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LawVol
08-06-2007, 03:03 PM
I seem to recall that this has been tried before. Yet another demonstration of the fact that lessons are usually encountered rather than learned.


Iraq: Easier to occupy from the air?
BY: Ali Al-Fadhily, Inter Press Service
08/06/2007


Many Iraqis believe the dramatic escalation in U.S. military use of air power is a sign of defeat for the occupation forces on the ground.


"Going back to air raids is an alarming sign of defeat," Salim Rahman, an Iraqi political analyst from Baghdad told IPS. "To bombard an area only means that it is in the hands of the enemy."

http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=20437

One can only hope that this isn't the proposed post-surge solution...

Steve Blair
08-06-2007, 03:07 PM
I seem to recall that this has been tried before. Yet another demonstration of the fact that lessons are usually encountered rather than learned.

http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=20437

One can only hope that this isn't the proposed post-surge solution...

One can indeed hope, and it is a shame that corporate memory on this stuff seems to be only a couple of years long....

Sometimes I fear that the air power advocates in all services forget that you need to control the GROUND in many cases, COIN being one of them. Being able to put bombs on target (or rockets) isn't the same thing as controlling the target zone.

And no worries...I deleted the duplicate post.:)

carl
08-08-2007, 12:30 AM
The recent increase in the use of airpower seems to me to be the USAF looking to get in on the potential success of the recent change in strategy; an artful dodge by a cagey bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, it results in episodes like the one I read about in Stars and Stripes last month; the saga of how the air force destroyed several footbridges south of Baghdad using only 9,500 pounds of bombs.

A capability looking for a purpose.

LawVol
08-08-2007, 11:55 AM
The recent increase in the use of airpower seems to me to be the USAF looking to get in on the potential success of the recent change in strategy; an artful dodge by a cagey bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, it results in episodes like the one I read about in Stars and Stripes last month; the saga of how the air force destroyed several footbridges south of Baghdad using only 9,500 pounds of bombs.

A capability looking for a purpose.

I assume you are referring to the recent good news out of Iraq regarding the surge? If so, I think you are way off mark. The AF isn't a sniveling politician merely looking for votes. Whether you agree or not, the AF command has consistently argued that airpower (at least its lethal component) can contribute significantly to COIN or Irregular Warfare, as the AF calls it. I personnally disagree with the emphasis on lethal airpower, but I have to concede that the AF command has been consistent regardless of the news out of Iraq. Your last comment may be a little more on target (pardon the pun).

Steve Blair
08-08-2007, 12:42 PM
I assume you are referring to the recent good news out of Iraq regarding the surge? If so, I think you are way off mark. The AF isn't a sniveling politician merely looking for votes. Whether you agree or not, the AF command has consistently argued that airpower (at least its lethal component) can contribute significantly to COIN or Irregular Warfare, as the AF calls it. I personnally disagree with the emphasis on lethal airpower, but I have to concede that the AF command has been consistent regardless of the news out of Iraq. Your last comment may be a little more on target (pardon the pun).

AF command has been consistent with their emphasis on the lethal air power component since before Vietnam. The more things change....:wry:

Seriously, I wish sometimes that they would actually WATCH that Berlin Airlift footage they cram into AFROTC courses and absorb the COIN lessons therein. The lethal component is important, but not as important as the immediate humanitarian surge capability that good airlift can provide.

carl
08-09-2007, 03:21 AM
I assume you are referring to the recent good news out of Iraq regarding the surge? If so, I think you are way off mark. The AF isn't a sniveling politician merely looking for votes. Whether you agree or not, the AF command has consistently argued that airpower (at least its lethal component) can contribute significantly to COIN or Irregular Warfare, as the AF calls it. I personnally disagree with the emphasis on lethal airpower, but I have to concede that the AF command has been consistent regardless of the news out of Iraq. Your last comment may be a little more on target (pardon the pun).

I hope I am off the mark, and I admit my comment was a bit sardonic. But it seems very curious that the AF has substantially increased their forces in country (if I remember reading the stories right) at a time when fast movers toting big bombs are probably less needed than ever.

