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SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 11:49 AM
Here are a couple of little brain farts that I had during my presentation to the Army War College Distance Education class yesterday (and now has been integrated into my "Rethinking Insurgency" presentation):

1. What's the ultimate strategic objective--government control of "ungoverned spaces" or stability? This is a crucial decision. If, as I argue, it is stability (based on the idea that protracted conflict rather than insurgent "victory" generates threats like terrorism and organized crime), the U.S. role should involve things like mediation between insurgents and government, and aiding a sectarian militia which can protect a repressed or excluded group rather than simply assistance to the government (which is our current approach). The idea of a “legitimate resistance forces (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0717/p01s01-wome.html)” in Iraq—Sunni Arab militias--is interesting. IF the core of the conflict is fear of repression and distrust of the government by Sunni Arabs, it might make sense to give them something to protect their community other than AQ.

2. Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult. It conflicts with the American strategic culture which thrives on quick, clean, decisive outcomes. As a result, we do it half way, embroiling ourselves without demanding the reengineering of the political, economic, cultural, and social system which gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

I believe we should either do it right or not do it all. If a state facing an insuring is not willing to undertake deep changes (to include things like the empowerment of women), I believe we should opt out. Other nations should be able to choose between sustaining their "culture" or undertaking reforms which lead to prosperity and stability, but we should not bear the costs for the decision.

Think about it--what if we opt out? But, you might say, If we do, insurgents may win and take over a country! And, I reply, So what? Think of insurgent victories of Cold War--Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe. How much of a real threat did any of them become? Even what may be the worst of the lot for us--Cuba-- was no real threat, but only an imagined one sustained by Florida politics. If, in fact, insurgents seize power somewhere and become state sponsors of terrorism, we can stop them more effectively and cheaply than we could try and stop them from coming to power by propping up incompetent governments. Ultimately, insurgent victories may be less of a threat to U.S. national interests than involvement in a protracted, perhaps failed counterinsurgency campaign.

So, again I say, let's either do it right or not do it at all.

Old Eagle
07-17-2007, 12:24 PM
Think you'll find an ally in Jeff Record from AirWC.

The Gordian knot, however, is what do you do when there is no alternative to becoming involved? The U.S. has major national interests, but no hope of fighting AirLandBattle Lite, the preferred course of action? My gut (it's a Shirtsoff thing) tells me that building HN and regional forces is part of the answer.

And, how does one discern what those cases are? In the early 90s, for instance, Afghanistan certainly did not pass the "so what?" test. Oops.

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 12:28 PM
Think you'll find an ally in Jeff Record from AirWC.

The Gordian knot, however, is what do you do when there is no alternative to becoming involved? The U.S. has major national interests, but no hope of fighting AirLandBattle Lite, the preferred course of action? My gut (it's a Shirtsoff thing) tells me that building HN and regional forces is part of the answer.

And, how does one discern what those cases are? In the early 90s, for instance, Afghanistan certainly did not pass the "so what?" test. Oops.

Jeff and I are fellow travelers. I wrote a dustjacket blurb for his Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (http://www.amazon.com/Beating-Goliath-Why-Insurgencies-Win/dp/1597970905)(althought the ingrate has yet to send me a copy). Where we diverge is that I think he focuses too much on Cold War style insurgencies.

What I'm trying to suggest is that there are no cases where declining involvement is impossible. We think there are, but there aren't (with the possible exception of Mexico and Canada. After all, if Canada fell to insurgents it might interrupt our strategic supply of comedians).

tequila
07-17-2007, 12:36 PM
Think of insurgent victories of Cold War--Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe. How much of a real threat did any of them become?

*cough* China *cough*

I also have quibbles with the idea that some sort of wholesale transformation of a culture is necessary to win at counterinsurgency. What wholesale transformation/Westernization of society was required to defeat the Malayan Communists, the Huks in the Philippines, or the South Korean Communists 1945-1950? To beat UNITA or the Hutu genocidaires in the Congo, or bring GAM to the peace table in Aceh, or to defeat the GIA/FIS in Algeria? Or indeed, any number of South American insurgencies?

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 12:55 PM
*cough* China *cough*

I also have quibbles with the idea that some sort of wholesale transformation of a culture is necessary to win at counterinsurgency. What wholesale transformation/Westernization of society was required to defeat the Malayan Communists, the Huks in the Philippines, or the South Korean Communists 1945-1950? To beat UNITA or the Hutu genocidaires in the Congo, or bring GAM to the peace table in Aceh, or to defeat the GIA/FIS in Algeria? Or indeed, any number of South American insurgencies?


You plan on doing counterinsurgency support in China?

But, your point is an interesting one. Let me tell you how I addressed (or, depending on your perspective, danced around) the Malaya issue during my talk yesterday.

In 2003 I was part of a team led by Steve Biddle (then a colleague of mine at the Strategic Studies Institute, now at the Council on Foreign Relations) which examined the conventional campaign of March-April 2003. Steve's conclusion was that the Iraq military and political leadership was so incompetent that the operation neither validated or invalidated defense transformation. It was an inadequate test.

I contend that Malaya was the same. The insurgents were, to put it in technical terms, absolute blundering boobs. The Brits probably could have beaten them with a couple of dozen drunk Manchester soccer fans (although that would have entailed significantly more human rights abuses). It may be an inadequate test, yet we have derived a whole theory of counterinsurgency from that conflict.

I don't know enough about your other two examples. I am reminded, though, that the Huk conflict write large took several centuries (if you remember that the Spanish and we fought them before the Filipino government did). And, Korea did, in fact, undergo a systemic and cultural change.

So, what I'm getting it is that if the insurgents are morons, our doctrine and strategy are perfectly adequate. I'm not sure, though, that it is for truly serious insurgents.

Tom Odom
07-17-2007, 01:01 PM
[I]
1. What's the ultimate strategic objective--government control of "ungoverned spaces" or stability? This is a crucial decision. If, as I argue, it is stability (based on the idea that protracted conflict rather than insurgent "victory" generates threats like terrorism and organized crime), the U.S. role should involve things like mediation between insurgents and government, and aiding a sectarian militia which can protect a repressed or excluded group rather than simply assistance to the government (which is our current approach). The idea of a “legitimate resistance forces (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0717/p01s01-wome.html)” in Iraq—Sunni Arab militias--is interesting. IF the core of the conflict is fear of repression and distrust of the government by Sunni Arabs, it might make sense to give them something to protect their community other than AQ.


