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SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 10:51 AM
The news is abuzz this week with assessments that al Qaeda's influence and power have returned to pre 9/11 levels. I'm sure the Bush administration will explain this as it does its Iraq strategy: everything is on track, but it just takes time.

Maybe that's true. But an alternative explanation is that the administration's strategy is fatally flawed. There are two primary reasons for this. First, when the enemy is motivated primarily by U.S. penetration into the Islamic world, increasing the amount of U.S. penetration into the Islamic world is not exactly the best way to calm them down. But because the administration has based its strategy on the assumption that Islamic extremists aren't really motivated by what they say motivates them but instead by something we made up and ascribed to them ("they hate freedom"), it can't grapple with the idea that its actions are the exact wrong thing to do.

Second, while the administration is right that the foundation of the threat we face is the ideology which generates extremists, it has come up with a strategy that focuses on killing or capturing extremists rather than undercutting the hostile ideology. America's primary "partners" in the conflict--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--tolerate and even support the ideology which gives rise to violent extremists. Our strategy tolerates this. It is a fatal flaw

Ski
07-12-2007, 11:43 AM
Good point, but I'd also bring up that these countries are also not democracies, and that's a contradiction in the strategy as well. If the GWOT is about "democracy" that is.

We've seen what happens with a real democracy in Palestine. Hamas now is the ruling party. I'd say that all three of the countries you mention would have decent percentages of radical Islamic political parties entrenching themselves if any of these countries were to actually become a democracy.





Second, while the administration is right that the foundation of the threat we face is the ideology which generates extremists, it has come up with a strategy that focuses on killing or capturing extremists rather than undercutting the hostile ideology. America's primary "partners" in the conflict--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--tolerate and even support the ideology which gives rise to violent extremists. Our strategy tolerates this. It is a fatal flaw

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 11:47 AM
Good point, but I'd also bring up that these countries are also not democracies, and that's a contradiction in the strategy as well. If the GWOT is about "democracy" that is.

We've seen what happens with a real democracy in Palestine. Hamas now is the ruling party. I'd say that all three of the countries you mention would have decent percentages of radical Islamic political parties entrenching themselves if any of these countries were to actually become a democracy.


Our strategy is based on the assumption that democracies will be liberal democracies. Policymakers need to read Fareed Zakaria so they can grapple with the notion of illiberal democracies.

I still contend, though, that we should be defining our relationship with other states more on whether they oppose or support the ideology of Islamic extremism rather than whether they torture AQ suspects for us.

FascistLibertarian
07-12-2007, 12:04 PM
Well if you live in Iraq or the occupied ter's why would u care if your a demo?
Thats great you voted but you have no job, the power and water dont work, and people want to kill you and your family.
Demo's will only work when the legit state can give services and protection for people.
Otherwise of course u would turn to Hamas and hezbollah.
Talk to some people from Leb about who gets things done and provides for them.......
If the leb state doesnt and hez does who are you going to support?

tequila
07-12-2007, 12:15 PM
Steve, could you clarify how the Egyptian state supports Islamist extremism? You could make an argument for Saudi, sure, and maybe Musharraf and the Pakistani state at certain times, especially in Afghanistan, but I have a hard time figuring how the Egyptians do so.

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 12:18 PM
Steve, could you clarify how the Egyptian state supports Islamist extremism? You could make an argument for Saudi, sure, and maybe Musharraf and the Pakistani state at certain times, especially in Afghanistan, but I have a hard time figuring how the Egyptians do so.

The Egyptian state press and most of the clerics spew an endless stream of hate toward the United States. Mubarak seems to take the approach of the Sauds--so long as the hate is directed against the United States, it isn't pointed at me. This environment helps Egyptians conclude that attacking the United States is OK.

marct
07-12-2007, 12:23 PM
That's a good point, FL, and it brings up one really important issue, loosely paraphrased as - "what is a nation state that you are mindful of it"?

Modern nation states are just one form of social organization, and a pretty recent one at that. The idea that a "government" should "give services and protection for people" is also quite new, and derives out of the concept of western feudal obligation. "Services and protection" are, when you get right down to it, nothing more than a set of mutual obligations and responsibilities, and these can appear in any number of different forms.

When Steve noted that

Our strategy is based on the assumption that democracies will be liberal democracies.
there is also another implicit assumption that the organizations involved will only be nation states which, to my mind, is a fatal flaw.

Marc

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 12:28 PM
there is also another implicit assumption that the organizations involved will only be nation states which, to my mind, is a fatal flaw.

Marc


Agree. I kind of played with that idea in my Rethinking Insurgency monograph. During the prep seminars for Unified Quest over the winter, I was struck by the idea that in our conceptualization of counterinsurgency, the "end state" is that a government is in full control of its territory and has no challengers as a provider of security. Given what I see in the world, that is swimming against the tide of history which seems to be moving toward less effective national governments, not more.

That said, I have yet to come up with an alternative. Should we be able to form alliances with militias? Can we form alliances with and declare war on PMCs?

marct
07-12-2007, 12:45 PM
Hi Steve,


Agree. I kind of played with that idea in my Rethinking Insurgency monograph. During the prep seminars for Unified Quest over the winter, I was struck by the idea that in our conceptualization of counterinsurgency, the "end state" is that a government is in full control of its territory and has no challengers as a provider of security. Given what I see in the world, that is swimming against the tide of history which seems to be moving toward less effective national governments, not more.

I certainly agree that the "end state" is always viewed in that way :wry:. I also agree that the general trend is away from effective nation states. Personally, I think that that assumption is just a reworking of the "and they lived happily ever after" of the high romantic fairy tale genre.:D


That said, I have yet to come up with an alternative. Should we be able to form alliances with militias? Can we form alliances with and declare war on PMCs?

Already been done. On the first point, look at the Cold War ops in, say Angola or Nicaragua or any number of other "countries". As to the second point, again the answer is yes - does the name Mike Hoare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mike_Hoare) ring a bell or Executive Outcomes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes) :D?

I think one of the main reasons for restricting "official" international politics to nation states is to maintain the position that the only legitimate type of government is a nation state. This is an ideological illusion that serves a number of domestic political purposes.

