William S. Lind :collection (merged thread) [Archive] - Page 2

Polarbear1605

12-02-2010, 08:08 PM

Man, Oh Man! Where do I start with this one? I think it is commendable that the author of this article (Fourth Generation Warfare and the Moral Imperative) used Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict to make his point on his moral aspects of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). Yes, the moral aspects of war are important but remember; 4GW or not; it is still WAR. I also feel this article is a good example of how the Boyd Theory (and remember Boyd called it a discourse vs theory) can be undermined with some very bad politically correct conclusions and how good doctrine can become bad dogma. I also understand that this article is dated being published in 2003. At that time, the strategic gaps in the Iraq War were becoming as obvious as large football size sink holes on the Washington DC Beltway. For the author to jump into that demonstrates his own degree of moral courage.
In my opinion, the author would be wise to remember that wars are to be fought rigorously because a rigorously fought war is a short war and a short war makes for a moral war (if such a thing exists). The article gives me the impression that the author is professing the strategy of “Benevolent Assimilation”. Guess what! We tried that and it didn’t work because it gives the enemy too much maneuver room. If someone wants to challenge that, be my guest…but first take a look at the Balangiga Massacre (and maybe even compared it to Wanat).
I know, I know…calm down bear, calm down!
The author basically opens with Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict slide 122; ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT. He concludes with his own “adaptation of John Boyd’s “essence of moral warfare” graphic” (ah…excuse me but that’s Colonel Boyd to you there LTC Wilcox). In slide 122, Col Boyd is evolving the “ideas and experiences of Clausewitz, Balack, and Falls to the Essence of Moral Conflict. The “essence of moral conflict” (according to Col Boyd) is to “create, exploit, and magnify…Menace…Uncertainty…Mistrust” in order to “Surface, fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity”… with the aim to…”Destroy moral bonds that permit an organic whole to exist”.
Later in the Patterns brief Col Boyd concludes (slide 125): that the “Counterweights” to Menace, Uncertainty and Mistrust are “Initiative…Adaptability….Harmony” and also makes his point about the simultaneous aim (Cheng and Chi):
“Aim
Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.
Simultaneously,
build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.”

The author’s conclusion which is different from Col Boyd’s is that the essence of moral war is “Create, Exploit, and Magnify: Security…Certainty…Trust” with the idea…”Make life routine and ordered with guaranteed freedoms and the expectation of justice. System of governing that creates trust”…with the “Aim” to “Create moral bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.” This conclusion sounds a bit sophomoric to me when we are discussing 4GW and/or counter insurgence.
Other sophomoric conclusions:
“Army Special Forces ought to be our military force of choice, and we should withdraw our conventional forces as quickly as possible”. I thought that basic problem in Iraq was we didn’t have enough conventional forces to secure an occupied country?
“Human source intelligence (HUMINT) is the key to combating 4GW,” and the same can be said about counter insurgencies, or any other type of war. The real question is why was this ignored in Iraq?... in Afghanistan?
“Our Chaplains ought to get smart on the Koran and teach the soldiers how to I understand what it really says.” When the vehicle is not suitable for the terrain, how is changing a lug nut going to help?
“At the strategic level, the US must come to grips with the Palestinian issue and assist in its resolution.” …and I thought only beauty queens talked about world peace.
The biggest glaring mistake here is that Col Boyd would have never stated that the counterweight to uncertainty is “Certainty”. You cannot create something you will never have on any battle field but you can create “Adaptability: Power to adjust or change in order to cope with m new or unforeseen circumstances”. The same holds true that the counter weight for Menace is not Security but “Initiative: Internal drive to think and take action without being urged”; and the counterweight for Mistrust is not Trust but “Harmony: Interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way”.
Slap, there is a lot of this stuff out there, it starts off great but leads you down a miserable dogmatic trail.

slapout9

12-03-2010, 12:26 AM

Slap, there is a lot of this stuff out there, it starts off great but leads you down a miserable dogmatic trail.

That is why I put it(article) up as a target and see who shoots at it:wry: I thought you were mad because it was written by an Army Guy and not a Marine:D

I too thought he started off well and then he began to drift. I do think the Moral level is most important because it gives you courage to fight in uncertain environments when you know what and why you are fighting in the first place, that is the true moral bond of the organic whole IMO.

And when you have the true Moral high ground you should fight with all your might and get it over with as soon as possible. Big wars or Small wars don't matter that much to me....it is LONG wars that we seem to have the most trouble with. What do think Boyd would say about that? I don't think he would like them myself butt?????

Dayuhan

12-03-2010, 01:04 AM

And when you have the true Moral high ground you should fight with all your might and get it over with as soon as possible.

In most wars all sides are convinced that they hold the "true moral high ground"; that's why they fight. Osama and Omar unquestionably believe that they hold the "true moral high ground". Who decides which "moral high ground" is the "true" one anyway?

slapout9

12-03-2010, 01:09 AM

who decides which "moral high ground" is the "true" one anyway?

combat!

Polarbear1605

12-03-2010, 04:24 PM

That is why I put it(article) up as a target and see who shoots at it:wry: I thought you were mad because it was written by an Army Guy and not a Marine:D

Well Slap, target or trap, you now know what bear bait looks like. :wry:
I really do not care if this guy is Army or Marine, in my opinion he is selling PC horse puckky based on bad analysis and shallow thinking. I will still stand by this warning: Watch out for those service publications, they tend to reinforce the current institutional propaganda (and the Marine Corps Gazette, as a rule, is not an exception).

Big wars or Small wars don't matter that much to me....it is LONG wars that we seem to have the most trouble with. What do think Boyd would say about that? I don't think he would like them myself butt?????

Remember, the “Patterns of Conflict” Discourse was born out of a study Boyd started as a LIC Study (Low Intensity Conflict, that’s what we called it back in the 70s). Boyd’s method: to take things apart, find the pieces that worked, and put it back together again is noticeably absent in the article (Wow! Look what I built! What do we call it? Maybe a…Snowmobile!). LTC Wilcox had the right references but still got it wrong (18 Taken from Franklin C. Spinney presentation on Boyd, “Evolutionary Epistemology”) and (9 Montgomery C. Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare”, Parameters (Summer 2003) pp. 4-5.) (You need to read those, BTW). Because the author didn’t use the method, another thing that bugged me…most of his examples were negative…he offered no positive “pieces”, yet he found the moral “Holy Grail”.

What Boyd would say about the LONG war is in Patterns…go back and review Patterns again. Moral Essence is extremely important, and it is so important you/we cannot afford to get it wrong. It is much bigger than just the sound bit of “the moral high ground”…it is systemic and it is “Cheng and Chi”; whatever works for us must also work against the enemy. Whenever Boyd gives a definition, it has two parts, for example, again (as Bear stomps his foot):
“Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.
Simultaneously,
build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.”
IMO, if we followed the thinking of the article, you and I would be discussing how a platoon of pilgrims, totting bibles, got to Baghdad as part of the 2007 surge, after all, what is more moral than a pilgrim.:p

slapout9

12-03-2010, 04:49 PM

“Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.
Simultaneously,
build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.”

I think part of the problem in understanding Boyd is he stays at the abstract level and dosen't give to many concrete examples. As an example I just saw on the news that a survey was conducted in A'stan that said over 90% of the population had no idea that we invaded A'stan because of their association with AQ and the 911 attacks. I think that is a moral failure on our part (US) for not making that clear to the population and that undermines our legitamcy in their eyes, we just seem like foriegn invaders.

Polarbear1605

12-03-2010, 06:01 PM

I think part of the problem in understanding Boyd is he stays at the abstract level and dosen't give to many concrete examples.

Absolutely, I think he is abstract because he is teaching us a new way to think, however, “Patterns” is full of concrete examples (GOOD GAWD! Are you blind man!...j/k)…and, IMO, Boyd is telling us to go back and apply his method to those examples to see what he is seeing; and then go find your own examples; and apply them to current situations.

As an example I just saw on the news that a survey was conducted in A'stan that said over 90% of the population had no idea that we invaded A'stan because of their association with AQ and the 911 attacks. I think that is a moral failure on our part (US) for not making that clear to the population and that undermines our legitamcy in their eyes, we just seem like foriegn invaders.

Again, absolutely correct, and you are now looking at both sides of the equation (Cheng and Chi – commendable. BTW…this kind of thinking will never get you a job with a service publication). So! Mass media has resolved the issue here in the US. “The SOBs killed 3000+ citizens in a cowardly act.” How do we get that same message across to 90% of the population of a tribal, stone age, dirt floor country? But!... in a country that is full of tribal warriors and that knows and understands blood feuds… and, because it is a tribal muslin country, the people recognize that a primary communications channel is the tribal chief and the village Imam. Hmmmm? I know I am being presumptuous here but you wanted an example, and I gave you one without pilgrims or bibles. :wry:

slapout9

12-03-2010, 06:31 PM

Bear, gotta go for awhile, will respond later.

slapout9

12-03-2010, 08:52 PM

Absolutely, I think he is abstract because he is teaching us a new way to think, however, “Patterns” is full of concrete examples (GOOD GAWD! Are you blind man!...j/k)…and, IMO, Boyd is telling us to go back and apply his method to those examples to see what he is seeing; and then go find your own examples; and apply them to current situations.

Again, absolutely correct, and you are now looking at both sides of the equation (Cheng and Chi – commendable. BTW…this kind of thinking will never get you a job with a service publication). So! Mass media has resolved the issue here in the US. “The SOBs killed 3000+ citizens in a cowardly act.” How do we get that same message across to 90% of the population of a tribal, stone age, dirt floor country? But!... in a country that is full of tribal warriors and that knows and understands blood feuds… and, because it is a tribal muslin country, the people recognize that a primary communications channel is the tribal chief and the village Imam. Hmmmm? I know I am being presumptuous here but you wanted an example, and I gave you one without pilgrims or bibles. :wry:

Bear,

1-The more abstract a concept the more situations it can be applied to, but you also get the risk of it being applied incorrectly, which is how many people view Boyd IMO.

2-When I think of the moral level as it relates to the US I think of a formal "Declaration of War" there is a lot of moral authority in doing that and we screwed that up IMO. Whe we first went into A'stan that was explained to the forces we supported and it seemed to work well, truth and honor required that we retalite, but then we fell off the snowmobile and started doing make the world safe for freedom and democracy....really bad move IMO.

I will read the Meigs article in a little while.

slapout9

12-04-2010, 06:05 AM

Short one minute video of Boyd on doctrine.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=heWpHSOMAmY&feature=related

Fuchs

12-04-2010, 11:45 AM

As an example I just saw on the news that a survey was conducted in A'stan that said over 90% of the population had no idea that we invaded A'stan because of their association with AQ and the 911 attacks.

Can you provide a source?

Polls tend to produce a 5-30% minority at all times, even if you ask whether an ocean is blue. A 90% result suggests that de facto pretty much nobody knows the reason.

Polarbear1605

12-04-2010, 02:12 PM

1-The more abstract a concept the more situations it can be applied to, but you also get the risk of it being applied incorrectly, which is how many people view Boyd IMO.
Ah Ha! IMO Boyd had to keep it abstract in order to adapt to an ever changing situation. Then you wrote down that magic word "RISK"...we are making comments on what we are doing wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan...risk is always there with or without Boyd and with or without a good strategic leadership...risks are not the issues ....but the assumptions to minimizie the risks are.

2-When I think of the moral level as it relates to the US I think of a formal "Declaration of War" there is a lot of moral authority in doing that and we screwed that up IMO. Whe we first went into A'stan that was explained to the forces we supported and it seemed to work well, truth and honor required that we retalite, but then we fell off the snowmobile and started doing make the world safe for freedom and democracy....really bad move IMO.

Depends on which war your talking about...afghanistan when we went in we could morally, pretty much do what we wanted. Have you read "Jaw Breaker"...The CIA did a tremendous job conducting that war...very rigorious...they were not constrained by doctrine because there was none...risks were extremely high...it is not until the military takes over the operation that see it stale mate. BTW the military takes over when the risks became low.

slapout9

12-04-2010, 02:25 PM

Ah Ha! IMO Boyd had to keep it abstract in order to adapt to an ever changing situation. Then you wrote down that magic word "RISK"...we are making comments on what we are doing wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan...risk is always there with or without Boyd and with or without a good strategic leadership...risks are not the issues ....but the assumptions to minimizie the risks are.

Yes, Boyd did have to keep it abstract. But the risk I am talking about is the risk of being misunderstood, not any specific risk relative to a specific situation.

slapout9

12-04-2010, 02:31 PM

Depends on which war your talking about...afghanistan when we went in we could morally, pretty much do what we wanted. Have you read "Jaw Breaker"...The CIA did a tremendous job conducting that war...very rigorious...they were not constrained by doctrine because there was none...risks were extremely high...it is not until the military takes over the operation that see it stale mate. BTW the military takes over when the risks became low.

Exactly, moral certainty provides operational clarity! Yes, I read Jawbreaker several times. I am a big fan of that operation, them boys put the Alabama Whoop Ass on em!! Although I would argue that this was essentially Airpower theory(The Air Control Theory) from the 1950's. Now take a look at Iraq and how moral certainty degraded and then look what happened:eek:

I also read the Montgomery Meigs article last night.

slapout9

12-04-2010, 02:51 PM

Can you provide a source?

Polls tend to produce a 5-30% minority at all times, even if you ask whether an ocean is blue. A 90% result suggests that de facto pretty much nobody knows the reason.

I saw it on MSNBC about 2 weeks ago.

Ken White

12-04-2010, 04:39 PM

Polarbear1605

12-05-2010, 02:59 AM

Yes, Boyd did have to keep it abstract. But the risk I am talking about is the risk of being misunderstood, not any specific risk relative to a specific situation.

Oops! Sorry about running down that rabbit trail. I did misunderstand your intent. :)

Polarbear1605

12-05-2010, 03:10 AM

Exactly, moral certainty provides operational clarity! Yes, I read Jawbreaker several times. I am a big fan of that operation, them boys put the Alabama Whoop Ass on em!! Although I would argue that this was essentially Airpower theory(The Air Control Theory) from the 1950's. Now take a look at Iraq and how moral certainty degraded and then look what happened:eek:

I also read the Montgomery Meigs article last night.

Hmmm...your going to have to expand on The Air Control Theory comment a bit... your lossing me there.
You also need to expand the "how moral certainty degraded" phase...???? I think Iraq demonstrates a failure of strategic thinking by not only the national comand authority but also the military stategic leadership....??? :confused:

slapout9

12-05-2010, 02:51 PM

Hmmm...your going to have to expand on The Air Control Theory comment a bit... your lossing me there.
You also need to expand the "how moral certainty degraded" phase...???? I think Iraq demonstrates a failure of strategic thinking by not only the national comand authority but also the military stategic leadership....??? :confused:

Bear,

1-Using small ground teams in conjunction with airpower goes all the way back to WW1 in Iraq (Mesopotamia) started by the UK and updated by the US Air force.

2-The original Moral Imperative to attack Iraq was possession of WMD, when that turned out to be false and we probably new that from the start. That undermined our legitimacy both at home and in the region. We lost at the Moral level of warfare IMO.

PS: Operation Jawbreaker was on TV yesterday! Somebody needs to give these guys some medals! They should also.......well I could go on but I want.

Backwards Observer

12-05-2010, 04:13 PM

One notes with bewilderment the stubborn recalcitrance of uncivilised tribes in recent history to automatically cede the moral high ground to those who would slaughter their kinfolk and reduce their dwellings to smouldering rubble from the air. Puzzling.

Guilio Douhet's Theory of Air Power

... ...

Having achieved command of the air, pilots would then destroy the enemy's will to resist by conducting aerial bombing on his cities, industrial centres and civilian population. It was thought that civilians were not prepared for the effects of war and the bombing of population centres would create panic among the people.

... ...

In the 1920s Britain bombed Kurds and Arabs in Iraq when they rebelled against Britain's attempts to control them.

... ...

Winston Churchill, the colonial secretary at the time, believed that gas could be used effectively against the Kurds and Iraqis (as well as against other peoples in the Empire): 'I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilised tribes.'

... ...

Wing-Commander Sir Arthur Harris, later Bomber Harris, head of wartime Bomber Command, was happy to emphasise that 'The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage. Within forty-five minutes a full-size village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured.' It was an easy matter to bomb and machine-gun the tribespeople, because they had no means of defence or retaliation. Iraq and Kurdistan were also used as testing grounds for new weapons; devices specifically developed by the Air Ministry for use against tribal villages.

excerpts from "Bomber Theory" - http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/AVbombertheory.htm

slapout9

12-05-2010, 04:24 PM

slapout9

12-05-2010, 04:31 PM

Here is a quote form the Montgomery C. Meigs article "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare" on how Political Will really collapses.

The tumultuous politics of the 1930s left the French body politic torn between the forces of the right and left. The connivance of the 200 richest families, none willing to look past its psychological fatigue and warped self-interest to appreciate the good of the state, devastated political will

I had to read it twice because I thought he was talking about modern day America.

Backwards Observer

12-05-2010, 04:49 PM

What is bewildering is people who refuse to realize the CIA didn't do that.

I understand completely. The excerpted quotes in my post do not mention CIA, for whom I have a healthy respect, but your point is taken.

slapout9

12-05-2010, 05:22 PM

I understand completely. The excerpted quotes in my post do not mention CIA, for whom I have a healthy respect, but your point is taken.

I know you do, but you are very correct in what you quoted as it relates to to how most people view air power. Bomb em, Burn em and Gas em. They don't want to talk about how air power has progressed since then.

Backwards Observer

12-05-2010, 06:12 PM

They don't want to talk about how air power has progressed since then.

[Announcer's voice]: Air Power...now with added morality!

Look, I'm in no position to judge the moral high whatnot of whatever, but as you point out, the whole Douhet thing just doesn't seem to fly with folks anymore, if indeed it ever did. Call me nuts, but I think this is probably a good thing. If Air Power theory is moving towards a brighter future, all well and good.

As a side note, and correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall reading somewhere that Douhet was influenced in part by the Italian Futurist movement. Huh...

Futurism had from the outset admired violence and was intensely patriotic. The Futurist Manifesto had declared, "We will glorify war - the world's only hygiene - militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman."[8]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futurism

---

I haven't read the following linked article, but it's the first link in Google if you put in "douhet futurism":

False Gospel for Airpower Strategy? A Fresh Look at Giulio Douhet's "Command Of The Air". http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/douhet.html

Thanks for enduring my half-baked quibbling.

slapout9

12-05-2010, 08:51 PM

Thanks for enduring my half-baked quibbling.

It's not half baked quibbling. Debate is a good thing.

This is pretty good for an advanced Air Force Targeting scheme.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdf

William F. Owen

12-06-2010, 08:09 AM

If Air Power theory is moving towards a brighter future, all well and good.

Air Power, can only be the use of aircraft, manned or un-manned for, for military purposes. That's it. It's hardly even the basis for a theory.

Chris jM

12-06-2010, 09:07 AM

Air Power, can only be the use of aircraft, manned or un-manned for, for military purposes. That's it. It's hardly even the basis for a theory.

We need theory on how to employ our various capabilities and arms such as armour, infantry and SF, do we not? I understand your opposition to theory elevated above policy, but surely the question of how we deploy and employ our forces and systems requires a theoretical grounding so that we can get the doctrine, ORBATS and TTPs right.

Air power can be used in a number of ways - fighting for air superiority, reconnaissance, in direct support of tactical forces (CAS), in support of Bde or Corp level manoeuvre (battlefield interdiction) or as a strategic weapon against high value targets (that's off the top of my head and isn't directly linked to any air power doctrine). Dictating how it will be employed and integrated into a campaign plan seems the perfect basis for theory. Trying to say anything less sounds like your taking reductionism to an all new extreme, Wilf!

Backwards Observer

12-06-2010, 09:19 AM

Air Power, can only be the use of aircraft, manned or un-manned for, for military purposes. That's it. It's hardly even the basis for a theory.

Clausewitz Guy! "Worst theory...ever!!"

slapout9

12-06-2010, 04:38 PM

Clip from National Geographic Channel special on Operation Jawbreaker. It will be on the National Geographic Channel today. Check your local cable listings for correct time.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DBN-4tn_iQ

William F. Owen

12-06-2010, 05:29 PM

We need theory on how to employ our various capabilities and arms such as armour, infantry and SF, do we not?
Do we?
Theory is essential, but we don't need over-arching theories like "Infantry Theory." We need Infantry Doctrine - what is taught. Within in that you can have various theoretical constructs and ideas, BUT they must be able to be applied in practice.

Air power can be used in a number of ways - fighting for air superiority, reconnaissance, in direct support of tactical forces (CAS), in support of Bde or Corp level manoeuvre (battlefield interdiction) or as a strategic weapon against high value targets (that's off the top of my head and isn't directly linked to any air power doctrine).
....and would any air force ever accept that idea that "Air Power" is not actually "strategic" in any way and limited to tactical action, and then almost never decisive?
Good luck in that Theory!
What Air Power ideas that do exist are often (not always) more about driving the emotional and status needs of airmen/pilots, than anything much to do with warfare, and the rational study of Air Warfare is a completely different game.

Chris jM

12-06-2010, 06:02 PM

Do we?
Theory is essential, but we don't need over-arching theories like "Infantry Theory." We need Infantry Doctrine - what is taught. Within in that you can have various theoretical constructs and ideas, BUT they must be able to be applied in practice.

Which, in my mind, IS theory. We don't need overarching or 'grand narrative' for each arm or capability, but we do need some theory both describing and prescribing how we train, deploy and employ those assets. In other words, I agree with you entirely.

....and would any air force ever accept that idea that "Air Power" is not actually "strategic" in any way and limited to tactical action, and then almost never decisive?
Good luck in that Theory!
What Air Power ideas that do exist are often (not always) more about driving the emotional and status needs of airmen/pilots, than anything much to do with warfare, and the rational study of Air Warfare is a completely different game.

You are preaching to the converted. I'm currently working on a MA Thesis looking at the WW1 era, trying to identify how the British and German services approached the challenges of command in the air war and how successful each approach was. I'm spending a lot of time 'in the weeds' but I am also starting to see how the Germans elevated their attack aviation arm to be an end in itself. The RFC, on the other hand, never lost sight of their operational purpose to provide reconnaissance and direct support to their ground forces regardless of the cost involved. Times, though, have changed and the German-led divorce of air power from campaigning seems to be institutionalised in every air force.

Fuchs

12-06-2010, 06:04 PM

I am not completely comfortable with slapping the etiquette "theory" on so many things, but how if not "theory" should we call this:

- idea, what to do and how to do it with air power
- not yet tested in wartime
- not part of actual doctrine anywhere

?

Concept? Idea? Proposal? Approach?

William F. Owen

12-06-2010, 06:39 PM

Which, in my mind, IS theory. We don't need overarching or 'grand narrative' for each arm or capability, but we do need some theory both describing and prescribing how we train, deploy and employ those assets. In other words, I agree with you entirely.

IMO, the focus should be doctrine, because if it cannot be taught, then its basically useless. Very little in the military world or in Warfare is causal, and it's study is basically a social science and a very shaky one at that.

EG: "COIN Theory" for example is a pseudo-science, with no rigourous basis.

Fuchs

12-06-2010, 06:50 PM

William F. Owen

12-06-2010, 07:11 PM

Doctrine is what is taught, it's not all that can be taught.

You need to accept the legitimacy of alternatives to doctrine, for else there will never be a legitimate proposal for improving doctrine.

So what do you call "all that can be taught?" Doctrine +?

Improving doctrine comes from improved study. Almost no one studies Warfare. None of that demonstrates a need for "theory" in my eyes.

Especially anything dreamed up by the current crop of thinkers. Look at the current fiascos with "manoeuvre Warfare" "COIN" and EBO.

Fuchs

12-06-2010, 08:04 PM

There's more than that.

How would you call the Japanese principles of war publication?
http://www.solargeneral.com/library/combat/principles-of-war-a-translation-from-the-japanese.pdf

Isn't that theory?
Have a look at its Part III Ch III - that's not what I'd call "doctrine", for I don't know whether any army teaches this at staff colleges or officer courses.

Polarbear1605

12-06-2010, 08:12 PM

Bear,

1-Using small ground teams in conjunction with airpower goes all the way back to WW1 in Iraq (Mesopotamia) started by the UK and updated by the US Air force.

2-The original Moral Imperative to attack Iraq was possession of WMD, when that turned out to be false and we probably new that from the start. That undermined our legitimacy both at home and in the region. We lost at the Moral level of warfare IMO.

1 – If you are talking this Air Control Theory …and I think you are: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gagnon.pdf
I do not see the connection between the initial Afghanistan (CIA) invasion and Air Control Theory. There was no control idea in the forehead of the CIA … they were conducting war with the intent of destroying (killing) the enemy and they did that very well (and better than the US military can do it). They got inside the AQ/Taliban OODA loop by organizing the opposition tribes into a single and coordinated unity of effort. When we entered Afghanistan, the AQ/Taliban was basically fighting a second generation war (trench lines, bunkers, caves, etc.). Manning the opposition with SF teams basically allows them to move from 2GW to a very successful mobile 3GW force. (4GW is another debate).

2 – I do not think a lack of WMD lost the moral level of warfare in Iraq. There is plenty of moral justification to take out Hussein … he was a mass murderer who worshiped Stalin (Kurd chemical attacks, environmental swamp Arabs genocide, put down of the Shiite rebellion after Desert Storm). I think that our own US opposition party is what lost the moral high ground with the US military naively, without thought, reinforcing those notions (Murtha and Haditha; Abu Ghraib was a self inflicted wound…the press story and pics were from the Army investigation). :mad:

Polarbear1605

12-06-2010, 08:19 PM

Especially anything dreamed up by the current crop of thinkers. Look at the current fiascos with "manoeuvre Warfare" "COIN" and EBO.

Now wait a minute, I would not include Maneuver Warfare in that little list of yours...COIN and EBO! Oh Ya! :D

slapout9

12-07-2010, 01:06 AM

1 – If you are talking this Air Control Theory …and I think you are: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gagnon.pdf
I do not see the connection between the initial Afghanistan (CIA) invasion and Air Control Theory. There was no control idea in the forehead of the CIA … they were conducting war with the intent of destroying (killing) the enemy and they did that very well (and better than the US military can do it). They got inside the AQ/Taliban OODA loop by organizing the opposition tribes into a single and coordinated unity of effort. When we entered Afghanistan, the AQ/Taliban was basically fighting a second generation war (trench lines, bunkers, caves, etc.). Manning the opposition with SF teams basically allows them to move from 2GW to a very successful mobile 3GW force. (4GW is another debate).

2 – I do not think a lack of WMD lost the moral level of warfare in Iraq. There is plenty of moral justification to take out Hussein … he was a mass murderer who worshiped Stalin (Kurd chemical attacks, environmental swamp Arabs genocide, put down of the Shiite rebellion after Desert Storm). I think that our own US opposition party is what lost the moral high ground with the US military naively, without thought, reinforcing those notions (Murtha and Haditha; Abu Ghraib was a self inflicted wound…the press story and pics were from the Army investigation). :mad:

Bear,
1-That study is close enough, but I only wanted to point out that the British Air Control theory was the start point(connection to A'satn) to begin using airplanes to do something beside being flown around in the skies by guys wearing scarfs and only trying to shoot down other guys wearing scarfs and usually named the Red baron.