Steve,

The immediate exception that jumps out at me--by exception the case where stability is not the preferred choice--is Pakistan and the tribal lands. There the government itself has chosen stability (also known as survival) and we have to date gone along with that choice.

The other issue I have with this is that we do not often make a clear choice for either stability or government control. We drift or back into things based on a combination of foreign policy and domestic politics.

I will say that in OIF I believe we are going to gave to make the choice very soon--or perhaps change our original choice from government control to stability. Either way we will have to accept more instability in the interim.


Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult. It conflicts with the American strategic culture which thrives on quick, clean, decisive outcomes. As a result, we do it half way, embroiling ourselves without demanding the reengineering of the political, economic, cultural, and social system which gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

I believe we should either do it right or not do it all. If a state facing an insuring is not willing to undertake deep changes (to include things like the empowerment of women), I believe we should opt out. Other nations should be able to choose between sustaining their "culture" or undertaking reforms which lead to prosperity and stability, but we should not bear the costs for the decision.

COIN is diffficult. But what you propose is social and cultural imperialism. The only choice that has any hopes for success under this model is opt out. This also argues against your first point where stability maybe the goal rather than government control. Nothing could be more destablizing than attempted re-engineering using force. We are now in the 4th year of that in Iraq.

In some cases, however, I believe we are going to have to bite the bullet and force change where it affects us most directly. The case I have in mind is Saudi Arabia and the royals. Pakistan is a very close number two on the same list.

Best

Tom

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 01:07 PM
Steve,

The immediate exception that jumps out at me--by exception the case where stability is not the preferred choice--is Pakistan and the tribal lands. There the government itself has chosen stability (also known as survival) and we have to date gone along with that choice.

The other issue I have with this is that we do not often make a clear choice for either stability or government control. We drift or back into things based on a combination of foreign policy and domestic politics.

I will say that in OIF I believe we are going to gave to make the choice very soon--or perhaps change our original choice from government control to stability. Either way we will have to accept more instability in the interim.



COIN is diffficult. But what you propose is social and cultural imperialism. The only choice that has any hopes for success under this model is opt out. This also argues against your first point where stability maybe the goal rather than government control. Nothing could be more destablizing than attempted re-engineering using force. We are now in the 4th year of that in Iraq.

In some cases, however, I believe we are going to have to bite the bullet and force change where it affects us most directly. The case I have in mind is Saudi Arabia and the royals. Pakistan is a very close number two on the same list.

Best

Tom

But what is the REAL threat to U.S. national interests if the Northwest Tribal Area is run by primitive extremists? Or even if Afghanistan is?

Just seems to me that it would be a better strategy to launch attacks against any AQ bases in those areas and REALLY focus on homeland security (to include strict controls on people from states which foster Islamic extremism) than to try to go into those areas and drag them kicking and screaming into the 19th century.

tequila
07-17-2007, 01:29 PM
Steve,

Sorry - the only reason I mentioned China is because it was a classical Cold War insurgency which resulted in a rather significant national security threat to U.S. interests in Asia for decades.

Saying that the Huk movement extended back hundreds of years is a bit erroneous in my view. The Huks were more than just a peasant rebellion.

I would argue that Korea did not undergo the sort of massive systemic and cultural shift you are talking about during the time it took to defeat the Communist insurgency in the south. In fact, such a shift only took place after the insurgency and the conventional war was long past.


So, what I'm getting it is that if the insurgents are morons, our doctrine and strategy are perfectly adequate. I'm not sure, though, that it is for truly serious insurgents.

The question of whether or not our doctrine and strategy are adequate is not the same thing as necessitating massive cultural reform to defeat an insurgency. Algeria 1992-2001 is a good modern example, and I don't think anyone can claim that the FIS/GIA were not truly serious.

Tom Odom
07-17-2007, 01:30 PM
But what is the REAL threat to U.S. national interests if the Northwest Tribal Area is run by primitive extremists? Or even if Afghanistan is?

Just seems to me that it would be a better strategy to launch attacks against any AQ bases in those areas and REALLY focus on homeland security (to include strict controls on people from states which foster Islamic extremism) than to try to go into those areas and drag them kicking and screaming into the 19th century.

I would agree with you. The real threat is another AQ sanctum and the answer maybe to hit them repeatedly. I agree completely on US security--which 12 million illegals standing around arguing about their "rights" suggests is a complete joke. And I certainly agree that large scale conversion to 21st Century Western values is a non-starter.

But this is one of those cases where we are in bed with the government but not in bed with its internal policies. If we chose to strike the tribal lands in a sustained fashion, we will be writing off Musharaff's government. The choices are neither clear nor easy.

Personally I believe that we have thrown much of what we learned in the "Cold War" about containment out prematurely. We contained areas of the world and we made choices just as you suggest. I do not agree with the prattle about changes in warfare suddenly going back to ethinicty and blood rather than purely ideology. Conflicts around the globe in the Cold War combined all three. The Cold War was never simply about ideology. I also believe that we cannot simply say we don't like COIN and refuse to participate. Our participation may well be dictated by events beyond our control.

Best

Tom

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 01:40 PM
I would agree with you. The real threat is another AQ sanctum and the answer maybe to hit them repeatedly. I agree completely on US security--which 12 million illegals standing around arguing about their "rights" suggests is a complete joke. And I certainly agree that large scale conversion to 21st Century Western values is a non-starter.

But this is one of those cases where we are in bed with the government but not in bed with its internal policies. If we chose to strike the tribal lands in a sustained fashion, we will be writing off Musharaff's government. The choices are neither clear nor easy.

Personally I believe that we have thrown much of what we learned in the "Cold War" about containment out prematurely. We contained areas of the world and we made choices just as you suggest. I do not agree with the prattle about changes in warfare suddenly going back to ethinicty and blood rather than purely ideology. Conflicts around the globe in the Cold War combined all three. The Cold War was never simply about ideology. I also believe that we cannot simply say we don't like COIN and refuse to participate. Our participation may well be dictated by events beyond our control.

Best

Tom

Well, I still think we need to seriously consider whether there really are instances where we cannot avoid involvement. I think we convince ourselves that we can't but if we hold up the costs of resisting involvement with the costs of involvement, the deal takes on a different look.

