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Kreker
08-02-2007, 05:59 PM
I’m relatively new to SWJ and was asked by Granite State in the “Tell Us About You2” thread to discuss FCS and small wars. As an add on, there is some good FCS discussion in the “Army Future: Invade Azerbaijan” thread. So, I’m providing some insights into the FCS brigade combat team (FBCT) capabilities and how this modernization program is leveraging and infusing technology to the current force.

Today and tomorrow's operating environment (OE) require currently undefined levels of security for not only successful military operations, but also for partner nations to thrive in other areas relative to security and national power. That said, the adversary will seek to deter US involvement, isolate the US from local support or allies, and block the entrance to the country in which they are operating or lure us into “their zone.” Adding complexity to the OE are adversaries who have “gone to school” on US operations including protracted, simultaneous, full spectrum operations in difficult and diverse terrain (urban). Fueling the fire even more is that the adversary in some cases has niche capabilities better than ours, is a master of IO, and abides by no rules. This was borne out by the recent Herzbollah/IDF war in which the fight was on complex terrain in “their zone”; relying on low visibility and prepared defenses; and, with secured LOCs enabling Hezbollah to mass rockets, ATGMs, RPGs, and mortars.

Enter the FBCT, which is designed for complex urban environments. Compared to the HBCT it has 10X more unmanned assets, 6X more sensors (which are all networked), 2X more infantry soldiers (boots on the ground), and is 3X more reliable and maintainable. The eight variants of the MGV have increased lethality and survivability, are chemical and bio hardened, have a 360 degree hemispheric active protection system, are the primary node for sharing information, and carry most of the FBCT’s sensors. Insights from the OMNI FUSION 2007 COIN experiment documented that tactical FBCT formations are more survivable and lethal than current tactical units in the COIN urban environment (can provide more insight if needed).

At the tactical level of operations the FBCT has:
- Self-contained units with reliable equipment and greater situational awareness, do not need operational pauses, thus keeping continuous pressure on adversaries
- Multi-layered, unmanned ground and air systems dramatically increasing situational awareness and reach, and increased force protection by doing more of the dangerous and dirty jobs.
- Battle command on the move; more robust staffs dealing with the full range of military operations.
- High situational awareness available at the lowest levels empowering all leaders.
- Smaller footprint due to greater reach-back and more reliable equipment.
- Combat units are fully networked; interdependent land forces leveraging all Joint capabilities.
- Mitigating our increased difficulty in concealing our intentions (surprise).

Testimony from recently deployed Soldiers who participated in FCS Experiment 1.1 held at Ft. Bliss/WSMR indicated that the equipment used during the experiment could be used in theater now including the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), Class I UAV, and tactical and urban unattended ground sensors (T-UGS/U-UGS). On 22 July 2004, Army officials announced plans to accelerate the delivery of selected FBCT capabilities to the Current Force. The Army will accelerate fielding of select FBCT capabilities (called Spin Outs) to reduce operational risk to the Current Force. Spin Out 1 (SO 1) will initiate testing in FY08 and consist of prototypes issued to the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) for their use and evaluation. Following successful evaluation, production and fielding of SO 1 will commence to Current Force units. SO 1 will include T-UGS/U-UGS, NLOS-LS, JTRS, and Integrated Computer “B-Kit” for Abrams, Bradley, and HMMWV. This process allows FCS capabilities being put in soldier’s hands sooner than the core program current schedule. SO 2 will initiate its testing in FY 2010 and will consist of the integration of the program’s Active Protection Systems (APS), the Manned Ground Vehicle Mast Mounted Sensor to Stryker, the SUGV, and the Class I UAV. SO 3 will initiate testing in FY 2012. This SO will leverage heavily on core program events. SO 3 will include these FCS systems: Armed Robotic Vehicle –Assault- Light, Class IV UAV, and FCS Battle Command Network that will replace current ABCS in current force operation centers. The FCS network will benefit not just the Army, but the entire joint force, which will also be network-enabled.

The Army’s FCS approach is the most effective way to leverage current resources in order to modernize the force and to maintain readiness while investing in programs that extend U.S. military advantages into the future. As CSA GEN Casey has observed, the cost of modernizing is measured in dollars; the failure to modernize too often is measured in lives. Without FCS modernization, the Army will get new equipment, but no new capabilities. Our Soldiers absolutely require new capabilities to prevail against a learning and adaptive enemy who is not standing still.