2-If you can find an original copy of USA(project control) that is something very different and closer to 4GW ( there is very little Air Power in it which is why it was called project control) read it if you get the chance.

3-A'stan by the CIA was maneuver warfare IMO because they were given a Mission!!! and they picked the Objectives (just like Colonel Wyly said) then applied the main effort against a gap.

4-Agree 100% about using locals to get inside the enemies OODA loop.

5-SoDamn Insane was indeed a very bad man, but so are a lot of other people that we deal with and we don't invade their countries. And we don't have the President going on National TV saying that we have proof that he has WMD, when we knew he didn't.(General Van Ripper has You tube video stating this) That is where we lost the moral level of war IMO. The instances you mentioned just poured fuel on the fire so to speak IMO.

Bear, here it is. Towrds then he talks about going fishing with General Zinni and says there are know WMD and we knew it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qyboxT3r9i8&feature=related

By the way this is #10 of a ten part series by Van Riper and it id very, very good....he understands SBW!!!!!(PC version =Systems Based Warfare)

Polarbear1605

12-07-2010, 01:46 AM

Bear, here it is. Towrds then he talks about going fishing with General Zinni and says there are know WMD and we knew it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qyboxT3r9i8&feature=related

By the way this is #10 of a ten part series by Van Riper and it id very, very good....he understands SBW!!!!!(PC version =Systems Based Warfare)

Couple interesting guys your talking about there. General Zinni gave one of the most interesting examples of maneuver warfare at an officer's call when he was a regimental commander in Okinawa. The example was the 3rd Mar Div operations on Iwo Jima in WWII. Sent us all back to the books at the time.

General Van Riper was at the this year's Boyd conference and gave a good talk there. He is also one of the voices you hear asking questions at the beginning of the Boyd CDs you have. :)

slapout9

12-07-2010, 03:36 AM

General Van Riper was at the this year's Boyd conference and gave a good talk there. He is also one of the voices you hear asking questions at the beginning of the Boyd CDs you have. :)

Yes, he is very recognizable as is Boyd himself.

William F. Owen

12-07-2010, 04:28 AM

How would you call the Japanese principles of war publication?
http://www.solargeneral.com/library/combat/principles-of-war-a-translation-from-the-japanese.pdf

Isn't that theory?
Have a look at its Part III Ch III - that's not what I'd call "doctrine", for I don't know whether any army teaches this at staff colleges or officer courses.

At first glance, this looks extremely useful, so many thanks for that. I'll get back to you

William F. Owen

12-07-2010, 04:32 AM

Now wait a minute, I would not include Maneuver Warfare in that little list of yours...COIN and EBO! Oh Ya! :D
Sorry, but yes. MW has no rigourously tested basis in fact. It's an arbitrary device designed to teach the USMC. At best it's a doctrine and IMO, a deeply flawed one.

Polarbear1605

12-10-2010, 04:07 PM

Sorry, but yes. MW has no rigourously tested basis in fact. It's an arbitrary device designed to teach the USMC. At best it's a doctrine and IMO, a deeply flawed one.

I am asking this question as a quest for understanding and not in an effort to upset folks. I have heard those words (or similiar) before but I truely do not understand these words like "rigourously tested basis in fact" and "arbitrary device designed to teach the USMC". Can you explain how you got there or, better, provide some references? :)

Infanteer

12-12-2010, 09:11 PM

Maneuver Warfare was en vogue in the Canadian Army in the late 90s to the point where it was actually written into doctrine. A few years after the fact, the primary author of that doctrine came out and said that it had largely been lifted from the Brits and that it was utter junk.

Pretty bad when the guy who wrote it says that.

Fuchs

12-12-2010, 09:42 PM

Maneuver Warfare is no complete work in itself. It was an effort to inject some facets of the art of war into the U.S. land forces - facets that were neglected or missing.

You're prone to exaggerate and produce an incomplete work if you attempt to write a MW doctrine. That's like asking an artillery fanatic to write a land campaign doctrine.

Infanteer

12-12-2010, 09:48 PM

Actually, that's exactly what the author said - he called MW a cognitive doctrine; a series of ideas (some good, some not-so-good) that was turned into a doctrine.

bumperplate

12-13-2010, 02:57 AM

Rorschach of Conflict is a better title. I was just re-reading "Patterns" the other day. I just don't see it personally. How this ever got as far as it did, is a mystery to me, especially in the UK.

Pretty new to the site...I've read a lot of your stuff and I'm not as well read as you are.
I currently teach tactics to LTs. I teach them about the OODA loop. I try to find holes in it, but I can't. I go back to my time in graduate school and compare research from those like Lazarus and his "appraisal theory", which states that every stimulus is appraised, then run through the 'CPU' and a reaction is then set into motion. Lazarus doesn't really give much consideration to any hard-wiring and instinctual reactions, even the startle reflex.
Then you have researchers like Davidson who wholeheartedly believe in some hard-wiring and would probably endorse a bit of a hybrid of appraisal and predispositions.
Even surveying vision research, and accepting the position that visual stimuli is received without us acknowledging it, visually, does not clearly elucidate what happens in our brains when something happens "out there".
All this taken into consideration, I cannot find a plausible reason to throw out the OODA loop, from a psychophysiological perspective.
We observe, orient, decide and act....I cannot find an alternative. If that was not the case we could not condition ourselves for immediate action drills, or to exercise tactical patience.
Whether or not Boyd got to the right answer by the wrong means is not so much my concern. I think it's a sound concept and it's a vital part to understanding how we win the tactical fight.
Also, there are quite a few seasoned professional that have been in many more two-way firefights than I have, and they completely endorse the utility of understanding "patterns" and the OODA loop.
I think it's a very useful construct and plays well with the study of maneuver warfare principles or any others you feel vital to winning at the tactical level.

So, I realize you are not "buying it", but I can't understand why. Knowing what goes on within the anterior cingulate cortex and how omnipresent its activation is with just about every volitional act, there is no alternative for a layman's perspective than to express it as an OODA loop. I'm sure Boyd had no idea and had no intention of linking his patterns or OODA loop to any psychophysiological data, but it meshes rather well in my opinion.

William F. Owen

12-13-2010, 07:36 AM

Pretty new to the site...I've read a lot of your stuff and I'm not as well read as you are.

Do not be fooled! Reading means nothing in this game unless you can translate that into clear advice and guidance.

I currently teach tactics to LTs. I teach them about the OODA loop. I try to find holes in it, but I can't.
The OODA loop describes one possible set of actions. Looking, understanding, making a decision and then acting upon it, are things that people do. However it does not describe how people actually think for real. It describes one possible sequence of decision making. What if the observation is coloured by action already taken? It describes a possible process. It does not guide you as to how make decisions.

I think it's a very useful construct and plays well with the study of maneuver warfare principles or any others you feel vital to winning at the tactical level.
Well I think Manoeuvre Warfare is at best a crutch for poor understanding.

So, I realize you are not "buying it", but I can't understand why.
Do you teach the "Core Functions." FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT? Far more useful than the OODA loop. They provide clear explicit guidance, and each action is only successful if the previous one has been performed effectively.

Does that help?

davidbfpo

12-13-2010, 07:58 AM

Wilf cited:
Do you teach the "Core Functions." FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT? Far more useful than the OODA loop. They provide clear explicit guidance, and each action is only successful if the previous one has been performed effectively.From my "armchair" and for very different reasons I found the F3EA concept very useful; yes similar to Wilf's text: Find, Fix, Finish, Evaluate & Analyse. There are a few open source references to the concept.

William F. Owen

12-13-2010, 09:17 AM

Wilf cited:

From my "armchair" and for very different reasons I found the F3EA concept very useful; yes similar to Wilf's text: Find, Fix, Finish, Evaluate & Analyse.
The language used strongly implies that who ever came up with F3EA, did not understand the Core Functions. If they did, they would not have come up with the new words! :eek:

Chris jM

12-13-2010, 09:40 AM

Since the topic of conversation is turning to the Core Functions I'd like to clarify something that's been nagging at me:

- Where did they (the core functions) come from?
- Where are they written into doctrine?

I think they are a very powerful framework but I only ever see them referred to here and never in military literature, no matter where I look.

William F. Owen

12-13-2010, 01:55 PM

- Where did they (the core functions) come from?
- Where are they written into doctrine?

They can be traced to Ferdinand Foch in about 1906 or 1911. He was certainly translated into English by 1918. Liddell-Hart knowingly plagiarised them as the "man in the dark theory" in the 1920's, and claimed them as his own.

They were explicitly written into UK doctrine in 2005 in a complete form (as opposed to just "find, fix strike"), but they are strangely absent from the vast majority of written doctrine, yet seem well understood.

I gave a presentation of Core Functions to the Royal Thai Army "COIN" symposium in 2007 and it was all new to them!

Tukhachevskii

12-13-2010, 02:49 PM

Wilf cited:

From my "armchair" and for very different reasons I found the F3EA concept very useful; yes similar to Wilf's text: Find, Fix, Finish, Evaluate & Analyse. There are a few open source references to the concept, which IIRC appear to come from the SF world Such as this:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/119-rawley.pdf and http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_50/ai_n28072547/pg_6/
Sir, I'll think you'll fidn that the F3 concept you refer to is the intelligence gathering version rather than the pure "warfighting" concept Wilf is refering to.

Since the topic of conversation is turning to the Core Functions I'd like to clarify something that's been nagging at me:

- Where did they (the core functions) come from?
- Where are they written into doctrine?

I think they are a very powerful framework but I only ever see them referred to here and never in military literature, no matter where I look.

An example of the F3EA concept DavidBFPO is refering to (and an example of its use in doctrine for Chris JM) can be found in the UK Counter-Insurgency Manual Vol. 10 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf), Section 5-5 (this is F3 in its intelligence formatdeployed as a methodological aid/heuristic device)

Tukhachevskii

12-13-2010, 05:17 PM

The Military or “warfighting” version of Find-Fix-Finish(-Exploit, which one would assume was a given) is described in ADP Land Operations (http://www.da.mod.uk/jscta/preparation/adp_land_ops.pdf) Chapter 3 p. 51 onwards wherein it has morphed into find-fix-strike(-Exploit) which I am assuming is because of our adherence to the so-called “manoeuvrist” approach (....wait, it couldn’t be a PC term to replace the overly aggressive sounding “finish”,..... could it:eek:?!). This is the same doctrinal publication upon which Dr. Jim Storr worked. In case links don’t work (for whatever reason) a summary of the core functions as per ADP Land Operations can be found below;

0310. At its simplest, there are two core functions: to fix and to strike. The need to find and to be prepared to exploit is implicit in both. In the 5th Century BC, Sun Tsu coined the terms ‘ordinary force’ for the function of fixing the enemy or denying him the freedom to achieve his purpose; and the ‘extraordinary force’ for the function of manoeuvring into a position of decisive advantage from which he can be struck. Whilst finding and fixing contribute to shaping, striking and exploiting have the potential to be decisive. Fixing is by no means confined to defensive operations to protect the force. Defensive or offensive operations designed to fix the enemy may set the conditions for offensive action to strike him. Where circumstances permit, operations designed primarily to find, fix or strike the enemy should be exploited. Operational experi¬ence indicates that finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least achieve seamless transition from one to another. The campaign plan for Operation DESERT STORM chose to do both.

0311. The core functions have wide utility across the continuum of operations. In a COIN campaign non-military and paramilitary adversaries are found by information gathering by the intelligence services, covert and overt elements of armed forces, and other government agen¬cies. The uniformed military forces and the police, combined with diplomatic efforts and Informa¬tion Operations, fix the insurgents, acting as the ‘ordinary force’. Locally-raised forces can also help to find and fix opponents, and have been employed in numerous campaigns to good effect. Special Forces, military and police units and the legal system contribute to striking, acting as the ‘extraordinary force’. Exploitation in both combat and non-combat operations involves taking advantage of a developing situation in accordance with the superior commander’s intent. For ex¬ample, local tactical successes against insurgents may enable freedom of movement for military forces, civilian police, government officials and humanitarian workers. This process, if exploited, may assist in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population and allow economic and political development to take place.

Finding the Enemy
0312. Finding the enemy is a basic function which endures throughout an operation. It includes locating, identifying, tracking and assessing the enemy. Forces may be directed specifically to fight the battle for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. This will nor¬mally be a sound investment when the situation is confused and seemingly chaotic. Whatever its source, information is never wholly reliable. It may need checking or corroborating with other sources. Too much information is a form of friction that can impede decision-making.

Fixing the Enemy
0315. To fix is to deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of his freedom of action. By doing so, the friendly force gains freedom of action. Combat is adver¬sarial and lethal; an enemy will avoid being struck and defeated unless his freedom of action is constrained. It is difficult to strike an enemy effectively if he is not fixed. Furthermore, an enemy who has no freedom of action cannot dictate the course of tactical events; he has lost the initia¬tive. Depriving an enemy of his freedom of action has both physical and mental aspects. Physi¬cally, his force can be blocked, or pinned against an obstacle. Mentally, he is fixed if he believes he has no freedom of action, if he feels himself compelled to do something, or if he believes he should persist with something which in practice will not bring success. Deception or distraction can play a major role. Often the easiest way to fix an enemy is to attack something that he has to protect: his forces, for example. Deception may fix him until the deception is exposed, which may be too late for him to regain the initiative.

0318. Depriving the Enemy of his Freedom of Action. The enemy can also be fixed by a combination of methods which deny him information, deny him the ability to pass orders, and inhibit their execution. The enemy’s information sources and his command system are central to his ability to concentrate force. Both often depend on the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Dominating and exploiting it can help fix the enemy. An unsophisticated enemy or one who de¬centralizes command will be less vulnerable. Distracting and fixing the enemy is further achieved by embroiling him in subsidiary actions which divert him from his main purpose. He should also be denied physical mobility.

0319. Tactical Methods. Fixing the enemy may require the use of firepower or close combat. Such operations can use a significant element of one’s own combat power. Thus the extent to which the enemy’s freedom of action should be constrained has to be judged carefully, to ensure that the resources devoted to fixing are no more than the minimum required. The air operations which preceded the Normandy invasion in June 1944 fixed the German mobile reserves by a combination of interdicting road and rail routes, direct air attacks, and other deception measures. These gave the impression of a direct threat in the Pas de Calais area. This example highlights the value of fixing the enemy by several different means, making it difficult to counter any one. In Northern Ireland, patrolling, vehicle checks, searches and observation have all contributed to fixing the terrorist by limiting his freedom of action.

Striking the Enemy
0320. To strike is to manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose of the mis¬sion.

a. Manoeuvre. To manoeuvre is to gain a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre means more than movement in combination with fire. It allows combat power to be focused for greatest ef¬fect, avoids strengths and exploits weakness. The concept of water flowing over surfaces and gaps is useful to understand the concept. Water runs off surfaces – enemy strengths – and pours through gaps – enemy weaknesses. Existing gaps are exploited where pos¬sible. Failing that, they are created. There is usually a time aspect: to exploit fleeting op¬portunities requires agility, anticipation, and decentralized decision-making. This places a premium on reconnaissance, and on forward command which pulls combat power towards enemy weaknesses rather than pushing it from the rear. Doing so opens up options for striking the enemy which, if exploited, present him with multiple threats to which he is un¬able to respond coherently.

b. Direct Action. Direct action in combat means seizing objectives or destroying enemy forces. Firepower and movement are focused through simultaneity and tempo, to achieve shock and surprise and break the enemy’s will and cohesion. Such coordination makes the most of the complementary characteristics of tactical capabilities, concentrating force at the selected point to ensure a favourable outcome. There is also a time dimension to striking the enemy. It is generally preferable to apply concentrated violence to win quickly at minimum cost. However, constraints may dictate a more protracted approach without the prospect of a single decisive act. In these circumstances, operations should be sequenced and sus¬tained so that the effects on the enemy are cumulative. Nevertheless, whenever force is applied to strike it should be applied suddenly and in concentrations so as to achieve shock effect. Where the mission requires action other than the use of violent force, such as an arrest operation or preventing interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, similar while avoiding the adverse effects of shocking the general population.

Exploitation
0321. As a core function, exploitation is the seizure of opportunity in order to achieve a higher commander’s objective, or fulfil some part of his intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation re¬quires action beyond the given mission. It may therefore replace the task stated in orders.2 For example, a commander ordered to neutralize an enemy force covering the approaches to his commander’s objective may find an approach which is not covered and simply move directly to the objective. Opportunities can occur at any time whilst finding, fixing or striking. A commander should constantly search for such opportunities and, when they occur, pursue them ruthlessly. Exploitation should be expected from subordinates. They should not have to be told to exploit, and only told how far they may do so if absolutely necessary, using the term ‘limit of exploitation’. General von Moltke the Elder’s prescription for success at the operational level was “reconnaissance, victory and exploitation”, which might be described today as the aggressive handling of reconnaissance, tactical success and exploitation.

Infanteer

12-14-2010, 12:25 AM

Of note, it appears ADP Land Operations was replaced last week by a new ADP Operations.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDWP/ArmyDoctrinePublicationOperations.htm

slapout9

12-14-2010, 04:05 AM

is what the Air Force calls it. Find,Fix,Track,Target,Engage,Assess. In other words put the "Warhead on the Forehead:D"

Chris jM

12-14-2010, 10:32 AM

Thanks for the info - it is appreciated.

William F. Owen

12-14-2010, 11:56 AM

Of note, it appears ADP Land Operations was replaced last week by a new ADP Operations.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDWP/ArmyDoctrinePublicationOperations.htm

The worst piece of UK military doctrine for well over 100 years. Possibly ever. Disgraceful.
....just my opinion having read the pre-release draft and now this shambles.

Granite_State

12-24-2010, 01:37 AM

Sorry, but yes. MW has no rigourously tested basis in fact. It's an arbitrary device designed to teach the USMC. At best it's a doctrine and IMO, a deeply flawed one.

I share some of your frustration with the vague and sometimes historically shaky basis of maneuver warfare, but in my limited experience with it (a year and change as a second lieutenant) I think it's a good construct to teach tactical fundamentals and orient us around a few core principles: the main effort, auftragstaktik, relative speed and tempo, center of gravity and critical vulnerability. The danger is just falling in love with buzzwords or trying to be too cute, always looking to avoid the dreaded "attrition." One of the best things I heard from a general at TBS was "Someone, somewhere, is doing a frontal attack" (also doubles as a good late night text to friends at bars).

Granite_State

12-24-2010, 01:44 AM

Infanteer

12-24-2010, 05:39 AM

...the basics can be taught without junk theory too.

slapout9

12-24-2010, 06:22 AM

Slapout, have you seen the Marine Corps Gazette's Mastering Tactics TDG book? If you haven't I think you'd enjoy it, 15 TDGs from squad to MEB size, written by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR (ret.), who wrote FMFM 1 as a captain. Lengthy discussions of each scenario go over some of the same ground as Lind's book.

No I have not seen it but I have heard of it. Yea I probably would like it. I am really looking into this war game stuff thanks to Colonel Walters.... but I am a slow learner.

Polarbear1605

12-24-2010, 05:30 PM

I share some of your frustration with the vague and sometimes historically shaky basis of maneuver warfare...

I usually agree with WILF’s critical analysis of Boyd Theory/Maneuver Warfare (to a point). Sometimes, WILF’s criticism sometimes makes we wonder if the Boyd Theory and Maneuver Warfare are not two separate things (but that is another issue). I do think he at times makes the same mistake of generalization as the US military leadership and education system in regards to Maneuver Warfare. For example:

Citing Wilf:
The whole edifice of Maneuver Warfare rests on the idea that there are two competing forms of warfare, maneuver and attrition, one of which is skilled and the other which is clumsy. This construct is false; it makes no sense to favor one form over the other.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/09/the-manoeuvre-warfare-fraud/

For example, I never thought of maneuver and attrition warfare as competing. I always thought, however, that maneuver warfare needed a contrast in order to change military thinking of the time.

When he states that Maneuver Warfare lacks intellectual rigor, I agree, but lack of rigor should not translate to “vague and historically shaky”.
The reason I agree with the lack of rigor comment is because neither Boyd nor Lind, to the best of my recollection, ever held anything up as an absolution example of “this is the way to do it”. Instead what they told us was to read study and analyze certain examples and look for those maneuver warfare elements that make it successful. Yes, the stalemated trenches of Flanders and “shells, shells and more shells” were used as examples of “attrition warfare” but T.E. Lawrence and Rommel’s “Attacks” plus von Lettow-Vorbeck East African WWI Campaign were also use as Maneuver Warfare examples to study. The subtlety of the word study was lost on both Marine and Army doctrinal manual writers because they realized that when it comes to tactics most US military officers are neither studiers nor readers. Instead we push these innovative ideas into a military education system designed to destroy creativity and encourage buzz word solutions.
Rigor is not added to study by a double running the obstacle course before a written military exam. Rigor is added by study, presentation, debate and “adaptation” (had to throw that Boyd term in there). The part that was gotten wrong was the study part because it required the time to read.

slapout9

12-24-2010, 07:43 PM

There is nothing shaky or flaky about Maneuver Warfare IF you read the whole handbook including Colonel Wyly's section on the fundamentals of Tactics. A lot of people say stuff about it and then other people say the same stuff to more people, all the while nobody ever actually read the book. It is very much about how to fight a system in the most efficient and effective way and that will require that you develop your judgment of what to do based upon each situation. I will say they should have called it something besides Maneuver Warfare because that can create some confusion.

Infanteer

12-25-2010, 01:09 AM

Slapout, I've pretty much got the entire pantheon of this stuff on the shelf - I was a "maneuver warfare" junky prior to seriously considering the idea (I also was a pop-centric COIN junky too - fool me once, fool me twice!). Maneuver warfare clouds any useful concepts with so much junk that it should be flushed.

1. The "Generations of Warfare" argument is completely silly - anyone who argues that "4GW" is an evolution of "3GW Maneuver Warfare" which are both superior evolutions of "2GW Attritive War" is a fool. Maneuver Warfare builds on this poor history by taking any examples of "good tactics" for its own as examples of "maneuver warfare" while denigrating examples of "bad tactics" as "attrition warfare". Pretty easy to say my theory is good if I illogically assign all good, unrelated examples of history to my column!

2. The whole concept uses "maneuver warfare" and "attrition warfare" to create a false dichotomy where none exists. This takes away from the fact that firepower and maneuver both have roles to play on the battlefield and that attrition has battlefield value. Yes - the manual states that a "maneuver warfare force" still uses firepower, but the body of literature that Lind and Co. built around Maneuver Warfare (and yes, I've read almost all of it) clearly approaches things with this false dichtomy in mind. "Shattering will and cohesion" is done by killing people and wrecking stuff with firepower.

3. The OODA loop, which MW elevated from Boyd, is not a good model. Humans are not iterative. They are constantly observing and acting. So "getting in a loop" really makes no sense (a tip of the hat to LCol Storr on this one).

4. "Surfaces and Gaps" is silly. What consititutes a gap? If all I have to do to turn myself into a "surface" do is swing my MG 90 degrees, then is the concept of any use? "Recon Pull" suffers from the same problems.

Shall I go on?

Clearly, any benefits that maneuver warfare brings could be gained by abandoning the farce and simply looking at the basics.

slapout9

12-25-2010, 01:40 AM

Shall I go on?

Sure go a head, debate is a good thing. List everything you think is wrong with the book or theory.

Infanteer

12-25-2010, 05:06 AM

I'm on holidays now, so you'll have to wait a couple weeks for me to get home if you want to talk specifics. I've talked about some of the main concepts - Wilf's RUSI article is also good; along with numerous other Canadian and American critiques I've seen.

Problem is, I've never seen the MW crowd defend against the critiques. Unlike pop-centric COIN, MW seems to have died as theoretical death; it's proponents had to invent 4GW to maintain some relevance.

slapout9

12-25-2010, 10:50 AM

Polarbear1605

12-25-2010, 09:43 PM

Problem is, I've never seen the MW crowd defend against the critiques. Unlike pop-centric COIN, MW seems to have died as theoretical death; it's proponents had to invent 4GW to maintain some relevance.

Sounds like game on!

Infanteer

12-26-2010, 12:58 AM

Sounds like game on!

Merry Christmas to you as well!

Seriously, the narrative of the military literature on Maneuver Warfare seems to be:

1. Lind and co. create MW;

2. MW catches on and, in a flurry, is incorporated into doctrine;

3. Critiques of MW appear;

4. Critiques are not answered, instead 4GW is created (which isn't ever taken seriously); and

5. MW falls into relative disuse, slowly becoming a footnote in doctrine, but leaving some "maneuverist traces".

If you have copies of MW apologia in the light of all the literature critical of MW and its theoretical foundations, I'd love to see it.

slapout9

12-26-2010, 03:20 PM

Sounds like game on!

I would say it is game winning. Our enemies seem to understand it. By blending with the civilian population they Maneuver through huge gaps in the military surface in order to attack civilian soft spots. All done in order to accomplish their mission.

Granite_State

12-26-2010, 06:02 PM

Instead what they told us was to read study and analyze certain examples and look for those maneuver warfare elements that make it successful. Yes, the stalemated trenches of Flanders and “shells, shells and more shells” were used as examples of “attrition warfare”

But even this characterization is largely false. Much of the slaughter of the Western Front happened for more complex and common sense reasons than a fixation with "attrition warfare" (ex. the Somme, pressure had to be relieved on the French, a British Army largely made up of green conscripts was justifiably confined to simple tactics). Douglas Haig is usually depicted as the stereotypical Western Front "chateau general," but he was a cavalryman who was always looking for a breakthrough, not an attritional victory. He was a "maneuvrist!" And this is probably the purest example of "attrition warfare" that can be found.

Infanteer

12-26-2010, 08:42 PM

Actually, over half the casualties on the Western Front occured in the first and last phases of the war - the march to the Marne, the Spring Offensives and the Last 100 days. So 8 of 39 months of warfare - the 8 months of relative maneuver as opposed to the much maligned grinder of "attrition" trench warfare - produced over 50% of the casualties.

Polarbear1605

12-26-2010, 10:18 PM

But even this characterization is largely false. Much of the slaughter of the Western Front happened for more complex and common sense reasons than a fixation with "attrition warfare" (ex. the Somme, pressure had to be relieved on the French, a British Army largely made up of green conscripts was justifiably confined to simple tactics). Douglas Haig is usually depicted as the stereotypical Western Front "chateau general," but he was a cavalryman who was always looking for a breakthrough, not an attritional victory. He was a "maneuvrist!" And this is probably the purest example of "attrition warfare" that can be found.

Wow…first…let’s define this debate a bit…simply…Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict = Maneuver Warfare…based on the above comments we need a sand box to play in here that is smaller than a universe.
If you are calling Douglas Haig a “maneuverist” meaning a Maneuver Warfare general (= Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict) because as a former calvary officer he was always looking for gaps (at the Somme or anywhere else), I strongly disagree. 600,000 causalities in exchange to relieve pressure on Verdun and movement of the front line by 10 miles = an attritionist in my mind. The technique of surfaces and gaps does not define a maneuver warfare general…but I would say that a maneuverist is someone who is always adapting. Compare Haig to Ludendorff…Haig is severely criticized for lack of adaptability … compare to Ludendorff who changed both Germany’s defensive and offensive doctrine in the middle of a World War.

slapout9

12-27-2010, 05:41 AM

…but I would say that a maneuverist is someone who is always adapting.