True the AF isn't a politician looking for votes, but it is a bureaucracy looking for money,and "bureaucracy will do its thing." (that is a paraphrase from the title of a book.)

LawVol
08-09-2007, 12:41 PM
The AF operates many of the bases that the Army uses (Kirkuk comes to mind since I was there). It would seem that an increase in Army personnel would lead to an increase in personnel to run the bases. I would also assume that more airlift is need to move the troops and this would mean a need for more aircraft maintainers. Just guessing...

I agree that fast movers aren't needed as much, but I'm not sure the increase can be attributed to just that platform.

Steve Blair: You are absolutely right! If we could get our senior officers to look more toward the Berlin airlift as a model (rather than, say, Dresden), I think the AF would prove to be an invaluable asset in the types of operations we are likely to see in the future. Take Darfur for example. It's like Bosnia part two. So far the public attention has resulted in Prime Minister Gordon's plan. We'll be there soon, I'm sure. The world has plenty of failed or fragile states that could easily turn into terrorist havens. Using airpower to deliver specialized teams equipped to fulfill basic security and humanitarian needs would greatly increase the chance of avoiding the creation of another Afghanistan. We need to stop playing whack-a-mole after these places actually become problems and start thinking about how we can take preventive action. Airpower isn't the one-size fits all solution, but I do think that some unconventional uses of our equipment and personnel might be useful. I'm just a voice in the wilderness though.

slapout9
08-09-2007, 12:58 PM
LawVol, You are not completely alone. Col. Warden told me that it was just as easy for the Air Force to bomb somebody with FOOD as it is with a PGM. The difference is the effect you want to achieve. High altitude food drops were made in Afghanistan with great accuracy,the problem was that is was not the kind of food they like to eat. It was that Culture thing again.

Tom Odom
08-09-2007, 01:05 PM
LawVol, You are not completely alone. Col. Warden told me that it was just as easy for the Air Force to bomb somebody with FOOD as it is with a PGM. The difference is the effect you want to achieve. High altitude food drops were made in Afghanistan with great accuracy,the problem was that is was not the kind of food they like to eat. It was that Culture thing again.

Slap

I can tell you as a veteran of the 1994 Great Goma Bombing Raid that getting bombed with food can be very damn dangerous...:eek:

Tom

Steve Blair
08-09-2007, 01:37 PM
LawVol, You are not completely alone. Col. Warden told me that it was just as easy for the Air Force to bomb somebody with FOOD as it is with a PGM. The difference is the effect you want to achieve. High altitude food drops were made in Afghanistan with great accuracy,the problem was that is was not the kind of food they like to eat. It was that Culture thing again.

And this is why the AF senior leadership needs to break out of its mold. They KNOW they can do it, but they don't LIKE to. And there lies the critical difference. I suspect (though I could be wrong) that Warden (assuming this is the same Col Warden who wrote "The Air Campaign") would consider dropping food to be a waste of airframes and most likely not the effect he would want to achieve, even if it's the correct one for the circumstances. Sometimes the simple stuff DOES work.

Within the training environment I see every day, they do talk about the Berlin Airlift. But they never really come out and say that they couldn't do something like that now, and there's always the presence of the bombers in the background. It does get a full class period, but then it disappears in the bomb guidance footage from Desert Storm. It's all reactive, and that really limits the air power vision to a single dimension or element (bombs on target).

slapout9
08-09-2007, 02:03 PM
Steve, same Col. Warden. I was serious when I said he said it to me, I mean we were face to face in his office! This poor guy has been slandered more than anybody I have ever seen, half or more of what he is supposed to have said he never said. He paid a terrible price for it to in his Air Force career. A little known fact about him is that he flew the OV-10 Broncos we have talked so much about here on SWC,266 missions I believe,alot for the 1ST Air Cav. he knows about being shot at.