Thanks for the opportunity to contribute.

Granite_State
08-03-2007, 03:26 PM
Thanks for the thread, but to simplify a bit, I understand the FCS is a "system of systems", as you mentioned, but the core combat platforms are medium armor, not unlike the Stryker, is that right? Given the prevelance and dramatically increased firepower (IEDs, EFPs, ATGMs w/ Hezbollah) of our non-state adversaries, has there been some re-evaluation of heavy armor and the usefulness of the "Legacy Force"?

Kreker
08-06-2007, 05:48 PM
The FCS manned ground vehicle (MGV), of which there are eight variants, is a new family of networked vehicles with enhanced armor and protection technology, and next-generation survivability and sustainability features. Enhanced armor will be located on the entore vehicle to enhace survivability from IEDs and RPGs. Additionally, each MGV comes with an APS. MGVs have a common chassis, high-density diesel engine, hybird-electric drive, and band track.

The NLOS-C will be the first of the eight MGV variants to be developed and fielded as part of the FCS program. Plans call for 18 NLOS-C initial production platforms to be delivered between fiscal years 2010 and 2012 at a rate of six per year.

Currently, the Army plans on fielding 15 FBCTs. The remainder of the Army's BCTs (71) will be comprised of HBCTs, IBCTs, and SBCTs. All BCTs will be networked with the FBCT's battle command network.

So the "Legacy Force" will not be going away.

CSC2005
08-07-2007, 12:48 AM
Am I the only one that thinks the original post was written by a defense contractor for FCS? I smell SAIC:

:

SWJED
08-07-2007, 01:06 AM
Am I the only one that thinks the original post was written by a defense contractor for FCS? I smell SAIC:

:

I resemble that remark :wry: .

Rob Thornton
08-07-2007, 01:50 AM
All good bumper stickers - however, the effectiveness of the platforms, payloads, SoS, etc. all depend on the quality of the people who crew, use fight, interface with the GUIs, conduct operations in, from and around them, and most of all lead soldiers against tough enemies in challenging enviornments where technology does not solve all the problems and sometimes even encmbers us.

From one of the UAEE/FBCT-EE plank holders I'm hoping we wind up with the right tools. With the quality of some of the folks like COL Schaill, I believe we'll do OK.

As for contractors - I just consider that "life after":D - although I'm still a few years shy

MountainRunner
08-07-2007, 04:27 AM
Kreker,
That's a great narrative, but how does it fit with the reality of interfacing with people on the ground in a time where even the HMMWV is seen as less useful than the classic open air jeep?

Ski
08-07-2007, 11:07 AM
There's no way in hell that 15 EBCT/FBCT's are activated. A single FCS equipped BCT costs well into the mutiple BILLION dollar range. Hell, a Stryker BCT costs $1.2B.

This is the fallacy of the Army and FCS - they continue to expect to have these massive defense budgets with gigantic procurement programs. Hell, the FCS program was just tagged with an additional $13B rise in costs, now bringing it up to $174B for the entire program.

And as Mountain Runner states, it isn't even going to be that useful outside a high intensity conflict. A buried 500lb bomb will blow one of these to hell like any other vehicle.

I've read the argument about why FCS is needed - to counter hyper-kinetic rounds. We can't even get LOSAT right, and that sucker is 9 feet long and almost 200 pounds.

MountainRunner
08-07-2007, 04:13 PM
FYI: In the spirit of this thread, over in another part of SWC (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3625) I posted this link (http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=T5YEgaVk9CAJ_2fkT70xUrug_3d_3d)to a brief survey on robots in war. Thanks in advance for filling out the survey.

Granite_State
08-07-2007, 04:24 PM
There's no way in hell that 15 EBCT/FBCT's are activated. A single FCS equipped BCT costs well into the mutiple BILLION dollar range. Hell, a Stryker BCT costs $1.2B.

This is the fallacy of the Army and FCS - they continue to expect to have these massive defense budgets with gigantic procurement programs. Hell, the FCS program was just tagged with an additional $13B rise in costs, now bringing it up to $174B for the entire program.