Very much so and I don't know if it was in the book or some of the lectures that have been posted, but the 3 main elements the Mission,Surfaces and Gaps and the Main Effort are all connected to the theory. A new Trinity. You can't one without the other 2 even though the Main Effort is usually considered to be the most important at least from what I have read.

slapout9

12-27-2010, 01:07 PM

…but I would say that a maneuverist is someone who is always adapting.

Been thinking about that some more. Maybe it would be better to think of a Maneuverist as someone who is always making the enemy adapt, always maintaining the initiative. And at the highest level he would be making the enemy irrelevant to him as far as accomplishing his objective.

Polarbear1605

12-27-2010, 02:30 PM

Been thinking about that some more. Maybe it would be better to think of a Maneuverist as someone who is always making the enemy adapt, always maintaining the initiative. And at the highest level he would be making the enemy irrelevant to him as far as accomplishing his objective.
Good catch Slap! And actually, I believe that it is both you and your enemy.

Because combat is a matter of decisions and time, the adversaries are continuously reacting and counter-reacting to one another trying to get the upper hand in this mortal duel. Combat tactics can be viewed as a way to limit or eliminate the enemy’s options or reactions. Needless to say, killing the enemy eliminates all of his options.
http://warchronicle.com/TheyAreNotKillers/DefendOurMarines/BobWeimann/CaseForSquadLeader_SSgtWuterich_Haditha_25July08_3 21.htm
:)

Polarbear1605

12-27-2010, 06:07 PM

Merry Christmas to you as well!

Seriously, the narrative of the military literature on Maneuver Warfare seems to be:

1. Lind and co. create MW; Wrong! As an Obnoxious Buzzer sounds. Yes, Lind coined the term “Maneuver Warfare” but what he was talking about was Boyd’s Patterns in Conflict. I would say it went something like …Boyd and his first acolytes win the E-M Theory war with the production of the F-16/F-15. Boyd retires. Boyd then comes up with Destruction and Creation…”Tada! A snowmobile is born”. Boyd enters his monk phase reading and analyzing war. Destruction and Creation is important because the snowmobile method is what Boyd applies to develop Patterns. “Let us take it all apart; pick the best pieces; and build a snowmobile”.

2. MW catches on and, in a flurry, is incorporated into doctrine; From my observation, I have an issue with the phrase “in a flurry”. In 1978 I was introduced to Patterns of Conflict as a student at Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. In 1988-1989 my Command and Staff College Class was trying to figure out things like Commander’s Intent, Mission Orders and so were a lot of other folks. That’s ten years and we are just starting to get serious.
3. Critiques of MW appear; They did?? Where? If you got any please send me the references.

4. Critiques are not answered, instead 4GW is created (which isn't ever taken seriously); and I agree here….4GW was a definite MW spinoff and a distraction

5. MW falls into relative disuse, slowly becoming a footnote in doctrine, but leaving some "maneuverist traces". Yep! Can’t argue with that…after Desert Strom the debate, study, rigor and work on Boyd’s theory dropped into a black hole.
If you have copies of MW apologia in the light of all the literature critical of MW and its theoretical foundations, I'd love to see it. In light of literature? Literature? ..sorry you just completely lost me here…references?

slapout9

12-27-2010, 07:17 PM

I usually agree with WILF’s critical analysis of Boyd Theory/Maneuver Warfare (to a point). Sometimes, WILF’s criticism sometimes makes we wonder if the Boyd Theory and Maneuver Warfare are not two separate things (but that is another issue).

You might be on to something there, at the very least it might be better if they were seperated.

Steve Blair

12-27-2010, 07:24 PM

You might be on to something there, at the very least it might be better if they were seperated.

I think that's quite correct, actually. I've never been a big fan of Boyd, mainly because I always felt that he was "reaching" when he took a model developed from air to air combat theories and tried to stretch it to cover something much more complicated and involved. MW was an attempt to deal with that complexity.

That said, I'm no fan of the "generations of war" idea.

Infanteer

01-03-2011, 09:19 AM

1. Lind and co. create MW; Wrong! As an Obnoxious Buzzer sounds. Yes, Lind coined the term “Maneuver Warfare” but what he was talking about was Boyd’s Patterns in Conflict. I would say it went something like …Boyd and his first acolytes win the E-M Theory war with the production of the F-16/F-15. Boyd retires. Boyd then comes up with Destruction and Creation…”Tada! A snowmobile is born”. Boyd enters his monk phase reading and analyzing war. Destruction and Creation is important because the snowmobile method is what Boyd applies to develop Patterns. “Let us take it all apart; pick the best pieces; and build a snowmobile”.

Are you sure about this? Most of the literature that got the debate flowing seems to fall out of the concepts espoused in Lind's writing (of which Boyd's was one). I take MW to be a take on history using a mish-mash of germanophile/Boyd/new-age B.H. Lidell Hart to make a doctrine.

I can't see how John Boyd, who left the equivelent of two powerpoint presentations and an essay on dogfighting, could be credited with designing MW.

Polarbear1605

01-03-2011, 05:01 PM

Oh Ya! And I am as sure as the sun coming up at dawn. Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict spawned MW, again a term that Lind coined in a 1980 (?) Marine Gazette Article. You need to think of Lind as the political arm or the salesman of MW. Yes, Lind had his own ideas (some right and some wrong) and he is a germanophile (actually a kaiserophile ;)). I say political because in the late 70’s Lind, as a Senator Gary Hart Congressional Staffer, writes a flaming critical critique of the Army’s FM-100. Lind would continually leverage what the Marines did in MW against the Army until their adoption.
The 1980-81 Amphibious Warfare Class was where (and at the time Major Wyly was the tactics instructor) Lind introduced Wyly to Boyd. After the famous Boyd Brief given to that class, Lind and Wyly formed the first “unofficial” maneuver warfare seminar that meets in Lind’s home. Looking back at that seminar I think the first issue the seminar tried to crack was one of the first criticisms we heard from general officers …. “How do you control all those damn arrows that Boyd draws?” Some members of that seminar, at the end of the AWS class year, are transferred to 2nd MarDiv, Camp Lejuene and continue to meet at the O’Club. At one of those meetings, General Al Gray sits down at the table and asks what is going on. From there, Gray forms the first maneuver warfare board and appoints one of the young captains sitting at that table as the lead. The rest is history as they say.
You also need to look at the period of 1980 until the first version of the USMC’s FMFM-1 (1989?) as an evolutionary growth cycle of MW for the Marines. (And also remember patterns evolved into Boyd’s Discourse on Winning and Losing.) I mention this “evolution” because Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook was a very early work that was published to keep the debate going and was not intended to be the final word. I understand that it is easy to summarize Boyd’s work as a “couple of powerpoint presentations” but in my opinion that summarization avoids the obvious mental work (I think this is what WILF calls rigor) that is needed to understand the brief. That same mental labor was something, at the time, that was avoided (with a few exceptions) by the US general officer corps. :)

davidbfpo

05-13-2011, 07:51 PM

In post 270 in 2010 I stated
Wilf cited:

From my "armchair" and for very different reasons I found the F3EA concept very useful; yes similar to Wilf's text: Find, Fix, Finish, Evaluate & Analyse. There are a few open source references to the concept, which IIRC appear to come from the SF world Such as this:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/119-rawley.pdf and http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_50/ai_n28072547/pg_6/

After a query from a UK observer of such matters I searched for an original article on the F3EA cycle and found this article JFQ in 2008:http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA516799

Note one of the authors is now MG Flynn, of ISAF Intell fame.

Infanteer

05-14-2011, 12:01 AM

...of interest, has there been any new Maneuver Warfare literature? Seems like a dead concept to me.

Fuchs

05-14-2011, 12:09 AM

...of interest, has there been any new Maneuver Warfare literature? Seems like a dead concept to me.

The MW celebrities have passed their creative period. There are few post-2000 MW celebrities, and those few tend to have their own area of specialty.

slapout9

05-14-2011, 05:10 AM

...of interest, has there been any new Maneuver Warfare literature? Seems like a dead concept to me.

After listening to The Boyd Tapes from Polarbear IMO there is very little Boyd in the Handbook, in fact the Marine Corps just about missed the whole point of Boyd's theory. Boyd was not a Maneuverist........ he was a Stonewall Jacksonist "Mystify,Mislead and Surprise!" That is a condesed version of the Boyd theory.....bit more to it. I especially like his M&M theory on creating matches and mis-matches in the enemy. More as I have time. oh yeah there is a whole lot of Warden in Boyd's theory;) or there is a lot of Boyd in Warden.

Ken White

05-14-2011, 01:54 PM

..oh yeah there is a whole lot of Warden in Boyd's theory;) or there is a lot of Boyd in Warden.or "Birdmen of a feather"??? :D:D

slapout9

05-14-2011, 02:26 PM

or "Birdmen of a feather"??? :D:D

More Stealthman then Birdmen. In the Air it is the Stealth Fighter on the Ground it is the Guerrilla that blends perfectly with the Civilian population. It destroys their OODA loop. If you cannot Observe the Enemy you're whole OODA loop-decision cycle is messed up. You are inside the enemies OODA loop and all he can do is react to an unseen threat.

Infanteer

05-14-2011, 04:34 PM

he was a [B]Stonewall Jacksonist "Mystify,Mislead and Surprise!"

In the military, we call that "good tactics", not "Boyd Tactics" or "maneuver warfare".

Ken White

05-15-2011, 02:19 AM

The OODA loop has some merit for aerial combat, I guess -- don't know, not a fighter jock but it does make a certain sense.

For Ground Combat, different apples...

Guerillas rarely blend perfectly with the civilian populace, they can most always be picked out pretty easily. Whether you can do something about the ones so identified is another matter entirely and it generally accedes to politics, not tactics. I've engaged in staring contests with a bunch of Gs in towns in several countries. We both knew I knew -- and we both knew neither of us could do what was needed at that time and place... :wry:

Rarely in ground combat does the OODA loop apply. It sounds really cool and logical but in practice, a number of factors interfere with one's ability to apply the idea. Stealth -- in the form of terrain, vegetation and a lot of other factors including the old fog of battle / Murphy's Law bit -- plus the screw ups of ones subordinates or the enemy (or good put unplanned or unanticipated actions by either or both) tend to reward not the one who's inside another's loop but the one can react the most rapidly and effectively and that entails a number of variable most of which are not controlled by whoever gets inside the other guy's loop. It's not a solo thing like aerial combat, a lot of other folks are involved and just one of them can mess up everybody's loops.

In fact, most real success I've had in ground fights involved the other guy thinking he was inside my OODA loop even when I had no idea where he was much less what his loop entailed... :D

Infanteer's right. That was being done before 'Maneuver Warfare' became a flavor of the day. Even before Warden or Boyd were born. Before Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born. Believe it or not, even before I was born...:D

bumperplate

05-15-2011, 03:27 AM

Ken White

05-15-2011, 04:33 AM

...While I understand that many people dive into the weeds in their analysis of MW and other constructs...MW is far older than is the term in its current usage...

Unfortunately, most ground combat occurs in the weeds... :wry:
I still don't see concrete evidence to justify the casting aside of Boyd's OODA loop.Not suggesting that it be cast aside. As I wrote, I see obvious air combat applicability and acknowledge that it has operational and strategic value. It's just that it does not have too much applicability to ground combat at echelons below Corps (often and Division even more often). Deciding what, who, when, where and how to fight can and should use an OODA like approach. Once the scrap begins however, on the ground as opposed to in the air, there are too many factors and actors that can impinge to make the OODA loop the most important or even a very important factor. At least IMO. YMMV.

Simply; don't discard it but also do not take it as the holy grail. It's just another one of many useful aphorisms.

Fuchs

05-15-2011, 10:27 AM

This thread is enlightening but confusing. While I understand that many people dive into the weeds in their analysis of MW and other constructs...I still don't see concrete evidence to justify the casting aside of Boyd's OODA loop.

I must be either stupid or very poorly educated.

The killer argument for this is that the loop is a simplistic and misleading fiction, as are many staff procedure checklists. Everything happens at the same time, not sequentially.
Moreover, new orders follow before the effect of a previous order (or mission) can be understood.
To follow the OODA loop would actually be too slow, for leaders would wait with their next step until they have observed their last action's effect.

The OODA loop is furthermore badly overhyped. Similar and partially even more advanced concepts have been developed since the 70's, one such example integrated blue AND red loops instead of Boyd's weird omission of the red one.

1977 Lawson Command-Control Cycle (sense-process-compare-decide-act / under influence by environment, own forces and desired state). At the latest by 1985 it was a two-sided model.
source: Hughes, "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Command", 2nd Edition, pp.213 ff

Polarbear1605

05-15-2011, 01:25 PM

This thread is enlightening but confusing. While I understand that many people dive into the weeds in their analysis of MW and other constructs...I still don't see concrete evidence to justify the casting aside of Boyd's OODA loop.

I must be either stupid or very poorly educated.

Bumper, I cannot agree with you more...most criticisms of Boyd have little factual basis...see the four examples above ;). My experience has been many criticize Boyd but most don't want to do the work to present factual evidence or references.
OODA loop is not simple and it is just a portion of the theory. I think the beauty of the theory is that it not only works for air combat but also at the small unit tactical ground level. It also works at the strategic level but folks want to criticize it with sound bits learned at military career level schools.
The Body Theory is not something new and therefore it is in fact "good tactics". Boyd's research is extensive, unlike his critics, and where folks grab bits of the historical study they miss he is presenting his thinking process. He is pulling things apart looking for what works. The Boyd brief is how he got there, how he took things apart and put them back together. There is more to the theory than the OODA loop…there is a “Cheng and Ch’i” aspect to Boyd’s Theory that has been largely missed. One criticism of Boyd that is true is he didn’t write a book…we have the briefs but they miss a lot of the explaining he did at the briefs. Gentlemen…talk is cheap…:D

Polarbear1605

05-15-2011, 02:05 PM

Re-submit for those interested

I have seen and participated in a lot of debates concerning the Boyd Theory (Maneuver Warfare) on this blog. I have seen the Boyd briefings on two separate occasions (Amphibious Warfare School - 1981 and USMC Command and Staff College in 1989). When I sat through the first brief (Patterns of Conflict) I received a copy of the slides. Months later when I went through the slides again I realized that a major portion of the brief was missing. The missing part being the Boyd narrative…the Col would bark at you during the brief like an M-60 machine gun for over eight hours. I became convinced that in order to fully understand the brief you needed both the slides and the narrative.
Realizing my mistake and returning to C&S, when I got to listen to Col Boyd for the second time, I taped the Col’s “Discourse on Winning and Losing” that contains his discussions on “Patterns of Conflict”, “Organic Design for Command and Control”, and “The Strategic Game of ? and ?”. I also remember a number of other recorders on the table besides mine. I recently realized during a discussion on this blog that few if any of those recordings exist today.
I managed to find my cassettes (8 – 90 minute tapes) and made a decision to convert them to CDs. If anyone is interested I have establish a way for you to get a copy of those now 8 CDs (10-12 hours). I need to add a disclaimer here that this is a recording I made with a small old portable cassette player over multiple meetings that was sitting in the middle of a conference room table. The quality is not the best but the discussion can be heard. There is considerable back ground noise and Col Boyd was never one to stand still. In any event, if you are interested in obtaining a set please contact me (polarbear1605) with your email address and I will get the particulars to you. I will also be a this weeks Boyd Conference in Quantico if you want addition information about the CDs. Thanks, Polarbear

slapout9

05-15-2011, 06:04 PM

Here is what Boyd actually said from The Polarbear Tapes(sounds like a spy novel):wry: " Create a mismatch between what he should respond to, as opposed to the actual reality he should respond to in order to survive." That is the Real Boyd Loop and it has been hidden by default or by design for a long time. We have been Boyded (distracted and disoriented) by this OODA stuff.

Ken White

05-15-2011, 08:35 PM

...most criticisms of Boyd have little factual basis...see the four examples above ;). My experience has been many criticize Boyd but most don't want to do the work to present factual evidence or references.As one of the examples from above, let me assure you that my references to OODA Loops and ground combat are factual. As evidence, I can merely state that I am still here and if I'd been fooling around with OODA loops I likely would not be. Doesn't get much more factual than that and 200 pounds of evidence ought to count for something even if it is old. :wry:

I strongly disagree with you that the OODA loop has much applicability at the tactical level of ground combat (almost anything can and will have some applicability...). Certainly it can and should be applied on occasion but my observation has been that those occasions are rather rare. Fuch's observations above are accurate, Start trying to orient and you'll waste time. In close terrain, you'll find yourself flanked or worse. One must also consider that Boyd was an exceptional person, not everyone is and trying to apply the rules used by super bods when one is an ordinary bod can lead to embarrassment -- or worse...

We agree it has strategic value -- in fact, I'd say it has great Strategic value and can be applied quite often. It can in the right circumstance have Operational value and Tactical value -- though that last is where it is most likely to get muddied because of all the impactors and the relative quality and experience of the combatants.

Many of Boyd's theories have merit and as you imply, singling out the OODA loop is simplistic but I was responding to Slapout9's citing of the theory and Bumperplate's follow on. With respect to that extract from Boyd who is, after all, just one of many decent military theorists, I'll repeat what I said earlier re: the OODA loop:

"Simply; don't discard it but also do not take it as the holy grail. It's just another one of many useful aphorisms."

Polarbear1605

05-15-2011, 11:39 PM

As one of the examples from above, let me assure you that my references to OODA Loops and ground combat are factual. As evidence, I can merely state that I am still here and if I'd been fooling around with OODA loops I likely would not be. Doesn't get much more factual than that and 200 pounds of evidence ought to count for something even if it is old. :wry:
I strongly disagree with you that the OODA loop has much applicability at the tactical level of ground combat (almost anything can and will have some applicability...). Certainly it can and should be applied on occasion but my observation has been that those occasions are rather rare. Fuch's observations above are accurate, Start trying to orient and you'll waste time. In close terrain, you'll find yourself flanked or worse. One must also consider that Boyd was an exceptional person, not everyone is and trying to apply the rules used by super bods when one is an ordinary bod can lead to embarrassment -- or worse

:D…I state that most criticisms of Boyd are not based on factual evidence and you argue without factual basis…sorry, the in all my years of experience and “I am still here” argument does not sell me…I have a couple years of experience and I am still here…and I out weigh you…now what?...thanks for proving my point.:D
Let’s try again…can you give some factual evidence, an example, where Boyd’s OODA loop was not at work at the tactical level…let say company or platoon or squad level. You can pick the war. Remember…Boyd Theory…is not new and is, after all, nothing more than good tactics or an aphorisms.

We are wrestling with a lot of baggage here…maybe we should start a new thread titled “Boyd Theory”. I am serious here. Maneuver Warfare was an attempt to translate the theory into doctrine…it was a good try but needed to be worked, evaluated and changed. The sin is not continuing the work that proved or disproved the theory. I am open to good arguments…but I am waiting….and waiting…and waiting. As Americans, our attention is easily distracted with new bright shiny buz words that achieve self applause. We can go back to the theory and sort this out.

Fuchs statement is another great example of what I am talking about here.
“Everything happens at the same time, not sequentially. Moreover, new orders follow before the effect of a previous order (or mission) can be understood.” This statement is a distraction and does not represent any element of proof…it is opinion based on a misrepresentation. His argument is not sound by any stretch of the imagination. The Boyd Theory is not operating sequentially; in fact, it is just the opposite because Boyd’s assumption is everything does happen at once. The issue was and is how do we (assuming “we” are good guys) focus everyone’s efforts, when everything happens at once (and at the same time disorient the enemy’s focus). The first attempt was things like mission orders, commander’s intent, and focus of effort. Great try but it was version 1.0…we should be on version 4.0 or higher.

“Start trying to orient and you'll waste time” Disagree, if your saying that is part of Boyd Theory … and Boyd would argue that you orient to save time. If you land at a strange or new airport how do you orient? You normally move with the crowd in the direction of descending or ascending gates. As you move you orient as you pick up more information, you notice signs with arrows that say Baggage Claim, Passenger Pickup, Rest Rooms, and Ground Transportation. Based on that information you make the appropriate decisions to get yourself to an office, hotel or home. If you stop to orient as you get off the plane…no information, slow orientation and there you stand waiting for passenger assistance. I have seen a lot of words associated with the Boyd Theory but the phase “waste time” is not one of them.

Fuchs

05-16-2011, 12:52 AM

The Boyd Theory is not operating sequentially; in fact, it is just the opposite because Boyd’s assumption is everything does happen at once.

That's classic moving of goalposts. We've had that already with Warden's theory.
These theories are so vague that everybody can interpret into them what he likes to and in the end they're useless distraction theories for lack of any practical utility.

The OODA loop turns into a blend of uselessness once you remove the sequential application. How could you be faster in a loop than your enemy if the loop is no loop?

Fact is that being quicker and make good use of it is superior in air combat, football and at times even in armour tactics ... only dumb people need an OODA model to grasp this. Sadly, there's no additional value to the OODA meme; just a lot of hype.

Ken White

05-16-2011, 01:12 AM

I state that most criticisms of Boyd are not based on factual evidence and you argue without factual basis…A theory that disputes another theory is a non-factual critique of a non-fact.
sorry, the in all my years of experience and “I am still here” argument does not sell me…That's good -- I'm not in sales... ;)
I have a couple years of experience and I am still here…and I out weigh you…now what?...thanks for proving my point.With regard to Infantry combat, not training, experience, I'll see your couple of years, triple it and raise you five? How's that? Not really the point though. The point is that my anecdotal evidence is at least as good as your untested theory.

I hope you're over 6'2" or you're a chubby Bear. :D
Let’s try again…can you give some factual evidence, an example, where Boyd’s OODA loop was not at work at the tactical level…let say company or platoon or squad level. You can pick the war. Remember…Boyd Theory…is not new and is, after all, nothing more than good tactics or an aphorisms.I probably could if I wanted to dredge through my memory and recall a good one that made my point but that would be cherry picking so I see little point in doing so. I could also be totally objective and come up with another where the Loop was employed or evidenced but that would simply prove my point (that it is sometimes useful but is not a panacea) while also being cherry picked. Of course one can find examples in both directions. That's not the issue. The issue is who's doing what...
We are wrestling with a lot of baggage here...We can go back to the theory and sort this out.What is this we stuff, White Man? :D

I have no particular interest in debating the pros and cons of MW theory, Boyd or Warden. IMO all three have merit; none are the be all and end all. I simply answered a post with my opinion (which is unchanged) and you countered with your opinion (which I'm sure is also unchanged and which I have no desire to try to change). Far as I'm concerned we can and should leave it at that.
Fuchs statement is another great example of what I am talking about here.“Everything happens at the same time, not sequentially. Moreover, new orders follow before the effect of a previous order (or mission) can be understood.” This statement is a distraction and does not represent any element of proof…it is opinion based on a misrepresentation. His argument is not sound by any stretch of the imagination...We can differ on that also. My experience is that the statement is reasonably accurate a good percentage of the time with respect to tactical ground combat. There are NO unequivocals in such combat in my observation.
The first attempt was things like mission orders, commander’s intent, and focus of effort. Great try but it was version 1.0…we should be on version 4.0 or higher.Well, both the Marines when I was one and the Army when I was there used mission orders all the time. Did until you Baby Boomers screwed things up... :D

I agree with the thrust of that comment but would mention that all combat commanders are not comfortable with those concepts. All of them IMO should be but too many are not -- may never be. Theory is great but it has to be implemented by people and therein lies the old rub. If you want decentralized planning and execution, you need either a major war (we get smarter during those) or you need to revamp the Personnel system and the training regimen -- both discourage initiative.
“Start trying to orient and you'll waste time” Disagree...If you land at a strange or new airport how do you orient? You normally move with the crowd in the direction of descending or ascending gates. If you stop to orient as you get off the plane…no information, slow orientation and there you stand waiting for passenger assistance.You are not IMO orienting in that example, you are moving and doing while reacting to triggers and clues. That's what any good, intuitive combat commander does constantly. The not so good combat commander OTOH will be the Dude orienting at the Gate. That's the problem, the words and what they mean. More importantly, the understanding of what the words mean by he or she who implements the theory on the ground. My contention is that admirers of MW and Boydian theory assume everyone is as smart as they are and the theories will be properly implemented. They won't be...
I have seen a lot of words associated with the Boyd Theory but the phase “waste time” is not one of them.Remember you read it here first!

Look at it not in the context of the acknowledged excellence of the theory but in the context of the experience and competence of leaders in the ground tactical fight who will be trying to implement the theories in an environment filled with uncertainty...

bumperplate

05-16-2011, 04:15 AM

I'll see if I can respond and accurately but quickly give my perspective regarding the OODA loop & MW.

Maneuver Warfare is the term I choose to describe our "modern" doctrine. The only reason is that it's the term used most often - unsophisticated, but simple. The Lind book is something I own and have read quite a few times. I didn't take it as seminal work, but rather a synthesis and an attempt to reduce tactics to a digestible level in terms of quantity, and quality. As such I think it serves as a great template and foundation - but not a bible.

The OODA Loop makes perfect sense, in its generic on-the-street understanding. To say that humans don't observe, orient, decide and take action is to not understand human physiology. We receive stimulus, we figure out what it means, and we figure out what to do in response to it. Very simple. This is partly why battle drills are so extremely important.

This is easily extended to organizations: A BN enters an enemy's killzone and begins an effort to gain a foothold on dominant terrain to start defeating the enemy in detail within its battle positions. Sounds good. Then comes the enemy's counterattack. Now the friendly unit has a problem and must orient and take action to counter this problem. There is more to observe and orient to, and more "fog" to sift through, seems simple enough.

We speak of combined arms a lot - I always think of forms of contact. More forms of contact at the same time presents more of a problem. Presents more to observe and orient to....more things to consider....more options for action, and this takes time. A coordinated opposing force takes advantage of that time.

As for Boyd's hours of lecture, long slide shows, etc...it's not going to be perfect. It's the distillation and essence of his work that sticks out to me. The OODA loop is that essence and for me it makes sense. I can apply it to many if not all engagements. To take decision making and decision cycles out of consideration provides a mental image of two forces standing X meters apart simply firing at one another.

Even the raid to kill Bin Laden can be fitted to the OODA loop - in the past Bin Laden had been able to observe (maybe predict or guess is better?) and orient to US most likely COAs, he made decisions, took action, and avoided death (Tora Bora). Eventually the US came up with something he could not respond to fast enough and so he's now dead.

It's very simple to me. I have resigned myself to the fact that no greatly detailed warfare theory can stand for more than a day without some holes getting shot through it. The OODA Loop is not detailed. It's broad, and it's logical. How you apply it is up for endless debate. It's simplicity is what makes it easily digestible and applied for me.

slapout9

05-16-2011, 06:13 AM

The OODA Loop makes perfect sense, in its generic on-the-street understanding. To say that humans don't observe, orient, decide and take action is to not understand human physiology. We receive stimulus, we figure out what it means, and we figure out what to do in response to it. Very simple.

And you would be completely wrong according to Boyd. Let me explain why everything you have been told about this OODA loop stuff is wrong.

You and John Boyd are going to run a race around OODA Loop track. The winner Lives, the loser dies. First thing Boyd would do is attack you morally by going up to you and saying something like "Is there anything you would like me to tell your next of Kin at your funeral?" Then he would attack you mentally by saying something like " You do realize you are running the wrong direction don't you?" And finally he would attack you physically by breaking your leg instead of just trying to be out run you.

That is Boyd's version of OODA Looping the enemy. Get the tapes and listen for yourself.

bumperplate

05-16-2011, 02:53 PM

And you would be completely wrong according to Boyd. Let me explain why everything you have been told about this OODA loop stuff is wrong.

