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SWJED
07-11-2007, 08:45 PM
SWJ Blog - Al Qaeda in Iraq – Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/al-qaeda-in-iraq-heroes-boogey/) By Malcolm Nance.


Four years on in Iraq, the White House still portrays the war as a life and death struggle between the forces of good, the US led Multi-national forces, and the forces of evil, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

With the advent of the new “surge” strategy, the media ledes have been triumphing the numerous coalition “anti-Al Qaeda” operations in Anbar province including the areas of Karmah, Baqubah and the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad. These operations have the intent to secure Baghdad and other major urban areas from insurgent terrorism. The strategy writ simple is to deny the insurgents an urban sanctuary and killing ground as well as to secure the Iraqi population from their sectarian attacks through a series of wide-area operations. But are we fighting the right enemy?...

Much more at the link...

SWJED
07-15-2007, 11:05 AM
... at Lightfighter (http://lightfighter.net/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/5131022531/m/5631089723).

SWJED
07-15-2007, 11:42 AM
Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail – Al Qaeda and its Role in the Iraq Insurgency (http://billroggio.com/archives/2007/07/the_attempts_to_mini.php)


The attempts to minimize the role played by al Qaeda in Iraq in the larger Sunni insurgency took a significant step over the past week. Clark Hoyt, the public editor of the New York Times, claimed that the media had become complicit in the government's attempts to paint the entire Sunni insurgency with an al Qaeda brush. Also this week, Malcolm Nance published an article at the Small Wars Journal claiming al Qaeda is being given too much credit for the violence in Iraq. In the article, titled "Al Qaeda in Iraq--Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?," Nance claims al Qaeda is but a bit player in the Iraqi insurgency and is largely controlled by the Baathist remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime. To Nance, al Qaeda is both a U.S. Boogeyman and Baathist Puppet…

Michael Goldfarb at The Weekly Standard’s WorldWideWeekly.com - Al Qaeda in Iraq: Not Just a Boogeyman (http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/07/al_qaeda_in_iraq_not_just_a_bo.asp)


Roggio just posted what I think is the definitive takedown of the argument put forward earlier in the week by Small Wars Journal contributor Malcolm Nance. Nance's theory is that al Qaeda is basically a bit player in the insurgency--small, but lethal--and that the administration is trying to hype the threat the group poses in order to convince the American people that withdrawing from Iraq would be the equivalent of surrendering in the war on terror. Suffice to say, Roggio isn't buying it…

Nance's essay strikes me as part of a larger, renewed push by the antiwar crowd to discredit the idea that the war in Iraq has any real connection to the war on terror--as Roggio points out, the New York Times put in its two cents last Sunday with a piece by the public editor declaring that "President Bush and the United States military in Baghdad are increasingly pointing to a single villain on the battlefield: Al Qaeda...

SWJED
07-15-2007, 11:45 AM
at The Fourth Rail (http://billroggio.com/archives/2007/07/the_attempts_to_mini.php#comment-23148):


Thanks for the entertaining response but in quickly and forcefully responding to my analysis, which preceded the recent media debate, you make numerous claims that I never made. In fact you posted what I actually said right under the errors. Perhaps thats an editing mistake.

I recommend you read the blog entry a little more carefully and take the opportunity to read my book, the Terrorists of Iraq (www.terroristsofiraq.com).

As I live in the theater of operations (not Washington), speak Arabic and work with the Iraqis who are risking their life for us - I am just as deeply invested in my field intelligence assessments being right as you are about your opinions, but my life and that of many others depends on it being exceptionally right all of the time so its not just a semantics debate for me. One thing is certain, I never underestimate the enemy in Iraq ... any of them -ever.

Additionally, the excellent counter-insurgency & counter-terrorism experts at Small Wars Journal (www.smallwarsjournal.com) provide varied and scholarly opinions which may help clarify some facts.

SWJED
07-15-2007, 12:15 PM
Differences of opinion expressed through reasoned - and well sourced - debate is fine and that is what we are here for.

That said, statements such as the one Goldfarb made in his WorldWideWeekly piece (http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/07/al_qaeda_in_iraq_not_just_a_bo.asp) tend to irk me and smack of attempting to shut down or discredit an opposing view through "political labeling / stereotyping".

Goldfarb:


Nance's essay strikes me as part of a larger, renewed push by the antiwar crowd to discredit the idea that the war in Iraq has any real connection to the war on terror...

Tom Odom
07-15-2007, 03:05 PM
Nance's essay strikes me as part of a larger, renewed push by the antiwar crowd to discredit the idea that the war in Iraq has any real connection to the war on terror--as Roggio points out, the New York Times put in its two cents last Sunday with a piece by the public editor declaring that "President Bush and the United States military in Baghdad are increasingly pointing to a single villain on the battlefield: Al Qaeda...

Dave,

I picked up the same one. Sloppy labeling and equally sloppy analysis. I would bet that Goldfarb has never served a day in the US military but claims to be pro-war whatever that means. For him I have a response taken from the little kid on Meet the Fokkers....:cool:

A$$ H@LE

Tom

Maphu
07-16-2007, 02:45 AM
I think this is an excellent piece.

Of the many resistance groups in Iraq how many are AQI - 5%? The purpose of morphing all of the resistance to "al-Qaeda" is political propaganda aimed at the American public. Support for the occupation is losing ground. This is merely an effort to fool the public in to relating the invasion and occupation of Iraq with 911. It's being pushed by the Bush administration and dutifully echoed by the corporate MSM in the US.

Abu Buckwheat
07-16-2007, 03:03 AM
Dave,

I picked up the same one. Sloppy labeling and equally sloppy analysis. I would bet that Goldfarb has never served a day in the US military but claims to be pro-war whatever that means.

Hey let me translate ... "Oh You nasty liberal conspirators really get to me ... why don't you guys go join the military and fight a war sometime! ... oh, wait a minute, Small Wars what?"

I have no idea who Bill Roggio or Michael Goldfarb are and really don't care. I am really too busy trying to get an Iraqi with a Steyr SSG sniper rifle to shoot zero on a new set of optics! :rolleyes:

We have a war to fight and I am in it and intend to get in it further and deeper than a stop at the Burger King on Camp Victory.

Almost as if the gods were watching this analysis came out yesterday in the LA Times ... 0.7 percent of the captives in Iraq are foreign fighters. This all sounds .... soooo familiar! I think there is a book on it!