And as Mountain Runner states, it isn't even going to be that useful outside a high intensity conflict. A buried 500lb bomb will blow one of these to hell like any other vehicle.


That's my fear in a nutshell.

Kreker
08-07-2007, 04:30 PM
Kreker,
That's a great narrative, but how does it fit with the reality of interfacing with people on the ground in a time where even the HMMWV is seen as less useful than the classic open air jeep?

Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.

Kreker
08-07-2007, 04:40 PM
I resemble that remark :wry: .

This thread started with a question from Granite State based on my background input, which stated I was a defense contractor working FCS...not SAIC or Boeing. That said, I've spent the last 36 years working for the Army. I take great pride in that institution and try to do the best of my ability and beyond for today's Soldiers...for they are the ones carrying the load.

Kreker
08-07-2007, 04:49 PM
There's no way in hell that 15 EBCT/FBCT's are activated. A single FCS equipped BCT costs well into the mutiple BILLION dollar range. Hell, a Stryker BCT costs $1.2B.

This is the fallacy of the Army and FCS - they continue to expect to have these massive defense budgets with gigantic procurement programs. Hell, the FCS program was just tagged with an additional $13B rise in costs, now bringing it up to $174B for the entire program.

And as Mountain Runner states, it isn't even going to be that useful outside a high intensity conflict. A buried 500lb bomb will blow one of these to hell like any other vehicle.

I've read the argument about why FCS is needed - to counter hyper-kinetic rounds. We can't even get LOSAT right, and that sucker is 9 feet long and almost 200 pounds.

Ski,
I only state the facts as I know them. What the future holds is anyones best guess. As of today, the Army leadership supports FCS. It's the Army's major modernization program. To put it in perspective funding wise across DOD it is the ONLY
Army program in the top 10!

Don't know where you can up with the additonal $13B.

Yes, a 500lb buried bomb will blow up an FCS vehicle. But, hopefully with the sensor array, UGVs, UAVs, that 500lb bomb will be detected, either during emplacement or prior to contact.

Thanks for the opportunity to dialogue.

TT
08-08-2007, 05:47 PM
Hi Kekar,

Thank you for addressing the issue of FCS (a recent report said that the Army has come up with a new name but so far has not released what this is).

A question I have is how resilient is the FCS? This question arises from its ‘system of systems’ concept. A general argument is that the more complicated an interdependent system, the more likely it is that something will not work or go wrong, and the greater the possibility of a resultant damaging cascade across the system. I know you said that ‘tactical FBCT formations are more survivable … than current tactical units in the COIN urban environments’. Nonetheless, a question has to be to what degree is it possible, or even likely, that the functional elimination or even reduced capability of parts of the system could lead to substantial system degradation or even system failure?

I am not purely thinking of the consequences of lethal combat, but also the possible (probable?) use of electronic counter measures by an opponent. The possibly of the FCS networked system being seriously degraded or even collapsing in the midst of combat is a terrible prospect.

Thanks!

Kreker
08-08-2007, 08:38 PM
Hi Kekar,

Thank you for addressing the issue of FCS (a recent report said that the Army has come up with a new name but so far has not released what this is).

A question I have is how resilient is the FCS? This question arises from its ‘system of systems’ concept. A general argument is that the more complicated an interdependent system, the more likely it is that something will not work or go wrong, and the greater the possibility of a resultant damaging cascade across the system. I know you said that ‘tactical FBCT formations are more survivable … than current tactical units in the COIN urban environments’. Nonetheless, a question has to be to what degree is it possible, or even likely, that the functional elimination or even reduced capability of parts of the system could lead to substantial system degradation or even system failure?

I am not purely thinking of the consequences of lethal combat, but also the possible (probable?) use of electronic counter measures by an opponent. The possibly of the FCS networked system being seriously degraded or even collapsing in the midst of combat is a terrible prospect.

Thanks!

Hi TT,
The Army plans on releasing the new name at the AUSA National Convention in October.

On your second and third points, the Battle Command Network (BCN) is an interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, displaying, disseminating, storing and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support personnel. That said, the BCN dependability results from the network’s redundant, multilayered architecture, reliability of network components, and the network’s capability to withstand attack. Not only is the network dependable and secure, but it is to be self-configuring, self-healing, and survivable. I’ve included a word document that provides a basic overview of the BCN.

