Scrutinizing Petraeus's Record

[oblong]

I'm actually surprised that something like this hasn't been written earlier, or maybe it has, and I just missed it.

http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/07/19/petraeus/index.html

The appearance on the Hugh Hewitt show probably wasn't a big mistake, if only because the vast majority of americans have no idea who he is. But it clearly gave some people who were looking for a reason to be skeptical of anything Petraeus says that reason.

[RTK]

I'm actually surprised that something like this hasn't been written earlier, or maybe it has, and I just missed it.

http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/07/19/petraeus/index.html

The appearance on the Hugh Hewitt show probably wasn't a big mistake, if only because the vast majority of americans have no idea who he is. But it clearly gave some people who were looking for a reason to be skeptical of anything Petraeus says that reason.

What did you expect he'd say?

"Yes, Hugh, we're really in a bind. In fact, we're getting our @sses handed to us..."

Is it so hard for those who haven't been there to believe things are getting better, contrary to what is shown on MSM?

[SWJED]

There are some issues here – especially with the “general public”. The administration’s history of denial and painting a rosy picture in Iraq is not only haunting the suits but the uniformed leadership as well.

For the most part Council members – and the military at large – understand that General Petraeus is a straight shooter and has an extensive grasp of what it takes to win the COIN fight. As oblong pointed out – he is virtually unknown to the average Joe on the street who may have supported the war early on (and maybe longer) but feels somewhat betrayed and generally pissed off on how this all unfolded.

Now is the time for a full-court information press on what the new strategy means, the ramifications of a wholesale pull-out, and (with the clock reset to a spring – summer 2007 start) how long it takes to conduct successful COIN ops – even when you are doing “everything right”… This is critical as publications such as Salon and The New Republic are pounding out their own IO message – each and every day.

[mmx1]

Paul Krugman weighed in on the 19th in the NYT:
Paul Krugman: All the President’s Enablers (economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/paul-krugman-al.html)



In other words, General Petraeus, without saying anything falsifiable, conveyed the totally misleading impression, highly convenient for his political masters, that victory was just around the corner. And the best guess has to be that he’ll do the same thing three years later.

The pile-on from the left is starting.

[oblong]

Things may well be improving in Iraq, perhaps dramatically. But my question is Is giving an interview to a highly partisan radio host the right way to spread that message to a skeptical public, and more important, to Congress. Petraeus should have known how his appearance on that show would be spinned.

[Ken White]

Things may well be improving in Iraq, perhaps dramatically. But my question is Is giving an interview to a highly partisan radio host the right way to spread that message to a skeptical public, and more important, to Congress. Petraeus should have known how his appearance on that show would be spinned.

He's been sort of busy the last four years and I suspect he's not a blog visitor or a talk radio listener. Most Generals are studiously apolitical in the domestic politics sense at least publicly so he could well not have had a clue.

Heard he did another for NPR recently. I imagine he'd do one with anyone who asked and the mainstream media almost certainly hasn't asked -- though they may now.

Regardless the left leaning blogs and talking headless will have fun for a few days. Fortunately, the attention span out there is pretty short. :cool:

[Tom Odom]

There are some issues here – especially with the “general public”. The administration’s history of denial and painting a rosy picture in Iraq is not only haunting the suits but the uniformed leadership as well.

For the most part Council members – and the military at large – understand that General Petraeus is a straight shooter and has an extensive grasp of what it takes to win the COIN fight. As oblong pointed out – he is virtually unknown to the average Joe on the street who may have supported the war early on (and maybe longer) but feels somewhat betrayed and generally pissed off on how this all unfolded.

Now is the time for a full-court information press on what the new strategy means, the ramifications of a wholesale pull-out, and (with the clock reset to a spring – summer 2007 start) how long it takes to conduct successful COIN ops – even when you are doing “everything right”… This is critical as publications such as Salon and The New Republic are pounding out their own IO message – each and every day.


Excellent post, Dave. Anyone ever tell you to consider starting a web site for dicussions?

Seriously, great points. Even among those familiar with the issues some rosy predictions tend to act like sugar in cavities. As for those who do not track the issues, we do need a sustained IO effort to get their attention across the political spectrum. Even the comments after your post suggest that may be misinterpreted. As Ken said, I believe he was on NPR but so far no one has chosed to turn that "affliation" into an issue.

All of this points to just how deep the credibility gap is at this stage. I believe that McCaffrey's last stitrep had it right when he said general support for the war is gone and that our efforts regardless of wisdom or correctness in a military/strategic sense are on a timed clock.

Best

Tom,

[Merv Benson]

Most of those who objected to the General's statements or his forum for making it are already committed to our defeat in Iraq and they object to anything that might contradict that objective. While Hugh Hewitt is a center right host, he also interviews several leftist and war opponents in a respectful way. I think the real objection to the interview is that he elicited facts that do not support the narrative of the war's opponents.

If we are going to fight small wars, and make no mistake many of the opponents of the Iraq war want us never to fight them, our military leaders are going to have to come up with a way to buy the political time needed to make their effort successful in the theater of action. What we have discovered is that the real center of gravity for these efforts is in the public opinion of Americans who are not engaged in the theater of operations. It is an important area of the war effort that cannot be ignored.

The enemy has said that half its efforts are in the media battle space, and that is certainly the area where he has had the most success.

[SSG Rock]

The lack of or refusal to use critical thinking skills in America is astounding. Are we so needy that we gravitate to the point of view that is the most comforting rather than to accept the truth when it is right in front of you smacking you in the nose repeatedly? I don't know, sometimes I get so frustrated with some of the spin our government (both sides) try to pass off on Americans.

[goesh]

The Pope and all the Prophets could have been standing behind General P. nodding their heads in approval when he told the world what the reality in Iraq is and it wouldn't matter, some would still call him a Halliburton-Bush-Cheney puppet.

[Rank amateur]

Is it so hard for those who haven't been there to believe things are getting better, contrary to what is shown on MSM?

Yes, because:

1. The boy who cried wolf factor.
2. We're still being lied to; the Anbar awakening predates the surge as confirmed by one of our council members who was there, but that's not the spin.
3. Things rarely get better in the Middle East and they rarely stay that way. Other than, possibly, for Israel.

Also, you should consider

1. There's a difference between better and "good enough." For a significant amount of people, "We're finding less bodies in the streets" isn't good enough.
2. Getting better hasn't achieved the objective. Lots of intelligent people, including many in the military, don't believe that the objective is achievable.
3. Better for who? All many people care about is the US casualty rate. I'm sure if it dropped to zero, the political debate would change radically.
4. You're forgetting about the cost. Many taxpayers - including many here - don't want to pay more in taxes to make America better. Why should they pay to make Iraq better? (The military isn't used to this, but I suspect you're now in the same boat as the teacher who insists that with just a few dollars they could provide better education, or the engineering who wanted to build better flood protection for New Orleans. You may be right, but the best place for the money that I earn is in my pocket.)

[marct]

Hi RA,

Really good points!

I'd add in a couple of others to sort of round it out:

1. The Big Lie - pretty much everyone has heard about this in one form or another, but awareness of its possibility leads to a jaundiced view of anything "official".

2. Most people don't know enough history to recognize the patterns of what will happen if there is a precipitous pullout. And, given the cost of staying as you noted, why should "we" stay?

[skiguy]

There's a lot of talk here about what the general public doesn't understand, and I completely agree. Whenever I mention COIN to someone, they look dumbfounded because they've never heard of it. (and never mind when I mention names like Nagl or Kilcullen. They don't even care who they are and what they've done until I throw in the word Dr. or give their credentials/bio)

How can you, the military, (or maybe I could ask should you?) "teach" the general public about COIN so that they'll understand it better? I mean if I, who knows very little about COIN, can get it, why can't the public?

Is the only reason I'm understanding it because, a.) I have an interest in learning more about it or b.) I'm paying more attention to what's going on in Iraq from the people who know what they're talking about/doing (i.e. using better sources of information than most do)?

Maybe I should ask, does it even matter that the gen. public understands this? IMHO, yes it does matter...a lot. I've never changed an anti-war or a "bomb all the Muslims" person, but I helped change their attitude a bit when I explained to them how COIN works.

[Uboat509]

2. We're still being lied to; the Anbar awakening predates the surge as confirmed by one of our council members who was there, but that's not the spin.


I'm going to address this one because I am sick and tired of hearing it. First of all the "surge" is not nor was it ever the new strategy. The surge is simply a means to provide more troops to facilitate the new strategy. The new strategy is about pushing more troops out of the FOBs and getting them out where they can do more good. The commanders on the ground did not wait for the surge to start implementing this. Yes, the Anbar awakening started before the surge but without help from us it would have died there. No one is lying about it and I am sick and tired of hearing people who do not have enough information to have an opinion on the issue make grand sweeping statements like "We're being lied to."

SFC W

[marct]

Hi Uboat,


I'm going to address this one because I am sick and tired of hearing it. First of all the "surge" is not nor was it ever the new strategy. The surge is simply a means to provide more troops to facilitate the new strategy. The new strategy is about pushing more troops out of the FOBs and getting them out where they can do more good. The commanders on the ground did not wait for the surge to start implementing this. Yes, the Anbar awakening started before the surge but without help from us it would have died there. No one is lying about it and I am sick and tired of hearing people who do not have enough information to have an opinion on the issue make grand sweeping statements like "We're being lied to."

Well, without speaking for RA, I took his points as being "popular understandings" more than anything else. Of course the surge isn't a strategy, but it has been spun as one by a number of politicians and some media who conflate the surge with a strategy. Since most non-military people use the term "strategy" to cover everything from "how I am going to make breakfast" to "how I will penetrate the Chinese market and achieve world widget domination", I really don't find it surprising that they can't distinguish between them.

What I saw RAs list as was a series of reasons (actually, emotional responses, not rational thought) why the "common man" doesn't believe pretty much anything coming out from "official sources" - the blocks to communicative legitimacy as it were.

[tequila]

Releasing contradictory data (http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2007/09/fuzzy-numbers-a.html)about important metrics does not help.

[RTK]

I'll be foreward and honest with you;



1. The boy who cried wolf factor.


1. Horrbile analogy. There's a difference between listening and hearing. Most of the public has been hearing what they want to hear and not listening to the full story since the beginning of this war, typically hearing what suits their own preconceived notions.

2. We're still being lied to; the Anbar awakening predates the surge as confirmed by one of our council members who was there, but that's not the spin.
2. The Surge isnt' the strategy. Clear, Hold, Build is. What 1/1 AD was doing in Anbar that set the stage for the Anbar Awakening is a macro level of Tal Afar. People are missing the big picture here. The strategy has changed sginificantly in the last year. The surge has only accelerated progress with a new strategy.

3. Things rarely get better in the Middle East and they rarely stay that way. Other than, possibly, for Israel.
3. A narrow-minded and shortsighted approach to the Middle East. You're judging them with Western standards in mind. This clearly does not translate. The most basic cultural awareness class reminds us of this each time we deploy.



1. There's a difference between better and "good enough." For a significant amount of people, "We're finding less bodies in the streets" isn't good enough.

If that's the only metric you're looking at, then you aren't seeking the bigger picture. What improvements are being made in sewage disposal, water treatment, electricity per day, academic institutions, trash removal, medical services, and local security? If you're looking for body counts only, that's about the poorest metric I can think of.

2. Getting better hasn't achieved the objective. Lots of intelligent people, including many in the military, don't believe that the objective is achievable.

Not in 4 years its not. TX Hammes makes an excellent point in a History Channel Documentary dated 2004, stating words to the effect that the Malaysian Counterinsurgency Campaign took around 15 years. Others have taken upwards of 40. So the gold standard in the last century is 15 years, with an average of about 25. The American people don't have the patience to prosecute a war they don't understand nor do they care about understanding. For the vast majority of them, it doesn't affect them.


3. Better for who? All many people care about is the US casualty rate. I'm sure if it dropped to zero, the political debate would change radically.
BS. All many people care about is what Brittney Spears is doing this week or how OJ Simpson is going to get out the next jam. They could care less about what the strategic military objective in Iraq is, or, much less, how it's affecting the family of some poor Iraqi they'll never have to deal with anyway.


4. You're forgetting about the cost. Many taxpayers - including many here - don't want to pay more in taxes to make America better. Why should they pay to make Iraq better? (The military isn't used to this, but I suspect you're now in the same boat as the teacher who insists that with just a few dollars they could provide better education, or the engineering who wanted to build better flood protection for New Orleans. You may be right, but the best place for the money that I earn is in my pocket.)

Last I checked, I pay taxes too, and I've spent 24 months in Iraq. Does that mean I have a greater vested interest? I'd suspect you'd say no.