Jim Stratton
08-09-2007, 02:09 PM
Gentlemen,
As a serving USAF officer and graduate of the USMC SAW I am concerned that your posts misunderstand the service's corporate viewpoint on the relevancy of airpower to the COIN fight. Take a look at Frank Hoffman's link posted 6 Aug to MGen Peck's article, "Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare." MGen Peck provides statistics showing airlift moved over 1M personnel and 90K pallets of cargo using 50K airlift sorties last year in OIF/OEF. USAF strategic and tactical airlift sorties overwhelmingly outnumber air-to-ground strike missions in support of worldwide operations in OIF/OEF. While, in my opinion, MGen Peck's article is still too focused on the kinetic effects of airpower in the COIN fight, the characterization of USAF senior leaders as focusing exclusively on how to get 'fast movers' into the fight is specious. Though published on a USAF website, I'm sure you noticed that the article you are basing your discussion upon was not written by a USAF officer and the only quote provided from a USAF officer related how the Army sometimes wished there was more combat power overhead. The service's evolving COIN/IW doctrine is much more nuanced and covers a broader spectrum of conflict than your discussion reflects.

Tom Odom
08-09-2007, 02:24 PM
Jim Stratton,

Thanks for the interjection but before labeling comments on an ongoing discussion as specious, do 2 things:

A. Try reading a bit larger on this forum and you will find Frank Hoffman's blog entry under discussion and other related forums.

B. Go here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33) and introduce yourself.

Thanks

Tom

Stan
08-09-2007, 02:38 PM
LawVol, You are not completely alone. Col. Warden told me that it was just as easy for the Air Force to bomb somebody with FOOD as it is with a PGM. The difference is the effect you want to achieve. High altitude food drops were made in Afghanistan with great accuracy,the problem was that is was not the kind of food they like to eat. It was that Culture thing again.

Hey Slapout !
Not only did the AF not hit the mark in Sub-Sahara, they also sent the wrong Sierra...baby winter clothes and extremely dry flour (sans water).

Tom was on the "Ft. AP Hill" with the Swiss Bell Jet Ranger dudes as the 463Ls came a callin' :D

BTW, I dunno if we to this day know what they wanted to achieve. Do you, Tom ?

Tom Odom
08-09-2007, 03:17 PM
Hey Slapout !
Not only did the AF not hit the mark in Sub-Sahara, they also sent the wrong Sierra...baby winter clothes and extremely dry flour (sans water).

Tom was on the "Ft. AP Hill" with the Swiss Bell Jet Ranger dudes as the 463Ls came a callin' :D

BTW, I dunno if we to this day know what they wanted to achieve. Do you, Tom ?

I had the opportunity to discuss via email with the lead pilots on that mission, plus the Squadron Commander was in my syndicate at CGSC, taught mne how to brew beer, and frame art prints. That would be Chode Scott now a BG.

Chode was not there for the mission as he was TDY but he made it back in time to host an AAR in the Rhino Pub bar in the Kampala Sheraton.

As the military objective was irrelevant--we already had open roads and I had to arm twist the UNHCR into diverting the MHE to handle the material to be dropped (supposedly disaster MREs and biscuits)--the real reason was the White House wanted an air show on CNN to demonstrate our resolve to help the Rwandans. That we were helping the wrong Rwandans was spun until it all looked the same--like the Rwandans. :wry:

In any case the MC130 crews did their job but in the hurry up mission concepts were tiwsted, air drop pallets for Kosovo were pulled out and used (hence the winter baby clothes), and it was in a word, FUBAR. The mission was pure political bovine excreta (love that phrase--so much more intellectual than BS).

By the way Stan, you know Chode. It was his crew that danced on the bar in the American Club in K-town with Blue Keller's SF team after an exercise with the 31st Paras.

Tom

Stan
08-09-2007, 03:39 PM
The mission was pure political bovine excreta (love that phrase--so much more intellectual than BS).

By the way Stan, you know Chode. It was his crew that danced on the bar in the American Club in K-town with Blue Keller's SF team after an exercise with the 31st Paras.