Marc

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 12:47 PM
Hi Steve,



I certainly agree that the "end state" is always viewed in that way :wry:. I also agree that the general trend is away from effective nation states. Personally, I think that that assumption is just a reworking of the "and they lived happily ever after" of the high romantic fairy tale genre.:D



Already been done. On the first point, look at the Cold War ops in, say Angola or Nicaragua or any number of other "countries". As to the second point, again the answer is yes - does the name Mike Hoare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mike_Hoare) ring a bell or Executive Outcomes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes) :D?

I think one of the main reasons for restricting "official" international politics to nation states is to maintain the position that the only legitimate type of government is a nation state. This is an ideological illusion that serves a number of domestic political purposes.

Marc


I meant formal alliances with legal standing.

tequila
07-12-2007, 12:48 PM
The Egyptian state press and most of the clerics spew an endless stream of hate toward the United States. Mubarak seems to take the approach of the Sauds--so long as the hate is directed against the United States, it isn't pointed at me. This environment helps Egyptians conclude that attacking the United States is OK.

How much of this is generated by the Egyptian state and how much is simply allowed because it represents a genuine anti-American feeling, however?

Freer presses in places like India, Indonesia, and Turkey (also to an extent South Korea and Japan) also feature rather prominent anti-American rhetoric, with countervailing tendencies (also present in the Egyptian media, if less so, but certainly allowed). If Egypt overnight transformed into a liberal democracy, that would not stop anti-American rhetoric --- indeed, it might even see an increase.

FascistLibertarian
07-12-2007, 12:55 PM
All good points.
I think Islamist extremism is a major threat to the Egyptian government. They have been working with moderate Islamic people with decent results (recent baning of FGM with clerical support for example)

What confuses me is Syria is secular (as Iraq was). How come they support radical Islam outside of their borders?

marct
07-12-2007, 01:03 PM
Hi Steve,


I meant formal alliances with legal standing.

That just ties back to my comments about fairy tales :D. Okay, does a government contract have legal standing? Also, whose legal system? What do we mean by a "formal alliance"? Did the US have one with the FLNA in Angola? Does a state recognize a non-state faction as a state as the only way to justify the existence of an alliance (vide the PRC vs. Taiwan)?

Let me step back from these issues for a second and bring up the other end of the scale, to whit, trans-national organizations (TNO) - e.g. the UN, the WHO, the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, etc. Technically these groups are not nation states, but at least one of them enjoys protections under the Vienna Protocols (the UN) which implies a recognition of some form of sovereignty. Many nation states have entered into what are certainly de facto if, in some cases, not de jure "alliances" with these organizations.

Another example of a TNO which is being treated as a de facto "state" is AQ; witness the current US declaration of a de facto war against AQ and he current questions / concerns over the exact status and rights of prisoners captured during this war (e.g. gitmo).

Are we talking about de facto reality or de jure illusions? I'm not asking this to be silly; the answer will have really serious implications on planning and the creation of strategies.

Marc

FascistLibertarian
07-12-2007, 01:07 PM
To be a nation state you need (among other things) to be able to rasie taxes and have a standing army. This is why the EU and UN could never (in my view) be nation states.

Pragmatic Thinker
07-12-2007, 01:17 PM
Steve you wrote -- "Second, while the administration is right that the foundation of the threat we face is the ideology which generates extremists, it has come up with a strategy that focuses on killing or capturing extremists rather than undercutting the hostile ideology. America's primary "partners" in the conflict--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--tolerate and even support the ideology which gives rise to violent extremists. Our strategy tolerates this. It is a fatal flaw"

I think that capturing/killing extremists (terrorists, insurgents, guerillas,...) is important in a sense that our message is that if you join these ranks bad things can happen to you. This gets solidified everytime we hear the enemy saying "I am slightly demoralized and scared because my buddy Abdul just got captured last night in a raid, I am not sure I want to be a jihadist anymore..." Of course, I made that quote up but my point is this is a measurable way to do something. Also, I disagree with those who would contend that capturing/killing these guys hurts us. I will say that we will never "win" in Iraq and Afghanistan by this method alone but I will say that it is important part of the overall strategy which is what the military was created to do. However, I think our civilian government (mostly Department of State) has done a terrible job politically getting these countries "fixed", which they say is difficult to do based on the security situation and foreign investors unwilling to risk life and money in projects. So the cycle continues, we attempt to improve security (capturing/killing bad guys) and on the cheap we try to "rebuild" but there isn't nearly the impetus in rebuilding as there is in securing. I believe a major flaw in Iraq came when this administration shut out any outside foreign investors from going into Iraq and rebuilding. This is not an example of our government doing what was best for the Iraqi people, but what was good for the U.S. businesses. It is a shame that Iraqi's still lack basic electricity and running water four years after the war.

Now you mention that we tolerate Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan which I am assuming means that our support to these regimes is causing the militancy in the first place and secondly these regimes are mostly non-democratic from a western point of view and there are strong undercurrents of social discontent within those three countries. Sooo...my question is what should we do? Cut ties with them? In the case of Saudi Arabia that goes without saying, we have strong economic ties with them plus long standing political relationships that I still don't fully understand but they are there; in the case of Egypt we have strong interests in seeing someone we can deal with in charge of the Suez Canal; and in the case of Pakistan I think we continue with poor foreign policy in that one... Bottom line, I am not sure I know how to defeat an ideology. I know how to find and kill individuals who would like to bring physical harm to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I don't know how you defeat that drive in them to commit these acts. When foreign policy (war simply being an extension) is driven by economics and politics, and not truly morally or security driven you are going to have a messy conflict. People are pissed off because the Americans came into their country under the banner of "bringing prosperity and democracy" and all that has ensued is lots of violence and little overall prosperity. We can't have both...we either commit to these campaigns to truly bring prosperity which in my mind would mean any company (U.S. or otherwise) that is willing to come in and rebuild infrastructure should be allowed that opportunity. Also, you realize that when a country contains several disparate ethnic groups who have a long history of hating each other that removing the dictator isn't going to create a condition where love toward fellow man will follow. It is called a power grab and everyone wants their agenda met. We should have learned this lesson in Bosnia and Kosovo, but the only guy who really sounded off was General Shinseki and look what that bought him...

marct
07-12-2007, 01:31 PM
Hi FL,


To be a nation state you need (among other things) to be able to rasie taxes and have a standing army. This is why the EU and UN could never (in my view) be nation states.