Leaving Iraq is morally and ethically irresponsible (How dare I bring morals and ethics into a discussion like this). Regardless of the reasons we invaded, however valid or invalid any of them are, we created the situation over there. I'm sick and tired of the same old line; "We haven't found WMDs," "This is about Oil," "We went there to fight Al Qaeda." At this point, 4 years into this, we need to get over ourselves and face reality. We're there. We're going to be there for a while. Deal with it. How do we, as an American people, make things better?

I feel, as an American, like I'm on the New York Giants, with the entire country as the team. It's always someone else's fault and no one wants to accept responsibility for what's going on. The team sucks right now. No one is on the same page. Most people are so damned preoccupied with blaming someone else that they don't see the real issue right in front of their faces. We're in Iraq. We're tasked with building a government and providing security. We are. Not the Army, not the Marine Corps. We. What has John Q. Public done besides slap a yellow ribbon on his bumper or perhaps sent a package around Christmas? Not a damned thing.

You may say I'm a nepotist and you're probably right. After 6 years since 9/11 I've seen a country go from total support to "we support the troop and not the war" which is crap. I seldom listen to those who don't have a hand in this anymore, for reasons good, bad, or indifferent. If GEN George S. Patton was still alive, Old Blood and Guts would be pissed. I'd gather Chesty Puller is spinning in his grave. One day, I imagine, I will be too. Either way, I must be the last idiot that believes in this. And I'll continue to do so.

[Uboat509]

Hi Uboat,
Well, without speaking for RA, I took his points as being "popular understandings" more than anything else. Of course the surge isn't a strategy, but it has been spun as one by a number of politicians and some media who conflate the surge with a strategy. Since most non-military people use the term "strategy" to cover everything from "how I am going to make breakfast" to "how I will penetrate the Chinese market and achieve world widget domination", I really don't find it surprising that they can't distinguish between them.

What I saw RAs list as was a series of reasons (actually, emotional responses, not rational thought) why the "common man" doesn't believe pretty much anything coming out from "official sources" - the blocks to communicative legitimacy as it were.

My issue is not so much that he does not understand what the strategy is but rather that he takes what little knowledge he has and makes the leap to "We're being lied to."

SFC W

[Ken White]

than most. I for one appreciate that.

I would've been less so and would have pointed out that anyone who pays much attention to anything any politician or political appointee says is hopelessly naive; that no one lied to me about the surge turning anything around -- every pronouncement I've read had been very cautious (other than the civilian bloggers and the always clueless news media). :mad:

Not a fan of metrics. They have a purpose but in war, that purpose seems to be to totally confuse issues. They are incredibly hard to obtain with any accuracy and have a tendency to change rapidly, thus they are routinely manipulated by both sides in any discussion to counter each other. That seems totally intuitive to me but others apparently don't see it that way... :confused:

The bulk of Americans don't care about casualties. There are many that make much of them on both sides but IMO, the majority of noise is mere political theater. Most Americans want results, period and they want them rapidly. Not going to happen.

The taxpayer bit is always somewhat galling to me for the reasons you state plus the incredible amounts the Congress wastes here in the US. If there's a Congroid with over two terms who does not have a host of hignways, overpasses, bridges, buildings, Federal this or that Centers and whatever named after him or her, I'd like a list... :rolleyes:

Marc is correct, RA's items are indeed popular understandings -- too popular. They are also largely incorrect and I fault this administration as being the absolute worst of the twelve I've lived under in getting out a coherent message for a part of that. I could also rant about the media and the education system being even greater contributors but this isn't the thread for that. I'll just say that everyone has a right to an opinion and to express it. Seems to me that gives one an obligation to have an understanding beyond the popular 'wisdom' and a logical construct in expressing that opinion.

[Watcher In The Middle]

The bulk of Americans don't care about casualties. There are many that make much of them on both sides but IMO, the majority of noise is mere political theater. Most Americans want results, period and they want them rapidly. Not going to happen.

One additional point, if I may (from an ex-pol). The great bulk (probably at least 75%+) of the American people do not do "Lose" well - I mean not at all. Losses, and all the money - you will get a pass if you win. Now, you can debate what "winning" is, but but I'm convinced with the American people, "They knows it when they sees It" - all the spin otherwise means nothing. And IMHO, they saw both GEN Petraeus and AMB Crocker this last week and they said "winners".


The taxpayer bit is always somewhat galling to me for the reasons you state plus the incredible amounts the Congress wastes here in the US. If there's a Congroid with over two terms who does not have a host of hignways, overpasses, bridges, buildings, Federal this or that Centers and whatever named after him or her, I'd like a list...

We, if I really sat down & worked at it, I might be able to come up with a really, really short list....ok...a really, really, really short list.

[Ken White]

I never cease to be amazed at how that competitive spirit shows itself -- and at the absolute wisdom of the collective in most cases.

In fairness to the Robert C. Byrd State of West by God Virginia, it's the system and they just take advantage of it because if one does not, another will. The tragedy is that the Feds take in over 60% of all revenue and expend less than 40%. The difference is made up with grants and transfers to the States, Counties and Cities who are really responsible for most government functions.

Aside from the sheer waste and inefficiency and the bureaucracy supported at all levels to request, process and massage the grants and transfers; it wrongly puts local government which is most responsive to the populace in the supplicant mode and, even worse, the surplus allowed the Feds in the system encourages profligate spending by Congress and, far more importantly, encourages a lot of sloppiness in the federal government. The Federal government used to do most of its jobs fairly well, today it does not do most of its jobs at all well because it is too busy sticking it's nose into too many voter buying things that are not its business.

I've long believed that a part of the failure of the Armed Forces to lose their WW II mentality is an excess of money that allows too much to be spent on the wrong things and the political meddling that keeps it that way. The system is at fault.

[MattC86]

Not a fan of metrics. They have a purpose but in war, that purpose seems to be to totally confuse issues. They are incredibly hard to obtain with any accuracy and have a tendency to change rapidly, thus they are routinely manipulated by both sides in any discussion to counter each other. That seems totally intuitive to me but others apparently don't see it that way... :confused:

The bulk of Americans don't care about casualties. There are many that make much of them on both sides but IMO, the majority of noise is mere political theater. Most Americans want results, period and they want them rapidly. Not going to happen.



You didn't say so explicity, but I think you touched upon the dilemma we still don't have an answer to. I agree metrics are crappy, and are particularly worthless in COIN. Yet you can't expect Petraeus to testify before Congress that "things are getting better - I know it when I see it," which seems to be the real message both from high command and many of the guys (including RTK, Cavguy, and others here). They may be right, and probably are - I sure as hell don't know sitting around in Ithaca.

But the politicians want the metrics because it's their substitute for visible, tangible, progress. The American people aren't going to see Iraq in person, and we know just how well the news media will cover it. Even visits by think-tankers (O'Hanlon and Pollack got absolutely crucified for their moderate, cautious endorsement) or politicians (how many jokes has the Daily Show done about that moron Indiana congressman's "it was just like a market in Indiana") are discounted because they're slammed as unrealistic PR tours by the media and left-leaning segment of the public.

In a conventional war, we don't need the metrics because the American citizen can look at newspaper or a map and see how we're doing. For all the horror over American casualties at, say, Tarawa or the Bulge, the average American still saw the continuing (if bloody) progress of armies and navies towards Berlin and Tokyo. And that meant "bringing the boys home." The Korean War, which was very unpopular from late July-August 1950 (the Perimeter phase) and from 1951-53, was palatable to the public in those few months in between, when we were dashing towards Pyongyang and the Yalu and the war seemed as good as over.

It happened again in 2003 - when Baghdad fell, Bush's popularity rose. They all thought it was won.

But as we know, with COIN, there is no map to show the people. There are no daily news reports of Americans crossing another river, liberating another city. The news becomes the car bombs, the beheadings, or crimes committed by Americans.

I think that the political necessities have forced Petraeus and others into using metrics quite unsuited to truly judging success in COIN. Those metrics, which are not indicative of the progress being made, are then torn apart, analyzed ad nauseam, and declared by a sea of "experts" to mean either "we've turned the corner and are gonna win" or "we're still losing heavily." Take your pick - I lean more to the left than most of you.

But until there's a tangible way to measure the progress made in a limited or COIN strategy - no tanks rumbling towards Berlin - we're going to be forced to use those poor metrics.

And we need to figure out that tangible way to SHOW the progress we've made. Because as Ken says, the casualties are not what kills support. Lack of progress kills support. Or rather, the perception of a lack of progress.

Matt

[tequila]

After the surge report: views on the war in Iraq (http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/sep07b-iraq.pdf)- CBS News poll 14-16 Sep (pdf file).

No real public opinion shift after the Petraeus/Crocker testimony, if you don't want to click on the link.

I have a hard time understanding those who do not want to see metrics. They do not provide the whole picture, but they do provide critical data. If you define part of your mission as securing the population, then data that indicates whether or not the population is not being secured (i.e. increasing or decreasing numbers of dead civilians, increasing or decreasing sectarian migration) would appear to be somewhat important. Sure, no one may be laying IEDs for your patrols anymore, and the local militia appears quiescent. Perhaps this is because the militia has killed or expelled the local minority population, taken over their homes, and are now busy stripping their businesses for profit. Is this local progress? "Bottom-up" reconciliation? If you discount the dozen bodies found in the local garbage dump, or fail to recognize the 60 refugees who have just moved into abandoned homes, you just might think that's the case. After all, the place "feels" more peaceful and no one's shooting at you, no?

Uboat -


Yes, the Anbar awakening started before the surge but without help from us it would have died there. No one is lying about it and I am sick and tired of hearing people who do not have enough information to have an opinion on the issue make grand sweeping statements like "We're being lied to."


Does the President's quote below sound accurate to you?



Anbar Province is a good example of how our strategy is working. Last year, an intelligence report concluded that Anbar had been lost to al Qaeda. Some cited this report as evidence that we had failed in Iraq and should cut our losses and pull out. Instead, we kept the pressure on the terrorists. The local people were suffering under the Taliban-like rule of al Qaeda, and they were sick of it. So they asked us for help.

To take advantage of this opportunity, I sent an additional 4,000 Marines to Anbar as part of the surge.


RTK -


1. Horrbile analogy. There's a difference between listening and hearing. Most of the public has been hearing what they want to hear and not listening to the full story since the beginning of this war, typically hearing what suits their own preconceived notions.


I think you're missing the boat on this one. If most of the public is, according to you, only "hearing what they want to hear" and thus, I suppose, antiwar, you would not have seen public support for the Iraq War detioriate as it has --- it would have never been high at all. According to you, the public has always been antiwar. This is demonstrably false.


2. The Surge isnt' the strategy. Clear, Hold, Build is. What 1/1 AD was doing in Anbar that set the stage for the Anbar Awakening is a macro level of Tal Afar. People are missing the big picture here. The strategy has changed sginificantly in the last year. The surge has only accelerated progress with a new strategy.


As noted by David Kilcullen, success in Iraq has come largely by surprise and counter to expectations by surge planners (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/). The surge was presented by the President and others, especially principle architects like MG Keane and Fred Kagan, as a means to secure Baghdad through an increased troop presence (http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25356/pub_detail.asp). This would, in turn, "buy time" for or spur national reconciliation. "Clear-hold-build" is nothing but a slogan, and a pretty meaningless one at that given that it has supposedly been the plan (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55303.htm)since 2005. Getting off FOBs and into neighborhood patrol posts has delivered tactical success in many places, but this is tactics, not strategy, and has certainly not been a cornerstone Iraq-wide policy until Petraeus & Co. arrived.


If that's the only metric you're looking at, then you aren't seeking the bigger picture. What improvements are being made in sewage disposal, water treatment, electricity per day, academic institutions, trash removal, medical services, and local security? If you're looking for body counts only, that's about the poorest metric I can think of.

Data about this has been posted repeatedly on this message board. The number of Iraqis with access to clean water has risen from 50% to 70% since 2003 (http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/2007/pr070730_iraq_humanitarian_crisis) (now with cholera outbreaks (http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i9kvheUr1rKeZ1YpvHjHAFg_350w)!), electricity per day remains flat, academic institutions (http://chronicle.com/temp/reprint.php?id=j4hq71783rqvwf5836kxllw8nj911lsk)ha ve been devastated by violence and refugee flight (http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70697), medical services (http://discovermagazine.com/2007/aug/iraq2019s)are in the same place. Frankly none has been looking up, with the possible exception of local security and perhaps electricity.


Not in 4 years its not. TX Hammes makes an excellent point in a History Channel Documentary dated 2004, stating words to the effect that the Malaysian Counterinsurgency Campaign took around 15 years. Others have taken upwards of 40. So the gold standard in the last century is 15 years, with an average of about 25. The American people don't have the patience to prosecute a war they don't understand nor do they care about understanding. For the vast majority of them, it doesn't affect them.

If this is the case, then we probably should not get involved in insurgencies, since it is hopeless from the start.