Tom

I was actually trying to forget that MC crew (which BTW includes Chode and at times one SF LTC Blue :D )

OK, the wrong Sierra was on the 3 pallets, and the Swiss helo dudes may have forgotten the near miss that day (it's that or they're all dead), but the banana plantation owner ? The biscuits were a nice touch :cool:

Tom Odom
08-09-2007, 03:49 PM
I personally loved the French Sergeant who wanted to go attack the refugees to save the pallet which landed in the midst of the main refugee flow. What an IO opportunity that was....

Tom

slapout9
08-09-2007, 03:50 PM
Hi Stan/Tom. OK dry baby food in the desert.....:eek: Great way to loose weight....sounds like a Paris Hilton diet plan:)

LawVol
08-09-2007, 04:15 PM
Gentlemen,
As a serving USAF officer and graduate of the USMC SAW I am concerned that your posts misunderstand the service's corporate viewpoint on the relevancy of airpower to the COIN fight. Take a look at Frank Hoffman's link posted 6 Aug to MGen Peck's article, "Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare." MGen Peck provides statistics showing airlift moved over 1M personnel and 90K pallets of cargo using 50K airlift sorties last year in OIF/OEF. USAF strategic and tactical airlift sorties overwhelmingly outnumber air-to-ground strike missions in support of worldwide operations in OIF/OEF. While, in my opinion, MGen Peck's article is still too focused on the kinetic effects of airpower in the COIN fight, the characterization of USAF senior leaders as focusing exclusively on how to get 'fast movers' into the fight is specious. Though published on a USAF website, I'm sure you noticed that the article you are basing your discussion upon was not written by a USAF officer and the only quote provided from a USAF officer related how the Army sometimes wished there was more combat power overhead. The service's evolving COIN/IW doctrine is much more nuanced and covers a broader spectrum of conflict than your discussion reflects.

It is true that the article we are discussing in this thread was not written by an Air Force officer. It is also irrelevant. The COIN fight is driven as much by perception as anything else. If the hearts and minds we are trying to win over believe that we are too quick to drop bombs, then we are not winning the fight.

The airlift statistics you mention are notable, but how much of that is committed to humanitarian-type missions that will assist in winning over the populous? Given the increase in troops for the surge, I would expect airlift to increase and this certainly has apparently had a positive effect. However, I believe that we overemphasize kinetic effects to our detriment.

That being said, welcome aboard. Although I tend to see COIN in the same light as many of the regulars here, I try to keep them in line when they do an AF pile on.:D (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2131 ) It'll be nice to have some help.

Steve Blair
08-09-2007, 05:10 PM
And on key...RAND to the rescue....(well...sorta, anyhow).
Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG565/)

It looks to be a good read with some balanced conclusions and a call for reevaluation of the AF lift fleet. It got a plug in "AF Times" this week, too.

Stan
08-09-2007, 06:27 PM
Hi Stan/Tom. OK dry baby food in the desert.....:eek: Great way to loose weight....sounds like a Paris Hilton diet plan:)

Hey Slapout,
Actually, the 'air drop' was less than 3 clicks from the Nyiragongo Volcano (approx. 4 kilometers high). Tom and I lived less than 10 clicks from this bugger and she was always smokin'. Got to send you a jpeg.

There was a time we hoped she would just bust and save us a ton of trouble :wry:

The real diet however was cholera.

carl
08-09-2007, 10:33 PM
Gentlemen,
As a serving USAF officer and graduate of the USMC SAW I am concerned that your posts misunderstand the service's corporate viewpoint on the relevancy of airpower to the COIN fight. Take a look at Frank Hoffman's link posted 6 Aug to MGen Peck's article, "Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare." MGen Peck provides statistics showing airlift moved over 1M personnel and 90K pallets of cargo using 50K airlift sorties last year in OIF/OEF. USAF strategic and tactical airlift sorties overwhelmingly outnumber air-to-ground strike missions in support of worldwide operations in OIF/OEF.