You and John Boyd are going to run a race around OODA Loop track. The winner Lives, the loser dies. First thing Boyd would do is attack you morally by going up to you and saying something like "Is there anything you would like me to tell your next of Kin at your funeral?" Then he would attack you mentally by saying something like " You do realize you are running the wrong direction don't you?" And finally he would attack you physically by breaking your leg instead of just trying to be out run you.

That is Boyd's version of OODA Looping the enemy. Get the tapes and listen for yourself.

What you posted is precisely why I said "on-the-street" understanding. Very simple and not convoluted with moral, mental, and physical confounders.

Also, what you posted is a caveat leading to a tactics axiom: if you find yourself in a fair fight, then your tactics suck. The mental, moral, and physical things you describe would be effective, but not viewed as being very fair. And that's ok.

Boyd stuff is like philosophy for me: we can argue all day about whether or not the chair is blue, what is blueness, etc. But, at some point we just agree that it's blue and put in the stack with the other blue chairs. So too with Boyd, we can argue about the meaning of the OODA loop as a result of parsing out details from hours of lectures. Or, we can just take it at face value, where it's at its most valuable, and put it in our tool kit.

I use it as a conceptual teaching aid for myself and others. It works, so long as I don't try to make it graduate level, which just leads to paralysis by analysis.

Polarbear1605

05-16-2011, 04:08 PM

...of interest, has there been any new Maneuver Warfare literature? Seems like a dead concept to me.

The Blogs seem to be the only one publishing some of this current ideas.
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/
just started re-publishing the "Attritionist Letters" from the Marine Gazette
Project White Horse also has some here:
http://blog.projectwhitehorse.com/
and zenpundit sometimes has some things generally at the strategic Level:
http://zenpundit.com/

slapout9

05-16-2011, 04:11 PM

Boyd stuff is like philosophy for me: we can argue all day about whether or not the chair is blue, what is blueness, etc. But, at some point we just agree that it's blue and put in the stack with the other blue chairs. So too with Boyd, we can argue about the meaning of the OODA loop as a result of parsing out details from hours of lectures. Or, we can just take it at face value, where it's at its most valuable, and put it in our tool kit.

There is no argument. The man(Boyd) plainly says what he means on the tapes. From Boyd's interpretation it should be called the "Confusion Loop." It's not about understanding the situation and simply being faster at going through the OODA cycle, it is about how you can intentionally 'confuse" the enemy at all 3 levels.

I am presently working on having the tapes transcribed but that takes some time and money, but when I am done I am going to make it available.

bumperplate

05-16-2011, 05:00 PM

There is no argument. The man(Boyd) plainly says what he means on the tapes. From Boyd's interpretation it should be called the "Confusion Loop." It's not about understanding the situation and simply being faster at going through the OODA cycle, it is about how you can intentionally 'confuse" the enemy at all 3 levels.

I am presently working on having the tapes transcribed but that takes some time and money, but when I am done I am going to make it available.

RGR, totally understand what you're saying. I know that my use of the OODA loop is bastardized. But that's where I find the most utility. That layman's bastardized version of the OODA loop is more productive, for more audiences, than the detailed interpretation.

Also, to be totally honest - I find so much utility in this bastardized version that I'm a bit reluctant to analyze every word that went into creating this thing. I'm worried that I'll be disappointed. I don't want to shatter my faith in what is a very useful instructional tool. It's not about neglecting rigor, but about embracing a useful and productive tool to teach ground floor tactical principles.

Polarbear1605

05-16-2011, 05:23 PM

RGR, totally understand what you're saying. I know that my use of the OODA loop is bastardized. But that's where I find the most utility. That layman's bastardized version of the OODA loop is more productive, for more audiences, than the detailed interpretation.

Also, to be totally honest - I find so much utility in this bastardized version that I'm a bit reluctant to analyze every word that went into creating this thing. I'm worried that I'll be disappointed. I don't want to shatter my faith in what is a very useful instructional tool. It's not about neglecting rigor, but about embracing a useful and productive tool to teach ground floor tactical principles.

Are you bastardizing or are you adapting? Boyd spent a lot of time talking about adapting.
The Boyd Theory is misnamed...it should be the Boyd Study...it is full of historical examples ... history is written down and can be analysed... experience is great but only if it is discussed and taught.

Steve Blair

05-16-2011, 05:50 PM

Are you bastardizing or are you adapting? Boyd spent a lot of time talking about adapting.
The Boyd Theory is misnamed...it should be the Boyd Study...it is full of historical examples ... history is written down and can be analysed... experience is great but only if it is discussed and taught.

I haven't gone through Boyd's history stuff for a couple of years, but I do recall thinking that many of his examples were flawed on one level or another. He was always very selective in his use of history, though. Rather like Warden in that regard.

bumperplate

05-16-2011, 08:13 PM

Adapting is probably the best way to describe what I do with his stuff.

Fuchs

05-16-2011, 08:21 PM

Then it's probably better to name it differently.

This is the same as with Schwerpunkt, which got badly distorted by American 'adaption' as well.

Ken White

05-16-2011, 09:17 PM

This is the same as with Schwerpunkt, which got badly distorted by American 'adaption' as well.It's what we do best. :D

The saving grace is that we argue and quibble with each other about how to do anything and everything. Thus for every foul up, somebody gets things right. That's only a '50% right' average but that's so far been ahead of most others most of the time... ;)

And that quibble factor, really, is the basis for my concern with the theorists. More accurately with the potential for misapplication of their ideas. Actually, most of the theorists are smart enough to know that -- it's the acolytes and dedicated followers that miss the mark by insisting a particular method or theory will solve all problems. Those ideas might if they ever were implemented in the pure fashion but that will not happen. People will not apply theory as designed, they will interpolate and add their own fillips. That's really okay and whatever works for each person is great. :cool:

Read a lot, preferably from conflicting sources. Try ideas, preferably radical idea and develop your own methods. Accept things that work for you at the time and reject all the rest as extraneous. That's what Bumperplate says he's done and that's the way to go.

Most people do not adapt the pure operational methodology of others all that well but they will, if they exercise a bit of thought and initiative come up with solutions that are appropriate to the time and place. Some people like a pattern (some must have one -- they're generally dangerous...), some like to free flow, most mix the two approaches. Few will be able to apply 'rules' or precepts as they were intended. That's one reason we see so many discussions concerning Boyd and Warden.

Fuch's comment that better naming and adaptation is desirable is spot on not only on this score but on many others. It's the fanatics who insist on rigid adherence to the gospel of the Master who create problems.

Armed Forces trying to make Pattons from Pandas tend to breed particular problems in this regard... :rolleyes:

bumperplate

05-16-2011, 09:20 PM

I never did integrate Schwerpunkt into anything I teach...good thing I guess, after reading this thread.

No idea what to rename this thing. Perhaps it should be called the Small Wars Loop.

Polarbear1605

05-16-2011, 10:10 PM

Then it's probably better to name it differently.

This is the same as with Schwerpunkt, which got badly distorted by American 'adaption' as well.

I would really like to here your opinion on how we distorted it. I am serious because we probably did screw it up...and I would honestly like to here what the short comings were. Thanks

Fuchs

05-16-2011, 10:12 PM

see PM

slapout9

01-23-2012, 07:45 PM

Fuchs

01-23-2012, 07:56 PM

Listen to Steve Jobs talk about how to organize companies in order to develop trust with your subordinates....a key component of Maneuver Warfare.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jZi2waofq8&feature=related

"trust" -that's the keyword which triggers one of my "read my blog because I'm to lazy to write it all again" responses. ;)

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/12/discipline-and-mutual-trust-basics-of.html

slapout9

02-27-2012, 08:00 PM

Link to a 30 minute interview of Bill Lind from 2007. Lind discusses Somalia, Ethiopia and a wide array of things to include 4GW and the Military,Industrial,Congressional complex (Eisenhower's original phrase but was altered for his speech)
link to interview:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hjQOMlpH9A

slapout9

05-25-2013, 02:33 PM

Link to Chet Richards Blog on Boyd and other things to. Willima S. Lind has a special post that was done just for Chet on 4GW and is it alive or dead? Folks should read this.

http://slightlyeastofnew.com/2013/05/25/bill-lind-4gw-is-alive-and-well/#comment-301

Fuchs

05-26-2013, 03:53 AM

He offers his impressions, but no analysis.

I suppose an empirical analysis looking at the quantities of conflicts of various shapes would reveal that basically nothing has changed in hundreds of years save for very short interruptions (such as the IIRC 16 days of world peace after WW2).

Groups of humans are still using organised deadly violence against each other, and groups called "states" merely inhabit the more sophisticated end of the spectrum.

Great Britain fought in about fifty wars during the reign of Queen Victoria alone, what do you guess how many of these were against what Lind would call "states"?

Cavguy

05-28-2013, 07:25 AM

slapout9

05-28-2013, 08:14 PM

Personally, I'm happy to let 4GW as a concept die (and all the GW's). It's bad history, bad theory, and not really useful other than as a metaphor for "not conventional war". Plus the whole 2GW/3GW construct is a bludgeon of Lind's own construction and not really reflective of practice.

The key point of the 4GW theory that almost always gets buried in discussions about the UW/COIN/FID/Small Wars methods that are used and not used is that the theory is based upon the idea of WHO fights and WHY they fight. That is the part that is different and is also the part that is most often overlooked. I believe it is useful from the stand point that it shows the most likely enemies around the world both known and developing. And they are likely to be based upon Race,Religion and Language not some traditional nation-state-political motivation..

Bob's World

05-28-2013, 08:53 PM

"4GW"; "IW"; etc are to my mind all legends we have created to explain what we cannot understand. Humans have always done this over time.

Now, instead of trying to rationalize why there are sea shells on a mountain side, or why the sun rises or the moon goes through phases, we face a much narrower area of human ignorance that leads us to create legends.

Why does a family of "COIN" designed by Western Powers to maintain the profitability of foreign colonies or to contain major threats in the past fail to work equally to stabilize foreign partners today?

Why does the application of war, warfare, and Clausewitzian-logic in general to internal, populace-based conflicts in the modern era either fail to work at all, or if it does, only temporarily so and at a much higher cost to impose and sustain?

It can't be because we never really understood these conflicts to begin with, so it must be because the nature of the conflict itself has somehow changed. Right?

Perhaps. I personally subscribe to the camp (sometimes a lonely campfire to sit around) that we never had this right to begin with. Certainly modern information technologies have (for now) tilted the advantage away from governments and to those population groups who would challenge the systems of governance (foreign and domestic, formal and informal) negatively affecting their lives. But I suspect the nature of such conflicts is not much changed.

That is because the nature of conflict is tied to the nature of man, and not to the technologies man invents.

4GW is a legend that helps some draw comfort regarding something scary and not well understood. But it is not a concept that helps us to deal with such conflicts more effectively. It certainly does not help us better understand how to reduce our own powerful contributions to the causation of such events.

Steve Blair

05-28-2013, 09:27 PM

Aren't headshots supposed to bring down zombies?:wry:

4GW is nothing new...the only thing that is different perhaps is the pace of developments. Technology speeds up the process, both in terms of execution and commentary, but that's about it, really. WHO and WHY people fight has always been at the core of things, no matter what generational theory you subscribe to. Only someone who's ignorant of the history of conflict at all its levels would claim otherwise...or claim to have "discovered" that particular nugget.

Taiko

06-22-2013, 12:04 AM

slapout9

06-22-2013, 04:15 AM

Perhaps. I personally subscribe to the camp (sometimes a lonely campfire to sit around) that we never had this right to begin with. Certainly modern information technologies have (for now) tilted the advantage away from governments and to those population groups who would challenge the systems of governance (foreign and domestic, formal and informal) negatively affecting their lives.

Except that is one of the concepts of 4GW, which is why they constantly point out that nobody has won one yet. And they also point out that it is not new..... just changing from the present nation-state based system "back" to the older kinds of warfare that used to be conducted.

slapout9

06-22-2013, 04:17 AM

2007 radio interview of Bill Lind.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hjQOMlpH9A

TheCurmudgeon

06-22-2013, 02:23 PM

I don't care for the Generations of War construct. Short of technological advances the changes have occurred mostly in the political world. Much of this "non-state" nonsense is the result of westerners drawing arbitrary lines on the ground to define states. Truth be told "Nations" (groups of people sharing a common identity, history, religion, and language) have always fought against "States" (political entities that claim a monopoly on legitimate violence within a prescribed portion of the earth's surface) when their beliefs about what it right and what is wrong clash.

As for fighting for eternal salvation, I would suggest that that started long before the last century with the Crusades being the most well known example. Wars of identity - be it religion or ethnicity - have always existed.

If I really wanted to argue generations of war, my construct would be based on human needs. The first generation wars, conducted primarily by hunter-gatheres, were over food and women. The second generation wars, which occurred through most of recorded history, were wars of collective identity. Nations against Nations (and sometimes against States). The third generation are wars of individual identity - wars for individual rights (democracy) and sometimes wars for religions that offer individual salvation (christian and Islamic wars in particular). These wars are the most savage because in these wars each individual has his own reason to fight. He does not need a tribal or political leader to push him forward, only an idea of what the ultimate truth is. Today, with the advent of rapid communications, these wars can spread like wildfire. There are no peace treaties in these wars. There is often no single leader who can claim victory or concede defeat. Only exhaustion and a temporary reprieve. Force has limited value. You can't kill your way to victory in these wars - you would have to kill an idea. Accommodation, if it is even possible, is probably the only way out of these conflicts.

slapout9

07-10-2013, 05:22 AM

William S. Lind has not just returned with an occasional article he now has a blog that he started on the 4th of July. Here is the Link
http://www.traditionalright.com/

J Wolfsberger

07-10-2013, 02:50 PM

Fuchs

07-10-2013, 03:29 PM

As a follow on to the posts from Bob's World and The Curmudgeon ...

Whenever "State" and "Nation" aren't perfectly congruent and homogeneous, you have the seeds for violence. That is as true today, e.g. East Africa and Tutsi vs. Hutu, as it was a couple millennia ago, e.g. Ionian Greeks vs. Attic Greeks.

A second observation is that the weaker side will always fight "dirty," since they believe (rightly or wrongly) the rules get made by the stronger side and are always written to favor his interest.

Fighting "dirty" is not useful per se.
I did once post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9841&highlight=musings) a in my opinion more useful way of looking at this behaviour. It's not about 'rules'.

slapout9

09-06-2013, 06:30 AM

Bill Lind gives the 3 USA options for Syria and Egypt in the Middle East.

https://www.traditionalright.com/the-view-from-olympus-6-time-to-change-sides/

TheCurmudgeon

09-06-2013, 11:33 AM

From a pragmatic point of view I would have to agree with Lind - up to the point of chemical weapons. We have made the mistake of backing the guy using the chemical weapons in the past and it made us look hypocritical later.

We have backed the least best option in the past. The history of our foreign affairs during the Cold War was replet with th U.S. backing capitalist dictators against popularly supported representative communism. We are often willing to compromise our democratic principals for the "greater good".

Here we are presented with a similar choice - support a secular dictator instead of a popular Islamic state. The choice should be clear. Perhaps we are changing the way we think or perhaps we don't see a religion that is practiced in the U.S. as a threat in the same way we saw communism as a threat. I don't know.

SWJ Blog

04-22-2014, 04:00 PM

Mr. Lind, May We Focus Our Rage Please? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mr-lind-may-we-focus-our-rage-please)

Entry Excerpt:

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mr-lind-may-we-focus-our-rage-please) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

04-24-2014, 08:30 PM

The Continuing Irrelevance of William Lind (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-continuing-irrelevance-of-william-lind)

Entry Excerpt:

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-continuing-irrelevance-of-william-lind) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

JMA

04-30-2014, 06:50 PM

This thread refers to the article by William S Lind: An Officer Corps That Can’t Score (http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/an-officer-corps-that-cant-score/)

Lind's article has been discussed on many blogs and around here but with IMHO too much emotion where the 'messenger' is attacked rather than what he said being analysed to see if the cap fits. I suggest that Lind may well be lughing and saying 'I told you so' at the quality of the responses to his article from members of the US Officer Corps.

Perhaps in this thread contributors can attempt to analyse exactly what Lind said and agree or disagree in a constructive manner rather than with an emotional knee-jerk response? Here is my summary of what Lind stated:

Lind starts with listing the recent wars ‘lost’ by the US military – probably to draw the attention of the serving military. He stated that unlike after the defeat in Vietnam which:

…bred a generation of military reformers,’ … Today, the landscape is barren. Not a military voice is heard calling for thoughtful, substantive change. Just more money, please.

Then expanding:

Such a moral and intellectual collapse of the officer corps is one of the worst disasters that can afflict a military because it means it cannot adapt to new realities.

Lind explains why it is so as follows:

Why? … at the moral level—Colonel Boyd’s highest and most powerful level—our officers live in a bubble.

At Boyd’s next level, the mental, our officers are not professionals. … The vast majority of our officers read no serious military history or theory.

But officers are also victims:

Officers are also victims of three structural failures,…

The first, and possibly the worst, is an officer corps vastly too large for its organization—now augmented by an ant-army of contractors, most of whom are retired officers...

Command tours are too short to accomplish anything, Decisions are pulled up the chain because the chain is laden with surplus officers looking for something to do. Decisions are committee-consensus, lowest common denominator, ...

He continues:

The second and third structural failings are …They are the “up or out” promotion system and “all or nothing”

It is not difficult to see how these two structural failings in the officer corps morally emasculate our officers and all too often turn them, as they rise in rank and near the magic 20 years, into ass-kissing conformists.

He summarises:

Of these two types of failings, the structural are probably the most damaging. They are also the easiest to repair.

Fixing the substantive problems is harder because those fixes require changes in organizational culture.

He concludes:

If American military officers want to know, or even care, why we keep losing, they need only look in the mirror.

Does the cap fit?

JMA

04-30-2014, 07:23 PM

One Matthew Hipple, a U.S. Navy surface warfare officer has been vocal in condemnation of Lind as follows:

OUR DEBATING MILITARY: HERE IF YOU’RE LOOKING (http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/our-debating-military-here-if-youre-looking/) War on the Rocks

(Peter Munson's response is a must read)

and

OUR DEBATING MILITARY: HERE, IF YOU’RE LOOKING (http://cimsec.org/debating-military-youre-listening/) on CIMSEC

Does Hipple offer an effective counter to Lind? I think not.

There is surely a difference between the sharing of opinion over a beer or in an Internet discussion group by junior officers and papers/articles that result in actual institutional change? I would have thought that would be obvious, yes?

JMA

04-30-2014, 08:05 PM

A response by:

BJ Armstrong is a naval officer, PhD candidate in War Studies with King’s College, London, and a member of the Editorial Board at the U.S. Naval Institute.

GARDENING IN A “BARREN” OFFICER CORPS (http://cimsec.org/gardening-barren-officer-corps/)

AmericanPride

04-30-2014, 08:11 PM

I think the real issue is that despite all the debate, not much has structurally changed. As an Army officer myself, my concern is with the up-or-out system (not everyone wants to be a field grade officer). Having in-grade promotions like the federal civil service system would solve some of the issues that arise from abolishing the up-or-out scheme. Also get rid of key development positions. I also like the idea of a free agency for assignments though I think there should be reasonable limitations on time on station.

Why are we as an institution investing in everyone to become a senior leader when (1) not everyone wants to be a senior leader and (2) not everyone will become a senior leader? Invest in those people who want it and clearly have the potential to do it.

TheCurmudgeon

04-30-2014, 09:32 PM

While I have said elsewhere that I disagree with the basic premise that we “lost” Iraq or Afghanistan because of our officer’s educational or personnel systems, I do believe that any system must change with the times. The Army officer’s education and personnel system is behind the times.

1. We have not recognized the changing social structures and how those changes affect both the initiation and conduct of conflict. Gone are the days where we can eradicate a population as a solution to an insurgency, yet we still study military doctrine from that period. We are quick to recognize how technology will change war, we are slow to understand how social events are changing war even as we speak. Just look at the Ukraine. Putin can get what he wants without ever putting a tank on the battlefield by manipulating the population and using “self determination” as a first strike weapon. It can’t work everywhere, but it can work in some places. Our response - more tanks on the battlefield! Clearly we don't appreciate what is happening.

2. Our officer personnel system does not allow for expertise to be retained where we need it. Everyone is on a command track. We need technician who understand systems, both technical and human. Our current system does not allow for that. They all don’t need to be LTCs, but they need to receive pay commiserate with their worth.

That is enough for now.

JMA

05-01-2014, 07:33 AM

Selected responses from the An Officer Corps That Can’t Score (http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/an-officer-corps-that-cant-score/) article.

================
John says:
April 20, 2014 at 7:23 am
It is easier to question Lind’s moral authority to make these observations than it is to refute their accuracy. …

================
Philip Giraldi says:
April 20, 2014 at 10:46 am
I have been following this thread with some interest having served in the military during a long ago and now largely forgotten war and also having spent 17 years in CIA. I believe there are two distinct issues here – can the US military fight and defeat enemies, whoever they are and however they are designated. I think the answer is clearly yes. But wars are political, not purely military in nature and how wars are resolved is not necessarily a measure of the fighting capability of the armed forces. In that sense, we can win every battle and still come out with a lousy end-of-war scenario, which will be based on political considerations. In that sense, we lost in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan but the military is not necessarily to blame for the outcomes. …

================
M. Henry says:
April 20, 2014 at 4:31 pm
As a serving officer, I want to thank our author for these on-point and accurate statements. And to every prior service using the lazy ad hominem attack with only their own anecdotal rosy memories to back up the complaints – you are only proving this article correct. The use of “professional” to describe the bulk of barely educated ill-read officers is offensive. You do not need to break an arm to know it hurts; and you don’t need to serve to see a bureaucracy as ineffective.

=================
TBOU says:
April 20, 2014 at 7:11 pm
The decline of the war colleges might be to blame. Outside of the technical military schools (AFIT and NPS), the other military academic institutions are full of low standards. …

=================
bacon says:
April 21, 2014 at 12:31 pm
After 24+ years in the Army I can attest that the “up or out” policy leads directly and unavoidably to an end-of-career mindset of caution, just keep one’s head down and get thru the last 3 or 4 years. That mindset comes at a point when an officer has the most to offer and, sadly, the most to lose. I was fortunate in spending the last ⅔ of my career as a medical officer, a group just as privileged in the military as in private life and generally at no risk of loss of career from not being promoted.
There is a potentially easy fix. Vest military personnel in the retirement system after 5 years of service, as federal law mandates for most nonmilitary jobs with approved pension plans.

==================
Rick Johnson says:
April 24, 2014 at 4:50 pm
Lind doesn’t mention what affirmative action has done to the officer corps. If n officer who is a minority or a woman makes an accusation that they were denied the highest rating because of “racism” or “sexism,’ the rating officer’s career is effectively finished, despite any absence of proof beyond the accusation. Therefore, minorities and women are routinely given undeserved ratings and promoted. It is a cancer that has eaten away the moral fiber and courage of officers. No truly intelligent and honorable officer can survive in the present environment.

==================

AmericanPride

05-01-2014, 02:20 PM

JMA,

I have to say that the last comment blaming protections for minorities is revolting.

JMA

05-01-2014, 02:49 PM

Further comment on the Lind article:

William S. Lind’s Grim Assessment of the US Officer Corps (http://xbradtc.com/2014/04/19/william-s-linds-grim-assessment-of-the-us-officer-corps/)

Concluding:

I cannot help but notice the truth that rings from much of what Lind asserts. I have made some of those very same assertions myself on more than a few occasions. Give the article a read. What does the gang here think? Is Lind on target? If so, how do we fix it? Can it be fixed?

Of the 23 responses at time of posting:

===============
JoshO
April 19, 2014 at 9:12 am
Everyone should have to enlist. Then after at least two years or so of service officers could be recruited and selected from the ranks similar to the way we do with warrant officers. THEN the Army can send them to get the specific education that is required, not necessarily a degree. I feel like this would weed out a lot of the insincere and careerist political game players and people who are only looking for a way to pay for college. It could also be a good way reduce the officer bloat. A lot of jobs probably don’t need an officer to perform them anyway.

===============
timactual
April 19, 2014 at 2:19 pm
... We spend millions of dollars every year educating officers in every field but the one they work in; International Relations, English, MBA, etc. This does work out well for the officers, if not the military and the taxpayers, because it prepares them for lucrative careers as consultants, etc. when they leave active duty. ... I will bet money that less than 10% of the officer corps has a library card or even knows where the post library is.

===============
Esli
April 20, 2014 at 7:20 am
As a serving officer with 5 years of enlisted and 19 years of commissioned service (and a library card from everywhere I have been, even though post libraries invariably suck), I’m going to say the generalizations are rampant here, but also that the concerns of over-politicization and a lack of serious study are legitimate. ...

===============

carl

05-01-2014, 05:29 PM

JMA,

I have to say that the last comment blaming protections for minorities is revolting.

Is it true though?

AmericanPride

05-01-2014, 05:34 PM

Is it true though?

No - it's not true. It's 100% false. I would even venture so far as to say that the attitude expressed in the comment is one of the barriers (a"cancer") to actually building an effective officer corps.

carl

05-01-2014, 06:49 PM

American Pride:

You say it is not true. Mr Johnson said it is true. So far the two arguments cancel each other out. So it would be helpful if others joined in with their observations and experience.

You remonstrated against Mr. Johnson's attitude. I think it more proper to remonstrate against his dishonesty if he is, as you say, lying.

JMA:

I like this format you are using here. Good job.

slapout9

05-01-2014, 07:10 PM

It is stuff like this that leads to the questions which Lind raises about Military leadership. Is this all the Army leadership has to do? Worry about Black females and their cornrows and dreadlocks and how by not allowing such nonsense they become racist.

http://sandrarose.com/2014/04/petition-protests-racist-new-army-hair-regulations/

This is why our country and the military is in such horrible shape they don't want to talk about critical issues they want conduct Marxist social experiments on our beloved Exceptional American Armed Forces. People are getting tired of this social justice stuff.

AmericanPride

05-01-2014, 07:35 PM

Mr Johnson said it is true. So far the two arguments cancel each other out. So it would be helpful if others joined in with their observations and experience. You remonstrated against Mr. Johnson's attitude. I think it more proper to remonstrate against his dishonesty if he is, as you say, lying.

Carl, if you would like to defend a subtly racist position, be my guest.

It is stuff like this that leads to the questions which Lind raises about Military leadership. Is this all the Army leadership has to do? Worry about Black females and their cornrows and dreadlocks and how by not allowing such nonsense they become racist. This is why our country and the military is in such horrible shape they don't want to talk about critical issues they want conduct Marxist social experiments on our beloved Exceptional American Armed Forces. People are getting tired of this social justice stuff.

Slap, I generally admire your passion but your out of proportion outrage on what you call a "Marxist social experiment" to "worry about black females and.. not allowing such nonsense" is both (1) hilarious and (2) borders on racist. This is why the hairstyle policy is objectionable:

From the New York Times: (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/us/politics/armys-ban-on-some-popular-hairstyles-raises-ire-of-black-female-soldiers.html?_r=0)

At the root of the concern about the Army regulations, many black women said, is a lack of understanding about black hair, coupled with a norm that uses the hair of white women as its baseline. While black hair comes in all textures, much of it is deeply curly, making it difficult, unless chemically straightened, to pull back into a bun or to hang loose off the face in a neat, uniform way. My emphasis.