As a note, Hamas raises taxes and has a standing army, the EU and the UN have provisions for gaining revenue (taxes on governments in the EU case and "contributions" for the UN) and raising military forces. Right now, at least three nation states do not have standing armies: the Vatican, Lichtenstein and Monaco.

Marc

tequila
07-12-2007, 01:38 PM
A rather longer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_without_armed_forces)list of countries with no standing armies.

I would not count Hamas as having a standing army as opposed to a militia force. Hizbullah comes much closer.

A far better non-state example than either as far as success in levying taxation and progress towards a professionalized army would be the LTTE, which also has a small navy and air force. The LTTE also does not enjoy state sponsorship in the way that Hamas and Hizbullah do.

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 01:45 PM
Steve you wrote -- "Second, while the administration is right that the foundation of the threat we face is the ideology which generates extremists, it has come up with a strategy that focuses on killing or capturing extremists rather than undercutting the hostile ideology. America's primary "partners" in the conflict--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--tolerate and even support the ideology which gives rise to violent extremists. Our strategy tolerates this. It is a fatal flaw"

I think that capturing/killing extremists (terrorists, insurgents, guerillas,...) is important in a sense that our message is that if you join these ranks bad things can happen to you. This gets solidified everytime we hear the enemy saying "I am slightly demoralized and scared because my buddy Abdul just got captured last night in a raid, I am not sure I want to be a jihadist anymore..." Of course, I made that quote up but my point is this is a measurable way to do something. Also, I disagree with those who would contend that capturing/killing these guys hurts us. I will say that we will never "win" in Iraq and Afghanistan by this method alone but I will say that it is important part of the overall strategy which is what the military was created to do. However, I think our civilian government (mostly Department of State) has done a terrible job politically getting these countries "fixed", which they say is difficult to do based on the security situation and foreign investors unwilling to risk life and money in projects. So the cycle continues, we attempt to improve security (capturing/killing bad guys) and on the cheap we try to "rebuild" but there isn't nearly the impetus in rebuilding as there is in securing. I believe a major flaw in Iraq came when this administration shut out any outside foreign investors from going into Iraq and rebuilding. This is not an example of our government doing what was best for the Iraqi people, but what was good for the U.S. businesses. It is a shame that Iraqi's still lack basic electricity and running water four years after the war.

Now you mention that we tolerate Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan which I am assuming means that our support to these regimes is causing the militancy in the first place and secondly these regimes are mostly non-democratic from a western point of view and there are strong undercurrents of social discontent within those three countries. Sooo...my question is what should we do? Cut ties with them? In the case of Saudi Arabia that goes without saying, we have strong economic ties with them plus long standing political relationships that I still don't fully understand but they are there; in the case of Egypt we have strong interests in seeing someone we can deal with in charge of the Suez Canal; and in the case of Pakistan I think we continue with poor foreign policy in that one... Bottom line, I am not sure I know how to defeat an ideology. I know how to find and kill individuals who would like to bring physical harm to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I don't know how you defeat that drive in them to commit these acts. When foreign policy (war simply being an extension) is driven by economics and politics, and not truly morally or security driven you are going to have a messy conflict. People are pissed off because the Americans came into their country under the banner of "bringing prosperity and democracy" and all that has ensued is lots of violence and little overall prosperity. We can't have both...we either commit to these campaigns to truly bring prosperity which in my mind would mean any company (U.S. or otherwise) that is willing to come in and rebuild infrastructure should be allowed that opportunity. Also, you realize that when a country contains several disparate ethnic groups who have a long history of hating each other that removing the dictator isn't going to create a condition where love toward fellow man will follow. It is called a power grab and everyone wants their agenda met. We should have learned this lesson in Bosnia and Kosovo, but the only guy who really sounded off was General Shinseki and look what that bought him...


Personally, I think we should consider downgrading our ties to those countries. I mean, what do we really get from them? How constructive a role is Egypt playing in the Palestinian dispute? With the Saudis, it's not like they're not going to sell oil if we stop cozying up to them.

One way you defeat an ideology is by delegtimizing it. All three of those states help legitimize the extremist ideology. Basically, we said "you're for or against us" and we then allowed those three to play both sides. If there is an "axis of evil" today it is states that supply transnational terrorists and funds for them. At the top of the list is Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

marct
07-12-2007, 01:46 PM
Thanks, Tequila!


A rather longer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_without_armed_forces)list of countries with no standing armies.

I would not count Hamas as having a standing army as opposed to a militia force. Hizbullah comes much closer.

A far better non-state example than either as far as success in levying taxation and progress towards a professionalized army would be the LTTE, which also has a small navy and air force. The LTTE also does not enjoy state sponsorship in the way that Hamas and Hizbullah do.

I've got to agree with you on the LTTE as well.

I think the entire point behind this pat of the discussion is really to look at the question: what defines a nation state and are their entities that have all the core characteristics that are not nation states.

Marc

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 01:48 PM
Thanks, Tequila!



I've got to agree with you on the LTTE as well.

I think the entire point behind this pat of the discussion is really to look at the question: what defines a nation state and are their entities that have all the core characteristics that are not nation states.

Marc

Wait a minute!!! You mean discussions here are supposed to have a POINT?

marct
07-12-2007, 02:01 PM
Wait a minute!!! You mean discussions here are supposed to have a POINT?

Nah, but occasionally they slip past our guard :eek:.

Marc

FascistLibertarian
07-12-2007, 03:12 PM
Sorry I worded myself wrong.
Being ABLE to have a standing army.
These countries could (i seen the swiss guards protecting V City) but they dont.

BRUZ_LEE
07-12-2007, 03:14 PM
... I was struck by the idea that in our conceptualization of counterinsurgency, the "end state" is that a government is in full control of its territory and has no challengers as a provider of security. PMCs?

That's exactly why it was this BIG strategic blunder to topple Saddam (who was "in full control" of Iraq) without being able to provide a proper replacement for him (democracy or not).
Wasn't that the reason behind Schwarzkopf being stopped in 1991 from marching to Bagdad? The fear of the implosion of Iraq as a state actor and resulting from that a much more volatile, instable and dangerous region than with keeping Saddam in place?

