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Rifleman
02-15-2007, 09:50 AM
Here's a link to William Lind's article for February 13, 2007. It concerns the current hype in some circles over distributed operations; more or less what it is, what it isn't, and what it could be or should be. I think you will find Lind to be his usual controversial self. I liked this latest article though.

http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive.htm

jcustis
02-15-2007, 02:25 PM
I've got my issues with DO as well, but Mr. Lind demonstrates once again a certain degree of ignorance through his writing, which is a pity.

Sea Dragon was a concept experiment, not merely a justification to fund new programs. It was also not developed with small wars in mind per se, which undoubtedly do need lots of light infantry.

I think Mr. Lind is simply barking up the wrong tree. DO depends on tactical mobility, whether one wants to admit it or not, and that mobility has to have a relative advantage over the enemy's mobility. When operating in the hinterlands of Afghanistan, Jaeger tactics won't amount to crap unless you can move.

Across the spectrum of distributed operations, light infantry might not even be the answer. Although they had an infantry core, the British SAS and Long Range Desert Group (built from Commonwealth formations) didn't look like light infantry at all. They operated behind enemy lines, usually without mutual support, but relied on cavalry tactics to a degree, and a whole lotta vehicles to do it.

LAVs can offer a degree of tactical mobility required for distributed operations, but I guess it is pointless to look a their further development because they are from "a long list of the usual big-bucks programs—"MRAP, EFV, JLTV, LAV, V-22, CH53K," L-70 class Zeppelins etc.—which distributed ops supposedly justifies." :wry:

From the Wikipedia article on Lind (who by the way never once rucked up):


Lind has authored and co-authored a number of monographs on behalf of the Free Congress Foundation attempting to persuade American conservatives to support government funding for mass transit programs. He was a co-host of an NET program on light rail called The New Electric Railway Journal.

Maybe we should just move about the battlefield on light rails. Give me a break...Maybe Mr. Lind needs to be given a whole lot of books on the history of the N. Africa Campaign in WWII.
-----
Edited to add: As I step back and think about it, I think some of the confusion on DO may stem from the historical examples used. I strongly believe that the Long Range Desert Group is actually a markedly better case study to use when discussing DO. Anyone from MCWL and MCCDC listening?

Steve Blair
02-15-2007, 06:37 PM
I see a lot of fluff in this article, combined perhaps with some sour grapes that Mr Lind wasn't one of the "usual suspects" contacted (and contracted) to work on the project. He's also taking his light infantry stuff at something of a historical half-mast. Some armies may have used them in a guerrilla mode, but on the whole they were intended (and normally used) as highly trained skirmishing units with a good marksman capability (through the use of rifles) thrown in. Certainly there was talk of using them in other roles, but it normally didn't come to pass.

The LRDG was actually closer to light cavalry than infantry in terms of its raiding and reconnaissance role. Use of historical examples has often been a stumbling block for some military theorists, unfortunately. I'm reminded here of the "examples" Warden pulled for his Air Campaign, but that's a whole other rant....:D

TROUFION
02-16-2007, 12:26 AM
-----
Edited to add: As I step back and think about it, I think some of the confusion on DO may stem from the historical examples used. I strongly believe that the Long Range Desert Group is actually a markedly better case study to use when discussing DO. Anyone from MCWL and MCCDC listening?

Another WWII example that should, in my opinion, be looked at for a historical review regarding DO are the Long Range Penetration Operations of the Burma Campaign (Orde Wingate and Slim). Of particular interest is the 'Special Force' more commonly known as 'Chindits'. The use of airborne inserted, mobile columns, supplied by air, with a special purpose built 'air commando' was novel then and fits some of the DO concepts now.

Stratiotes
02-16-2007, 12:30 AM
I have been, in the past, a huge fan of Bill's. His work on maneuver warfare and 4GW is generally quite good. But, at times he does seem to have a bad habit of making blanket judgements or mischaracterizing some things. He is not just some nobody who has never served however - he is a pretty bright guy who has made some significant contributions in the past. This may not be one of them but I wouldnt' throw Bill out with the bathwater :).

jcustis
02-16-2007, 02:52 AM
Another WWII example that should, in my opinion, be looked at for a historical review regarding DO are the Long Range Penetration Operations of the Burma Campaign (Orde Wingate and Slim). Of particular interest is the 'Special Force' more commonly known as 'Chindits'. The use of airborne inserted, mobile columns, supplied by air, with a special purpose built 'air commando' was novel then and fits some of the DO concepts now.


I believe that the example of the Chindits are part of the reason why DO is confusing. For example, after they were inserted, they had no relative mobility advantage. The Japanese were either on foot like the Chindits, or happened to be constrained by the jungle. That constraint didn't make them less mobile than the Chindits, IMO, b/c when the Chindits got themselves into the midst of decent road and river networks, the Japanese came close to cornering them on a couple of occasions.

Chindit operations were also constrained by the wet monsoon season, and IIRC, was part of the impetus behind a anticipated 90-day window of operations.

TROUFION
02-16-2007, 04:30 AM
The fact that the Chindit ops faced constrants is the point. When you read the DO theory you see a tendency to use future tech promises to remove the effects of weather, terrain, enemy and relative mobility. In the case of the Chindits the Jungle, the air commando, the jungle skills, the use of FWCAS, and OSS/indig forces gave the Chindits realtive superiority. The radios they carried, the air resupply capability and indig foces gave them a level of communication and aggregation-deaggregation capability the enemy could not match. It was of course a unit designed to fight in jungle terrain only,, it was not intended to fight in open conflict and when pressed to do so as at Mytkynia they suffered. Historical examples are only capable of providing a perspective, what can work, what has worked and what is ineffective and what should be shelved. DO has a lot of open questions we should not write off any past close approximations. LRDG and LRPG are very similiar and neither is an exact guide for future DO.

jcustis
02-16-2007, 05:02 AM
The radios they carried, the air resupply capability and indig foces gave them a level of communication and aggregation-deaggregation capability the enemy could not match.

I'll give you the capabilities, but I'm not seeing the aggregation part. Didn't the columns remain separated throughout ops?

I'm doing intermittent reading of "Codebreaker in the Far East" by Alan Stripp. Based on what I've gotten through so far, the capability to decipher Japanese codes was fairly robust by 1943, and it makes me wonder how signals interception factored into Chindit movements and target planning.

Let's develop this a bit further, if you can humor me TROUFION...You make mention of the Chindits actually having relative superiority, but were there any lasting results? Did they sever any lines of communication that weren't restored in quick order? Did they tie down any formations, and if so, which ones? Did they pass on actionable intelligence that contributed to the destruction of any Japanese combat formation?

Finally, what would the Chindits have been were it not for Allied air superiority at the time, and the availability of CAS as a supporting arm?

I'm not trying to downplay the Chindits, just that I'm not so sure those operations bear the fruit of lessons learned that many people think.

TROUFION
02-16-2007, 12:29 PM
Here are the stats that I know of:

During the first 90 days of the Chindits, a brigade sized air ground task force, second operation March-May 1944. The Chindit 'special force' supported by the 1st Air Commando succeeded in:

Supporting the major offensive in southern and central Burma, Impahl-Kohima, by Slim's 14th Army by 1) destroying @70 enemy aircraft, 2) cutting the line of food and ammo supply 3) tieing down the equivalent of 2 and a half Japanesse Div.

"General Wingate's airborne tactics put a great obstacle in the way of our Imphal plan and were an important reason for its failure." Japanese 15th Army Commander.

Further: the columns moved about the jungle with speed and through radio and OSS/indig support were able to and did at many different points aggregate and deaggregate. This was a key component of their mobility and allowed them to conduct several larger scale assaults.

No analogy is perfect, and the Chindit force had a lot of downsides. They were missused in assaulting Mytkiniya-they lacked artillery and due to monsoons and scheduling the 1st Air Commando no longer flew for them at this time, they were kept in the field beyond the planned 90 day mark which seriously degraded their combat effectiveness. But these very downsides are what make the operations valuable to DO study. It is hard to replicate the effects of weather, distance , indigenous populations and extended combat in the DO experimentation. The 77th Inf which was the CHindit Special Force's official title, was made up of regular troops, not SAS types, regular troops who recieved extra training for jungle-airborne ops. Further LRP was somewhat radical in its day and controversial much the same as DO, the fight to get LRP actualized and supported is a similiar fight that proponents od DO face.

-T

jcustis
02-16-2007, 03:52 PM
The link will take you to the Marine Corps University page, and has some expanded scope of things DO:

http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/MCRCweb/Library/DOHome.htm

Rifleman
02-16-2007, 08:48 PM
I don't know how relevant this is, but I'll toss it out for consideration.

I think the SF Mobile Guerrilla Forces, aka the Blackjack projects, probably took the Chindit/Merrill's Marauders concept to the next level.

They accompolished a lot tactically; however, I don't know how significant or lasting the effects were. It seems to me that any study of the DO concept should include them though.

I've read one of Jim Donohue's books about the operations. I intend to read the others.

Xenophon
04-18-2007, 10:22 PM
Off topic a little bit, but I completely agree with his most recent (April 16th) article. But, I'd like to see him suggest how to make that transition. Not just complain that it hasn't been done.

PhilR
04-19-2007, 07:27 PM
I had some involvement at MCCDC in reincarnation of DO back in 2004(interestingly, many of the "usual suspects" from the USMC Hunter Warrior experiments).
What I don't like about the current USMC definition is that it describes units operating out of mutual support range of one another. I think that the whole point of DO is to redefine, through training, education, technology, etc. what exactly "mutual support" is and what distances it can be effected at.
It seems that much of modern warfare is simply the story of the tug between dispersion and concentration (look at Napoleon's corps). There are many variables: communications (to coordinate external fires and logistics), mobility, internal fires capabilities (that has to balance for mobility and logistics), training and maturity (how independent can units operate depending on the environment).
DO applies to every unit in every mission--its just how physically dispersed they can be and still be able to mass the appropriate "effects" (whether these be fires, civil affairs, training indiginous forces).
The current thrust of USMC DO seems to be to validate small unit infantry organization and equipping. I welcome DO if it means we're putting brainpower and $$ to supporting squads (compared to the money we put towards aviation and other big items).

ericmwalters
04-25-2007, 05:00 PM
I think as the DO concept translates from theory to application in the field we'll see it mature in ways well enough to decide whether or not Mr. Lind has reason to be wary. He was not alone in his negative impressions of some of the experimentation regarding what many thought was DO--notably the HUNTER WARRIOR evolution. Then Major John Schmitt--author of the venerable FMFM 1 Warfighting and a man who certainly has "rucked up"--wrote extensively of these same concerns. I'd also heard LtGen P.K. Van Riper echo these same concerns in other fora.

Regarding JCUSTIS's comment that:

As I step back and think about it, I think some of the confusion on DO may stem from the historical examples used.
I couldn't agree more. I've got a rather large PowerPoint file (with animation and speaker notes) that outlines a larger historical survey of DO if anyone is interested in getting it. Regrettably it does not contain the Long Range Desert Group, but I could easily work that in if we think the CHINDIT example doesn't do that particular facet of the concept justice.

--Eric
ericmwalters@yahoo.com
eric.m.walters@usmc.mil

Granite_State
07-20-2007, 04:48 AM
http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_07_16/article1.html

Tom Odom
07-20-2007, 12:30 PM
While I agree that the only applicable defintion of "victory" that means anything in Iraq is restoration of the state---in other words putting it back to where it was when we started--I also believe the likelihood of that happening is small.

But Lind in his ever present push for 4GW theory now proposes putting Al Sadr in charge as the man most likely to succeed is stunning. Whether you find it stunning in its brilliance or its stupidty is up to you.

I would pick stupidity and suggest Lind link up with Diana West.

Tom

SteveMetz
07-20-2007, 12:55 PM
While I agree that the only applicable defintion of "victory" that means anything in Iraq is restoration of the state---in other words putting it back to where it was when we started--I also believe the likelihood of that happening is small.

But Lind in his ever present push for 4GW theory now proposes putting Al Sadr in charge as the man most likely to succeed is stunning. Whether you find it stunning in its brilliance or its stupidty is up to you.

I would pick stupidity and suggest Lind link up with Diana West.

Tom

I can't figure out the motives of people like Lind and Luttwak with his "kill them all and plow salt into the earth" counterinsurgency strategy.

West I can understand--she knows she isn't trying to actually influence policy but is just trying to sell papers. So like Michael Moore, Limbaugh, Coulter, etc., she realizes that utter nonsense will appeal to some.

But Lind (and Luttwak) I would think actually want to be taken seriously by policymakers. Writing stuff like this erodes that possibility. What worries me is that while most people who are in a position to influence policy realize that West, Coulter, Limbaugh etc are entertainers and not policy analysts, there are people who take Lind (and Luttwak) seriously.

Steve Blair
07-20-2007, 01:11 PM
While I agree that the only applicable defintion of "victory" that means anything in Iraq is restoration of the state---in other words putting it back to where it was when we started--I also believe the likelihood of that happening is small.

But Lind in his ever present push for 4GW theory now proposes putting Al Sadr in charge as the man most likely to succeed is stunning. Whether you find it stunning in its brilliance or its stupidty is up to you.

I would pick stupidity and suggest Lind link up with Diana West.

Tom

No!:eek: They might reproduce then...:eek:

I think Lind got a taste of the policy thing during the maneuver warfare push and really liked it. After that he's just been playing the "see what Generation I have TODAY" game.

jcustis
07-20-2007, 02:56 PM
I need an emoticon that is holding its head in its hands...shaking.

It's no so much because I disagree with Lind on the Al-Sadr thing (and I do), but it's the fact that this is what the war has come to. We have begun to grasp at straws because there are so few options remaining.

I liked the analysis, and Lind may be spot on that a Christian invader may never be able to restore institutions in Iraq that have any chance of lasting. That is, not unless we develop a predisposition to violence and heavy-handedness that bends opponents and bystanders to our will, and in turn setting us back on that Catch-22 cycle.

Old Eagle
07-20-2007, 03:36 PM
I like the final paragraph where he ponders the effect on the presidential debates if one of the candidates were to back his proposal.

Waiting with baited breath ...out.

tequila
07-20-2007, 04:03 PM
I'd love to see a poll where we find out just how many presidential candidates could identify who Muqtada al-Sadr actually was, or what religious sect he was from.

I'm betting we'd see a pass rate under 50%.

Ski
07-20-2007, 04:38 PM
You noticed that as well?

I can tell you that he has met with at least one Presidental candidate.

Take that as you will.



I like the final paragraph where he ponders the effect on the presidential debates if one of the candidates were to back his proposal.

Waiting with baited breath ...out.

Granite_State
07-20-2007, 04:40 PM
While I agree that the only applicable defintion of "victory" that means anything in Iraq is restoration of the state---in other words putting it back to where it was when we started--I also believe the likelihood of that happening is small.

But Lind in his ever present push for 4GW theory now proposes putting Al Sadr in charge as the man most likely to succeed is stunning. Whether you find it stunning in its brilliance or its stupidty is up to you.

I would pick stupidity and suggest Lind link up with Diana West.

Tom

To be fair, Lind didn't say America should (or more importantly, could) put Sadr in charge. He wrote: "The one chance of victory we have left is to get out of the way of al-Sadr and anyone else in Iraq who might be able to re-create an Iraqi state"...

Obviously Sadr is not a good guy, but from what I understand he is far more of an Iraqi nationalist than most of the Shiite parties, like SCIRI (forget their new name), which are closer to Iran.

Of course, if we had a real deal with Iran, that wouldn't be as big a plus. Surprised no one has mentioned Lind's talk of rapprochement, that seemed to me to be the boldest thing in the article.

Merv Benson
07-20-2007, 04:43 PM
Metz said:


But Lind (and Luttwak) I would think actually want to be taken seriously by policymakers. Writing stuff like this erodes that possibility. What worries me is that while most people who are in a position to influence policy realize that West, Coulter, Limbaugh etc are entertainers and not policy analysts, there are people who take Lind (and Luttwak) seriously.

Unlike West and Coulter, Limbaugh actually supports Gen. Petraeus and the counterinsurgency strategy he is implementing in Iraq. He wants to see the military be given a chance to succeed. I am not sure what you would find wrong with that.

Granite_State
07-20-2007, 04:43 PM
I'd love to see a poll where we find out just how many presidential candidates could identify who Muqtada al-Sadr actually was, or what religious sect he was from.

I'm betting we'd see a pass rate under 50%.

I think if you asked them to give you more than three or four sentences on him, you'd be under 25%. The rhetoric you see from virtually all of them, even in places like Foreign Policy, is incredibly simplistic and even stupid.

Abu Buckwheat
07-20-2007, 04:52 PM
Obviously Sadr is not a good guy, but from what I understand he is far more of an Iraqi nationalist than most of the Shiite parties, like SCIRI (forget their new name), which are closer to Iran.

Of course, if we had a real deal with Iran, that wouldn't be as big a plus. Surprised no one has mentioned Lind's talk of rapprochement, that seemed to me to be the boldest thing in the article.

Al-Sadr as an alternative? Really? Thats a new level of insanity I hadn't considered before. Al-Sadr is setting himself and the MM as the new Hizballah/Hamas of Iraq. He has spent the last year separating the MM from the government and playing tight with Iran. Iran is playing bth SCIRI and the MM but a well tuned and compliant proxy force in Iraq that ignores the central government and empowered with hard killing advanced weapons like EFPs is in their interest and has already yielded long term resuslts in Lebanon. Hala Jaber's Hezbollah-Born with a Vengence (1st Edition) really captures this strategy of enter, ignore, supply Charity, build trust then build an army.. the MM have it sort of backwards but they did stand up to the US army three years ago and that bought a measure of respect. Enough respect to be a deal-maker or breaker to PM Maliki. He is intending to go on his own with the IRGC supporting him, but will the Badr and SCIRI allow it ... MAS is not someone we should bank on.

jcustis
07-20-2007, 04:54 PM
To be fair, Lind didn't say America should (or more importantly, could) put Sadr in charge. He wrote: "The one chance of victory we have left is to get out of the way of al-Sadr and anyone else in Iraq who might be able to re-create an Iraqi state"...

Obviously Sadr is not a good guy, but from what I understand he is far more of an Iraqi nationalist than most of the Shiite parties, like SCIRI (forget their new name), which are closer to Iran.

Of course, if we had a real deal with Iran, that wouldn't be as big a plus. Surprised no one has mentioned Lind's talk of rapprochement, that seemed to me to be the boldest thing in the article.

Oh, I'm all about rapprochment, but that's just the realist in me who knows we cannot wave a big stick around every time a gnat flies in our ear. Like using the honey vs. vinegar approach.

Jedburgh
07-20-2007, 06:39 PM
....Iran is playing bth SCIRI and the MM but a well tuned and compliant proxy force in Iraq that ignores the central government and empowered with hard killing advanced weapons like EFPs is in their interest....
Very good article in the Jul 07 Jane's Intelligence Review (http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/index.shtml): Shia backlash - Anti-coalition Sadrist factions in Iraq, for those with access:

...Although many Iraqi Shia groups are highly suspicious of Iranian motives, they are also in desperate need of financial and logistics support, as well as training. It is notable that Tehran's military assistance comprises weapons that are principally for use against coalition forces and bases - stand-off weapons such as armour-piercing roadside bombs, sniper rifles and indirect fire weapons. Tehran has also sought to dissuade its clients from undertaking internecine attacks and has acted as an intermediary in recent clashes between factions in Basra and other areas of southern and central Iraq.

This focus on anti-coalition attacks has opened up new relationships between Iran and the break-away Sadrist militias that are opposed to Iranian influence. Instead of courting Moqtada al-Sadr to attain high-level influence over the Sadrist movement, the Iranians appear to be taking a grassroots approach to influence the smaller militias....
I also want to second Abu Buckwheat's recommendation of Hala Jaber's Hezbollah-Born with a Vengence (http://www.amazon.com/Hezbollah-Hala-Jaber/dp/0231108346/ref=sr_1_1/104-4445286-0697562?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1184956718&sr=1-1).

Granite_State
07-21-2007, 06:10 PM
You noticed that as well?

I can tell you that he has met with at least one Presidental candidate.

Take that as you will.

I'm guessing idle speculation will not be rewarded with a name?

Ski
07-23-2007, 12:25 PM
You seem like a politically tuned in type of dude, I'm sure you can add one plus one together to figure out who this might be...;)




I'm guessing idle speculation will not be rewarded with a name?

William F. Owen
02-25-2008, 12:25 PM
1. Nothing against Mr Lind personally, except I think his writing and agendas have damaged US military thought, almost beyond repair and sowed confusion where none was needed.

2. Could someone tell me WHY D.O. is required? Not why the USMC wants to do it, but why anyone would be doing it?

jcustis
02-25-2008, 02:09 PM
I think in many circles the whole DO thing fits into similar theoretical constructs that deal with satellite patrolling, ink drop tactics, hive theory, etc.

Besides the sexy factor, I believe that the only reasonable and rational impetus comes from a desire to reduce the size of our formations (from an enemy targeting perspective). I haven't really tuned myself in to even why the Marine Corps wants to do it, since I heard from sources inside the issue what the equipment headaches would look like.

We are struggling to field even decent individual webbing equipment to the whole force, so I cast a dim eye when doctrinal constructs lean on technology (e.g. we get more capable optics, but don't train folks well on the basic Steiners we already have) too much.

Rifleman
02-25-2008, 11:31 PM
Wilf,

What interests me about Lind's writings is the whole non-nation state enemy idea. It has serious implications for law enforcement. I know there's always been battles between a nation's military forces and networks, tribes, cartels, mafias, etc., but Lind seems to be talking about them having a "monopoly" on violence in the future. If that turns out to be true then LE will be a bigger player than ever before.

As far as MW, DO, 4GW and other Lind ideas go, I don't know. He may be out to lunch from a military perspective. But I read Lind from an LE perspective.

jcustis
02-26-2008, 02:25 AM
2. Could someone tell me WHY D.O. is required? Not why the USMC wants to do it, but why anyone would be doing it?

I thought about your question above in more depth as I drove home from work today. As I said above, I'm a little on the fringe when it comes to what Colonels and Generals alike have said about why we need DO, but at the core (and beyond the sexiness) I think the impetus may be an urge to match enemy assymetric capabilities.