Al Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliate groups number anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 individuals, the senior U.S. military officer said. Iraqis make up the majority of members, facilitating attacks, indoctrinating, fighting, but generally not blowing themselves up. Iraqis account for roughly 10% of suicide bombers, according to the U.S. military.


Maybe we only fight the executve management: :D

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-saudi15jul15,0,3818698,full.story?coll=la-home-world (LA Times - Only 135 foreign captives out of 19,000 suspected 'insurgents')

jcustis
07-16-2007, 12:00 PM
Alas, Malcolm Nance needs no apologists or supporters to rally to his side, as he can easily hold his own in any discussion of things Iraqi.

What grinds my gears is that there continues to be this amateurish high-brow sense of sniff, sniff "Oh yes my good boy. Unfortunately, it appears my analysis is better than your analysis." The grinding is worsened by my sense that Michael Goldfarb kicked off his slippers in his study, turned on his computer, and then proceeded to defecate out of his ears.

He would have been better served by registering at Lightfighter and conducting a bit of research into just who Malcolm Nance is, what he has done, and what he continues to do to this day. He might have paused for a moment and thought differently about insuating that Nance's writing is easily lumped into arguments submitted by the antiwar crowd. We didn't get that depth of reasearch, and for that I find his dreamy admiration of Bill Roggio lacking.

And as for Roggio himself, I am perplexed where his depth of analysis comes from. Is it from his vast embed experience and discussions with commanders and boots-on-the-ground troops? Is it from his lengthy briefings given by intelligence analysts and collectors (if so, by god they need to be kicked in the head)? Or perhaps it comes from his lengthy discussions with these "front groups" or local sheiks and imams he has met when off the FOB. I think it is solely the first group...and that's fine, but please don't belittle those of us with half a brain left. Roggio's claim vs. fact breakout is to me an exercise of the pot calling the kettle black because most of his facts are unsupported and sweeping generalizations. If you want to come at Nance, Roggio, you need to bring your A-game and spend some more time drafting a counterpoint article with some meat, depth, and supported facts so that I can truly decide.

I am slightly amused by this blurb from the beginning of Roggio's post:


Also this week, Malcolm Nance published an article at the Small Wars Journal claiming al Qaeda is being given too much credit for the violence in Iraq. In the article, titled "Al Qaeda in Iraq--Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?," Nance claims al Qaeda is but a bit player in the Iraqi insurgency and is largely controlled by the Baathist remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime. To Nance, al Qaeda is both a U.S. Boogeyman and Baathist Puppet.

If taken seriously, these theories are likely to have a significant impact on the political battle over the war in Iraq as it is played out back here in the States. I took a look at the major points advanced by Nance and found his argument to be unpersuasive.

C'mon Roggio...If you had followed the same advice I have for Goldfarb, you would have conducted some research and found out that Nance didn't just wake up one morning and say, "Gee, I think I should write a blog that attacks the administration's assumptions about AQI". You didn't and frankly, for this OIF veteran, your writing comes across as amateurish. Nance's analysis is so much deeper than that, and he forms this from a ton more time in the saddle...not while musing in his study. Do you really think he is trying to influence some political battle in the Beltway over Iraq? Do you really?

Perhaps we are all still being duped about the nature of AQ (in and out of Iraq), and perhaps Osama Bin Laden is lounging on a beach in Cuba, sipping on a Mojito.:wry: When I do read commentary or opinion on Iraq, I tend to side with folks who have moved through Baghdad's dark back streets low-profile and ready to inflict extreme violence on bad guys who need it. Then again, that's just me.

Jedburgh
07-17-2007, 03:36 PM
CSIS, 16 Jul 07: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa’ida (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070716_sunni_insurgents.pdf)

...The US naturally focuses on Al Qa’ida because of 9/11 and the fact it poses a serious international threat. So do some Iraqi leaders, but largely because it is easier for them, particularly if they are Shi’ite, to blame as many of Iraqi’s problems on foreigners and Sunnis as possible. The reality is far more complex....

Abu Buckwheat
07-17-2007, 04:37 PM
CSIS, 16 Jul 07: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa’ida (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070716_sunni_insurgents.pdf)

Wow well I got CSIS and Cordesman on my side :)

... now if only someone had written all of this up into a 412 page highly detailed open-source intelligence analysis and historical narrative from 2002 to 2007 that would be an ideal source on the insurgency :rolleyes: ....

Tom Odom
07-17-2007, 04:51 PM
... now if only someone had written all of this up into a 412 page highly detailed open-source intelligence analysis and historical narrative from 2002 to 2007 that would be an ideal source on the insurgency :rolleyes: ....

Assuming they can actually read...

Most would not read it because it is too long....

But that would not stop them from saying it was incorrect :D

SWJED
07-25-2007, 09:18 AM
25 July Washington Post - Al-Qaeda in Iraq Is Part Of Network, Bush Says (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/24/AR2007072400852.html) by Michael Fletcher.


President Bush argued anew Tuesday that the Sunni insurgent group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq is an integral part of the larger al-Qaeda terrorist network, as he attempted to rebut critics who say the war in Iraq has distracted the United States from a broader struggle against Islamic extremism.

With public support for the war steadily declining, Bush told an audience of military personnel at an Air Force base here that many foreigners, including top lieutenants to Osama bin Laden, lead the Iraqi group. Some of them, he added, trained with the organization at its terrorist camps in Afghanistan or otherwise have deep ties with the network.

"Some will tell you al-Qaeda in Iraq isn't really al-Qaeda -- and not really a threat to America," Bush said. "Well, that's like watching a man walk into a bank with a mask and a gun, and saying he's probably just there to cash a check. We are fighting bin Laden's al-Qaeda in Iraq."...

25 July NY Times - President Links Qaeda of Iraq to Qaeda of 9/11 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/25/washington/25prexy.html?ref=world) by Jim Ruttenberg and Mark Mazzetti.


President Bush sought anew on Tuesday to draw connections between the Iraqi group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and the terrorist network responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks, and he sharply criticized those who contend that the groups are independent of each other.

At a time when Mr. Bush is trying to beat back calls for withdrawal from Iraq, the speech at Charleston Air Force Base reflected concern at the White House over criticism that he is focusing on the wrong terrorist threat...