As with any array of policies such as voter identification or facial hair, if it disproportionately affects a minority group it is discriminatory towards that group. In the case of hairstyles, since it disproportionately affects black women, it is racist. Failure to comply with the policy can lead to adverse administrative action. This is why Sikhs can receive exemptions for their facial hair and why black women should receive exemptions to the hairstyle policy. You don't have to say "I hate black people" to be racist in conduct. So the other option is to pay for all black women in service to chemically straigthen their hair for the sake of uniformity. Or, we could go back to the old days of no black women in the military...

And in a note to carl, this is why EO policies are necessary in the military.

JMA

05-01-2014, 07:43 PM

There have been other discussions on Officer Corps here on SWC, like this one:

Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6998&highlight=Initial+Officer+selection)

This thread had 50 responses and is worth a read through.

Then there is this one: Initial Officer Selection (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14027&highlight=Initial+Officer+selection)

Here we had 272 responses and again is worth sifting through.

slapout9

05-01-2014, 08:27 PM

Slap, I generally admire your passion but your out of proportion outrage on what you call a "Marxist social experiment" to "worry about black females and.. not allowing such nonsense" is both (1) hilarious and (2) borders on racist. This is why the hairstyle policy is objectionable:

From the New York Times: (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/us/politics/armys-ban-on-some-popular-hairstyles-raises-ire-of-black-female-soldiers.html?_r=0)

My emphasis.

As with any array of policies such as voter identification or facial hair, if it disproportionately affects a minority group it is discriminatory towards that group. In the case of hairstyles, since it disproportionately affects black women, it is racist. Failure to comply with the policy can lead to adverse administrative action. This is why Sikhs can receive exemptions for their facial hair and why black women should receive exemptions to the hairstyle policy. You don't have to say "I hate black people" to be racist in conduct. So the other option is to pay for all black women in service to chemically straigthen their hair for the sake of uniformity. Or, we could go back to the old days of no black women in the military...

And in a note to carl, this is why EO policies are necessary in the military.

American Pride,
The Military is a special society with one mission...... to fight and win our Nations battles and wars. Not be worrying about hairstyles and facial hair. Can you imagine what the intelligence services in Russia and China are doing. As you know they read and monitor all communications and make continuous assessments of our Military morale and how to break it. They must be laughing their collective Commie a** off about how our main concern is some mamby pamby hairstyles.

IMO they should all wear short hair and wear OD Green uniforms , then be made to memeorize the words from a Race Relations class I took in the early 1970's that was taught by a very big and mean looking Black Platoon Seargent. "Everybody wears OD Green and Everybody is going to bleed red. So you need to learn to work together"

That is what the leadership should be concerned about nothing else.

JMA

05-01-2014, 08:31 PM

AmericanPride, I'm sorry you see fit to create a race issue out of the comment made posted from another discussion group. I would really like to stay on the issues arising from Lind's article in relation to the US Officer Corps.

A reasonable person would conclude that the comment by one 'Rick Johnson' is neither 100% accurate nor 100% false - as you maintain but somewhere in-between. If you really want to take this matter further please start a new thread and discuss it there.

Carl, if you would like to defend a subtly racist position, be my guest.

Slap, I generally admire your passion but your out of proportion outrage on what you call a "Marxist social experiment" to "worry about black females and.. not allowing such nonsense" is both (1) hilarious and (2) borders on racist. This is why the hairstyle policy is objectionable:

From the New York Times: (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/us/politics/armys-ban-on-some-popular-hairstyles-raises-ire-of-black-female-soldiers.html?_r=0)

My emphasis.

As with any array of policies such as voter identification or facial hair, if it disproportionately affects a minority group it is discriminatory towards that group. In the case of hairstyles, since it disproportionately affects black women, it is racist. Failure to comply with the policy can lead to adverse administrative action. This is why Sikhs can receive exemptions for their facial hair and why black women should receive exemptions to the hairstyle policy. You don't have to say "I hate black people" to be racist in conduct. So the other option is to pay for all black women in service to chemically straigthen their hair for the sake of uniformity. Or, we could go back to the old days of no black women in the military...

And in a note to carl, this is why EO policies are necessary in the military.

AmericanPride

05-01-2014, 08:45 PM

JMA,

AmericanPride, I'm sorry you see fit to create a race issue out of the comment made posted from another discussion group. I would really like to stay on the issues arising from Lind's article in relation to the US Officer Corps.

My comments were in response to a statement you quoted that in turn was a response to Lind's article. So,(1) I'm on topic and (2) you created the 'race issue'. And given that race is one of the major defining social issues in the United States with an inverse proportional amount of attention actually dedicated to it, and as an Army officer myself, I think it's highly important to discuss in regards to the quality and capabilities of the officer corps. Clearly since some see it as necessary to target minorities or programs and/or policies affecting them as explanations for why the officer corps is failing, it is absolutely essential to address questions of race. Apparently racism IS one of the issues that needs addressing because there are still service-members out there (officers included) that do not have the intellectual or moral fortitude to eliminate racism from the ranks.

That is what the leadership should be concerned about nothing else.

That's nice in abstract. But that does nothing to address the issues raised in the New York Times article. If the only thing the leadership should be concerned about is "to fight and win our Nations battles and wars" then why bother having restrictions on hairstyle in the first place? :confused: I don't think a war was ever won by the size of someone's beard or the way in which they braided their hair. So to be ideologically consistent, your recommendation shouldn't be to condemn the soldiers who are advocating for a change in the hair policy but supporting them in abolishing it totally. That applies to the new tatoo policy as well - the only difference is that tatoos are optional. Your genetically-determined hair type is not.

JMA

05-01-2014, 09:12 PM

JMA,

My comments were in response to a statement you quoted that in turn was a response to Lind's article. So,(1) I'm on topic and (2) you created the 'race issue'. And given that race is one of the major defining social issues in the United States with an inverse proportional amount of attention actually dedicated to it, and as an Army officer myself, I think it's highly important to discuss in regards to the quality and capabilities of the officer corps. Clearly since some see it as necessary to target minorities or programs and/or policies affecting them as explanations for why the officer corps is failing, it is absolutely essential to address questions of race. Apparently racism IS one of the issues that needs addressing because there are still service-members out there (officers included) that do not have the intellectual or moral fortitude to eliminate racism from the ranks.

Good start a thread on this and take it from there.

AmericanPride

05-01-2014, 09:27 PM

Good start a thread on this and take it from there.

You've already started a thread and I'll take it from here.

AmericanPride

05-01-2014, 09:43 PM

JMA,

From Lind:

Such a moral and intellectual collapse of the officer corps is one of the worst disasters that can afflict a military because it means it cannot adapt to new realities. It is on its way to history’s wastebasket.

Substantively, at the moral level... our officers live in a bubble. Even junior officers inhabit a world where they hear only endless, hyperbolic praise of “the world’s greatest military ever.” They feed this swill to each other and expect it from everyone else. If they don’t get it, they become angry. Senior officers’ bubbles, created by vast, sycophantic staffs, rival Xerxes’s court. Woe betide the ignorant courtier who tells the god-king something he doesn’t want to hear.

They have learned what they do on a monkey-see, monkey-do basis and know no more. What defines a professional—historically there were only three professions, law, medicine, and theology—is that he has read, studied, and knows the literature of his field. The vast majority of our officers read no serious military history or theory.

Fixing the substantive problems is harder because those fixes require changes in organizational culture. OSD cannot order our officers to come out from the closed system, fortified with hubris, that they have placed around themselves to protect the poor dears from ever hearing anything upsetting, however true. Congress cannot withhold pay from those officers who won’t read. Only our officers themselves can fix these deficiencies. Will they? The problem is circular: not until they leave their bubble.

Intellectual and moral weakness is the primary reason cited by Lind for the failure of the officer corps. The consequences of that weakness is not limited to fighting America's wars - and really the consequences are not the focus of Lind's thesis anyway. So if the discourse takes us through problems of lingering racism in the ranks, or to the structure of the promotion system, or to any other subject related to "moral and intellectual collapse", then we're on topic. The inability and/or unwillingness to address uncomfortable issues is one of the very problems Lind cites!

In framing Lind's argument, I think it's better understood as a realization that the people that make up the ranks of the officer corps are not differentiated from their non-military counterparts in moral or intellectual purity or ability. And the sooner we dispense with the self-ascribed hero worship, the sooner we can move forward in developing policies that address substantive issues affecting the armed forces and national policy. Heroes don't win wars. Heroes die. Soldiers win wars. And we need to do a better job in defining soldiers than defining heroes.

JMA

05-01-2014, 10:30 PM

Another response to Lind's article:

Mr. Lind, may we focus our rage please? (http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2014/04/mr-lind-may-we-focus-our-rage-please.html)

Tucked away in a 'shoot the messenger' rant there are actually are some recommendations:

OK, there is some internal house cleaning that needs to be done – but it isn’t going to happen until there is a SECDEF or Service Secretary who makes it happen – or enables the right 4-star to make it happen.

Some ideas:
- Remove STEM degree requirements completely, or to no more than 50%.
- Benchmark some of the British officer accession and retention policies – specifically related to up-and-out and specialization of career paths.
- Repeal and update Goldwater-Nichols starting with JPME requirements. Move war college attendance until after selection to O5 (CDR/LtCol). Replace with opportunity for fellowships or advanced education 24/36-month opportunity windows. Only fund resident programs at civilian institutions. Emphasize in precepts to selection boards.
- Expand foreign exchange tours. Emphasize in precepts to selection boards.
- Forget BRAC, empower a broad Staff consolidation and restructuring of manning documents. Force pain ashore.
- Freeze all officer and senior enlisted on-base housing and begin to decommission sub-standard housing without replacing units. Force leadership to live in the communities they serve.

carl

05-02-2014, 03:12 AM

Carl, if you would like to defend a subtly racist position, be my guest.

Racist? Subtly racist? I don't know for that kind of thing. I'll leave it for others to judge.

But whatever, Mr. Johnson didn't comment upon racism. He commented upon what he saw as the ill effects of affirmative action and specifically upon how people can game the system to slant things their way. I asked if that was true. You said absolutely not. So as I said, your word cancels out his and his cancels out yours which leads to a need for others who would know to comment.

And in a note to carl, this is why EO policies are necessary in the military.

No I think not. As a civilian, I think there are other things that are rather more important that skin color or sex. Some of those things are pretty easy to measure. You can hump that weight twelve miles in the allotted time or you can't. You can hit the target at this range and that range in the allotted time or you can't. You can lead people cross country without getting lost often or you can't. Some of the things are more difficult to measure, do you have tactical acumen? Can you read the ground? Do you know when to give somebody a kick and when to give somebody a quiet word? Do the men trust you and do they want to follow you? These things are more difficult to measure but armies have been around a long time and they have come up with some more or less reliable ways to figure them out. Not one of the things I mentioned had anything to do with color or sex. Again as a civilian, I would prefer that the Army measure those things that have to do with the outcome of a fight and I don't see how sex or color figures into that.

former_0302

05-02-2014, 03:41 AM

davidbfpo

05-02-2014, 07:26 AM

Spotted yesterday a free link to read a Journal of Strategic Studies article 'The Morale Maze: the German Army in Late 1918' and Red Rat had time to read and comment:
..an interesting contrast to the current Lind debate.

Link:http://ht.ly/wmZI0

The Abstract:
The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be explained if the tactical realities of the war in late 1918 are clearly understood.

I am sure the saying "stabbed in the back" has appeared in one of teh Lind-related threads recently.

JMA

05-02-2014, 07:52 AM

I often wonder if they ever have this type of conversation at NASA.

I was a part of a large group of officers last year which was assembled to listen to the musings of a three-star general who happened to be in town. One of the tidbits he decided to pass on to us was that by 2030, the US demographic breakdown is expected to be about 50% Caucasian, 25% Hispanic, and 25% other. He then went on to say that the demographic breakdown of the military's officer corps needed to reflect those percentages. Though it was not expressly stated, one wonders if the fact that the nation is about 50% female will play into that as well...

JMA

05-02-2014, 09:09 AM

Racist? Subtly racist? I don't know for that kind of thing. I'll leave it for others to judge.

But whatever, Mr. Johnson didn't comment upon racism. He commented upon what he saw as the ill effects of affirmative action and specifically upon how people can game the system to slant things their way. I asked if that was true. You said absolutely not. So as I said, your word cancels out his and his cancels out yours which leads to a need for others who would know to comment.

Good comment Carl.

I believe AmericanPride jumped in too quickly to shout racism.

If there are good officers out there who leave the military due to what Mr Johnson states then it is a morale problem and needs to be addressed as a 'structural' issue.

I agree that the system has the potential to be gamed exactly as he states given the fear of a similar response as with the Donald Stirling incident in the US and the Jeremy Clarkson one in the UK (still developing) which would/could terminate a career with lifelong associated stigma.

My personal belief is that the false accusation of rape should carry the same penalty as rape itself. This can be applied to allegations of sexism, homophobia or racism in the military. This whole situation seems to be too difficult for the current crop of senior military officers to deal with.

Their solution seems to be borrowed from H L Mencken's maxim that ‘for every complex problem there is a solution that is simple, neat – and wrong.’

These are the same guys with stars on their shoulders who can't even produce a set of hair regulations for females in the military... yet have/will have the life and death command over a few million US troops in a war.

It is true that the US 'fish' is rotting from the head (Congress) down but this process is certainly being aided and abetted by the 'ass-kissing conformists' (according to Lind) who make up the general staff.

JMA

05-02-2014, 10:20 AM

Two other threads here on SWC worth a scroll through:

Officer Retention (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3736&highlight=Officer+Retention)

With 360 responses

Shut Down West Point and the War Colleges (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=70285&highlight=officer+retention#post70285)

With 63 responses

OUTLAW 09

05-02-2014, 11:50 AM

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 01:06 PM

As a civilian, I think there are other things that are rather more important that skin color or sex. Some of those things are pretty easy to measure. You can hump that weight twelve miles in the allotted time or you can't. You can hit the target at this range and that range in the allotted time or you can't. You can lead people cross country without getting lost often or you can't. Some of the things are more difficult to measure, do you have tactical acumen? Can you read the ground? Do you know when to give somebody a kick and when to give somebody a quiet word? Do the men trust you and do they want to follow you? These things are more difficult to measure but armies have been around a long time and they have come up with some more or less reliable ways to figure them out. Not one of the things I mentioned had anything to do with color or sex. Again as a civilian, I would prefer that the Army measure those things that have to do with the outcome of a fight and I don't see how sex or color figures into that.

That's easy to say in abstract and akin to saying that a corporation should be exclusively concerned with profits. And while the purpose of an organization, public or private, receive the highest attention, it does not in reality receive exclusive attention. There are many factors, some of them not obvious, bearing on an organization's operation whether it's business or war, and addressing them requires leaders armed with strong intellectual and moral character to act on them. In the military, with its high demands on physical ability and discipline, sex and race play important and subtle role in framing behavior, expectations, morale, and leadership. Alienating elements of the ranks on one basis or on another is detrimental to the higher purpose of winning America's wars.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 03:07 PM

Carl,

After thinking about your comments some more, it appears that your focus on almost exclusively on tactical thinking and abilities. I don't think anyone argues (I certainly don't at least) that we "lost" Iraq and Afghanistan because of a want of tactics. The Army has strategists, but I'm not sure that you'd call what the Army does as "strategy" - and as Iraq and Afghanistan (and Vietnam, and a number of other wars) demonstrates, an unbroken chain of tactical victories does not necessarily culminate into strategic victory. And that's a GO-level problem. Bottom-line: is the Army organized, equipped, and trained for success on the modern battlefield? Is the officer corps capable of answering that question in the affirmative or making the hard choices to ensure that we can?

slapout9

05-02-2014, 04:08 PM

Link to "Blue Angels vs. Red Devils" by William S. Lind

https://www.traditionalright.com/category/tr/

slapout9

05-02-2014, 04:39 PM

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 04:48 PM

This article is from 2013 I heard on a radio news program yesterday that in 2014 it is exploding. The true extent is unknown because most male victims are ashamed to report it, plus the political ramifications for the White House Gay policy make accurate reporting difficult. Lind,Wyly and even my old commanding General, Fredrick Krosen reported to senior military and political leadership that this was going to happen but Political Correctness won.
Some experts believe that the only other place where Gay rape exceeds the military is in Prison.:eek: don't know how they measured that but Predator Homosexual Behavior is just a know fact.

http://www.wnd.com/2013/05/military-suffers-wave-of-gay-sex-assaults/

Slap,

The article highlights that it's reported sexual assaults. It doesn't actually mean (though it could) that sexual assaults are increasing, but that the mechanism for reporting the crime is being used more frequently. Military sexual assaults are a widespread problem, and has been for a very long time, but the openness of homosexuals in the ranks is not relevant to that pattern. Comparing male-on-male sexual assaults to rates in prison is not surprising, given the hyper-masculinity and attendant insecurity that's widespread in both environments. In this context, it's less about sexual orientation and more about power and domination. Research into this field, for both male and female victims and predators, establishes this fact. Therefore, targeting homosexuals is in fact the wrong policy solution, and instead targeting the predator mentality, like the military is feabily attempting to do, is the right course of action. Part of this is removing predators from the ranks, part of it is providing better protection and recourse for potential victims (male and female), but also part of it (the part most resisted by the military establishment) is changing the military's structure and culture to eliminate opportunities and incentives for predation.

carl

05-02-2014, 06:19 PM

I was a part of a large group of officers last year which was assembled to listen to the musings of a three-star general who happened to be in town. One of the tidbits he decided to pass on to us was that by 2030, the US demographic breakdown is expected to be about 50% Caucasian, 25% Hispanic, and 25% other. He then went on to say that the demographic breakdown of the military's officer corps needed to reflect those percentages. Though it was not expressly stated, one wonders if the fact that the nation is about 50% female will play into that as well...

former_0302:

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

Out of curiosity, what was the setup like when he spoke? Did he wander about talking to small groups? Was it a big auditorium? Were questions taken? Were honest questions taken or was it understood that certain things won't be asked? That kind of thing.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 06:49 PM

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

What the heck are you talking about? That a general believes the demographics of the officer corps should reflect the demographics of the nation from which it is drawn is "the stuff of nightmares...[subordinated] to political fashion" and will be the bringer of "moral collapse" and "disasterous effects"? It's exactly your kind of reactionary fear-mongering that obstructs the development of sound, rational policy and it creates the very problems you claim you want addressed!

You don't know the context of that 3-star general's conversation. Does everything he speak about at every turn must "acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting"? It goes without saying that in the profession of arms, the ability fight and win wars, is essential. That this forms the basis of your criticism reveals your superficial understanding of the real problems at hand.

Here are the fundamental problems facing the armed forces:
- people and equipment are becoming more expensive on a per unit basis because of long procurement times, increased healthcare costs, inefficient budgeting and expenditures, and technological transformation
- this cost growth exceeds both the rate of inflation and rate of defense budget growth
- the cost growth disportionately reduces the size of the force, meaning that as individual units are more capable, the size in reduction results in an overall decline in combat power
- increased automation and systems means more overhead and administration
- combined, this means less available forward combat power
- less available combat power means greater demands on available combat power
- greater demands means higher operations tempo on both people and equipment, driving maintenance costs, refit/replinishment requirements, and exhaustion in the force
- that in turn means more money devoted to operations and less towards personnel (and more to defense and less towards social services)
- and that means a less fit, less educated, less qualified population to actually design, man, operate, and/or maintain those systems

What does this mean for the officer corps? It means it actually becomes increasingly difficult to formulate an effective strategy - the structural constraints imposed on leaders leaves very few options in implementing a dynamic, flexible strategy capable of matching the threats faced by the country. Instead, the "strategy" is driven by the availability of resources, including the Congressionally-constrained billeting of officers, which is limited because of the structural contradictions of the country's defense political economy.

We have one of the largest military budgets in American history combined with one of the smallest militaries by manpower in history. We are in a high tempo operations environment because of the political obligations of the government - meaning that far more is done today by far fewer people. And that's without the additional burdens of the campaigns in Afghanistan and formerly Iraq. So, in this environment, junior and mid-career officers are incredibly busy, even in the Reserves, with constant training cycles and mobilizations. There's really not time to implement change in the organization - and in any case, that's the job of the general officers, the number of which is tied by law to the size of the force. I don't fault the generals entirely; maybe they're just bad politicians having been imbued with strict conditions on the appropriate boundaries of civil-military relations. That Lind is both wrong (there are officers seeking to learn and transform the Army) and right (that this change is not occuring) should speak volumes about the conditions of our nation's defenses. Blaming black hairstyles or homosexuals is not only wildly off the mark but fuels the kind of obstructionism and division that makes it difficult to seek effective change in the first place.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 07:22 PM

And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem (http://nationalpriorities.org/analysis/2011/military-recruitment-2010/):

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 07:24 PM

And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. A single college in the South can easily commission more officers than the whole of New York City. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem (http://nationalpriorities.org/analysis/2011/military-recruitment-2010/):

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.

Fuchs

05-02-2014, 07:54 PM

We have one of the largest military budgets in American history combined with one of the smallest militaries by manpower in history.

I suppose these diagrams are a more accurate representation of reality:

PERSONNEL

http://www.comw.org/pda/1002BudgetSurge_files/image015.gif
http://www.comw.org/pda/1002BudgetSurge.html

http://www.marketsize.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ActiveDuty.jpg
http://www.marketsize.com/blog/index.php/2013/01/07/u-s-active-duty-military/

Fuchs

05-02-2014, 07:54 PM

SPENDING

http://i.imgur.com/7ET6z6h.jpg
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread1002996/pg1

http://files.abovetopsecret.com/files/img/fa532776b1.png (image too large)
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread1002996/pg1#pid17676345

http://www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/D5640DC5EFFC0F7C3EED5D4893C0D5B0.gif
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/02/the-fy-2009-defense-budget-request-the-growing-gap-in-defense-spending

BOTH
http://www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/7E40BD51F8C597EC120397CE6A067BF1.gif
(distorted by deployment-related extra compensations and reserve/active force balance)
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/02/the-fy-2009-defense-budget-request-the-growing-gap-in-defense-spending

So the military (and army) aren't really small. Budget and manpower are merely somewhat below non-World War zenith. That's fine.

In fact, I think Americans are crazy for spending so much on the military because the public good of defence can be had with a fraction. Most of the effort goes into the additional bullying and 'messing in distant places' capabilities.

Steve Blair

05-02-2014, 08:07 PM

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 08:12 PM

Hi Fuchs,

Thanks for the graphs.

From one of your links:

The upward trend in the DoD budget partly reflects decreased efficiency and a failure to make disciplined choices in procurement. It also reflects the decision to put the military to work in wars of a type for which it was not designed. Finally, it reflects increased readiness, activity, and capability. In some important respects, today’s US military is more powerful than its Cold War predecessor, even though the number of full-time military personnel is 30% less. Among the enhancements are a vast increase in its capacity to attack targets with aircraft and missiles. Also, its capacity to rapidly deploy troops and equipment has improved. In these and other ways, the power of the Pentagon has been re-inflated.

You and I have discussed this subject at some length before. One thing your graph is missing the growth of the operations and maintenance proportion of the DoD budget from a low of ~24% in the early 1960s to today's high of 45%. At the same time, the proportion of spending for military personnel has decreased from approximately 50% to today's 25% (even as your heritage foundation graph illustrates the per unit cost of servicemembers increased by 200%). Nine of the last ten years have seen the lowest military personnel spending 3-year averages since FY48. In contrast nine of ten highest years of O&M expenditures were between FY02 and FY14.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 08:17 PM

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

former_0302

05-02-2014, 08:31 PM

former_0302:

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

Out of curiosity, what was the setup like when he spoke? Did he wander about talking to small groups? Was it a big auditorium? Were questions taken? Were honest questions taken or was it understood that certain things won't be asked? That kind of thing.

It was a large auditorium, and he did take questions. That was only one of the comments at which I looked in askance. Another was his assertion that, among his peers, that getting females integrated into all units (combat arms included) is unquestionably the right move, and that the biggest problem facing the Marine Corps right now is sexual assault.

He did take honest questions, and some were willing to ask rather difficult ones. I would not have characterized his responses to those questions as particularly substantive, however.

former_0302

05-02-2014, 08:46 PM

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

In response to (1), the reason for this, IMO, is that there is a certain part of society which has a tradition of military service, and this sector continues to feed the beast. Is that happening at the expense of another sector of society which is clamoring to get in? If that is so, I haven't heard about it.

(2), okay, but that is a societal problem, not a military problem, and the military is not capable of fixing societal problems, either here or abroad...

(3), I sincerely hope that the values of the military are different than the society from which they're drawn. If I'm not mistaken, that's part of the whole "...special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities..." thing. If the values aren't different, we have a problem.

slapout9

05-02-2014, 08:51 PM

That's nice in abstract. But that does nothing to address the issues raised in the New York Times article. If the only thing the leadership should be concerned about is "to fight and win our Nations battles and wars" then why bother having restrictions on hairstyle in the first place? :confused: I don't think a war was ever won by the size of someone's beard or the way in which they braided their hair. So to be ideologically consistent, your recommendation shouldn't be to condemn the soldiers who are advocating for a change in the hair policy but supporting them in abolishing it totally. That applies to the new tatoo policy as well - the only difference is that tatoos are optional. Your genetically-determined hair type is not[/B][/B].

Now your talking. The side with the shortest hair always looses:wry:

The Supreme court made a ruling about things of this nature (cannot remember the court decision, maybe somebody can) but basically it ruled that the Military is a separate and special closed society and cannot be expected to follow what would be considered regular social and cultural norms, behavior,etc. The reason was/is because of it's very special "combat" mission to protect America. And combat was the key distinction between how the made the ruling. The point being all this social normalization/justice stuff has no business in the military IMO and it is probably even illegal per the Supreme court.

My Platoon Sergeant was right then and he is right now. "Everybody should be OD Green and everybody is going to bleed red, so you have to learn to work together"

Steve Blair

05-02-2014, 08:59 PM

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

My point is simply that we've been here before. Comparing the current reality with the artificial construct that was the Cold War isn't helpful, either. You need to consider that the military's current position of privilege is very much an outgrowth of the first Gulf War and lingering elite guilt about the way the Vietnam military was treated (in the aftermath of the Gulf War, at least...such feelings were noticeably absent during the 1980s and before). It's not a historical norm in the United States.

Popular sentiment has never really favored long-term external engagement. It could be swayed and to an extent justified by the Cold War, but once that ended popular enthusiasm faded (and I suspect a strong case could be made that it was fading during Vietnam). How much of your external engagement is really remnants of the Cold War? It's also interesting to note that the draft-era army was always considered something of an emergency force, and that its strength fell drastically in the 1950s. It was built back up for Vietnam, and then moved back to the more traditional (for the United States) volunteer force.

If you're going to talk about normal, you need some understanding of where that normal came from and if what you consider is normal is in fact something else. In the wider scope of American history (that two-thirds you mentioned), a large military (and especially one based on conscription) has never been considered normal by a fair chunk of the population. And for the bulk of its non-draft history (and even its draft history after the mid-1950s when deferments became more common) the army has never been especially representative of the population (either in the officer corps or the enlisted ranks). Very, very few of the issues you bring up are new, although the scale might be (although a compelling case can be made that the army that served on the Frontier between 1848 and 1892 faced many similar challenges in terms of distance, support structure, and very low strength).