Speaking of "prattle about changes in warfare suddenly going back to ethnicty and blood rather than purely ideology" I followed the advice of my hero Frank Hoffman and started Ralph's new book last night. As usual, I agree with about 75% of it and have no real trouble wading through the of gratuitous insults to get to the meat of the analysis (although I know a lot of people do).

wm
07-17-2007, 04:16 PM
What I'm trying to suggest is that there are no cases where declining involvement is impossible. We think there are, but there aren't (with the possible exception of Mexico and Canada. After all, if Canada fell to insurgents it might interrupt our strategic supply of comedians).

A loss of Canada might also produce a pretty serious interruption to the strategic supply of the natural gas that is used to power generators that provide the electric power we use to do things like communicate on this discussion board!

Methinks there's a lot more global interconnectivity than seems to have been considered prior to making the proposal to disengage on a fairly global basis. We are no longer living in a world like the periods of the Cleveland Presidency--thanks to Teddy Roosevelt.

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 04:53 PM
A loss of Canada might also produce a pretty serious interruption to the strategic supply of the natural gas that is used to power generators that provide the electric power we use to do things like communicate on this discussion board!

Methinks there's a lot more global interconnectivity than seems to have been considered prior to making the proposal to disengage on a fairly global basis. We are no longer living in a world like the periods of the Cleveland Presidency--thanks to Teddy Roosevelt.


I've never found the economic justifications for counterinsurgency persuasive. Even if insurgents take over a country, they're unlikely to stop selling whatever it is their nation produces. They themselves are going to face extensive demands from all the people they promised a better life, and they'll need money to address that.

Plus, we can put this in the context of Iraq. We are worried about an insurgent victory there affecting the petroleum market. But what if we'd spent what we've now sunk into Iraq on developing domestic oil production or alternatives? I suspect we'd be better off.

Old Eagle
07-17-2007, 05:22 PM
Steve,

Have you seen the SO JOC? It's 4 cases are much broader than anything you envision.

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 05:29 PM
Steve,

Have you seen the SO JOC? It's 4 cases are much broader than anything you envision.


Check. In a way, that follows the ideas I'm trying to make--that we think more in terms of stability ops/peacekeeping than in terms of warfighting. What I'm struggling with is that our current conceptualization of counterinsurgency sees it as a variant of warfighting, meaning that the strategic objective is "victory." What I'm trying to say is that victory requires reengineering a flawed society, and we're not willing to pay the cost to do that. So we've put ourselves in a situation where we can't attain our own strategic objectives.

Stability ops are different because the strategic objectives are not necessarily "victory." Stability I think we can attain.

Ken White
07-17-2007, 06:22 PM
Check. In a way, that follows the ideas I'm trying to make--that we think more in terms of stability ops/peacekeeping than in terms of warfighting. What I'm struggling with is that our current conceptualization of counterinsurgency sees it as a variant of warfighting, meaning that the strategic objective is "victory." What I'm trying to say is that victory requires reengineering a flawed society, and we're not willing to pay the cost to do that. So we've put ourselves in a situation where we can't attain our own strategic objectives.

Stability ops are different because the strategic objectives are not necessarily "victory." Stability I think we can attain.


toss words around that feed perceptions that are inimical to what we want to do.

Leaving aside the 'heroes,' 'warfighter' and such cinematic or media excesses, I'll also reluctantly forebear commenting on the current fad for naming operations in grandiose and vastly overstated terms (OEF, OIF) which themselves send a bad message subject to manipulation.

Instead, let me just suggest that the very term 'war' applied to a counterinsurgency sends bad messages and the use of words like victory, defeat and such in the context of such an effort where the best outcome can only be an acceptable conclusion sends a terrible message that can and will be used, domestically (regardless of which party is where) and internationally to our detriment.

You are correct IMO in that we in the US are not prepared to pay the price -- or be patient enough, some of both I think -- to wage a successful counterinsurgency in the classic mode. Stability ops are possible and we should head that way.

I have never subscribed to the "American's don't want casualties" routine. While it's certainly true in a relative sense, it has been used as a propaganda tool by many and is vastly misunderstood. There is no question that some Americans do not want any casualties and that some relatives of those hurt or killed will be angry but they are a small minority, most Americans will accept high casualties as long as the goals are clear and the operation(s) are successful. Failure, bungling and sloppy work turn off more Americans than do body bags. As we have seen...

A military capability is required, no question but it needs to be focussed and far better trained to be effective and quick. We have the capability, the potential is there but Congress is a big part of the problem.

Simply put, big hardware items that bring benefit to multiple States and Districts are a better sell in Congress then are a few small high end pieces of materiel from small suppliers and in small quantities for smash and grab raids or the cost of training to get the 'conventional' forces to a level of capability required to perform the operations that can be effective. This tends, unfortunately, to drive the Army in a quest for a bigger budget to go where the money is.

Put most but not all of the heavy and medium stuff in the ArNG, congress will buy that and you can have the best of both worlds.

Removing SF and CA from SOCom and putting them to work on their primary designed missions while leaving, even expanding, JSOC would be helpful. However, a well trained Infantry Battalion can ride helicopters, fast rope and kick doors as well as those guys can. The MEU-SOC effort worked but can be improved and the Army is equally capable of doing it. We are going to be confronted with a high number of second and third term enlisted guys who are Grunts and they'll have some good experience. The key is in the training; it is good now -- it can be better.

Whoops. Inadvertent lie, there. The Key is in getting the 'senior leadership' to adapt. ALL of them...

wm
07-17-2007, 09:23 PM
I've never found the economic justifications for counterinsurgency persuasive. Even if insurgents take over a country, they're unlikely to stop selling whatever it is their nation produces. They themselves are going to face extensive demands from all the people they promised a better life, and they'll need money to address that.

Plus, we can put this in the context of Iraq. We are worried about an insurgent victory there affecting the petroleum market. But what if we'd spent what we've now sunk into Iraq on developing domestic oil production or alternatives? I suspect we'd be better off.

I wasn't arguing for an economic justification to COIN. I was instead arguing that your view of the potential US place in the world (as a "rugged individualist" standing alone in a corner at the prom, refusing to take to the floor except with those select few partners who dance the way we like) is rather outmoded, pre-20th Century, in fact.