BS. All many people care about is what Brittney Spears is doing this week or how OJ Simpson is going to get out the next jam. They could care less about what the strategic military objective in Iraq is, or, much less, how it's affecting the family of some poor Iraqi they'll never have to deal with anyway.


If this was the case, then public support would not be an issue. No one would care about whether or not the war was successful or not. Instead, polling indicates that the Iraq War is seen as the No. 1 issue facing the United States.


Leaving Iraq is morally and ethically irresponsible (How dare I bring morals and ethics into a discussion like this). Regardless of the reasons we invaded, however valid or invalid any of them are, we created the situation over there. I'm sick and tired of the same old line; "We haven't found WMDs," "This is about Oil," "We went there to fight Al Qaeda." At this point, 4 years into this, we need to get over ourselves and face reality. We're there. We're going to be there for a while. Deal with it. How do we, as an American people, make things better?

Are we in Iraq now for morality and ethics? Really? If so, one could question the priorities and tasking of our national resources, since there are many other areas where we could extend "morality and ethics" in our foreign policy and national governance.


I feel, as an American, like I'm on the New York Giants, with the entire country as the team. It's always someone else's fault and no one wants to accept responsibility for what's going on. The team sucks right now. No one is on the same page. Most people are so damned preoccupied with blaming someone else that they don't see the real issue right in front of their faces. We're in Iraq. We're tasked with building a government and providing security. We are. Not the Army, not the Marine Corps. We. What has John Q. Public done besides slap a yellow ribbon on his bumper or perhaps sent a package around Christmas? Not a damned thing.

John Q. Public has not been asked to do anything but sign off on whatever the President has put in front of him, which has been a politically spun happyface since Day 1. If the case had been put to the public in 2003 as rebuilding the government of Iraq and providing security and economic reconstruction for years on end with an eventual pricetag of $500+ billion and thousands of American lives, I doubt it would have ever sold.

If a leader had the courage to tell the American people that failure in Iraq is not an option, but actually laid out the real costs and sacrifices necessary for success, the American people might have responded. Hard to put all the blame on John Q. Public for not wanting to continue to be treated like mushrooms and being skeptical of the government's new storyline --- even if the new storyline might have more truth than the last.

[RTK]

RTK -



[QUOTE]I think you're missing the boat on this one. If most of the public is, according to you, only "hearing what they want to hear" and thus, I suppose, antiwar, you would not have seen public support for the Iraq War detioriate as it has --- it would have never been high at all. According to you, the public has always been antiwar. This is demonstrably false.
It is what it is. And it's my opinion without any factual basis.



As noted by David Kilcullen, success in Iraq has come largely by surprise and counter to expectations by surge planners (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/). The surge was presented by the President and others, especially principle architects like MG Keane and Fred Kagan, as a means to secure Baghdad through an increased troop presence (http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25356/pub_detail.asp). This would, in turn, "buy time" for or spur national reconciliation. "Clear-hold-build" is nothing but a slogan, and a pretty meaningless one at that given that it has supposedly been the plan (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55303.htm)since 2005. Getting off FOBs and into neighborhood patrol posts has delivered tactical success in many places, but this is tactics, not strategy, and has certainly not been a cornerstone Iraq-wide policy until Petraeus & Co. arrived.

All due respect, I know many of the surge planners. This is exactly what they were looking for.






If this is the case, then we probably should not get involved in insurgencies, since it is hopeless from the start.

Hard is not hopeless - Gen Petraeus in Jan 2007.



Are we in Iraq now for morality and ethics? Really? If so, one could question the priorities and tasking of our national resources, since there are many other areas where we could extend "morality and ethics" in our foreign policy and national governance.

In the Army, as long as we have the Army Values, then it is and always has been a morality and ethics issue. Some have created problems by not upholding these values. The vast majority of Soldiers hold leadership, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage close.



If a leader had the courage to tell the American people that failure in Iraq is not an option, but actually laid out the real costs and sacrifices necessary for success, the American people might have responded. Hard to put all the blame on John Q. Public for not wanting to continue to be treated like mushrooms and being skeptical of the government's new storyline --- even if the new storyline might have more truth than the last.

Couldn't we crack a book and look at historical precedence? When has failure ever been an option? In Patton's speach to Third Army on 5 JUN 1944 he said:

"Men, this stuff that some sources sling around about America wanting out of this war, not wanting to fight, is a crock of bull####. Americans love to fight, traditionally. All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. You are here today for three reasons. First, because you are here to defend your homes and your loved ones. Second, you are here for your own self respect, because you would not want to be anywhere else. Third, you are here because you are real men and all real men like to fight. When you, here, everyone of you, were kids, you all admired the champion marble player, the fastest runner, the toughest boxer, the big league ball players, and the All-American football players. Americans love a winner. Americans will not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win all of the time. I wouldn't give a hoot in hell for a man who lost and laughed. That's why Americans have never lost nor will ever lose a war; for the very idea of losing is hateful to an American."

That's the American I hope I'm still a part of.

[tequila]

It is what it is. And it's my opinion without any factual basis.

To track the change in opinion over time:

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/img/ruy031607.jpg


All due respect, I know many of the surge planners. This is exactly what they were looking for.

David Kilcullen:

The other implication is that, to be perfectly honest, the pattern we are seeing runs somewhat counter to what we expected in the “surge”, and therefore lies well outside the “benchmarks”. The original concept was that we (the Coalition and the Iraqi government) would create security, which would in turn create space for a “grand bargain” at the national level. Instead, we are seeing the exact opposite: a series of local political deals has displaced extremists, resulting in a major improvement in security at the local level, and the national government is jumping on board with the program. Instead of coalition-led top-down reconciliation, this is Iraqi-led, bottom-up, based on civil society rather than national politics.


In the Army, as long as we have the Army Values, then it is and always has been a morality and ethics issue. Some have created problems by not upholding these values. The vast majority of Soldiers hold leadership, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage close.


The Army does not decide if we stay in Iraq or not, nor should it. The Army is the instrument of national policy, not its origin.


Couldn't we crack a book and look at historical precedence? When has failure ever been an option?

Respectfully, that has nothing to do with the question of whether or not Iraq is a good use of national resources and manpower. The American people have been told over and over again that Iraq is somehow worth the struggle --- but the price will be low, the enemy is on the run, the struggle is easy, in fact is almost over (just another six months!). Most of this has been BS, quite a bit of it propagated by spokesmen in military uniform. That the American people now distrust messengers bringing what looks like more of the same happytalk should hardly be cause for dismay --- frankly it is reassuring that the American people are not willing to shut up and sing at whatever the government hands them.

[Cavguy]

Point of order:

The transformation in Ramadi was underway well before the surge (Snowballing as of Sept 06)

Two companies of Marines from a MEU (approx 300 marines) were added into Ramadi AO in November 2006. They increased our ability to "clear, hold, build" in a few more areas. Most of the troops went elsewhere in Anbar.

While the initial surge forces certainly expanded our options, they were by no means decisiive. Arguments claiming Anbar was because of the surge are false, in my opinion, but it is true the surge has left the units better able to exploit the gains and expand them than would have been possible before.

[Ken White]

is metric-happy and that COIN doesn't provide the instant hard knowledge that HIC provides. I'm equally aware that due to those factors there will be metrics. That doesn't change the fact that most of them will be flaky, will prove little, will change frequently, will be manipulated by each side in the argument and that they really will prove little.

Also suggest the the neat graphs prove that polls are metrics. Not to mention that they 'prove' the "1/3 and two year rules." Again.

The public is fickle but they want rapid results. When they do not get them, they get surly. No news there.

Quoth Tequila:


"...Most of this has been BS, quite a bit of it propagated by spokesmen in military uniform. That the American people now distrust messengers bringing what looks like more of the same happytalk should hardly be cause for dismay --- frankly it is reassuring that the American people are not willing to shut up and sing at whatever the government hands them."

Regrettably, BS is a fact of political life -- and not just in the US, it's worldwide. If people are dumb enough to pay much attention to it, I'm not terribly sympathetic. Interestingly, it is my sensing that most Americans do NOT pay much attention to it, only the politically attuned seem to do so.

In essence, I think the American people have pretty good BS detectors and that they have never, in my lifetime, been willing to sing the government tune. No news there...

[Armchairguy]

I see one of the big problems (for me anyways) is that I only have so many information sources (news media, government, here) and out of the sources I have I see contradictory messages. As one poster put it "I'm not there" so everything I consume has already been shaded by the mind, emotions, politics and agenda of the reporter or organization they represent. I guess it comes down to picking the color of pony we want to see since we can't see it for ourselves.
On the main topic of General Petraeus and his record I really can't say much other than I believe that he is a straight shooter. On what he says he is trying to do, my mind concludes it is the best course available.

On the subject of the neat little graphs courtesy of Tequila they really say "Crap, I thought this thing was going to be easier".

The real bone of contention is whether the troops should stay or go, with many on both sides in the argument honestly believing what they want is in the countries best interest, some it is pure partisan politics. So regardless of who General Petraeus really is each side will build him up or tear him down to support their viewpoint.

[Rob Thornton]

RTK:

2. The Surge isnt' the strategy. Clear, Hold, Build is. What 1/1 AD was doing in Anbar that set the stage for the Anbar Awakening is a macro level of Tal Afar. People are missing the big picture here. The strategy has changed significantly in the last year. The surge has only accelerated progress with a new strategy.

Tequilla:

As noted by David Kilcullen, success in Iraq has come largely by surprise and counter to expectations by surge planners. The surge was presented by the President and others, especially principle architects like MG Keane and Fred Kagan, as a means to secure Baghdad through an increased troop presence. This would, in turn, "buy time" for or spur national reconciliation. "Clear-hold-build" is nothing but a slogan, and a pretty meaningless one at that given that it has supposedly been the plan since 2005. Getting off FOBs and into neighborhood patrol posts has delivered tactical success in many places, but this is tactics, not strategy, and has certainly not been a cornerstone Iraq-wide policy until Petraeus & Co. arrived.[/QUOTE]

Maybe its a given, but lets start with some common definitions. I'll use Colin Gray's (from "War, Peace and International Relations: an Introduction to Strategic History - 2007 pg. 40), but most others are pretty close - and he is pretty well known and respected:

[QUOTE]-Tactics refers to the actual use of armed forces, primarily, though not exclusively, in combat. In essence, tactics are abut how to fight, about military behavior itself. Rob's note: I heard another one I liked a bit better which was - " the thinking human application of technology on the battlefield to achieve a purpose"

-Operations refers to the use made of tactics for the conduct of a military campaign.

-Operational Art is the skill with which forces are maneuvered so that they are well positioned for tactical advantage. But it refers also to the ability to know when to accept or decline combat, with a view to advancing campaign wide goals. Operational Art uses the threat and the actuality of battle to win a campaign.

- Strategy refers to the use made of operations for their impact upon the course and outcome of a war. Strategy is the bridge between military power and policy.

As stated many times - although it has become synonymous to the point where it has entered the record - a surge in BCTs is an increase in the means available to implement a strategy - the strategy was already being implemented - but it required the additional means to do it on a larger scale - so yea - there was lots of places where it may have started early because some CDRs understood that is what needed to happen, had the freedom to implement it, and then fed the results back up the Chain of Command.

The big shift in the strategy then came with a focus on securing populations - vs. infrastructure, or institutions - call it a different way of looking at the problem - but that led to operational and tactical consequences. As mentioned it also required the means (a surge in available units) to make it happen on a large scale. The shift at all three levels of war has offered up opportunities and MNF-I is doing the right thing - they are identifying success on the different LOOs and LLOOs and trying to exploit it for long term gain.

So yes, there is a big difference - the current leadership is more recognitional in terms of how it fights. It picks up on what is working, considers it in respect to policy objectives and makes decisions to retain the initiative vs. trying to pursue things that won't work just because that is how it was written - it realizes that this is a non-linear (not to be confused with non-contiguous) fight and does not necessarily conform to linear equations. Because people are dynamic, emotional, not always rational you can't operate on that an equal input will result in a guaranteed output.

All of that to explain what I thought RTK said in a very simple and concise manner.

Best Regards, Rob

-for a good article on the non-linearity of war, check out Alan Beyerchen's "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War" International Security, Vol 17, No. 3 pgs. 59-90 - pub. MIT

[Rank amateur]

Well, without speaking for RA, I took his points as being "popular understandings" more than anything else..

You would be the most educated person who ever spoke for me so don't worry about it.

From The President's official web site (http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/)

Our Success In Meeting Surge Objectives Allows Us To Begin Bringing Some Of Our Troops Home. The premise of our strategy is that securing the Iraqi population is the foundation for all other progress. This week, General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified before Congress and made clear that our challenge in Iraq is formidable. Yet they concluded that conditions in Iraq are improving, that we are seizing the initiative from the enemy, and that the troop surge is working.