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 08:59 PM

In response to (1), the reason for this, IMO, is that there is a certain part of society which has a tradition of military service, and this sector continues to feed the beast. Is that happening at the expense of another sector of society which is clamoring to get in? If that is so, I haven't heard about it.

Access to enlistment is not the issue. Willingness to enlist is the issue. As the country becomes increasingly Hispanic (and to some extent, Asian) while the Army remains white and black, the disproportions will only increase. This logic is also at work in the growth of metropolitan areas and the depopulation of rural areas - and the relatively fast growth of the West (driven by Hispanics and Asians) compared to the rest of the country. Is it "bad" in of itself that the Army is disproportionately white and black? No. But it becomes "bad" when, for example, senior leaders fail to recognize the demographic makeup of their institution and attempt to implement policies that are actually destructive of good order and discipline. And this will become an issue in the future as Congress, especially the House, begans to reflect the changing demographic patterns of the country, and it starts focusing its attention on dated military policies and culture.

(2), okay, but that is a societal problem, not a military problem, and the military is not capable of fixing societal problems, either here or abroad...

It is absolutely a military problem if 1 of 4 potential recruits are ineligible to enlist on the basis of their education or health. It was the military at the start of the Cold War that pushed for the national school lunch program, and it should continue to support policies that are conducive to maintaining an able-bodied and -minded population. This also applies to the country's technological policies. Policy-makers should rid themselves of the false dichtonomy between military and non-military spending and, through the painful process of Congressional appropriations, seek out a rational budget that recognizes the linkages between public policy and military capabilities.

(3), I sincerely hope that the values of the military are different than the society from which they're drawn. If I'm not mistaken, that's part of the whole "...special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities..." thing. If the values aren't different, we have a problem.

If the values are different, don't be surprised when Congress decreases defense spending, cuts back troop and procurement numbers, and limits pay and benefits. American veterans receive a special place in the politics of the public, and this is unique to the United States; with the country's changing demographics and diverging makeup of the military and general population, that's not guaranteed to last.

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 09:11 PM

The point being all this social normalization/justice stuff has no business in the military IMO and it is probably even illegal per the Supreme court.

So where do you draw the line on "social normalization/justice stuff"? Was integration a viable social experiment for the military pursue? If so, why?

slapout9

05-02-2014, 09:40 PM

So where do you draw the line on "social normalization/justice stuff"? Was integration a viable social experiment for the military pursue? If so, why?

I don't draw lines at all that's the Commie way! The American way is to set performance standards of excellance. If they pass they get in if they don't then you tell them how they can improve and come back and try again and again and again if need be. Always the opportunity to be all you can be based upon your individual will and skill!

As to question number two of course not! We never should group people by color or custom or any other Commie collective grouping system but by performance standards. THAT IS WHAT MAKES AMERICA EXCEPTIONAL! If you work for it you get, not who your daddy is or what you look like or where you went to school or how much money you have.

former_0302

05-02-2014, 09:47 PM

Access to enlistment is not the issue. Willingness to enlist is the issue. As the country becomes increasingly Hispanic (and to some extent, Asian) while the Army remains white and black, the disproportions will only increase. This logic is also at work in the growth of metropolitan areas and the depopulation of rural areas - and the relatively fast growth of the West (driven by Hispanics and Asians) compared to the rest of the country. Is it "bad" in of itself that the Army is disproportionately white and black? No. But it becomes "bad" when, for example, senior leaders fail to recognize the demographic makeup of their institution and attempt to implement policies that are actually destructive of good order and discipline. And this will become an issue in the future as Congress, especially the House, begans to reflect the changing demographic patterns of the country, and it starts focusing its attention on dated military policies and culture.

Hmmm... well, I can't speak for the entirety of the USMC, but my service has acquainted me with vastly more Hispanic Marines than AA Marines. Perhaps it's a service thing.

Can you give an example of the sort of policy which is "...actually destructive of good order and discipline?" Not entirely sure of what you're driving at.

It is absolutely a military problem if 1 of 4 potential recruits are ineligible to enlist on the basis of their education or health. It was the military at the start of the Cold War that pushed for the national school lunch program, and it should continue to support policies that are conducive to maintaining an able-bodied and -minded population. This also applies to the country's technological policies. Policy-makers should rid themselves of the false dichtonomy between military and non-military spending and, through the painful process of Congressional appropriations, seek out a rational budget that recognizes the linkages between public policy and military capabilities.

Is it military problem? Only if the military requires significantly more people than it does now. You're saying 75% of the potential recruits are eligible? According to the figures on the census.gov site, there's about 29 million 17-29 year old males in the US. If 75% of that is fit for military service, I'd say our problem isn't too severe, unless we plan to occupy China.

If the values are different, don't be surprised when Congress decreases defense spending, cuts back troop and procurement numbers, and limits pay and benefits. American veterans receive a special place in the politics of the public, and this is unique to the United States; with the country's changing demographics and diverging makeup of the military and general population, that's not guaranteed to last.

We must be thinking of "values" in different contexts. Your response doesn't make any sense to me in relation to the point I was trying to make, so I'll assume I just didn't state what I meant very clearly...

AmericanPride

05-02-2014, 10:09 PM

As to question number two of course not! We never should group people by color or custom or any other Commie collective grouping system but by performance standards. THAT IS WHAT MAKES AMERICA EXCEPTIONAL! If you work for it you get, not who your daddy is or what you look like or where you went to school or how much money you have.

With the exception of your amusing definition of communism, I agree with you in principle. The problem is how to make this work in practice. I think on the matters of race, with the exception of a few minor policy points evident in the news, the military has largely figured this out. It's now tackling the issue of sex (and maybe in the future, even gender :eek:). In alot of ways, though, "where you went to school" for example, does matter. The article I quoted earlier notes that many high schools cannot educate their students sufficiently to pass the AFQT. High schools are funded locally. For a number of historical-socio-political reasons, schools in minority communities are typically disproportionately underfunded. This means that minorites are less likely to meet the same standards for enlistment. It's not because minorities are inherently less capable - it's because their starting point is more distant from the standard than their white counterparts.

Can you give an example of the sort of policy which is "...actually destructive of good order and discipline?" Not entirely sure of what you're driving at.

I think the military's handling of females in combat arms is probably the most destructive policy at the moment.

Is it military problem? Only if the military requires significantly more people than it does now. You're saying 75% of the potential recruits are eligible? According to the figures on the census.gov site, there's about 29 million 17-29 year old males in the US. If 75% of that is fit for military service, I'd say our problem isn't too severe, unless we plan to occupy China.

My bad. I meant 1 in 4 are eligible. So that's about 7.25 million fit for military service.

We must be thinking of "values" in different contexts. Your response doesn't make any sense to me in relation to the point I was trying to make, so I'll assume I just didn't state what I meant very clearly...

What did you mean by values?

Fuchs

05-02-2014, 11:02 PM

As to question number two of course not! We never should group people by color or custom or any other Commie collective grouping system but by performance standards. THAT IS WHAT MAKES AMERICA EXCEPTIONAL! If you work for it you get, not who your daddy is or what you look like or where you went to school or how much money you have.

LOL, no. That's just a horrible caricature of some modern (U.S.) American mythology.

Being the by far biggest Western country and shielded by two oceans is what makes it exceptional.
Meritocracy (aside from being suboptimal*) is not much more at home in the U.S. than in plenty other countries.

In fact, the American idea of how to create a lieutenant is stuck in the 18th century when the ancien rgime supposed that nobles were by birth suitable for serving as officer and didn't need proper training or practice. It's a laughingstock in comparison to most other developed countries' ways of creating lieutenants.

The German way (to let them serve as a special kind of NCO first and educate/train them before they get commissioned) goes back to Carnot during the French revolution and isn't exactly fresh, but at least not stuck in the ancien rgime.

*: Now about how and why meritocracy is suboptimal:
Peter principle, that's why.
Losers and undisciplined men shouldn't be promoted, but other than that promotions should be done based on potential. A very good colonel may be a horrible general. It's thus wrong to promote all very good colonels. It's correct to promote some mediocre colonels who show much potential for the General's job while holding some very good colonels back in their rank.

The German army accepted this shortly after the First World War and invented what's today known as assessment centre. The impetus was that it was forced to enlist men for 12 years only (and as minimum) and was very much restricted in size.

Not macht erfinderisch.
(~"Necessity is the mother of invention." More accurately: Distress drives you to be inventive.)

The had to get the very best candidates for the job, so they paid more attention to candidate selection than an other army.

former_0302

05-02-2014, 11:42 PM

I think the military's handling of females in combat arms is probably the most destructive policy at the moment.

While I agree that particular policy is destructive, you specifically said "...senior leaders fail to recognize the demographic makeup of their institution and attempt to implement policies that are actually destructive of good order and discipline." I don't see it as being destructive because of anything to do with the demographic makeup of the institution. I see it as being destructive because it's nonsensical.

My bad. I meant 1 in 4 are eligible. So that's about 7.25 million fit for military service.

Where are those numbers coming from? Not saying you're wrong, I just find it hard to believe. I've seen the USMC's Qualified Candidate Population numbers, which are generated by the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. I don't know exactly how Recruiting Command derives them, but they total up to a significantly higher number than 7.25 million. They also don't include the 25-29 demographic.

What did you mean by values?

The way you phrased what you said led me to believe that you meant that the values of the military population, and the values of the civilian population from whence they came, should be the same. If that's what you meant, I can't agree with it.

former_0302

05-02-2014, 11:56 PM

In fact, the American idea of how to create a lieutenant is stuck in the 18th century when the ancien rgime supposed that nobles were by birth suitable for serving as officer and didn't need proper training or practice. It's a laughingstock in comparison to most other developed countries' ways of creating lieutenants.

I'm curious, given this statement, as to exactly how you think Americans create lieutenants?

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 12:12 AM

Fuchs

05-03-2014, 12:22 AM

I'm curious, given this statement, as to exactly how you think Americans create lieutenants?

ROTC or academy, but mostly through ROTC.

The German path for reserve (2 or 3 years active service) officers: link (https://mil.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/milkarriere/!ut/p/c4/Pcg5DoAwDAXRs3CBuKfjFkDngANfCYtMFonT4wpN9YZmsk6u2D jjOjnRSNOC3jd3IEVWhag47Co_2CMXdSqPaJUrBLz2HZfH2zO_ ONpKdxy6D3h9J4I!/)
Active service officer candidates have a more comprehensive path.

carl

05-03-2014, 01:26 AM

American Pride:

You said this

Willingness to enlist is the issue.

and this

Alienating elements of the ranks on one basis or on another is detrimental to the higher purpose of winning America's wars..

Now forgive me for putting together my interpretation of all your arguments but I have to to make my point and it's too confusing to go back and copy and paste. These two quotes along with all your other posts lead me to what I believe your position is.

From what I gather you believe that in order for the military to fill its ranks it must get recruits from all the census groups at least in rough proportion to their numbers in the population. It order to do that it must establish race and sex goals or quotas for these groups otherwise they won't sign up in sufficient numbers. In other words it must bribe these groups by dangling guarantees of position to entice them into joining. There is a problem with that position.

First and most importantly it denigrates the patriotism and willingness to serve of the groups targeted. The people in those groups are all grown up and if they decide not to join up they have good reasons. As former_0302 says a lot of that is cultural. Some groups are just more inclined than others to go in. Different groups going into different professions or fields is quite normal in society. Thomas Sowell has written about that a lot.

Another problem with your position is that you are saying that they can be bribed. You are saying in effect that we can overcome their unwillingness to serve by bribing them. Them they will sign up. That is insulting.

An additional problem is your position doesn't treat the people in your target groups as individuals. They are just members of a herd and will respond if the right stimulus is applied.

I don't find such a position very respectful of the people it purports to care for.

As far as the three star goes, the context provided by former_0302 was quite clear as was the three stars position. You can't fancy it up much. He believes the demographic of the officer corps needs to reflect the demographic of society at large.

Aside from the denigration of talent for fighting and leading that reflects, I suspect he has no idea of the administrative mess it would create. Who is black? What is white? What is mixed race and how should we count it? Is Sikh a race or a religion? Is religion race? Depending on the answers to those questions and what the % of this or that is projected to be when the next promotion cycle comes there would be a mad scramble to document that indeed this person is whatever would help get him promoted. The military being what it is there would have to be published procedures and policies relating to all of this. They would have to determine what was black, white, brown and variations thereof. And you know what that would mean? It would mean the US military, the great leveler, would have to create a race code, something not seen since the 30s in Europe and a long time ago in the South.

A note about school spending and eduction. NYC spends about $19,000 per student per year. Boy what Father Gallagher and Sister Mary Loretta could have done with $19,000 per year per student. Anyway, the people the NYC schools turn out aren't very well educated I've read. So perhaps it isn't about the amount of money spent, but how it's spent.

I am glad to see that today I am only a superficial reactionary fear monger. Yesterday I was a racist so I am coming up in the world.

TheCurmudgeon

05-03-2014, 01:34 AM

former_0302

05-03-2014, 01:56 AM

ROTC or academy, but mostly through ROTC.

The German path for reserve (2 or 3 years active service) officers: link (https://mil.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/milkarriere/!ut/p/c4/Pcg5DoAwDAXRs3CBuKfjFkDngANfCYtMFonT4wpN9YZmsk6u2D jjOjnRSNOC3jd3IEVWhag47Co_2CMXdSqPaJUrBLz2HZfH2zO_ ONpKdxy6D3h9J4I!/)
Active service officer candidates have a more comprehensive path.

I don't know how true that is of the other services, but it is largely not true of the Marine Corps. You can google the Marine Corps Almanac and check for yourself, but the breakdown for 2013 officer accessions (which one assumes is a garden-variety year) is this:

MECEP/ECP/MCP: 218
Naval ROTC: 212
Officer Candidate Course: 344
Platoon Leader Course: 591
Academy: 267

The MECEP/ECP/MCP are competitive enlisted to officer programs, in which enrollees wind up joining an ROTC unit, so they technically enter the service through ROTC. However, they need to have some minimum enlisted service time before they're eligible for the program, and they need to have been pretty good Marines to get into the program. It should also be noted that a significant portion of the OCC/PLC accessions are prior enlisted personnel.

In any event, no argument that we could do better, but the timeline in the link you provided is not too different from the path that Marine officers take through OCS/TBS/follow-on MOS school. All of that takes a minimum of one year, before a lieutenant is ever in a position to lead anyone, following their graduation from whatever college they came from. Your first job as a lieutenant is effectively a sort of internship anyway; a not-insignificant number of lieutenants are relieved for cause. I guess I'm not seeing an enormous difference.

Edited to add: I think our philosophy is that the best way to learn how to be an officer is to actually go be an officer. While there are certainly some who are not ready when they get there, I'd say most are ready enough.

former_0302

05-03-2014, 02:05 AM

former_0302,

The ratio comes from Army Recruiting Command estimates while I used the census population data you provided. It's due to a combination of education, physical fitness, health, and moral/legal.

Right, the MCRC data is based on the same factors as far as I know. I saw the numbers in some brief I had to sit in during 2010/11-ish, but IIRC their recruitable number total across the US was over 10 mil. Again, it was for 17-24 year-olds.

Perhaps the Army uses different metrics, or maybe the method for counting has been updated.

carl

05-03-2014, 02:20 AM

Yep! that's how Paris Hilton got her money or George W. Bush went to Yale, they did it based on individual merit.

Perhaps the implication behind your comment is what you see in your world. I can't know what that is.

But in my world and for most of the people I know in it, this about sums it up.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRB2dGI1vRM

(I love that scene and it is surprising how often it seems appropriate.)

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 02:27 AM

From what I gather you believe that in order for the military to fill its ranks it must get recruits from all the census groups at least in rough proportion to their numbers in the population.

No - the military can fill its ranks any number of ways. Right now, it's largely effective in filling the ranks, minus the Army Reserve. But it's not effective in overcoming institutional self-selection. Think of self-selection as institutional incest.

It order to do that it must establish race and sex goals or quotas for these groups otherwise they won't sign up in sufficient numbers. In other words it must bribe these groups by dangling guarantees of position to entice them into joining. There is a problem with that position.

One of the problems with that position is that it's not my position.

Some groups are just more inclined than others to go in. Different groups going into different professions or fields is quite normal in society. Thomas Sowell has written about that a lot.

One - Thomas Sowell is a partisan hack. There's a couple of well-written articles out there about it. Two - why are "some groups just more inclined than others"? And if the disinclined are among the fastest growing groups in the country, what are the consequences for the military?

Another problem with your position is that you are saying that they can be bribed. You are saying in effect that we can overcome their unwillingness to serve by bribing them. Them they will sign up. That is insulting.

Compensation is bribery? :eek: Statistically, there is a range of monetary and in-kind compensation that predicts X to Z amount of enlistees will join for every $ in benefits. That some groups, generally defined, may require more compensation than others is not surprising, irrelevant, or insulting. What's insulting - and not founded in reality - is the idea that everyone is joining the services out of patriotism, and that this is the only good reason to join. People join for many reasons - for adventure, for the benefits and pension, for the professional skills, for school, for their friends or family, and so on. Knowing the segmentation of American demographics is absolutely important to filling the ranks and for communication with the public. And people stay for many of the same reasons, which is why when the Army was hemorrhaging junior officers, it didn't appeal to their patriotism; it offered them material incentives to stay. And it still does this today for enlisted soldiers.

He believes the demographic of the officer corps needs to reflect the demographic of society at large.

And you have not demonstrated why that is detrimental to the armed forces. The mission of the armed services is to fight and win the nation's wars, but that's not the only function of armed services in a country. It provides employment, education opportunities, skills training, and social normalization. In the US, these functions are generally applauded and supported - not so much in other countries. As the make-up of the country changes, so too will the relationship between the public and the military as an institution. The military can be pro-active and get ahead of this trend or it can increasingly isolate itself from society-at-large. Eventually, and this has already started, people will start asking why are we paying soldiers relatively well when everyone else's salaries are flat; why are we building schools around the world when schools here are failing; why do we prop up governments abroad when local governments here are going bankrupt. Those are the questions that senior leaders need to be prepared to address because it will impact the readiness of the armed forces even though they are not directly related to fighting and winning wars. We got a taste of this with sequestration when the assumption that the GOP will protect the defense budget was over-turned by the zeal to enforce government retrenchment. And we'll see training budgets, staffing, and pay and benefits continue to be cut.

Aside from the denigration of talent for fighting and leading that reflects, I suspect he has no idea of the administrative mess it would create. Who is black? What is white? What is mixed race and how should we count it? Is Sikh a race or a religion? Is religion race? Depending on the answers to those questions and what the % of this or that is projected to be when the next promotion cycle comes there would be a mad scramble to document that indeed this person is whatever would help get him promoted. The military being what it is there would have to be published procedures and policies relating to all of this. They would have to determine what was black, white, brown and variations thereof. And you know what that would mean? It would mean the US military, the great leveler, would have to create a race code, something not seen since the 30s in Europe and a long time ago in the South.

You went from "the officer corps needs to reflect the demographic of society at large" to "the US military, the great leveler, would have to create a race code". Slow down speed racer. By the way, the military already tracks its service-members' race, religion, sex, etc.

I am glad to see that today I am only a superficial reactionary fear monger. Yesterday I was a racist so I am coming up in the world.

Be confident that your promotion was by merit alone. ;)

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 02:38 AM

carl

05-03-2014, 03:02 AM

No - the military can fill its ranks any number of ways. Right now, it's largely effective in filling the ranks, minus the Army Reserve. But it's not effective in overcoming institutional self-selection. Think of self-selection as institutional incest.

Describe the self selection. I don't get it. It's a volunteer force.

One of the problems with that position is that it's not my position.

Fair enough. What is your position?

One - Thomas Sowell is a partisan hack. There's a couple of well-written articles out there about it. Two - why are "some groups just more inclined than others"? And if the disinclined are among the fastest growing groups in the country, what are the consequences for the military?

Well that's one way to deal with an articulate man who disagrees with you. Call him a partisan hack.

What are the consequences of the fastest growing groups disinclined to join the military? I figured one of them, figuring for you of course, would be insufficient numbers to fill the ranks eventually. But you said above no. Then there was something about how values and outlook differ and if they differed enough then the military might not get what it needed. I don't accept that. The people of the country are pretty smart and if you said to them "What do you guys want? Really now what do you want, a military that will win wars or one that precisely reflects the demographic %s?" I figure they would want to win.

Compensation is bribery? :eek: Statistically, there is a range of monetary and in-kind compensation that predicts X to Z amount of enlistees will join for every $ in benefits. That some groups, generally defined, may require more compensation than others is not surprising, irrelevant, or insulting. What's insulting - and not founded in reality - is the idea that everyone is joining the services out of patriotism, and that this is the only good reason to join. People join for many reasons - for adventure, for the benefits and pension, for the professional skills, for school, for their friends or family, and so on. Knowing the segmentation of American demographics is absolutely important to filling the ranks and for communication with the public. And people stay for many of the same reasons, which is why when the Army was hemorrhaging junior officers, it didn't appeal to their patriotism; it offered them material incentives to stay. And it still does this today for enlisted soldiers.

No I didn't say anything about monetary compensation. I was talking about race and sex quotas. I was talking about guarantees involving position and rank, power essentially.

Now you say junior officers were leaving because no appeal was made to their patriotism. But you also say that in order to attract certain demographic groups into junior officer ranks they have to guarantees about how many of them will get certain positions. That isn't an appeal to patriotism, it's bribery which you say didn't work in retaining junior officers. I don't see the logic here.

And you have not demonstrated why that is detrimental to the armed forces. The mission of the armed services is to fight and win the nation's wars, but that's not the only function of armed services in a country. It provides employment, education opportunities, skills training, and social normalization. In the US, these functions are generally applauded and supported - not so much in other countries. As the make-up of the country changes, so too will the relationship between the public and the military as an institution. The military can be pro-active and get ahead of this trend or it can increasingly isolate itself from society-at-large. Eventually, and this has already started, people will start asking why are we paying soldiers relatively well when everyone else's salaries are flat; why are we building schools around the world when schools here are failing; why do we prop up governments abroad when local governments here are going bankrupt. Those are the questions that senior leaders need to be prepared to address because it will impact the readiness of the armed forces even though they are not directly related to fighting and winning wars. We got a taste of this with sequestration when the assumption that the GOP will protect the defense budget was over-turned by the zeal to enforce government retrenchment. And we'll see training budgets, staffing, and pay and benefits continue to be cut.

It is not detrimental to the armed forces if the officer corps reflects the demographic makeup of the country...if that occurs naturally. It is very detrimental to the armed forces if quotas and goals, special favors and bribery, are used. That results in something other than fighting and leading prowess being used to select officers and that affects the ability to win.

These things you mention "employment, education opportunities, skills training, and social normalization" are all well and good. But they are all byproducts of a military the purpose of which is to fight and win. They came about as ancillary (I was dying to use that word) effects. If you want a job corps, a tech school or a halfway house, build one. The military is there to fight, any attention directed away from that distracts from it.

You went from "the officer corps needs to reflect the demographic of society at large" to "the US military, the great leveler, would have to create a race code". Slow down speed racer. By the way, the military already tracks its service-members' race, religion, sex, etc.

Speed up Speed Racer's big brother. I explained that. The military does track all that. So does just about everybody. What will change is they will have create by any other name a race code in order for the promotion system to have something to work with if the 3 stars goal is to be achieved.

I've seen this kind of thing in action. Back in the early 90s the major airlines were being pressured by the Feds to hire this minority or that one. You should have seen the guys who suddenly became Choctaw Indians after very diligent geneological (sic) searches. That was a minor thing then. You do that in the military and things will get very ugly.

carl

05-03-2014, 03:13 AM

Carl,

Also, about New York City schools. I can't speak to their quality, but I can tell you that New York is ranked 18th out of quality enlistees as a state. In fact, the mid-west and northeast tends to score higher than the south in terms of quality. The lowest state is Mississippi which also ranks 44th in education spending per student. That's not a coincidence. Education matters. And spending on education also matters.

You spoke about education and spending. I commented about education and spending.

The 18th ranking would only be of use if you relate it to how New York ranks in state spending per student, which I have. New York in 2011 was no. 1 in spending per student at 19k per. Now if results were directly related to gross spending you would expect NY to score a bit higher that 18th. No. 18 in spending is North Dakota which spends per student 11.4k followed by Ohio and Nebraska.

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 06:16 AM

Carl,

Here are some statistics on the relationship between education spending and quality recruits. This includes all 50 states plus Washington DC.

The first is the relationship between education spending by state and the proportion of category I (those who scored 91 - 99 on AFQT) recruits:

http://s30.postimg.org/cyktcesoh/Spending_Quality.jpg

Essentially, the higher the spending, the higher proportion of quality recruits.

Second image: the relationship between recruitment rate and quality.

http://s2.postimg.org/93lc6nkl5/Recruitment_Rate_Quality.jpg

The higher the proportion of quality recruits, the lower the enlistment rate.

Last image: the relationship between education spending and recruitment rate.

http://s21.postimg.org/gtwkqpl6f/Spending_Recruitment_Rate.jpg

The higher a state spends on education, the less likely its students are to enlist. In sum, the data suggest that well-funded education programs produce higher quality enlistments but also discourages such candidates from enlisting in the first place.

These things you mention "employment, education opportunities, skills training, and social normalization" are all well and good. But they are all byproducts of a military the purpose of which is to fight and win.

Hence the distinction between 'mission' (fight and win wars) and 'function' (implicit or unintended outcomes). Fighting the nation's wars is the stated intent but it's not the only reason for which we maintain a standing professional army. Some of it is deliberate - like the politics - and some of it is structural, like the economics of it.

The people of the country are pretty smart and if you said to them "What do you guys want? Really now what do you want, a military that will win wars or one that precisely reflects the demographic %s?" I figure they would want to win.

Based on what evidence? Which segment of the population are you referring to?

Now you say junior officers were leaving because no appeal was made to their patriotism.

I never said that. Reread my statement.

That isn't an appeal to patriotism, it's bribery which you say didn't work in retaining junior officers.

Again, reread my statement. I'll quote it:

And people stay for many of the same reasons, which is why when the Army was hemorrhaging junior officers, it didn't appeal to their patriotism; it offered them material incentives to stay. And it still does this today for enlisted soldiers.

Material benefits like cash bonuses, MOS reclassification, and non-deployability did work in increasing retention. Your ideal of unwavering patriotism is a myth - it may attract some to the military and may even keep some there, but like I stated, people join and stay for many different reasons. When recruiters make their pitches, they don't rely on appeals to patriotism; they try to illustrate all the benefits to service from the adventure of it, to the professional skill development and experiences, to the rates of promotion and pay. It's your comments that this amounts to 'bribery' is what is insulting. Mythologizing military service obstructs the implementation of sound policy in improving the armed forces. You're not the only one that does this; military service members are guilty of it too, and it's that cognitive dissonance that probably goes a long way in explaining the disillusionment. And that brings us full circle to self-selection.

Although an older study, this research sums it up (http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/68068):

This report focuses on whether such differences arise because of socialization processes involved in military training and service, or because of prior differences in values and beliefs among those who select to enter military service....These findings among seniors closely replicate earlier research comparing soldiers, sailors, and civilians; taken together, the data suggest that self-selection is the dominant factor and that actual service may not substantially enhance prior attitude differences.