Thanks.

Anthony Hoh
08-08-2007, 09:16 PM
Kreker,
My problem with this kind of technology is that the "Army" wont find the time to train the analog methods. As an OC I have followed the SSG that could not do simple mounted land navigation due to his dependace on the BFT. This unnamed Soldier had taken this route twice before. We made multiple "route corrections" and by 3 oclock in the morning I was ready for him to hook his tow bar to my vechile and drag me around the "box" at his lesiure. Super cool guy technology is great. But it will fail me. Technology still has to be fielded by the right people. I feel as if the Army is trying to overcome the soft underbelly of the Nintendo generation with technology. When what Soldiers need is tougher realistic training with no batteries included. Are any of the technology experts talking about how much training time will be consumed by mastering these imporved digital systems? And will their be time for me to teach a SSG how to do terrain association on a map? I have seen the FCS video at the last AUSA convention. I admit its cool and it briefs well. I have seen some of the stuff upclose, as we have an RDECOM rep next door to me. However I feel lethality needs to take a backseat to personality in a COIN enviroment. Give me 1.2B and I would teach every Soldier in the Army basic Arabic now that would save lives.

Kreker
08-09-2007, 12:34 PM
Hi Anthony,
You bring up very valid questions and concerns. I don't have the answers. I will say that the FCS program is the first procurement that includes training as one of its key perfomance parameters. Which means that training receives equal attention to the other KPPs (e.g., networked BC, survivability, networked lethality, sustainability/reliability). Embedded training is to be present on all FCS platforms. For the MGVs the crew will have access to databased TSPs, to conduct training on their platform in a LVC environment. There are also to be CCTT like trainers in the FBCT. The crew can use the TSPs or they can modify conditions within a TSP to adjust the difficulty during training or build a TSP to support a mission rehearsal.

That doesn't answer the mail on training in an analog environment, unless planned and resourced in the schoolhouses, units, and CTCs, which falls on the leadership to make it happen.

TT
08-09-2007, 12:42 PM
Kreker,

Thank you for the explanation. If it all works as hoped, then resilience may not an issue. I for one tend to be a bit sceptical about claims made for immature future technologies, particularly when the tech package is as complicated and forward leaning as the FCS system is. But only time will tell.

TT

Anthony Hoh
08-09-2007, 03:36 PM
Kreker,
Thanks for the prompt response. I understand some may consider the analog training as a obviously necessary componet. I just dont hear any "buzz" about it, so I worry an EM charge will render the Army of the future useless. I hope when the TSP's are developed "they" take the time to show several was to manage and in some cases work around or without our digital systems.

Cavguy
08-10-2007, 09:19 PM
Kreker,

What's your make on this?

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4058


The program was initiated as an attempt to find the means for the Army to rapidly deploy overwhelming combat power in response to overseas crises. FCS vehicles were intended to weigh less and require less logistical support than current heavy weapons while retaining the same, or better, levels of lethality and survivability.

The Army’s goals for FCS networking architecture are: to augment connectivity inside Army units and with other services, to increase situational awareness and understanding on the battlefield and to further synchronize operations. The idea is that superior information will allow soldiers to hit their enemy first instead of relying on heavy armor to withstand a hit. Put another way, the concept assumes lighter armor is an acceptable trade off for more communications and computers because the network will routinely permit soldiers to find, identify and kill enemy anti-armor systems before they have a chance to attack. Based on the deployment of prototypical systems in Iraq since the beginning of the war there, analysts at CDI are unaware that this concept has achieved even rudimentary feasibility. Indeed, the devastating success of enemy IEDs and EFPs in Iraq has led to the deployment of heavier armor, not lighter, and an acknowledgement that the enemy rarely permits itself to be found and identified by sensor hardware.

Posted today at DefenseTech.

I have to admit, even as an Armor guy I'm a skeptic of the FCS from what I have been briefed - how much armor are we looking at, and what kind of direct fire systems will be incorporated?

After Iraq, most of the FCS assumptions I was presented at CCC in 2001 seem to have been obliterated by reality in Iraq ....