We could choose to be like Feudal Japan (sort of your suggestion) until the world decides to encroach. We could also choose to work within the context of the world as a partner and aid other nations rather than play the heavy who has to have everyone else do it our way (that is, be victorious in the "conquering" sense). However, this latter option seems rather short sighted.

While I think we must play in the international arena, we are not forced to make it a zero-sum game. Several alternatives outcomes are possible--Win-win (playing the stab ops card perhaps); win-lose (playing the military victory card almost for sure); lose-lose (my take on the outcome of playing your proposed disengagement card).

Regarding the last part of your post--I think you would be pretty amazed to discover just how energy independent we could be today, were we not playing the same kind of economic games in the oil industry that others on this thread have alluded to with regard to our acquisition and budget practices vis-a-vis the defense industry.

SteveMetz
07-17-2007, 10:13 PM
I wasn't arguing for an economic justification to COIN. I was instead arguing that your view of the potential US place in the world (as a "rugged individualist" standing alone in a corner at the prom, refusing to take to the floor except with those select few partners who dance the way we like) is rather outmoded, pre-20th Century, in fact.

We could choose to be like Feudal Japan (sort of your suggestion) until the world decides to encroach. We could also choose to work within the context of the world as a partner and aid other nations rather than play the heavy who has to have everyone else do it our way (that is, be victorious in the "conquering" sense). However, this latter option seems rather short sighted.

While I think we must play in the international arena, we are not forced to make it a zero-sum game. Several alternatives outcomes are possible--Win-win (playing the stab ops card perhaps); win-lose (playing the military victory card almost for sure); lose-lose (my take on the outcome of playing your proposed disengagement card).

Regarding the last part of your post--I think you would be pretty amazed to discover just how energy independent we could be today, were we not playing the same kind of economic games in the oil industry that others on this thread have alluded to with regard to our acquisition and budget practices vis-a-vis the defense industry.

I wasn't arguing for isolationism. I was arguing in favor of moving away from our current model of more or less bilarteral counterinsurgency support to try and prop up a flawed system. And, I was arguing that I don't think it makes sense to say that we should be involved in counterinsurgency in a place simply because it produces oil or some other resources (whether Iraq, Nigeria, or somewhere else). Even if insurgents took over those places, they'd still need to sell oil.

marct
07-18-2007, 01:04 PM
Steve, I think that you are fixating on the wrong level of analysis. Supporting government operations in states that are undergoing an insurgency is not necessarily about "winning a war" or securing strategic resources. A lot of it comes back to a really simple point: is the US' word any good?

Diplomacy, as someone once put it, relies on credit established on the battlefield. Nobody would trust a country who said "we are your friend, so give us free trade, but we won't help you defeat those people who are trying to destroy you". This is reminiscent of Achilles grumping around in his tent :cool:.

Having said that, I would also like to point out that your two categories, COIN and Stability Ops, are also problematic :D. First, they are not discrete, they are a continuum. Second, by casting them solely in kinetic terms you are leaving out other possible solutions.

It strikes me that a far better way of casting the entire problem set would be to recognize that "stability operations" are multi-faceted from natural disaster recovery through refugee issues and economic displacement to outright insurgencies. These types of operations should be, especially towards the natural disaster end, should be an automatic action rather than a diplomatic action (it's a case of is your word good when you [the US] says that X, Y, and Z are your values). The issue of supporting your allies should not be a question, although the issue of making some one or some faction your allies should be.

On the issue of an insurgency in Canada - not only would you loose your supplies of comedians and natural gas, but you also might want to check out how much petroleum, hydro electric power and fresh water you get from us as well :D. Believe me when I tell you that the Canadian public would be quite happy to stop exporting gasoline to the US if we could get it ourselves at even a 100% markup over the oil sands production cost of $15.85 (CDN) per barrel :eek:!

Marc

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 01:15 PM
Steve, I think that you are fixating on the wrong level of analysis. Supporting government operations in states that are undergoing an insurgency is not necessarily about "winning a war" or securing strategic resources. A lot of it comes back to a really simple point: is the US' word any good?

Diplomacy, as someone once put it, relies on credit established on the battlefield. Nobody would trust a country who said "we are your friend, so give us free trade, but we won't help you defeat those people who are trying to destroy you". This is reminiscent of Achilles grumping around in his tent :cool:.

Having said that, I would also like to point out that your two categories, COIN and Stability Ops, are also problematic :D. First, they are not discrete, they are a continuum. Second, by casting them solely in kinetic terms you are leaving out other possible solutions.

It strikes me that a far better way of casting the entire problem set would be to recognize that "stability operations" are multi-faceted from natural disaster recovery through refugee issues and economic displacement to outright insurgencies. These types of operations should be, especially towards the natural disaster end, should be an automatic action rather than a diplomatic action (it's a case of is your word good when you [the US] says that X, Y, and Z are your values). The issue of supporting your allies should not be a question, although the issue of making some one or some faction your allies should be.

On the issue of an insurgency in Canada - not only would you loose your supplies of comedians and natural gas, but you also might want to check out how much petroleum, hydro electric power and fresh water you get from us as well :D. Believe me when I tell you that the Canadian public would be quite happy to stop exporting gasoline to the US if we could get it ourselves at even a 100% markup over the oil sands production cost of $15.85 (CDN) per barrel :eek:!

Marc


I don't think that trading with us requires us to make a commitment to a given regime. And that's what our traditional approach to COIN was. That's what I'm getting at--stabilization operations don't entail support to a given regime. Traditional--or what Frank Hoffman and others call "classical"--COIN does.

And on our word being any good, what I'm suggesting is that we should be more selective in regimes we make a commitment to. In the past, we've made a commitment to any regime facing first a communist, now an Islamic extremist threat. I believe we should only make such a commitment to a regime that is truly committed to systemic change, not just to its own survival.

marct
07-18-2007, 01:42 PM
Hi Steve,


I don't think that trading with us requires us to make a commitment to a given regime. And that's what our traditional approach to COIN was. That's what I'm getting at--stabilization operations don't entail support to a given regime. Traditional--or what Frank Hoffman and others call "classical"--COIN does.