This brings to mind something I observed at a C.O.B. for the time I was there. It seemed that about 40% or more of the heavy airlifters serving the base were Russian aircraft, AN-12's and IL-76's, with east European crews. The 40% figure is a subjective guess, but for every C-17 that landed 1.5 IL-76's landed and there were rather more Antonovs than Hercs.

Could this reliance on former Soviet aircraft and pilots to supply what seems like a big part of our airlift be a problem in the the future? What if Vladimir decides he doesn't want these guys to do this and pressures them to stop?

This apparent shortage of airlift I don't blame on the USAF though. They keep asking for more C-17's and the Pentagon keeps saying no.

Culpeper
08-10-2007, 02:37 AM
I hope I am off the mark, and I admit my comment was a bit sardonic. But it seems very curious that the AF has substantially increased their forces in country (if I remember reading the stories right) at a time when fast movers toting big bombs are probably less needed than ever.

True the AF isn't a politician looking for votes, but it is a bureaucracy looking for money,and "bureaucracy will do its thing." (that is a paraphrase from the title of a book.)

Uh, these guns on target are a lot easier for the ground troops dealing with a problem than having a platoon leader order one of his squads to deal with the problem. The fight doesn't have to be fair. I'm an advocate of CAS and the increase of USAF personnel taking on more and more of an on the ground approach to getting guns and bombs on target. The Air Force doesn't mind the Army calling in a strike from the ground but the Air Force would prefer an Air Force grunt such as a ROMAD or CCT doing this work. The USMC wrote the book on CAS and so if there is more USAF assets being used than you can bet the Marines are way ahead in this department. Now, in the old days you had an Air Force ALO, which was a fighter pilot on the ground, usually at battalion level and above, calling in strikes. You might recall in the movie, "Platoon", the scene during the final battle a NVA sapper running into the USAV TOC and blowing up the ALO (played by Oliver Stone) and his ROMAD. But that was the way they used to do it. Today, every level within the Army has Air Force personnel working much closer to the fighting trained not only in Air Force doctrine and tactics but Army doctrine and tactics as well. In fact, most of these Air Force guys are so deep into the Army that the minority find themselves stationed on USAF air bases and most have completely lost the work "9 to 5" Air Force mentality. I don't think anyone is stealing the show and I doubt you will find a single grunt complaining about an A-10 Thunderbolt using his guns and bombs to give a guy a break. We are either going to learn to master joint operation with sister services or we will go back to the days when the Air Force couldn't direct a Navy or Marine CAS strike because the Air Force don't understand the company language. One step forward. Two steps back. I have a little practical experience in this area. When I was in we got rid of Carter and Reagan broke the plate on the old ways. We had to start getting up before sunrise and run five miles, jump out of air planes, actually inspect, maintain, and operate our equipment, learn to shoot, go through Army infantry training. It was truly the beginning of joint special operation training. Only they forgot to tell us that. So, as you can see, my viewpoint is that anything that has to do with small wars today has special operations at its core. And that includes exclusive and deadly use of of air assets. I whole heartedly disagree that the use of air power is a sign of weakness or a Plan B. With today's precision guided weaponry air assets are here to stay. This is something that has been ongoing since the days of bombing during WWII when only 20% of a strategic bomb load got within a thousand yards of the intended target. CAS wasn't much better during that period as well. Baby, we have come a long way since then. For the average grunt, CAS is death on call.

carl
08-10-2007, 04:34 AM
Culpeper:

This boils down to a question, I think, of how much is enough? Most of what the USAF can bring (AC-130s and A-10s excepted) may be too much for the situation as it stands. I just don't see the critical need for extra B-1s, F-16s, Tornados, and F-15Es.

Every squad leader would probably love to see a section of A-10s overhead at all times. But it would cost too much for the returns you would get. At any one time you only have so many resources available. Are those resources going to be better used on fast movers hauling big bombs or would they be better used on giving everybody serious Arabic language instruction or setting up a nationwide ID system like Bing West talks about?