White House transcript of President Bush's remarks (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070724-3.html).

tequila
08-17-2007, 10:46 AM
NEFA Foundation - State of the Sunni Insurgency, Aug 2007 (http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/iraqreport0807.pdf) (pdf). A good summary of the development of AQI and its political wing, the Islamic State in Iraq, and its subsequent falling out with the Islamic Army in Iraq / Reform & Jihad Front.

tequila
09-07-2007, 10:37 AM
The Myth of AQI (http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html)- Andrew Tilghman, Washington Monthly. Our own Abu Buckwheat features prominently in this article. Raises some very interesting questions on the size and reach of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some highlights:


...
Even if the manpower and number of attacks attributed to AQI have been exaggerated—and they have—many observers maintain that what is uniquely dangerous about the group is not its numbers, but the spectacular nature of its strikes ... He points, as do many inside the administration, to the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara, a revered Shiite shrine, as a paramount example of AQI's outsize influence. President Bush has laid unqualified blame for the Samara bombing on al-Qaeda, and described the infamous incident—and ensuing sectarian violence—as a fatal tipping point toward the current unrest.
But is this view of AQI's vanguard role in destabilizing Iraq really true?

...

it remains unclear whether the original Samara bombing was itself the work of AQI. The group never took credit for the attack, as it has many other high-profile incidents. The man who the military believe orchestrated the bombing, an Iraqi named Haitham al-Badri, was both a Samara native and a former high-ranking government official under Saddam Hussein. (His right-hand man, Hamed Jumaa Farid al-Saeedi, was also a former military intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein's army.) Key features of the bombing did not conform to the profile of an AQI attack. For example, the bombers did not target civilians, or even kill the Shiite Iraqi army soldiers guarding the mosque, both of which are trademark tactics of AQI. The planners also employed sophisticated explosive devices, suggesting formal military training common among former regime officers, rather than the more bluntly destructive tactics typical of AQI. Finally, Samara was the heart of Saddam's power base, where former regime fighters keep tight control over the insurgency. Frank "Greg" Ford, a retired counterintelligence agent for the Army Reserves, who worked with the Army in Samara before the 2006 bombing, says that the evidence points away from AQI and toward a different conclusion: "The Baathists directed that attack," says Ford.


and ...



... The first group that profits from an outsize focus on AQI are former regime elements, and the tribal chiefs with whom they are often allied. These forces are able to carry out attacks against Shiites and Americans, but also to shift the blame if it suits their purposes. While the U.S. military has recently touted "news" that Sunni insurgents have turned against the al-Qaeda terrorists in Anbar Province, there is little evidence of actual clashes between these two groups. Sunni insurgents in Anbar have largely ceased attacks on Americans, but some observers suggest that this development has less to do with vanquishing AQI than with the fact that U.S. troops now routinely deliver cash-filled duffle bags to tribal sheiks serving as "lead contractors" on "reconstruction projects." The excuse of fighting AQI comes in handy. "Remember, Iraq is an honor society," explains Juan Cole, an Iraq expert and professor of modern Middle Eastern studies at the University of Michigan. "But if you say it wasn't us—it was al-Qaeda—then you don't lose face ..."

Tom Odom
09-07-2007, 12:34 PM
it remains unclear whether the original Samara bombing was itself the work of AQI. The group never took credit for the attack, as it has many other high-profile incidents. The man who the military believe orchestrated the bombing, an Iraqi named Haitham al-Badri, was both a Samara native and a former high-ranking government official under Saddam Hussein. (His right-hand man, Hamed Jumaa Farid al-Saeedi, was also a former military intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein's army.) Key features of the bombing did not conform to the profile of an AQI attack. For example, the bombers did not target civilians, or even kill the Shiite Iraqi army soldiers guarding the mosque, both of which are trademark tactics of AQI. The planners also employed sophisticated explosive devices, suggesting formal military training common among former regime officers, rather than the more bluntly destructive tactics typical of AQI. Finally, Samara was the heart of Saddam's power base, where former regime fighters keep tight control over the insurgency. Frank "Greg" Ford, a retired counterintelligence agent for the Army Reserves, who worked with the Army in Samara before the 2006 bombing, says that the evidence points away from AQI and toward a different conclusion: "The Baathists directed that attack," says Ford.

hmmm that might indicate sectarian war and at the time, we were saying no civil war....

Hat Tip, Tequilla and to you too, Abu Buckwheat!
Tom

SWJED
10-15-2007, 03:01 AM
15 October Washington Post - Al-Qaeda In Iraq Reported Crippled (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/14/AR2007101401245.html?hpid=topnews) by Tom Ricks and Karen DeYoung.


The U.S. military believes it has dealt devastating and perhaps irreversible blows to al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent months, leading some generals to advocate a declaration of victory over the group, which the Bush administration has long described as the most lethal U.S. adversary in Iraq.

But as the White House and its military commanders plan the next phase of the war, other officials have cautioned against taking what they see as a premature step that could create strategic and political difficulties for the United States. Such a declaration could fuel criticism that the Iraq conflict has become a civil war in which U.S. combat forces should not be involved. At the same time, the intelligence community, and some in the military itself, worry about underestimating an enemy that has shown great resilience in the past...

carl
11-25-2007, 06:54 PM
I just finished reading "The Terrorists of Iraq" by Malcolm Nance, who I believe is also Abu Buckwheat. It was informative and the central arguement of the book, that Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) are the majority (80-83%) and driving force of the insurgency with Iraqi Islamic Extremists (15-17%) and AQI (2-5%) making up the rest, was very convincing.

With this and the recent "tribal revolt" phenomena some questions were raised in my mind.

These revolts are all described as being against AQI, which I will take to mean AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists.

And, taking Ramadi as an example (I am depending here on Cavguy's long post about the events there), these "revolts" have involved hard fighting. The severity of the fighting seems to indicate that perhaps more than 20% of the insurgency is being revolted against. Again using Ramadi as an example, once the "revolt" succeeds, the insurgency mostly stops.

Considering these things, here are my questions:

1. Did AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists grow in power to the extent they
displaced the FRLs as the driving force in the insurgency?

2. Are the "tribal revolts" against more than AQI, are they also against
parts of the FRL insurgency?

3. Are the FRLs still the relatively cohesive group Malcolm describes in his
book?

4. Have the FRLs, or some of them, given up pursuing the insurgency? If so, for how long and why?

I am not trying to express a back door opinion here. The only thing I know from personal experience about Iraq is how long some of the runways are. These questions truly puzzle me.