That's an interesting question. While I would agree with you in the abstract, historically there has been a very strong tie between setting the conditions of economic activity and recognition and support for the government that allows this to happen. That's why I chose the free trade example...

I agree that stability operations do not, again of necessity, require support for a given regime, and it's one of the reasons why I actually approve of more of a move to stability operations :D. The problem I was trying to raise was in situations where commitments have already been made.


And on our word being any good, what I'm suggesting is that we should be more selective in regimes we make a commitment to. In the past, we've made a commitment to any regime facing first a communist, now an Islamic extremist threat. I believe we should only make such a commitment to a regime that is truly committed to systemic change, not just to its own survival.

I totally agree with you on being selective about which regimes you make agreements with. It has certainly been a problem in the past and is still a problem. I will, however, disagree with you on a requirement to make systematic change. In some instances, that is probably both necessary and desirable for all concerned, but in others, say Thailand, it is ridiculous. It is the sort of requirement that led to the monarchy not being restored in Afghanistan (which has increased resentment here).

Taken to its logical conclusion, which, I'll admit, is a bit of a reductio ad absurdam :D, this puts the US squarely back into the same role of the 5th Comintern - a regime that is bent solely on exporting reflections of itself.
If that sounds silly, which I'll admit it does, how do you think people in other nations will view it?

I'm being purposely confrontation here, Steve, because I'm hoping that you will start to think about this outside the US-centric box (try thinking like a Canadian :eek:). I don't really think that the US will start acting like the Soviets :D, but WMs scenario of isolationism is a definite possibility.

Marc

Steve Blair
07-18-2007, 02:23 PM
I would also disagree with systematic change being a requirement for US assistance/involvement. Each country, and each situation, is different. Marc's correct in that such an approach does make us look like the Soviet Union with its commitment to support all "wars of national liberation."

Our fixation on systematic change, I think, reflects our own conviction that our system is the "best" and that to be worthy of our support other countries should adapt it as well. Some countries do quite well with blended monarchies, while others wouldn't know what to do with one. And our track record in many places with supporting democracies (or what we called democracies...look at Latin America) isn't all that great. Democracies can easily be spun into dictatorships by "fathers of the people" or "fathers of the country" if the proper social networks aren't in place.

Stability operations are a slightly different ball of wax in that the visible level of commitment on the part of the US is lower, so more options are available. I tend to feel that as the level of commitment rises, rhetoric (from the press, politicians, and others) actually limits the options we have available as the situation molds itself into a "victory or death" type framework.

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 02:29 PM
I would also disagree with systematic change being a requirement for US assistance/involvement. Each country, and each situation, is different. Marc's correct in that such an approach does make us look like the Soviet Union with its commitment to support all "wars of national liberation."

Our fixation on systematic change, I think, reflects our own conviction that our system is the "best" and that to be worthy of our support other countries should adapt it as well. Some countries do quite well with blended monarchies, while others wouldn't know what to do with one. And our track record in many places with supporting democracies (or what we called democracies...look at Latin America) isn't all that great. Democracies can easily be spun into dictatorships by "fathers of the people" or "fathers of the country" if the proper social networks aren't in place.

Stability operations are a slightly different ball of wax in that the visible level of commitment on the part of the US is lower, so more options are available. I tend to feel that as the level of commitment rises, rhetoric (from the press, politicians, and others) actually limits the options we have available as the situation molds itself into a "victory or death" type framework.

By systemic change I didn't mean to make them like us, or even to make them representative democracies. What I'm getting at is that there are certain elements of some states which invariably hinder development and security. For instance, I agree with Ralph Peters that no culture that represses women is going to be competitive in the globalized world, and cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence. I'm not drawing a casual link but there is some sort of affiliation.

What I'm therefore suggesting is that if we go to a state and say, "A, B, and C" are the characteristics of competitive, stable states in the modern world. And they say, "We can't do that because it runs counter to our culture." Then our response should be, "See you around. Have a nice war."

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 02:33 PM
Hi Steve,



That's an interesting question. While I would agree with you in the abstract, historically there has been a very strong tie between setting the conditions of economic activity and recognition and support for the government that allows this to happen. That's why I chose the free trade example...

I agree that stability operations do not, again of necessity, require support for a given regime, and it's one of the reasons why I actually approve of more of a move to stability operations :D. The problem I was trying to raise was in situations where commitments have already been made.



I totally agree with you on being selective about which regimes you make agreements with. It has certainly been a problem in the past and is still a problem. I will, however, disagree with you on a requirement to make systematic change. In some instances, that is probably both necessary and desirable for all concerned, but in others, say Thailand, it is ridiculous. It is the sort of requirement that led to the monarchy not being restored in Afghanistan (which has increased resentment here).

Taken to its logical conclusion, which, I'll admit, is a bit of a reductio ad absurdam :D, this puts the US squarely back into the same role of the 5th Comintern - a regime that is bent solely on exporting reflections of itself.
If that sounds silly, which I'll admit it does, how do you think people in other nations will view it?

I'm being purposely confrontation here, Steve, because I'm hoping that you will start to think about this outside the US-centric box (try thinking like a Canadian :eek:). I don't really think that the US will start acting like the Soviets :D, but WMs scenario of isolationism is a definite possibility.

Marc

I think, at least, that I am working outside the US-centric box because I'm not saying that if other nations won't adopt our institutional framework, we eschew involvement. What I'm saying is that there are, as Ralph Peters pointed out (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98spring/peters.htm), identifiable signs of non-competitive societies. If our erstwhile partners don't want to address these things, we're setting ourselves up for failure by supporting them.

tequila
07-18-2007, 02:58 PM
Restrictions on the free flow of information.
The subjugation of women.
Inability to accept responsibility for individual or collective failure.
The extended family or clan as the basic unit of social organization.
Domination by a restrictive religion.
A low valuation of education.
Low prestige assigned to work. These are the markers of failure according to Peters. He doesn't really go into the mix of how many of these are necessary for success or failure, but I think Peters is assigning far too much value to some very hazy variables here. Moreover, he is specifically talking about requirements for becoming an advanced, postindustrial knowledge economy based on services --- many countries would love to hit basic industrialization in the first place, and the example of India vs China shows that there is something to be said for industrializing first before jumping straight to services.