There may also be a point of diminishing returns with airplanes. They need big bases with big runways and a lot of people to maintain the planes and the base. All those people have to be protected and supplied. All the convoys to supply them have to be protected as do the roads etc, etc, etc. If there weren't so many planes all the ground forces dedicated to protecting them and their bases could do something else.

I just don't trust the high ranking aviator generals not to run around like kids with a hammer looking to pound something.

Culpeper
08-10-2007, 12:51 PM
Those are all good points. I might point out that the F16 and even F15 can perform CAS quite well and you can never have enough aircraft stacked up during the day waiting for a mission. Nevertheless, the presence of a large air force goes beyond the so-called "low intensity" conflict on the ground. It also adds to the show of force capability for the entire region. If a show of force is a diplomatic tool that can prevent a conflict elsewhere in the region than the cost-benefit has no limit.

LawVol
08-10-2007, 03:30 PM
Of course, CAS is invaluable to the infantry and has an obvious role in COIN. However, bombs on target is typically a tactical answer to a strategic question when it comes to COIN. For all the precision technology we have, civilian casualties are inevitable. This, in turn, creates additional enemies and provides talking points for the insurgent IO campaign and the media. Employing our air assets with a focus on the desired end state (e.g. stability) would pay greater dividends IMO.

As for a show of force, I'm not sure we're actually getting a positive return on that. Our insurgent enemies do not seem to care about a show of force. They fight us despite our technological superiority and are doing quite well it would seem. As for our regional enemies, I would think that a huge show of force with a large Air Force presence would work the opposite way. Look at it throught their eyes. Here we have the world's most powerful country with the world's most effective and technologically superior air force and it cannot defeat insurgents with small arms using car jacks to launch rockets. Using overwhelming force to crush a gant only works if you actually crush the gnat. But this isn't that type of war. A new approach is needed that realizes that our tools for mission accomplishment aren't only lethal.

This type of fight requires something we Americans typically lack: patience. Sure the tendency is to want pay back. I feel this too on an initial level. But over-reliance on that mentality simply creates additional problems. By looking to non-lethal solutions perhaps we can fix the issue rather than simply defer it. I read a quote just today from Gen Patreaus who said that money is ammunition. He is absolutely right. By using money for reconstruction and other humanitarian type projects, we gain more ground than by simply resorting to the knee-jerk reaction of bombing. Either way we're spending money, but one way allows us to take the form of facilitators rather than occupiers plus we gain the moral high ground, something we should not underestimate given world opinion.

Okay, off my soapbox.:)

Granite_State
08-10-2007, 03:46 PM
I've been reading stories about the increased use of airstrikes in Iraq and Afghanistan for at least a couple of years now, it seems to me that increased use of airpower is being adopted as a necessary expedient because of the ground force not being large enough in either theater. I think Tom made a comment to that effect in a thread a couple months ago.

Even with precision-guided munitions, there is plenty of collateral damage. I understand that CAS saves a lot of American lives, but it strikes me as being like the force protection argument, that in the big picture our obsession with casualty counts creates more enemies and leads to strategic failure. I also realize coalition forces are very careful with CAS, just saw something the other day on the Blackwater battle at the CPA compound in Najaf in 2004, when strike planes were repeatedly pulled back for fear of civilian casualties. But if most of the past practitioners of COIN are to be believed, airpower is one of the worst tools you can use, alongside artillery.

This always made sense to me:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/six_easy_paragraphs.htm

LawVol
08-10-2007, 04:34 PM
That is perhaps the best explanation I've read. I'd add a caveat to your statement, however. [I]Lethal[I] airpower is perhaps one of the worst tools. Although I have a few irons in the fire right now, I want to look into the British approach to insurgency particularly the Northern Ireland troubles. Slapout sent me a recently completed study the British Army did and it is facinating thus far.

I tend to lean more toward an LE approach to this war. Surely there are some negatives, but I think the positive outweighs.