Well,...now we are facing exactly that. :mad:

So much about the effects-based approach to operations in practice...
BRUZ

RTK
07-12-2007, 03:23 PM
That's exactly why it was this BIG strategic blunder to topple Saddam (who was "in full control" of Iraq) without being able to provide a proper replacement for him (democracy or not).
Wasn't that the reason behind Schwarzkopf being stopped in 1991 from marching to Bagdad? The fear of the implosion of Iraq as a state actor and resulting from that a much more volatile, instable and dangerous region than with keeping Saddam in place?

Well,...now we are facing exactly that. :mad:

So much about the effects-based approach to operations in practice...
BRUZ

I think the official reason was that we were there to eject Iraq from Kuwait and upon doing so, we completed the mission. The operational estimates of taking Baghdad were high casualties and possible chemicals. I buy your reason as more probable but don't think it was ever presented as THE reason.

marct
07-12-2007, 03:29 PM
Hi FL,


Sorry I worded myself wrong.
Being ABLE to have a standing army.
These countries could (i seen the swiss guards protecting V City) but they dont.

I'l admit to playing socratic games here, but let's look at this a bit more. If having a standing army is not a requirement for being a nation state, only the ability to raise one, then all sorts of organizations that are not usually considered to be nation states share that ability, including trans-national corporations (which, historically, I should point out often had the right to tax as well).

It still brings us back to the point hat nation states are just one type of organization amongst many that provide the same "services".

Marc

tequila
07-12-2007, 03:42 PM
Well, several leaders have articulated the reasons for not going all the way in 1991.

Dick Cheney (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=55):


I think if we were going to remove Saddam Hussein we would have had to go all the way to Baghdad, we would have to commit a lot of force because I do not believe he would wait in the Presidential Palace for us to arrive. I think we'd have had to hunt him down. And once we'd done that and we'd gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his government, then we'd have had to put another government in its place.

What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or Shi'i government or a Kurdish government or Ba'athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists? How long would we have had to stay in Baghdad to keep that government in place? What would happen to the government once U.S. forces withdrew? How many casualties should the United States accept in that effort to try to create clarity and stability in a situation that is inherently unstable?
I think it is vitally important for a President to know when to use military force. I think it is also very important for him to know when not to commit U.S. military force. And it's my view that the President got it right both times, that it would have been a mistake for us to get bogged down in the quagmire inside Iraq.

Norman Schwarzkopf (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/7.html):


On the question of going to Baghdad. If you remember the Vietnam war, we had no international legitimacy for what we did. As a result we, first of all, lost the battle of world public opinion and eventually we lost the battle at home.


In the Gulf War we had great international legitimacy in the form of eight United Nations Resolutions, every one of which said "Kick Iraq out of Kuwait", did not say one word about going into Iraq, taking Baghdad, conquering the whole country and hanging Saddam Hussein. That's point number one.

Point number two, had we gone on to Baghdad, I don't believe the French would have gone and I'm quite sure that the Arab coalition would not have gone, the coalition would have ruptured and the only people that would have gone would have been the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

And, oh by the way, I think we'd still be there, we'd be like a dinosaur in a tar pit, we could not have gotten out and we'd still be the occupying power and we'd be paying one hundred percent of all the costs to administer all of Iraq.

...

But I think, more importantly, there's a strategic consideration. Saddam Hussein portrayed that war from the very beginning as "This is not a war against Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. This is the Western colonial lackey friends of Israel coming in to destroy the only nation that dare stand up to Israel, that is Iraq".

Had we proceeded to go on into Iraq and take all of Iraq, I think that you would have millions of people in that part of the world who would say Saddam was right, that that was the objective.

...

So the bottom line, as far as I'm concerned, is that sure, emotionally I would have loved to have gone to Baghdad and grabbed Saddam Hussein, but this was not an emotional decision, it was a strategic decision, and strategically we were smart enough to win the war and win the peace.

George Bush & Brent Scowcroft (http://www.millat.com/ghalibcom/events/iraq98/why_we_didnt_remove_saddam_.htm):


While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs.
Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

BRUZ_LEE
07-12-2007, 04:09 PM
Well, several leaders have articulated the reasons for not going all the way in 1991. ...

Thanks for the quotes. They are really spot-on.

BRUZ

FascistLibertarian
07-12-2007, 04:43 PM
We should also remember that Sadam and the Taliban did not have 100% control over their own countries. Why should we expect we will do better?



If having a standing army is not a requirement for being a nation state, only the ability to raise one, then all sorts of organizations that are not usually considered to be nation states share that ability, including trans-national corporations (which, historically, I should point out often had the right to tax as well).

It still brings us back to the point hat nation states are just one type of organization amongst many that provide the same "services".

Hi Marc!

I am just saying that to be a nation state you need the ability to raise an army. Not that everyone that can is a nation state.

The issue of services is spot on. I see it in two ways
1) You can pay so you hire Blackwater
2) You are poor, your house gets bombed, the non-state organizations which we label terrorist are able to provide better service. People naturally will trust the non state player which is looking out for them. Plus these people get targeted by the powerful countries which makes them look like heros and us like bullies.

Transnational corps are building their own armies...... Its the thing that makes sense. I dont really see what can be done to stop considering we live in market economies.
Shell has to either hire mercs in Nigeria or leave.
Traditionally these companies were National (ie Dutch or British joint stock companies).
National companies still exist of course.

The nation state is a construction, if it cant provide people will lose faith.
I love Canada (best country in the world!), how long that would be true if I couldnt get power and the French were bombing our cultural symbols I dont know.

I think for Iraq the question is how unified should the country be? Ie Regional autonomy and local forces?

marct
07-12-2007, 04:59 PM
Hi FL,


I am just saying that to be a nation state you need the ability to raise an army. Not that everyone that can is a nation state.

Oh, I know that :D. Still and all, I think it goes to the core of what a "state"means, whether that's a nation state or a tribal state - a combination of ability and lived reality as it were.


The issue of services is spot on. I see it in two ways
1) You can pay so you hire Blackwater
2) You are poor, your house gets bombed, the non-state organizations which we label terrorist are able to provide better service. People naturally will trust the non state player which is looking out for them. Plus these people get targeted by the powerful countries which makes them look like heros and us like bullies.