Global Scout
11-25-2007, 11:15 PM
Carl, having served in a couple of different regions in Iraq, and having been in all, the dynamics of the conflict(s) are different in each, so I don't think even someone who is a so called expert on Iraq can answer your questions with more than educated speculation.


1. Did AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists grow in power to the extent they
displaced the FRLs as the driving force in the insurgency?

This is a great question, but it is also possible that the FRLs are funding any Sunni group that is anti-coalition. While they may fight one another in the future, or even fight one another now, I wonder is FRLs expats are funding AQI?


2. Are the "tribal revolts" against more than AQI, are they also against parts of the FRL insurgency?

I have seen tribal revolts against JAM also (a Shi'a militia group).


3. Are the FRLs still the relatively cohesive group Malcolm describes in his
book?


4. Have the FRLs, or some of them, given up pursuing the insurgency? If so, for how long and why?

I don't know, but I wonder is the FRLs see the Shi'a as a greater threat to their objectives than the coalition forces?

Ron Humphrey
11-26-2007, 03:26 AM
Having just had the opportunity to read said posting I would have to agree with the presentation strictly from an analytic standpoint.

This being said I think several questions come to mind which I would love direction in finding research materials to answer.

1- When changes such as have begun in varying parts of Iraq reference new end games with possible outcomes not necessarily considered plausible by the populace in the past, how does this affect those who make up those very base of these FRL's.

Considering the fact that they and their families are a part of the landscape which is Iraq.

2- Even though many a well researched individual might be able to follow the line of thinking presented does it not seem wiser that when presenting the big picture within the context of information to the masses; that it be kept as simple and direct as possible.

( The bad guys are those who are shooting at us and / or the populous and they are against us so they are with the bad guy you know; AQ)

3- The fact that AQ seems to be the fall guy for everything bad that happens is a bad idea why?:wry:

( It doesn't seem that many other shall we say organizations throughout the world have any problem with letting them be out there as the tip of the spear.)


I just like to think that those who have worked so hard to encourage it's success will find themselves falling on that spear sooner or later.

Call me an optimist :rolleyes: KISS principle always worked for me

kehenry1
11-26-2007, 07:18 AM
I always think these questions interesting.

First, in the beginning, AQI was in Iraq under different names as is their usual practice of multiple leaders recruiting their own forces, housing them and paying them. It took them some time to coalesce into an organized force.

Second, I recall (without referencing links, but having a decent memory) that the FRL and AQI (under whatever name they called their individual groups) were issuing statements attempting to assert their rightful leadership of the "resistance" or at least their legitimate claim to being in the fight at all. In some statements, they praised each other, but attempted to convince the other to follow their guidance in the matter. even in the beginning, their were questions about what targets were being attacked, the civilian death toll and other issues. They also, if I am not mistaken, occasionally exchanged fire with one another and accused the other of trying to injure their people and cause. All with flowery language still attempting to come to some sort of agreement for cooperation.

I don't think I am incorrect in these statements. I also believe that this was the first sign of how we would and should "divide and conquer". Aside from recent developments regarding the split, after several years of reading Iraqi blogs, it seems that Iraqis were rather xenophobic regarding outsiders. Particularly after Saddam had brought in large numbers of "Palestinians" whom he gave preferential treatment to including housing, money and education.

Which brings me to point number three: We are often too busy looking at the pronouncements of "AQI" from the point of view of a domestic audience. Which is interesting since we often talk of "strategic communications" in a "small war" that is global in nature (such as recruiting, funding and IO). Who was this information aimed at?

In which case, it seems rather important that we divide the insurgency into "local" and "foreign", assigning much of the atrocities to AQI. While it gave them the publicity they wanted for their global jihad and they were quite willing to take it, in the end it allowed for several actions. Basically, damaging their global standing as "defenders of Islam" while allowing the FRLs an "out" whenever they felt inclined to return to the political process. Obviously, they can and have blamed some of the worst episodes on the "foreigners", true or not.

Further, in regards to AQI "taking credit" willingly, they did everything in their power to assert their position of supremacy over this insurgency in order to stir support for their greater cause trans-nationally. Zarqawi beheading people on video and other propaganda from AQI cannot be dismissed. For quite some time, it was the strongest and most voluble propaganda coming out of Iraq. It colored all other pronouncements from all other groups within Iraq.

It is clear that even during 2005 and 2006, prior to the great "awakening" their was a serious split over agenda and power between these two groups. Who was the "largest" v. who had the "power" v. "end state" was always going to be a question with these groups. It's fairly obvious that there were significant numbers of indigent FRL or other anti-government organizations and people within Iraq, but leadership, power and organization are not always about who has the most people.

As Zarqawi once wrote to Zawahiri, it is about being "victorious" or perceived as such. Who has the strongest "sword arm" in his terminology. Clearly, AQI was, at least publicly, the "strong horse" in the arena. I believe that this led many smaller indigent organizations and individuals linking with AQI or affiliate "armies", enlarging their cadre and over all power. Eventually, leading to AQI becoming the governing force and organizer of the insurgency.

However, the "cracks" were apparent in 2005 when several letters were being written to Zawahiri directly, by passing Zarqawi, complaining of some of the leaders that were taking money from the "mujihadeen" who were arriving, leaving them with little food, sub-standard housing, demanding mostly martyrdom attacks and poor leadership all together. There were also complaints regarding the targeting of civilians and the atrocious beheading videos. Which I believe prompted Zawahiri to write a letter to Zarqawi telling him to tone it down and cautioning him against trying to debate or enforce any religious ideology when he was not "educated" in the matter.

Iraqi bloggers explained that AQI was generally Salafist Wahabi in nature while the Anbar tribes were largely from the Hanafi school of jurisprudence with a few other groups like Matridi, etc thrown in.

As important (or more so) as the religious orthodoxy, AQI and several indigent criminal or insurgent gangs duked it out in Al Qaim in 2005. Later reports indicated this was over control of the smuggling routes and other traditional methods of income for those tribes on the border. AQI was obviously trying to control these routes to smuggle in money, men and weapons, by passing the "middle man" while possibly bringing the area under their total control.

