolutely resist the temptation of hooking onto one particular view. Earlier we saw an attempt to to write off lessons from Algeria because the French used torture (so there, I guess, goes every war). Open minds must function like sponges there can be not limit to what can be studied.

Not sure how much earlier that was... clearly before November 2010.

[jmm99]

Your negative review of Demarest was 8 Aug 2010 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=104635&postcount=116).

The comments on Galula (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/galula-relevant-anymore) also include one by Gian Gentile (snips):


by gian p gentile (not verified) | November 15, 2010
...
Moreover, why the defense of him? sheesh, how would it sound if I were calling for the complete relevance, at the operational and strategic levels, of Enrst Junger and "Storm of Steel"? In a sense we have elevated the tactics and operational method proposed by David Galula, based on his experience as an infantry company commander in an area about 10k by 10k in the mountains of North Algeria with about 10,000 local inhabitants and a handful of insurgents, to the level of high relevance. In short, Galula was a tactician of coin, hence the comparison to Junger as a tactician of offensive maneuver in WWI trench warfare.
...
Besides, and back to the comparison to Junger, remember that the French lost in Algeria. But the consumption with the tactics of coin causes folks to overlook this essential fact. It is not that Galula should not be read because he should, but the danger is to place faith in the notion that better tactics at coin can rescue failed strategy and policy. What saved the French in Algeria was not the better tactics of David Galula, but the better policy of de Gaulle when he decided to leave.

To understand what Gian is talking about, one must have at least passing familiarity with Enrst Junger's "Storm of Steel (http://www.amazon.com/Storm-Steel-Penguin-Classics-J%C3%BCnger/dp/0142437905)", and Galula's "Pacification in Algeria (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf)" (freebie), which indeed describes Galula's "experience as an infantry company commander in an area about 10k by 10k in the mountains of North Algeria with about 10,000 local inhabitants and a handful of insurgents." (JMM: a bit more than a "handful").

If our world were perfect, Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0275993035), would be the theoretical preface-introduction to his practical "Pacification in Algeria". That sequence (short theoretical introduction; longer practical historical exemplars) was, of course, Jack McCuen's method of presentation. From "Pacification":


298 Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958

III.
A Few Concluding Remarks

1. Better a bad plan than no plan at all. The one offered here has the merit of existing.

2. A better plan will certainly be found, but only if one draws on the experience of all the cadres who, whatever their position, were confronted with the various problems raised by pacification in Algeria. They are groping now. One has the right to grope, but not forever. For instance, one can imagine ten methods to make a census, but there is surely one better than the others; this is the one that must be chosen, widely applied, and generally imposed.

3. The best way to assess a plan is to test it in the field. Its imperfections will then appear. It is only thereafter, when the plan has been revised, that one has the right to apply it everywhere. For the experience to be profitable, it must be conducted, not only with the leaders in charge of implementing the plan in the test area, but also with a crowd of observers, who will follow the experiment from A to Z, will take part in its final critique, and will subsequently move elsewhere, not to implement it directly themselves but to instruct and control the local cadres.

March 21, 1957
Captain D. Galula
Colonial Infantry
45th B.I.C.
S.P. 86-836 AFN

Perhaps, that would have slowed down those (apparently Zenpundit (http://zenpundit.com/?p=3603), Mark Safranski, among them) who seem to insist that, since Galula looks to Mao for theory, commies and poor people are requisites for insurgencies (revolutions), and thus for Galula's "counterinsurgency warfare" ("counterrevolutionary warfare"). Of course, reading Galula's two books together requires one to absorb the fact that the Algeria revolution was primarily Islamic-nationalistic (although it certainly had communist states among its cheerleaders and materiel supporters).

So, those who ignore the history before them, are ... bound to be ignorant.

Regards (one "sponge mind" to another :))

Mike

[carl]

It is disappointing to me that Gian would be so dismissive of Galula's experience. Galula spent almost the whole time between the end of WWII and his assumption of his command directly observing, sometimes very directly observing small wars (the Chinese Civil War post 1945 maybe being not so small) on two continents and at least four countries. That is a very great depth of experience to which he added practical command experience.

There are few contemporary Americans who can match that.

[jmm99]

Gian can defend himself - my only comment is that he read both of Galula's books (unlike some other Galula critics) and only then delivered his opinion - albeit, not what I'd say about Galula (which agrees with your comment re: his pre-Algeria and post-Algeria experiences).