If you'd dumped your chief spokesperson after "Mission Accomplished" you might have more support. People listen to the Commander in Chief. If he's wrong too many times in a row, they stop listening. That's marketing. That's the hearts and minds of most American people.

[Rank amateur]

How do we, as an American people, make things better?


Honestly, this is a socialist question. The capitalist answer is that only Americans can build America and only Iraqis can build Iraq.

If I were a Democratic spin doctor I'd call Iraq "the largest failed welfare experiment in history."


It's my opinion without any factual basis.

As a marketer, I deal with this all the time. That's why I like the Powell doctrine. It allowed you to employ your unique skills without having to worry about anyone's opinion, but if you want to get into the hearts and minds business - and you want to be effective - you need to accept that opinions don't match facts and facts don't always change opinions.

American body count might be the worst possible metric, but none the less it's what most of the public cares about. (And really, the fact that people care whether you live or die isn't the worst thing in the world.)

If people stop listening to the president it really doesn't matter if you think he's a great leader. People have stopped listening. (For that matter, it really doesn't matter whether John Kerry deserved his medals or not.) The Iraq war has been "swift boated." Ironically, not by the left, but by the people who said "WMDs" "greeted as liberators," "Iraqi oil will pay for it" "mission accomplished" "dead enders." They've lost their credibility.

Final point. As a marketer I'm 99.99% sure that no much how much better things get under President Hillary, ;), you're never going to become a Democrat. Some people might think that doesn't make sense, but it wouldn't make any difference. You'd still be who your are. That's your right. If you honestly accept how difficult it would be for an Iraqi to change your opinion, you might be able to have more realistic hearts and minds objectives during your next tour, and you just might be more successful. (Thought it's much more likely that you'll ignore everything I say, because you have preconceived opinions about the most valuable sources of information, and some marketing guy on the net isn't one of them. ;))

[Rank amateur]

My issue is not so much that he does not understand what the strategy is but rather that he takes what little knowledge he has and makes the leap to "We're being lied to."

SFC W

Fair enough. We feel like we're being lied to. Like I said above, we feel how we feel. It's our right. Once people are wrong about, "WMDs," dead enders" and "mission accomplished," we're allowed to stop listening. We're allowed to feel like we're being lied to. We don't need to believe "we've finally figured out what we're doing."

For the record though, I know the difference between tactics and strategy. The strategy - last I heard - was to reduce violence, in order to create "breathing space" which would lead to reconciliation. I think most people admit the strategy isn't working.

http://warnewsradio.org/images/maliki_ahmadinejad_handshake.jpg

I suspect that the new strategy is to try some different tactics and see if something salvageable emerges from the chaos, which makes some sense. Or it's to arm the Sunni in order to curb Iranian influence and no one has the courage to admit that our strategy is arming the ones who killed us and who used to work for Saddam. (Of course, my last suggestion may be caused by my incorrect belief that I've been lied to. I have biases just like everyone else.)

PS: When you're talking about hearts and minds, pictures are almost always more effective than words. I was thinking about how stupid the anti Paetreus moveon.org ad was and thinking that they should've run the above picture with the headline, "Do you want America's best and bravest to die in order to give Maliki more time?" But that was just off the top of my head. I'm sure I could come up with a pretty good pro war ad too. It wouldn't use any of the following terms: Bush, Maliki, surge or benchmarks. I'd probably go with some version of Petraeus knows what he's doing and he deserves our support. He seems to be the only one the public trusts, so it makes sense to reinforce those beliefs. Or maybe I'd let RTK talk directly to the camera about why he wants to go back to Iraq. It depends on whether or not RTK could talk calmly about Iraq for 30 seconds without raising his voice. ;)

[skiguy]

American body count might be the worst possible metric, but none the less it's what most of the public cares about. (And really, the fact that people care whether you live or die isn't the worst thing in the world.)


You'll have to define "care about". If you mean sensible people are genuinely concerned, then yes. Most find any troop's death horrible. But I think the antiwar crowd..maybe only the extreme anti-war crowd...it just seems to me they are waiting for round numbers, almost excited about it. "We're coming up to 2500". I've been on Leftist websites where they make predictions of how many days it's going to be until it reaches a certain round number. That's not concern. That's self-centeredness. They are only using the number of deaths to justify taking the stance they do.
And how many politicians do we see do this? Do you really think they are concerned or are they using it for political purposes? Some may be genuinely concerned, but I think many of them aren't sincere in their concern.

[RTK]

Or maybe I'd let RTK talk directly to the camera about why he wants to go back to Iraq. It depends on whether or not RTK could talk calmly about Iraq for 30 seconds without raising his voice. ;)

You'd be suprised how many times you've probably seen me on camera doing just that without knowing it.

[Rob Thornton]

For the record though, I know the difference between tactics and strategy. The strategy - last I heard - was to reduce violence, in order to create "breathing space" which would lead to reconciliation. I think most people admit the strategy isn't working.

I suspect that the new strategy is to try some different tactics and see if something salvageable emerges from the chaos, which makes some sense. Or it's to arm the Sunni in order to curb Iranian influence and no one has the courage to admit that our strategy is arming the ones who killed us and who used to work for Saddam. (Of course, my last suggestion may be caused by my incorrect belief that I've been lied to. I have biases just like everyone else.)

RA, I'm not so sure you do - although I'm sure you believe you do. The strategy is to secure the population while working on some of the other things (infrastructure, economic and both high end (national) and low - end (local, provincial and even tribal) politics to take some of the pressure of the hatreds, animosities, etc. that further put Iraqis at odds. People don't change fast - particularly when they are threatened with the idea that what little they have left might get taken away as well - we not only have to establish security for a week or a month, but establish the conditions that allow for the type of sustainable security long enough where people, families, tribes can live with they otherwise might only accept for a short term - this is hard, dangerous work - most of us understand that all too well - nobody said any difference to Congress, nor did anybody sugar coat consequences, or guarantee a damn thing.

The strategy determines the direction, and the direction frames the tactics - even if the tactic was first tried on a small scale then adapted - for theater wide "means" to be redirected to a new purpose requires a change in strategy I was there when the strategy started to change, and it changed the way resources were being used, and it changed the way TF AND BCT CDRs saw the battlefield.

As for what most people agree - well when they put on the uniform, or accept some other position of responsibility their opinion takes on a different set of values. Any elected president - whether it SEN Clinton, GOV Romney, former Mayor Giuliani, SEN Obama, fmr SEN Thompson is going to have to govern - and going to have to work foreign policy in a post 9/11 world. They are often going to have to make the best of a slew of bad choices - and often those in uniform are going to have to march out and execute those policies and some of us are going to have to die for them - think of it as a serious turn in market shares. Both parties have a history of presiding over and during wars - its their responsibility - we follow regardless - its who we are.

I also recall GEN Petraeus saying it was damned hard to go out and court folks who'd just recently been trying to kill you - trust me, nobody on the ground has any illusions about that - but that is not the whole story - not every Iraqi on the ground who is working for a tribal sheik has tried to kill Americans or ISF - many just want the damned violence to stop.

ref RTK not valuing the input of those out of uniform -its the same no matter if you are in or out of uniform - if you want somebody to listen, the package matters and so does the content.

There are somethings that are only going to make sense if you've spent a year or so there as a soldier outside the FOBs (or in some place like it where what goes on there passes for normal) - even then, if you are in one place or another and face a different set of conditions - your perspective is going to be different. But if you have not been there, no amount of T.V., blog reading, testimony hearing, etc. is going to provide you the internalized experience set to see either the frustrations or possibilities that exist. While RTK (and the rest of us) may have a set of beliefs or opinions that are hard to quantify or qualify, they were not cheap in the making - and we are going to weight them against others with regard to what they understand without us having to say or write a word - that is the bias of having been there.

Best Regards, Rob

[RTK]

While RTK (and the rest of us) may have a set of beliefs or opinions that are hard to quantify or qualify, they were not cheap in the making - and we are going to weight them against others with regard to what they understand without us having to say or write a word - that is the bias of having been there.

Here's another way of saying it:

Unless you've been covered in your brother's blood, stood at attention while your First Sergeant calls his name three times, and written that damnable letter to a family none of us wishes ever to write, then you don't understand the reasons why we feel the way we feel.

[Steve Blair]

Ok...I'd really prefer not to see this turn into a "soldiers versus civilians" thread. Neither side is more "special" here: I've seen and heard equally uninformed opinions from both sides of the equation...in a number of areas. Bias applies on both sides...that's the nature of bias.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve, that is good Sunday morning wisdom. Its a line we all walk here in distinguishing where war is different from any other human social undertaking. I think its important to discuss those if the public wants to understand why War is different, as are the people who wage war on behalf of the state or the political purpose and goals of non-state entities.

The words "tactics" and "strategy" have been applied to many other activities and professions - however, there is no place like war where their implementation is so subject to "fog, friction & chance" - its the confluence of the objective and subjective, rational and irrational, man and machine under circumstances where the outcome is often final in horrific terms. While intuition can be a hallmark of many professions, few others if any determine physical life and death of yourself, the men & women you are responsible for, the innocents and the enemy like war. Its a poker game of the highest and most final order.

As we discussed on the "greatest generals" thread, about what makes a great general, its often hard to judge that just based on the outcome of one battle or one campaign because of the difficulty with examining the context of the battle or war in which the decision was made.

On a side note:

I saw where Fox is dong a piece on the "forming" of GEN Petraeus today. I'm not sure how I feel about that (not that it matters) - it just has something to do with timing - I guess that is just the modern media. However, it may offer a chance for at least part of the public to be exposed to how military leaders are made today, as opposed to those we often see on the History Channel. Perhaps it will generate interest in service - also a good thing.

Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, following up on the history channel. Tonight at 8pm EST they will have the complete history of "Hillbilly's"... does not have anything to do with this thread but I know everyone wants to watch this. :D:D:D

[Steve Blair]

Steve, that is good Sunday morning wisdom. Its a line we all walk here in distinguishing where war is different from any other human social undertaking. There are differences in how beliefs are formed, and I think its important to discuss those if the public wants to understand why War is different, as are the people who wage war on behalf of the state.

Agree completely, but at the same time it's important that the exchange remain two-sided. By that I mean it's important for those in uniform to understand (as much as possible) how the beliefs of those out of uniform are formed (and of course the reverse applies as well). Ignorance is certainly not confined to one community or the other, but neither is brilliance. Just as I grow concerned when certain segments label all in uniform as baby killers, I worry when certain segments label all those out of uniform as ignorant Joe six-packs or whatever. It is indeed a fine line, and one that we need to be aware of as we continue our discussions. SWC is in many ways (I feel) unique in that we attract both sides of the coin, and encourage them to talk and discuss (and even debate and rant from time to time).

I do wonder what Fox will do with that segment. Personally I get frustrated with things like the History Channel and its popcorn history, but on the plus side it at least gets people who might not normally care about history watching and possibly asking questions.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve -
Very valid concerns & well spoken.
I also need to amend this:


There are differences in how beliefs are formed, and I think its important to discuss those if the public wants to understand why War is different, as are the people who wage war on behalf of the state.

to include those who wage on the behalf on non-state. it might read:

I think its important to discuss those if the public wants to understand why War is different, as are the people who wage war on behalf of the state or the political purpose and goals of non-state entities.

It may seem like a fine point - but it acknowledges that there are other entities that wage war, and impose more, or decrease the restrictions on what is acceptable in waging it. There interaction with us has an effect on how we wage war - it may be subtle and evolutionary in nature, but I beleive its there.

[skiguy]

Just quickly about civilian vs military, or no war experience vs war experience. (IMO a civilian's opinion with war experience is just as credible as a Soldier's opinion) I have no clue personally what war is like, but I can get some idea by listening to those with the experience. (do you with war experience agree with this?). I'm not saying we can know what you felt, but we can get an idea from listening to your stories. Example: What is in someone that makes him fall on a grenade to save his buddies? I'll never know the answer to that no matter how much I read about it. But if a Marine writes a good, descriptive article about what it was like fighting in Fallujah, I can get a better grasp. (but I still won't understand completely what it was like)
This is the best we civilians can go on right now without experiencing it. Whatever opinion you guys formed from your experiences, political or policy, makes mine irrelevant...that is, until I go over there myself. How do I know I'll support OIF after I've been there for 6 months? I don't know that.

[Steve Blair]

Actually, ski, I'd say your opinion is as valid as anyone else's. The difference lies in the foundation of that opinion. If you're seeking out information and background, your opinion has more validity than one formed by someone who does not. And since Small Wars involve all levels of society, all levels need to be included in the discussion. It's not just a military problem, or a combat problem (although those do factor in). It takes the cop, the historian, the economist, the doctor, the nurse, the grocer, and every other occupation you can imagine, to be successful. And that may be an area we fall short in. Because so many people are afraid to express themselves, or to lend their talents to the fray because they lack a certain membership card, we fall behind in the war of ideas; a major component in any Small War.