Of course, by cutting off the traditional money making methods of these tribes, they were cutting into the traditional power of the local sheiks and tribes. Which is why the Marines and other forces began providing money and jobs through the auspices of the local sheiks and other power structures within these tribal lands. All politics are local, as they say.

Recall also Zawahiri's letter requesting funds be sent to them in Afghanistan and bin Laden's recent plea for unity and money. Pleas that have been repeated more than once throughout this period.

Later, Zarqawi was relegated to the role of a "military commander" and an umbrella council was set up to manage the multiple connections with the other insurgent groups. This is one area that AQ in general was successful in the past. Recalling that Al Qaeda means "the base" and was essentially bin Laden's managerial and organizing skills that had lists of mujihadeen from the Afghan/Russo conflict who he contacted and began organizing for this current global conflict. They attempted to use these same managing and organizing skills in Iraq.

The umbrella council was essentially a response to complaints regarding the continued encroachment on these FRL organizations' power by AQI, Zarqawi's style and a belated realization that they needed to put an Iraqi face on the insurgency. That after we had labeled it largely AQI, blamed them for the worst of the worst and, through their own actions and our IO, gave the Iraqi people someone else to hate and blame for their misery. And, provided the backdrop for political reconciliation since the Shi'ites and other Iraqis were not going to feel too friendly towards the "insurgency" if it was all blamed on indigenous forces.

I think we'll see similar activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan by AQI. Take, for instance, the recent release on As Sahab (AQ media) of the Afghan Taliban leader asserting his leadership of the Afghan "insurgency" while declaring allegiance to bin Laden. Are the Pashtuns going to fight a war for a bunch of Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni, Libyan, Uzbek, etc outsiders? Or, are they fighting for their own people and power?

They are apparently copying our own tactics by trying to assert some legitimate indigenous group as the having the "right" to legitimate resistance while simultaneously maintaining the facade of a global Islamic conflict. They were simply too late in doing that in Iraq. Zarqawi's ego, the zealous nature of the foreigners and their attempts to assert absolute control had already ruined that.

Back to the council and Zarqawi's demise as both a leader and literally. In Zawahiri's letter, he warned Zarqawi, not too subtly, either that his ego and inability to "get along" was going to get him killed by someone in the organization like a leader in Afghan (who was killed, some say, on the orders of Zawahiri for being "outside" of their control) or that he already had a traitor in his midst and that he should watch out. That is an interesting question since, not long after that letter, we nearly apprehended Zarqawi and he was severely wounded. Then, a few months later, we followed someone in his organization, eventually leading to Zarqawi's location and death.

Al Masri and AQI attempted to step back and become "the king makers" behind the FRLs, but the cracks were too great. Multiple denouncements and attempts at reconciliation were flying back and forth, eventually leading to al Junabi's insurgency media denouncing Omar al Baghdadi, the nominal "Iraqi face" of the council, as a fake. He said that the insurgency could not swear allegiance to someone without a face and whose father no one knew (considering the Arab/Muslim attachment to ancestors tracing back to Muhammed, that was a good indication of the FRLs contempt for that theatrics). All the while, the "awakening" was gaining power in the tribal lands.

Then we see the insurgency virtually collapse back on itself. Which view is correct? Do the numbers count or don't they?

kehenry1
11-26-2007, 07:22 AM
Now, to the question of whether AQI was more or less of the insurgency than any public statement said it was.

I want to re-assert this thought: numbers do not mean power. If it did, then our presence there with over 100,000 soldiers at any given time would have eliminated the possibility or probability of an insurgency. Further, the number of dead and wounded "insurgents" would have quickly finished it off. That was not true. So, I have to wonder if "numbers" of AQI v. indigenous insurgents make it any more true for control of the insurgency?

Whether it was 20% AQI and 80% locals, it seems clear that AQI had control over the insurgency by mid 2005. The organization, types of attacks, and targets with the number of foreign fighters and suicide attacks makes that a reality. I would add that the information, such as maps and organization records, gathered from exploiting the site where Zarqawi died, with subsequent re-organization of our own battle plans that rolled up a huge portion of the insurgency seems to also indicate AQI had operational control.

Their spiraling loss of control in mid to late 2006, post Zarqawi's death, and the damage we were able to inflict on the "insurgency" using this exploited information through 2007, seems to have led the FRLs to the conclusion that it is better to negotiate for internal power than give it to AQI who were never going to leave and had a totally different agenda for the end state of Iraq than the FRLs. And, had they maintained that association with AQI, might have seen themselves and the rest of the Sunni tribes smashed into nothing without any political, economic or military power. Possibly totally dispossessed and constantly on the defensive in a future Iraq ruled by Shia and Kurds.

In numbers, does it matter that AQI was only "20%" of the insurgency with "80%" being indigenous if, in power and operational control, they were 60-80%? Do the numbers change the tactics or delegitimize any claims that AQI was the "real" enemy in Iraq?

Do public statements by politicians, the SoD or commanders in the field represent a failure to recognize the complexity of the insurgency? Is this why we were slow to change tactics? Were such statements purposefully misleading for political reasons (ie, to keep domestic political support for staying in Iraq)? Or were they based on our first clumsy attempts to separate the insurgency from the people of Iraq, managing any support for its on going efforts by claiming it was "foreign", and basically kill two birds with one stone by damaging AQs claims to be "defending" Islam and Muslims at the same time?

Or, were we right all along that AQ represented the power and organizing force behind the insurgency and our failure to change tactics was an internal military and political philosophy? A philosophy and organization that wanted nothing to do with fighting another counter-insurgency and performing nation building post Viet Nam and the much vaunted "Powell Doctrine"? Instead, was geared towards conventional war fighting and killing as many "tangos" as possible? A political, military and popular idea that war should look like GW1?

Was the culmination point of victory a combination of all of these things with the addition of AQI damaging itself through a bad strategic decision to declare war on Shi'ites and anybody else that didn't fit their idea Muslim or go along with their religio-political ideology or accept their plan for an "Islamic State of Iraq"?

The focus on the exact numbers or "percentages" that either group represents seems too narrow a focus to try to evaluate the how or why of this war or any future insurgency. What seems more important is to be able to identify the different groups involved, their amount of operational and political control or influence and determine any differing agendas among them. Using this calculation to split the group into smaller and smaller pieces, pealing it like an onion as they say.

