The President's Guerrilla Expert Vietnam

[SWJED]

26 December 1969 issue of Time Magazine - The President's Guerrilla Expert (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941771-1,00.html) (Hat Tip Tom Ricks via Warlord Loop).


Though Viet Nam has been his specialty since 1961, Sir Robert Thompson was never influential with either John Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson. It was Richard Nixon who embraced his views wholeheartedly—most likely because they coincide with his own.

Suave, controlled and bearing a striking resemblance to the late actor Herbert Marshall, the Cambridge-educated Thompson, 53, was knighted for devising the strategy that ultimately defeated local Chinese Communist terrorists in Malaya in the 1950s. He was then Britain's secretary for defense of the Federation of Malaya; later (1961-65), he served as head of the British advisory mission in Viet Nam. Now retired from government, he is an occasional consultant for the Rand Corp., the noted U.S. think tank. His experience in Malaya convinced Thompson that counterinsurgency does not require massive forces, large-scale bombing or continual pursuit of the enemy. He contends that such tactics play into the hands of guerrillas by increasing casualties and enlarging the scope of the combat. Thompson emphasizes localized "police" actions to protect the population against guerrilla attacks and to ferret out subversives. That proved easier in Malaya, where the terrorists were often ethnically different from the local population, than in Viet Nam, where friend and foe may be indistinguishable. The Malaya guerrillas also had no handy sanctuaries across nearby borders...

[SteveMetz]

26 December 1969 issue of Time Magazine - The President's Guerrilla Expert (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941771-1,00.html) (Hat Tip Tom Ricks via Warlord Loop).


OK but I still insist that the deification of Thompson, Galula, Kitson etc. can be a problem. It leads to a tendency to approach counterinsurgency by asking, "What would Sir Bob do?" or "What would Frenchie Dave do?"

Along these lines, I'm giving the first major presentation based on my Rethinking Insurgency study to the Army War College Distance Education Class today (I'm a substitute for Ahmed Hashem, who developed bronchitis). If anyone is interested, email me and I'll send the slides to you.

[BRUZ_LEE]

OK but I still insist that the deification of Thompson, Galula, Kitson etc. can be a problem. It leads to a tendency to approach counterinsurgency by asking, "What would Sir Bob do?" or "What would Frenchie Dave do?"


That's of course true.
All these COIN gods were acting at the OPERATIONAL level of war. But a STRATEGICALLY hopeless situation can't be solved by operational art or good tactics.

BRUZ

[SteveMetz]

That's of course true.
All these COIN gods were acting at the OPERATIONAL level of war. But a STRATEGICALLY hopeless situation can't be solved by operational art or good tactics.

BRUZ

Absolutely right. But that's what we keep doing.

[tequila]

Perhaps because our leaders pray that tactical successes will relieve them of the difficulties of reevaluating failed or nonexistent strategies?

[Tom Odom]

OK but I still insist that the deification of Thompson, Galula, Kitson etc. can be a problem. It leads to a tendency to approach counterinsurgency by asking, "What would Sir Bob do?" or "What would Frenchie Dave do?"

Along these lines, I'm giving the first major presentation based on my Rethinking Insurgency study to the Army War College Distance Education Class today (I'm a substitute for Ahmed Hashem, who developed bronchitis). If anyone is interested, email me and I'll send the slides to you.


Agreed in that none of these guys said anything that had not be said or done in one fashion or another. But it is very human to want to attach a name to a theory; it puts a human face on things and makes it more comfortable. One of the things I like about Dave Kilcullen is that he often reminds those who would do the same to him that what he offers is not new but merely adapted to today's world.

On the need for strategy, no argument there.

best

Tom

PS
Steve, send me the slides, please.

[SteveMetz]

Agreed in that none of these guys said anything that had not be said or done in one fashion or another. But it is very human to want to attach a name to a theory; it puts a human face on things and makes it more comfortable. One of the things I like about Dave Kilcullen is that he often reminds those who would do the same to him that what he offers is not new but merely adapted to today's world.

On the need for strategy, no argument there.

best

Tom

PS
Steve, send me the slides, please.


But I'm a real contrarian--I don't think the key is winning public support (which is the essence of the Cold War era British approach).

My colleague Steve Biddle did an exhaustive study of the March-April 2003 conventional campaign in Iraq. He concluded that the Iraqis were so incompetent that the campaign was not an adequate test of whether we were or were not on track with transformation.

I think the same applies to the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya. Yet a whole strategy and doctrine has been derived from it.

[BRUZ_LEE]

Absolutely right. But that's what we keep doing.