Think of Taliban/AQ elements in the Afghanistan context. We haven't done that good of a job running them to ground while lumbering around in large formations. In the current scheme of things, the lowest-level unit capable of extended and independent operations may be X size. Well, we aren't killing a lot of bad guys with X size units, so some probably feel we need to reduce our signature and footprint in order to gain that edge in surprise.

The problem is that while it may have worked okay enough when both antagonists in a conflict were foreigners (Germans vs. Commonwealth in N. Africa...Chindits vs. Japanese in S.E. Asia...etc.) in a strange land, things become a bit more tenuous when the enemy is swimming in the sea and you're nothing more than a fisherman trying to avoid falling out of the canoe. That's why I think we need to have the ability to revert to DO when the time/space permits itself, but we are in for an ass-whoopin' if we want to kid ourselves that that is the only way to go, and we can just aggregate to meet larger threats.

William F. Owen
02-26-2008, 05:22 AM
Wilf,

What interests me about Lind's writings is the whole non-nation state enemy idea. It has serious implications for law enforcement. I know there's always been battles between a nation's military forces and networks, tribes, cartels, mafias, etc., but Lind seems to be talking about them having a "monopoly" on violence in the future. If that turns out to be true then LE will be a bigger player than ever before.


Well let's not forget LE was originally a military task. The dividing line between LE and Military is pretty blurred sometimes. We, the British, got it more right than most in terms of our colonial experience.

To my mind, LE is about countering commercial endeavours, while military is about countering violent political endeavours. Where they cross, you get the fusion or synthesis of the two areas (or should). Look at Colombia, Sierra Leone and the Niger delta for a snap shot of this type of event. Where the enemy are your countrymen, and/or acting in your sovereign territory, then the police should have primacy.

...now pretty much all the serious thinkers in this area, including yourself, can reach this conclusion without too much trouble, yet Lind seems to live in some other reality where supporting the idea, regardless of the evidence, seems paramount.

William F. Owen
02-26-2008, 05:25 AM
I thought about your question above in more depth as I drove home from work today.

Humbled by your concern!


The problem is that while it may have worked okay enough when both antagonists in a conflict were foreigners (Germans vs. Commonwealth in N. Africa...Chindits vs. Japanese in S.E. Asia...etc.) in a strange land, things become a bit more tenuous when the enemy is swimming in the sea and you're nothing more than a fisherman trying to avoid falling out of the canoe. That's why I think we need to have the ability to revert to DO when the time/space permits itself, but we are in for an ass-whoopin' if we want to kid ourselves that that is the only way to go, and we can just aggregate to meet larger threats.

Excellent point and I have high lighted your very useful insight. Many thanks!

slapout9
01-12-2010, 11:26 PM
A while back I finally found an affordable paperback copy of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook by William S. Lind. I thought it was a very impressive book especially the appendix by Colonel Wyly "The Fundamentals Of Tactics."
He lists 5:
1-Surfaces and Gaps
2-Mission Tactics
3-The Main Effort
4-Concept Of The Objective
5-Concept Of The Reserve

On other threads we have had discussions of some of the liabilities of the MW concept but when I read the original book I don't see any problems with it. In fact it may be very useful to adopt MW thinking in our War On Terrorism or what ever we are now calling it.

One concept that comes to mind immediately is the Main Effort. Colonel Wyly points out that this may be the most important concept of all and indeed it makes sense to me. Our fundamental problem seems to be that we do not have a Main Effort in the WOT. Thoughts and Comments?

Steve Blair
01-12-2010, 11:27 PM
Somewhere I just heard Wilf's head explode......;)

Actually, I tend to think that MW is like any other concept...there is good in it, but when carried to bizarre extremes of dogmatism it becomes bad. The same can be said for the XGW theories of warfare, reliance on conventional (or nuclear) deterrence and so on.

Fuchs
01-12-2010, 11:42 PM
I thought that booklet was actually quite good at the time when I read it, but that was years ago. There's worse stuff available. It sounded at times quite like a very, very long statement of belief.


Today I would likely begin to criticize many things in that booklet that began to differ from my views in the meantime, but that doesn't mean much. This will be unavoidable with every book until I completed my own one. :D

Chris jM
05-06-2010, 10:33 AM
I came across Lind's book in the back of a library, and remembering this thread and your recommendation I picked it up. Very easy to read - got through it in a few hours.

I am not convinced, however, having weighed up the criticisms for and against MW. It seems to be a great framework 70% of this time, which renders it somewhat flawed as a construct for fighting your wars.

I did like the importance by Lind and later Col Wyly stressed upon recon-pull. It's common sense but something I have never done or seen done well, being happier to palm off 'recce' to Bn elm and then wander (bumble?) around as a Pl complete, without a recce screen fd. Live and learn.

In explaining battlefield success as a series of belief statements as Fuch termed it I think Lind is right for the wrong reasons. The MW Handbook makes it sound very easy, but I doubt the utility of the ideas when the going gets tough and you have to go head to head with the enemy's strength.

My preference is for working to Stephen Biddle's 'Modern System' he outlined in Military Power. While his work was not prescriptive for success ala a handbook, he outlined the reasons behind mission comd, dispersion, depth, combined arms, fire and manoeuvre etc in a way that I found faultless. The unfortunate thing is that he does not offer quick 'cheats' to success as Lind does, possibly because there is no such thing as quick fixes to warfighting success.

Further, I think MW is perfectly suited to the likes of the Israeli's who have inbred initiative and msn command into their organisational culture. I think the British system is far more disposed towards methodical, concentrated deliberate operations against enemy strength as opposed to the flash, sexy MW image. Trying to impose or achieve highly decentralised tactics won't work as effectively in this culture, and ignoring the aesthetic attractions of military ballet ala MW, the last century of Anglo-Saxon dominance on the battlefield has been achieved without MW philosophy.

While I'm being overly critical as to the merits of the concept, I did enjoy the handbook and found it a very good thought-provoking read that deserves a second going-over in the future.

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 12:35 PM
.
My preference is for working to Stephen Biddle's 'Modern System' he outlined in Military Power. While his work was not prescriptive for success ala a handbook, he outlined the reasons behind mission comd, dispersion, depth, combined arms, fire and manoeuvre etc in a way that I found faultless. The unfortunate thing is that he does not offer quick 'cheats' to success as Lind does, possibly because there is no such thing as quick fixes to warfighting success.
Important book. Some of it is annoyingly and not usefully academic, but the basics are extremely sound and well reasoned. I strongly recommend it.

As concerns Lind's book, I think I have covered it extensively on other threads.

William F. Owen
05-06-2010, 12:43 PM
Further, I think MW is perfectly suited to the likes of the Israeli's who have inbred initiative and msn command into their organisational culture. I think the British system is far more disposed towards methodical, concentrated deliberate operations against enemy strength as opposed to the flash, sexy MW image.
The idea that the IDF do or adhere to something called "MW" is a myth generated by the MW camp, based on a poor understanding of how the Israelis actually work. For example, what some folk think is "mission command" is very different from what a lot of IDF officers think is mission command.

Chris jM
05-07-2010, 12:26 AM
The idea that the IDF do or adhere to something called "MW" is a myth generated by the MW camp, based on a poor understanding of how the Israelis actually work. For example, what some folk think is "mission command" is very different from what a lot of IDF officers think is mission command.

True, my bad. I was really getting at the fact that MW ideology aspires to achieve the kind of decentralized, adaptive and audacious leadership shown by the Israeli's in 1956/67. My point was then that the Israeli way of war at the time enabled them to undertake those kinds of campaigns, whereas the British system is orientated in a different direction in the realm of war-fighting.

Red Rat
06-11-2010, 03:42 PM
The idea that the IDF do or adhere to something called "MW" is a myth generated by the MW camp, based on a poor understanding of how the Israelis actually work. For example, what some folk think is "mission command" is very different from what a lot of IDF officers think is mission command.
Wilf,

Please elaborate as I am now intrigued; what do IDF officers regard as Mission Command?

Do you have a good book on the IDF you could recommend? I am going through "34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon" by Amos Harel which is whetting my appetite to learn more.

William F. Owen
06-11-2010, 04:37 PM
Please elaborate as I am now intrigued; what do IDF officers regard as Mission Command?

They do not have one version of it, nor where they really aware that they were doing it, till the MW crowd started talking about it. Essentially, it means doing your best and not giving up. Inaction is simply never permissible. Action is expected. The man on the spot is expected to know best and act accordingly.
What the UK calls "Mission Command" they call "Command."


Do you have a good book on the IDF you could recommend? I am going through "34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon" by Amos Harel which is whetting my appetite to learn more.
34 Days is OK, but there are a number of errors, because it was written too soon after the conflict.
Reuven Gal's "A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier" is old, but it's a good start.

Polarbear1605
06-11-2010, 06:12 PM
In an effort to get back to the original question, not seeing a Main Effort for the WOT; I have to agree, I don’t see one either. The US military has taken a considerable step back from MW. We (the Marines) worked the concept very hard in the early 80’s. Major Wyly (then) initially called it the “Point of Main Effort”. The problem with that term is that it sent all of us AWS students to our maps looking for the ME between grid lines. The Marines later changed the term to “Focus of Effort”. Also remember the Maneuver Warfare Hand book is an early effort.
Col Wyly would probably call the ME the unit that the commander would use to accomplish a decisive decision on the battlefield. It is a unifying tool in that all other units then become supporting units because whatever decisions their commanders make, those decisions must contribute to the success of the ME. As we tried to work our way through this concept, we found that you first needed a commander’s intent and then a ME. We also learned that the two (Commander Intent and ME) could not exist separately but were dependent on one another.
Assuming that the WOT is at the strategic level, and understanding there was never a ME designated; and looking at the history of the WOT; I would have to say that the first ME was the CIA and its invasion and take down of Afghanistan in 2001. It was there that the ME shifted from the CIA to DOD (Rumsfeld). I didn’t say you would like it but that is my opinion regarding a historically example of a strategic ME.

slapout9
06-11-2010, 08:13 PM
I would have to say that the first ME was the CIA and its invasion and take down of Afghanistan in 2001. It was there that the ME shifted from the CIA to DOD (Rumsfeld). I didn’t say you would like it but that is my opinion regarding a historically example of a strategic ME.

That is solid gold!!!!!!!! strangely according to the book the 5! original concepts of his "fundamentals of tactics" were reduced to 3 for the whole Amphibious Warfare Class. Mission Tactics,Main Effort,Surfaces and Gaps. The concept of the Objective and the Reserve were taught only to his (Col. Wyly's)"Den" according to the book. And yet the concept or rather the confusion over the difference between a Mission vs. an Objective was and is one of the most important parts of the book.

In Wyly's later lectures he did specifically state that the Main Effort was not just a unit (what) but also a where, you can't have one without the other and then he goes to further state as you(Polarbear) have that it all works together.

The Marine Corps has lost something by deviating from the orginal core concepts IMO it's the basis of a whole new 5 Rings theory IMO:D

But Colonel Warden's designation of a "Key Force" has a lot of similarities to the concept of a "Main Effort."

slapout9
06-11-2010, 08:36 PM
"Consider the principle of the objective. Remember, the main effort is where you determine you are going to do something decisive. That should be what you do when you select an objective. Therefore, there is a relationship."

From Colonel Wyly's Lecture No.3-The Main Effort.

Polarbear1605
06-11-2010, 10:26 PM
True the ME is also a where and part of the where is "The Commander should be with his ME (not to supervise but to support (or shift the ME). Take a look at "Panzer Leader" - p.100 Guderian talks about a battalion commander, the brigade CO and the division commnader along with himself all observing a ME attack. Do you have a date on those Wyly lectures...to me it sounds like your dabbling in the early stuff...not that it was wrong but a lot of evolution continued to turn from 81 to 89-90 or so.

slapout9
06-11-2010, 11:35 PM
I was using the Maneuver Warfare Philosophy this afternoon. My higher headquarters (wife) gave me the Mission of getting some stuff for a B-B-Que this weekend. Since no one was available for me to delegate the mission to I became the Main Effort and as such I selected the Objective of Winn Dixie. While en route to the Objective I negotiated the Surfaces (road construction and auto accident) by finding Gaps (detours) to the Objective.

Upon my arrival at the Objective I discovered I could not accomplish my Mission based upon the lack of good Ribs for B-B-Que even though I had secured the Objective, but as in rapid war like circumstances the Objective was no longer relevant. Since selection of the Objective is part of the responsibility of the ME commander I selected another Objective and began to travel toward it again mindful of the Surfaces and Gaps. This time upon arriving at the Objective the correct Pork Ribs and Beer were acquired and I returned to home base and reported to Higher that the Mission had been accomplished.

MW is a whole new theory of life:)

jmm99
06-12-2010, 01:19 AM
I've looked at John Schmitt, 1989 FMFM 1 Warfighting (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Warfit1.htm) and John Schmitt, 1997 MCDP 1 Warfighting (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1.pdf), which both have sections on Maneuver Warfare.

The 1989 version is fairly short:


MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. But in order to fully appreciate what we mean by maneuver we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in time as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in both dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

From this definition we see that the aim in maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion--his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole--rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time-consuming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have paralyzed his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.

This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. Nor do we means to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. But the aim is not an unfocused application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of maneuver to contribute to the enemy's shock and moral disruption. The greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction--the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly--but the moral dislocation it causes.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greater tempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late--until eventually he is overcome by events.

Also inherent is the need for violence, not so much as a source of physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation. Toward this end, we concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.

The final weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer several courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

The 1997 version seems to follow the above (I did not do a word for word) and adds but a paragraph to its MW section:


Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness,
an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in
consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.

The 1989 version then goes to its section PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND. The 1997 version inserts a section ORIENTING ON THE ENEMY and then PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND.

Chapter 4, The Conduct of War, section headings in 1989
—The Challenge
—Maneuver Warfare
—Philosophy of Command
—Shaping the Battle
—Decision Making
—Mission Tactics
—Commander's Intent
—Focus of Effort
—Surfaces and Gaps
—Combined Arms

Chapter 4, The Conduct of War, section headings in 1997
—The Challenge
—Maneuver Warfare
—Orienting on the Enemy
—Philosophy of Command
—Shaping the Action
—Decisionmaking
—Mission Tactics
—Commander’s Intent
—Main Effort
—Surfaces and Gaps
—Combined Arms
—Conclusion

Now, having eaten up too many bytes showing what my question is based on, my question is:

What is (are) the major difference(s) - if any - between 1985 Lind-Wyly vs 1989 Warfighting vs 1997 Warfighting ?

Regards

Mike

slapout9
06-12-2010, 03:11 AM
Do you have a date on those Wyly lectures...to me it sounds like your dabbling in the early stuff...not that it was wrong but a lot of evolution continued to turn from 81 to 89-90 or so.

According to the book the lectures started in the fall of 1981.

slapout9
06-12-2010, 03:26 AM
A while back I finally found an affordable paperback copy of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook by William S. Lind. I thought it was a very impressive book especially the appendix by Colonel Wyly "The Fundamentals Of Tactics."
He lists 5:
1-Surfaces and Gaps
2-Mission Tactics
3-The Main Effort
4-Concept Of The Objective
5-Concept Of The Reserve




jmm99 from the my original post the 5 basic concepts are the difference. The first 3 have remained constant through all editions. The last 2 Objective and Reserve were deleted.....serious mistake IMO and the other 2 editions you mentioned have added other items to list without adding any real value IMO.

That is why I was so interested in seeing the original documents. The original truth. The lecture on the Objective is so critical IMO that leaving it out almost jeopardizes the whole theory. Why this was done I still don'tknow especially since some of the context on why we lost Vietnam would seem very relevant to the situation in Afghanistan and the War on Terror or whatever we are calling nowadays.

If it was applied today the Mission: would be be to kill capture UBL and his AQ associates. The Objective would have to be the Whole World!!!! otherwise you could never accomplish your mission, because each local objective (location of the enemy) could change quickly. For that reason Wyly points out that you assign Missions BUT never assign Objectives. Objectives are chosen by lower level commanders based upon what and where the enemy Currently is, which may change at any moment. Makes sense to me.

William F. Owen
06-12-2010, 05:28 AM
Colonel Wyly "The Fundamentals Of Tactics."
He lists 5:
1-Surfaces and Gaps
2-Mission Tactics
3-The Main Effort
4-Concept Of The Objective
5-Concept Of The Reserve

I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defence. More over how do you use it in defence?
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.

Polarbear1605
06-12-2010, 11:07 AM
I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny.
Yep!...basically it didn't...but the concepts continued to build and grow with the USMC Warfighting manual FMFM 1. Remember at the time we were trying to figuer out what MW was based on the Boyd "Patterns of Conflict" Brief and all those damn arrows

William F. Owen
06-12-2010, 12:36 PM
Remember at the time we were trying to figuer out what MW was based on the Boyd "Patterns of Conflict" Brief and all those damn arrows
Rorschach of Conflict is a better title. I was just re-reading "Patterns" the other day. I just don't see it personally. How this ever got as far as it did, is a mystery to me, especially in the UK.

Polarbear1605
06-12-2010, 01:06 PM
Rorschach...lol...good discription! Agree but in its defense the slides are probably 25% of the information. Boyd's "Patterns" brief was 8+ hours of talking directly at and about those slides and Boyd talked like a M-60 machinegun. Unfortunately, except for the slides, Boyd never wrote his stuff down...I remember Lind and Wyly joking they were going to lock Boyd into an office and trade food for manuscript pages.

William F. Owen
06-12-2010, 01:31 PM
Unfortunately, except for the slides, Boyd never wrote his stuff down...I remember Lind and Wyly joking they were going to lock Boyd into an office and trade food for manuscript pages.

...and why? I asked Bill Lind this and no one seem to know. Boyd was working in the age of video tapes and cassettes. No ever seems to have recorded his presentations as a whole or sat down with him and asked him to do it.
What we have of someone who died in 1995, and was prominent from 1982 onwards is almost nothing, except several versions of some slides and the odd bit if video.

Polarbear1605
06-12-2010, 01:58 PM
Now, having eaten up too many bytes showing what my question is based on, my question is:
What is (are) the major difference(s) - if any - between 1985 Lind-Wyly vs 1989 Warfighting vs 1997 Warfighting ?
Regards
Mike

Really they are all the same. 1981 to 1985 Lind and Wyly were rebels sowing an insurgence at the grass roots level (Captain level). There was no offical support for the thing until General Grey got involved when he was the 2nd Division Commander. At one point Wyly would be sent to the career "plenalty box" and later released by Grey. Of course, when Grey became Commandant MW became a done deal. I think it was 82-83 the Commandant (Kelly maybe) make a public statement that MW folks needed to stop meeting in the cellars of DC. That was a direct reference to the unoffical AWS MW seminar that met at Lind's house once a week. The Wyly and Lind stuff "evolved" into the 1989 version of Warfighting.

Polarbear1605
06-12-2010, 02:08 PM
...and why? I asked Bill Lind this and no one seem to know. Boyd was working in the age of video tapes and cassettes. No ever seems to have recorded his presentations as a whole or sat down with him and asked him to do it.

I am surprised Lind didn't tell you. I reason I heard Boyd never wrote it down, on several occasions, was Boyd was afraid the Russians would get it. After AWS I learned my lesson and when a student at CSC I did record the brief on cassette. I guess I need to get that converted to CD so I can post it/send it out.

slapout9
06-12-2010, 02:21 PM
I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defence. More over how do you use it in defence?
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.

Higher HQ just gave me another misssion I have to go do:wry:. I will respond later.

William F. Owen
06-12-2010, 02:48 PM
I am surprised Lind didn't tell you. I reason I heard Boyd never wrote it down, on several occasions, was Boyd was afraid the Russians would get it.
The Russians would get hold of Patterns? Sorry, why was that an issue?

After AWS I learned my lesson and when a student at CSC I did record the brief on cassette. I guess I need to get that converted to CD so I can post it/send it out.
Well that is Gold DUST!!! Cos that is the first I have heard of a whole brief being recorded!! Seriously!

Fuchs
06-12-2010, 03:13 PM
There's about an hour or more on Youtube.

William F. Owen
06-12-2010, 03:14 PM
There's about an hour or more on Youtube.
I know. It's still not all or even one of the briefs.

Polarbear1605
06-12-2010, 03:20 PM
The Russians would get hold of Patterns? Sorry, why was that an issue?

Well that is Gold DUST!!! Cos that is the first I have heard of a whole brief being recorded!! Seriously!

At the time, MW was a method to fight outnumbered and win, at least, that is what we said in those days. I think in Boyd's mind, if the Russians adopted it ...game over? Remember, this is back in 79-81 time frame and we were trying to think of how a Marine BLT could defeat a Russian Army Group. ;) RIGHT!

I just dug the cassettes out of the old cardboard box room. There are eight 60 minute cassettes; 5 are labeled "Patterns in Conflict"; one is labeled "Organic C" (Command) and two are labeled "On Strategy". Looks like I managed to get three lectures. I remember CSC would not schedule Boyd as a lecture for the whole class but they did allow a small group of us to meet in a conference room. I threw a hand cassette recorder into the middle of the table...quality is not the best.

William F. Owen
06-12-2010, 05:46 PM
I just dug the cassettes out of the old cardboard box room. There are eight 60 minute cassettes; 5 are labeled "Patterns in Conflict"; one is labeled "Organic C" (Command) and two are labeled "On Strategy". Looks like I managed to get three lectures. I remember CSC would not schedule Boyd as a lecture for the whole class but they did allow a small group of us to meet in a conference room. I threw a hand cassette recorder into the middle of the table...quality is not the best.
PM Sent

slapout9
06-12-2010, 11:12 PM
I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defense. More over how do you use it in defense?
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.



1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense. The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.

2-ME is part of MW based upon the book, it's just different based upon your war fighting philosophy.

3-Wyly goes into great detail over the confusion over Mission vs. Objective which is why I thought and think that was one of his most important lectures. And it is very relevant to today's current situation. IMO the definition of the "objective should be confined to a location from which you can best accomplish your mission". And be prepared to change that constantly based upon how the enemy acts and reacts.

4-I understand what you mean by tactics can be unit variable and I agree with that. The tactics of a company have to be different than that of a platoon or squad or there wouldn't be any reason to have such organizations. But what I think Lind and Wyly were driving at were the guiding principles that underlie all Tactics and I think they did a pretty good job overall.

5-The principles of tactics may be 5 things or maybe less, Wyly and Lind made a good start. Mission,ME,Surfaces and Gaps need to be there but I might add Time as the fourth principle. Indeed Time may be the ultimate principle. Just my opinion.