But then, I've followed up Galula's two books with Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency (http://www.amazon.com/Galula-Writings-Officer-Defined-Counterinsurgency/dp/1440800499); and Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory (http://www.amazon.com/Galula-Algeria-Counterinsurgency-Practice-International/dp/0313395756); as well as some articles in French - e.g., DAVID GALULA: “LE CLAUSEWITZ DE LA CONTRE-INSURRECTION” (http://maisonducombattant.over-blog.com/pages/David_Galula_19191968-487697.html).

Depends on how much of an Info-Sponge one becomes.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Weed out your PM Inbox - It's at its 50 PM limit. Then I'll re-send the PM.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

It is disappointing to me that Gian would be so dismissive of Galula's experience. Galula spent almost the whole time between the end of WWII and his assumption of his command directly observing, sometimes very directly observing small wars (the Chinese Civil War post 1945 maybe being not so small) on two continents and at least four countries. That is a very great depth of experience to which he added practical command experience.

There are few contemporary Americans who can match that.

But many contemporary Americans are trying to match that... and a few others including an Aussie too.

It appears that to establish themselves they need to demeen those before them. This is a pity and IMHO diminishes the critics more than those being criticised, in this case Galula.

However in the posted quote Gentile says: "It is not that Galula should not be read because he should, but the danger is to place faith in the notion that better tactics at coin can rescue failed strategy and policy."

In this he is quite obviously correct.

However, he makes the same mistake as many youngsters trying to make a name for themselves in haste whereby he uses the win/lose words too freely and fails to understand - yes I mean that - that soldiers at the tactical level can only refine and develop better and more effective theatre specific tactics and methods and have very little effect on strategy and policy.

My guess is that - in keeping with my theory - that he never spent a few years as a young officer learning his trade commanding a platoon in war. This would diminish his opinion greatly IMHO.

[JMA]

Gian can defend himself - my only comment is that he read both of Galula's books (unlike some other Galula critics) and only then delivered his opinion - albeit, not what I'd say about Galula (which agrees with your comment re: his pre-Algeria and post-Algeria experiences).

But then, I've followed up Galula's two books with Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency (http://www.amazon.com/Galula-Writings-Officer-Defined-Counterinsurgency/dp/1440800499); and Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory (http://www.amazon.com/Galula-Algeria-Counterinsurgency-Practice-International/dp/0313395756); as well as some articles in French - e.g., DAVID GALULA: “LE CLAUSEWITZ DE LA CONTRE-INSURRECTION” (http://maisonducombattant.over-blog.com/pages/David_Galula_19191968-487697.html).

Depends on how much of an Info-Sponge one becomes.

Regards

Mike

Very good Sponge-Mike... impressed.

Lets hope the sponge thing will go viral... ;)

Then let's follow up with the bag of golf clubs analogy.

14 clubs allowed in a bag... that means we can allow 14 references in the bag of soldiers trying to understand insurgencies and counterinsurgent 'methods' (used to include policy, strategy and tactics)

So the task is to list 14 references/books/etc which should be continually studied (not just read and then discarded) which will provide young officers a solid foundation of understanding in respect of counter-insurgency.

I get first shot and nominate:

1) The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen.
2) ...
3) ...
etc

(PS: if anyone knows the heirs to the McCuen estate please prevail on them to get a reprint and a Kindle version as Amazon prices of $150 is outrageous.)

[davidbfpo]

JMA's challenge:
Then let's follow up with the bag of golf clubs analogy.

14 clubs allowed in a bag... that means we can allow 14 references in the bag of soldiers trying to understand insurgencies and counterinsurgent 'methods' (used to include policy, strategy and tactics)

So the task is to list 14 references/books/etc which should be continually studied (not just read and then discarded) which will provide young officers a solid foundation of understanding in respect of counter-insurgency.

My first 'clubs' are all books on my bookshelf, my reading is due to a variety of "armchair" interests and stretches over forty years. Not in priority:

1. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall (French Indo-China)
2. Victory at Any Cost by Cecil Currey (General Giap)
3. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War by Ron Reid Daly (Rhodesia)
4. Koevoet by Jim Hooper (SW Africa Namibia)
5. Accidental Guerilla by David Kilcullen
6. The Frontier Scouts by Charles Chevenix-Trench (NW Frontier India)
7. Low Intensity Operations by Frank Kitson
8. SAS: Operation Oman by Tony Jeapes
9. SAS: The Jungle Frontier by Peter Dickens (Borneo)
10. War Comes to Garmsir: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier by Carter Malkasian (contemporary Afghanistan)

Not on my bookshelf, but left a profound impression:

11. A Savage War of Peace by Alistair Horne (Algeria)

SWC has a number of reading lists on COIN and IIRC CT. They often cause much debate as to their value.