[skiguy]

Steve, thanks, but I may have worded it incorrectly. I meant my opinion about what war is like in general is irrelevant.
I support OIF, yet if a Soldier (and I don't mean a Soldier with a bad attitude problem about military life) just returned home and says it's a mess and he doesn't support it anymore, who am I to tell him he's wrong? Yes, I have the freedom to state my opinion, but he has the authoritative opinion. (I'd rather a guy who's been there tell him he's wrong)

[Rob Thornton]

Ski,
We absolutely want you (as a representative of the greater American public) to understand as much as can be obtained through assimilating the experience of others (BTW - we also do this through History) - because as Steve notes - its critical to the vitality of our society that you do. As for the exclusiveness of the "soldier" - if you are involved in a war on a personal level - a non-soldier in a war, then the commonality of that experience is much greater. Even the civilian who lives in the city plagued by war, has an understanding of the horror of war - and if they must live with it their entire lives, they know it better then most.

Since war is a social activity, and the make up of healthy societies are diverse - so are the opportunities to contribute in solutions. Much of a person's success in understanding war without participating in it, or suffering from it is based upon that person's willingness to empathize on a number of levels while thoughtfully considering why war happens, how it changes things and what its nature is.

There should be no membership cards with regards to thinking about war - the goal should be prevention if possible, resolution as quickly as possible, and the establishment of a peace that prevents the next war in the same location between the same people. We all can play a role in addressing the fear, honor and interests which drive people to war.

Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

I support OIF, yet if a Soldier (and I don't mean a Soldier with a bad attitude problem about military life) just returned home and says it's a mess and he doesn't support it anymore, who am I to tell him he's wrong? Yes, I have the freedom to state my opinion, but he has the authoritative opinion. (I'd rather a guy who's been there tell him he's wrong)

Ski, if there is a war, its likely it is a mess. The conditions which led to war, and prolonged it almost guarantee it. In our society, that soldier is certainly entitled to his or her opinion, and I think its healthy to our society that they can voice it. What you can do to further your own understanding is ask questions that provide more insight to the thoughts you already have - where was the soldier at, what did they do, what exactly do they mean by "its a mess"? Where that soldier may have served may be much worse then the next city over. Wars have an objective and subjective nature to them. The subjective extends right down to the personal experience by individual participants.

Does that help?
Regards, Rob

[Steve Blair]

yet like all opinions, his may be authoritative for his specific place and time. One of the deeply frustrating things about Small Wars (and war in general) is that conditions vary greatly from foxhole to foxhole. If you look back at World War II, you'll find some bitterness among some Pacific veterans that the war in Europe drew so much more coverage, and within the Pacific subset there are those who remain convinced that MacArthur intentionally declared areas "secure" prematurely so that he could pull US troops out and rotate in Australian and New Zealand troops to "mop up," thus keeping perceived US casualties low.

And as Rob points out, your opinion of war is valid if for no other reason than as a civilian you sustain home front morale and support. If your opinion isn't informed or clear, then one of the pillars of any conflict is weak. War by its very nature is a multi-faceted thing...no one person can understand all aspects or faces of it. A combat soldier sees a different side than a medic, or an aid worker, or a citizen in a city that has seen conflict, or the person sitting at home trying to make sense of the many different sides he sees painted for him. One of the greatest challenges, and rewards, of a historian is trying to blend all those perspectives together into something resembling a whole so that future generations can understand (or have a chance to understand) what transpired during a particular fragment of time.

Not everyone who has been in war understands why it happened, or even what happened. In many cases all they see is their snapshot of it, and some never leave that snapshot. That also happens on the civilian side (witness the numerous anti-war types that seem to be desperately trying to link back to the 1960s). The complexity of it is perhaps beyond total human comprehension, but the more you know the more informed your personal decisions are, and the more you can help others frame their decisions.

[Steve Blair]

Ski, if there is a war, its likely it is a mess. The conditions which led to war, and prolonged it almost guarantee it. In our society, that soldier is certainly entitled to his or her opinion, and I think its healthy to our society that they can voice it. What you can do to further your own understanding is ask questions that provide more insight to the thoughts you already have - where was the soldier at, what did they do, what exactly do they mean by "its a mess"? Where that soldier may have served may be much worse then the next city over. Wars have an objective and subjective nature to them. The subjective extends right down to the personal experience by individual participants.

Does that help?
Regards, Rob

Exactly. Vietnam is a good example of this, although there are as many examples as there have been wars. I'd like to use a handful of war movies to illustrate the point (with the standard disclaimer that movies aren't war, but they often provide a good visual reference point for general discussions).

Oliver Stone insists that "Platoon" is the Vietnam War. There are also those who insist that "Hamburger Hill," "Go Tell the Spartans," "Full Metal Jacket," or "81 Charlie Mopic" are Vietnam. The answer (if there is one)?

Yes. They all are, but for the specific viewpoint and spatial reference point of the main character(s). Platoon may be valid for Stone, but it isn't for the people being painted in Go Tell the Spartans. And the sort of conflict painted in those movies doesn't reflect the streetfighting in Hue shown in Full Metal Jacket or the larger-scale "hill fights" that can be generically shown in Hamburger Hill.

For the World War II example, Saving Private Ryan shows one snapshot, as does Midnight Clear and Letters from Iwo Jima.

And now I need to stop...too much fuzzy philosophy type stuff on a Sunday morning.....:eek:

[skiguy]

Yes,Rob, that helps.


yet like all opinions, his may be authoritative for his specific place and time.
.....
but the more you know the more informed your personal decisions are, and the more you can help others frame their decisions.
I agree, but I still feel uncomfortable telling an experienced Soldier with a differing opinion that I disagree.Maybe that's just me.

Not to get sappy here, but to try to answer (and add to the philosophical discussion:)) "what is in someone who falls on a grenade to save his buddies?" Yes, it's honor and bravery, but IMO it goes beyond that. There's a spiritual dimension to it. To paraphrase Jesus: "There is no greater love than a man who lays down his life for his friends"

THAT, my friends and heroes, is what separates you from us. (maybe I understand more than I think I do)

[Steve Blair]

Yes,Rob, that helps.


I agree, but I still feel uncomfortable telling an experienced Soldier with a differing opinion that I disagree.Maybe that's just me.

Not to get sappy here, but to try to answer (and add to the philosophical discussion:)) "what is in someone who falls on a grenade to save his buddies?" Yes, it's honor and bravery, but IMO it goes beyond that. There's a spiritual dimension to it. To paraphrase Jesus: "There is no greater love than a man who lays down his life for his friends"

THAT, my friends and heroes, is what separates you from us. (maybe I understand more than I think I do)

This is also a level of bravery that is not unique to the military (one only need look at the VT incident to find an example of it), although it is within the framework of military service that it is most often expressed or noticed.

[Rob Thornton]

Ski - it might be jumping on a grenade, or maybe one of the many acts our soldiers, airman, sailors and marines perform every day and never seek credit for. However, it might be a fireman, or police officer running into a burning building, or patrolling a section of a large U.S. metropolitan city alone and unafraid in the late hours. It might be a volunteer trying to unearth survivors from the twin towers, or risking a mine collapse to save his buddies - or recover their bodies so their families can say goodbye - it might be a doctor or nurse who goes to some place stricken by a deadly, communicable disease, or a NGO or IO working in a village under the control of some warlord. There are lots of heroes that walk past us everyday, and never wear a label, or ask for a thank you.

I mentioned in our PM traffic that there are so many ways people can serve a greater good. All of it helps. All of it stands for people who will not be afraid at the potential that they might sacrifice themselves in order to help others. As Steve mentioned, selfless service extends well beyond the uniformed services - but uniformed service, because of its nature, highlights many of the things we regard highest about ourselves -duty, honor, virtue, love. I will tell you I have met many a man and woman though that showed tremendous bravery, and selfless service, but never wore a uniform, but their humanity was very visible. Anyone who serves something greater and better then themselves is probably somebody worth knowing.

Best Regards, Rob

[Abu Buckwheat]

Actually, ski, I'd say your opinion is as valid as anyone else's. The difference lies in the foundation of that opinion. If you're seeking out information and background, your opinion has more validity than one formed by someone who does not. And since Small Wars involve all levels of society, all levels need to be included in the discussion. It's not just a military problem, or a combat problem (although those do factor in). It takes the cop, the historian, the economist, the doctor, the nurse, the grocer, and every other occupation you can imagine, to be successful. And that may be an area we fall short in. Because so many people are afraid to express themselves, or to lend their talents to the fray because they lack a certain membership card, we fall behind in the war of ideas; a major component in any Small War.

Hear hear, well said.

[goesh]

I really liked what Mr. Thornton said. The common man is a common hero forming the backbone of our nation. It's hard to assign hero status to guys who go to work every day, raise their kids right, pay their bills and taxes and don't break the Law, but when the nation goes to war, they go to the factories and don't ask for nothing except honest pay for honest work. It is particularily galling for the common hero to have a man like General P. ascend through the ranks, pay his dues, put himself in danger for the nation then get treated like a piece of ####.

[tequila]

It is particularily galling for the common hero to have a man like General P. ascend through the ranks, pay his dues, put himself in danger for the nation then get treated like a piece of ####.

Leave General Petraeus alone! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xiuRhy4CqzU) :D

edit: The idea that criticizing or questioning the pronouncements of a general simply because that person is a general is quite misguided as well as being a bit hypocritical given the nature of this site. Most of the people in this particular web community are guilty of the same, if not GEN Petraeus than Generals Sanchez, Abizaid, Casey, Clark, Dunlap, or many, many others. LTC Yingling upbraided the general officer corps as a body to the general applause of many here.

[Watcher In The Middle]

It is particularily galling for the common hero to have a man like General P. ascend through the ranks, pay his dues, put himself in danger for the nation then get treated like a piece of ####.

Tend to agree, though for different reasons. Primarily, because it's just stupid, stupid politics. Had a longtime pol friend (Democrat) who made a point of "learning" me a few political lessons, that the brilliant pols in DC apparently haven't learned.

First off, don't make fun of a person's name (like a certain much discussed ad did). Makes you look petty, and honestly, it's a cheap shot. And when it's a cheap shot, it colors and cheapens the entire debate that follows.

Secondly, remember your goal - it's really a political version of COIN - the goal is to build alliances and a network of supporters to further your interests, not to damage your own base of support. Ask yourself if you want to be aligned politically with individuals who take cheap shots and "go to the mat" over petty issues.

Third, it's never really your enemies you have to worry about - you know what they'll do to you. It's your friends you got to worry about.

Lastly, when you make fun of a person's name, it can get very personal. And you never know who out there you are pissing off until afterwards, and then it's too late. You never want to get that personal in politics.

GEN Petraeus came to D.C. and did his job. I sincerely doubt you will see a replay of such political stupidity the second time around. I fully expect the next time, there will be an unwritten political agreement in place so we don't have a replay of this type of congressional spectacle (read: debacle) occur.

[Ken White]

Leave General Petraeus alone! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xiuRhy4CqzU) :D

edit: The idea that criticizing or questioning the pronouncements of a general simply because that person is a general is quite misguided as well as being a bit hypocritical given the nature of this site. Most of the people in this particular web community are guilty of the same, if not GEN Petraeus than Generals Sanchez, Abizaid, Casey, Clark, Dunlap, or many, many others. LTC Yingling upbraided the general officer corps as a body to the general applause of many here.

the General -- it is that our 'esteemed' Congress critters trashed the General...

IMO, making themselves look pretty tawdry. YMMV.

[oblong]

http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_09_24/article2.html

His judgment is rather harsh. But there certainly seems to be a logic to this argument:


What then should he have recommended to the Congress and the president? That is, if the commitment of a modest increment of additional forces —the 30,000 troops comprising the surge, now employed in accordance with sound counterinsurgency doctrine —has begun to turn things around, then what should the senior field commander be asking for next?

A single word suffices to answer that question: more. More time. More money. And above all, more troops.

It is one of the oldest principles of generalship: when you find an opportunity, exploit it. Where you gain success, reinforce it. When you have your opponent at a disadvantage, pile on. In a letter to the soldiers serving under his command, released just prior to the congressional hearings, Petraeus asserted that coalition forces had “achieved tactical momentum and wrestled the initiative from our enemies.” Does that reflect his actual view of the situation? If so, then surely the imperative of the moment is to redouble the current level of effort so as to preserve that initiative and to deny the enemy the slightest chance to adjust, adapt, or reconstitute.

Yet Petraeus has chosen to do just the opposite. Based on two or three months of (ostensibly) positive indicators, he has advised the president to ease the pressure, withdrawing the increment of troops that had (purportedly) enabled the coalition to seize the initiative in the first place.