Chris jM
06-12-2010, 11:47 PM
1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense. The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.


There is one part in the MW Handbook I recall, where Lind talks about the surfaces and gaps issue. With a commander talking about the difficulties in identifying a genuine gap and in a trap (i.e. a path of less resistance that will lead you into the enemy's killing area) he states that it is an art, and some people will have the skills, imagination and flair and others will not.

The mentality that we bypass all obstacles and enemy strengths in order to find the indirect approach through which we can, with minimal attrition, dislocate his ability to defend against us is a little on the optimistically ethereal side, in my opinion. Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.

As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.

The whole narrative-imposed-where-narrative-does-not-fit reminds me very much of a quote from a recent New Yorker article:


"as the Bacchae knew, we always tear our Gods to bits, and eat the bits we like... Certain kinds of truth are only convincing in a narrative. The idea, for instance, that the ring of power should be given to two undersized amateurs to throw into a volcano at the very center of an enemy's camp makes sound and sober sense, of a kind, in Tolkein; but you would never expect to find it as a premise at the Middle Earth Military Academy."

Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.

slapout9
06-13-2010, 01:44 AM
Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.

1-both Lind and Wyly talk about it and yes if you blindly follow easy terrain sooner or later you will end up right in the middle of an ambush. There suggestion was, if you run up against a surface where there is no apparent gap then find the weakest part of the surface. The whole defensive perimeter is not going to be of equal strength, which is why one of them (I think Wyly) called it soft spot tactics.

2-In later additions they talk about Combined Arms just as you have, in fact that became one of the later added principles of MW. To my way of thinking it just adds confusion to the idea of the main effort. To me the ME could very well be an artillery unit or air unit used to blow a hole in the enemies surface and make your own gap instead of just blindly walking or riding around searching for one.

Chris jM
06-13-2010, 02:45 AM
1-both Lind and Wyly talk about it and yes if you blindly follow easy terrain sooner or later you will end up right in the middle of an ambush. There suggestion was, if you run up against a surface where there is no apparent gap then find the weakest part of the surface. The whole defensive perimeter is not going to be of equal strength, which is why one of them (I think Wyly) called it soft spot tactics.

Certainly, that's one perspective. I just see the construct of surfaces/gaps to be of little utility to the commander on the ground. As a way of analysing combat it's fine, but it isn't robust or solid enough a tool to be employed by a commander. It's too open to external factors, the least of all being a perceived knowledge of the enemy in the midst of battle that's simply unrealistic.

As unattractive as the idea is, and it was brushed upon earlier, competent drills, SOPs and tactics will be of far greater assistance. Knowing how to advance to contact, the battle drills to go through and how to apply them to the situation remains fraught with uncertainty and demands flexibility - but the battle drills provide a framework for success.

MW and battle-drills aren't mutually exclusive, but I don't see MW as adding anything of great value to the battle-drills concept. Tactics will succeed when combined arms are applied properly, regardless of how one views 'tempo', 'surfaces', 'mission command' and so forth. MW might be right in parts (the God we tear to bits and consume what we like) but it isn't the whole picture, and it isn't a silver-bullet to victory.


2-In later additions they talk about Combined Arms just as you have, in fact that became one of the later added principles of MW. To my way of thinking it just adds confusion to the idea of the main effort. To me the ME could very well be an artillery unit or air unit used to blow a hole in the enemies surface and make your own gap instead of just blindly walking or riding around searching for one.

Combined arms is, IMHO, absolutely the most important tactical construct that has to be taught and employed for combat success. I have seen it become confusing due to poor thinking - for example, I have seen it defined as the combination of Battlefield Operating Systems so that suddenly logistics becomes a 'combined arms'. Sure, supply is essential but surely combined arms are those things we have that affect the enemy.

I'd suggest your view of MW that assumes knowledge of the enemy - more so than ever will be possible. MW, I believe, is right in parts but for the wrong reasons. Instead of trying to being clever, as MW tells us, we are far better off focussing upon being technically proficient at tactical drills at all levels.

I don't think MW is dangerous but rather that it represents unnecessary complication. It won't directly lead us to disaster but it does not represent the best possible practise.

Ken White
06-13-2010, 03:17 AM
...he states that it is an art, and some people will have the skills, imagination and flair and others will not.Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art.
...Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.That is the mechanical solution -- it is necessitated by the democratic nations rather foolish effort to be fair in promoting people to command; if one cannot have an artist, one must give his mechanic all the tools available and if one uses more mechanics than artists, then one must have tons of tools...:rolleyes:
As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.We can agree on that as a generalization but Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.
Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.Not necessarily; depends on the Commander. For most, generally mechanics, you're obviously correct. For the rather more rare artists, not necessarily -- far more often than not they'll pull it off, even against the odds...:cool:

The problem is that a democratic and 'fair' personnel system in a bureaucracy cannot tolerate artists..

Until there's a big, real, tough war (see Freyberg, B) ... :wry:

Chris jM
06-13-2010, 03:55 AM
Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art....Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.:

How, though, do we identify the artists vice mechanics? Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework - charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example. Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.

I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.

And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership ;)

slapout9
06-13-2010, 04:09 AM
I'd suggest your view of MW that assumes knowledge of the enemy - more so than ever will be possible.

That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothist:wry: Fire and Maneuver compliment each other so I don't see the need to pick one or the other. In something as tricky as combat I would always want to have both, if maneuver worked or could work thats fine but I wouldn't want to bet my life on it.

Kiwigrunt
06-13-2010, 04:22 AM
So does MV, and the text and pixels expended on it, benefit the artist or the mechanic…or both (or none)?
With other words, is the differentiation between artist and mechanic/scientist pertinent?

Chris jM
06-13-2010, 04:41 AM
That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothist:wry: Fire and Maneuver compliment each other so I don't see the need to pick one or the other. In something as tricky as combat I would always want to have both, if maneuver worked or could work thats fine but I wouldn't want to bet my life on it.

Apologies then - I was putting words into your mouth. I am in complete agreement with what you are saying above, with both F&M complimenting each other. Only the most basic and ill-informed reading of MW (or any doctrine, I would posit) would suggest otherwise. Unfortunately the allure of 'manoeuvrist' minimal losses for maximum gains means that it is taught almost as an antithesis to combat - that we can defeat the enemy without having to fight him, cue the Sun Tzu quote about subduing as being the acme of skill. As a platoon or company commander that doesn't really help all that much.

Understand, though, that you win this argument by default. Come 0800 hours most days I don a uniform, drink from the company Kool Aid and sell the party line of MW being all that and a bag of chips!!

slapout9
06-13-2010, 04:46 AM
Understand, though, that you win this argument by default. Come 0800 hours most days I don a uniform, drink from the company Kool Aid and sell the party line of MW being all that and a bag of chips!!


On that I will have to say good night. Here is a present that maybe you can take to work with you. It is Army MW from WW2. I have posted it before but here is the link so you can have a quick look.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA383584&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Ken White
06-13-2010, 05:19 AM
That's not an insult, just an observation. The world in that respect is divided into those who wish to apply them and those who do not...
How, though, do we identify the artists vice mechanics?By observation and subjective judgement. Subjectivity is anathema to bureaucracies and politicians because it is, after all, only an opinion. Whereas objectivity produces empirical results. Which can be and often are fudged...
Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework...But not much. It upsets the bureaucracy and the personnel folks who want objective criteria only to determine who gets to do what. It also upsets the politicians who want everyone to be treated fairly. Heh. What they really want is no complaints from non selectees that cannot be shown to be based on objective data so they can say "you didn't make the grade and this proves it." A proven competent and experienced commander who says "...promote Heebly, he's good; do not promote Phugabosky, he'll get people killed.." is anthema to the 'system.'
...- charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example...Charisma has nothing to do with it; competence in an art form -- and combat is an art, not a science -- has everything to do with it. Not one of the best Commanders I had in combat was charismatic -- only three of about a dozen got to be Flag Officers, the system does not tolerate guys who are great tactically but not pretty or socially adept.

A mechanical Commander trained conventionally who is a good mechanic and has some experience will beat an inexperienced intuitive Commander. He will rarely beat an experienced intuitive Commander.
Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.I agree with your first generalization, though that's from our choices, not from necessity nor is it demonstrably better than other processes.

I disagree with the second. To put it as simply as possible, that 'artist' will arrive at correct decisions by pretty much the same process as will a good mechanical type -- he or she will just do it faster and is highly likely to omit some steps. There's been plenty of research and there are tons of papers out there. Googling "Intuitive Military Commanders" gets 616K hits, most garbage but some gold. (LINK) (http://www.google.com/search?q=intuitive+military+commanders&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a).

The issue is not that we cannot do it; the issue is that in democratic societies in peacetime who have a fetish for worrying about a huge mobilization force, the dual emphasis of PC 'fairness and objective criteria' and designing training to mass produce people for spaces it isn't going to be done.

Not to worry, as I said, they always come out in wars. Then a lot of the mechanics get to take charge of Post Exchanges... :wry:

I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.Yeah, many say that. That's what we're doing now. How's that working out for us? Most mid grade and young senior NCOs and Company and Field Grades in the US will tell you not so good...:rolleyes:
And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership ;)The desirable quality is a competent, experienced practitioner who can win and keep more of their own troops alive while doing so. I've seen a lot of intuitive commanders, artists in that sense, do that -- I've seen a lot of mediocre mechanics get too many people killed unnecessarily while failing to successfully complete missions and then get promoted because, screwed up or not, they had checked all the right boxes, they played that system you cite. :mad:

William F. Owen
06-13-2010, 05:22 AM
1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense.
But that is a simplistic and mostly wrong model for proto-modern war. Weapons fire across frontages, and weapons are mobile. Weapons can also mass fire in time and space - artillery. The proto-modern defence aims to have surveillance, fires and reserves (+50%). The analogy of surfaces and gaps, simply does not apply. It would not have applied at Cambrai, Hamel, Port Arthur, Iwo Jima, or even Kursk and El Alamein.
The surfaces and gaps model is a set up to make MW work and it only uses examples where it can be applied. Crossing the Meuse, Operation Micheal etc.

The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.

Direction of enemy threat?

-ME is part of MW based upon the book, it's just different based upon your war fighting philosophy.
I don't have a "war fighting philosophy." I adhere to what works. We have a huge body of work to adhere to, we just seem to want to ignore it, because its simple and not-sexy.

IMO the definition of the "objective should be confined to a location from which you can best accomplish your mission". And be prepared to change that constantly based upon how the enemy acts and reacts.
So objectives are terrain? That makes sense, if given as part of the mission.
"Seize intact the Bridge at XYZ, by 21:00 and hold until relieved."
"Capture and hold Hill 1234 by 21:00."

But what I think Lind and Wyly were driving at were the guiding principles that underlie all Tactics and I think they did a pretty good job overall.
Yet no mention of the Core Functions which could by some said to be the guiding principles of tactical doctrine. Moreover Core Functions are completely absent form MW as far as I can tell.

The problem I have with MW is it's lack of precision, rigour, and history. If someone tells me (and they have) that the USMC as grossly lacking in tactical training, and MW was a forcing mechanism, the OK. BUT taken out of that context, MW sets you off down a false trail, where a lot is wrong.
As someone pointed out, would be still talking about MW if it had been called "Competent Warfare."

Ken White
06-13-2010, 05:24 AM
So does MV, and the text and pixels expended on it, benefit the artist or the mechanic…or both (or none)?above...:D

With other words, is the differentiation between artist and mechanic/scientist pertinent?Only in combat and all other things being equal. Then it's quite pertinent.. ;)

It has little or nothing to do with maneuver warfare; or, more correctly, maneuver warfare has little or no effect on who is a good combat commander and who is not. :wry:

Kiwigrunt
06-13-2010, 05:56 AM
The world in that respect is divided into those who wish to apply them and those who do not..{metrics that is}

Yup, there are three kinds of people in this world; those who can count and those who cannot.:p






And then there are the artists.

Ken White
06-13-2010, 02:40 PM
you probably realized...;)

slapout9
06-14-2010, 02:38 AM
But that is a simplistic and mostly wrong model for proto-modern war. Weapons fire across frontages, and weapons are mobile. Weapons can also mass fire in time and space - artillery. The proto-modern defence aims to have surveillance, fires and reserves (+50%). The analogy of surfaces and gaps, simply does not apply. It would not have applied at Cambrai, Hamel, Port Arthur, Iwo Jima, or even Kursk and El Alamein.
The surfaces and gaps model is a set up to make MW work and it only uses examples where it can be applied. Crossing the Meuse, Operation Micheal etc.

Direction of enemy threat?

I don't have a "war fighting philosophy." I adhere to what works. We have a huge body of work to adhere to, we just seem to want to ignore it, because its simple and not-sexy.

So objectives are terrain? That makes sense, if given as part of the mission.
"Seize intact the Bridge at XYZ, by 21:00 and hold until relieved."
"Capture and hold Hill 1234 by 21:00."

Yet no mention of the Core Functions which could by some said to be the guiding principles of tactical doctrine. Moreover Core Functions are completely absent form MW as far as I can tell.

The problem I have with MW is it's lack of precision, rigour, and history. If someone tells me (and they have) that the USMC as grossly lacking in tactical training, and MW was a forcing mechanism, the OK. BUT taken out of that context, MW sets you off down a false trail, where a lot is wrong.
As someone pointed out, would be still talking about MW if it had been called "Competent Warfare."

I am not sure which book or version of the book you have/read/or accessed but practically every point you raised is addressed by Lind or Wyly in the version I have.

The Exception is of course is what I called your War Fighting Philosophy. Other than that it's all pretty much in there.

William F. Owen
06-14-2010, 04:40 AM
I am not sure which book or version of the book you have/read/or accessed but practically every point you raised is addressed by Lind or Wyly in the version I have.

I have the 1985 Westview Press first edition. I know it raises each point but it does not provide any convincing arguments.
One example is the supposed differences between the 5-paragraph order format and "Mission type orders" - which is just plain wrong. Page 30.
The issue of gaps being entrances to ambushes (Fire Sacks) Page 79- is never dealt with adequately, .
a.) in terms of guidance. - the need to conduct the break in battle.
b.) in terms of actually understanding the problem - the fact that up to 50% of the enemy maybe a mobile reserve.

Chris jM
06-14-2010, 08:15 AM
On that I will have to say good night. Here is a present that maybe you can take to work with you. It is Army MW from WW2. I have posted it before but here is the link so you can have a quick look.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA383584&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Looks like a good read, I hope to get time to read it properly this week. Thanks.

William F. Owen
06-14-2010, 08:42 AM
It is Army MW from WW2. I have posted it before but here is the link so you can have a quick look.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA383584&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
OK, I know this Monograph very well. How is anything to do with MW?

This work is most often cited as an example of good planning and command. - do not plan more than is actually required or possible.
If we accept it was something to do with MW, what would make it the opposite?

Chris jM
06-14-2010, 08:53 AM
That's not an insult, just an observation. The world in that respect is divided into those who wish to apply them and those who do not...

Observe away, no offense taken. Honestly though, no - I'm far from a metrics man.

Rather I deliberately take the 'nay-sayers' stance as I find I learn most here by critically quizzing them/ you. I don't intend to come across as the argumentative type - and I hope that I'm not raising petty argument for argument's sake. I will make no apologies, though, in continuing to draw you and others here into debate - I'm learning far more via this means than others, both professional and academic. I took a post-grad paper on Insurgency in '08, and I'm not exaggerating when I say that a single post here receives more knowledgeable, critical and enlightening comments than my entire collection of essays and presentations received during that course. I agree with Fuchs' signature - why exclusively discuss agreement? Group-think is something best avoided.

I agree with you in a lot of what you say. However, I would challenge your view in that the system and the organisation relies upon producing and fielding the mechanics.

Perhaps I'm tackling this in the wrong manner - basically, how could the system develop it's artists without undermining it's own structures enforcing the basics of tactical success that demand mechanisation in most undertakings (tactics, logistics, appreciations, etc)?

It seems that your/my system is sufficiently good at a) providing sufficient quality forces, b) having those forces adapt to meet the demands placed upon it and c) getting the right people to the right spots, when required. Reference Eisenhower, McChrystal for the last one. I can accept the first two have built in inefficiencies when worked as a templated, linear model in terms of personnel progression (which is, at heart, what we're discussing), but how can you do it otherwise without damaging the working system?

Trust me, I like the idea of a meritocracy based upon purely upon outputs and abilities rather than assessed/ proven ability in replicated training. I just don't see it as feasible given the flaws inherent to any large organisation of people. Judging, identifying and then elevating those artists seems to me an aspirational task that will be codified and regimentalised (hence: mechanised) at all turns.


It has little or nothing to do with maneuver warfare; or, more correctly, maneuver warfare has little or no effect on who is a good combat commander and who is not.

My point exactly! The 'artist' of MW is the wrong way of looking at it - better we find and promote those who can do the mechanics of designing, executing and adapting combined-arms plans well. We know how combined arms works within our doctrine and TTPs, so lets reward those who demonstrate ability in that field.

slapout9
06-14-2010, 12:57 PM
Here is a copy of Lecture 3 the main Effort. It starts out with Col. Walters but about half way through is Col. Wyly's lecture.


http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/Main_Effort_Primer.pdf

William F. Owen
06-14-2010, 03:56 PM
Here is a copy of Lecture 3 the main Effort. It starts out with Col. Walters but about half way through is Col. Wyly's lecture.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/Main_Effort_Primer.pdf
Thanks but the Main Effort is,
a.) Common to all Warfare - not unique to MW. Foch wrote about it extensively. - for the avoidance of "parallel battles."
b.) is Entscheidende Stelle - decisive point in German. NOT Schwerepunkt!! - that is the "heavy point." - the COG! That is wrong!
c.) - see Paragraph 323 of the 1935 Truppenfurhung. Also paragraph 389 - the determining of the Main Effort.
d.) Soviet Doctrine talks about the ME as well, but usually in terms of "main attacks" and "Secondary Attacks."

All of these are nothing to do with MW. Everything MW talks about, that makes sense, is a normal and commonly used facet of warfare.

slapout9
06-14-2010, 04:13 PM
I have the 1985 Westview Press first edition. I know it raises each point but it does not provide any convincing arguments.
One example is the supposed differences between the 5-paragraph order format and "Mission type orders" - which is just plain wrong. Page 30.
The issue of gaps being entrances to ambushes (Fire Sacks) Page 79- is never dealt with adequately, .
a.) in terms of guidance. - the need to conduct the break in battle.
b.) in terms of actually understanding the problem - the fact that up to 50% of the enemy maybe a mobile reserve.

Just my opinion, but since they were presented as lectures with TDG's(Tactical Decision Games) Wyly nor Lind wanted to give a prescribed schoolbook solution they wanted to instill a thinking process where the student arrived at his own solutions to the problem presented.


Also,I checked the page numbers of the examples you gave and they are the same. I have an old paperback edition (wasn't going to drop 50 bucks for a hard copy) so I wasn't sure if it still had all the information in the original version.

Ken White
06-14-2010, 04:16 PM
Honestly though, no - I'm far from a metrics man.That, as our Martha Stewart used to say, is a good thing...

There's a time and place for metrics, they're absolutely imperative for many things. My observation has been that tactical decision making is not such a thing.
I don't intend to come across as the argumentative type - and I hope that I'm not raising petty argument for argument's sake. I will make no apologies, though, in continuing to draw you and others here into debate.Understood and not a problem.
I agree with you in a lot of what you say. However, I would challenge your view in that the system and the organisation relies upon producing and fielding the mechanics.I think it does, at least here in the US, for several reasons. That methodology works, it's broadly proven in two big wars and works adequately in little ones. It is easier to do than is the identification and development of talent. It is politically palatable. It allows more people to be accepted into the fold, thus allowing a larger pool from which talent may rise when needed. There are more, not least the laziness of trainers but those are the principal reasons for developing mechanical processes (like the MDMP) and the pretty much standardized use of the mechanical approach in most Armies.
Perhaps I'm tackling this in the wrong manner - basically, how could the system develop it's artists without undermining it's own structures enforcing the basics of tactical success that demand mechanisation in most undertakings (tactics, logistics, appreciations, etc)?Heh, that, too. So many thing are indeed mechanical that casting 'mechanics' aside is impossible; it is easier to use the template for most everything. The real issue is not developing 'artists' -- it is that most Armies stifle them (and thus they leave early...) mostly due to the group think you wisely wish to avoid. I suspect that group think syndrome has different precipitators from nation to nation...

I wouldn't change much in the current system but I would institutionalize the acceptance of mavericks and talent to a greater extent than is now the norm. Note I say 'greater extent' rather than totally -- totally would result in unmilitary chaos...:wry:
It seems that your/my system is sufficiently good at a) providing sufficient quality forces, b) having those forces adapt to meet the demands placed upon it and c) getting the right people to the right spots, when required.Totally agree.
but how can you do it otherwise without damaging the working system?I have seen senior commanders who encouraged their talented folks -- perhaps tolerated them is a better word (give that some thought...) -- as opposed to most of their peers who would not do so. The real problem is, IMO, with the personnel policies and that problem is part politically coreect ('fair,' 'objective assessment,' 'balanced') and part ease of effort for the Per folks. Life is easier for Per weenies if every LTC is potentially able to command a Battalion.

I say LTC because I believe that most should be allowed to get to Captain, at Major culling begins and command and staff tracks are locked and a goodly number are allowed to command battalions -- and that's where the hard cuts start.
Trust me, I like the idea of a meritocracy based upon purely upon outputs and abilities rather than assessed/ proven ability in replicated training. I just don't see it as feasible given the flaws inherent to any large organisation of people. Judging, identifying and then elevating those artists seems to me an aspirational task that will be codified and regimentalised (hence: mechanised) at all turns.In reverse order; that's why we're where we are; it is not infeasible, it is simply difficult and therefor avoided for the most part; war provides the ultimate meritocratic selection and democratic societies for a host of reasons are unlikely to stop training good mechanics, start accepting talented mavericks and go completely meritocratic. A hard war brings out that talent and it rises fairly rapidly to the top.

That's reality, I know that -- what I also very strongly believe is that a good intuitive commander can whip an excellent mechanical commander. Against an outstanding mechanic -- and a few of those are about -- you'd need an excellent or better intuitive guy. Intuition and talent give an edge, they are not infallible. There are a host of very competent mechanics out there. Kiwi Grunt modified one my smart aleck comments to say "there are those who can count, those who can't and then there are the Artists." True -- I'd modify that to say there are those who must count ot paint by the numbers; there those who can count and paint without numbers -- and Artists who can do both. Tactically speaking, the 'artist' knows when to be mechanical and when that is not advisable; he take shortcuts -- and good ones. Wars bring that out...