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 03:13 PM
[/LIST]These are the markers of failure according to Peters. He doesn't really go into the mix of how many of these are necessary for success or failure, but I think Peters is assigning far too much value to some very hazy variables here. Moreover, he is specifically talking about requirements for becoming an advanced, postindustrial knowledge economy based on services --- many countries would love to hit basic industrialization in the first place, and the example of India vs China shows that there is something to be said for industrializing first before jumping straight to services.


His list may or may not be right, but what makes Ralph valuable is that he is at least willing to grapple with the idea that some intrinsic elements of some cultures may make them uncompetitive. Unfortunately, the concept of failed or flawed cultures is something academic simply is unwilling to grapple with, therefore there is little or no truly rigorous research on what the signs of failure are.

marct
07-18-2007, 03:16 PM
Hi Steve,


By systemic change I didn't mean to make them like us, or even to make them representative democracies.

Good :D. Part of the reason why I brought that up is that that has been a fairly consistent rhetorical message that has been coming out of the US Executive branch for the past 50+ years. As Steve Blair just noted, we've seen it time and time again in Latin America, Africa, etc.


What I'm getting at is that there are certain elements of some states which invariably hinder development and security. For instance, I agree with Ralph Peters that no culture that represses women is going to be competitive in the globalized world, and cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence. I'm not drawing a casual link but there is some sort of affiliation.

Certainly there are elements that hinder both security and development - I totally agree. Sometimes, however, the elements that hinder development are the same elements that lead to stability, so it's not a good idea to lump the two together - sometimes it is an either / or situation.

Let's take this element of "represses women". First, who defines what "represses" is? This has been a real fight inside the women's movement globally when, for example, wearing a hijab was listed by some as a form of repression and by others as a form of freedom. Second, a rapid change in gender roles inevitably leads to massive social instability - look at the first women's movement (1890's), the effects of the Suffragette movement and the second women's movement in the 1960's-70's. It has taken Western societies over 100 years to change the social definition of women's roles and it is still causing instability.

Okay, let's look at the idea that "cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence". I'm assuming that that refers to economically competitive. While I would agree that there has to be an outlet for inherent competition within a society, I would disagree that it has to be economic competition - that's only one form of institutional outlet amongst many, although it is an important one.


What I'm therefore suggesting is that if we go to a state and say, "A, B, and C" are the characteristics of competitive, stable states in the modern world. And they say, "We can't do that because it runs counter to our culture." Then our response should be, "See you around. Have a nice war."

<sigh> And how is this different from replicating the US or other Western nations which are the very data points used to define "competitive, stable states"? It's only running the same replication strategy through the black box of academia.

Okay, having said that, there are ways to do it that do not cause massive instability because of the cultural engineering that you are requiring. Malinowski's The Dynamics of Culture Change (http://www.amazon.com/Dynamics-Culture-Inquiry-Relations-Africa/dp/B000FMMUQ0/ref=sr_1_1/104-7529850-2413521?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1184771128&sr=8-1) goes into how to do this but, as a caution, it requires a very long term commitment and, at the same time, quite a few resources.


I think, at least, that I am working outside the US-centric box because I'm not saying that if other nations won't adopt our institutional framework, we eschew involvement.

Sorry, I should have made my point more clearly. What I was asking you to do was to think / feel / react like someone who is being told by the US that they have to change regardless of what they want. It's that, let's call it an emotional reaction, that is crucial in both politics and diplomacy that I was after.


What I'm saying is that there are, as Ralph Peters pointed out (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98spring/peters.htm), identifiable signs of non-competitive societies. If our erstwhile partners don't want to address these things, we're setting ourselves up for failure by supporting them.

Does that apply to the US as well? Should the European nations of NATO demand that the US institute universal medical care because all advanced societies (outside of the US) have it? Given that an insane amount of the US' GDP will go into their health care system over the next 20 years, this is clearly a sign of a social trend towards both instability and non-competitiveness. Why should we support you :cool:?

Marc

marct
07-18-2007, 03:23 PM
Hi Steve,


His list may or may not be right, but what makes Ralph valuable is that he is at least willing to grapple with the idea that some intrinsic elements of some cultures may make them uncompetitive. Unfortunately, the concept of failed or flawed cultures is something academic simply is unwilling to grapple with, therefore there is little or no truly rigorous research on what the signs of failure are.

There has actually been a fair amount of research on it, it just isn't taught that much any more. The Malinowski book I mentioned in my last post is one example, and there have also been studies on failed cultures and failed attempts at cultural engineering.

I do agree with you that there hasn't been that much rigorous research on the issue recently, but that is partly because the underlying unilinear evolutionary assumptions are rejected now by most Anthropologists and Sociologists.

Marc

Steve Blair
07-18-2007, 03:29 PM
But the Soviet Union also had universal health care...and I'd say that their competitiveness wasn't as great as it could have been....;)

That said, I think Peters' list has some value, but more as an internal checklist or list of things to consider BEFORE getting involved or approaching another nation. I don't see it as a list of demands to be met but rather as a tool for evaluating a state or a first step in developing such a tool.

The US has a tendency to do many of these things in a very public way, shackling us to policies or states before any real think-through has been done (at least in my view). That's partially press-driven and partly a result of a political system that is more or less totally focused on internal processes (read elections and maintaining power) and less on outside events and factors. While many bemoan the lack of military experience among current politicians, I think it's just as disturbing (or maybe more so) to see how many are lawyers or the like with precious little exposure to history (American or foreign) or international events as a whole. I think this creates a knee-jerk reaction something like "How will these pictures of starving children impact my chances for reelection if I don't do something (or appear to do something)" as opposed to "This is tragic, but how does it fit in with events in the region or other international events and considerations." Our system conditions a short view with a very US-centric focus and desire for quick results.

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 03:31 PM
Hi Steve,



Good :D. Part of the reason why I brought that up is that that has been a fairly consistent rhetorical message that has been coming out of the US Executive branch for the past 50+ years. As Steve Blair just noted, we've seen it time and time again in Latin America, Africa, etc.



Certainly there are elements that hinder both security and development - I totally agree. Sometimes, however, the elements that hinder development are the same elements that lead to stability, so it's not a good idea to lump the two together - sometimes it is an either / or situation.