The military does a poor job of making itself attractive to those who are not already attracted to it. In the context of sequestration, intensely competitive budget priorities, the nature of the international security environment, the country's changing demographics to minority-majority and urbanization, and globalized media, it's more important now than ever that the military constructively engages with the public. It can't bury its head in the sand and say "if it has nothing to strictly and directly do with fighting the nation's wars, we want no part in it!" That won't sell to the public. This is a democratic country last I checked and the military needs to make an effort to be responsive and accountable to the public to which it is subordinated. It won't do that by holding on to dated processes and ideas, a hyper-masculine culture, and disinterest in the social dynamics of the population from which it is trying to draw soldiers, leaders, and public endorsement.

JMA

05-03-2014, 08:22 AM

Recent - after 24 April - responses from the An Officer Corps That Can’t Score (http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/an-officer-corps-that-cant-score/) article.

==============
Publicus says:
April 25, 2014 at 1:33 pm

Speaking as a former Army infantry officer who served in the 70′s and early 80′s Mr. Lind’s article hits the target right on. However, there are more basic reasons why the current officer corps is rotten.
First, the jock/athlete culture has triumphed. Take a look at the current ROTC curriculum. It is overwhelmingly oriented towards athletic prowess. Cadets – college students – are forced into the work-out room, to participate in “Warrior Games”, ad nauseum. Football field heroics is deemed good leadership – better-than-average intelligence is ignored. What is being taught by the current generation of officers to their successors is that it is more important to successfully run a marathon than study your enemy. The indoctrination the cadets regurgitate is frightening in its simplistic ignorance.
Second, I recommend reading the book “The Generals.” It is a superb analysis of how the system established by General Marshall to fight WWII – perform or move aside – has been completely replaced with the plodding “good boys” who don’t rock the boat but are ready to sell out their troops and subordinate officers without blinking an eyelash if they see a promotion possibility.
Third, it is the fault of the civilian administrations in committing the Army to missions that never should have been attempted. Nation-building in Afghanistan? You’ve got to be kidding me.
Fourth, and last, to succeed in the current environment, an officer must subscribe to all of the politically correct gender, sexual preference, and other asinine cause celebres of groups the political class is scared of. Women in combat units? Let us speak the heresy which must not be said. The standards WILL be lowered to appease the feminist harpies – and a lot of good men will die in a future war so the politicians can have bragging rights at today’s toney wine and cheese parties. …

==============
Austin Fall says:
April 26, 2014 at 12:05 am

Though not a bull’s eye this article at least hits the paper. Lind may be deaf because there are many officers that want “substantive change” but most of these officers will never reach a level to be able to make a change. From 2001, how many officers have combat experience? Of those how many are still in the service? Of those how many have reached any level with enough influence? With no combat attrition or the insignificant effect combat has in future advancement; the officers that have a visceral understanding of the changes needed to be made are civilians again or will reach the level to make policy changes in years to come at numbers too insignificant to do so. Combat is a defining factor but for most, Green Beans instead of Starbucks, life inside the wire was business as usual. The garrison mentality still dominates 80% or more of the officer corps even after multiple deployments.

=================
RW says:
April 26, 2014 at 4:52 pm

I am one of those Army officers and couldn’t agree more with the points brought up in this article. As a battery commander, my every decision was mandated by regulation or higher commanders guidance. We have become more concerned with CYA and political correctness than fighting wars. None of this can be brought up in an open discussion because it would mean at the very minimum, a poor performance eval. In this downsizing Army, a bad eval can mean the boot. After 7 years, I am on the way out.

=================
eponodyne says:
April 29, 2014 at 12:06 am

Forgive me if this has been suggested upthread already, but there is a very simple fix: Shut down the service academies. Close down the ROTC programs. Make sure that the only way to become an officer is to first reach NCO status as an enlisted man, and attend OCS. …

=================

The last comment should probably be read in conjunction with this 2009 article: Tom Ricks -- Why We Should Get Rid of West Point (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/16/AR2009041603483.html)

05-03-2014, 02:37 PM

After following the debate between Carl and American Pride, I wanted to offer this piece of anecdotal evidence about the composition of the US Army, posted on 4 April at War Council (http://www.warcouncil.org/blog/2014/4/5/what-i-wish-i-knew-from-cadet-to-lieutenant-in-afghanistan):

Your Soldiers will do amazing things – Far more often than your Soldiers doing stupid things, you will be blown away at how talented they are. I have the following Soldiers in my platoon: a former blacksmith and rodeo clown, a NASCAR pit crewman, two carpenters, a private who is a multi-millionaire and drives and (sic) Audi R8, a Sugar Bowl-winning, University of West Virginia offensive lineman and a SSG who graduated college at 17 years old and taught physics at Tulane before the age of 26.

For what it is worth, the composition of his platoon is not that dissimilar from the one I led back when the US Army was, arguably, at or very near its post-Viet Nam nadir.

A lot of graphs displaying quantitative data are all well and good. Equally nice is the appeal to emotion found in a You Tube extract from a Hollywood production.

1Lt Ginther has things to say about both these techniques too:

Since when did Microsoft Xcel become a leadership tool? – This is a huge pet peeve of mine. When I was a cadet, I saw way too many kids immediately go to computers, spreadsheets and power point to solve problems. Yes, these are skills you will use at nausea when you’re a lieutenant, but get outside of your own head and go work with your Soldiers.

Band of Brothers, Black Hawk Down, The Unforgiving Minute and other sources – Just because you read these books and saw these movies doesn’t make you an expert on warfare or the next Chris Kyle or Mike Murphy. Furthermore, these sources are not the benchmarks for which you should measure the fallibility of tactical or technical opinions and TTPs of others around you. These are personal accounts and reflections on leadership, personal challenges and demons, and should supplement your development as a leader, Soldier and as a person.

At then end of the day, perhaps the best take away from the LT is the following:

Your parents probably did a better job prepping you for leadership than anyone – If your parents taught you to get along with everybody as a kid, work in school, made you clean your room, be home by curfew and they trusted you, you’ll be alright. Being a good, honest person has gotten me much farther in my relationships in the Army than I ever expected.

I suspect that if Lind's critique has any real value, then it is as a criticism of American society as a whole, not just its military.

TheCurmudgeon

05-03-2014, 02:58 PM

OK, so there has been a lot of chatter back and forth - how about a list of suggestions?

I will offer three:

1. Slow down junior officer promotions, speed up senior officer promotions. You learn a lot more about leadership with a platoon or a company than in a staff job. This, of course, will require legislative approval - a change in ROPMA.

2. Include more socio-cultural education in the system early on, say the Captain's Career Course. If you are going to take regional alignment seriously (which I doubt) then send your Captain's to work with/live with militaries in their aligned region. Keep them aligned with the same country so that they can build relationships. Relationships matter in the rest of the world.

3. At Major, start separating out command track officers. But once you do that don't just let everyone else fester. Find their niche and use them.

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 03:56 PM

I suspect that if Lind's critique has any real value, then it is as a criticism of American society as a whole, not just its military.

wm,

And that's one of the major problems as a result of the divergence thesis in military culture and the public. If the military is self-selecting (which it is) and the fastest growing demographics in the country are not a part of that self-selection (which they aren't), then several things can happen: the military can become socially (and eventually politically) isolated or its values can change. The military has proved to be a resilient institution of the years and it has adapted, if slowly, to many of society's evolving expectations - from integration, to women in the services, to the all-volunteer force. Are the values and norms of the military today the same as it was in 1776? Will it be the same in 20 years? The military is going to change and the leadership it needs to be proactive in directing that process rather than having it imposed on them.

EDIT: Also, I take issue with the "excel" et. al quote, only because sound decisions can only be deliberately made through a thorough understanding and rigorous examination of the facts to solve problems. Excel is great for this - obviously, excel or any other program is not a replacement for leadership, which is different. Too many times have I seen leaders make decisions on whim and bias rather than factual evidence or use the military equivalent of "It's true because I said so". Part of that is fueled by the nature of command (especially in a combat environment) but part of that is also cultural; there are many norms embedded in military culture that produce resistance to study, intellect, and examination (of the self and surroundings).

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 04:09 PM

former_0302

05-03-2014, 04:24 PM

Fuchs

05-03-2014, 04:33 PM

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 04:44 PM

former_0302

05-03-2014, 04:50 PM

I doubt the way you guys use the word "values" is appropriate here.

A soldier should not consider obedience as a "value" of his/her.
You folks didn't have the whole Stauffenberg et al episode, but other countries with different experiences don't consider obedience as a value that makes sense at all.
It's a behaviour, and sometimes it's inappropriate.

I'm not considering obedience to be a value. Obedience is a response to a stimulus, one of several which are possible (you could walk away, scream obscenities, flat-out refuse to do what you were ordered to do, etc.). An individual's response to a given stimulus is in part, at least, a result of their moral/ethical makeup. In other words, their values.

If you value your position in the hierarchy, value the ideals under which you chose to serve in the first place, you will obey. If not, you'll follow whatever else you value. Follow?

05-03-2014, 05:05 PM

wm,

And that's one of the major problems as a result of the divergence thesis in military culture and the public. If the military is self-selecting (which it is) and the fastest growing demographics in the country are not a part of that self-selection (which they aren't), then several things can happen: the military can become socially (and eventually politically) isolated or its values can change. The military has proved to be a resilient institution of the years and it has adapted, if slowly, to many of society's evolving expectations - from integration, to women in the services, to the all-volunteer force. Are the values and norms of the military today the same as it was in 1776? Will it be the same in 20 years? The military is going to change and the leadership it needs to be proactive in directing that process rather than having it imposed on them.

EDIT: Also, I take issue with the "excel" et. al quote, only because sound decisions can only be deliberately made through a thorough understanding and rigorous examination of the facts to solve problems. Excel is great for this - obviously, excel or any other program is not a replacement for leadership, which is different. Too many times have I seen leaders make decisions on whim and bias rather than factual evidence or use the military equivalent of "It's true because I said so". Part of that is fueled by the nature of command (especially in a combat environment) but part of that is also cultural; there are many norms embedded in military culture that produce resistance to study, intellect, and examination (of the self and surroundings).

My critique has nothing to do with social divergence or distance (I think the latter is the term Charlie Moskos used back in the 70s when he wrote on the impacts of the all volunteer Army--probably worth a literature review by others on this thread). Instead it has to do with how Americans today raise their sons and daughters. I suspect that the kinds of things the LT suggested that parents make their kids do are not being accomplished. I will not elaborate further because my information is only anecdotal.

To AP's edit point, I am reminded of the quotation attributed to Mark Twain:"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics."
Statistical analysis has value as long as the assumptions underlying the statistics are made clear. And, as we should all be aware from the nice scatter plots AP shared earlier, in what are the most interesting cases for decision makers (my assumption/bias), outliers are usually present. As another representation of my bias, I tend to plan for the worst case outlier, not the best case or the average case, unless I have reasons to do otherwise. BTW, calling them reasons is actually somewhat of a misnomer because reason usually plays little part in it. It is instead more often the qualitative/emotional kind of gut feeling that Hollywood can portray so well.

Some knowledge management folks today now describe two categories of knowledge: explicit and tacit. Knowing when to go with your gut is part of tacit knowledge--something that comes with experience and mentoring or working with other expert practitioners. Explicit knowledge is the kind of stuff we get from textbooks and classrooms. Creating a useful spreadsheet includes both explicit knowledge (how to use Excel for example) and tacit knowledge (what data to select and how to display it).

Given this distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge, I think the Curmudgeon is on to something with slowing down promotions. I would, however, not wait until the field grades to start identifying and utilizing officer specialists--explicit knowledge acquisition should start as part of the early officer development classes as well--including BOLC and MCCC. Of course to do this will mean the bean counters will have to accept end strength trade offs because of the number of officers in the school account. Such is life when resources are scarce and the competition for them is fierce.

former_0302

05-03-2014, 05:12 PM

former,

I agree with Fuchs perspective on 'values'. Obedience, for example, is great when your unit is in contact. It's not so great when an institution worth over $1 trillion and a million+ service-members is on a path of decline or committed to a course of failure. Honesty, integrity, courage (moral, intellectual, physical) are values I'd place higher than willingness to obey.

While I don't disagree with your hierarchy of values, none of those are why people who could have joined the military tell me they didn't join the military. They talk to me about not wanting to be told what to do all the time, and that they don't want to get blown up in some far away land. Maybe you hear different things... The second part is certainly why the mothers of America discourage their sons and daughters from joining as well. I'm the first person from my family to voluntarily join the military in over 160 years of having been in this country. I couldn't adequately describe how badly my parents didn't want that to happen. And I'm from the demographic which is generally more willing to serve. What's your plan for overcoming that? Promising the mothers of America that you won't get their kids schwacked?

In a democratic society, the military needs to remain responsive to the expressed needs (through the political system) of the public. If that means females in combat arms or adapting regulations on facial or head hair for a multicultural force, then the military needs to change to implement those values. I have yet to see a substantive argument published anywhere that integration, homosexuals, or responsive regulations are detrimental to good order and discipline or the ability to fight and win wars.

I don't have any direct experience in serving with an open homosexual, so I'll pass on commenting about that. However, if you think that integrating females into combat units is a good idea... we'll just have to disagree.

I suppose, then, that you would agree that there is a substantive argument that, let's say, the average football/basketball/whatever team will be improved by replacing half of its members with women?

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 05:19 PM

My critique has nothing to do with social divergence or distance (I think the latter is the term Charlie Moskos used back in the 70s when he wrote on the impacts of the all volunteer Army--probably worth a literature review by others on this thread). Instead it has to do with how Americans today raise their sons and daughters. I suspect that the kinds of things the LT suggested that parents make their kids do are not being accomplished.

How is the first sentence unrelated to your second and third? I think we're talking about the same subject but understanding the words differently.

Given this distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge, I think the Curmudgeon is on to something with slowing down promotions. I would, however, not wait until the field grades to start identifying and utilizing officer specialists--explicit knowledge acquisition should start as part of the early officer development classes as well--including BOLC and MCCC. Of course to do this will mean the bean counters will have to accept end strength trade offs because of the number of officers in the school account. Such is life when resources are scarce and the competition for them is fierce.

I agree in principle. And the military already does this with some specialists, like nurses, doctors, and lawyers. Functional Areas (in the Army) and skill identifiers are available - but they're not open until (senior) captain. Slowing promotions doesn't address the problem of making everyone a generalist and assuming they're on a command track. Eventually it's still up or out...

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 05:33 PM

While I don't disagree with your hierarchy of values, none of those are why people who could have joined the military tell me they didn't join the military. They talk to me about not wanting to be told what to do all the time, and that they don't want to get blown up in some far away land. Maybe you hear different things...

There's a whole range of reasons, some of which actually seem quite petty in the 'big picture'; i.e. "peer pressure". I've heard those reasons you've listed, as well as having better pay/benefits elsewhere, "my friends won't approve", etc. Incidentally, the military is regularly ranked as one of the highest regarded government institutions in public opinion polls. So there's a disconnect somewhere; people generally admire the military but don't want to do it themselves. I've heard the "I'll join when the military when it needs me" reason a number of times too.

The military already offers a diverse range of benefits and incentives - some of the services are more flexible than others. From the perspective of the Army, I think it would be more effective reforming itself as an institution (in regards to culture, advancement, etc) than increasing the amount of kind or benefits.

I suppose, then, that you would agree that there is a substantive argument that, let's say, the average football/basketball/whatever team will be improved by replacing half of its members with women?

I think this is a cultural (and subsequently structural) question, not a sex or gender one. History is replete with examples of fierce and capable female warriors and/or soldiers. But women have for the better part of history been regulated to specific roles in society, usually far from any battlefield. I doubt that very much has to do with women being less capable of fighting - I think it's more true that if women are less capable of fighting than men, it's because women in general have been regulated into that position by social structure. I haven't read the literature in depth, but I'd be interested in a discussion of the role of women in the Soviet armed forces during world war II as soldiers, snipers, partisans, etc. Someone on this board may have extensive knowledge on it.

former_0302

05-03-2014, 06:03 PM

From the perspective of the Army, I think it would be more effective reforming itself as an institution (in regards to culture, advancement, etc)

How?

I think this is a cultural (and subsequently structural) question, not a sex or gender one. History is replete with examples of fierce and capable female warriors and/or soldiers. But women have for the better part of history been regulated to specific roles in society, usually far from any battlefield. I doubt that very much has to do with women being less capable of fighting - I think it's more true that if women are less capable of fighting than men, it's because women in general have been regulated into that position by social structure. I haven't read the literature in depth, but I'd be interested in a discussion of the role of women in the Soviet armed forces during world war II as soldiers, snipers, partisans, etc. Someone on this board may have extensive knowledge on it.

It is replete with them? Really? Name me some, excluding Joan D'Arc, which is the only one I can come up with without using the power of Google. Whoever they were, I'd argue that it probably wasn't in their job description that, before they could even start fighting, they had to wear 60%+ of their body weight in various armor/other gear.

I suppose the fact that a WNBA team would get crushed by a good high school boy's basketball team, and virtually any men's collegiate team, is a result of social structure? As Keyshawn Johnson says, "C'mon, man!"

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 06:12 PM

I suppose the fact that a WNBA team would get crushed by a good high school boy's basketball team, and virtually any men's collegiate team, is a result of social structure? As Keyshawn Johnson says, "C'mon, man!"

I'm on my way out but I want to take the time to address this point (I'll get to the others later). From birth, women are segregated from men in nearly all forms of physical competition - and the boys receive the better part of the investment in time, training, resources, etc. So it's not surprising whatsoever. This same consequence is actually true to within men competition as children are segregated by age. I'll get the citations to you later. Malcolm Gladwell has a good basic coverage of this effect in one of his books (I forget which).

Fuchs

05-03-2014, 06:13 PM

Historically about 1/3 of the women in the best age group for combat were pregnant or recovering from pregnancy (almost 10 births/women average for almost all of mankind's history) and tribes were much more capable to overcome the loss of males than the loss of females (in the long term).

Pre-20th century history is thus not authoritative on the 'females in the military' topic.
Besides, Lind didn't mention "females" or "women" in the article.

former_0302

05-03-2014, 06:29 PM

I'm on my way out but I want to take the time to address this point (I'll get to the others later). From birth, women are segregated from men in nearly all forms of physical competition - and the boys receive the better part of the investment in time, training, resources, etc. So it's not surprising whatsoever. This same consequence is actually true to within men competition as children are segregated by age. I'll get the citations to you later. Malcolm Gladwell has a good basic coverage of this effect in one of his books (I forget which).

Your point is absolutely irrelevant. DNA says that women will be, on average, smaller, slower and weaker than men. No amount of de-segregation in competitive terms will change that. Unless you think you can legislate biology... which we actually may be able to do soon. Whether that's a good idea or not is another thing...

@ Fuchs--forum conversations tend to take on a life of their own. Since I'm new here, if the consensus is that I'm dragging the thread too far in a wrong direction, I'll stop.

AmericanPride

05-03-2014, 08:00 PM

Your point is absolutely irrelevant.

Okay then. Debate closed. :rolleyes:

TheCurmudgeon

05-03-2014, 09:27 PM

TC,

After thinking about this issue some more, I don't think the problem is exclusively military. I agree that the military is facing a substantive problem in what Lind describes as "intellectual and moral courage", however the military as an institution cannot be separated from the social and political fabric in which it is embedded.

From the beginning of the War on Terrorism, the generals viewed the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (especially Iraq) as 'short-term'. 11 years is only 11 cells across the horseblanket chart in the operations shop. When the lives of weapon systems are mapped out as far as 2050 and beyond, it's easy to dismiss the structural changes necessary to address the problems faced in the present, especially if they're expected to last only a few years.

I don't think tweaking the officer management system will effect the change needed to address the problems identified by Lind. It has to be both cultural and structural - in fact, Lind states this as well. Officers need to be more effectively educated (before and during service) and there needs to be substantive changes in the country's defense political economy. Education overcomes institutional self-selection, which breeds institutional decay and intellectual stagnation. That said, many of the prescriptions here and in the comments quoted by JMA only address the tactical or surface symptoms of the fundamental problems, which are inherently cultural and structural (and perhaps primarily structural since culture is often a reflect of structure).

First, I would agree that the problem is not isolated to the military. For starters, any institution of its size is going to suffer from bureaucratic malaise. So it you think you are going to solve that with a change in the personnel system you are kidding yourself. Also, the military is a reflection of the society. There is currently a significant "me first" attitude of the Ayn Rand "virtue of selfishness (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Virtue_of_Selfishness)" variety. Combined with the "everyone deserves a prize" crowd you get the drive for "disruptive thinkers", people with little or no actual experience who believe they know what is best for everyone else but don't really want to work their way up the ladder and earn that position, they want it given to them. The military is a argot society that is dependent on the idea of "duties", not "rights." You get people suing the Army over policy because they have the "right (http://www.foxsanantonio.com/news/features/top-stories/stories/guardsman-sues-over-army-tattoo-rules-3453.shtml)" to be part of a unit. That is hard for many people who have grown up in the "me first" generation to assimilate to.

As for moral courage, I say that is a question of civil-military relations. No one wants to stick there neck out if it is going to get chopped off. The tone for that was set by Rumsfeld and GEN Shinseki. It has not changed since. In 2008 I was in CGSC and we have a civilian from the Bush Administration come down to talk to us all about civil-military relations. The "revolt of the Generals" was still a hot topic. We were told never to talk out of turn and if we did not like something our options was to resign. I stood up and asked directly, if the President gives me an unconstitutional order my only option is to resign? Yes was the answer. We are never, ever supposed to question our civilian masters. That tone was set by Rumsfeld and it has not changed. It won't change until those people who lived through that era pass out of existence.

Since much of the military personnel system is legislated by people with absolutely no military experience - I am talking about Congress, not the President, read your Constitution on who has the power to regulate the military - then none of this is likely to change. We need to concentrate on what we can fix. The officer education system and the officer assignment system. And we need to dump the "zero-defect" mentality. Those we can fix on our own. Everything else is just idle talk.

EDIT: One point on the "zero-defect" mentality, it will be around for the next few years. Why? Because we are in a draw-down. The easiest way to find out who to dump is to look in their records for issues. That is reality. No amount of high minded talk is going to change that reality. Some of that is good. Too fat, can't pass a PT test, ... so long. Some of it is OK. Like to send dirty texts to your LTs because you think you are Gods gift to women, ... ... so long. Some of it is not so great. Screw up an exercise or allow a piece of equipment to get lost or damaged on your watch, or just covering for your soldiers so they don't get whacked, ... so long. Any large system is going to chew-up and spit-out some good with all the bad.

Fuchs

05-03-2014, 10:06 PM

Some more about "failure of generals" thin:
http://eb-misfit.blogspot.de/2014/05/when-skull-thickness-is-measured-in.html

TheCurmudgeon

05-03-2014, 10:44 PM

As noted in the article, corruption is a problem we create. When you have only two types of diplomacy, the carrot - we give you tons of money to do our bidding; or the stick - we will use our military to destroy you, and then pay your successor to tons of money to do our bidding; then corruption is a necessary evil. If we could learn to understand others instead of assuming we know what they need, then this might change. But sadly, as we move towards a new Cold War because Russia is the enemy of NATO, we have learned ... wait for it ... NOTHING!:eek:

Happily, that is another thread entirely.:D

slapout9

05-04-2014, 05:36 AM

Bill Moore

05-04-2014, 06:52 PM

In the Lind article you see a reference to Col. Michael D. Wyly who is probably one of the finest living military writers that there is, he is a very farsighted individual indeed. He wrote the best part of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook. But the link to the article below is very Germain to this thread. I have posted it before but it defintely belongs here.

P.S. Curmudgy! In it Wyly discusses what every Marine must know about the future of warfare and list 3 suggestions for every Marine(I would think it applies to Army officers to) to know in order to be prepared.

Here is the link to the article as usual comments are welcome.
http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/wyly_4gw.htm

His three points

First, we must expect the unexpected in terms of new kinds of enemies and new kinds of forces that assume the function of soldiers and nondescript war makers.
Second, we must come to grips with the fact that our traditional form of warfare, i.e., high tech with overwhelming firepower delivered from a distant standoff, no longer solves problems.
Third, the Corps must be a bastion of Americans who really do support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

Don't disagree with any of them, but I think the frst and third points are well known and bring little new to the table. His second point is critical, it is also the point that Gen Rupert Smith makes well in his book, "The Utility of Force," but Wyly doesn't address the so what of this comment (at least in the article you provided a link to). I know I sound like I'm defending military officers, and to some extent I am while also remaining highly critical, but what Wyly is pointing out is deeply flawed understanding of war and its requirements by our civilian leadership that our defense industry reinforces with their insistence that technology will save the day. To some extent they're right, and we don't want to be disadvantaged by being technically trumped by our adversaries, but that doesn't mean people aren't ultimately decisive.

JMA

05-04-2014, 07:35 PM

Bill,

Wyly's article was dated 1995 while Smith's book was published in 2005.

Both - obviously - made a contribution to military thinking in their time.

Despite the writings of these two persons the 'civilian leadership' in both respective countries have learned nothing during the intervening years. This is the really bad news.

His three points

Don't disagree with any of them, but I think the second and third points are well known and bring little new to the table. His second point is critical, it is also the point that Gen Rupert Smith makes well in his book, "The Utility of Force," but Wyly doesn't address the so what of this comment (at least in the article you provided a link to). I know I sound like I'm defending military officers, and to some extent I am while also remaining highly critical, but what Wyly is pointing out is deeply flawed understanding of war and its requirements by our civilian leadership that our defense industry reinforces with their insistence that technology will save the day. To some extent they're right, and we don't want to be disadvantaged by being technically trumped by our adversaries, but that doesn't mean people aren't ultimately decisive.

carl

05-04-2014, 07:37 PM

@ Fuchs--forum conversations tend to take on a life of their own. Since I'm new here, if the consensus is that I'm dragging the thread too far in a wrong direction, I'll stop.

Run with it man, it goes where it goes.

carl

05-04-2014, 08:25 PM

Equally nice is the appeal to emotion found in a You Tube extract from a Hollywood production.

I sense a bit of sniffing disapproval there.

Emotion is a rather important thing when dealing with human motivation, especially motivation of people fighting in wars since the war will get a lot of those doing the fighting killed. The people know that and yet very often they kept on going up that hill, running toward the Japanese battleships or land at Kham Duc anyway. The reasons they do that are many and I think, remember I'm an always a civilian, the most important ones are emotional when the steel can be seen or it is flying through the air so fast as to be invisible. So I very much see a place for referencing emotion in back and forths like this.

Now back to the general fray.

To this civilian defending excel spreadsheets as a military decision making tool is...silly. The great leaders of the past didn't need them and there were a lot of great leaders in the past. If they had them they still would be who they were and if McClellan had excel that wouldn't have made him Grant. The problem is for the military to find those Grants and I fear that if proficiency with excel is valued the next incarnation of Bill Slim (sorry British, we're taking your man) who happened to be a computer klutz will be lost to us. That is not a good thing.

As far as women in combat goes, I figure way back when before the dawn of email and before even writing the humans did try mixed sex groups in combat. I think people tried everything way back when. It wasn't tried too much after that because the ones who thought that was a good idea lost their fights and they all got killed. The reason I figure that is because humans are very pragmatic and if mixed sex groups had worked in battle, people would have kept on doing it because winning is a good thing. Even people who couldn't read could figure that out. So the idea died and lay dead for so long that people forgot why it was so, it just seemed the natural thing. Then PC came along and it looks as of we may have to learn that lesson all over again.