In the meantime, we can be happy that the system produces a large pool of competent folks from which talent can be gathered when needed and that there are some senior commanders who tolerate if not encourage talent.
My point exactly! The 'artist' of MW is the wrong way of looking at it - better we find and promote those who can do the mechanics of designing, executing and adapting combined-arms plans well. We know how combined arms works within our doctrine and TTPs, so lets reward those who demonstrate ability in that field.I don't think we're in total agreement on that but we're probably close enough for government work. :D

I say that because I believe the odd or rare good intuitive guy who sticks around will generally demonstrate more ability... ;)

slapout9
06-15-2010, 12:09 AM
OK, I know this Monograph very well. How is anything to do with MW?

This work is most often cited as an example of good planning and command. - do not plan more than is actually required or possible.
If we accept it was something to do with MW, what would make it the opposite?

I am glad you read it,cause when I posted it, what 2 years ago I couldn't find anybody that had ever read it or much wanted to read it, finally had to
harrass Rob Thornton into reading it while he was going through school:eek:.
But the main reason I posted it is because Colonel Wyly's lecture on "The Concept Of The Objective" is not available except in the Lind book. The above Monograph comes to many of the same conclusions as Wyly did. The most important of which is the Objective has to serve the Mission and the Objective is likely to change once the operation begins. Another point the author makes is in WW2 the Objective had a different connotation than it does today, back then it was part of the commanders defeat mechanism. Kind of a "Pet Rock" of mine cause it is a form of targeting.

If you read the paper closely there are many similarities between this paper and some of the concepts presented in MW. Example the futility of trying to predict the enemy, the Mission above all else, the criticality of the Objective, the studying/orienting on the enemy,and properly resourcing units to deal with uncertainty/chaos of war and let the on scene commander apply those resources as he sees fit. Sounds a whole lot like Mission Tactics, Main Effort and Surface and Gaps to me anyway.

Cavguy
06-15-2010, 02:40 AM
That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothist:wry: Fire and Maneuver compliment each other so I don't see the need to pick one or the other. In something as tricky as combat I would always want to have both, if maneuver worked or could work thats fine but I wouldn't want to bet my life on it.

I had an interesting discussion on this with a CGSC instructor while discussing Leonhard's Art of Maneuver Warfare. We were discussing maneuverist vs. attrition tactics. He made the salient point that MW is best suited for an army that plans to fight outnumbered or must conserve its strength (his same criticism of Clausewitzian thought), not one that dominates. His advice was very U.S. Grant - use maneuver where appropriate but beat them through attrition and let the other guy attempt to "maneuver" out of his problem.

The corallary - discussed in his book (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Delusion-American-Screwed-Afghanistan/dp/0760337136/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1276569469&sr=8-1), was that attrition is necessary in offensive war which will result in occupation - an outmanevered army which takes only light casualties is a big risk long term. Ultimately the CSA, Germany, and Japan were beaten (long term) by the attritional warfare inflicted upon their populations and armies which not only physically but morally defeated them.

Could go on but it was an interesting counterpoint. Mostly I fall into the KW school - I try to figure out the context and do what works .....

slapout9
06-15-2010, 03:11 AM
Could go on but it was an interesting counterpoint. Mostly I fall into the KW school - I try to figure out the context and do what works .....

Please go on, sounds like some good stuff.

Pete
06-15-2010, 03:37 AM
Oddly enough, much of the population of Germany didn't think it had been beaten during the First World War, which was a war of attrition if there ever was one. Much of the blame for that can be placed on Field Marshal Ludendorff, who asked for the armistice in November 1918 and then postwar was the main author of the "stab in the back" theory. Possibly if the Germans had been more ostentatiously humiliated in 1918 there wouldn't have been a need for another round in 1939.

Regarding the peaceful occupations of Germany and Japan in 1945, I sometimes wonder how much of that was due to fear of what the occupying armies might have done if provoked. There was an implicit threat of worse things to come had the occupations been resisted.

William F. Owen
06-15-2010, 04:21 AM
If you read the paper closely there are many similarities between this paper and some of the concepts presented in MW.
That is because MW is what most normal folk do anyway. MW was not new, or even original or even a "concept." It was the USMC and others waking up to the minimum standard that had existed for 300 years.

Example the futility of trying to predict the enemy, the Mission above all else, the criticality of the Objective, the studying/orienting on the enemy,and properly resourcing units to deal with uncertainty/chaos of war and let the on scene commander apply those resources as he sees fit.
...and this again is what all competent forces were doing. None of those things are MW. His Grace the Duke of Wellington, would have beaten them into you, as soon as you got on his staff. So would the "attritionist" Montgomery.

Now, if you want to ask why do we no longer do those things, then OK. Very good question, but nothing to do MW

William F. Owen
06-15-2010, 04:35 AM
I had an interesting discussion on this with a CGSC instructor while discussing Leonhard's Art of Maneuver Warfare. We were discussing maneuverist vs. attrition tactics. He made the salient point that MW is best suited for an army that plans to fight outnumbered or must conserve its strength (his same criticism of Clausewitzian thought), not one that dominates. His advice was very U.S. Grant - use maneuver where appropriate but beat them through attrition and let the other guy attempt to "maneuver" out of his problem.

How can anyone differentiate between "Manoeuvre tactics" and "attrition tactics" - other than apply force in a given context?
I do not understand the reference to Clausewitz.

...but I disagree with the Instructor. Manoeuvre/moving is risky. You are moving. If you are outnumbered that can be dumb. To manoeuvre freely you need a very solid reserve, a secure base, and very good reconnaissance. = Numbers. Attempting Envelopment and Breakthroughs with low numbers is very high risk.

"Attrition" = Killing, so logically aims at high Loss-exchange ratios. Kill a lot of them, and save your strength. - Battle of Agincourt. Khe-Sahn, Bastone = Not moving.

Again, how does it help or inform military education to artificially describe things in terms of Manoeuvre and Attrition. It's meaningless, IMO. It's a pop-up book version of tactics, that avoids education.

slapout9
06-15-2010, 04:45 AM
That is because MW is what most normal folk do anyway. MW was not new, or even original or even a "concept." It was the USMC and others waking up to the minimum standard that had existed for 300 years.


The first sentence in the book is "Maneuver Warfare is not New" it then goes to explain how the first example was a cave man sneaking up behind another cave man and whacking him instead of going club-to-club. I have never read or heard anybody say it was new.

William F. Owen
06-15-2010, 05:07 AM
The first sentence in the book is "Maneuver Warfare is not New" it then goes to explain how the first example was a cave man sneaking up behind another cave man and whacking him instead of going club-to-club. I have never read or heard anybody say it was new.

I know. Look at all the historical examples lifted from history. By NEW I meant new as "insight". It was a fraud. It aimed to mislead folks into believing a set of things that were not true, and - IMO, most folks knew they were not true.
All the things grouped together as part of MW, were normal practice, given any degree of context.

Why not call it "Competent Warfare." - If they had, would those opposing it, be in favour of "Incompetent Warfare?"

slapout9
06-15-2010, 05:08 AM
His advice was very U.S. Grant - use maneuver where appropriate but beat them through attrition and let the other guy attempt to "maneuver" out of his problem.


That would be the ultimate Maneuver:wry:

Kiwigrunt
06-15-2010, 05:30 AM
That would be the ultimate Maneuver:wry:

Or static manoeuvre.:D

Chris jM
06-15-2010, 10:40 AM
There's a time and place for metrics, ...Tactically speaking, the 'artist' knows when to be mechanical and when that is not advisable; he take shortcuts -- and good ones. Wars bring that out...

I'm in agreement with the entirety of your post, effectively.


In the meantime, we can be happy that the system produces a large pool of competent folks from which talent can be gathered when needed and that there are some senior commanders who tolerate if not encourage talent.I don't think we're in total agreement on that but we're probably close enough for government work. :D

And that, too. Close enough for alliance work, I would add as well - there will always be a certain amount of unnecessary friction since you republican upstarts divorced yourselves from the Queen's english and started to use the same words with different meanings! ;) It's so much easier when you can use the same lexicon in complete acceptance - such as say 'fag' and 'jandal' and 'thong' without being classified as an immoral scoundrel out of hand :eek:


I say that because I believe the odd or rare good intuitive guy who sticks around will generally demonstrate more ability... ;)

Again, I won't dispute that. Intuition can go both ways though - MacArthur did well in the Inchon landings, but his refusal to follow doctrine and the organisational norms didn't help him after that. I will also suggest that it is in itself an art in balancing the need for rules and precedent in sustaining and maintaining a large organisation while identifying and elevating the talented few within that group. It's easier to err to the former position until the gods of necessity dictate otherwise.

Ken White
06-15-2010, 03:07 PM
...It's so much easier when you can use the same lexicon in complete acceptance - such as say 'fag' and 'jandal' and 'thong' without being classified as an immoral scoundrel out of hand :eek:Hmm. True. Not sure how you knew I wore a thong, though... :eek:
Intuition can go both ways though - MacArthur did well in the Inchon landings, but his refusal to follow doctrine and the organisational norms didn't help him after that. I will also suggest that it is in itself an art in balancing the need for rules and precedent in sustaining and maintaining a large organisation while identifying and elevating the talented few within that group. It's easier to err to the former position until the gods of necessity dictate otherwise.True on all counts. That's why I earlier said "I wouldn't change much in the current system but I would institutionalize the acceptance of mavericks and talent to a greater extent than is now the norm. Note I say 'greater extent' rather than totally -- totally would result in unmilitary chaos..." Yes, it would. Picture an Army full of MacArthurs. :eek:

slapout9
06-16-2010, 03:51 AM
I know. Look at all the historical examples lifted from history. By NEW I meant new as "insight". It was a fraud. It aimed to mislead folks into believing a set of things that were not true, and - IMO, most folks knew they were not true.
All the things grouped together as part of MW, were normal practice, given any degree of context.

Why not call it "Competent Warfare." - If they had, would those opposing it, be in favour of "Incompetent Warfare?"

Wilf,fraud requires criminal intent and I see no evidence of that. I think it is better described by what Colonel Walters said it is "Fuzzy" but not Fraud. And the Fuzziness occurred by trying to apply Boyd's Air Combat Maneuvering theory to ground or amphibious operations. Boyd developed his theory in single fighter combat in a single environment, just the Air. I guess it is pretty good in that environment and in the situation of fighter to fighter combat, but it does follow that the Boyd theory(a central part of MW theory according to the book) can be applied to Marine operations where you can face threats from the Air, The Land, The Sea and even from Under the Sea.

As the MW people tried to twist a Fuzzy concept based on Boydian logic it started to come apart. If they would have stayed with Maneuver and clarified that concept and made it clearly concrete they would have been better off. Now if they apply the concept of Maneuver as it is applied and defined in SBW they will have something..... indeed they will really start winning.:rolleyes:

William F. Owen
06-16-2010, 01:12 PM
Wilf,fraud requires criminal intent and I see no evidence of that.
Let me be clear. I am not suggesting anything criminal, but I strongly believe there was a collective intent to force MW on the USMC, using a body of evidence that would not withstand close scrutiny.
I know Fraud is perhaps a strong word, but I am referring to "Intellectual Fraud," but it was done for very good reasons, in the eyes of those doing it.


As the MW people tried to twist a Fuzzy concept based on Boydian logic it started to come apart. If they would have stayed with Maneuver and clarified that concept and made it clearly concrete they would have been better off.
I think you may well be right, and as Franz Osinga told me, not one has ever really critiqued Boyd's entire body of work. Indeed Franz is about the only guy who has seen all of it.

Polarbear1605
06-16-2010, 02:14 PM
Let me be clear. I am not suggesting anything criminal, but I strongly believe there was a collective intent to force MW on the USMC, using a body of evidence that would not withstand close scrutiny.

No one FORCED MW onto the Marines. Yes it started at the grass roots level with the help of Lind. Yes, initially the senior leadership was against it but they had no viable argument against it. As Marine Captains, we could see the school book solutions were obviously flawed. We went into MW willingly and with enthusiasm. We did exactly what is going on in this thread...we discusssed and debated. We looked for examples. As Boyd taught, we pulled things apart, examined them and put the parts back together in our own little "snowmobile".
Ok! Slap and WiFO you two just won a audio copy of Boyd's Discourse on Winning and Losing that includes "Patterns" and other Boyd briefs joined together in a 12 hour presentation given at Marine CSC 1989. I need you addresses via an email ... it is going to be a couple weeks because they are being converted from tape to CD. Not that anyone was ever going to figuer it out but I also just came clean as to exactly what I have.

William F. Owen
06-16-2010, 02:19 PM
No one FORCED MW onto the Marines.

Maybe not forced, but people wanted the Marines to adopt it, and they set out to make it happen.

Ok! Slap and WiFO you two just won a audio copy of Boyd's Discourse on Winning and Losing that includes "Patterns" and other Boyd briefs joined together in a 12 hour presentation given at Marine CSC 1989.
PM sent. - Way cool, and I owe you one.

slapout9
06-16-2010, 07:30 PM
Ok! Slap and WiFO you two just won a audio copy of Boyd's Discourse on Winning and Losing that includes "Patterns" and other Boyd briefs joined together in a 12 hour presentation given at Marine CSC 1989.

WoW!!!!! PM has been sent. See I don't study Warfare I investigate it, like a cold case. So anytime I can get the original evidence I start drooling because there is almost always some little tid bit that was overlooked or deemed unimportant, when in fact it is almost always the Key to solving the case.


As for the "snowmobile" that is where I think you guys should have kept going on tlaking and thinking because your were getting so close to a really precise and repeatable and teachable definition of Maneuver Warfare. Which you should call Marine Warfare.....has more MoJo to It.;) Instead of Boyd's snowbile you need think.....Air Boat:)

Individual Marine Air Boat Stuff.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xI8yfz-HmfU&feature=related

slapout9
06-17-2010, 01:56 PM
:)http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nq8Fn55axd4&feature=fvw

slapout9
06-17-2010, 07:44 PM
Lecture on Surfaces and Gaps (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/Surfaces_Gaps_Primer.pdf).

Lecture on Commander's Intent (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/Commander%27s_Intent.pdf)


(http://smallwarsjournal.com/document...ort%20Surfaces_Gaps_Primer.pdf)

Infanteer
06-18-2010, 05:04 AM
I'll give the book credit - it sure got us (the collective profession) talking about stuff. Judging from the attention that has been paid to doctrine in academic circles over the last 2 decades, I'd rate the Maneuver Warfare Handbook as a piece worthy of looking at to frame the debate for the simple reason that although it may not have actually contained good answers, talking about it led us to them.

Polarbear1605
06-18-2010, 03:30 PM
I'll give the book credit - it sure got us (the collective profession) talking about stuff. Judging from the attention that has been paid to doctrine in academic circles over the last 2 decades, I'd rate the Maneuver Warfare Handbook as a piece worthy of looking at to frame the debate for the simple reason that although it may not have actually contained good answers, talking about it led us to them.

Hear! Hear! :)

William F. Owen
06-19-2010, 05:45 AM
I'll give the book credit - it sure got us (the collective profession) talking about stuff. Judging from the attention that has been paid to doctrine in academic circles over the last 2 decades, I'd rate the Maneuver Warfare Handbook as a piece worthy of looking at to frame the debate for the simple reason that although it may not have actually contained good answers, talking about it led us to them.
I possess a copy because I consider it one of the most influential pieces of US military thought/literature written since 1945.

....but I think its mostly wrong.

Polarbear1605
06-19-2010, 11:40 AM
....but I think its mostly wrong.

lol...well ya! I would add a qualifier to the above quote "by today's standards". Well the good news is you sent me digging through my book shelves looking for my copy ... and I do have to read it again...been a long while. In its defense, it was all we had at the time. In addition, the book was written to convince us knuckle draging Marines (especially general officers) there was a better way. Maneuver Warfare can be way too conceptional to a "2-up-1-back" Marine. I remember Boyd "advising" one of our AWS tactical conference room exercises (1981). Each conference group would develop a operation plan and then we would war game it. As we started our planning Boyd basically stop the exercise because the entire class was focused on the maps. His comments were the maps come later focus on the enemy and that at the time about blew out our minds....lol.

slapout9
06-19-2010, 03:56 PM
Well the good news is you sent me digging through my book shelves looking for my copy ... and I do have to read it again...been a long while. In its defense, it was all we had at the time. In addition, the book was written to convince us knuckle draging Marines (especially general officers) there was a better way.

Good, that was why I started this thread. We have discussed MW here many times but this time I approached it as the Police working a "Cold Case" so I sought the original evidence. That has changed my views on several things so far. And it is Wyly perhaps more so than Lind. But coming from the Army that was suffering from "Vietnam Psychosis" the writers did a great service to their country by starting people to think about the "Art Of War" again.

Preliminary conclusion so far is:
Maneuver is CONCEALED movement to the Objective. That is what has never been clearly defined, that should be the guiding principle. It applies to Stealth Bombers,using a terrain feature to hide your troop movement, to being a guerrilla and simply taking off your uniform so you can maneuver through the population and bypass the surface of the Uniformed opposing Military. If you are not concealing your movement you are not Maneuvering IMO.

Ken White
06-19-2010, 04:08 PM
Preliminary conclusion so far is:
Maneuver is CONCEALED movement to the Objective. That is what has never been clearly defined, that should be the guiding principle... If you are not concealing your movement you are not Maneuvering IMO.Exactly. There's a huge difference between 'fire and movement' and 'fire and maneuver' -- have to be able to do both but of the two the former is all too common while latter is vastly preferable.

Polarbear1605
06-19-2010, 07:37 PM
Maneuver is CONCEALED movement to the Objective. That is what has never been clearly defined, that should be the guiding principle. It applies to Stealth Bombers,using a terrain feature to hide your troop movement, to being a guerrilla and simply taking off your uniform so you can maneuver through the population and bypass the surface of the Uniformed opposing Military. If you are not concealing your movement you are not Maneuvering IMO.

True…but remember you maneuver to gain an advantage or, better yet, you maneuver to place the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. Towards the end of the Falklands war, LtCol Nick Vaux, was the commander the Royal Maries 42 Commando Battalion. In order to close in on Port Stanley, LtCol Vaux was given an object to take a hill that the Argentine forces had plenty of time to fortify. The position was well dug in and complete with wire and mines. The LtCol infiltrated his battalion behind the Argentine position during the night and attacked it from the rear. The night attack presented one set of advantages; the attack from the rear represented yet another advantage because it cut off the Argentine retreat route. Many of the Argentine soldiers panicked and tried to get off the hill by running through their own mine fields. Running through mine fields at night …yep, results as expected. The Argentineans that didn’t run put their hands in the air. The Argentineans that fought were quickly dispatched.
Another example, 6th Marine Regiment is the 2ndMar Div Breaching Force for Desert Storm . The 6th Marines attacked with three battalions up each with a responsibility to create two lanes in two mine field belts separate by about a click and a half. Each mine field belt was protected by a line of company fortified positions. The first mine belt was lightly defended. The second line had its full compliment. Once the breaches were completed, or a gap was created, one battalion executed a “rollup” by suppressing positions with artillery and looping behind them and attacking from the rear. Imagine a line of enemy company positions. You’re the Iraqi company commander in one of those positions. As the arty that was falling on your trenches shifts to your fellow company commander’s position; you come out of your hole, the company on one flank is in the process of surrendering, the position on the other side is getting hammer by arty, and you look to the rear to see a Marine mech company closing in on your position from the rear. Another hands in the air monument. In a few hours that battalion rolled up the better part of an Iraqi division. I mention LtCol Vaux because he was an instructor at AWS the same time as Col Wyly.

slapout9
06-19-2010, 10:39 PM
The LtCol infiltrated his battalion behind the Argentine position during the night and attacked it from the rear. The night attack presented one set of advantages; the attack from the rear represented yet another advantage because it cut off the Argentine retreat route.

1-infiltrated and night are both examples of Maneuver because they are Concealed from the enemy.

2-attack from the rear. indicates proper selection of the Objective, which is why I say the Objective should be defined as the best location from which can accomplish your mission. As the paper I posted above on Plans says it should be part of the Commanders Defeat Mechanism. Per the MW book I would say he understood his mission, he found surfaces and gaps, sent the main effort through the gap to the proper objective (based on gaining a mission advantage) not just a "hill" and accomplished his mission.

3-Your second example is very good, but it has a lot of what Ken said above Fire and Movement. Also combined arms(a later added concept) is just rapid switching and synchronizing of the ME to me. A very good thing to do mind you, but it still deals primarily with the ME and how they will or can change rapidly in combat. Combined arms is better discussed inside the boundary of the ME concept instead of another layer of concept complication IMO. As Warden would say it is selection of the "Key Force" with all others supporting it during that particular phase and then "switching" to the next "Key Force" during the next phase of the operation. My thoughts anyway on the still to be determined final forensic analysis.;)

Chris jM
06-20-2010, 12:09 AM
I'll give the book credit - it sure got us (the collective profession) talking about stuff. Judging from the attention that has been paid to doctrine in academic circles over the last 2 decades, I'd rate the Maneuver Warfare Handbook as a piece worthy of looking at to frame the debate for the simple reason that although it may not have actually contained good answers, talking about it led us to them.

Very true. If one looks upon MW as a 'tactical primer' designed to get commanders and units orientated to fighting, it has a lot of merit. As a complete, all-inclusive war-fighting philosophy it's proponents often present it as I think it falls short, but not without raising good and valid points for debate as you say.