Jim Stratton
08-10-2007, 04:41 PM
Gents,

The discussion here about airpower's relevancy to the COIN fight is a good one, but I want to make sure we keep a couple of facts in mind (by the way, I understand the relatively new JP 1 tries to settle the COIN/IW debate once and for all by settling on IW).

1) There is a difference between airpower and the Air Force. Airpower is brought to bear regardless of the service providing the platform, and is a critical component of the current, joint interdependent fight. Airpower, writ large, covers a broad spectrum from airlift, ISR, air superiority, CAS, etc. The Air Force, on the other hand, is engaged in the current fight in many capacities other than airpower. The most heavily stressed MOS's at my fighter wing are most definitely NOT pilots. Our security forces, air traffic controllers, logisticians, medics, and civil engineers maintain a constant rotation to OIF/OEF. In fact, their units are never up to their full TO&E at home station because some portion is always deployed. The warriors in my wing are those who drive gun trucks from Kuwait to Victory, dig wells in HOA, provide a coherent battlefield picture to commanders, try to patch up maimed Americans at Balad, and patrol outside the wire at Kirkuk. Ignoring the contribution of these Airmen ignores the way the USAF has adapted to the current fight, all without the depth of manpower that the Army has as a result of their larger manpower pool.

2) The only reason we employ kinetic airpower in Iraq or Afghanistan is because a ground commander requested CAS, not because the USAF is fighting its own fight. Per joint doctrine, there should be a JTF in Iraq and one in Afghanistan in order to synchronize the actions of subordinate commanders in the AO. One does not exist, usually explained "because the fight is to distributed." The Combined Air Operations Center's (CAOC) role has essentially devolved to ensuring all the Joint Tactical Air Support Requests (JTARs) floating up from battalions across the AO are met. The CAOC is most definitely not employing kinetic airpower on its own, separate campaign outside of MNC-I or ISAF's fight. That there has been no consistent gnashing of teeth over the lack of CAS by ground commanders is a testament to the effectiveness of the CAOC in meeting these requests. The fact is, the 'surge' of airpower to Iraq is as a result of the 'surge' of JTARs due to the current offensive, not because USAF senior leadership is trying to win battles inside the beltway. Check out the following link for a more complete picture, [URL="http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0215/Articles/ResponsetoIsAirForceCommandandControlOverlyCentral ized.html"]

To the hearts and minds vs. collateral damage points from LawVol, I completely agree. However, in my experience collateral damage (and fratracide) resulting from airpower carries with it a bigger stigma than collateral damage resulting from ground forces. I have not been able to find the statistics, but I would hazard a very educated guess that there have been more civilians killed as a result of stray M-4, SAW, Bradley, DPICMS et. al. fires than from errant bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The point is, and I think we both agree, that the so-called traditional American way of war that involves maneuver supported by fires may not be the solution in an IW conflict, regardless of where those fires come from. Every dead civilian as a result of coalition fires means a step closer to success for the insurgents. Unless we fundamentally change how we approach the fight and significantly limit our fires, regardless of the source, we will always have trouble winning hearts and minds. I for one, though, would find it hard to tell a company commander with troops in contact to maneuver without supporting fires as he was taking casualties.

Cavguy
08-10-2007, 06:02 PM
As for a show of force, I'm not sure we're actually getting a positive return on that. Our insurgent enemies do not seem to care about a show of force.


Okay, I have to call you on this as out of your experience lane. The "show of force" is actually effective in tactical operations. Once the enemy knows airpower is overhead, and ready for use, he breaks contact. We even used a show of force to stop a AQIZ attack on a friendly Sunni tribe east of Ramadi in late '06. We didn't have good enough PID to bomb or forces in the area, so we opted for a show of force. As soon as the insurgents got buzzed, they began displacing. We followed them and rolled them up.

Many a ground commander, including myself, has used a show of force when dropping a bomb is impractical or we detect something suspicious with no troops nearby. If you've ever been buzzed by a jet in the middle of a fight, it's bone shaking.