This defies logic. It’s as if two weeks into the Wilderness Campaign, Grant had counseled Lincoln to reduce the size of the Army of the Potomac. Or as if once Allied forces had established the beachhead at Normandy, Eisenhower had started rotating divisions back stateside to ease the strain on the U.S. Army.



But I'm very much a layman. I'd be curious what others with more expertise think about this piece

[Ken White]

and he makes imminent sense in many things. I agree with him that both US political parties are equal elements in the problem that is the governance and the foreign policy of the US. We do not agree on some other things.
His comments in the linked article are his opinion and track totally with his history on the topic of war in general and this one in particular -- however, he's being disingenuous in the article. While I generally agree with the thrust of that article, there are some anomalies in it that merit scrutiny. At one point he says:

"A single word suffices to answer that question: more. More time. More money. And above all, more troops."
Totally true -- but -- he elides a critical point of which he is totally aware. In 1942, then Major general George S. Patton Jr. was at Camp Irwin training a Division to go to North Africa. He was called to the War Department and told he was being elevated to command the operation. Shortly, a Plans Officer went to see General George C. Marshall and told him "General Patton said he needs more troops, more equipment and more time or it cannot be done." Marshall looked up and said "Tell General Patton to return to California and continue training, we'll give the job to someone else." Very quickly, Patton was talking to Marshall and accepting the mission -- with the Troops available.

The point, of course is that Generals have egos and that they hate to refuse missions, no matter how difficult. Sixty years later, Tommy Franks got caught in the same trap. Five years after that, so did Petraeus. Bacevich knows that...

The North Africa operation, BTW, had its problems; as in Iraq, an Army not prepared for what it would confront fumbled a lot of things.

Any military operation is constrained by a number of factors; most critical are Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available and Time (METT-T). The mission is prescribed by the civilian leadership, the enemy is wild card, the terrain is what it is and one has to live with it, troops available are always subject to many limiting factors and the time is generally short and occasionally a political construct, not a military one -- and Bacevich is aware of all that.
He also said:

"This defies logic. It’s as if two weeks into the Wilderness Campaign, Grant had counseled Lincoln to reduce the size of the Army of the Potomac. Or as if once Allied forces had established the beachhead at Normandy, Eisenhower had started rotating divisions back stateside to ease the strain on the U.S. Army."
Supremely disingenuous; Bacevich knows there are no more troops unless the Army is totally committed to Iraq -- and he knows that is not going to happen much as he wishes that it or a rapid withdrawal be undertaken. Both parties will rebel at that either and Bacevich knows as all of us should that much of what goes on in Congress is not about the Troops or even Iraq -- it's about the 2008 elections.
Further from the Article:

"Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is one officer keen to confront rather than ignore that contradiction. In an article appearing in the current issue of the journal Military Review, General Chiarelli writes:

"The U.S. as a Nation—and indeed most of the U.S. Government—has not gone to war since 9/11. Instead the departments of Defense and State (as much as their modern capabilities allow) and the Central Intelligence Agency are at war while the American people and most the other institutions of national power have largely gone about their normal business.""
I'd go a step further -- the US has not been at war since 1945. General Chiarelli's (one of the really good guys, BTW) statement applies just as well to Korea and Viet Nam with only the caveat that due to the draft that existed on both those wars there was very slightly more Mr. & Mrs. America involvement -- but not one ounce more involvement by the US Government (to include the Pentagon...) or the nation as an entity. Bacevich knows that as well.

In short, it's not a bad article but it's beautifully tailored to make his long standing points on governance and the use of force -- and this war. I think his conclusion is overly pejorative and unproven -- and I'm not a Petraeus fan.

[Rank amateur]

RA, I'm not so sure you do - although I'm sure you believe you do. The strategy is to secure the population while working on some of the other things (infrastructure, economic and both high end (national) and low - end (local, provincial and even tribal) politics to take some of the pressure of the hatreds, animosities, etc. that further put Iraqis at odds.

A) I think the strategy may have changed and no one told you. Arming the Sunnis, doesn't seem to fit into what you said.

B) The strategy you describe is contrary to human nature. If you wanted Rush and Michael Moore to agree, would you remove all pressure on them, or would you lock them in a room without food until they agreed?

(When I started browsing here I really didn't expect to contribute much, but as a marketer I need to understand something about human nature and I am amazed by how little thought has gone into the basic human nature of Iraqis. If two kids in a school yard had a dispute, you know that letting them pound on each other for a while is the fastest way to get them to agree. You watch, and only intervene if one starts pounding the crap out of the other. And then it's easy to intervene, because the loser wants your help. If you try to keep them apart, they just go to a place where there are no adults and have the fight they wanted to have earlier. That's basic human nature.)


You'd be suprised how many times you've probably seen me on camera doing just that without knowing it.

Post the youtube links, and anymore pictures of you with the Stanley Cup.


Here's another way of saying it:

Unless you've been covered in your brother's blood, stood at attention while your First Sergeant calls his name three times, and written that damnable letter to a family none of us wishes ever to write, then you don't understand the reasons why we feel the way we feel.

There's a reason the corner worker has a white towel. The bloody boxer is often too involved in the fight to make the right decision. There's also a reason that a boxer has a trainer. Sometimes the boxer forgets that retreat isn't the same as defeat. In no way does that diminish the boxer's accomplishment or bravery. In fact, the boxer who listens to his trainer is most likely to emerge victorious in the end.

Ski, if there is a war, its likely it is a mess.

I agree, but the reason wars start is usually because both sides believe, "It won't take us very long to kick their ass." Cheney and Rummy weren't the only ones saying OIF would be over soon. If the public has false perceptions, the military helped create them.

[Rob Thornton]

A) I think the strategy may have changed and no one told you. Arming the Sunnis, doesn't seem to fit into what you said.

RA - the Sunnis are already armed - anyone in the country can have an AK with a magazine - its legal - the change is in getting them organized and responsible for portions of their area. To arm them further- the Iraqi govt will have to step in and provide additional means, or they will have to acquire it other wise. Its hard to imagine how this can be from over here - Congress has been told repeatedly - but they still don't understand - they must think there is some kind of assault weapons ban in Iraq - things are different there - and the only way to understand it is to go.


If two kids in a school yard had a dispute, you know that letting them pound on each other for a while is the fastest way to get them to agree. You watch, and only intervene if one starts pounding the crap out of the other. And then it's easy to intervene, because the loser wants your help. If you try to keep them apart, they just go to a place where there are no adults and have the fight they wanted to have earlier. That's basic human nature.)

Its not as simple as you make it sound - its far more complex - and the consequences are too hard to ignore. I don't care for Rush or Moore - Peacocks don't have to live in the real world with all of its consequences. I'm not a politician, pundit, talk show host, or director, etc. I'm a soldier - while I can empathize with all the other folks who are not soldiers - in the end I'm still a soldier - and we don't make policy - but we do have to execute it. The environment we operate in changes constantly and the situation that was last week is dynamic and changes constantly - and so does the way in which we pursue our objectives.

I think you do have a snapshot of human nature - and am glad you are participating - there are two reasons I take part here - one is to gain insights and knowledge outside my own experience - the other is to educate the public on what I've seen or done and perhaps help them understand the uniformed services - I've been in since 1985 - and have seen a bit. While I think you have a part of it in your experience set - I'll tell you there is a great deal more out there - because of what I do I'd say I've had a chance to see the very worst of human nature and the very best.

Best Regards, Rob

[Rank amateur]

I'd say I've had a chance to see the very worst of human nature and the very best.

In all years, and all your experiences, have you ever seen people who were more likely to resolve their differences when there was no pressure to resolve them?


Its not as simple as you make it sound

Honestly, it is. David Ogilvy said, "The consumer isn't stupid, she's your wife." Meaning, that if the ad sounded like BS to your wife, it would sound like BS to all the other customers.

If you wouldn't want a foreign company named Blackwater to be able to shoot Americans without fear of reprisals, they won't want that in Iraq. If you felt something was worth fighting for, you'd fight for it. So will they. If you were willing to accept help, but not a hand out, they're not willing to accept a hand out either. If you're willing to fight with the French, but would never trust them, your new "allies" in Iraq will never trust you.

People are people. They always have been and always will be.


the change is in getting them organized and responsible for portions of their area.

Before the Shiite dominated Army was responsible for security. This could just be a tactical change, but as a spin doctor I suspect that we are moving back to the Reagan strategy of using the Iraqi Sunni as a force against Iran and that no one has the cajones to admit that we've invested 100s of billions and 3,000 lives to go back in time 20 years to implement a strategy that would be more effective if Saddam were still alive.

(I fully admit that I'm cynical, and my cynicism is why I don't serve, and that I am sometimes wrong, but I'm not always wrong.)

[Rob Thornton]

RA - you argue well - I'm afraid this is just one of those things we are going to have to agree to disagree on.

You do bring good value to the SWC - and I'm glad you are here.
Best regards, Rob

[Ken White]

In all years, and all your experiences, have you ever seen people who were more likely to resolve their differences when there was no pressure to resolve them?

In the ME, pressure is more likely to create resistance. These are people who essentially do not discipline their kids much; the kid grows up not having any concept of the meaning of 'no.' For example, April Glaspies comment to Saddam that the US had 'no interest in his claim to Kuwait' was seen by him as carte blannche to take it -- and he did.

They are people that, if you admire something they have , will insist on giving it to you -- and will quite frequently be offended if you do not take it. Thery also believe they are supposed to tell you what they think you want to hear. This has caused a number of westerners to think they had agreement on a process or item only to find out they had no such thing.

They are people who will kill family members for bringing 'dishonor' on the family. They are studiously polite people who will be almost obsequeious in front of you and arrange your murder ten minutes later.


Honestly, it is. David Ogilvy said, "The consumer isn't stupid, she's your wife." Meaning, that if the ad sounded like BS to your wife, it would sound like BS to all the other customers.

If David erred, something would not sell. No real harm. If the soldier errs, someone dies unnecessarily. More to the point; they have finely tuned BS detectors and they have long memories. We have a reputation for BSing them. They have not forgotten. We are also kafir ferenghi -- they always remember that...

The counterpoint to that is they do like results, proven proper performance currently can outweigh previous sins. They are very pragmatic.


If you wouldn't want a foreign company named Blackwater to be able to shoot Americans without fear of reprisals, they won't want that in Iraq. If you felt something was worth fighting for, you'd fight for it. So will they. If you were willing to accept help, but not a hand out, they're not willing to accept a hand out either. If you're willing to fight with the French, but would never trust them, your new "allies" in Iraq will never trust you.

The first part of that is correct; they wouldn't want that. The second part is partly correct. If you threaten a fight with an area resident, he will look around. if there is no one in the crowd he knows, he will beg and whine, will get down on his knees and grovel. If there is someone he knows, depending on the closeness of acquaintance, he may or may not fight. If there is a family member present he will fight, possibly to the death. Again, they are a very pragmatic people...

The third part is way wrong. They will take a hand out in a second; will even ask for one. they're proud but that 'no hand out' routine is a western norm, it doesn't work in the ME; they will take all they can get and ask for more -- and if you offer a concession or compromise on anything, they will take that as a weakness. Haggling is an are pastime.

The fourth part is even more wrong -- no one in the ME will ever 'trust' anyone who is not family (preferably) or tribe / clan / moetie, etc (secondarily).


People are people. They always have been and always will be.

True -- but cultures vary. In the words of R. Kipling; "Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old. "

That, BTW, is quite important.


Before the Shiite dominated Army was responsible for security. This could just be a tactical change, but as a spin doctor I suspect that we are moving back to the Reagan strategy of using the Iraqi Sunni as a force against Iran and that no one has the cajones to admit that we've invested 100s of billions and 3,000 lives to go back in time 20 years to implement a strategy that would be more effective if Saddam were still alive.

Actually, Regan's approach was generally conciliation and avoiding conflict. Carter erred mightily in his handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure and started a downhill spiral in the ME -- show a weakness there of any kind and it will be exploited. Reagan's failure to react to the kidnappings and bombings in Beirut confirmed in the minds of the ME that we were morally weak. Bush 41 failing to go to Baghdad confirmed that in their minds and everything Clinton did just embedded it that much deeper. They, like you did not understand the very significant cultural differences. Every thing they did was correct in accordance with western values -- and totally wrong with respect to ME values.


(I fully admit that I'm cynical, and my cynicism is why I don't serve, and that I am sometimes wrong, but I'm not always wrong.)

No, you aren't, nor is there anything wrong with not having served. Your logic above is impeccable in western terms. Regrettably, the ME operates on a different wave length.

Another Kipling quote:

"Now it is not good for the Christian's health To hustle the Aryan brown, For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles, And it weareth the Christian down. And the end of the fight is a tombstone white With the name of the late deceased-- And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here Who tried to hustle the East."