[hypothetical fantasy] In reference to the latest comments on the subject, I can only imagine as to what the 'MW' handbook could look like if it were written today by those that contribute here. Although a wiki-style editing process is far from efficient, having the handbook rewritten in a 'collaborative argument' from the SWC personalities would be very, very interesting indeed. [/hypothetical fantasy]

Polarbear1605
06-20-2010, 01:05 AM
1-infiltrated and night are both examples of Maneuver because they are Concealed from the enemy.
Nope disagree. Infiltration and night attack are examples of tactical techniques. Concealment (another technique) is not a element of Maneuver because there may be times when you want the enemy to observe your maneuver. This gets back to Boyd’s classic match up between the F-86 and the Mig -13 in the Korean War. The success of the F-86 was it could transition … bank left, bank right…faster than the Mig because of the F-86 hydraulics. Each time the Mig observed a transition he would react but would eventually realize he was falling farther and farther behind…until he brain turned to dish water (Boyd terminology) and he did nothing but fly straight. The six 50 cals the F-86 packed quickly settled the issue. I would argue that Vaux’s objective was the enemy as Wyly discusses.
The enemy decision was to defend the high ground facing the Brits. LtCol Vaux got inside this decision (or OODA) loop by attacking from the rear at night before the enemy could adjust. The enemy realizing the enemy was now behind them and in fact mingled with them and because they could not transition quick enough their cohesion broke. The enemy that tried to response were quickly killed … end game… no options when you dead.


2-attack from the rear. indicates proper selection of the Objective, which is why I say the Objective should be defined as the best location from which can accomplish your mission. As the paper I posted above on Plans says it should be part of the Commanders Defeat Mechanism. Per the MW book I would say he understood his mission, he found surfaces and gaps, sent the main effort through the gap to the proper objective (based on gaining a mission advantage) not just a "hill" and accomplished his mission.
Agree, especially with the “not just a “hill” part”. Remember, however, the Brits were trying to seize the final city/port of Stanley at the end of a campaign. LtCol Vaux’s capture of this particular piece of high ground along with several others by other battalions placed the enemy commander in Stanley in a untenable position. His surrender would follow in short order because the enemy was looking down his throat.

Hmmm …#3...not sure if I follow your line of thought here . Yes supporting arms can help in shifting the ME. The focus was on the enveloped enemy company commander. Remember arty suppresses… preventing the suppressed position from providing support like the breaking out of antitank weapons that could play hell with Marine amtraks.

slapout9
06-20-2010, 01:50 AM
Concealment (another technique) is not a element of Maneuver because there may be times when you want the enemy to observe your maneuver.

I would argue that if you want the enemy to observe your maneuver....you are doing nothing more than concealing your true intentions! That is a maneuver to me, your letting him see something with the intention of faking him out, which is based on deception, which is a form of concealment.
Example Dick Army of Tea Party fame is now recommending that all Tea Baggers that are running for office should not run as tea party members....they should run as Republicans until they get elected than announce they are Tea Baggers. It is a Political Maneuver based upon concealing your true intentions, I believe a military commander can and often does the same thing, but it is all based upon concealment.

If the Marines are the premier MW force they should all be on Submarines to conceal their movements instead of big visible aircraft carriers.:D More later have to go watch a father's day movie.

Chris jM
06-20-2010, 02:05 AM
This gets back to Boyd’s classic match up between the F-86 and the Mig -13 in the Korean War. The success of the F-86 was it could transition … bank left, bank right…faster than the Mig because of the F-86 hydraulics. Each time the Mig observed a transition he would react but would eventually realize he was falling farther and farther behind…until he brain turned to dish water (Boyd terminology) and he did nothing but fly straight. The six 50 cals the F-86 packed quickly settled the issue. I would argue that Vaux’s objective was the enemy as Wyly discusses. ...The enemy realizing the enemy was now behind them and in fact mingled with them and because they could not transition quick enough their cohesion broke. The enemy that tried to response were quickly killed … end game… no options when you dead.


I don't want to sidetrack the issue, but the Korean war air combat allegory is a little over-used and simplistic. The F-86 was also apparently superior to the MiG-15 due to greater pilot visibility. I think the claim that the OODA loop allowed the US pilots to win by a faster decision making cycle is misleading - if you look at the doctrine, where the USAF employed decentralised (as opposed to the Chinese/ North Korean ground-based intercept controllers) command and employed better trained pilots, the majority of the engagements were won by the USAF selecting a position of advantage from which to attack their MiG adversaries from as opposed to mid-combat manoeuvring. I read this in a hard-copy MA thesis which I don't have access to, and while I apologise for the lack of references it does 'ring true' logically (to me, anyway).

This doesn't take away from 'MW theory' at all, but rather adds to it in different ways if you are a believer. Tempo and speed is important but remains far from a silver-bullet. Having a tactical advantage (altitude and the element of surprise in the Korean air war, occupying an ambush position by night behind an enemy position) is more important than seeking to 'get inside the enemies decision cycle' and 'dislocate' or 'destroy cohesion'. The importance placed upon pursuing abstract, undefinable and illusive/ unpredictable second or third order effects is one of the key weaknesses of MW theory in my limited understanding of it.

slapout9
06-20-2010, 04:49 AM
Once the breaches were completed, or a gap was created, one battalion executed a “rollup” by suppressing positions with artillery and looping behind them and attacking from the rear. Imagine a line of enemy company positions. You’re the Iraqi company commander in one of those positions. As the arty that was falling on your trenches shifts to your fellow company commander’s position; you come out of your hole, the company on one flank is in the process of surrendering, the position on the other side is getting hammer by arty, and you look to the rear to see a Marine mech company closing in on your position from the rear. Another hands in the air monument. In a few hours that battalion rolled up the better part of an Iraqi division. I mention LtCol Vaux because he was an instructor at AWS the same time as Col Wyly.

1-This is exactly what I mean by concealed movement. The bold highlights show that the attack was successful because the Marine attacking movements were concealed! If the artillery did not suppress (conceal the marines movement) the attack might not have succeeded.

2-The Artillery suppression is what I mean by the Main effort(as opposed to combined arms) in this case, everything else hinged on that succeeding, supporting attacks that followed were more in line with the deployments of the commanders reserves. Which Wyly has a lecture on in the book also, which was also deleted when newer editions were written. When ever Arms are combined they have to be synchronized in order to avoid friendly fire incidents, that synchronization is alot like the concept of establishing or switching the main effort to me. Why can't artillery be a main effort and then switch to an air strike main effort and then switch to an infantry main effort?

3-Wyly says during his lecture in the book that whenever they(the AWS class) use the term objective it will mean a geographic reference point.... But he does have a couple of lines were he talks about a "Mobile" enemy being the objective, but even then he talks about referring to it as a "enemy mortar position"

We are just going to have to find Colonel Wyly :D and wake him up and ask him.

Fuchs
06-20-2010, 09:25 AM
I like to emphasize camouflage, concealment and cover, but I dislike the emphasis on concealment in the last few posts.

Suppressing artillery fires and a combination of mech infantry and artillery fires should rather be discussed with terms such as "shaping" or "combined arms".

William F. Owen
06-20-2010, 09:46 AM
Artillery suppression can only work on positions that have been identified, and are vulnerable to suppression. - Look at IWO JIMA, not all or even any positions were identified and all mostly invulnerable to to the preparatory barrage - thus carnage!

Fuchs
06-20-2010, 10:15 AM
Indeed, smoke (blinding, not suppressing) is often the better choice.

Last I heard was that HE and smoke make up an alarmingly small share of standard artillery munition load in Western NATO's arty battalions, though. The HE share is going back to huge in countries that signed the cluster munitions ban, of course.

slapout9
06-20-2010, 01:16 PM
Indeed, smoke (blinding, not suppressing) is often the better choice.



Wyly actually makes that point in one of his lectures.

Polarbear1605
06-20-2010, 07:21 PM
1-This is exactly what I mean by concealed movement. The bold highlights show that the attack was successful because the Marine attacking movements were concealed! If the artillery did not suppress (conceal the marines movement) the attack might not have succeeded.

Wait a minute! I thought we were discussing if concealment is part of maneuver as defined by Wyly/Lind (and therefore Boyd). We seem to have gotten off track here talking about suppression and other technique details that always come out in these discussions.
No! MW is not concealed movement…that is a technique. MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments. (Wow! I think I am proud of the last sentence.) The examples I gave, I thought, demonstrated two competing decision processes. Competing (because it is combat, usually with a winner and a loser) where faster or shorter decision cycles not only move us closer to a favorable outcome but also cuts inside our opponents decision cycle and stretches or lengthens his cycle by generating confusion and disorder. The issue is how do we accomplish this or how we hold it all together with all the moving parts, gears, wheels, people, politics, enemy and planets whirling around in that battle space.
Geez! I can’t leave this thread alone for a second, not ever for Fathers Day…lol. ;)

Chris jM
06-20-2010, 07:37 PM
MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments. (Wow! I think I am proud of the last sentence.) The examples I gave, I thought, demonstrated two competing decision processes. Competing (because it is combat, usually with a winner and a loser) where faster or shorter decision cycles not only move us closer to a favorable outcome but also cuts inside our opponents decision cycle and stretches or lengthens his cycle by generating confusion and disorder.

'Two decision cycles' is just too simplistic, isn't it? You don't fight an enemy commander in an isolated duel ala a chessboard - as a battalion commander you might be attacking an enemy company position, say. That enemy company commander is part of a Bn, who in turn is part of a Bde, etc etc. Each commander has his own reserve our counter-atk reserve, not to mention the neighboring companies to the one your trying to defeat.

So against whom do you 'generate confusion and disorder' by 'cutting inside your opponents decision cycle'? The enemy, as in the FF, will have dozens of different decision cycles whirling around and interacting simultaneously if we use the Boyd analogy. Saying that we are fighting any one of these - or even saying that we are fighting them all simultaneously - is more or less a meaningless pursuit... no?

And happy father's day, too. :)

Fuchs
06-20-2010, 07:44 PM
Robert Leonhard's "dislocation" framework about maneuver warfare is so far the most impressive thing that I saw on the topic of maneuver warfare.

slapout9
06-20-2010, 07:47 PM
MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments. (Wow! I think I am proud of the last sentence.)

That's my fault....but I was getting to the time question:cool: just had to work up to that. I am looking for a certain passage in the book. Is what is strange about it is, that whoever wrote the passage didn't mention his name. I'll put it up in a minute.

slapout9
06-20-2010, 08:14 PM
I have the paperback edition and on the second printed page is this.
The title of the page is called: "About The Book And Author" then there is this statement about halfway down. "The purpose of Maneuver Warfare is to defeat the enemy by disrupting his ability to react,rather than by physical destruction of forces."

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy. So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage. Relative to the highlighted statement above, although time is important the main point (purpose) of MW seems to be to disrupt his ability to react not just simply be faster??:confused:

Kiwigrunt
06-20-2010, 10:18 PM
I have the paperback edition and on the second printed page is this.
The title of the page is called: "About The Book And Author" then there is this statement about halfway down. "The purpose of Maneuver Warfare is to defeat the enemy by disrupting his ability to react,rather than by physical destruction of forces."

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy. So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage. Relative to the highlighted statement above, although time is important the main point (purpose) of MW seems to be to disrupt his ability to react not just simply be faster??:confused:

That is assuming that your enemy is static and either not expecting anything or just waiting for something to happen. Yet if they are competent then they too are likely to want the initiative so they too may be up to something. Just because you are manoeuvring and assuming you are not being seen, doesn’t guarantee that you are not being seen. In that case, the more time you take, the more time you give the enemy to react.

When the British Paras first advanced (movement) towards the bridge at Arnhem they had their ability to act and react disrupted by an inferior and adhoc kampfgruppe Krafft, which very quickly manoeuvred into a linear blocking position. Had Krafft not been so swift, things might have been very different. Krafft may have been one of those artists……since he had no instruction on MW or OODA. So Polarbear’s quote on MW seems to be quite accurate here:


MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments.

But is that not applicable to warfare in general?

slapout9
06-21-2010, 12:56 AM
When ever Arms are combined they have to be synchronized in order to avoid friendly fire incidents, that synchronization is alot like the concept of establishing or switching the main effort to me. Why can't artillery be a main effort and then switch to an air strike main effort and then switch to an infantry main effort?


Speaking of Boyd, I think this is very Boydian. Sometime ago he wrote a paper about aircraft design and energy and maneuverability. I am paraphrasing now but basically he said it wasn't the overall fastest fighter that would win, it was the one that could "switch" maneuver states. Now I am not exactly sure what he meant by that, but I think my above example would or could apply?

Polarbear1605
06-21-2010, 12:57 AM
Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy. So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage.

I like your questions because they get the old grey matter moving again.
I am 99% sure Wyly, Lind and Boyd would all say the same thing. You don’t have all the time in the world. No matter what advantage you have going for you, it will be fleeting. For example, soon or later someone is going to think of a way to detect a stealth bomber. A stealth bomber is not invisible, not even to radar (understanding its radar signature is the size of a humming bird) and somebody it going to figure out how to counter it. Any advantages you have you press because it is much better to have the enemy reacting to you vs you reacting to the enemy.

slapout9
06-21-2010, 01:20 AM
I like your questions because they get the old grey matter moving again.
I am 99% sure Wyly, Lind and Boyd would all say the same thing. You don’t have all the time in the world. No matter what advantage you have going for you, it will be fleeting. For example, soon or later someone is going to think of a way to detect a stealth bomber. A stealth bomber is not invisible, not even to radar (understanding its radar signature is the size of a humming bird) and somebody it going to figure out how to counter it. Any advantages you have you press because it is much better to have the enemy reacting to you vs you reacting to the enemy.

It was a good question,but you gave a better answer,especially the highlighted part.

William F. Owen
06-21-2010, 05:29 AM
"The purpose of Maneuver Warfare is to defeat the enemy by disrupting his ability to react,rather than by physical destruction of forces."

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy.
Exactly! - like an Ambush. It's preparation not speed. Speed is not linked to surprise, except when it means doing something the enemy is unprepared for. - Time, Space, and Nature, being the three qualifications of surprise.

So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage. Relative to the highlighted statement above, although time is important the main point (purpose) of MW seems to be to disrupt his ability to react not just simply be faster??:confused:
Correct. As Fuchs and I were discussing off line, an young Israeli Martial Artist guy I know looked at the OODA loop, and pointed out that the aim was never to be faster, but always to slow the other guy down. Competing for speed is actually meaningless.
If it was race, your first action is to trip the other guy.

Fuchs
06-21-2010, 10:48 AM
It's a bit more complex.

Speed/quickness/rapidity has effects on many levels. A small advantage may have great effect on the ability of the enemy to shoot back (the famous first shot kill of MBT combat), while the same small advantage would be useless on another level (few seconds are meaningless in brigade staffs).

Overall, I'd say that the speed difference counts, and it has diminishing returns (adding xy speed advantage provides a lesser benefit than the previous xy speed advantage).

slapout9
06-21-2010, 12:54 PM
Yes Time is an interesting quality. If I was going to arrest Bruce Lee the one thing I would be sure of is that he would be faster than me. So I would switch my main effort and pull my gun and shoot the fugger:D.

Figuring out that you need to switch and what to switch to and being quick about it seems to be where time is the factor, but it doesn't necessarily mean faster but in in a sense having more accurate judgment of what is going on IMO.

slapout9
06-21-2010, 12:59 PM
If it was race, your first action is to trip the other guy.

Yes, that is Strategery as Bush the second would say:wry:... Strategy is a lot like criminal behavior(break the rules!) to me anyway.

William F. Owen
06-21-2010, 02:42 PM
Strategy is a lot like criminal behavior(break the rules!) to me anyway.
Well yes. Criminals use strategy. Usually not well, but they do.

Polarbear1605
06-21-2010, 03:24 PM
'Two decision cycles' is just too simplistic, isn't it? You don't fight an enemy commander in an isolated duel ala a chessboard - as a battalion commander you might be attacking an enemy company position, say. That enemy company commander is part of a Bn, who in turn is part of a Bde, etc etc. Each commander has his own reserve our counter-atk reserve, not to mention the neighboring companies to the one your trying to defeat.
So against whom do you 'generate confusion and disorder' by 'cutting inside your opponents decision cycle'? The enemy, as in the FF, will have dozens of different decision cycles whirling around and interacting simultaneously if we use the Boyd analogy. Saying that we are fighting any one of these - or even saying that we are fighting them all simultaneously - is more or less a meaningless pursuit... no?
Absolutely, and now you’re cutting to the real issue. (At this point I want to yell “TADA!”) How do you apply an OODA Loop develop from air combat studies (one-on-one dog fights) to modern combat…or, as I said before, how do you control all those damn “arrows” in the Boyd brief? That issue and problem is what send Boyd into “Patterns”, Strategy ? vs ?, and all the rest, etc. Now we closed our own loop; that issue is what sent the Marine Corps into discussions, debates, nashing of teeth, whining, etc. on topics like “commanders intent”, mission orders” , “surfaces and gaps”, and all the rest. Based on this thread… my sinister and deviate mind and I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you to Maneuver Warfare and the joys self-flagellation…;)

If it was race, your first action is to trip the other guy.
Yes…but remember it is both…tripping the racer is an example of MW…but even better is that you should also run like your butt is on fire…if you don’t, the tripee is going to get up and start running…with an adrenalin rush advantage from being so damn mad at you.

It's a bit more complex. Speed/quickness/rapidity has effects on many levels. A small advantage may have great effect on the ability of the enemy to shoot back (the famous first shot kill of MBT combat), while the same small advantage would be useless on another level (few seconds are meaningless in brigade staffs).
Overall, I'd say that the speed difference counts, and it has diminishing returns (adding xy speed advantage provides a lesser benefit than the previous xy speed advantage).
Hear, Hear. You said it brother!

William F. Owen
06-21-2010, 03:59 PM
Yes…but remember it is both…tripping the racer is an example of MW…but even better is that you should also run like your butt is on fire…if you don’t, the tripee is going to get up and start running…with an adrenalin rush advantage from being so damn mad at you.

Whoh there my big furry friend. The racer analogy is the very fallacy I was trying to address.
Trying to be faster is pointless. "Speed" (action faster then reaction) can only relate to the generation of surprise - the enemy being un-prepared for your action, which is why concealing an action is far better than competing in time and space. - which suggests than actions that impeded the enemy's ability to effectively prepare are those which are the most worthwhile.

This is where I don't get the OODA loops "speed of cycling" thing. A lot of stuff in a 7,000 man armoured brigade takes the time that it does, just because it cannot be done faster. - and if it was it would make not that much difference.

Fuchs
06-21-2010, 05:52 PM
Me thinks speed contributes more to uncertainty than to surprise.

Surprise is an advantage - but quickly moving troops can be surprised by a contact just as much as those they ran into. The advantage lies then in superior readiness for battle, not in the speed.

Polarbear1605
06-21-2010, 06:10 PM
Whoh there my big furry friend. The racer analogy is the very fallacy I was trying to address.
Trying to be faster is pointless. "Speed" (action faster then reaction) can only relate to the generation of surprise - the enemy being un-prepared for your action, which is why concealing an action is far better than competing in time and space. - which suggests than actions that impeded the enemy's ability to effectively prepare are those which are the most worthwhile.
I can agree with the above statements but I don’t agree with the absolute of “only”… if you add a qualifier…something like…”understanding that it is situational dependent” or “in most but not all cases”, at least IMO, it is better because it is less predictable.

This is where I don't get the OODA loops "speed of cycling" thing. A lot of stuff in a 7,000 man armored brigade takes the time that it does, just because it cannot be done faster. - and if it was it would make not that much difference.
Your right…distributing ammo, refueling, issuing orders, repairs, moving to assembly areas, crap it is starting to rain, etc. takes time. Boyd (the engineer) would say they create friction that lengthens your OODA loop; therefore, any action you take needs to eliminate (or at least limit) your friction and at the same time increase or add to the enemy’s friction. Think about the Japanese switching bombs and torpedoes at Midway. If you can do these types of things faster than the enemy why not take advantage of the opportunity. Yet another reason to study mission orders, commander's intent, etc.
Now, getting back to your tripped runner scenario (you can tell, I really like it) just because it is fun. I made the assumption you knew that the runner you tripped was faster than you (otherwise why trip him). After you trip him, you still want to take off running to at least avoid the fist fight. Even if you win the fight you are probably going to be too sore and bruised the next day to race again…and if you going to run why not run towards the finish line. In any event, what I have learned about you is that I need to watch you closely, because I am beginning to think you have a bit of treachery in your blood when it comes to rules. ;)

Polarbear1605
06-21-2010, 06:17 PM
Me thinks speed contributes more to uncertainty than to surprise.

Surprise is an advantage - but quickly moving troops can be surprised by a contact just as much as those they ran into. The advantage lies then in superior readiness for battle, not in the speed.

I was always under the impression that Boyd (and crew) stressed the uncertainty thing more than surprised. :)

slapout9
06-21-2010, 06:20 PM
Back to the race. Seems Orienting (step 2) on the enemy/opponent by tripping him is pretty good Boyd cycling. So if he gets back up instead of tripping him this time, you break his leg(s). Point being Orienting(step 2) on the Enemy so you can conduct a Decisive Maneuver is the critical part of the cycle, not so much speed but Orienting to be Decisive. A modern example would be the Israeli Nuclear Reactor raid on Iraq in the early 1980's. It was a Decisive Maneuver.

slapout9
06-21-2010, 06:38 PM
Yet another reason to study mission orders, commander's intent, etc.


Absolutley agree 100%.... Mission orders,Main Effort,Surfaces and Gaps are better concepts. Is Boyd really that helpful or would we be better off without him? A lot of really smart folks in the Air Force thought he was a little bit of a flake.

Polarbear1605
06-21-2010, 07:21 PM
Back to the race. Seems Orienting (step 2) on the enemy/opponent by tripping him is pretty good Boyd cycling. So if he gets back up instead of tripping him this time, you break his leg(s). Point being Orienting(step 2) on the Enemy so you can conduct a Decisive Maneuver is the critical part of the cycle, not so much speed but Orienting to be Decisive. A modern example would be the Israeli Nuclear Reactor raid on Iraq in the early 1980's. It was a Decisive Maneuver.

Absolutely. One of the old west lawmen; when asked what is the best way to shoot a man answered "in the back of the head" or something to that effect.
But remember there is always a reaction...look at Irans nuclear sites today...how deep are they under ground?

slapout9
06-21-2010, 07:39 PM
But remember there is always a reaction...look at Irans nuclear sites today...how deep are they under ground?

Yes, that is probably not an option today. Another thing I learned in LE (modified from the original) its not the weapon that is the problem...its the guy with the will to use the weapon that is the problem.

Polarbear1605
06-21-2010, 07:56 PM
Absolutley agree 100%.... Mission orders,Main Effort,Surfaces and Gaps are better concepts. Is Boyd really that helpful or would we be better off without him? A lot of really smart folks in the Air Force thought he was a little bit of a flake.