And we will. Most people don't think of it like this but to my knowledge all the ships of the USN have mixed sex crews and when the next big sea fight comes we will be conducting an experiment that has never before been conducted in the history of the humans, mixed sex crews in fighting ships in combat (and I mean real fighting the IJN in the Slot at night type combat, not firing a cruise missile at a third world nation). We'll see if this experiment works. I hope so because the price foe defeat will be very high.

AmericanPride

05-04-2014, 09:15 PM

To this civilian defending excel spreadsheets as a military decision making tool is...silly. The great leaders of the past didn't need them and there were a lot of great leaders in the past. If they had them they still would be who they were and if McClellan had excel that wouldn't have made him Grant. The problem is for the military to find those Grants and I fear that if proficiency with excel is valued the next incarnation of Bill Slim (sorry British, we're taking your man) who happened to be a computer klutz will be lost to us. That is not a good thing.

Those are two different issues. And the first part is not "defending excel"; excel is a tool. It's about the lack of rigorous intellect applied to military problems. This is not strongly cultivated in the officer corps until senior leadership - and only narrowly. Another poster referenced this problem implicitly with the failure of the senior leadership to understand sociology, et.al and how it fits with military science. Embarking on military campaigns in the complexity of the modern security environment without appreciating the nuances of practical understanding is both ignorant and deadly. Modern general officers are no longer galloping on horseback to break the enemy's center - they're managers of a complex multi-layered bureaucracy embedded in an tightly-woven political-economic-social fabric and engaged in a highly disruptive enterprise with long-term multi-ordered effects. There is no excuse for ignorance, especially for officers.

I think people tried everything way back when. It wasn't tried too much after that because the ones who thought that was a good idea lost their fights and they all got killed. The reason I figure that is because humans are very pragmatic and if mixed sex groups had worked in battle, people would have kept on doing it because winning is a good thing.

That's a highly superficial reading of history. Care to provide any examples? Humans are pragmatic - to an extent. They're also rationalizing, which means they're better at excusing their condition than rationally improving or understanding their condition. Fuchs is right about the historical condition of women, which indicates that exclusion of women from combat is a socio-political construction rather than one based strictly on military proficiency. The destruction of mythologized forms of femininity is the greatest problem facing the integration of women in the hyper-masculine culture of the military. And this social construct is enforced through very deeply-held norms that are practiced through structurally discriminatory practices - and not just in the military, but from the moment of birth. Success in combat, like sports, is not exclusively a question of maximizing physical strength. It also requires technical skill, intellect, and moral and physical courage. Is the 'worst' male soldier more effective in combat than the 'best' female soldier?

Also, the military is a reflection of the society. There is currently a significant "me first" attitude of the Ayn Rand "virtue of selfishness" variety. Combined with the "everyone deserves a prize" crowd you get the drive for "disruptive thinkers", people with little or no actual experience who believe they know what is best for everyone else but don't really want to work their way up the ladder and earn that position, they want it given to them. The military is a argot society that is dependent on the idea of "duties", not "rights." You get people suing the Army over policy because they have the "right" to be part of a unit. That is hard for many people who have grown up in the "me first" generation to assimilate to.

If the "military is a reflection of society" and society is changing, shouldn't the military also change? Similarly, if the conduct or character of war is changing, doesn't that also necessitate a change in military culture? Is a 19th century military culture optimal for 21st century conflict?

TheCurmudgeon

05-04-2014, 09:28 PM

If the "military is a reflection of society" and society is changing, shouldn't the military also change? Similarly, if the conduct or character of war is changing, doesn't that also necessitate a change in military culture? Is a 19th century military culture optimal for 21st century conflict?

My answer to the first question is "No", the military should not change, at least not in the same way. My reasoning here is far to complicated to put forth here. I can send you something privately if you want to understand it.

The answer to the second question is that those are two separate issues. The character of war has not really changed. Conduct has changed enormously in the last 100 years.

former_0302

05-04-2014, 11:12 PM

That's a highly superficial reading of history. Care to provide any examples? Humans are pragmatic - to an extent. They're also rationalizing, which means they're better at excusing their condition than rationally improving or understanding their condition. Fuchs is right about the historical condition of women, which indicates that exclusion of women from combat is a socio-political construction rather than one based strictly on military proficiency. The destruction of mythologized forms of femininity is the greatest problem facing the integration of women in the hyper-masculine culture of the military. And this social construct is enforced through very deeply-held norms that are practiced through structurally discriminatory practices - and not just in the military, but from the moment of birth. Success in combat, like sports, is not exclusively a question of maximizing physical strength. It also requires technical skill, intellect, and moral and physical courage. Is the 'worst' male soldier more effective in combat than the 'best' female soldier?

"Superficial" != "wrong." Apologies if I came across as harsh yesterday, but the reason your point is not relevant is because you aren't going to fix it in your lifetime, and probably not in your grandkid's. What you are speaking of is the result of thousands of years of natural selection. You're not going to change the cumulative effect of that in a generation, unless you start playing God with people's DNA.

There are examples of mammalian species where the female is larger/stronger than the male, but they evolved that way due to factors that necessitated it. It didn't happen with us, and the impetus to get it to change hasn't happened yet. I'd argue that the military's role and purpose in society is too important to make it that impetus.

Being a graduate of IOC, I've followed the attempts to get a woman through it with interest. To date, only one has completed the initial event, and she managed to break herself in the course of doing it. The initial event at IOC isn't even in the top five of events at IOC in terms of level of difficulty. I imagine that there are some women out there who can do it... but I doubt they meet USMC height/weight standards for females. I think the build necessitated by those standards is too slight to be able to make it.

Lost in all of this is the simple fact that not a single female Marine I know would choose to go into a combat arms field if given the choice. Admittedly, I don't know all of them, but the fact that the ones I do aren't clamoring for this change to be made leads me to believe that the drive behind doing this isn't coming from what I'd consider a "pure" source.

If the "military is a reflection of society" and society is changing, shouldn't the military also change? Similarly, if the conduct or character of war is changing, doesn't that also necessitate a change in military culture? Is a 19th century military culture optimal for 21st century conflict?

Why should the military reflect society? Do you want a military that reflects a fascination with Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga, or any of the rest of the inanities that our society loves? The military requires its members to live a standards-based existence, and IMO a lot of those standards are not as stringent as they should be. What standards there are in civilian American society pale in comparison.

TheCurmudgeon

05-05-2014, 12:55 AM

Why should the military reflect society? Do you want a military that reflects a fascination with Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga, or any of the rest of the inanities that our society loves? The military requires its members to live a standards-based existence, and IMO a lot of those standards are not as stringent as they should be. What standards there are in civilian American society pale in comparison.

I am going to disagree with you a little on this. Young enlisted and officers have a fascination with popular culture. Civilians have a fascination with combat video games. That is just entertainment.

What I am referring to are the social standards of duty and loyalty that are part of the military. I care much less about other standards like uniform or haircut standards, or even PT and height/weight to a point (No soldier ever stayed back home because they were too fat or could not pass a PT test, we took them with us anyway.) Standards are only important in as far as they reflect a necessity on the part of the mission and, secondary to that, a dedication to accomplishing that mission. When the standards become more important than the mission than we have lost focus.

In garrison before the war we were strict on enforcing uniform and decorum standards because they kept the Soldier sharp and situationaly aware. When some senior NCOs and Officers tried to enforce the same standards on the FOB the standards made less sense and the NCO's and Officers lost respect. They did not understand the purpose of the standard. Standards became a self-licking ice cream cone.

TheCurmudgeon

05-05-2014, 01:39 AM

P.S. Curmudgy! In it Wyly discusses what every Marine must know about the future of warfare and list 3 suggestions for every Marine(I would think it applies to Army officers to) to know in order to be prepared.

Here is the link to the article as usual comments are welcome.
http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/wyly_4gw.htm

Slap,

I have a bit of a problem with #3. Interpreting the Constitution is not easy. First, you have to decide if you believe it is a living document that is meant to be read and interpreted by people today, as Justice Roberts would advocate; or is it a dead document that was written in stone the moment it was signed and must be interpreted as the drafters understood things as Justice Scalla believes. If you get past that you have a document that Nine Constitutional scholars can interpret as it applies to a specific situation and still disagree almost right down the middle -- 5 to 4 -- on many key issues. And you want a Marine in combat to make decisions on the interpretation of the Constitution in a split second that these justices have months to research and think about and still not come to the same conclusion? I think that is utter nonsense.

Give them some basic values, like the Army's seven values, and have those guide their decisions. DO NOT expect them to interpret the Constitutionality of any action. Let their senior officers worry about that. They are the ones that need to understand if the orders they are given are just and legal.

former_0302

05-05-2014, 01:46 AM

I am going to disagree with you a little on this. Young enlisted and officers have a fascination with popular culture. Civilians have a fascination with combat video games. That is just entertainment.

What I am referring to are the social standards of duty and loyalty that are part of the military. I care much less about other standards like uniform or haircut standards, or even PT and height/weight to a point (No soldier ever stayed back home because they were too fat or could not pass a PT test, we took them with us anyway.) Standards are only important in as far as they reflect a necessity on the part of the mission and, secondary to that, a dedication to accomplishing that mission. When the standards become more important than the mission than we have lost focus.

In garrison before the war we were strict on enforcing uniform and decorum standards because they kept the Soldier sharp and situationaly aware. When some senior NCOs and Officers tried to enforce the same standards on the FOB the standards made less sense and the NCO's and Officers lost respect. They did not understand the purpose of the standard. Standards became a self-licking ice cream cone.

I agree that, in reality, some standards are more important than others. I also agree that the standards for a deployed unit should be somewhat different from those for a unit in garrison, and even ones in the field during exercises (I had a platoon sergeant once who wouldn't let Marines ever be outdoors without something on their head, which I thought was a bit extreme).

Having said that, moral and performance standards in particular matter. I don't care so much for PT standards, like you, mainly because our PT standards are not a metric of anything that is all that important to job performance (how fast you can run three miles in shorts and sneakers is not at all indicative of how mission-ready you'll be after you've walked 10 miles carrying 50 lbs, in my experience). If you can't hit a target under specific conditions, I don't want you on that gun/mortar/whatever. If you can't navigate, I don't want you in any job where your GPS batteries die and you have to use a map and compass to get somewhere.

The moral standards are a similar thing. If you don't have the discipline to not drink and drive, or use drugs, or even cheat on your spouse, I don't think you should wear a uniform. None of those things will necessarily get you fired from civilian employment, but they'll get you booted out of the service pretty quickly.

Those are the main things I'm referring to when I speak about standards.

TheCurmudgeon

05-05-2014, 01:48 AM

carl

05-05-2014, 04:28 AM

Those are two different issues. And the first part is not "defending excel"; excel is a tool. It's about the lack of rigorous intellect applied to military problems. This is not strongly cultivated in the officer corps until senior leadership - and only narrowly. Another poster referenced this problem implicitly with the failure of the senior leadership to understand sociology, et.al and how it fits with military science. Embarking on military campaigns in the complexity of the modern security environment without appreciating the nuances of practical understanding is both ignorant and deadly. Modern general officers are no longer galloping on horseback to break the enemy's center - they're managers of a complex multi-layered bureaucracy embedded in an tightly-woven political-economic-social fabric and engaged in a highly disruptive enterprise with long-term multi-ordered effects. There is no excuse for ignorance, especially for officers.

I'll go with using the old noodle to solve military problems. But I'm not so sure how study of things like sociology fits into it. History absolutely but not some amorphous subject like sociology. Temuchin didn't study sociology nor Scipio nor Washington nor Nelson. But they knew all about leading and motivating men in battle. To me it is most important to somehow someway find guys who have the innate ability to lead and fight rather than somehow trying to teach and put in there what they may not have. To me leadership and fighting ability is born into a man, you can hone it, but you can't put in what God didn't put there in the first place.

Nobody has galloped on horseback to break the enemy's center, high up commanders anyway, for a long time. Grant didn't and he and Lincoln both were "managers of a complex multi-layered bureaucracy embedded in an tightly-woven political-economic-social fabric and engaged in a highly disruptive enterprise with long-term multi-ordered effects."

That's a highly superficial reading of history. Care to provide any examples? Humans are pragmatic - to an extent. They're also rationalizing, which means they're better at excusing their condition than rationally improving or understanding their condition. Fuchs is right about the historical condition of women, which indicates that exclusion of women from combat is a socio-political construction rather than one based strictly on military proficiency. The destruction of mythologized forms of femininity is the greatest problem facing the integration of women in the hyper-masculine culture of the military. And this social construct is enforced through very deeply-held norms that are practiced through structurally discriminatory practices - and not just in the military, but from the moment of birth. Success in combat, like sports, is not exclusively a question of maximizing physical strength. It also requires technical skill, intellect, and moral and physical courage. Is the 'worst' male soldier more effective in combat than the 'best' female soldier?

Any examples? No, remember I said this may have been long before the long time before. But I think if you look at all the accounts we have of preliterate fighting groups from the Commaches to the Mongols to the Zulus men have done the fighting. The women stayed home with the kids. I think the whole of human history militates against the belief that men fighting and women not is a "socio-political construction". Except for one or two exceptions the women stayed home and the men fought. It strains credulity, mine anyway, to think that way back when in the time before the time before people decided to create a "socio-political construction" that didn't have a pragmatic basis.

Maybe that is superficial but maybe too some things don't need a lot of words to explain. The family dog doesn't bother the family cat anymore because it doesn't like getting its muzzle cut up. Simple.

I'll expand upon this tomorrow and explain also why going to far with the women in combat may result in coercing abortion.

Fuchs

05-05-2014, 05:46 AM

The moral standards are a similar thing. If you don't have the discipline to not drink and drive, or use drugs, or even cheat on your spouse, I don't think you should wear a uniform. None of those things will necessarily get you fired from civilian employment, but they'll get you booted out of the service pretty quickly.

Yep, with you 100%. Without morals, the rest is just window-dressing.

I don't buy it.
Career soldiers have a tendency to think of themselves (or the military) as superior to the general
population - particularly if they happen to write in English. It was only a question of time till this
attitude would resurface once the topic wandered towards the civ-mil-relationship and
representativeness issue.

There's nothing that special about the military. And the people in it aren't that special either. Many of
them would be (or were) failures in civilian life, for example - and this includes officers and NCOs.

The more strict the military pretends to be on minor offenses, the more likely they are to be hidden from
official records. You don't really think a general loses his job for driving drunk or cheating on his wife, do
you? And abuse of 'go drugs' by flying personnel is an open secret if not officially endorsed.
The ones who get into great trouble for such things are the ones who have made the wrong enemy in
the system.

Besides, there are plenty civilian jobs in which stuff like drunk driving or drug abuse may be career-
ending. German policemen live in perpetual fear that some stain in their personnel records could stall
their career indefinitely, for example. A great share of the working population depends on their driver's
license and lives in fear about losing it.

There's also nothing special about job requirements for a very large portion of the military. Office work is
office work, workshop work is workshop work - for most of its jobs and much of the time the military
cannot really claim to be in need of substantially elevated standards.
It's easy to find a great many civilian jobs with more critical demands on the personnel than for most of
the military personnel, even at wartime.
Think of a railway control centre, a surgeon, a bus driver, a pilotage, a lab technician, ... the dumbass
doing an inventory list in a depot full of spare parts cannot come close to them only because he's
wearing a BDU. So why would him cheating on his wife or smoking pot on weekends be of interest at all?

Bill Moore

05-05-2014, 09:09 AM

I agree that, in reality, some standards are more important than others. I also agree that the standards for a deployed unit should be somewhat different from those for a unit in garrison, and even ones in the field during exercises (I had a platoon sergeant once who wouldn't let Marines ever be outdoors without something on their head, which I thought was a bit extreme).

Having said that, moral and performance standards in particular matter. I don't care so much for PT standards, like you, mainly because our PT standards are not a metric of anything that is all that important to job performance (how fast you can run three miles in shorts and sneakers is not at all indicative of how mission-ready you'll be after you've walked 10 miles carrying 50 lbs, in my experience). If you can't hit a target under specific conditions, I don't want you on that gun/mortar/whatever. If you can't navigate, I don't want you in any job where your GPS batteries die and you have to use a map and compass to get somewhere.

The moral standards are a similar thing. If you don't have the discipline to not drink and drive, or use drugs, or even cheat on your spouse, I don't think you should wear a uniform. None of those things will necessarily get you fired from civilian employment, but they'll get you booted out of the service pretty quickly.

Those are the main things I'm referring to when I speak about standards.

I actually find my position closer to Fuchs than yours on this issue oddly enough, and perhaps that is due to being in the Army through the late 70s to recently and watching the evolution of the impact of the Christian Right on the Army in particular. It was getting to the point I thought we may have been in the North Korean military or the former Soviet military with everyone spying upon one another looking for dirt they could report on. The type of dirt that gets reporting on today such as drinking, Joe cheating on his wife, etc. would have resulted in the tattler being told to mind his own business a couple of decades ago. On the other hand, hopefully every effort would be made to hammer the self-serving individual who cheated on his travel voucher or used his position in other ways to personally gain from it. There is a difference between professional values that are important to the organization and subjective personal values (how one lives his or her life).

Quite frankly I knew several good soldiers to include officers that drank and some even cheated on their spouses, but wouldn't for a second do anything unethical professionally and you wouldn't hesitate to count on them in combat if you knew them. They just came from a different school of thought when it came to how they conducted their personal lives. Morals are absolutely important, but morals that are related to the profession, not subjective morals where you get to evaluate someone's personal life. This focus on people's personal lives is little more than political correctness concealed as discipline, and it is ruining our society and our military. We boot these guys out, while keeping those who appear to be squeaky clean by appearances, yet it is the squeaky clean ones more often than not that end up betraying their country, perhaps because it didn't live up to their high expectations? Snowden and the specialist who provides droves of classified material to Wikileaks are examples of these types of crusaders. We're in a human organization and if we don't get that humans will error and that each will have different personal values we'll only create the illusion of a force that conforms to a particular set of morals in their personal life. We need to focus on their professional lives and not keep trying to peer into their bedrooms. I can recall two officers who made a huge issue of infidelity and excessive drinking. One later was caught in an act of infidelity and the other finally got called out (and kicked out) when he got his 4th Driving While Intoxicated ticket. There seems to be a correlation between those who are the most self-righteous and also the most guilty.

JMA

05-05-2014, 12:04 PM

AmericanPride

05-05-2014, 01:44 PM

"Superficial" != "wrong." Apologies if I came across as harsh yesterday, but the reason your point is not relevant is because you aren't going to fix it in your lifetime, and probably not in your grandkid's. What you are speaking of is the result of thousands of years of natural selection. You're not going to change the cumulative effect of that in a generation, unless you start playing God with people's DNA.

Any examples? No, remember I said this may have been long before the long time before. But I think if you look at all the accounts we have of preliterate fighting groups from the Commaches to the Mongols to the Zulus men have done the fighting. The women stayed home with the kids. I think the whole of human history militates against the belief that men fighting and women not is a "socio-political construction". Except for one or two exceptions the women stayed home and the men fought. It strains credulity, mine anyway, to think that way back when in the time before the time before people decided to create a "socio-political construction" that didn't have a pragmatic basis.

It's superficial because it is a reading of history without any factual basis. It has no more evidence than any modern day conspiracy theory.

I imagine that there are some women out there who can do it... but I doubt they meet USMC height/weight standards for females. I think the build necessitated by those standards is too slight to be able to make it. Lost in all of this is the simple fact that not a single female Marine I know would choose to go into a combat arms field if given the choice. Admittedly, I don't know all of them, but the fact that the ones I do aren't clamoring for this change to be made leads me to believe that the drive behind doing this isn't coming from what I'd consider a "pure" source.

And those are excellent examples of the normative barriers that I have been speaking about. Here is a good research paper addressing (http://works.bepress.com/maia_goodell/2/) these normative obstacles. Some excerpts:

The Article examines four problems with the physical strength rationale: (1) stereotyping – the assumption that no woman can do the job without testing the abilities of the individual woman; (2) differential training – the failure to account for the potential for improvement for women who often have less prior physical activity; (3) trait selection – measuring only tasks that are perceived to be difficult for women, while ignoring equally mission critical tasks that women may be better at performing; and (4) task definition – not considering if there are other ways to get the job done. Each of these problems reveals a distortion based on an underlying normative belief that the military should be a male realm. It is this belief, not the reality of physical strength, that motivates the de jure exclusion, the very type of justification forbidden by law, and detrimental to women, men, and the military mission.

A pattern emerges from these four problems. What appears to be a biological truth is actually better understood as a normative belief that the military’s job is in some way peculiarly suited to men. It is not that
women’s bodies do not measure up against an objective standard, but
that the standard is defined so women do not fit it. This Part examines
the normative claims exposed as underlying the physical-strength arguments.

It goes beyond stereotyping, however, because in believing men are stronger, we both train them to be stronger, and we create a military designed around their abilities—in other words, we make the belief real. Epistemologist Sally Haslanger has termed this cognitive mechanism
“assumed objectivity.”207 Members of a powerful group ascribe characteristics to a weak group in a way that makes the differences real, and in a vicious cycle, the ascribed characteristics help make the weak group
weak.208 For example, slave owners might ascribe a lack of intelligence
to slaves, claim that this characteristic is innate, use this professed belief
to justify a lack of education, and in this way make real a difference that
keeps the slave owners in power.

I'll go with using the old noodle to solve military problems

Where did I suggest otherwise? :confused:

05-05-2014, 02:44 PM

I sense a bit of sniffing disapproval there.

Emotion is a rather important thing when dealing with human motivation, especially motivation of people fighting in wars since the war will get a lot of those doing the fighting killed. The people know that and yet very often they kept on going up that hill, running toward the Japanese battleships or land at Kham Duc anyway. The reasons they do that are many and I think, remember I'm an always a civilian, the most important ones are emotional when the steel can be seen or it is flying through the air so fast as to be invisible. So I very much see a place for referencing emotion in back and forths like this.
No sniffing disapproval. In a later post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=156005&postcount=76) responding to AP, I believe I suggested leaders' need for both quantitative intelligence and emotional intelligence.

To this civilian defending excel spreadsheets as a military decision making tool is...silly. The great leaders of the past didn't need them and there were a lot of great leaders in the past. If they had them they still would be who they were and if McClellan had excel that wouldn't have made him Grant. The problem is for the military to find those Grants and I fear that if proficiency with excel is valued the next incarnation of Bill Slim (sorry British, we're taking your man) who happened to be a computer klutz will be lost to us. That is not a good thing.
Please do not confuse the tool with the skill. Excel is a tool that provides data for decision makers. Grant most assuredly had data presented to him that helped him decide what to do. McClellan may have had too much attachment to data, producing a species of the paralysis of analysis. I would suggest that Viscount Slim shares my view. On page 194 of his book Defeat into Victory, he says
From start to finish they [the men of the Fourteenth Army] had only two items of equipment that were never in short supply: their brains and their courage.

Most people don't think of it like this but to my knowledge all the ships of the USN have mixed sex crews and when the next big sea fight comes we will be conducting an experiment that has never before been conducted in the history of the humans, mixed sex crews in fighting ships in combat (and I mean real fighting the IJN in the Slot at night type combat, not firing a cruise missile at a third world nation). We'll see if this experiment works. I hope so because the price foe defeat will be very high.
US Army tactical SIGINT/Electronic warfare teams have had women in them since at least the mid-70s. These teams deploy well forward on the battlefield, farther forward in fact than most of the infantry, armor, and artillery soldiers. They will even be found either with or in advance of the cavalry units that are the advanced scouts of the US Army.
BTW, I doubt that we will see ship to ship fighting of the type you described between the USN and IJN around Guadalcanal. I suspect future naval combat to be like the action that took place at the Battle of Midway, with a significant portion of the manned aircraft replaced by missiles of various kinds. Instead of a picture of muzzle flashes as destroyers and cruisers slug it out with cannon fire in the Slot, a more likely better image might be the sight of an Exocet slamming into the HMS Sheffield off the Falkland Islands, fired from a delivery platform completely out of the range of the ship's organic weapons.

AmericanPride

05-05-2014, 03:24 PM

Taking fuchs' last comment to the next step, and also understanding some of the statistics I posted earlier, what is the minimally accepted threshold for knowledge, skills, or abilities to make someone an effective soldier (or airman, sailor, marine, etc)? By mythologizing military service, are we artificially placing that threshold too high, and therefore excluding segments of the population that would otherwise be fit for military service? Is the military just another profession with its own set of required skills and abilities, norms and functions?

Also - I'd be curious to know if there's data available about the average age of senior leaders over time. Time in grade/service requirements more or less make the military a gerontocracy by default. It is not a meritocracy where promotions and assignments are based strictly on abilities, achievements, and potential. It is dependent on your institutional age.

As for the historical participation of women in modern combat, I'd reference the experience of Soviet women during World War II. On the face it, there seems to be broad experiences (snipers, tankers, infantry, pilots and navigators, etc). Are there any works out there looking at this experience from a 'should women be in combat' perspective?

former_0302

05-05-2014, 03:44 PM

Quite frankly I knew several good soldiers to include officers that drank and some even cheated on their spouses, but wouldn't for a second do anything unethical professionally and you wouldn't hesitate to count on them in combat if you knew them. They just came from a different school of thought when it came to how they conducted their personal lives. Morals are absolutely important, but morals that are related to the profession, not subjective morals where you get to evaluate someone's personal life. This focus on people's personal lives is little more than political correctness concealed as discipline, and it is ruining our society and our military. We boot these guys out, while keeping those who appear to be squeaky clean by appearances, yet it is the squeaky clean ones more often than not that end up betraying their country, perhaps because it didn't live up to their high expectations? Snowden and the specialist who provides droves of classified material to Wikileaks are examples of these types of crusaders. We're in a human organization and if we don't get that humans will error and that each will have different personal values we'll only create the illusion of a force that conforms to a particular set of morals in their personal life. We need to focus on their professional lives and not keep trying to peer into their bedrooms. I can recall two officers who made a huge issue of infidelity and excessive drinking. One later was caught in an act of infidelity and the other finally got called out (and kicked out) when he got his 4th Driving While Intoxicated ticket. There seems to be a correlation between those who are the most self-righteous and also the most guilty.

Can people's personal lives make them professionally vulnerable? Why do we spend six figures on a background check before giving someone a TS/SCI clearance? Would you personally be comfortable with giving a clearance to a known philanderer? A known drug user? Etc?

I also know some people who value their oath of enlistment/office more highly than any other commitment they ever made, but I'm struggling to think of any objective method by which you could differentiate them from anyone else who just didn't want to live up to the commitments they've made. The oath of office/enlistment is a lifetime commitment, in the same way that marriage vows are (or, at least, that's how they're designed). A lack of willingness to live up to one doesn't necessarily indicate a lack of willingness to live up to the other, but it does indicate a lack of good judgment on the part of that individual, and a possibility of being put into a vulnerable position by enemy intelligence services. I can't be the only Archer fan here, but the 'honeypot' is not just Sterling Archer's favorite intelligence operation; it does actually happen.

That's only one example of the sort of things that people who aren't ethically sound can be drawn into. There are lots of examples of bribes, kickbacks, embezzlements, etc., involving military personnel. All of those are, IMO, moral issues.

I suppose that while I understand your distinction between personal and professional ethics, I don't consider them separable as you apparently do.