In repeating a previous question, was making AQI "the fall guy" a bad idea in the whole scheme of things considering current outcomes?

Norfolk
11-26-2007, 01:52 PM
An outstanding pair of posts Kat. Fantastic work.:cool:

Ron Humphrey
11-26-2007, 02:33 PM
Kehenry-

" In numbers, does it matter that AQI was only "20%" of the insurgency with "80%" being indigenous if, in power and operational control, they were 60-80%? Do the numbers change the tactics or delegitimize any claims that AQI was the "real" enemy in Iraq? "

Thank you very much for explaining it in such a detailed fashion.

I couldn't have asked for better explanation

Global Scout
11-29-2007, 10:35 PM
First, if AQI is only one aspect of the insurgency (perhaps the global aspect, much as AQ was the global aspect of the insurgency against the USSR in Afghanistan), then our success against this foreign inspired insurgent/terrorist element doesn't equate to a strategic victory, at the most is an operational victory, if AQI has truly been defeated, but my study and experience indicates otherwise.

Tactics must be adjusted based upon who the enemy is, and all the factors that influence the enemy's behavior, so it does make a difference. A foreign enemy that does not have popular support needs to be defeated through attrition. An insurgency that is home grown and has some degree of support from the population must be separated from the population, which means the primary effort is winning over the population, instead of strictly waging a war of attrition.

Rank amateur
11-29-2007, 10:57 PM
A foreign enemy that does not have popular support needs to be defeated through attrition.

But, they can control their loss rate, by slipping across the border when out gunned, and not slipping back until they've gathered new recruits.

Global Scout
11-30-2007, 01:54 AM
Of course foreign AQ fighters can slip across the border, but the reality is there is little need to do so when there are plenty of areas in Iraq that are wide open for them to relocate. The homegrown insurgents, beyond the well to do FRL, don't necessarily have that option, as it is not a pleasant experience for the average Iraqi insurgent to relocate to Jordan, Syria, or Iran.

One example was the most recent battle of Falluja, where AQI left several fighters in the city, and the rest withdrew to fight elsewhere in Iraq. That means we need to clear, hold, and build, and not resort to the Vietnam strategy of taking hills just because the enemy is there and then giving them back to him.

Rank amateur
11-30-2007, 03:23 AM
That means we need to clear, hold, and build, and not resort to the Vietnam strategy of taking hills just because the enemy is there and then giving them back to him.

Agreed, but isn't that different from attrition.

Global Scout
11-30-2007, 05:56 AM
SOF have fixated on the mantra find, fix and finish, which is an attrition strategy, but one that failed us. The conventional forces have also, for the most part, focused on this attrition approach, and again to no end.

My point was this type of strategy could work in some limited cases, such as a small terrorist group that doesn’t have support from the people, such as many left wing terrorist groups in Europe in the 70’s and 80’s. You find and neutralize the leadership, then the threat is over. You already won the population over, they are law abiding citizens who dislike criminals (for the most part). This approach may work if you are able to eliminate the cadre of a budding insurgency before it turns into a movement. Once it is a movement, the attrition strategy won’t work unless you take it to the level that Stalin or Hitler did and wipe out entire populations, and even then the approach is questionable.

In order to win these conflicts, it is essential we have a population focused strategy, which will allow us to separate the population from the insurgents, and if we can do that (if we can’t, then we probably can’t win) it then becomes a relatively easy manner of finding and killing the small percentage of insurgents who won't realize that they are now fighting for a lost cause.

As for the quote about deep experience, I sometimes think that the so called deep experience for most of our senior officers and those who teach academics at their schools is narrowly confined to conventional warfighting, and they try to transfer their conventional maneuver warfare concepts, like culmination points, centers of gravity, etc. to irregular warfare, and it doesn’t work. All it does is distract our planners from the real work of figuring out what needs to be done and doing it. Instead our planners will spend countless hours tripping over mouse turds, and never reach an acceptable answer that will be mutually agreed upon. On the other hand those who actually have muddy boots experience are out there trying to get it done regardless of the inertia at the upper echelons of nonsense with their cool, yet meaningless slides depicting logical lines of operations, decisive points, tactical and operational COGs, etc. Yes, in this experience hinders.

Ken White
11-30-2007, 06:25 AM
day that banning Power Point would increase our real war fighting capability by an order of magnitude...

Poor old METT-T is so simple and yet so often ignored in an effort to apply buzzwords to situations where they are an encumbrance.

Jedburgh
12-19-2007, 07:17 PM
CTC, 19 Dec 07: Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf)

Al‐Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records is the latest in a series of reports from the Combating Terrorism Center drawing on newly released information from captured al‐Qa’ida documents maintained in the Defense Department’s Harmony Data Base. The report is a preliminary analysis of records containing background information on foreign fighters entering Iraq via Syria over the last year. The data used in this report was coded from English translations of these records and undoubtedly contains some inaccuracies due to imprecise translation as well as through errors in the transcription process. The CTC plans further studies based on the Sinjar Records and expects to hone and improve the accuracy of our database as we do so.....

SteveMetz
12-21-2007, 11:59 AM
Interesting report (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373868) from the Jamestown Foundation:


For the last few months, reports from Iraq have been indicating a tangible decline in insurgency and terrorist operations. For the first time since 2003, the Iraqi people are enjoying a sense of security in the streets of Iraq, although skeptics claim it is the calm that precedes the storm. The stabilizing security situation comes amid claims that al-Qaeda has been defeated or at least has been seriously crippled in Iraq (alerhab.net, November 24). Has al-Qaeda actually been defeated and subjugated by the coalition forces in the Iraqi arena? Taking al-Qaeda’s past and current behavior into account while monitoring Iraq’s jihadi websites, one is presented with strong indications that al-Qaeda is adapting to the new realities on the ground while avoiding direct confrontation with the coalition forces. The global strategy of al-Qaeda since 9/11—as posted in al-Qaeda’s internet forums—sheds further light on the terror plans it has designed to lure and engage Americans in various fronts in the region...

AdamG
02-07-2008, 03:29 PM
On a related note:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article3320938.ece

From The Times
February 7, 2008

Children 'taught to kidnap and kill at al-Qaeda camp' in Iraq

*
Admiral Smith and Major-General Mohammed al-Askari, an Iraqi army spokesman, said they were releasing the videos to highlight al-Qaeda’s growing use of woman and children and deepening depravity.