Good Question. IMO he is essential, however, Boyd (and crew) didn’t teach us mission orders or any other MW tool sets. Boyd, again IMO, taught us how to think and how to approach the problem. This gets back to his snowmobile analogy. You have to pull everything apart, look at the components and figure out what works best for you and why; and at the same time think why it what works against your opponent. He used the word “discourse” a lot – a formal, orderly exchange of ideas and thoughts … to adapt to our environment that is always changing. We (Marines) were looking for a formula or a set of rules…but he would not commit to one…he kept sending us back to the books and discussions (he made our heads hurt).

slapout9
06-21-2010, 08:21 PM
This OODA loop theory was starting to be taught in LE back in the 80's....but it is based on standard Medical Theory form the 1930's:eek: All problems that are solved by human beings go through a 4 step process.

1-Perception
2-Analyzing and Evaluating
3-Formulating a Response
4-Initiating A Motor Response

To me this seems a lot easier to understand and certainly seems to accomplish what the OODA loop was trying to do but with a lot less ambiguity.

http://www.emich.edu/cerns/downloads/papers/PoliceStaff/Shift%20Work,%20%20Stress,%20%20Wellness/Survival%20Stress%20in%20Law%20Enforcement.pdf

Fuchs
06-21-2010, 08:42 PM
There were better and more elaborate models than OODA before the 80's, including in the U.S. and USSR. The basic thought has been incorporated in written texts generations ago, if not centuries ago.

OODA has two strengths:
a) good marketing
b) fuzzy and wide interpretation to fit all needs

Hacksaw
06-21-2010, 10:07 PM
I was privy to the best example that speed does not equal tempo...

As contextual setting, I had just joined the 101st after a year as a planner in 2ID...

In the Div rehearsal for UFL, the Div CMD made a point of addressing all the new "Iron Majors" by emphasizing that "the 101st maneuvered and made decisions 160km/hr" at which point I immediately thought... "it also gets its arse in a fix at the same speed"

segue to the exercise...

From my seat in the TOC, I literally looked into the the senior officer VTC suite, couldn't help but listen :D

The Corps commander hounded the Div CDRs to go faster (in fact he threatened and maligned their manhood)... he order a BDE AASLT over the objections of the DIV CDR who tried to inform him that despite best efforts conditions had not been set... result: BCT reduced to 30%...

In the midst of the ground attack, the 2ID CDR kept trying to counsel a more deliberate approach explaining very clearly the impact of bypassing known UGF and HARTs and the size of the force required to secure the ever expanding LOC, he was ignored and the Corps was grinding to a halt as the LOG was interdicted... and I KNEW the red CDR was sitting in his cell at the Yongsan BCTC site just licking his chops as the fly got further entangled in his web...

To protect the relatively innocent, I won't elaborate on the AASLT to conduct a deliberate river x-ing IOT pass a heavy div :eek: THAT WAS SPECIAL!!!

I provide all the above, because when asked for AAR comments, I gave my BN CDR the best, most poignant input (for which he was too timid to contribute)... The Corps mistook speed for tempo, at no point was the Corps inside the opposing commanders ability to respond /// it was a great lesson -- that unfortunately went un-learned as the same Corps CDR made the same mistake the next year:mad:

Infanteer
06-21-2010, 11:31 PM
I was privy to the best example that speed does not equal tempo...

We have a saying - "slow is smooth, smooth is fast". It is used to prevent guys from just rushing things and generating what I call "speed wobble" - you see it happen when guy's try to get things done too fast to "be fast". I remember a mech attack during an exercise where orders were issued fast, steps missed and people started to lose track of things. Speed wobble kicks in and the whole she-bang falls apart (much like your example, Hacksaw).

William F. Owen
06-22-2010, 05:44 AM
. A modern example would be the Israeli Nuclear Reactor raid on Iraq in the early 1980's. It was a Decisive Maneuver.
It may have been a decisive action. It really had nothing to do with Manoeuvre.
Was it even decisive? Did it halt Iraq's WMD program?

William F. Owen
06-22-2010, 05:52 AM
I remember a mech attack during an exercise where orders were issued fast, steps missed and people started to lose track of things. Speed wobble kicks in and the whole she-bang falls apart (much like your example, Hacksaw).
Which is why Drills are so important - especially in Mech, because Quick battle orders have to be passed, over the radio, possibly while on the move.
That could mean going from the march/hide/FUP, to crossing the start line/FAP in <15 mins.

slapout9
06-23-2010, 06:09 PM
http://www.spartancops.com/ooda-loop-simple-concept-modern-combat-strategy/

H/T to John Robb at Global Guerrillas for finding this.

ericmwalters
06-24-2010, 12:11 AM
I could pontificate on any number of these postings, but I've said more than my piece in many other places. All I'll say is--at the time--the MANEUVER WARFARE HANDBOOK was all we had that told us there was a different way to do things that what we were currently being taught in our service schools and in field exercises. Keep in mind, nearly all of us were historically and theoretically ignorant. Those well-versed in history and theory are right to be somewhat startled that we would grab onto such things as this book. For many of us, it started us reading and learning--and now the book seems relatively quaint given this new understanding. But even if quaint, I've found it's difficult for many to adequately practice what Lind and Wyly recommend, which is why I tend to teach MW solely through TDGs, Case Method, and wargaming--and through nothing else. Too hard to talk abstractly about it. Found many who could "talk the talk" but not "walk the walk."

A good example is with regard to Main Effort. While it's convenient to label a particular unit as the "Main Effort," over a series of TDGs/wargames it usually becomes clear that it's the ACTION that the designated unit is intended to do that should be listed as the "Main Effort." At least that has been my practice. For example, I might say "Main Effort is getting past the enemy fortified belt and taking this crossroads here. Initially, this will be 1s Battalion." If 1st Battalion gets held up and 2nd Battalion is getting past the enemy fortified belt and promises to get the crossroads, it's very easy for people to "pass the ball" (usually combat support assets and supplies) from 1st Battalion to 2nd without waiting for orders. A little bit trickier on the defense, but it's done in much the same way.

We do some Irregular Warfare scenarios and the principles still hold, although the communication is much trickier. We're still practicing that.

I would hope for a 2nd Ed of MANEUVER WARFARE HANDBOOK. It's a quarter century old and in serious need of an overhaul given all that's been discussed and studied (and learned/not learned) since it's publication. While Bill Lind and Mike Wyly have talked about that even fairly recently, I've not seen much movement in that direction. Maybe if Westview Press would pay them more in royalties...now that Bill has retired to Cleveland OH in the last month, he certainly has time on his hands, even if Mike in Maine has not!

slapout9
06-24-2010, 12:55 AM
We do some Irregular Warfare scenarios and the principles still hold, although the communication is much trickier. We're still practicing that.



That is one of the things that intrigues me the most in that it wouldn't make any difference between regular and irregular warfare.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 04:55 AM
But even if quaint, I've found it's difficult for many to adequately practice what Lind and Wyly recommend, which is why I tend to teach MW solely through TDGs, Case Method, and wargaming--and through nothing else. Too hard to talk abstractly about it. Found many who could "talk the talk" but not "walk the walk."
Concur. It was actually war gaming that first began to kill my faith in MW. 99% of the time there was a sensible plan, and a dumb plan. Calling the dumb plan "attrition" and the good plan "manoeuvre" was simply idiotic.
My point being, you cannot teach some thing that is not MW. There is not Attrition or Manoeuvre. There is simply Warfare done well, and that which is not.

A good example is with regard to Main Effort. While it's convenient to label a particular unit as the "Main Effort," over a series of TDGs/wargames it usually becomes clear that it's the ACTION that the designated unit is intended to do that should be listed as the "Main Effort." At least that has been my practice.
If you read the discussion between Guderian and Von Kliest about the crossing of the Meuse River, the allocation of the Main Effort is made without any references to units at all. They are actually worried about avoiding to have to do two river crossings, instead of one, and where the boundaries of the French 2nd and 9th Armies are.

Infanteer
06-24-2010, 01:40 PM
If you read the discussion between Guderian and Von Kliest about the crossing of the Meuse River, the allocation of the Main Effort is made without any references to units at all. They are actually worried about avoiding to have to do two river crossings, instead of one, and where the boundaries of the French 2nd and 9th Armies are.

Main effort always intrigues me as Western armies adopted "Intent, Scheme of Maneuver, Main Effort and Endstate" as essential pieces of the Concept of Operations but never really attempted to qualify these things.

The best understanding I have of how to apply the main effort is an action/effect so as to amplify one's intent. In the absence of any direction on the field of battle, a commander simply considers his commander's intent for "what to do" and his main effort for "how to do it".

"The battalion's main effort will be the seizure of Hill 123, which will allow us to dominate the enemies lines of communication. B Company will be on the main effort."

Units can be mentioned, not "as" the main effort but "on" it. If something happens, the main effort can be shifted ("main effort is now on interdicting Hwy 7") or the who is on it can be ("B Coy hit an obstacle belt, A Coy made it through - A Coy is now on the main effort") - the key here indicating that all actions and fires with in the unit should be in support of A Coy now vice B Coy.

Anyone else understand it differently?

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 01:52 PM
This may help, from:
UK ADP Land OPs.

Main Effort
0618. While Main Effort is not a principle of Mission Command, it is an essential concept that balances unity of effort and freedom of action. The Main Effort is a concentration of forces or means by which a commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is a mental tool to provide a focus for that activity which a commander considers crucial to the success of his mission. Unity of effort is enhanced through the selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force. Both are supported by designating a Main Effort.

0619. A Main Effort is given substance in three inter-related areas. The first is in the manner in which a force on the main effort is supported. This might require grouping extra combat power to the main effort and the allocation of priority for combat support and combat service support. The second area relates to the tasks and purposes given to commanders who are not on the main effort but have to support it directly or indirectly. This might include the employment of echelon forces and reserves and the sequencing of shaping, decisive and sustaining operations. The third area is the practical integration of main and supporting efforts into a concept of operations. This might require the narrowing of boundaries to concentrate force, requiring economy of effort elsewhere.

0620. Giving substance to a main effort is directly related to achieving a decision in tactical action. The Main Effort should be expressed as a single action together with the principal force undertaking that activity. A Main Effort described as ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD by 4th Armoured Brigade’ is more useful than ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD’ because it informs the force as a whole as to who should be supported. A land tactical commander should have only one Main Effort within the concept of operations for a given battle or engagement. It is mandatory for subordinates elsewhere to support the Main Effort, in order to ensure its success and hence the fulfilment of the higher commander’s intent. Commanders of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements should assume that they are to support the main effort unless specifically ordered otherwise.

0621. In combat, shifting the Main Effort is the principal means available to a commander to respond to a changing situation. By the simple articulation of a switch of Main Effort, subordinates should change the focus of their support without further detailed orders. This requires a thorough understanding of the concept of the Main Effort and particularly the duty of subordinates to support it in practical ways. The Main Effort should be shifted once the commander can identify a more effective manner of achieving his mission. The mission and the broad concept of operations remains the same but shifting the Main Effoto exploit an unexpected opportunity.

slapout9
06-24-2010, 02:39 PM
"The battalion's main effort will be the seizure of Hill 123, which will allow us to dominate the enemies lines of communication. B Company will be on the main effort."


By my understanding you would never say anything like that. It would go more like this. Company B will be the Main Effort in order to allow the Battalion to accomplish their mission of dominating Enemy LOC. Reference Hill 123.

This would allow to change the objective (location) should it become necessary because the point is not to seize the hill but to do something to the Enemy LOC.

If you have the book see Wyly's lecture on the Concept of the Objective.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 02:44 PM
By my understanding you would never say anything like that. It would go more like this. Company B will be the Main Effort in order to allow the Battalion to accomplish their mission of dominating Enemy LOC. Reference Hill 123.

OK, so...


0620. Giving substance to a main effort is directly related to achieving a decision in tactical action. The Main Effort should be expressed as a single action together with the principal force undertaking that activity. A Main Effort described as ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD by 4th Armoured Brigade’ is more useful than ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD’ because it informs the force as a whole as to who should be supported. A land tactical commander should have only one Main Effort within the concept of operations for a given battle or engagement.

Does that help?

slapout9
06-24-2010, 02:57 PM
Does that help?

Better,but list the action you are going to take against the enemy. 4th Armor Bdg. will block enemy force X from doing .......ref point hill 123. Point being fight the enemy not the ground. Sieze hill 123 sounds like I should stick my bayonet in it as opposed to sticking it in the enemy.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 03:01 PM
Better,but list the action you are going to take against the enemy. 4th Armor Bdg. will block enemy force X from doing .......ref point hill 123. Point being fight the enemy not the ground. Sieze hill 123 sounds like I should stick my bayonet in it as opposed to sticking it in the enemy.
Sorry, but are describing the mission? The point is the ME is implicit to the mission.
If the aim is to capture Objective Gold, then destroying the enemy until he is unable to contest it, is also implicit to the mission.
A lot of mission verbs are very bad at this. My favourite being "delay," which is usually meaningless.

slapout9
06-24-2010, 03:22 PM
Sorry, but are describing the mission? The point is the ME is implicit to the mission.
If the aim is to capture Objective Gold, then destroying the enemy until he is unable to contest it, is also implicit to the mission.
A lot of mission verbs are very bad at this. My favourite being "delay," which is usually meaningless.

That was part of Wyly's point, if you assign an objective it may be obsolete by the time you get there. Example if the enemy moved from hill 123 would you still seize it or find out where the enemy is so you can accomplish the mission. Your point is well taken about mission verbs.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 03:29 PM
That was part of Wyly's point, if you assign an objective it may be obsolete by the time you get there. Example if the enemy moved from hill 123 would you still seize it or find out where the enemy is so you can accomplish the mission. Your point is well taken about mission verbs.
If Hill 123 dominated "Route Gerbil" , then yes you would. If the enemy refuses to hold terrain, then what purpose is he serving. Sooner or later, you will fix him and destroy him.

slapout9
06-24-2010, 03:34 PM
If Hill 123 dominated "Route Gerbil" , then yes you would. If the enemy refuses to hold terrain, then what purpose is he serving. Sooner or later, you will fix him and destroy him.

That's the point orient on the enemy not the ground. And if you do find him on hill 123 eating lunch on route gerbil then kill him.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 03:59 PM
That's the point orient on the enemy not the ground. And if you do find him on hill 123 eating lunch on route gerbil then kill him.
And this is where we get into the dissonance at the heart of MW. My mission maybe terrain defined to enable other operations. You may have to take Hill 123, to provide armoured freedom of action on Route Gerbil to enable 13 Armoured Brigade to isolate the enemy in Snoop-town.

This is where Boyd's orient on the enemy not the ground, becomes misleading. Guderian had to secure crossing points on the Meuse regardless of where the French Army where. 2 PARA were told "Capture Goose Green."

slapout9
06-24-2010, 04:14 PM
This is where Boyd's orient on the enemy not the ground, becomes misleading. Guderian had to secure crossing points on the Meuse regardless of where the French Army where. 2 PARA were told "Capture Goose Green."

I don't think so, in fact that is exactly what MW is. Guderian had to secure crossing points, that's a mission, where(objectives) is left up to local commanders. The bridge he goes to secure may be blown up by the time he gets there, but that is no excuse for mission failure,he should go and find fording points or carry bridging equipment with him.

But why did you capture Goose Green? Because you want to deny it to the enemy. What you want to do to the enemy(mission) always comes first and generally remains constant. Where (the objective) is very changeable, more than one location to skin the cat.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 04:27 PM
I don't think so, in fact that is exactly what MW is. Guderian had to secure crossing points, that's a mission, where(objectives) is left up to local commanders. The bridge he goes to secure may be blown up by the time he gets there, but that is no excuse for mission failure,he should go and find fording points or carry bridging equipment with him.
Your missing the point. You need to take and hold terrain. You cannot always be chasing the enemy. "Capture the Airfield at X"


But why did you capture Goose Green? Because you want to deny it to the enemy. What you want to do to the enemy(mission) always comes first and generally remains constant. Where (the objective) is very changeable, more than one location to skin the cat.
Entirely symbolic. It was seen as a political necessity to capture somewhere. - and it was the only land bridge between the two major islands in the East Falklands.

slapout9
06-24-2010, 04:34 PM
Your missing the point. You need to take and hold terrain. You cannot always be chasing the enemy. "Capture the Airfield at X"


Entirely symbolic. It was seen as a political necessity to capture somewhere. - and it was the only land bridge between the two major islands in the East Falklands.

1-if you kill the enemy(starting to sound like you:)) you want have to chase them and you want have to hold any terrain because you will have it all.

2-the only land bridge....... so your Mission is to deny that(land bridge) to the enemy in order to do, etc.

William F. Owen
06-24-2010, 04:50 PM
1-if you kill the enemy(starting to sound like you:)) you want have to chase them and you want have to hold any terrain because you will have it all.
....but you do not know where the enemy are! - and you still have take and hold objectives. If you find em, kill em, but your mission comes first and that may be grab Hill XYZ.

slapout9
06-24-2010, 05:05 PM
Your missing the point. You need to take and hold terrain. You cannot always be chasing the enemy. "Capture the Airfield at X"


Entirely symbolic. It was seen as a political necessity to capture somewhere. - and it was the only land bridge between the two major islands in the East Falklands.


....but you do not know where the enemy are! - and you still have take and hold objectives. If you find em, kill em, but your mission comes first and that may be grab Hill XYZ.

Go and find them. That is why we are in the mess we are in. We are being out Maneuvered because the enemy want play by our rules so they can go anywhere . Until we figure out how to get the population to tell us where the enemy is we can hold ground all we want but we will not win.

Ken White
06-24-2010, 06:17 PM
both correct and whether the enemy, the terrain or a mission not really including terrain or enemy('destroy the Bridge at MV 123456,' or like this LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Biting)) should be the focus is really determined by the type of warfare in which one's engaged. This:
Until we figure out how to get the population to tell us where the enemy is we can hold ground all we want but we will not win.makes / made sense in Iraq or Afghanistan, it would've made less sense in Viet Nam and still less in Korea or WW II.

'Establish a blocking position from CY 235679 to CY 281723' and 'On order, TF 3-64 AR conducts a delaying action from RL 351717 to RL 407664...' are typical MCO missions and such broad mission orders must be employed when the disposition and strength of the enemy is uncertain -- a condition that happens quite often. Remember that in MCO, the population tends to displace to avoid being caught between the elephant herds trampling the undergrowth. 'Conduct a parachute operation to seize and hold the Airfield at JD 4604' -- which may or may not be occupied by the evil enema -- is another...

Polarbear1605
06-24-2010, 06:58 PM
I hate to jump in here (well…not really) because I believe this is the only way to learn MW (with rigorous debate) …not that I am any kind of expert; I just got to see this whole thing work ONCE. Yes, MW says you should focus on the enemy, but it does not say you should ignore the terrain. I have never heard any MW guy state a commander should not go through his normal METT (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time) analysis. The focus on the enemy part gets back to the old Sun Tzu principle (know your enemy). I think we can agree that knowing where the enemy is part of that and if you don’t know where he is … you need to figure it out relatively quickly. We were always taught that if all else fails (if you can’t find the enemy) ATTACK because if you are going after something of value he will react and expose himself.
Also there is another technique to MW called commander’s intent and mission orders. Both only work together. Mission Orders supply the “WHAT” you want and not the HOW. I would say Take Goose Green as a mission order is unacceptable but to say “Take Goose Green” in order to … deny the enemy, or provide a friendly supply port, etc. is a lot closer to mission orders.

Fuchs
06-24-2010, 08:51 PM
I would say Take Goose Green as a mission order is unacceptable but to say “Take Goose Green” in order to … deny the enemy, or provide a friendly supply port, etc. is a lot closer to mission orders.

Even better is if the officers know each other well enough or were together when the decision was done or communicated and it's not necessary to tell intent explicitly any more.
The intent should actually be clear long before such short-term missions were given - for example before the march order was given.

slapout9
06-25-2010, 12:08 AM
For everyone worried about jumping in, feel free. Everything I write is my interetation of the book, so here is the Adult Warning Label.
I could be wrong! So feel free to ask,adjust,and give your 2 cents worth.

slapout9
06-25-2010, 12:14 AM
both correct and whether the enemy, the terrain or a mission not really including terrain or enemy('destroy the Bridge at MV 123456,' or like this LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Biting)) should be the focus is really determined by the type of warfare in which one's engaged. This:makes / made sense in Iraq or Afghanistan, it would've made less sense in Viet Nam and still less in Korea or WW II.



Yes, and there could be situations where the military is deployed where you do literally Orient on the Terrain and Attack it:) Haiti comes to mind. Also General Honore' has been on TV talking about the Gulf Oil Spill saying "We Have To Kill The Oil" he is treating the Oil like an enemy and we will have move our Objectives (locations) as the Oil does......so we can kill it:)

slapout9
06-25-2010, 03:10 AM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9rmuQ3aApw

William F. Owen
06-25-2010, 04:55 AM
For everyone worried about jumping in, feel free. Everything I write is my interetation of the book, so here is the Adult Warning Label.
I could be wrong! So feel free to ask,adjust,and give your 2 cents worth.

I think something that has to be recognised is that missions require a terrain reference. If you were out to destroy an enemy Battle Group, then that would be predicated in terms of terrain. You cannot just chase them all over creation.

"Destroy all enemy within the Battle Group AO" - see boundaries. - Is a valid mission. If the enemy gets away (and he shouldn't), then new orders, more planning. Maybe very quick plans, but you can never predict enemy action

Polarbear1605
06-25-2010, 02:44 PM
Even better is if the officers know each other well enough or were together when the decision was done or communicated and it's not necessary to tell intent explicitly any more.
The intent should actually be clear long before such short-term missions were given - for example before the march order was given.

Yes! By knowing your fellow officers (the guys on your left and right flanks, for example) that knowledge builds TRUST which is an essential element to mission orders. I would argue that mission orders can be very scary because sooner or later the order receiptant is going to be someplace you don't expect. Your first reaction is you are going to say what in the hell is he doing there? But knowing your folks will help in trusting the decsions they are making to support your mission.

Tukhachevskii
06-25-2010, 02:53 PM
I would say Take Goose Green as a mission order is unacceptable but to say “Take Goose Green” in order to … deny the enemy, or provide a friendly supply port, etc. is a lot closer to mission orders.


I always thought that the IOT part of the order was what defined aufragstaktik type commands with the terrain and the (immediate) enemy being factored in on that basis. But now, not so sure...

slapout9
06-25-2010, 02:57 PM
"Destroy all enemy within the Battle Group AO" - see boundaries.