Let's take this element of "represses women". First, who defines what "represses" is? This has been a real fight inside the women's movement globally when, for example, wearing a hijab was listed by some as a form of repression and by others as a form of freedom. Second, a rapid change in gender roles inevitably leads to massive social instability - look at the first women's movement (1890's), the effects of the Suffragette movement and the second women's movement in the 1960's-70's. It has taken Western societies over 100 years to change the social definition of women's roles and it is still causing instability.

Okay, let's look at the idea that "cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence". I'm assuming that that refers to economically competitive. While I would agree that there has to be an outlet for inherent competition within a society, I would disagree that it has to be economic competition - that's only one form of institutional outlet amongst many, although it is an important one.



<sigh> And how is this different from replicating the US or other Western nations which are the very data points used to define "competitive, stable states"? It's only running the same replication strategy through the black box of academia.

Okay, having said that, there are ways to do it that do not cause massive instability because of the cultural engineering that you are requiring. Malinowski's The Dynamics of Culture Change (http://www.amazon.com/Dynamics-Culture-Inquiry-Relations-Africa/dp/B000FMMUQ0/ref=sr_1_1/104-7529850-2413521?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1184771128&sr=8-1) goes into how to do this but, as a caution, it requires a very long term commitment and, at the same time, quite a few resources.



Sorry, I should have made my point more clearly. What I was asking you to do was to think / feel / react like someone who is being told by the US that they have to change regardless of what they want. It's that, let's call it an emotional reaction, that is crucial in both politics and diplomacy that I was after.



Does that apply to the US as well? Should the European nations of NATO demand that the US institute universal medical care because all advanced societies (outside of the US) have it? Given that an insane amount of the US' GDP will go into their health care system over the next 20 years, this is clearly a sign of a social trend towards both instability and non-competitiveness. Why should we support you :cool:?

Marc

I'm not saying any nation is obligated to change the way that we want. I'm just saying that I don't want my tax money going to those who refuse the address the root causes of their problems.

That's the same way I feel about domestic politics. I don't think the government should force people to make good life decisions (don't drop out of school, don't have illegitimate babies, don't use drugs, don't smoke cigarettes, save for retirement) but I don't feel that taxpayers should subvent bad life decisions.

So, in counterinsurgency support, we should be explicit on what the requirements are for our assistance. If those requirements are unacceptable to the potential partner, then no deal.

As is, we base our decision to support a partner more on the ideology of their opponent than on their willingness to meet our requirements.

At this point, I don't exactly what the right requirements are. But I do feel strongly that we need to develop them.

marct
07-18-2007, 03:36 PM
Hi Steve,


But the Soviet Union also had universal health care...and I'd say that their competitiveness wasn't as great as it could have been....;)

And just look at how unstable they became since adopting US institutions :eek::D!!!


That said, I think Peters' list has some value, but more as an internal checklist or list of things to consider BEFORE getting involved or approaching another nation. I don't see it as a list of demands to be met but rather as a tool for evaluating a state or a first step in developing such a tool.

Agreed. Honestly, I am playing Devil's Advocate in this thread, in part because of the cultural-political traits you noted. Some type of criteria, publicly available and updated based on the best understandings available, would be an invaluable tool for development and alliance building.

Marc

Ken White
07-18-2007, 03:38 PM
four years (generally) at the political appointee level in DoD and DoS do not help. The creeping increase of said appointees at the expense of senior Civil Service folks is also a detriment (not that some of such do not improve things with their departure...:wry:).

Nor, for that matter, is the too frequent rotation of Flag Officers throughout DoD much help.

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 03:54 PM
Honestly, I am playing Devil's Advocate

Cool--now we're up to three uses for an anthropologist!

Tom Odom
07-18-2007, 04:23 PM
Cool--now we're up to three uses for an anthropologist!

Now that was culturally sensitive...:eek:

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 04:32 PM
Now that was culturally sensitive...:eek:

Well, I think Bernard Shaw's quip when asked what he thought about culture in America ("it would be a good idea") applies to me as well. After all, I am a plumber's son from Elk Hills, West Virginia.

marct
07-18-2007, 07:43 PM
Hi Steve,

I think we're up to 4 uses now, if you count sauce differences :eek:!

SteveMetz
07-18-2007, 08:14 PM
Hi Steve,

I think we're up to 4 uses now, if you count sauce differences :eek:!


My bad. Never was any good at math.

wm
07-19-2007, 11:58 AM
Since this thread seems to have slipped into a more humor-oriented discussion, I thought I'd pass on this story to illustrate a problem with the whole "competitiveness" notion.

A Harvard MBA goes on vacation to Cabo San Lucas. There he sees a fisherman who puts out to sea each day in his row boat with a pole and some bait. He also see the fisherman return each day with a single fish.
The MBA goes to the fisherman and says, "I have a great deal of expertise in process improvement. I believe we can reassess your approach to fishing and increase your catch quite dramaticly."
The fisherman responded, "Why would I want to do this, senor? Right now I fish whenever I want and am happy with my catch"
The MBA answered," With more productivity, you could sell more fish and make more money."
The fisherman asked, "What would I do with this extra money?"
The MBA replied, "Why invest it into more fishing boats to increase your catch even more, thereby increasing your revenues and profits still more."
The fisherman: "Why do this?"
The MBA: "You invest those funds into a canning plant, export the output and become a billionaire, of course."
The fisherman said, "Once I became a billionaire, what would I do next?"
The MBA said, "Why take time off and come to places like Cabo San Lucas to fish whenever you liked and be happy with what you catch."


The values that underlie the normative judgements one makes regarding success do not necessarily have to be the same as those of American business tycooon wannabes.

marct
07-19-2007, 12:24 PM
Hi WM,


The values that underlie the normative judgements one makes regarding success do not necessarily have to be the same as those of American business tycooon wannabes.

I love it! It really points out the problems with any hypertrophied cultural trait :D.

Mark O'Neill
07-19-2007, 12:33 PM
Hi WM,



I love it! It really points out the problems with any hypertrophied cultural trait :D.

Careful... that barbecue can be fired up really easily!

SteveMetz
07-19-2007, 12:58 PM
Careful... that barbecue can be fired up really easily!

We need a name for this dish. My suggestions:

1. Doc Kebob
2. Scholar on a Spit
3. Deconstructionist Hash

marct
07-19-2007, 03:18 PM
Careful... that barbecue can be fired up really easily!