[slapout9]

Ken,that was a masterful response!

[Uboat509]

Well said, Ken. Western thought processes will get you into a world of trouble here very quickly. That has been, and remains, a serious problem. I have even heard commanders wondering out loud why the locals will join a tribal militia but won't join the local IP. IP that are lead by a member of a different tribe.


Before the Shiite dominated Army was responsible for security. This could just be a tactical change, but as a spin doctor I suspect that we are moving back to the Reagan strategy of using the Iraqi Sunni as a force against Iran and that no one has the cajones to admit that we've invested 100s of billions and 3,000 lives to go back in time 20 years to implement a strategy that would be more effective if Saddam were still alive.

First off this is a bit misleading. The IA is Shia dominated...in Shia dominated areas. Go to a Sunni dominated area and you will find Sunni troops. I am sure that there are exceptions but they are few and far between. The other thing about this statement is that it assumes Shia troops will automatically be friendly to Iran because they are the same religion. But the thing is, most of the Iraqi Shia are Arabs whereas the Iranians are Persians. The ME is NOT a melting pot. Iraqi Shia may be willing to support the Iranians but for the most part, only as long as they stay on their side of the border.

SFC W

[Watcher In The Middle]

Ken:

Your post comes across to the "house dummy" here as a very practical, down-in-the-dirt understanding of some of the the culture differences existing over in the ME. It also clearly points out (in very practical terms) differences in cultural outlook.

It's a very thought provoking post, and raised all sorts of questions.

First, would many of these same "guidelines" also apply to the Persians (Iran)?

Second, if so, then you just provided the base outline for all our negotiations in any talks with Iran. I've often thought that maybe our best team of negotiators with the Iranian government shouldn't be from the DOS or the military, but should be a group made up of the best "Texas Holdem" players in the world. If the Iranians want to grandstand and play geopolitical poker, no prob. Sometimes you got to show 'em you can play the game, too.

[Tom Odom]

Ken,that was a masterful response!

Agree completely. What you laid out is very hard to get across to folks--It may be instinctually apparent to those with time in the region abd sometimes that makes it even harder to explain to Westerners who have not had the opportunity to really adjust to non-Western ways.

I was teaching some last week doing OEF update overviews for the OCs as we have an OEF rotation soon. I always start these things with the idea of Afghanistan as a tribal region versus a nation state and then relate all the issues back to that initial premise. You can see the light bulbs go on these days very quickly, especially compared to 3-4 years ago when most had never been exposed to these cultures. Two years ago many had but they were undergoing the "cross-cultural backlash" where the shock of the cultural differences prompts dislike among many if not most. Now they are old hands and they understand more and see the seams and oppostunities where effective cross-cultural interaction is possible and productive.

One young man came up to see me after one class to talk tribal relations versus a central government, which Afghanistan unlike Iraq has never really had. He was very astute because he was a Native American from the Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma. I asked him to join SWJ. Hopefully he will.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Ken:

Your post comes across to the "house dummy" here as a very practical, down-in-the-dirt understanding of some of the the culture differences existing over in the ME. It also clearly points out (in very practical terms) differences in cultural outlook.

It's a very thought provoking post, and raised all sorts of questions.

First, would many of these same "guidelines" also apply to the Persians (Iran)?

Second, if so, then you just provided the base outline for all our negotiations in any talks with Iran. I've often thought that maybe our best team of negotiators with the Iranian government shouldn't be from the DOS or the military, but should be a group made up of the best "Texas Holdem" players in the world. If the Iranians want to grandstand and play geopolitical poker, no prob. Sometimes you got to show 'em you can play the game, too.

Not "hold 'em"...real old-school draw poker players. Better to have someone there who is used to not seeing the other guy's cards and doesn't blink in the process. IMO they're much better at reading other players and keeping their own hand well-hidden.

[marct]

I especially liked your comment about


no one in the ME will ever 'trust' anyone who is not family (preferably) or tribe / clan / moetie, etc (secondarily).The only thing I would like to note is that there is an extension to this that goes back to a critical error many observers seem to make in interpreting this comment. First off, every clan based society has to have some way of dealing with inter-clan feuds (and the mechanisms for doing so are really varied, but always there). Second, every clan system I am aware of has developed a system of bringing non-clan members into the clan; again, the forms vary, but it is always there. It strikes me that one of the really crucial things that we tend to overlook is the search for these two mechanisms.

It's on points like these that I disagree with RA, and agree with your characterization of his comments as great Western analyses; they are, but that doesn't mean they apply in any other culture area. For example, the process for dealing with clan/family feuds that has developed in Western societies is the legal system: "sue 'em, don't kill 'em" as it were. The history of that development is long (at least 2500 years) and is based around the state (and, usually, in the form of the crown or volkmoot) acting in a manner to break the power of the great families.

The same is not really true in the ME, which, on the whole, has a radically different conception of State organizations. Generally speaking, and this is really a broad brush generalization, ME cultures tend to produce God Kings who co-opt clan structures rather than Kings (or volkmoots) who mediate clan structures/disputes. This style of state organization goes back in many areas of the ME to at least the 4th millennium BC, and is still apparent in some current ME states and is also a major characteristic of Islam itself where Allah is the God King ("Muslim" literally means "one who submits [to God]").

There's a term in Anthropology - "segmented lineages" - that is useful here. Basically, it looks at degrees of "closeness in kinship terms, and there has been some interesting analysis of how these operate in real world terms (for example here (http://cse.ucdavis.edu/%7Ecmg/netdyn/K&C-a.pdf)). I believe that Dave Kilcullen's PhD dissertation looked at kinship effects in insurgency as well (Dave, if you read this a comment would be useful - also, I'd love to get a copy of your dissertation as well :D).

Back to the point about inter-clan (tribe, lineage, etc.) mechanisms for a) stopping conflicts and b) incorporating outsiders into the system. These mechanisms are radically different from those in the Anglo Culture Complex as are the behaviours that they generate and we cannot afford to make the mistake of assuming that they are the same.

Marc

[Ken White]

Ken:
. . .
. . .

First, would many of these same "guidelines" also apply to the Persians (Iran)?

Definitely. It applies generically to the ME, Christians and all sects included. Not just Arabs and Persians but all races. The Arabs and Persians are most inclined that way but vestiges of it can be seen everywhere. I managed to spend some time in all the countries except Yemen and Israel and the traits were universal.


Second, if so, then you just provided the base outline for all our negotiations in any talks with Iran. I've often thought that maybe our best team of negotiators with the Iranian government shouldn't be from the DOS or the military, but should be a group made up of the best "Texas Holdem" players in the world. If the Iranians want to grandstand and play geopolitical poker, no prob. Sometimes you got to show 'em you can play the game, too.

Sorry, but I don't think so. My Boss and I were on the train from Tehran to Ahvaz many years ago. We traveled with two Iranian Colonels and were introduced to "Persian poker" -- the Iranian dealing made up the rules as he went along for that hand while the Emrikai dealing were held to Hoyle -- which both Colonels knew well. The Arab Legion in Jordan played generally the same way.

They approach negotiations with the same idea; they know their rules and you do not. Haggling throughout the ME is a blood sport. The south Asians do it also but not as well -- thus Khalilzad was only fairly effective as Ambassador to Iraq.

They really do not bluff -- and will generally spot one and call it quickly. They change the rules so they do not have to bluff. If you bluff and get called, you lose great face with them. You find that almost no stores have price tags on items for sale, they live to haggle. If you accept the first price offered, you'll lose their respect and they'll try to take you for everything you've got. If you hold out to the fifth or sixth, you'll get a little respect and a little less rapaciousness. Go to ten or fifteen and you're mildly okay in their book. You will never be fully okay because you're a westerner.

You may or may not have seen the picture of Bush in Iraq last time; one with Sheik Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha. Several leftish blogs linked to the picture and said the Sheik was showing his contempt for Bush. Don't think so. I think that look was seething hatred at being forced to consort with a man who had invaded his country and killed members of his tribe. As stated, they are pragmatic to a fault and will deal with anyone who offers them an advantage. But all deals are temporary...

I also left out two important items (it was late and I'm old... :( ). The bit about if you if you admire something they have, they'll insist on giving it to you -- and will quite frequently be offended if you do not take it. True -- and they emphatically expect total reciprocity.

It is considered not only permissible but desirable to lie (as we in the west see it -- they do not look at it that way) to a customer -- or a foreigner...

[Ken White]

...

The only thing I would like to note is that there is an extension to this that goes back to a critical error many observers seem to make in interpreting this comment. First off, every clan based society has to have some way of dealing with inter-clan feuds (and the mechanisms for doing so are really varied, but always there). Second, every clan system I am aware of has developed a system of bringing non-clan members into the clan; again, the forms vary, but it is always there. It strikes me that one of the really crucial things that we tend to overlook is the search for these two mechanisms.
I've seen that on both sides of the globe. It even extends to foreigners as individuals -- a grouping will reject all or some foreigners or other races as a class but still accord select individuals the rights of kinship, as it were.

The same is not really true in the ME, which, on the whole, has a radically different conception of State organizations. Generally speaking, and this is really a broad brush generalization, ME cultures tend to produce God Kings who co-opt clan structures rather than Kings (or volkmoots) who mediate clan structures/disputes. This style of state organization goes back in many areas of the ME to at least the 4th millennium BC, and is still apparent in some current ME states and is also a major characteristic of Islam itself where Allah is the God King ("Muslim" literally means "one who submits [to God]").
True -- and it's still apparent today. It has been said that in the west, one makes money in order to influence politics and power; in the ME one gets into politics and gains power to accrue money... :)

Back to the point about inter-clan (tribe, lineage, etc.) mechanisms for a) stopping conflicts and b) incorporating outsiders into the system. These mechanisms are radically different from those in the Anglo Culture Complex as are the behaviours that they generate and we cannot afford to make the mistake of assuming that they are the same.

Marc
Critical and accurate point. The British were masters at having a person accepted as a kinsman in societies around the world -- Freya Stark and Wilfrid Thesiger come to mind. We Americans don't seem to do that well. Yet we do have people who truly understand the cultures of regions of interest. That knowledge has been used, too rarely, to stop conflicts. Regrettably, the knowledgeable folks are too often ignored by the power structure... :wry:

[Rex Brynen]

I do feel it is important to underscore that the attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of population groups are mediated by a lot of additional variables: rural/urban, age, education, travel or diaspora experience, subregion, etc. Thinking of educated, urban middle class Egyptians in "Arab-bedouin-tribal" terms won't get you very far, for example (especially since their culture was urban and rural-sedentary back when semi-migratory tribes were still wandering parts of Europe!)

The social psychology data on bargaining shows that these factors can sometimes be just as important as religion or ethnicity.

Role can also be as influential as culture (or, perhaps, it can be said instead that that occupational culture counts too). To a certain degree, diplomats tend to behave like diplomats, taxi drivers tend to behave like taxi drivers, etc. In predeployment training it is not unusual for NGO or UN workers to receive, for example, cross-cultural negotiations training for dealing with that strangest of tribes... the military (and in the field, US and Indian officers or US and Indian UNICEF staff often seem more alike to each other than they are with their national compatriots in different organizations).

Finally, there are important idiosyncratic differences in bargaining style (as everyone will undoubtedly know from the bosses and coworkers around them).

I'm sure this is realized, but I did want to highlight it. Understanding cultural context is essentially--I absolutely agree with that thrust of the discussion that it matters, and often matters a lot. At times, however, it can be as dangerous to assume that you "know" someone's negotiation style or preferences from ethnicity as it can be to go in with ethnocentric cultural blinders.

On top of this, negotiators will sometimes play upon the other side's stereotypical perception of their presumed character and negotiating style to advantage.

I once found, for example, that "confused, naive Western graduate student/tourist" can work surprisingly well with Syrian secret policemen... They finally gave up trying to shake me down from the belief that, as a foreigner, I truly didn't understand that I was supposed to pay them a bribe. :D

[Ken White]

folks respond the same way to the appallingly ignorant American Farmer type in the same manner... :wry:

To underscore your point on context, it did not work in Iraq,. Even without a visa in my passport, they knew I'd been in Iran. :eek:

[Hacksaw]

Oblong,
Your questioning of the GEN Petraeus' venue is understandable but misguided. Despite the commonly held perception that a 4-star general is "in charge" nothing could be farther from the truth wrt this type of media engagement. "Experts" in DoD most assuredly directed who the General would speak to and who he wouldn't, at least on the record and in conjunction with official testimony. That's not to say that they control GEN Petraeus' testimony, I spent too much time in his company to imagine his intellect much less his ego would allow that type of manipulation. The man is not without fault, but he's far from a mouth piece.