They were clearly seeking to build on the widespread disgust inspired by the terrorist group’s use of two mentally disablen women last Friday to attack two crowded pet markets in Baghdad, killing about 100 people. The explosives attached to the women were detonated remotely and they may not even have known what they were doing. They were also teenagers, the military said yesterday.

SpykeSzeredy
05-13-2008, 08:03 PM
I recently had a chance to see the Sinjar data through a software demo which produced some of the stat's on the foreign fighters. I wish I had the data now as I type.

Additionally, Newsweek just did a story on the Sinjar data and looked at Darnah, Libya, a dead-end city. http://www.newsweek.com/id/132938?from=rss

There were a number of different outcomes from the Sinjar data when I reviewed it beyond the city of origin, it included which fighters donated to the cause, how much was donated, skills, who recruited them, and indicated there was only a handful of movement facilitators working the number of fighters entering into Iraq via Syria, at least to this location. The data would indicate an HR shop was busted, and there others with other movement facilitators bringing in the bodies. I did not notice, but were the fighters from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from a Wahabbi background leaning towards very anti-West, and some instances anti-Islam other than Wahabbi? The Saudi Arabia piece is probably not obtainable due to the lack of this pone piece of data. Additionally, further analysis the Sinjar data may show a difference in why each fighter was heading in to Iraq?

In reviewing the article by Mr Watts, the recommendation leans towards conducting surrogate operations around established governments to stem the flow of foreign fighters, or change the landscape of a nation. No government is going to allow another nation to microscopically focus on flash point cities. But, working through the country team at the embassy can provide information back to planners to assist identifying possible hot spots of interest and why these hot spots exist, and possibly how to deal with these locations. Some of the ideas behind why a foreign fighter is recruited may be no different than looking into inner-city gang’s and their recruitment in the United States and elsewhere. Is it culture and society, dead-end from the government, and a lack of being able to provide for oneself or one’s family (also culturally linked)? Cultural analysis is key to any actions simple or complex in future operations. Will analysis across the economic and social aspect of the M.E. and North Africa provide a better insight into the FFN in IZ? This is yet to be determined.

In respect to finding linkages to the current FFN in Iraq and Afghanistan, one solid linking line is religion. But what is next; culture or nationalism? Motivations will be different between males and females and this is another aspect to be reviewed as there have been female suicide bombers.

But, what happens when the region changes, it’s not the Trans-Sahel or the Middle East. Is it up-risings in Bolivia, Colombia, or Korea? The same the analysis will need to be performed to identify who is recruited and for what reasons; nationalistic, ideology or theological, cultural, desperation, or just for money and glory?

In looking at the future of complex operations, Irregular Warfare, Hybrid Warfare (pick a term), will FFN' be classified as the surrogate fighters for other entities? These entities can be mafia or organized criminal elements, insurgencies, or some other form of activity. The fact a FFN needs money to pay for fighters and equipment comes from smuggling cigarettes and drugs and their sales starts to link organized crime into insurgent activities as quickly as donations from believers in the cause.

Tom Odom
06-11-2008, 07:05 PM
I found this Michael Ware report quite interesting. The AQI bureacracy is incredible; just like those little finance ladies in tennis shoes from the old days in the Army...


Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq (http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html?iref=mpstoryview)
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- With Christmas 2005 approaching, the princes of al Qaeda's western command were gathering. They'd been summoned for something special -- to plot a three-month campaign of coordinated suicide, rocket, and infantry attacks on American bases, checkpoints, and Iraqi army positions.

1 of 2 In al Qaeda in Iraq's hierarchy, prince designates a senior leader, and these princes had been gathered by the most senior among them, the prince for all of Anbar province itself.

This commander, his name not recorded in al Qaeda's summaries of the meetings and referred to only by rank, spent that December fleshing out his vision for the wave of assaults with the gathered subordinates who would lead his combat brigades.

Jedburgh
07-26-2008, 08:52 PM
CTC, 23 Jul 08: Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al-Qa'ida's Road in and Out of Iraq (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_July_23.pdf)

This report analyzes al‐Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and is being issued with a trove of AQI documents (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Sinjar2.asp) captured by coalition forces near Sinjar, Iraq. The documents include almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al‐Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records. The CTC also acquired demographic information on all Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in detention at Camp Bucca, Iraq. Most of this data has not previously been released to the public.....

Jedburgh
03-25-2009, 06:48 PM
CTC, 16 Mar 09: Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al‐Qa`ida in Iraq (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/DD_FINAL_FINAL.pdf)

Al‐Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq’s Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. That AQI’s ideological extremism alienated many Iraqis is well understood, but radicalism alone does not fully explain AQI’s decline: poor leadership, vulnerable communication mechanisms, tension between Iraqi and foreign members, and weak indoctrination efforts contributed to strategic and tactical blunders that alienated even other Sunni insurgents. In lieu of major social and political shifts (which are possible) that offer AQI a sustained safe‐haven, these dynamics are unlikely to change dramatically; they serve as important obstacles to AQI’s resurrection. Conversely, al‐Qa`ida elements elsewhere, primarily along the Afghanistan‐Pakistan border, are hindered less by these weaknesses. There are lessons from the fight against AQI that are applicable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but al‐Qa`ida’s operations there are likely to be much more durable than those in Iraq.

Section I of this paper traces al‐Qa`ida in Iraq’s transition from welcome partner to mortal enemy of Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, focusing particularly on the Islamic Army of Iraq. Section II draws on declassified internal AQI correspondence and open sources to describe how external pressures—from U.S. forces and tribal sources—exacerbated AQI’s fallout with other insurgents while rending the movement from within. Section III assesses AQI’s prospects in Iraq and the impact of AQI’s failure on the future of the global jihadist movement. Section IV offers recommendations for containing AQI in the future and for applying the lessons of AQI’s demise to other elements.....
Complete 36-page paper at the link.

Bob's World
03-25-2009, 08:53 PM
The very flawed concept of "Global Insurgency" has caused most to really mis-understand AQ in general, and AQI specifically.

It is far more accurate to look at AQ as a non-state organization that has no populace, but that through the power of the information tools of globalization is able to take advantage of a legal "sanctuary of status," as well as to a lesser degree sanctuary of poorly governed populaces and sanctuary of state borders to conduct a very state-like unconventional warfare campaign. This campaign is primarily to take down the Saudi Monarchy, but also other western legitimized governments of the region; with a secondary and supporting objective of breaking US support to the region in order to facilitate success of the primary objective.