Yes, an area of Maneuver!

To me the ME is nothing but the dead German guy talking about.....the right force(designated unit) at the right place(objective) at the right time(changing events) against an opponent who will react.

William F. Owen
06-25-2010, 03:08 PM
To me the ME is nothing but the dead German guy talking about.....the right force(designated unit) at the right place(objective) at the right time(changing events) against an opponent who will react.
CvC's use of Schwerepunkt is very different from the Wily/Lind version. The German manuals of 1934 have a distinct phrase for "Main Effort" - it is not Schwerepunkt!

... again this is where idea of "Manoeuvre Warfare" is problematic. Foch wrote about the main effort. It was central to his teaching, as was "mission command". Main Effort is not unique or even a part of MW.

Ken White
06-25-2010, 03:13 PM
Yes! By knowing your fellow officers (the guys on your left and right flanks, for example) that knowledge builds TRUST which is an essential element to mission orders. I would argue that mission orders can be very scary because sooner or later the order receiptant is going to be someplace you don't expect. Your first reaction is you are going to say what in the hell is he doing there? But knowing your folks will help in trusting the decsions they are making to support your mission.That is not always possible in major combat operation or a very large war with a mobilized force including reserves and new accessions and personnel turmoil induced by heavy casualties.

While totally agreeing with your premise, it simply may not always be as possible as it is in peacetime or even in a period of limited and minor warfare as today. I suggest that the current requirement -- and it is that, a requirement, to obtain the degree of trust required -- of 'knowing people' is a direct result of our current mediocre training, a shortfall that plagues both the Army and the Corps (though the Corps admittedly is slightly better than the Army in this -- that it is smaller helps in all aspects).

More effective training, particularly Officer and Enlisted initial entry training, would enhance trust today and may be imperative in the future.

Steve Blair
06-25-2010, 03:15 PM
More effective training, particularly Officer and Enlisted initial entry training, would enhance trust today and may be imperative in the future.

Correct, along with a total overhaul of the personnel system that shuffles people along far too quickly and locks in the "up or out" that also hampers the building of trust and competence.

We no longer field a conscript army...so why are we saddled with training and personnel systems that were developed for such an army?

slapout9
06-25-2010, 03:41 PM
CvC's use of Schwerepunkt is very different from the Wily/Lind version. The German manuals of 1934 have a distinct phrase for "Main Effort" - it is not Schwerepunkt!


Yes, there is also a German term for "decisive point" that I read in a book (will have to find it) but decisive point seems to be more what MW was talking about or wanted to talk about, and they are very different as I recall. Off to locate the book.

Polarbear1605
06-25-2010, 05:53 PM
Yes, there is also a German term for "decisive point" that I read in a book (will have to find it) but decisive point seems to be more what MW was talking about or wanted to talk about, and they are very different as I recall. Off to locate the book.
You need to be careful here less you fall afowl of the same issue of Lind and Wyly. You can see this in Gudarians book Panzer Attacks. Schwerepunkt was translated to "point of main effort". As I said before that sent us inspecting maps looking for the "point". This took a couple years to work through but after some conversations with modern day german generals, they explained the mis-translation. They also explained the "focus of main effort" or "focus of effort" was a truer translation and that fits better into what slap said: "the right force (designated unit) at the right place (objective) at the right time (changing events) against an opponent who will react."

slapout9
06-25-2010, 07:30 PM
The book is:
"On The German Art Of War-Truppenfuhrung" by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki


page 109 paragraph 389
"In order to properly deploy the attack force,the commander must know early on the decisive points of the enemy position. This information is necessary for the determination of the point of main effort."

My interpretation is decisive points are "Gaps" in the enemy position. The point of main effort would be the "Location" opposite those "Gaps". That location is where the "Attack Force" (designated main effort unit) should go.

This is why I believe Colonel Wyly said a ME is not just naming a specific unit but also WHERE that unit should be. The two go together you can't have one without the other. And you can't know where to put the ME without understanding the Enemies... Surfaces and Gaps.

Fuchs
06-25-2010, 07:43 PM
The meaning was likely much more encompassing.

It could be a fording, a difficult to defend stretch of a river, a sector defended by a formation in disorder or at low readiness, a front sector with inadequate strength and much else.

I'd like to look at it and its context in the original. What's the chapter?

slapout9
06-25-2010, 07:51 PM
The meaning was likely much more encompassing.It could be a fording, a difficult to defend stretch of a river, a sector defended by a formation in disorder or at low readiness, a front sector with inadequate strength and much else.

I'd like to look at it and its context in the original. What's the chapter?

Absolutely, you could do a great more by saying a "Gap" is any enemy Vulnerability.

It is Chapter 6-The Attack page 109 in my book, paragraph 389.

Fuchs
06-25-2010, 08:05 PM
Wow, your book sucks. I hope there's a better English translation of TF available.


389 Für den Ansatz des Angriffs ist es wichtig, die Punkte der feindlichen Stellung, die über ihren Besitz entscheiden, früh zu erkennen. Dies ist für die Bestimmung des Schwerpunktes des Angriffs ausschlaggebend.

It's a very trivial paragraph.
My translation (as close to the original as I can, therefore no good grammar):


389 For the preparation of the attack it is important to recognize the points (~parts) of the enemy position (~defensive network) that decide over its possession early on. This is decisive for the setting of the Schwerpunkt of the attack.

Or in short, in my words:
"Don't forget that you should attack a dominating hill in order to throw the enemy out of his nearby trenches."

slapout9
06-25-2010, 08:13 PM
Fuchs, man that is a great translation.

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 05:17 AM
b.) is Entscheidende Stelle - decisive point in German. NOT Schwerepunkt!! - that is the "heavy point." - the COG! That is wrong!
c.) - see Paragraph 323 of the 1935 Truppenfurhung. Also paragraph 389 - the determining of the Main Effort.

THis is from the Stackpole copy of Truppenfuhrung as well. The translation of 389, does not say "Heavy Point." Is that not correct?
Do Entscheidende Stelle and Schwerepunkt mean the same thing?

Fuchs
06-26-2010, 11:44 AM
Actually, I don't think that "entscheidende Stelle" is really a defined term, it's just two words that make sense in combination.

You better set up your Schwerpunkt at a entscheidende Stelle, for else you have made a mistake, but the two aren't the same if you did a mistake (or weren't able to set up/move your Schwerpunkt in time).

"heavy point" is nonsense in my opinion. "Schwerpunkt" is the German word for "centre of gravity" in physics, and CvC misunderstood Newtonian Physics to such an extent that he adopted the term for a very different meaning in the military.

Schwerpunkt was in the practice of 1870-1945 (and later as well) about a concentration of the own strength to gain local superiority at a point where you want to decide the battle or break through.
The move from Napoleonic warfare to front line warfare* changed the meaning a bit (you needed to keep all parts of the line strong enough to enable the units there to fulfill the basic functions of a front line* - and single battles were rarely as decisive as Sedan).


* It's actually interesting to think about the basic functions of a front line even though such a thing is unlikely to appear in modern warfare. The reason for my interest is exactly the expectation of its absence; we will lack the functions of the line, so it's valuable to understand what we're missing and probably need to replace with something else.
To replace the functions of a static linear defence in mobile warfare is quite challenging, a prime candidate for potential shortcomings of modern armies.

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 03:18 PM
"heavy point" is nonsense in my opinion. "Schwerpunkt" is the German word for "centre of gravity" in physics, and CvC misunderstood Newtonian Physics to such an extent that he adopted the term for a very different meaning in the military.
I agree, but the point is, when CvC uses it, we know what it means. He left a categoric definition, which is both useful and demonstrable in terms of teaching.

I also understand what "Main Effort" and show how it works.
....but "Schwerpunkt" and "Main Effort" are not the same thing! - despite the fact that some German Doctrine seems to use the two terms interchangeably.

* It's actually interesting to think about the basic functions of a front line even though such a thing is unlikely to appear in modern warfare. The reason for my interest is exactly the expectation of its absence; we will lack the functions of the line, so it's valuable to understand what we're missing and probably need to replace with something else.
To replace the functions of a static linear defence in mobile warfare is quite challenging, a prime candidate for potential shortcomings of modern armies.
That is insightful and I concur - but front lines are a symptom of proto-modern warfare. "Front lines" are absent from the majority of recorded military history.

Fuchs
06-26-2010, 04:56 PM
....but "Schwerpunkt" and "Main Effort" are not the same thing! - despite the fact that some German Doctrine seems to use the two terms interchangeably.

The German doctrine (officially, we never had such a thing - we dislike the word "Doktrin")certainly doesn't use the word "Main Effort". Even the anglophile Willmann didn't use it.
So what is the second word in use really?

I suspect yet another translation problem...

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 05:11 PM
The German doctrine (officially, we never had such a thing - we dislike the word "Doktrin")certainly doesn't use the word "Main Effort". Even the anglophile Willmann didn't use it.
So what is the second word in use really?
Well Truppenfuhrung was "Doctrine" - it was taught. British "Field Service Regulations were "Doctrine" as well. All manuals are doctrine.

So basically, despite being completely different things, both things get call "Schwerepunkt?" - again, the current British Translation, explicitly says "Main Effort" - as in "entscheidende Stelle"

I suspect yet another translation problem...
So how do we resolve it?

Fuchs
06-26-2010, 05:45 PM
We should attribute this to a translation problem. 389 was poorly translated. The earlier chapters of TF are general, later ones rather specific. 389 was a quite specific paragraph that got unduly generalized in the English translation.


Tell me if you ever see "Entscheidende Stelle" instead of "entscheidende Stelle", for the Capital E (except at the very beginning of a sentence) would indicate a use as one term instead of merely two words used together.


- - - - -

And again, German armed services do not and did not use "Doktrin" as a term. It's a rather negative word in German. The approach is different anyway.

One example: It was customary to write "Kein Schema!" (no schematic!) on almost all graphics till about the 50's. The content of ZDv and HDv field manuals was (probably still is) less a holy writing than for foreign armies.

Very few maxims and de-facto principles are being treated like written in stone and immune to debate (and some of them should not be!).

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 05:55 PM
Tell me if you ever see "Entscheidende Stelle" instead of "entscheidende Stelle", for the Capital E (except at the very beginning of a sentence) would indicate a use as one term instead of merely two words used together.
Am I correct that "Entscheidende Stelle" means "crucial place/location"

And again, German armed services do not and did not use "Doktrin" as a term. It's a rather negative word in German. The approach is different anyway.
I agree with the sentiment, but armies are based on teachings and learning. Without it, you have nothing.

Fuchs
06-26-2010, 06:17 PM
http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&lang=de&searchLoc=0&cmpType=relaxed&sectHdr=on&spellToler=&search=entscheidend

http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&lang=de&searchLoc=0&cmpType=relaxed&sectHdr=on&spellToler=&search=Stelle

There's a difference between capital E and normal e.
A capital E would indicate a use as a defined term.


Btw, neither was used in TF paragraph 389 !

William F. Owen
06-26-2010, 06:57 PM
Btw, neither was used in TF paragraph 389 !

What about paragraph 123 and 323?

Fuchs
06-26-2010, 07:16 PM
The text isn't written for greatest grammer, and my translation will be close and therefore even worse grammar...


123. Für den Aufklärungsdienst sind nicht mehr Kräfte zu verwenden, als es der Zweck verlangt.
Die Aufklärungskräfte sind beizeiten in der wichtigsten Richtung zusammenzufassen, besonders wenn mit überlegenen feindlichen Aufklärungskräften zu rechnen ist. In Nebenrichtungen ist nur das Notwendigste einzusetzen.
Anzustreben ist, die Aufklärung je nach der Lage aus zurückgehaltenen Aufklärungskräften jederzeit zu verdichten, erweitern oder, wenn notwendig, auch in neuer Richtung ansetzen zu können.

"For the reconnaissance service are not more troops to be used than the purpose requires.
The reconnaissance troops shall be timely concentrated on the most important direction, especially if superior enemy reconnaisance forces are to be expected. Only the minimum (most necessary) shall be allocated for secondary directions.
It is to strive that the reconnaissance according to the situation be densified with held back reconnaissance forces at any time, expanded (enlarged, extended) or, if necessary, also to be sent into a new direction."


323. Jeder Angriff bedarf einheitlicher Führung; er darf nicht in Einzelangriffe zerfallen.
Die Hauptkraft und die Masse der Munition sind an der entscheidenden Stelle anzusetzen. (...)
Ist die entscheidende Stelle nicht von vornherein zu erkennen, so muß der Schwerpunkt ins Ungewisse gebildet und erforderlichenfalls nachher verlegtwerden, oder er wird erst später gebildet.
Tritt der Erfolg während des Angriffs an einer anderen Stelle ein wie da, wo er erwartet oder beabsichtigt war, so ist er entschlossen auszunutzen. Soll der Schwerpunkt verlegt oder später gebildet werden, so müssen ausreichende Reserven vorhanden sein, starke Wirkung aller Waffen muß in der neuen Richtung vereinigt werden können.
(...)
(my emphasis)

"Every attack requires a unified leadership; it must not degenerate (break down) into individual attacks.
The main force and the larger part (mass) of the munition are to be allocated to the decisive point. (...)
If the decisive point is not recognizable in advance, so the Schwerpunkt needs to be created in uncertainty or if necessary later moved, or it is being created only later on.
If the success happens during the attack at another point than there where it is being expected or intended, so it is to be exploited resolutely. If the Schwerpunkt shall be moved or created only later on, then sufficient reserves need to be available, it needs to be possible to unite strong effect of all weapons in the new direction.
(...)"


Emphasis: No capital "E", therefore the two words have no extraordinary meaning, no general definition as one term.

slapout9
06-26-2010, 11:37 PM
Page 12 Editors' Introduction of my book.

It is written as one word with a capitol E like this "Entscheidungsstelle" does that make a differance?

Kiwigrunt
06-27-2010, 02:30 AM
On page 187 of “Not mentioned in dispatches” Schwerpunkt is translated as ‘focus of energy’.


The equivalent of the German term Schwerpunkt, which translates as focal point, centre of gravity, thrust point, main effort etc; the centre of critical activity in an operation. This may be a place or, more likely, a part of one’s force, or an activity, or a combination of these. The focus of energy is where one applies one’s most important efforts in order to fulfil the mission, usually to maximise the effect one may create upon the enemy. The focus of energy is a concept for focussing one’s efforts on achieving concentration of strength against relative weakness, probably repeatedly at temporary focal points, conducive to maximising the physical and psychic power of one’s force relative to the enemy’s. Skilful focussing and refocusing can allow a materially weaker force to annihilate a stronger one by repeatedly achieving local superiority and by maximising the effects of manoeuvre.

Fuchs
06-27-2010, 08:13 AM
Page 12 Editors' Introduction of my book.

It is written as one word with a capitol E like this "Entscheidungsstelle" does that make a differance?

That's basically the same as "Entscheidende Stelle".

The word ist awkward and strange. Today's civilian would almost certainly prefer "Ort der Entscheidung"; "Entscheidungsstelle" sounds like taken from a management organigram. I've never read it before.

jmm99
06-27-2010, 07:39 PM
How does this article rate on the accurate-inaccurate scale re: German language, German military usage and German military history ?

Clausewitz's Schwerpunkt: mistranslated from German - Misunderstood in English (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_1_87/ai_n27135952/), Military Review, Jan-Feb, 2007 by Milan Vego.

Regards

Mike

Polarbear1605
06-28-2010, 01:57 PM
:eek:This article in Marine Gazette surprised me greatly because of their "tongue in cheek" approach. See! Even today the "discussions" continue.
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/attritionist-letters-3

Never put a lot of faith in most of the Gazette stuff, even being a Marine...but now I need to go back and find #1 and #2. ;)

Fuchs
06-28-2010, 05:02 PM
How does this article rate on the accurate-inaccurate scale re: German language, German military usage and German military history ?

Clausewitz's Schwerpunkt: mistranslated from German - Misunderstood in English (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_1_87/ai_n27135952/), Military Review, Jan-Feb, 2007 by Milan Vego.
That will take a while.

slapout9
07-08-2010, 03:52 AM
Found this from 1998. Kind of an update of Wyly's fundamentals of tactics.


http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/notes/FundTactics.pdf

William F. Owen
07-08-2010, 06:02 AM
Found this from 1998. Kind of an update of Wyly's fundamentals of tactics.

http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/notes/FundTactics.pdf

Thanks. This actually explains how a lot of the errors crept in! - but 1998 is kind of late. Weren't all the pamphlets in place by 1991?

slapout9
07-08-2010, 10:47 AM
Thanks. This actually explains how a lot of the errors crept in! - but 1998 is kind of late. Weren't all the pamphlets in place by 1991?

I am not sure of the time line, could very well have been since the book itself is from the late 1980's.

jmm99
07-08-2010, 12:27 PM
Gentlemen (and I use that term loosely),

MCDP 1 Warfighting was in place in 1989 and revised in 1997 under Chuck Krulak - his comment (20 June 1997):


Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energetic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister Services. Our current naval doctrine is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare as described in that publication. Current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver from the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the philosophy contained in Warfighting. Our philosophy of warfighting, as described in the manual, is in consonance with joint doctrine, contributing to our ability to operate harmoniously with the other Services.

That said, I believe Warfighting can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself. It is in this spirit that Warfighting has been revised, and this publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 1. I have several goals for this revision. One goal is to enhance the description of the nature of war — for example, to emphasize war’s complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for modern conflict’s expanding forms. Another goal is to clarify the descriptions of styles of warfare. A third goal is to clarify and refine important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander’s intent, main effort, and critical vulnerability. It is my intent to do this while retaining the spirit, style, and essential message of the original.

Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps. The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This book contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.

Warfighting is not meant as a reference manual; it is designed to be read from cover to cover. Its four chapters have a natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Chapter 2 derives a theory about war from that understanding. This theory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for war and how we wage war, chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray stated in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty.

So spake the oracle of that time.

MCDP 1-1 Strategy, MCDP 1-2 Campaigning and MCDP 1-3 Tactics were 1997 publications - MCDP 6 Command & Control was a 1996 publication - all under GEN Krulak's imprimatur.

Regards

Mike

slapout9
07-08-2010, 12:42 PM
Gentlemen (and I use that term loosely),



jmm99,Seems close enough for guvmint work:). I have the 1997 PDF of Warfighting. Do you know of any major chnages from the original?

jmm99
07-08-2010, 03:24 PM
my backgrounder and question, Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100296&postcount=15); and here is Polarbear's answer, Oh remembering the Battles! (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100316&postcount=23):


Really they are all the same. 1981 to 1985 Lind and Wyly were rebels sowing an insurgence at the grass roots level (Captain level). There was no offical support for the thing until General Grey got involved when he was the 2nd Division Commander. At one point Wyly would be sent to the career "plenalty box" and later released by Grey. Of course, when Grey became Commandant MW became a done deal. I think it was 82-83 the Commandant (Kelly maybe) make a public statement that MW folks needed to stop meeting in the cellars of DC. That was a direct reference to the unoffical AWS MW seminar that met at Lind's house once a week. The Wyly and Lind stuff "evolved" into the 1989 version of Warfighting.

I'd consider the Magnus Albus Ursus to be pretty much definitive; unless Chuck Krulak waltzes out of the woodwork with something different.

I found a little difference in chap. 4 (1989 vs 1997); but didn't really do a good comparison on chaps 1-3. You do. :D

Cheers

Mike

Polarbear1605
07-08-2010, 06:32 PM
Found this from 1998. Kind of an update of Wyly's fundamentals of tactics.


http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/notes/FundTactics.pdf

In a book by Winford Holland, “Red Zone Management: Changing the Rules for Pivotal Times”, the author states that there are six phases to any major project:
1. Enthusiasm
2. Disillusionment
3. Panic & Hysteria
4. Search for the Guilty
5. Punishment of the innocent, and
6. Praise and Honor for the non-participants
Having watched many outstanding comrades go through phase 4 and 5, IMHO, because of the 1998 date, this is part of Phase 6. It is hard to tell for sure because of all the background noise of lips smacking upon butts.

Polarbear1605
10-14-2010, 05:46 PM
I have seen and participated in a lot of debates concerning the Boyd Theory (Maneuver Warfare) on this blog. I have seen the Boyd briefings on two separate occasions (Amphibious Warfare School - 1981 and USMC Command and Staff College in 1989). When I sat through the first brief (Patterns of Conflict) I received a copy of the slides. Months later when I went through the slides again I realized that a major portion of the brief was missing. The missing part being the Boyd narrative…the Col would bark at you during the brief like an M-60 machine gun for over eight hours. I became convinced that in order to fully understand the brief you needed both the slides and the narrative.
Realizing my mistake and returning to C&S, when I got to listen to Col Boyd for the second time, I taped the Col’s “Discourse on Winning and Losing” that contains his discussions on “Patterns of Conflict”, “Organic Design for Command and Control”, and “The Strategic Game of ? and ?”. I also remember a number of other recorders on the table besides mine. I recently realized during a discussion on this blog that few if any of those recordings exist today.
I managed to find my cassettes (8 – 90 minute tapes) and made a decision to convert them to CDs. If anyone is interested I have establish a way for you to get a copy of those now 8 CDs (10-12 hours). I need to add a disclaimer here that this is a recording I made with a small old portable cassette player over multiple meetings that was sitting in the middle of a conference room table. The quality is not the best but the discussion can be heard. There is considerable back ground noise and Col Boyd was never one to stand still. In any event, if you are interested in obtaining a set please contact me (polarbear1605) with your email address and I will get the particulars to you. I will also be a this weeks Boyd Conference in Quantico if you want addition information about the CDs. Thanks, Polarbear

Fuchs
10-14-2010, 05:53 PM
…the Col would bark at you during the brief like an M-60 machine gun for over eight hours.



This may just be a nuisance to readers here, but I want to tell you what this reminded me of:

A film director once said that it's not good directing if you need more than 90 minutes duration for a story.

Tukhachevskii
10-15-2010, 10:47 AM
This may just be a nuisance to readers here, but I want to tell you what this reminded me of:

A film director once said that it's not good directing if you need more than 90 minutes duration for a story.