In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.(Sun Tsu)

There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.(Sun Tsu)

Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor
damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure
spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage
of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
able to avert the consequences that must ensue.(Sun Tsu)

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to
retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.
This is called hobbling the army....(Sun Tsu)

...looking at OIF I could go on and cite the whole book ...

BRUZ

[Tom Odom]

My colleague Steve Biddle did an exhaustive study of the March-April 2003 conventional campaign in Iraq. He concluded that the Iraqis were so incompetent that the campaign was not an adequate test of whether we were or were not on track with transformation.

That matches what we found in the Desert Storm Special Study Group with then BG Scales as we wrote Certain Victory.

On the issue of public support, I still lean that way. I do believe that what is often thrown about as "winning public support" is often too sugary--as in a junior high school popularity contest. The case I have in mind is Rwanda 95-98.

1995 with the refugee crisis over and the refugees rearming, the new GOR cleared the IDP camps culminating with Kibeho. Depeneding on who was counting or guestimating, somewhere between 2000 and 4000 IDPs died at Kibeho. It was very much the Fallujah 2 of its day; we knew it was going to be bloddy and it was. But it convinced most of the IDPs to go home.

1996 the refugee camp clearing operations, the new GOR used an indirect approach to turn the flank of the militias and hardliners holding the camps. As a result, the refugees picked up in mass--just as they had done in 1994--and walked home. The new GOR--learning from Kibeho in 1995--refused to allow any way station camps to be established. The refugees were walked all the way home.

1997 the insurgency inside Rwanda flared as the rurned refugees brought the war back inside the country. Two things happend:

A. The GOR with Congolese rebel proxies took the Congo and broke the back of the Rwandan Hutu extremist forces. This was not a "clean" operation--it set off a major conflict that still plays out today with casualties in excess of 4million.

B. The GOR using former Rwandan military officers (Hutus) who had been integrated into the new military and the very best officers of the former rebel RPA to mount a multifaceted COIN campaign. By 1998, they had convinced the Hutu extremist sympathizers inside Rwanda that the former regime forces were defeated in the Congo and would never retake Rwanda.

I offer this again because it was not a case of winning the popualtion as in sudddenly they all looked to the new government as their savior and friend. Rather that they reocognized that hopes of a Hutu Power resurgence were doomed and that it was therefore in their best interest to accept the new government and its policies.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

That matches what we found in the Desert Storm Special Study Group with then BG Scales as we wrote Certain Victory.

On the issue of public support, I still lean that way. I do believe that what is often thrown about as "winning public support" is often too sugary--as in a junior high school popularity contest. The case I have in mind is Rwanda 95-98.

1995 with the refugee crisis over and the refugees rearming, the new GOR cleared the IDP camps culminating with Kibeho. Depeneding on who was counting or guestimating, somewhere between 2000 and 4000 IDPs died at Kibeho. It was very much the Fallujah 2 of its day; we knew it was going to be bloddy and it was. But it convinced most of the IDPs to go home.

1996 the refugee camp clearing operations, the new GOR used an indirect approach to turn the clank of the militias and hardliners holding the camps. As a result, the refugees picked up in mass--just as they had done in 1994--and walked home. The new GOR--learning from Kibeho in 1995--refused to allow any way station camps to be established. The refugees were walked all the way home.

1997 the insurgency inside Rwanda flared as the rurned refugees brought the war back inside the country. Two things happend:

A. The GOR with Congolese rebel proxies took the Congo and broke the back of the Rwandan Hutu extremist forces. This was not a "clean" operation--it set off a major conflict that still plays out today with casualties in excess of 4million.

B. The GOR using former Rwandan military officers (Hutus) who had been integrated into the new military and the very best officers of the former rebel RPA to mount a multifaceted COIN campaign. By 1998, they had convinced the Hutu extremist sympathizers inside Rwanda that the former regime forces were defeated in the Congo and would never retake Rwanda.

I offer this again because it was not a case of winning the popualtion as in sudddenly they all looked to the new government as their savior and friend. Rather that they reocognized that hopes of a Hutu Power resurgence were doomed and that it was therefore in their best interest to accept the new government and its policies.

Best

Tom


--------------------------

[Merv Benson]

WE keep discovering that public support in this country is more decisive than in the target of the insurgency. The enemy sees it as the center of gravity and so far the communist in Vietnam and the insurgents in Iraq appear to be on target. Meanwhile, in all our counterinsurgency operations, we have yet to really engage much on this front.