No worries, mate. If that happened, it would just be another piece of proof. As Peters (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98spring/peters.htm)noted in the article that Steve Metz referenced


For countries and cultures that not only restrict but actively reject information that contradicts governmental or cultural verities, even a fully industrialized society remains an unattainable dream.

Given the current state of the US Manufacturing economy, what more do I need to say :D?

On a somewhat more serious not, let's just take a look at Peters list.



Restrictions on the free flow of information.
The subjugation of women.
Inability to accept responsibility for individual or collective failure.
The extended family or clan as the basic unit of social organization.
Domination by a restrictive religion.
A low valuation of education.
Low prestige assigned to work.

There are a few things in it that I agree with and a lot that I disagree with - mainly because it, and the article itself, reminds me of the old saw about "If it's good for General Bullmoose, it's good for the USA" writ on the international scale (Steve M., I don't suppose you would like to comment on what form of government, exactly, Henry Ford thought was best? I'll gve you a hint, it wasn't liberal democracy).

1. Restrictions on the free flow of information.

Any society that does not restrict some flow of information will, given todays technology, probably disappear in a blinding flash of light. Certain types of information are too dangerous to be spread around, and by "dangerous", I mean either to the physical or social well being of the society and its members.

The real indicator should not be whether or not there are restrictions on the free flow of information, but a) what areas or topics are restricted and b) how well are / can those restrictions enforced.

2. The subjugation of women.

In principle, I agree with this but I have a lot of problems with how "subjugation" is defined. More on this later, since it is only one half of the equation...

3. Inability to accept responsibility for individual or collective failure.

This is a very interesting one and, again, while I agree in principle, Peters and I happen to share the same base culture (the Anglo Culture Complex) which places a fairly high premium on the individual (for it's roots, see Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism; online (http://xroads.virginia.edu/%7Ehyper/WEBER/toc.html) or amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Protestant-Spirit-Capitalism-Routledge-Classics/dp/041525406X)).

Now, here is the problem I have with it. In order to "accept responsibility" you have to have two things: a model of causation and a distinction between that which can be controlled and that which cannot (Malinowski used the terms "science" and "religion" to refer to these distinctions with the applied terms being "technology" and "magic" respectively). "Responsibility" can only be taken for actions that are culturally perceived as being in the realm of science / technology, i.e. things that an be controlled.

Often, the model that is emplaced by an institution for responsibility has little bearing on the actual, post-facto, untangling of the event. Furthermore, different models of causation lead to different forms of social application of responsibility. For example, in cultures with a strong locus of causation placed on individuals (e.g. US, Canada, Australia, etc.), we find that individuals will be found, if they are not readily apparent, to fulfill the required role - think of the old saw "Some one has to be blamed!". In cultures with a collectivist sense of causation (e.g. China), we find institutions being "blamed" rather than individuals, while in other cultures with an exteriorized sense of causation (The Aztecs spring to mind as do certain evangelical sects), "failure" is always the judgement of an external being, usually a deity (but not always - the Invisible Hand, Historical Inevitability and other non-theistic deities come to mind), and the "blame" for the failure is placed on either the collective group of "believers" or on an "other" that has angered the "deity" (BTW, Peters Parameters article comes close to this line of argument).

4. The extended family or clan as the basic unit of social organization.

As a rough and ready rule of thumb in the modern world, this one isn't too bad. As a statement of a social "law", it is just plain wrong. For example, Greece, Rome and early modern Britain all operated on an extended family model of social organization. The US, in the 19th and early 20h centuries, did as well, although a air amount of it was via para-kinship networks such as the Masons.

He is quite correct when he notes that "family networks provide a safety net in troubled times, offering practical support and psychological protection". They also act as a source of capital accumulation and access to capital (e.g. Britain pre-1853) which can reduce individual risk and spur investment. But, if we look at the rest of this sentence - "they do not build the rule of law, or democracy, or legitimate corporations" - I find myself in a quandary. Democracy, and by that I mean the very word comes from the Greek "demos" or tribe. Rule of law? Which law? Salic law, which led to Saxon law and British law comes out of a tribal society, as does Hebrew law and the Code of Hammurabi. "Legitimate corporations"? What does he mean by that? The Romans had the legal concept of corporations, including limited liability corporations!

5. Domination by a restrictive religion.

This one I agree with, although I suspect that we use totally different definitions of religion. The one I use comes from Clifford Geertz (http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/Anthropology.htm) and includes non-theistic "ideologies".

I mentioned in point 2 on the subjugation of women that I would have more to say, and this is where I will say it. What Peters is missing is that it is not just the subjugation of women, it is the subjugation of people by both beliefs and physical means. Again, the exact definition of "subjugation" is hard to come up with, except in the very broad sense, but it can be loosely defined as "systems of thought, action and belief that hinder the growth and development of individuals in such a manner they cannot reach or realize their full potentials and they are aware of these restrictions."

The reason why I chose that wording is that awareness is central to the problem of stability. If you are not aware that you are limited, hen phenomenologically you are not limited. Or, somewhat more crudely, if you can't see the chains you ain't gonna be pissed.

6. A low valuation of education.

Again, this is a god rule of thumb, but a terrible "law". All too often, "education" is confused with information, knowledge and wisdom. Education, in and of itself, is merely training in culturally accepted and accredited ways of thinking / doing. A better formulation wold be "a low value on learning", which does not imply accreditation, but even that falls short of the goal (no wisdom implied).

7. Low prestige assigned to work.

Once again, a decent rule of thumb but a bad "law". It really all hinges on the conceptualization of "work", and Peters is assuming a Weberian definition of this. Let's be radical, as in go back to the roots, for a minute. The English word "work" comes from the Old German word "Werg" - to "fashion" something (connotation of transformation). Originally, this transformation or fashioning could be applied to anything (art, weapons, cultivation, consciousness, etc.). The modern, Weberian meaning is much more restrictive and applies only to "products" that can be sold (even though Weber himself did not like it). "Work" must be "productive" (i.e. salable); it must be "meaningful" work where the sole criterion for meaning is the value of the product as a commodity. This is a highly limited and restrictive focus, one that was dominant in the Industrial Age, but is of limited applicability in the Information Age.

**********

Okay, I've been working on this post for an hour, what with fighting my ISP, and I'm done for now.

Marc