So:

AQI is not part of the Iraqi Insurgency, they are there conducting UW to incite, guide, and support the Iraqi insurgency.

There are three general categories of insurgency, and all three existed in Iraq: Separatist (Kurd), revolutionary (Sunni), and resistance (Shia) in rough breakdown. None of these are AQ, and all are made up of Iraqis. Iran conducted UW as well in support of the Shia insurgency.

"Foreign fighters" in AQI are largely nationalist insurgents from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Lybia, Algeria, and Morocco that want to change their own governance at home and who traveled to Iraq to support the second objective of breaking the US support to the region. Expect this brand of support to shift to Afghanistan along with the US. Where we go, they will go.

None of these are "Terrorists," though all use terrorist tactics. If you describe your foes by their purpose for action it is far easier to separate them and design effective tactics for dealing with each. If you conflate them all as "terrorists" you are just shooting your way into a quagmire. Similarly misrepresenting AQ as waging "global insurgency" confuses our solutions for dealing with them as well.

Jedburgh
11-30-2009, 05:36 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 25 Nov 09:

Al-Qaeda in Iraq Operations Suggest Rising Confidence Ahead of U.S. Military Withdrawal (http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35772&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=3db3baeba3)

.....At the moment, the goals for the insurgents are less territorially defined and more aimed at encouraging the anarchical conditions that support the survival and influence of their organizations. Today, several factors contribute to a growing operational space for insurgent activity by promoting discouragement and subverting reconciliation efforts:

• The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq’s urban areas on June 30, in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), has left behind a less capable Iraqi Security Force (ISF) to carry on the mission of ensuring protection and confronting terrorists.

• The growing Arab-Kurdish divide over the ownership of “disputed territories,” especially in Ninawa province, has provided an effective venue for insurgents to exploit security disparities and ethnic divisions (see Terrorism Monitor, October 23).

• The continued reluctance of the Shi’a-dominated government to integrate Sunni fighters from the Awakening (Sahwa) Movement into the Iraqi security and civilian sectors has led to growing suspicions and uncertainty amongst some Sunnis over Baghdad’s long term intentions vis-à-vis their status and use.....

Jedburgh
01-10-2011, 03:41 AM
RAND, 15 Dec 10: An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1026.pdf)

This monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group’s power and influence. We draw on captured financial records that recorded the daily financial transactions of both one specific sector within Anbar province and the AQI provincial administration. To our knowledge, this monograph offers one of the most comprehensive assessments of the financial operations of AQI or any other contemporary Islamic militant group....

AdamG
01-11-2011, 02:17 PM
In an exclusive extract from his new book, A History of the World since 9/11, Dominic Streatfeild explains how despite expert warnings, the US let al-Qaida buy an arsenal of deadly weapons – then tried to cover it up.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/07/iraq-weapons-factory-al-qaida-us-failure


The arrival of al-Qaida

Initially, looters at Qa'qaa had targeted consumer goods such as fridges and air-conditioners. Although munitions had been taken, no one really knew what to do with them. It soon dawned, however, that they might be intrinsically valuable. Weaponry was rapidly emerging as a second currency.

"After the invasion, we started seeing these Arabs, these foreign fighters," recalls Haki, "Palestinians, Egyptians, Libyans." Most Yusifiyans were wary of these new arrivals, but a number of local tribes took them in: "Karagol, Jenabies, Rowissat . . ."

Yusuf, an emerging leader in the insurgency who belongs to one of these tribes, confirms the story. "We allowed the Arabs into our houses and our farms. We welcomed them properly. Some of them even married our daughters." The fact they were Arab strangers was sufficient to ensure hospitality, but these foreigners had extra pull. They were fedayeen. They were al-Qaida.

They also informed the tribes that some of Qa'qaa's contents were considerably more valuable than rocket launchers and pistols. It wasn't long before Yusuf finally stumbled upon Qa'qaa's real treasure. "We found something that we didn't recognise. It was like a powder. It was stored in specific conditions, in special barrels." Yusuf had no idea what it was, but he thought he might as well take some. Only later would he learn that it was pure, crystalline high explosive.

Following the rush to appropriate munitions, Yusifiyans had to figure out where to store their loot. Many hid it in their homes. This soon led to tragedy. Rival groups fired rocket-propelled grenades into each other's houses, knowing they were full of explosives. Accidents also led to fatalities. One of Yusuf's barns blew up.

AdamG
06-01-2011, 03:14 AM
Two Iraqi refugees in U.S. charged in terrorism-related case

Two men are charged with sending cash, explosives and missiles to Iraq for use against Americans. Their case underscores gaps identified in the U.S. refugee vetting process before last year.
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-kentucky-terror-arrests-20110601,0,6989529.story

AdamG
06-06-2011, 11:01 AM
Payback is a bitch. May they all wind up as fertilizer in a canal.


KIRKUK, Iraq — Even his parents admit that Faras Awad was a killer. As an insurgent leader in this northern Iraqi city, he kidnapped women and executed civilians in the years after the American invasion. Then he vanished, to escape the law, his enemies and a $50,000 bounty on his head.
But someone needed to pay. Late last year, Faras’s younger brother Yousef was kidnapped, shot in the head and dumped in an abandoned lot. The police called it a lawless act of revenge — one brother dying for the sins of another.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html?_r=2

Jedburgh
10-14-2011, 03:20 PM
MES-MCU, Sep 11: Al-Qaida, the Tribes and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq’s Unstable Triangle (http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/Lists/MES%20Occasional%20Paper%20Series/Attachments/3/MESOPS_2_IraqUnstableTriangle.pdf)

Dealing with tribal systems has posed a continuing challenge to Al-Qaida as it operates in the Middle East and Africa,where a tribal environment is still an integral part of society in many of the countries. How Al-Qaida views and manages the tribal system within its individual areas of operation in many cases can mean the difference between success and failure, and the jihadist movement cannot ignore this issue, which has been a major factor affecting its prospects, especially in Iraq. This study examines Al-Qaida’s experience dealing with the tribes in Iraq in terms of a triangular relationship involving the Sunni tribes, Al-Qaida, and the government (or the United States as the governing authority in the initial stages), with latter two entities often competing for the allegiance of the tribes....