Blackwater?!? Sheesh! I'd far rather hire Executive Outcomes than Blackwater!

More seriously, there are some serious economic and logistics costs involved in having any type of armed forces. What we are seeing now is a shift in the cost of the offense-defense-speed-identification equation; basically a cost ration between offense and defense modified by the cost of speed of delivery and target identification.


Transnational corps are building their own armies...... Its the thing that makes sense. I dont really see what can be done to stop considering we live in market economies.
Shell has to either hire mercs in Nigeria or leave.
Traditionally these companies were National (ie Dutch or British joint stock companies).

Yup. I was thinking of the Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company in particular. Of course, we could also add in the HBC for Canadian content :D.


The nation state is a construction, if it cant provide people will lose faith.

Yup, and, just to get back to the start of this entire thread (:D), there are some pretty serious implications for policy and planning as well as international politics coming out of this.

Marc

Pragmatic Thinker
07-12-2007, 05:32 PM
Personally, I think we should consider downgrading our ties to those countries. I mean, what do we really get from them? How constructive a role is Egypt playing in the Palestinian dispute? With the Saudis, it's not like they're not going to sell oil if we stop cozying up to them.

I think you under estimate the importance of Saudi Arabia as a political ally in the region. They are considered extremely influential in the region, especially with their neighbors and more importantly within OPEC. The energy argument is indeed valid, but for the US the implication resides in their (Saudi) ability to control pricing within OPEC and not so much physical oil supply. We as a nation are more dependent upon Canadian sand tar crude then Saudi sweet, but that is a whole other discussion. I do agree with you that they allow people within their population to spread this radical Islamic ideology that is so embraced by Al Qaeda and other groups throughout the globe, however, I believe it is too dangerous (especially economically) to simply cut ties with the Saudi's. They punished us in 1973 with the Arab Oil Embargo, and they could similiarily punish us again (and our "global economy" partners like China, India, and many others) today by either slowing production to create increases in oil prices, push to convert petro dollars to euros which would put this economy into an economic meltdown greater than the Depression, or any other various measures that would have sever economic consequences at home. People talk about global markets and economies as a good thing, but a smart warrior and analyst would know that economic inter-dependence directly relates to how we craft foreign policy which directly effects military operations. I have simplified my point but the bottom line remains we need ($$) these countries on our "side" so to speak and not actively against us.

Ski
07-12-2007, 05:46 PM
PT

There is also a vast amount of Saudi money invested in the United States, and if that money was suddenly go away, I think there would very serious economic (and therefore political) repercussions. Egypt and Pakistan don't have anywhere near the economic influence on the US as Saudi Arabia does. But they are important because Egypt is the largest Arab country in terms of population (and that Suez Canal is still as important today as it was the day it opened for business), and Pakistan because of the nukes and AQ connection in Waziristan.

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 05:56 PM
PT

There is also a vast amount of Saudi money invested in the United States, and if that money was suddenly go away, I think there would very serious economic (and therefore political) repercussions. Egypt and Pakistan don't have anywhere near the economic influence on the US as Saudi Arabia does. But they are important because Egypt is the largest Arab country in terms of population (and that Suez Canal is still as important today as it was the day it opened for business), and Pakistan because of the nukes and AQ connection in Waziristan.

I don't think the Saudi regime is suicidal. I mean, what are they going to do with all that money if they pulled it out of the United States? We need to get over this myth that they have leverage of us because of their oil and money but we don't have any leverage over them.

tequila
07-12-2007, 06:08 PM
Not that the Saudis are going to pull their dough, but frankly American investments have not done well in years. I work in the currency markets, and one of the great mysteries of the markets in the past decade has been the willingness of foreigners to invest in U.S. assets given the relatively poor returns.

Central banks in search of stability, petrodollars, the Chinese peg, tax arbitrage, and political influence are all good answers. None of these, however, are necessarily permanent.

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 06:16 PM
Not that the Saudis are going to pull their dough, but frankly American investments have not done well in years. I work in the currency markets, and one of the great mysteries of the markets in the past decade has been the willingness of foreigners to invest in U.S. assets given the relatively poor returns.

Central banks in search of stability, petrodollars, the Chinese peg, tax arbitrage, and political influence are all good answers. None of these, however, are necessarily permanent.


Coinicidentally, here's the passage I've been writing over the past 30 minutes for my in-progress monograph entitled The Fragile Assumptions of American Strategy:

Six years after September 11, American grand strategy is not generating the desired results. Certainly a number of terrorists have been killed or captured and key terrorist cells broken up, but the ideology of Islamic extremism has not been delegitimized and terrorists have found new methods for communications, planning, training, fund raising, and attacks. The intelligence community admits that globally, al Qaeda is as strong as it was at the time of the 2001 attacks. Hostility toward the United States is escalating, particularly in the Islamic world. Iraq, the centerpiece of American strategy since 2003, appears doomed to be at best a partial success when compared to the lofty expectations immediately following the removal of the Hussein regime, possibly a disaster. This all suggests the need for a fundamental reevaluation and revision of American grand strategy.

Two alternatives appear to make sense. Certainly we should assume that we will be engaged in conflict with violent Islamic extremists for at least so long as: 1) we remain dependent on imported petroleum and thus engaged in the Islamic world; 2) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues and we remain an ally of Israel; 3) the Islamic world does not undertake the massive introspection and reform necessary to address its economic and political problems. But which of the two alternatives one supports depends on whether violent Islamic extremism is seen as the paramount security threat of our time, or as one of several threats and challenges. If it is one of several, then clearly American grand strategy should move toward a more balanced treatment of threats and challenges, ending the tendency to gauge every issue, policy, and program in terms of its relationship to the war on terror. American strategy should continue to stress proliferation, but do so without portraying the problem solely as the “nexus” between terrorism and proliferation. It should also give greater weight to what is often called “human security”—day to day freedom from disease, poverty, and crime. It should certainly address the way that globalization and other shifts in the global economy affect security. Current strategy is largely devoid of assessments of the impact that the growing American trade imbalance, immigration, deficit spending, the aging of the American population, the declining position of American science and technology, and climate change have on security. None of these are, strictly speaking, related to the war on terror. But they are serious. A balanced grand strategy would shift some resources and attention to them.