Granite_State
08-11-2007, 12:56 PM
Kreker,

What's your make on this?

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4058



Posted today at DefenseTech.

I have to admit, even as an Armor guy I'm a skeptic of the FCS from what I have been briefed - how much armor are we looking at, and what kind of direct fire systems will be incorporated?

After Iraq, most of the FCS assumptions I was presented at CCC in 2001 seem to have been obliterated by reality in Iraq ....

Great post. That was my understanding of the FCS too, that sensors and data processing is supposed to mitigate the need for heavy armor. Don't see how that can possibly work in a low-tech LIC/IW/COIN environment. Seems to me like the RMA meets reality yet again.

T.X. Hammes had a great article on the central assumption of the RMA, eliminating the fog of war, being flawed, and he was writing in about 1998 I believe. I'll see if I can find it.

Granite_State
08-11-2007, 01:25 PM
Two simple examples, Somalia and Iraq, will suffice to show that an enemy can defeat at least one grid – in these cases our sensor grids -- and force us to fight from a position of information INFERIORITY.

The Somalis defeated our sensor grid by blending in with the civil population in Mogadishu. Our systems could not see inside the buildings nor tell the “good” guys from the “bad” guys when they were outside. All our sophisticated collection systems were unable to inform US commanders that the Somalis had developed an aggressive, well-developed defensive system to counter our raid tactics. We did not even know they had brought massive numbers of rocket-propelled grenades back into the city. As a result of the failure of our sensor grid, our commanders were completely surprised by the vigorous and rapid reaction to our early October raid. The result was 19 American dead and our withdrawal from Somalia.

Clearly the Somalis had Information Superiority. They knew what tactics we would employ; exactly where our forces were stationed; what routes we would use to reinforce the Rangers; how we would react to a helicopter shot down. They even knew the importance of immediate international media coverage of the event. They had a plan to get members of the media to the scene, get them to record it and get those pictures on the air.

Contrast the decisive Somalia action to the hesitant UN/US action and ask yourself which side had a superior understanding of the tactical and operational picture.

A second example where sophisticated sensors have not given us an advantage is the current crisis in Iraq. For all our tremendous capabilities, we do not know where Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are. We do not know how he will respond to air attacks. We do not know how the Arab masses will react to a sustained campaign. We don’t have his command and control system precisely located. The list of what we don’t know is longer than the list of what we do know. This is against an enemy we have focused on for over 7 years! Clearly, the fundamental uncertainty in war has not changed.

In the Iraq case, all three sensor girds failed. Our sensor grid failed to provide a perfect view of the battlefield. Our command and control grid has failed to provide a clear, coherent course of action and remains tied up in both internal and international debates about what that course of action should be. Finally, even if we had a course of action, our engagement grid might not be able to execute it. Our precision weapons are useless against targets we cannot locate. Even if the target is located, the precision weapons may not be useable due to political or humanitarian restraints. Saddam is an expert at placing military targets inside installations such as hospitals, mosques, etc. All three grids essential to Network-Centric warfare have been defeated by a not particularly well run Third World nation. The real world has shown that Network-Centric Warfare cannot guarantee and advantage.

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes_netwar.htm

Cavguy
08-11-2007, 02:58 PM
Great post. That was my understanding of the FCS too, that sensors and data processing is supposed to mitigate the need for heavy armor. Don't see how that can possibly work in a low-tech LIC/IW/COIN environment. Seems to me like the RMA meets reality yet again.

T.X. Hammes had a great article on the central assumption of the RMA, eliminating the fog of war, being flawed, and he was writing in about 1998 I believe. I'll see if I can find it.

After having watched us in Iraq struggle to find IED's with technological means, and utilized some of the most advanced methods out there - we're still not finding/defeating all the IED's (remember, it only takes one) with thermals, robots, mine flails, ECM Jammers, infrared, and even more futuristic clearing devices I can't discuss here.

Kreker, am I to believe that FCS has somehow developed some super secret new tech that can find the IED's with its next-gen tech and protect my guys despite low armor? If they did exist, I am sure they would have been fielded already (I can see the next "60 Minutes": Army has had IED defeat technologies it wont field until FCS, soldiers continue to die awaiting gear)

Don't get me wrong, I'm not against technologyor the new systems. I think having a common platform will do wonders for logistics and maintenance. I just feel the system's capabilities are being far oversold, especially since no one has seen an actual FCS prototype yet. Several FCS tech spin-offs recently have improved other systems But the "network will detect and ID everything" ad for FCS doesn't match the reality I have experienced, and it frankly worries me.