[carl]

However, he makes the same mistake as many youngsters trying to make a name for themselves in haste whereby he uses the win/lose words too freely and fails to understand - yes I mean that - that soldiers at the tactical level can only refine and develop better and more effective theatre specific tactics and methods and have very little effect on strategy and policy.

Absolutely. Gian provides two more examples of that. Once years ago in a Journal comment a National Guard Special Forces SGT said that Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare helped him a lot when he was in Afghanistan. Gian jumped all over him about how it wasn't a good book. And in another case there was a Blog article (I think) about how the Marines were having their guys read West's The Village. Gian got upset because he didn't think that provided the proper historical depth and breadth.

I couldn't understand that. If a SGT on the spot said a book helped him, it is by definition of value. The Marines were recommending something that might help privates and SGTs do a better job, not write better papers in history class. Like you say, if it helps the people down low it is good even if it doesn't, in some people's view, properly address 'strategy'.

My vote for inclusion in the bag of clubs:

The Village by West.

(I don't mean to pick on Gian but he always make an impression and his name is easy to remember.)

[jmm99]

(PS: if anyone knows the heirs to the McCuen estate please prevail on them to get a reprint and a Kindle version as Amazon prices of $150 is outrageous.)

Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/The-Art-Counter-Revolutionary-Strategy-Counter-insurgency/dp/B0006BOEKK) and AbeBooks (http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?tn=Art+Counter-revolutionary+War) range from $135 to $250 used.

The McCuens did the reprint idea in 2005 with a small publisher, Hailer Publishing, in St. Petersberg, Florida. Hailer republished a number of rare military works, including McCuen. It was in business in Apr 2011 when I cited McCuen here at SWC, but has since gone defunct (its webpage (http://www.hailerpublishing.com/) is now a link to small self-publishing houses). Hailer's books were paperbacks, but used good scans of the originals - McCuen was about $15-20.

There probably are more used copies of McCuen floating around South Africa than in the US; as I ran into this in looking for Hailer and McCuen - Vigilantes: A contemporary form of repression (http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/component/content/article/1442-vigilantes-a-contemporary-form-of-repression.html) (1989), which has these snips re: Beaufre (another one I've sponged up) and McCuen:


The explicit adoption of low intensity conflict strategy by South Africa's security establishment appears to fall into two phases. The adoption and implementation of the military establishment's current strategic blueprint coincided with the entrenchment of the influence of the military establishment through the accession to power of P W Botha and General Magnus Malan. This blueprint is a direct application of the military theories of the French General Andrew Beaufre. Beaufre, who was a general in the Algerian civil war, argued in his book 'Introduction to Strategy' for a military approach that acknowledged the existence of an extended battlefield. In Beaufre's theory, the battlefield must be extended to encompass all aspects of a civil society, particularly social and ideological spheres, such as the radio and the classroom. According to Beaufre, the proper concern of the military should be extended to co-ordinating all aspects of a civil society.

The dissolution of the boundaries between military and civil society as Beaufre proposed has now passed into South African political lexicon - 'total strategy' in response to 'total war'. The clearest adoption of Beaufre's recommendations, and equally the clearest expression of the influence of the military establishment in South African politics is the elaborate co-ordinating security structure known as the Joint Management Security System. It should be mentioned that a young South African lieutenant, Magnus Malan, served as a military observer in Algeria in the very regiments under the command of General Beaufre. Beaufre's book has long been prescribed reading at the South African Military Academy.