The second approach assumes that, in fact, the conflict with Islamic extremism is the preeminent security threat of our time. The problem then becomes delegitimizing the ideology which generates terrorists and extremists rather than simply killing and capturing terrorists. Current American strategy does, in fact, recognize the need to dry up the source. But its method for doing so—imploring other nations to adopt liberal democracy—is inadequate. A more focused strategy would, admittedly, be uncomfortable and force the United States to rethink some of its most closely held values and traditions. Specifically, it would require:

 Maximum disengagement from the from the Islamic world. (This is based on the assumption that when Islamic extremists say they are motivated by American penetration of the Islamic world, they are telling the truth—that is what motivates them, not a “hatred for freedom.”)
 Ending America’s petroleum addiction.
 Developing a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not simply whether they prosecute al Qaeda (our current criterion). States like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others which by commission or omission tolerate and even encourage anti-American extremism would be non-partners. Aid to, immigration from, and visas for the citizens of non-partner states would end.
 Approaching cyberspace as a key battlefield. Currently, it is the ultimate "ungoverned space." Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.
 Be prepared to launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups but do not reengineer their nations. While this may be a worthy endeavor, the strategic costs outweigh the benefits.

Pragmatic Thinker
07-12-2007, 08:08 PM
Six years after September 11, American grand strategy is not generating the desired results. Certainly a number of terrorists have been killed or captured and key terrorist cells broken up, but the ideology of Islamic extremism has not been delegitimized and terrorists have found new methods for communications, planning, training, fund raising, and attacks. The intelligence community admits that globally, al Qaeda is as strong as it was at the time of the 2001 attacks. Hostility toward the United States is escalating, particularly in the Islamic world. Iraq, the centerpiece of American strategy since 2003, appears doomed to be at best a partial success when compared to the lofty expectations immediately following the removal of the Hussein regime, possibly a disaster. This all suggests the need for a fundamental reevaluation and revision of American grand strategy.

Two alternatives appear to make sense. Certainly we should assume that we will be engaged in conflict with violent Islamic extremists for at least so long as: 1) we remain dependent on imported petroleum and thus engaged in the Islamic world; 2) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues and we remain an ally of Israel; 3) the Islamic world does not undertake the massive introspection and reform necessary to address its economic and political problems. But which of the two alternatives one supports depends on whether violent Islamic extremism is seen as the paramount security threat of our time, or as one of several threats and challenges. If it is one of several, then clearly American grand strategy should move toward a more balanced treatment of threats and challenges, ending the tendency to gauge every issue, policy, and program in terms of its relationship to the war on terror. American strategy should continue to stress proliferation, but do so without portraying the problem solely as the “nexus” between terrorism and proliferation. It should also give greater weight to what is often called “human security”—day to day freedom from disease, poverty, and crime. It should certainly address the way that globalization and other shifts in the global economy affect security. Current strategy is largely devoid of assessments of the impact that the growing American trade imbalance, immigration, deficit spending, the aging of the American population, the declining position of American science and technology, and climate change have on security. None of these are, strictly speaking, related to the war on terror. But they are serious. A balanced grand strategy would shift some resources and attention to them.

The second approach assumes that, in fact, the conflict with Islamic extremism is the preeminent security threat of our time. The problem then becomes delegitimizing the ideology which generates terrorists and extremists rather than simply killing and capturing terrorists. Current American strategy does, in fact, recognize the need to dry up the source. But its method for doing so—imploring other nations to adopt liberal democracy—is inadequate. A more focused strategy would, admittedly, be uncomfortable and force the United States to rethink some of its most closely held values and traditions. Specifically, it would require:

 Maximum disengagement from the from the Islamic world. (This is based on the assumption that when Islamic extremists say they are motivated by American penetration of the Islamic world, they are telling the truth—that is what motivates them, not a “hatred for freedom.”)
 Ending America’s petroleum addiction.
 Developing a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not simply whether they prosecute al Qaeda (our current criterion). States like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others which by commission or omission tolerate and even encourage anti-American extremism would be non-partners. Aid to, immigration from, and visas for the citizens of non-partner states would end.
 Approaching cyberspace as a key battlefield. Currently, it is the ultimate "ungoverned space." Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.
 Be prepared to launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups but do not reengineer their nations. While this may be a worthy endeavor, the strategic costs outweigh the benefits.

Steve,

This is some good stuff...not sure I can support disengagement from the Islamic world. I completely agree we need to end petroleum addiction or at least minimize its strangle-hold on us economically and politically. I also like doing something about those countries who allow radical Islam to continue within their borders, however, I would rather see us provide economic and political rewards to those countries in addition to the immigration limitations. I tend to believe economic incentive works well when applied correctly. Absolutely, we need to get the upper hand in our IO/CN fight to include more offensive capabilities in shutting these sites down. Lastly, I am all for the limited raid option using our SOF for what they were intended for -- applying lethal force against a target in denied areas where the risk couldn't be any higher. It isn't the operators who fear failure or a mishap but rather our civilian leadership... Overall I am with you on these points... Now go run for President, win, and reform our political system :)

Tacitus
07-12-2007, 08:21 PM
Not that the Saudis are going to pull their dough, but frankly American investments have not done well in years. I work in the currency markets, and one of the great mysteries of the markets in the past decade has been the willingness of foreigners to invest in U.S. assets given the relatively poor returns.

Central banks in search of stability, petrodollars, the Chinese peg, tax arbitrage, and political influence are all good answers. None of these, however, are necessarily permanent.

Hey tequila,

I don't understand this, either. The difference in the interest rate between U.S. bonds and foreign competitors (I'm excluding junk) has been pretty small. Combine that with a falling value of the U.S. dollar against their own currencies, and it doesn't strike me at all that it is a no-brainer decision for foreigners to buy U.S. bonds.

Where is it written in the U.S. constitution that the Chinese central bank must hold dollar denominated reserves? It isn't, but people act as though it is.

Somedays I wonder if foreigners are stupid, or just naive. They realize that in the end, the U.S. government can monetize the debt if our national debt overwhelms us, don't they? I doubt Congress and the President will ever cut entitlements.

SteveMetz
07-12-2007, 08:50 PM
Overall I am with you on these points... Now go run for President, win, and reform our political system :)

I doubt even the many skeletons in my closet would jump on *that* bandwagon.