It's not about identifying the enemy CRP and AGMB anymore ... It's Id'ing the insurgent who now has learned how to evade detection in urban terrain by UAV's (the smart ones know exactly how to avoid technical detection) and target weak points in our systems. And placing precision and devistating fire at engagements of as little as 5 meters or less with armored vehicles. No defeat mechanisim I have seen advertised can react to an RPG fired 10m away - which is very common in Iraq. If we're banking on NLOS missile systems - I haven't seen a ranged missile system yet that can be used at less than 75m arming distance .... RPG-22 Tandem warheads are even showing up in Iraq. So if we go light on the armor and expect the tech to protect us ....

Ken White
08-11-2007, 03:25 PM
It is a needed capability but is also, unfortunately, a typical US response to a problem -- substitute technology for training and throw money at it.

While the capability has many uses and is important, it cannot be allowed to get center stage and be seen as the ultimate answer. In any war, people will provide that answer and we need to realize that the excessive centralizing effect of the current approach to network centric warfare is inimical to flexibility and innovative thinking -- technology will impose severe limits on tactical and even operational flexibility if not contained.

I agree with Hammes' premise but the quote illustrates a couple of minor and perhaps unintentional omissions on his part. The failure in Somalia was not of sensor capability. It was in very small part a failure of intelligence -- specifically a failure on the part of the intel folks to just listen to people on the ground who were trying to tell them facts and placing more reliance on technology than people. The largest failure was in the tactics and techniques. As he says, the Somalis what we would do and knew how we would react to events. One of the most damning critiques of US military performance I've ever read was a quote from a Somali Militia 'Colonel' who said "We knew what the Americans would do. They had done the same things six times. In war no one should ever do the same thing twice." That is just flat embarrassing... :(

He also missed the point that Iraq was also an intelligence failure of some magnitude. The lack of Humint created the gaps that he cites. Sensors and technology are great but they cannot do everything so his central premise is correct but he did not suggest a corrective for the problem he identified.

Nor did he address the political and perhaps psychological factors. A broader failure in Somalia was the Clinton order to get Aideed and Adm (Ret) Jonathan Howe's ineptitude and intransigence. The subsequent pullout was a terrible decision and arguably, along with Carter and Reagan failures to confront Islamist probes and a few other backdowns put us where we are today. The political aspects of the failures in Iraq are more nuanced and diverse and are, IMO, definitely not restricted to the civilian leadership.

The possible psychological factor is that too many in the Armed Forces have become entirely too risk averse -- that is a current US societal trait and the Armed Forces are a reflection of society but whatever the source, it needs to be fixed...

In any event I agree now with his premise -- particularly that JV 2010 was and is dangerous -- as I did when I first read that article nine years ago when I was still a Proceedings subscriber. I disagree that the failure of the sensors, etc. were a significant part of the problem in either case he cites . Rather, over reliance on them became a problem in both cases -- that is a doctrinal and training, not a technological failure. He does sort of allude to that.

However, I thought then and still think he needed to offer a prescriptions for improvement. As the old saw says, "Any idiot can find a problem, the genius provides a solution..." Old Boss of mine told me never to mention a problem without having a recommendation to fix it in hand... :wry:

The prescriptions are simple:

The political calculus needs to be refined and finished before commitment. Do not over rely on technology. Do not over centralize C2. Train people well. Let them do their jobs and trust them to do that.

Kreker
08-22-2007, 12:41 PM
Kreker, am I to believe that FCS has somehow developed some super secret new tech that can find the IED's with its next-gen tech and protect my guys despite low armor? If they did exist, I am sure they would have been fielded already (I can see the next "60 Minutes": Army has had IED defeat technologies it wont field until FCS, soldiers continue to die awaiting gear) ....