In the mid-1980s, South African strategists appeared to be swinging towards the more practical theories of Colonel J. J. McCuen, who developed his theories of counter-insurgency warfare in Vietnam. McCuen's writing belongs to the genre known as low intensity conflict theory. This school of thought is now dominant amongst United States counter-insurgency theories, particularly over the 'Westmoreland strategy' applied in Vietnam. General Westmoreland's approach to counter-insurgency was to make maximum military use of technologically superior resources and firepower to smash a third world enemy. The Westmoreland school believed in 'asphalting Vietnam'.
...
In 1986 General Meiring, the former general of the South West Africa Territory Force, expressed his preference for McCuen's theories over the abstractions of Beaufre. They are more practical, more explicit on the particular 'hard war' steps such as the creation of counter-revolutionary groups, and 'soft war' (WHAM) steps including electrification of townships the military should undertake in its WHAM strategy. In late 1986, McCuen's theory had been precised to a 75-page document entitled 'The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare' and distributed throughout the Management Security System.

What is apparent in McCuen's theory, and in the speeches of its South African proponents, is that the creation of a political solution requires not a commitment to political bargaining, not even top-down reform, but a bottom-up reconstruction of political forces. The move from total strategy to (active) low intensity conflict is the subtle move from controlling dissent to reorganising politics. Phillips and Swilling date the shift as occurring in 1985/6, the same time that vigilantes emerged.

(footnotes omitted).

Mark, you have discussed Beaufre and McCuen before in the context of South African military education - so, I toss the ball back to you with a question: Did Beaufre and McCuen have any impact in Rhodesia; or was that too much earlier than their acceptance in South Africa ?

Regards

Mike

PS:

I get only one choice, and McCuen is taken; so, to continue the list:

1. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen - JMA

2. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall - David

3. The Village by West - Carl

4. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition) (http://www.amazon.com/dp/080326366X) - jmm99

5. .....

[slapout9]

Don't forget Roger Trinquier-Modern Warfare.

[jmm99]

but do you want Roger Trinquier-Modern Warfare as your choice (one per customer) to the 14-club golf bag - aka subaltern's ruck ?

Be definite.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Yes, I would Trinquier to be read....it is a very how to do it book.


McCuen is the best especially for Americans but as you say it is taken. I have the Hailer edition sorry to hear the company went bad. I had an issues with the delivery of the book. Made 1 phone call and problem was solved at their expense.


How come davidfpro gets 11 clubs and all the rest just get 1.:D


McCuen also has the best overall concept as it is a Counter Revolution.......Counter Insurgency is a weird word to describe what is actually happening........ which is a Revolution and it's Counter. Just some extra free advice to clear things up for everyone.:eek:

[jmm99]

1. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen - JMA

2. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall - David

3. The Village by West - Carl

4. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition) - jmm99

5. Roger Trinquier - Modern Warfare - Slapout9

6. ...

-----------------------------------------
I'm following the "rules" set by JMA - it's his thread; his "command", as they say.

David was only being his usual helpful self; proving that a Sponge-David soaks up more than a Sponge-Mike. But, I ruthlessly kept only his first entry on his list.

Someone had to be "adjutant" for this list; anyone else wants it, they are welcome.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Don't forget Roger Trinquier-Modern Warfare.

Roger Trinquier - Modern Warfare.pdf (http://louisville.edu/armyrotc/files/Roger%20Trinquier%20-%20Modern%20Warfare.pdf/view)

[JMA]

Thanks Mike, appreciate you taking care of the staff work on this one.

David please confirm that is your choice.




1. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen - JMA

2. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall - David

3. The Village by West - Carl

4. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition) - jmm99

5. Roger Trinquier - Modern Warfare - Slapout9

6. ...

-----------------------------------------
I'm following the "rules" set by JMA - it's his thread; his "command", as they say.

David was only being his usual helpful self; proving that a Sponge-David soaks up more than a Sponge-Mike. But, I ruthlessly kept only his first entry on his list.

Someone had to be "adjutant" for this list; anyone else wants it, they are welcome.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Here are some secondary selections that other people should pick.

Slow Burn by De Forest

Silence Was a Weapon by Herrington

War Comes to Long An by Race

The entire body of work by Bing West.

What may be a surprise selection to some but it was actually Robert Thompson who came up with this one.-any of the Jim Corbett books on hunting man-eaters. The reason for this one is it gives the best picture of what living under the threat of terror coming for you in the night is like.

War Comes to Garmser by Malkasian (I stole this from David).

The Philippine Insurrection books by Brian Linn, especially accounts of the intel work against the shadow governments done by Lt. William T. Johnston.

Small Wars Manual by USMC.

[carl]

Another one that somebody else should submit.

All the interviews Octavian Manea has done for SWJ.