Dominique R. Poirier
07-12-2007, 09:31 PM
Tacitus and Tequila,
Unless I missed something at some point, and to my benighted point of view since I’m not at all in economics and trade (I read The Economist from time to time and that's all), all this seems pretty obvious to me.

I justify my point.

In 2003 China superseded Mexico as U.S. main trading partner. Wall Mart alone accounts for 10% of China’s exports to the U.S. and 1% of China’s GDP (Read the March 2004 issue of Commentary).

So, what does China buy that big to the United States in return? Do you see my point?

About Saudi Arabia, the issue is slightly different. It is today the third oil exporter to the United States with 1.458 million barrels per day.

So, in recent years, oil-exporting countries have experienced windfall gains with the rise in the price of oil. A look at how oil exporters “recycle” their revenues suggests that roughly half of the petrodollar windfall has gone to purchase foreign goods, especially from Europe and China (Hmmm), while the remainder has been invested in foreign assets, and more especially in U.S. assets; directly and indirectly.

The way in which oil exporters deploy their revenues has important implications for oil-importing countries. Higher oil prices reduce purchasing power in oil-importing countries and thus are a drag on their growth. But when oil exporters use the revenues from oil sales to increase their purchases of goods from oil-importing countries, these negative effects on growth are reduced. Increased purchases of foreign assets by oil exporters can also help sustain growth in oil-importing countries, albeit less directly. Such asset purchases are a form of lending: In effect, oil importers can sustain their consumption and investment spending by borrowing from oil exporters to finance their higher oil-import bills.

How about this explanation?

Ken White
07-13-2007, 04:19 AM
Coinicidentally, here's the passage I've been writing over the past 30 minutes for my in-progress monograph entitled The Fragile Assumptions of American Strategy:

. . .

 Maximum disengagement from the from the Islamic world. (This is based on the assumption that when Islamic extremists say they are motivated by American penetration of the Islamic world, they are telling the truth—that is what motivates them, not a “hatred for freedom.”)
 Ending America’s petroleum addiction.
 Developing a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not simply whether they prosecute al Qaeda (our current criterion). States like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others which by commission or omission tolerate and even encourage anti-American extremism would be non-partners. Aid to, immigration from, and visas for the citizens of non-partner states would end.
 Approaching cyberspace as a key battlefield. Currently, it is the ultimate "ungoverned space." Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.
 Be prepared to launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups but do not reengineer their nations. While this may be a worthy endeavor, the strategic costs outweigh the benefits.

That is good. In order:

- I agree but would offer the caveat that while many of the Islamists do indeed mean that, many Muslims would not like to see us go. Further and as you know, not all Islamists would cease and desist. It is admittedly easier to deal with a few rather than many but the process would not be either clean or quick. I guess what I'm saying is this needs to be done cautiously and over time.

- Definitely!

- I certainly agree but I'm very, very skeptical the political will is there. There is also the obvious tie-in with the first and second points. It's possible that a 'sales job' may be required to get true and merited consideration of the very valid premise.

- That needs to happen and should not be problematic or even controversial.

- Agreed and PT is correct, the operators are ready but yet again, the political will problem (as he mentions) rears its head. That problem is not limited to civilian politicians. There is also the fact that the Armed forces are a reflection of US society, as the general population has gotten a little softer and more risk averse, so too have the Armed forces. Risk aversion in high places kept foot patrols out of Iraqi streets in 2003 when, lacking the abysmally stupid (IMO) disbanding of the Army and the Cops things might not have deteriorated to this extent.

A follow on to that is that we as a nation IMO do not have the patience to do long term things and we are confronted with the fact that we have an image rebuilding problem. It took us from 1975 until about 1985 to start rebuilding internationally from Viet Nam and that process was barely complete by 1990. The Somalia operation hurt and the fly swats with Tomahawks plus Bosnia and Kosovo were quite minor setbacks; Iraq has been a major setback and I see another ten year rebuild phase coming on. If we don't screw it up...

All that is a long way of saying that your spoiling raids will take a lot of work; we, 28 years after the Tehran fiasco are still not ready to do that effectively due to spending a lot of money on the wrong equipment, inadequate training *, wrong organization for the wrong combat *, emphasis on numbers and mass instead of stealth and deception, lack of will and and over zealous 'force protection' concerns in the aforementioned high places. Most Americans ( >60% ) will tolerate casualties, they just want good payback; in other words, do what you have to but get it done right and don't take too much time doing it.

* Not totally pertinent to your paper but I suggest, organization first -- that we need to be prepared for a major conventional war (my way would be an enlarged Heavy National Guard with no more than 8-9 Bdes of Active heavy types); Mid level (I guess we're gonna have Strykers and get FCS; again 8-9 active Bdes, max); The probable future of light infantry prepared to get attached or OpCom support elms, the remaining 27+ Bdes, 8 of 'em Airborne for a rapidly deployable strategic reserve. I put the organization first because the training hinges on that. The average infantry battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do given the same expenditure and effort for training. JSOC needs a slight beef up and the SF Groups need to get out of direct action. We need the long distance insertion capability tha should've been the priority from 1980 on -- we still do not have it (but we can of course, fight across the north German Plain...). Thus was written the gospel according to St. Ken...

All that has no bearing on your words, they are good. I merely throw out those thoughts for consideration based on my experience that the senior guys really like turnkey answers and like to ask "why do you say that...". :).

P.S.

I have a few skeletons I can trot out to vote for you...

tequila
07-13-2007, 09:23 AM
I don't understand this, either. The difference in the interest rate between U.S. bonds and foreign competitors (I'm excluding junk) has been pretty small. Combine that with a falling value of the U.S. dollar against their own currencies, and it doesn't strike me at all that it is a no-brainer decision for foreigners to buy U.S. bonds.

Tacitus, you and I are in 100% agreement. There is no purely rational economic reason for this. Thus we look for other reasons.


In 2003 China superseded Mexico as U.S. main trading partner. Wall Mart alone accounts for 10% of China’s exports to the U.S. and 1% of China’s GDP (Read the March 2004 issue of Commentary).

So, what does China buy that big to the United States in return? Do you see my point?

About Saudi Arabia, the issue is slightly different. It is today the third oil exporter to the United States with 1.458 million barrels per day.