Cavguy,
Have been on vacation so there's been a lapse on my part. Very good posts by you, Granite State, and Ken. Technology is the driver for FCS. As mentioned in the article FCS's future rests in adhering to technology maturity. In some cases, the FCS contractors have made decent gains and in some cases they are behind their goals. Thus the write-ups from GAO, CBO, etc.

As to the question of IEDs, the FCS team is working with JIEDO, as are others, in trying to find solutions. To my knowledge the technology is not there yet. If one is to believe what FCS is to bring to the fight, then here's one scenario: UAVs perch on high urban terrain to monitor key facilities and routes. UAVs and UGVs both monitor subterranean entrances and exits. THey "see" and "sense" through structures, inside subterranean complexes, and through urban clutter including electronic interference and battlefield rubble to detect personnel and equipment. Sensor packages discriminate between COBs and combatants, detecting weapons, explosives, and other threats.

Bottom line is technolgy will drive FCS's success. Many are skeptical. I admit that in some cases I have my doubts as well. HR McMaster wrote a good article about the future of transformation and about dominate knowledge in future wars.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/S03-03.pdf


Regards.

Rob Thornton
08-22-2007, 02:27 PM
Bottom line is technolgy will drive FCS's success. Many are skeptical. I admit that in some cases I have my doubts as well. HR McMaster wrote a good article about the future of transformation and about dominate knowledge in future wars.

Kreker,
I know many of the technologies are coming across OK. I've been to a quite a few of the demos, wrote quite a few trip reports., and done quite a bit of thinking on it - I was one of the robotics guys for the Experimental Element (and also an OPs Officer in MCG1 at the CAB and FBCT level for the experiments) - granted I left the program in 06 to serve on a TT, but I know the obstacles well. However, I think all must be wary when claims are made when inextricably linking technology and success without qualifying the critical role people play in fighting wars.

I will agree that FCS will provide us with some good technology we can apply to our tactics. However, it does not provide a failsafe solution against a thinking, adaptive, and energetic enemy - adaptive, agile, innovative soldiers are the best thing to counter the enemy. Ground combat will forever remain a dirty, cut-throat and personal business as long as people are involved - technology can provide some advantages, but it does not neutralize it. While NLOS and BLOS, the gamut of FCS UMS (UAS,UGS, UGS, etc.) offer lots more data, and some options at points in the fight, its people who will make use, or fail to make use of what they see and how they comprehend its relevance to the fight.

Good tech I think is that which enables people to do their jobs better without compromising the required fundamentals. It does not seek efficiency at the expense of effectiveness.

As mentioned before, I think COL Schaill's BCT down in Bliss will inject the realism of today's challenges the program was unable to attain previously.

Best Rob

Kreker
08-23-2007, 02:52 PM
Kreker,
I know many of the technologies are coming across OK. I've been to a quite a few of the demos, wrote quite a few trip reports., and done quite a bit of thinking on it - I was one of the robotics guys for the Experimental Element (and also an OPs Officer in MCG1 at the CAB and FBCT level for the experiments) - granted I left the program in 06 to serve on a TT, but I know the obstacles well. However, I think all must be wary when claims are made when inextricably linking technology and success without qualifying the critical role people play in fighting wars...
Good tech I think is that which enables people to do their jobs better without compromising the required fundamentals. It does not seek efficiency at the expense of effectiveness.

As mentioned before, I think COL Schaill's BCT down in Bliss will inject the realism of today's challenges the program was unable to attain previously.

Best Rob

Hi Rob,
Couldn't agree with you more! The Soldier will be the centerpiece of all the happens or fails to happen. Thus the 14+1+1, that's been at the forefront of all the FCS briefings (use to be 18+1+1 until the Army restructured the program in Jan 07), with the last "1" being the Soldier. I, too, was involved in the experiments conduct at the UMABL during 2004 (BSCPC).

I believe that the key tech for the Soldier will be his connectivity to and integration with the FCS network and FCS Battle Command. So we're in synch.

Regards.

kit
08-29-2007, 03:38 AM
Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.


If he's so busy interfacing and communicating, when will he find the time to shoot back? Can we say, "sensory overload?"

kit
08-29-2007, 03:48 AM
When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

Kreker
08-30-2007, 11:06 PM
When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

Hi Kit,
Couldn't agee with you more, thus twice the number of boots on the ground in a FBCT than a HBCT.
Cheers.