So Martin Scorsese and Francis Ford Coppola are rubbish? Are you saying that Goodfellas and The Godfather were crap because they came in at over 90 mins? Or, for that matter, am I to assume that Tolstoy's War and Peace should be edited down to 100 pages? You must have attention deficiet disorder (as opposed to my dyslexia)?:wry:

Which director happened to make that comment exactly?

slapout9
10-15-2010, 02:36 PM
I have seen and participated in a lot of debates concerning the Boyd Theory (Maneuver Warfare) on this blog. I have seen the Boyd briefings on two separate occasions (Amphibious Warfare School - 1981 and USMC Command and Staff College in 1989). When I sat through the first brief (Patterns of Conflict) I received a copy of the slides. Months later when I went through the slides again I realized that a major portion of the brief was missing. The missing part being the Boyd narrative…the Col would bark at you during the brief like an M-60 machine gun for over eight hours. I became convinced that in order to fully understand the brief you needed both the slides and the narrative.
Realizing my mistake and returning to C&S, when I got to listen to Col Boyd for the second time, I taped the Col’s “Discourse on Winning and Losing” that contains his discussions on “Patterns of Conflict”, “Organic Design for Command and Control”, and “The Strategic Game of ? and ?”. I also remember a number of other recorders on the table besides mine. I recently realized during a discussion on this blog that few if any of those recordings exist today.
I managed to find my cassettes (8 – 90 minute tapes) and made a decision to convert them to CDs. If anyone is interested I have establish a way for you to get a copy of those now 8 CDs (10-12 hours). I need to add a disclaimer here that this is a recording I made with a small old portable cassette player over multiple meetings that was sitting in the middle of a conference room table. The quality is not the best but the discussion can be heard. There is considerable back ground noise and Col Boyd was never one to stand still. In any event, if you are interested in obtaining a set please contact me (polarbear1605) with your email address and I will get the particulars to you. I will also be a this weeks Boyd Conference in Quantico if you want addition information about the CDs. Thanks, Polarbear

I have a set and I am still listening to them. All I can say is get a set...listen to them ....and decide for yourself. I will post more on this as I finish listening to them. Wish I could have gone to the Boyd conference:(

slapout9
11-01-2010, 06:58 PM
Maneuver Warfare theory states that one of it's goals is to generate confusion and disorder in the enemy system until it can no longer effectively respond. So how do you do that.

4 steps to do a Boyd Slap on a whole country:eek:

1-Demoralize
2-Destabilize
3-Crisis
4-Normalize


Link to video on how to brainwash a nation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeMZGGQ0ERk&feature=related

What step is America in?

Ken White
11-01-2010, 07:19 PM
We generate our own confusion and disorder on a daily basis, therefor we are constantly in all those states. That's a design feature, not a bug. :cool:

Of course, as it is a feature, the level of those states changes fairly frequently in an almost random pattern and it is my considered opinion that we concurrently and as is normal occupy all four states. However, by a slight margin our highest state at this time is just below 'Destabilize' to which we recently moved from full 'Demoralize.'

The question now is whether we will descend to 'Crisis' or raise to 'Normalize.' That will likely take about a year or two to be accurately determined.

My belief and bet would be we're headed yet again to 'Normalize.'

Gotta love Roller Coasters...:D

slapout9
11-01-2010, 09:27 PM
My belief and bet would be we're headed yet again to 'Normalize.'

Gotta love Roller Coasters...:D


I know what you said but did you mean that? The 4 steps are from a Soviet Subversion Agent, their Perspective and Definitions are very different than the American version and definitions. Point being from the Soviet perspective step 4 is.......Martial Law:eek:

Fuchs
11-01-2010, 10:13 PM
Single source...

slapout9
11-01-2010, 10:15 PM
Step 4 Normalization explained in greater detail.:eek:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAyLHSNKuQ0&feature=related

Ken White
11-01-2010, 11:51 PM
I know what you said but did you mean that? The 4 steps are from a Soviet Subversion Agent, their Perspective and Definitions are very different than the American version and definitions. Point being from the Soviet perspective step 4 is.......Martial Law:eek:I'm not a Soviet Subversion Agent, just a dumb American. :wry:

We're not anywhere near Martial Law barring something totally unforeseen.:eek:

As an aside, I'll see your Video and raise you four books: “The Sword and the Shield,” by Vasili Mitrokhin, LINK (http://www.amazon.com/Sword-Shield-Mitrokhin-Archive-History/dp/0465003109); “KGB” by Christopher Andrew; "The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World" by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin; and “Perjury” by Allen Weinstein. The first in particualr tells how said Soviet subversion types neatly wormed into the US Education milieu over three generations to bring about their version of "normalize." That effort that may yet be successful.

Or it may lead to proving correct the definition of 'Grapeshot' by Ambrose Bierce (so you may not be off too far...). :D

Fuchs
11-02-2010, 12:31 AM
Maybe KGB was trying to turn the U.S. red. That would of course mean that the KGB was 100% incompetent at doing it.
Today's United States is more politically more right-wing than Germany during the late 2nd empire.

A large minority of Americans decries a mandatory social insurance system as "socialism" which was basically invented by a German royalist-arch-conservative and built on by German post-WW2 Christian-conservatives. Both times it was meant to be (and effective as) an anti-socialist system.


The video makes much more sense when we consider that

* converts are usually extremely zealous - both in religion and politics
* he was pleasing the government and the whole right wing of the time with it
* about 5-10% of mankind is made up of idiots

Keep in mind that history has exactly zero examples which would fit his description of how many years this or that phase takes.


Besides; it's long-known and obvious that PsyOps and secret financing were popular intelligence service activities in the Cold War. This worked both ways, of course.

slapout9
11-02-2010, 01:18 AM
I'm not a Soviet Subversion Agent, just a dumb American. :wry:

We're not anywhere near Martial Law barring something totally unforeseen.:eek:

As an aside, I'll see your Video and raise you four books: “The Sword and the Shield,” by Vasili Mitrokhin, LINK (http://www.amazon.com/Sword-Shield-Mitrokhin-Archive-History/dp/0465003109); “KGB” by Christopher Andrew; "The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World" by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin; and “Perjury” by Allen Weinstein. The first in particualr tells how said Soviet subversion types neatly wormed into the US Education milieu over three generations to bring about their version of "normalize." That effort that may yet be successful.

Or it may lead to proving correct the definition of 'Grapeshot' by Ambrose Bierce (so you may not be off too far...). :D


I read "The Sword and the Shield" I'll check into the others.
In the mean time I'll raise you 8 videos called "More Deadly Than War" link is below.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qdt46Uk61UY

slapout9
11-02-2010, 01:26 AM
A large minority of Americans decries a mandatory social insurance system as "socialism" which was basically invented by a German royalist-arch-conservative and built on by German post-WW2 Christian-conservatives. Both times it was meant to be (and effective as) an anti-socialist system.




That's true. The hard part for people to understand is that Communism and Capitalism are the SAME. BOTH end up with power concentrated in the hands of a NON-Elected Elite Few. One uses a Central Committee the other uses a Central Bank. But in the end they both do the same exact thing.

Ken White
11-02-2010, 01:51 AM
* about 5-10% of mankind is made up of idiotsyour percentage is way low...:wry:
Besides; it's long-known and obvious that PsyOps and secret financing were popular intelligence service activities in the Cold War. This worked both ways, of course.True, it'll take another 100 years or so to sort out who really did what to who. :o

Ken White
11-02-2010, 01:54 AM
In the mean time I'll raise you 8 videos called "More Deadly Than War" link is below.That's some tuff stuff. :eek:

I may make 80 or even 90 but probably not. So I'll likely miss it. Drop me a line downstairs and lemme know how it comes out. ;)

Bob's World
11-02-2010, 01:37 PM
Slap,

Nice pull, I've listened to the first one. I hope people can watch this and see how we are employing fear-mongers today on the evils of Islamic ideology just as we did back when Mr. G Edward Griffen put together this persuasive little bit of propaganda. I suspect he was working for the Republican party in the efforts to get Johnson out of office for promoting civil rights and elevate Nixon to the presidency. (Break, just googled him, and he served as the writer for Wallace's vice presidential candidate, Curtis LeMay. Totallly explains the racist bias and nuke the commies message. My apologies to President Nixon).

Communism is not so much an ideology of revolution, but rather an ideology employed by revolutionaries. They did so because it worked in those populaces. They tried to employ it in Saudi Arabia as well, and it fell flat among those people. Similarly today Islamist ideologies are what works with oppressed people in Muslim nations.

Einstein would label this guy "an intelligent fool," I would be less gracious.

It is time to stop fearing ideologies, and to instead focus on the real issues that drive these revolutions, and work to ensure we are mitigating rather than enabling the tragedy through our policies and engagement.

We got on this boat in about 1950 when we modified containment from one of realist blocking of Soviet expansion into western Europe to one of moralist containing of communist ideology within the Sino-Soviet bloc. Ideas cannot be contained, and the real idea in play was indeed that of "liberty," communism was merely the lubricant to get it moving. Today this is still true, more than ever ideas cannot be contained, and the idea is still "liberty."

“In times of tyranny and injustice when law oppresses the people, the outlaw takes his place in history.”Robin Hood (2010)

slapout9
11-02-2010, 02:38 PM
Slap,

Nice pull, I've listened to the first one. I hope people can watch this and see how we are employing fear-mongers today on the evils of Islamic ideology just as we did back when Mr. G Edward Griffen put together this persuasive little bit of propaganda. (2010)

Yes, you have to understand your enemy. But we don't understand our enemy. Did you catch the part about how there are no Communist countries!!!!because the final goal of Communism was to CREATE a stateless society!!!! 9.9 people who are anti-communist don't even know that. But we are doing exactly that because we believe in this bogus idea that Government is bad and the free market is everything. Most people have never studied Marx or Lenin so most people don't understand that Capitalism=Communism!!! which is why we are generally in the mess we are in. We have been Boyd Slapped by a huge Propaganda machine.

Fuchs
11-02-2010, 06:29 PM
The Eastern German communist party called their system "real existierender Sozialismus" (really existing socialism) and didn't even pretend that there was communism anywhere.
IIRC they blamed the permanent confrontation with the West for the inability to do that big step forward.

Pete
11-02-2010, 11:54 PM
We got on this boat in about 1950 when we modified containment from one of realist blocking of Soviet expansion into western Europe to one of moralist containing of communist ideology within the Sino-Soviet bloc.
It was more complicated than that. During the first Eisenhower administration there was talk of rolling back Communism, but that ended when Soviet tanks entered Budapest in 1954. It's one thing to encourage dissent with propaganda and empty promises but quite another thing to start World War III.

slapout9
11-03-2010, 01:54 AM
Slap,

Nice pull, I've listened to the first one. I hope people can watch this and see how we are employing fear-mongers today on the evils of Islamic ideology just as we did back when Mr. G Edward Griffen put together this persuasive little bit of propaganda.

Bob's World, you really,really need to watch the whole thing. A lot of what you talk about he talks about. The most important part is that the "New Kind of Warfare" was always composed of 2 sections... Violent and Non-Violent. Also everything he talks about actually happened and in that sense it is propaganda but it is also true. Check the sources and references he talks about they are still there.

What we are calling Terrorist movements(or what ever we are calling it now) are know different than the Communist movement. The methods are exactly the same both Violent and Non Violent and both were and are financed by Rich Special Interest groups. The Rebranding of Communism is what we are now calling Globalization....no borders, no countries, no rules, no governments, it is the same thing.

Bob's World
11-03-2010, 11:30 AM
Bob's World, you really,really need to watch the whole thing. A lot of what you talk about he talks about. The most important part is that the "New Kind of Warfare" was always composed of 2 sections... Violent and Non-Violent. Also everything he talks about actually happened and in that sense it is propaganda but it is also true. Check the sources and references he talks about they are still there.

What we are calling Terrorist movements(or what ever we are calling it now) are know different than the Communist movement. The methods are exactly the same both Violent and Non Violent and both were and are financed by Rich Special Interest groups. The Re-branding of Communism is what we are now calling Globalization....no borders, no countries, no rules, no governments, it is the same thing.

Slap, agree, in many ways his understanding was spot on, particularly in regards to not becoming overly focused on violence as the one measure of insurgency, that often, in fact, insurgency is very subtle and or non-violent in its execution.

It was his "blame shifting" PSYOP campaign that I found hard to swallow; and that is the same thing we do today. Back then we blamed our problems on communism and its proponents just as today we blame them on Islamism and its proponents. You can get a lot of Americans to buy into the line, even today, but particularly in '69/70 when this was apparently made, that the war in Vietnam was about expanding communism rather than liberating and unifying Vietnam from western colonialism. But it is a harder sell to then make the case that the rebellion that we call the American Civil Rights Movement was also about expanding communism and that the claims of discrimination were just overplayed propaganda by communist instigators to fire up the otherwise happy, satisfied African American populace. Pure and evil bull####.

A very similar dynamic is going on today, and yes, if we suppress violent approaches well, then it will likely seek non-violent approaches and likely prevail. Or if we take out AQ, another organization will emerge with a different ideology (still based in Islam, as that is the target populace) and new tactics, and may well prevail as well. It is not the leader, the organization, or the ideology that causes these conflicts. If the conditions of insurgency are not ripe within the target populace such efforts will fall flat. So the key metric that one has conditions of insurgency to deal with is when such efforts take root, in whatever from.

I wouldn't go so far as to call this guy the anti-Christ, but he is smart, knowledgeable, and convincingly effective in his delivery. But he is so dangerously wrong in how he then spins those talents to his purposes. He tells you what you want to hear, then he leads you where he wants you to go. I just advise caution, that's all. But he does make some great points, but you need to be well versed to sort them out. An audience that is not versed in the topic in advance would quickly be led down the primrose path he sets out for them. He absolves them of their sins, and then offers them salvation. Effective.

Bob's World
11-03-2010, 11:45 AM
It was more complicated than that. During the first Eisenhower administration there was talk of rolling back Communism, but that ended when Soviet tanks entered Budapest in 1954. It's one thing to encourage dissent with propaganda and empty promises but quite another thing to start World War III.

By chance, a couple weeks ago I picked up a copy of "American Foreign Policy Since World War II" by John Spannier and Steven W. Hook. I was expecting a dry painful tome, but in fact, it was an easy and fascinating read. I highly recommend it, as it gives you the greater context and thinking that these events fell into, and how they shaped the ever-changing variations of "Containment."

1954 was indeed a big year. That is also the year that we resolved the Koreas in their current form and decided to partition Vietnam into a North and South along an armistice line, to pull forces to either side of the line and to conduct a nation-wide election in 1956 to decide who would govern the whole. (an election we later canceled after a massive campaign led by Lansdale to convince hundreds of thousands of Catholics to move south of the line, etc) But it was the kick in the nads delivered by the fall of our great ally and friend, Nationalist China in 1949; followed by the pure shock that Maoist China did not share our view of ourselves in regards to China, and in fact saw us as evil, that really set us on our heels. That is what drove the change of Containment from realist focus on soviet expansion to an idealist focus on containing the idea instead.

Ken White
11-03-2010, 03:30 PM
containment and the like expressed by Historians and Political Scientists based on their readings.

As one who was an adult predominately engaged with and strongly interested in 'national security' but who also worked in various civilian enterprises and lived in several areas of the nation throughout the entire period, the consistent take of American attitudes expressed in such histories is well off the mark IMO.

Much of the historical 'data' is of necessity derived from period writings and media or from interviews or 'oral history' from the anointed of the era. It has been my observation over the years that the majority of academics, writers and media persons, the "anointed," do not well understand the great unwashed in so called middle America and about whom they write. That shows in much current history of the period. They may get the big events about right, sort of have to do that, however, their perceptions of public beliefs and attitudes is general significantly skewed compared to my recollections. The "idealist" approach to foreign policy has always been present amongst the power structure in this nation, all ideologies -- it has almost never been present among the hoi polloi -- tolerated, yes but endorsed or even believed for a second -- no.

Spanier, for example, back in the day was basically a proponent of "exceptionalism" and decried the ignorance and isolationism of the masses who were willing to essentailly ignore Communism as a minor annoyance, which it was. The masses weren't nearly as stupid as he perceived...

All that to say: Some Americans buy into the BS both parties and all politicians and would be demagogues spew. Most do not. Never have, really.

Rather they are in fact amazingly tolerant of the many errors of the anointed...:cool:

(and yes, I've read the book. Not the latest iteration but some years ago. ;) )

slapout9
11-03-2010, 08:39 PM
But it is a harder sell to then make the case that the rebellion that we call the American Civil Rights Movement was also about expanding communism and that the claims of discrimination were just overplayed propaganda by communist instigators to fire up the otherwise happy, satisfied African American populace. Pure and evil bull####.

A very similar dynamic is going on today, and yes, if we suppress violent approaches well, then it will likely seek non-violent approaches and likely prevail. Or if we take out AQ, another organization will emerge with a different ideology (still based in Islam, as that is the target populace) and new tactics, and may well prevail as well. It is not the leader, the organization, or the ideology that causes these conflicts. If the conditions of insurgency are not ripe within the target populace such efforts will fall flat. So the key metric that one has conditions of insurgency to deal with is when such efforts take root, in whatever from.



Bob's World,
I think your missing the point. Revolutionary Warfare finds Gaps ( Maneuver Warfare) in any society and exploits them, it doesn't create them. And it will always use both Violent and Non-Violent means. That is why I like the film, Griffen is irrelevant.

But Communism is not about taking over Governments it is about DESTROYING all forms of government, that was the final goal and that is what most people don't understand about it. The NAFTA treaty could have been written by Karl Marx himself, it destroys the legitimacy of the State and so does Islam to certain extent.

That is why I like the Jones theory. The counter-measure is Good government, always was. The American concept of a Mission based government has built in protections against any type of Insurgency, but the more people have the concept that Government is bad, and Government can't solve problems the more vulnerable we will become and the more we will descend into Communist/Corporate Feudalism.

Kind of an interesting view of Islam here, what do you think?
http://www.youtube.com/user/HISTROIKA

Pete
11-03-2010, 09:13 PM
... the ignorance and isolationism of the masses who were willing to essentailly ignore Communism as a minor annoyance, which it was.
True, but the guy who coined the phrase "Acheson's cowardly college of containment" was elected president twice, although he didn't finish his second term.

Steve Blair
11-03-2010, 09:45 PM
Much of the historical 'data' is of necessity derived from period writings and media or from interviews or 'oral history' from the anointed of the era. It has been my observation over the years that the majority of academics, writers and media persons, the "anointed," do not well understand the great unwashed in so called middle America and about whom they write. That shows in much current history of the period. They may get the big events about right, sort of have to do that, however, their perceptions of public beliefs and attitudes is general significantly skewed compared to my recollections. The "idealist" approach to foreign policy has always been present amongst the power structure in this nation, all ideologies -- it has almost never been present among the hoi polloi -- tolerated, yes but endorsed or even believed for a second -- no.

I'd say that's because, Ken, too many current writers have bought into the media perpetuation of polls as actually reflecting widely-held opinions as opposed to their snapshot of the (possible) feelings of the 200 or so people who actually answered the phone. I've noticed that those sort of sweeping generalizations aren't as common in histories written about periods before widespread opinion polling.

Ken White
11-03-2010, 10:02 PM
True, but the guy who coined the phrase "Acheson's cowardly college of containment" was elected president twice, although he didn't finish his second term.is almost totally driven by domestic political party politics. As you pointed out elsewhere, rhetoric is rhetoric, WW III would be a different problem.:eek:

That guy knew that at the time, he said what he said simply to make his political opponents look wimpy. That sort of worked -- mostly because his predecessor had set the stage for that belief. Note that caused 42 and 44 to take actions they did not wish to take to in failed attempts to assuage that concern. :wry:

The fascinating thing is that guy got elected to that second term with pretty full knowledge by the American voters of what he had 'done' and then was forced to leave early -- also due almost entirely to domestic political party politics and not to what he had 'done' -- the Voters went along pretty much because he was guilty of an excess of arrogance, an American No-No.

I think the uniformed White House Secret Service / EPS detail uniforms (below) had more to do with it than any illegal acts. :D

Seeing a half dozen big beefy guys in that get up brought on massive guffaws nationwide. This was the only pic I could find -- I guess the SS didn't want to be embarrassed and gathered and destroyed all the photos they could...:cool:

I do believe yesterday was a gentle nudge by those American voters to remind both parties that communism isn't a big problem, minor crookedness isn't a big problem -- but arrogance is not acceptable. We'll see if DC is smart enough to take the hint. My bet is no...

slapout9
11-04-2010, 04:02 AM
A native American Elder explains the first level that Boyd talks about....the Moral level. There is some chit chat at the start but it gets really good.



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9piIziXU9RE&feature=related

slapout9
11-05-2010, 02:41 PM
I do believe yesterday was a gentle nudge by those American voters to remind both parties that communism isn't a big problem, minor crookedness isn't a big problem -- but arrogance is not acceptable. We'll see if DC is smart enough to take the hint. My bet is no...

Except it ain't so. Communism Re-Branded as Collectivism is the main problem.

Marx had an some equations. C-M-C vs. M-C-M. I will focus on the second one M=money and C=commodities. The new Corporate /Communist headquarters is the The Federal Reserve. What did the Fed just do? They printed a bunch of money out of nothing and gave it to the Bankers(Capitalist) who used it to buy existing commodities which will drive up prices, which will result in more money going to the concentrated non elected, non accountable elite. And because the Fed is not accountable to Government it doesn't matter who got elected, because the goal of Communism is and always was the destruction of National Sovereignty(Government accountability to the people within a geographic area).

Ken White
11-05-2010, 04:05 PM
So is what you said essentially so. Two different things.

My point was that nudge was to avoid efforts and things like those that you cite. The point for both our stated issues is whether DC will tune in. I doubt it... :mad:

Pete
11-05-2010, 06:55 PM
When Ken was a Corporal you had to know how to use a clutch in order to bring about a paradigm shift. :)

slapout9
11-05-2010, 08:07 PM
So is what you said essentially so. Two different things.

My point was that nudge was to avoid efforts and things like those that you cite. The point for both our stated issues is whether DC will tune in. I doubt it... :mad:

Yes sir, except I think there is going to be some sparks this time. Rand Paul has already said he has more in common with Dennis Kuncinich than with the Republican party:) Both are Constitutional Americans....the Republi-DeCrats hate people that actually have morals:D

Ron Paul (Rand's father) is probably going to get to chair the Audit the Fed Committee and if that happens and the American people see Who and What is really going on at the Fed.....well it's gonna be a great day. Time some music. "Great Day To Be Alive " by Travis Tritt
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bcU2Hy3upBg