So, in recent years, oil-exporting countries have experienced windfall gains with the rise in the price of oil. A look at how oil exporters “recycle” their revenues suggests that roughly half of the petrodollar windfall has gone to purchase foreign goods, especially from Europe and China (Hmmm), while the remainder has been invested in foreign assets, and more especially in U.S. assets; directly and indirectly.

The way in which oil exporters deploy their revenues has important implications for oil-importing countries. Higher oil prices reduce purchasing power in oil-importing countries and thus are a drag on their growth. But when oil exporters use the revenues from oil sales to increase their purchases of goods from oil-importing countries, these negative effects on growth are reduced. Increased purchases of foreign assets by oil exporters can also help sustain growth in oil-importing countries, albeit less directly. Such asset purchases are a form of lending: In effect, oil importers can sustain their consumption and investment spending by borrowing from oil exporters to finance their higher oil-import bills.

How about this explanation?

Dominique, first off you really, really shouldn't source anything from Commentary. Also Canada remains the U.S.' largest trading partner by a long shot.

Also that is why I noted the various extra-economic causes of such large levels of irrational foreign investment in U.S. assets. Yes, the Chinese, the Saudis/Gulfies, and to a lesser extent the Russians are largely financing American domestic consumption, and losing a lot of reserves doing so. The question is, why do they bother to do this when rational economic actors would abandon the U.S. for better returns elsewhere?

The Chinese do it because they still see U.S. assets as safe, to curry favor in Washington, to keep its largest export market stable, and to safeguard its own export-driven growth. If the Chinese were a democracy, they likely would not have continued to subsidize the U.S. since doing so in essence costs the Chinese worker enormous sums. But since when has China ever listened to its workers?

The Saudis/Gulf States do it largely for the same reason why they buy F-16s. The stability of the U.S. economy is critical to the maintenance of the Saudi regime, and it doesn't hurt to have some buy-in to the political system.

However, this odd situation where poorer countries are investing in and subsidizing the wealthiest economy in the world (a subsidy accruing disproportionately to a select few in the U.S. financial sector --- note the rise of private equity firms driven by the frothing debt market, whose LBO-driven M&A boom has in turn propelled the U.S. stock market to its current levels) but the gravy train is not going to run forever. The imbalances caused, especially by China's Treasury buying spree of the past decade, are building to a point where even the PBoC is starting to realize its unsustainability.

SteveMetz
07-13-2007, 10:38 AM
Dominique, first off you really, really shouldn't source anything from Commentary.

Why is that? It has an ideological leaning, but so do many journals. As a scholar, I'd consider a citation from Commentary as valid as one from the Atlantic, New Republic, Weekly Standard, Harpers, New Yorker, National Review, etc.

tequila
07-13-2007, 10:52 AM
Why is that? It has an ideological leaning, but so do many journals. As a scholar, I'd consider a citation from Commentary as valid as one from the Atlantic, New Republic, Weekly Standard, Harpers, New Yorker, National Review, etc.

Perhaps the events of the past four years have overly soured me on things written by Podhoretz, Gelernter, Peretz, Muravchik, Herman, etc. When I read Commentary nowadays, I smell Socialist Worker circa 1991.

Tacitus
07-16-2007, 05:43 PM
Tacitus, you and I are in 100% agreement. There is no purely rational economic reason for this. Thus we look for other reasons.

Also that is why I noted the various extra-economic causes of such large levels of irrational foreign investment in U.S. assets. Yes, the Chinese, the Saudis/Gulfies, and to a lesser extent the Russians are largely financing American domestic consumption, and losing a lot of reserves doing so. The question is, why do they bother to do this when rational economic actors would abandon the U.S. for better returns elsewhere?

The Chinese do it because they still see U.S. assets as safe, to curry favor in Washington, to keep its largest export market stable, and to safeguard its own export-driven growth. If the Chinese were a democracy, they likely would not have continued to subsidize the U.S. since doing so in essence costs the Chinese worker enormous sums. But since when has China ever listened to its workers?

The Saudis/Gulf States do it largely for the same reason why they buy F-16s. The stability of the U.S. economy is critical to the maintenance of the Saudi regime, and it doesn't hurt to have some buy-in to the political system.

However, this odd situation where poorer countries are investing in and subsidizing the wealthiest economy in the world (a subsidy accruing disproportionately to a select few in the U.S. financial sector --- note the rise of private equity firms driven by the frothing debt market, whose LBO-driven M&A boom has in turn propelled the U.S. stock market to its current levels) but the gravy train is not going to run forever. The imbalances caused, especially by China's Treasury buying spree of the past decade, are building to a point where even the PBoC is starting to realize its unsustainability.

Tequila,

That is a solid answer to the question of why they do this. Indeed, it pretty much the ONLY credible explanation that economists can come up with these days. It is just economic intertia, the natural coninutation of an unbalanced economic policy until it blows up on somebody.

This state of affairs continues at the moment because of their desire for "stability." Because no dollar crisis has erupted, it is assumed by the government that this can just continue forever. Taking preventative measures would likely cause some pain, and better to shift that onto the next guy who follows along, if it is in fact, needed at all.

Allow me to use an analogy here. Picture a tranquil Alpine setting. All the towns and villages are down in the valley. Snow keep falling and falling in the mountains in the higher elevations. Alert people down below are nervous about this and warn of a massive avalanche if things continue. They are scoffed at by the others, "Don't you see it is different this time because (fill in your own explanation). And everyone goes about their business. Bold weathermen have attempted to climb up higher to measure the snowpack to try to measure how much can be accumulated before the avalanche triggers, but even they admit that this is impossible because there are too many variables and unknowns involved to confidently predict the breaking point. But from merely looking at historical examples, they know such a point exists, and we are past points where it has occured in recorded history. Down in the valley, it all seems great... except for these irritating worry-wart weathermen who seem to be crying wolf all the time about the record snowfalls up in the mountains.

Doesn't this end in a dollar crisis? And then the Federal Reserve has to either allow the value of the dollar to crash against foreign currencies and gold, or ratchet up interest rates to very high levels to defend the value of the currency? Pick your poison, so to speak. That's where these sort of circumstances always led in all the economic classes I ever took. The crazy thing is that we have seen this movie before in the runup to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Hello 1970s all over again?