[tequila]

LTC Odom,

I just ordered your book, thanks for the reminder. I was just wondering if there are details of the GoR's COIN campaign including the Congo war in the book, or does it mainly describe the genocide? Thanks.

[Tom Odom]

Hey mate,

You would have to look at my book ---and hopefully Ambassador Dave Rawson's once he gets it out--as the first half of the story.

For the second half, turn to Ambassador Bob Gribbin's book (http://regribbin.com/) and also Colonel Rick Orth's writings (http://research.yale.edu/ycias/database/files/GS25.pdf) for some publications.

Don't forget the conspriacy theorists as well. Rick like Dave Rawson, Bob Gribbin, and yours truly has been vilified by Mr. Conspiracy Wayne Masden. (http://www.rense.com/general76/amady.htm). I am waiting for a copy of Ambassador Krueger's book (http://www.utexas.edu/utpress/books/krufro.html) due out from University of Texas; Dave Rawson and I are the subject of an entire chapter concerning our roles with the RPA.

Another interesting article on the Congo War (http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get5.cgi?directory=fall99/&filename=THOM.htm#11)aspects of this is by Bill Thom who was DIO for Africa.

Best

Tom

[tequila]

Thanks for the excellent sources! My productivity at work may suffer for the next few days ... :D

[Tom Odom]

Tequila,

Here is the latest conspiracy blurb (http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=13139)I've found. Same guy wrote a book-length garbage assessment last year....this one claims that expat Somalis were the secret weapon in Kagame's rebel army.

Best

Tom


To get an idea of the scope of the war, it is very easy to get information and details in Addis Ababa, where you will find people who were hired to fight for the RPF. They will tell you that the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia recruited foreign fighters for the RPF.11 These soldiers came from Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and South Sudan to fight against the Rwandan Government. Obviously, there is no need to say that the 1990-1994 war was a civil war as it was described before and after the RPF seized power. Even today there are Somalis living in Rwanda with full Rwandan citizenship and still others who were disappointed and left for Europe. That is why, at the end of the day, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) said Paul Kagame was linked to Al-Qaeda without giving more detailed information.12 Many of those guys fighting with the RPF were actually terrorists, but that label was not used with those countries at that time because it was before September the eleventh, 2001!

[walrus]

One of the works I have found to be useful in better understanding societies, and why some work better than others, and others don't work at all, is "Trust - The Economic Value of Trust and Cooperation" by Francis Fukuyama.

To me, this was the book that made me understand the rationale for "Hearts and Minds" campaigns. They don't need to love us, but they have to trust us, and eventually trust each other.

Trust and cooperation are regarded as "externalities" (zero costs and values) by economists, but Fukuyama points out that this is wrong, because high levels of trust and cooperation reduce transaction costs. Conversely, it is very very expensive and time consuming to try and do a deal with someone you don't trust, or who does not trust you, if that is, you can do a deal at all.

Extending Fukuyama a little, I believe there is considerable evidence that failed states are that way because the levels of trust and cooperation between inhabitants progressivley decrease as one moves outwards from family, clan, tribe and sect to almost zero. I would be interested to know if this is in fact the situation in Iraq.

If this is in fact true, then it becomes clear that the primary purpose of the hearts and minds operations, as well as the conduct of the defence forces themselves, is to raise levels of trust and cooperation, primarily by providing enough security to allow citizens to develop (or redevelop) the necessary levels of trust and cooperation for a society to function.

Conversly, as I think we have seen, the insurgents wish to promote their version of "trust and cooperation" which purveys security as a product of adherence (or at least compliance) with the dictates of the insurgents. Any cooperation with us is punishable by death.

It also becomes obvious that any time anyone does something to make Iraqis distrustful of us, then we are making our task all that harder

[RJO]

Trust and cooperation are regarded as "externalities" (zero costs and values) by economists, but Fukuyama points out that this is wrong, because high levels of trust and cooperation reduce transaction costs. Conversely, it is very very expensive and time consuming to try and do a deal with someone you don't trust, or who does not trust you, if that is, you can do a deal at all.

I think this is absolutely on target. As anyone can attest who has ever worked in an organization (any kind of organization) that had someone within it who was known to be a frequent liar, progress grinds to a halt, because you can never be sure what's going to happen next, even with your supposed allies.

A very important online paper on this topic is "Trust: The Lubricant of Military Operations (http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/shay/trust_and_friction.htm)" by Jonathan Shay. If internal friction is one of the obstacles to military success, then trust is the internal lubricant that reduces this friction.

I'd be very interested to hear other people's opinions of Shay's paper.

RJO