[JMA]

Kindle vesion @ $3.27:

Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (http://www.amazon.com/Small-Wars-Principles-Practice-Edition/dp/080326366X/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1392251172&sr=8-2&keywords=Callwell%2C+Small+Wars%3A+Their+Principle s+and+Practice)

[JMA]

... this thread - in respect of COIN theory - seems to have dropped off the radar.

However, no reason not to continue...

I would add another book to the list.

Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping by Frank Kitson (http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=Frank+Kitson)

Kitson's personal military autobiography Bunch of Five (http://www.amazon.com/Bunch-Five-Frank-Kitson/dp/0571271359/ref=sr_sp-btf_title_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1394070004&sr=1-5&keywords=Frank+Kitson) is worth reading in conduction with the above.

Both available on Kindle.

[carl]

I just finished a book on Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish war. Very interesting. It occurs to me that because of the antagonists in that war there is a lot in English available about the activities and thoughts of the insurgents. One book that I haven't read but that looks interesting is called Guerrilla Days in Ireland by Tom Barry. He was a flying column commander.

This is the only small war I can think of where you can so easily get both sides of the story.

[McArthur]

Team,

The Rhodesia Regiment Association is releasing a book in several weeks, a definitive history of the Rhodesia Regiment. It is going for NZD$110, and looks like a really mighty volume of a book. If anybody is interested, check out their website or even flick me a PM and I can put you in touch.

There is a large expat community in my hometown in New Zealand, and the Association is based there (Along with a small museum in the local garrison bar). I know they also have a large number of books etc available for purchase.

When I get some free time I am going to fly up there to hopefully have a pint with the Association and purchase my copy of the book. I also have Chris Cock's Fireforce on it's way to me now, which I am very excited about.

Cheers all,

Mac

[flagg]

Hi Flagg,

Had breakfast with Jonathan Pittaway this morning and sadly there are no immediate plans for additional print runs for his SAS and Selous Scouts books. Keep your eyes out on e-bay.

Don't forget the RLI book (proceeds to the Regimental Association):

Africa's Commandos: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (http://alturl.com/u58ib)

Other books can be found on facebook group: Rhodesian War Books (https://www.facebook.com/groups/329912373706110/) including fiction.

I finally got my hands on two Pittaway books: SAS and Selous Scouts.

Both highly recommended. I suspect these books will continue to climb in value due to such low print volume.

Of all the books I have on the respective topics, I reckon these are both the best.

-----

I also just added this one:

Special Branch War, Ed Bird

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1909982342/

[JMA]

I finally got my hands on two Pittaway books: SAS and Selous Scouts.

Both highly recommended. I suspect these books will continue to climb in value due to such low print volume.

Of all the books I have on the respective topics, I reckon these are both the best.


Glad you came right. You want to share how much they are going for?

Now you need this one to to complete your Rhodesian unit histories ;)

AFRICA'S COMMANDOS (http://www.amazon.com/AFRICAS-COMMANDOS-Rhodesian-Infantry-Airborne/dp/1907677755/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1403483277&sr=1-1&keywords=africa%27s+commandos)

[flagg]

Glad you came right. You want to share how much they are going for?

Now you need this one to to complete your Rhodesian unit histories ;)

AFRICA'S COMMANDOS (http://www.amazon.com/AFRICAS-COMMANDOS-Rhodesian-Infantry-Airborne/dp/1907677755/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1403483277&sr=1-1&keywords=africa%27s+commandos)

I may have to since I've already got some of Chris Cock's other books:

Fireforce
Out of Action
Saints

I paid about $100USD for each from different sellers plus shipping to NZ.

Not cheap, but worth it.

I will eventually pick up Pittaway's other books LRDG(Rhodie) and Koevoet(Saffie) as well.

[davidbfpo]

I have consolidated four RFI threads into this:All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3407)

A lot of information sits in the main thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090&highlight=rhodesia) and the recently published book: Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15803&highlight=rhodesia) (Now in Historians arena).

As the war in Rhodesia was within a region wracked by conflict it is worth checking another thread: South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10859&highlight=rhodesia) and COIN in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19529&highlight=portuguese) (Now in Historians arena).

A debate over the Rhodesian tactic 'Fireforce' is found in the Afghan context: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10742&highlight=rhodesia)

A general search finds Rhodesia / Rhodesian appears in over a hundred threads, often in book lists for example.

I have copied this to the main thread.