Live well and row

[Armchairguy]

Ken, Marc, I appreciate the infomation. It is illuminating. Do these cultural attributes apply to Afghanistan as well? I'm betting the haggling is the same, but are there nuances of difference in other areas? For instance the obligation to defend a guest. Is this common across the ME?

[marct]

Hi Armchairguy,


Ken, Marc, I appreciate the infomation. It is illuminating. Do these cultural attributes apply to Afghanistan as well? I'm betting the haggling is the same, but are there nuances of difference in other areas? For instance the obligation to defend a guest. Is this common across the ME?

Haggling is pretty much universal - it has only disappeared in the West over the past 150 years, and not in all places.

The obligation to defend a guest is another universal at least in any tribal culture that has a warrior ethos (some don't, but not many). The obligation is also reciprocal - the guest must defend the house of the host while under guest right there. In the West (mainly amongst the Germanic and Celtic tribes), this was called something like "guestright" or the laws of hospitality.

Marc

[Ken White]

earlier. I agree with Marc, would only add that my perception is that the defense of guest effort is more solid in Afghanistan than it is in the ME -- other than among the Kurds, where it is quite strongly entrenched. Mountain folks the world over tend to have slightly different mores than their flatland counterparts.

The Arabs and Persians IMO occasionally seem to be inclined to a more, er, pragmatic approach...

[Armchairguy]

Thanks guys!

[oblong]

http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/10/28/boylan/index.html#postid-updateB3

If I were Col. Boylan, I would have handled things differently.

More here:

http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003664994

[J Wolfsberger]

Oblong,

I hate reading hard leftists - it gives me a headache.

Somebody needs to remind Col. Boylan why he shouldn't wrestle with pigs - you both get dirty and the pig enjoys it.

[Rank amateur]

I thought I'd dig up this thread. It bounced around a lot but my thesis that building capacity and creating breathing space doesn't automatically produce reconciliation seems relevant today.

Ken's comment "pressure is more likely to create resistance" is interesting given the pressure being placed on Sadr.

Marc might want to comment on the tribal reconciliation process when one side suddenly has more weapons than the other.

Another one of Ken's comments that is interesting: "It is considered not only permissible but desirable to lie (as we in the west see it -- they do not look at it that way) to a customer -- or a foreigner..." leads me to another hypothesis: Iraqis have figured out that if they call their rivals "terrorists" we'll use our use kinetic weapons against their rivals.

And finally, Ken's comment that "no one in the ME will ever 'trust' anyone who iis not family (preferably) or tribe / clan / moetie, etc (secondarily)" is undoubtedly true and supports my hypothesis that capacity building won't work. The government uniform comes off as soon as the fur flies. Here's photographic proof from CNN that it happened at least once.

http://i.l.cnn.net/cnn/2008/WORLD/meast/03/29/iraq.main/art.police.afp.gi.jpg
An Iraqi police commando receives a Quran and an olive branch after deserting Saturday in Baghdad's Sadr City.

While everyone has acknowledged the brilliance and accuracy of Ken's previous post, no one has added up what it all means. It means that Iraqis only held up their purple fingers because they knew we were watching. It means that the only way to rule Iraq is the way Saddam did: give the most important responsibilities to your family and rule your family with an iron fist. Give the next most important responsibilities to your tribe and rule them with an iron fist. Give the next most important responsibilities to your religious group and rule them with an iron fist. Oppress everyone else with an iron fist. The mistake that Ken makes is thinking that if we deploy an iron fist for 10 or 15 years it won't matter that we don't have a family, a tribe or a relevant religious group in Iraq.

That's why I suggest that if you are in Iraq you reduce every interaction to a business transaction as simple as buying a carpet: how much do you want to attack Al Qaeda? That's why strategically I advocate withdrawal; we're never going to succeed without a family, without a tribe and without a religious group in the fight.

[Ken White]

I thought I'd dig up this thread. It bounced around a lot but my thesis that building capacity and creating breathing space doesn't automatically produce reconciliation seems relevant today.I don't think anyone of any importance ever said it would.
Ken's comment "pressure is more likely to create resistance" is interesting given the pressure being placed on Sadr.Why? I'd also note that Sadr has had several competing pressures placed on him by several actors -- which one will he most resist?
Another one of Ken's comments that is interesting: "It is considered not only permissible but desirable to lie (as we in the west see it -- they do not look at it that way) to a customer -- or a foreigner..." leads me to another hypothesis: Iraqis have figured out that if they call their rivals "terrorists" we'll use our use kinetic weapons against their rivals.True in the first year or so, hardly at all true today. We're slow and we got taken early on but the Intel finally caught up and we're a lot more skeptical and aware today.
And finally, Ken's comment that "no one in the ME will ever 'trust' anyone who iis not family (preferably) or tribe / clan / moetie, etc (secondarily)" is undoubtedly true and supports my hypothesis that capacity building won't work. The government uniform comes off as soon as the fur flies.I'm not at all sure what you mean by capacity building. Still, if your picture is to illustrate that people will change side based on the parameters I cited plus other factors -- Heh. :cool: No kidding. Welcome to the ME.
While everyone has acknowledged the brilliance and accuracy of Ken's previous post, no one has added up what it all means...I think you do a distinct disservice to most people here and I'd suggest that those who said my earlier post was reasonably accurate already knew that everything I said was, in at least broad measure, correct -- and thus they'd already figured out what it meant. Something that seems to have eluded you, at least based on your post above to which this responds.
...It means that Iraqis only held up their purple fingers because they knew we were watching. It means that the only way to rule Iraq is the way Saddam did: give the most important responsibilities to your family and rule your family with an iron fist. Give the next most important responsibilities to your tribe and rule them with an iron fist. Give the next most important responsibilities to your religious group and rule them with an iron fist. Oppress everyone else with an iron fist...I suppose that's one way to look at it. I don't agree with much of that but you're certainly welcome to if you wish to do so.
...The mistake that Ken makes is thinking that if we deploy an iron fist for 10 or 15 years it won't matter that we don't have a family, a tribe or a relevant religious group in Iraq.You probably really ought to give up telling me what I think, you haven't gotten one call correct so far -- IOW, your'e batting .000 on that. Ken strongly disagrees with an iron fist, period -- go back to your first repeat of what I said "Ken's comment "pressure is more likely to create resistance" is interesting..." If that's what I believe, why would I be remotely disposed to do something that would build resistance. Your position is highly illogical. Again.
That's why I suggest that if you are in Iraq you reduce every interaction to a business transaction as simple as buying a carpet: how much do you want to attack Al Qaeda?...Boy, they'd have a lot of fun with you... :D
...That's why strategically I advocate withdrawal; we're never going to succeed without a family, without a tribe and without a religious group in the fight.Define succeed.

[Rank amateur]

Still, if your picture is to illustrate that people will change side based on the parameters I cited plus other factors -- Heh. :cool: No kidding. Welcome to the ME.

I'll bite. Let's define all the factors and then let's see if sticking around for 10 or 15 years will have any influence over them. Your list looks good to me. What other factors do you want to add?




That's why I suggest that if you are in Iraq you reduce every interaction to a business transaction as simple as buying a carpet: how much do you want to attack Al Qaeda?...


Boy, they'd have a lot of fun with you...

Cav guy was there. If he thinks my simplification is completely off the mark, I'll admit that I was wrong.

[Ron Humphrey]

I thought I'd dig up this thread.

that you went to all this trouble of digging through the thread in order to say this-



It means that the only way to rule Iraq is the way Saddam did: give the most important responsibilities to your family and rule your family with an iron fist.


and this



That's why I suggest that if you are in Iraq you reduce every interaction to a business transaction as simple as buying a carpet: how much do you want to attack Al Qaeda? That's why strategically I advocate withdrawal; we're never going to succeed without a family, without a tribe and without a religious group in the fight.

I'm afraid there are some major parts of what has and does happen that you seem to miss.

Generally I've seen that happen when someone tends to look more for what happens to support their own thesis, and less at the overall picture of history.
It's great to be right when your right but I propose its even better to be the one to catch yourself when your not right It means your searching for truth rather than backup.

Regardless of how business like or structured any given society is it is still filled with people and those deserve more than to be treated as actors in someones play.

No offense meant simply concern about where that line of thinking eventually leads you.

[Rank amateur]

it is still filled with people and those deserve more than to be treated as actors in someones play.


All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:

What is collateral damage? I can't think of a better definition than minor actors in someone else's drama.





No offense meant simply concern about where that line of thinking eventually leads you.

No offense taken. I'm hoping that my line of thinking leads us all to the truth. If it won't, someone will blow my arguments out of the water because I am seriously outgunned in each and every debate amongst council members.

[Ken White]

I'll bite. Let's define all the factors and then let's see if sticking around for 10 or 15 years will have any influence over them. Your list looks good to me. What other factors do you want to add?Added factors; temperature, humidity, power supply, employment situation, attitude of relatives, experiences bad or good with coalition elements, location, education and probably a dozen more. Seriously. Whim governs much in the ME. Insh'Allah covers many things.

Sticking around another 10 or 15 years will have little effect. More than 30 -- which I deem quite possible -- might have some small effect. However, I have a question, given the unlikelihood of having much effect on personalities and psyches that have developed over several thousand years, why would you want to influence a change or really think you could? Doesn't seem to me to make much sense. What benefit is derived from even engaging in trying to change something when the chance of success is slight?
Cav guy was there. If he thinks my simplification is completely off the mark, I'll admit that I was wrong.Don't know about him but I don't think your simplification was off the mark, it was pretty accurate. Has nothing to do with the fact that they'd really have fun haggling with you. You're a smart guy and you sell things for a living. probably do well at it; they haggle for fun and profit -- not the same thing as selling. They just love a guy that's got them figured out.

Is that it? You resurrect an old thread, post a fairly detailed comment citing several things I said (one presumes there was some purpose to that); I respond in equal detail and you have only two ad-copy blurbs for discussion?

[Ron Humphrey]

What is collateral damage? I can't think of a better definition than minor actors in someone else's drama.

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_ages_of_man)

The question for this is for whom did and do the players perform, or at whose direction;)

[Rank amateur]

Is that it? You resurrect an old thread, post a fairly detailed comment citing several things I said (one presumes there was some purpose to that); I respond in equal detail and you have only two ad-copy blurbs for discussion?

I was just hoping you'd say this:

"Sticking around another 10 or 15 years will have little effect. "

If Rob said the same thing I probably wouldn't comment very often because I have little else of value to add. (But I would keep reading because I learn a lot here, especially when you share your war stories.)


LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_ages_of_man)

The question for this is for whom did and do the players perform, or at whose direction;)

Sometimes, I hate the director. Sometimes, I don't.

[Ken White]

I was just hoping you'd say this:

"Sticking around another 10 or 15 years will have little effect. "

If Rob said the same thing I probably wouldn't comment very often because I have little else of value to add. (But I would keep reading because I learn a lot here, especially when you share your war stories.)much to the dialog? If you want to contribute value, you've proven you're capable of expressing coherent and complete thoughts; you should simply do that more often. The little blurbs and barbs don't add much.

Nor do my war stories add much -- and it's easy to read mine or anyone else's in this medium and draw an incorrect inference; so be careful... ;)

Okay, I said what you hoped I'd say. What, precisely does that tell you? That saying that means that I believe there's no sense in staying due to that fact? Surely you know better than that. That since we're unlikely to change 3,000 years of culture in 10 or 15 we shouldn't be there? I don't think that's anywhere near the most significant reason we're there. What difference does it make whether Rob or anyone else agree with me or with you, you asked a specific question of me and I answered; does this mean that either you or I believe that we are only there to 'influence' them? And our beliefs are only acceptable if someone else concurs?

What does my saying that indicate?

For other examples:
Sometimes, I hate the director. Sometimes, I don't.Means what? Who is the director? What is being directed? Is the director the issue or is the play the issue?
...I'm hoping that my line of thinking leads us all to the truth...Truth? Truth of or in what? Leading us all to it implies that, whatever that truth is, it is overarching and encompasses all and is irrefutable. You and / or we may or may not ever get there but without others having at least some knowledge of that truth you seek, a lot of pixels are going to be wasted trying to get there. What IS your line of thinking -- or are we supposed to play guessing games?
If it won't, someone will blow my arguments out of the water because I am seriously outgunned in each and every debate amongst council members.That's not necessarily correct but reliance on short pithy pointed comments does make one wonder about the depth of your interest. Drive by shootings aren't popular anywhere to my knowledge.

[SWJED]

Ken offers sage advice:


If you want to contribute value, you've proven you're capable of expressing coherent and complete thoughts; you should simply do that more often. The little blurbs and barbs don't add much.

Dave D.

[RTK]

That's why I suggest that if you are in Iraq you reduce every interaction to a business transaction as simple as buying a carpet: how much do you want to attack Al Qaeda?

Culturally obtuse. You'd go nowhere with this for the long term. You'd be leasing success.