Kind of like my avatar's quote about paint rounds, "It scares the hell out of people". (but doesn't make "pretty pictures")

Tom Odom
08-10-2007, 06:13 PM
Kind of like my avatar's quote about paint rounds, "It scares the hell out of people". (but doesn't make "pretty pictures")

What's with all the negative waves, Moriarity?:D

Cavguy
08-10-2007, 06:14 PM
The only reason we employ kinetic airpower in Iraq or Afghanistan is because a ground commander requested CAS, not because the USAF is fighting its own fight.


Exactly right. I would also add that it is not a decision taken willy-nilly, it takes A LOT of approval to drop a bomb. Obviously I can't get into specifics of what level currently approves, but I will say commanders themselves are the most hesitant to drop it. But when a unit is pinned down and taking casualties, a well placed PGM employed effectively is the best way to minimize casualties for us and for civilians. No one is dropping bombs as a first resort in Iraq, I assure you. And there's a lot of places we just won't drop no matter who's in contact.

I also can say a F-15E dropped JDAM ended a fight with insurgents that killed one and wounded two of my soldiers. The bomb imploded the house, and didn't touch the ones next to it, because of the delay. Prior to that, we had fired 3 Hellfires, tank rounds, and lots of small arms into the suburban area concrete reinforced structure the enemy was in. The JDAM used the trick. It's easy to sit here on the forum and criticize those dropping bombs - but if it was your soldiers chewed up and pinned down, you'd thank God for that CAS every day. I had the option of dropping the bomb on the structure before my soldier was killed trying to clear it, and didn't for collateral damage fears. Once he was killed and we took wounded getting him out, it just wasn't worth more casualties to do what a bomb could do for us.

Cavguy
08-10-2007, 06:30 PM
What's with all the negative waves, Moriarity?:D

"To you, a hero is some sort of sandwich, not some nut who takes on three Tigers!"

I just love that movie. I am sure Ted Turner does too, hence it shows at least twice a month on TBS/TNT.

All tankers secretly want to be Oddball. :eek:

Tom Odom
08-10-2007, 06:47 PM
It's easy to sit here on the forum and criticize those dropping bombs - but if it was your soldiers chewed up and pinned down, you'd thank God for that CAS every day.

Cav,

No one on this forum or this site makes light of casualties or the decisions regarding the use of aerial weapons. This forum is for discussion, however, from all sides.

I have written my own perspective on this for SWJ magazine. I still say there is no such thing as a collateral casualty in COIN. They are friendly or they are enemy and that means extremely selective targeting as you have alluded to. In his post Jim Stratton makes very close the same point regarding careful use of aerial weapons.

But at the same time, there are serious debates ongoing in OEF on this subject. It is not as I have said on other forums with LawVol and others discussing this an Air Force problem--it is an all service problem and ultimately it is a ground commander's decision as you state below.

Meanwhile AF leaders like MG Peck have used dismissive language in the recent past regarding consideration of collateral damage. The use of the term IW with COIN as a subcategory may clarify things; it may only add confusion because in the case of MG Peck's latest discussion he talks much about IW and little about COIN.

Finally I would also say there is a countervailing trend from certain Air Force and Naval Air senior leaders about the misuse of aerial platforms in non-lethal roles. Specifically the use of sensors on the platforms for counter-IED suveliiance. Those leaders describe this effort as largely wasted. At the same time I would suspect those sorties are rolled into the count of missions flown in support of ground operations, a figure used to support the USAF and Naval air roles in the war.

Best

Tom

Steve Blair
08-10-2007, 06:59 PM
I second Tom's comments, but would also add that I'm looking for ways that the AF can contribute in a meaningful way early in the COIN effort without having to resort to kinetic methods. If we can find different ways to use what they bring to the table (rapid mobility and a good forward presence, although with the need for a long and heavy tail if they remain in place for any length of time) we may be able to avoid ground commanders having to call for tons of CAS.

Tom's point about Peck's comments comes close to another point as well: at times the AF does muff its case when going public. As a service they focus on technology more than any other, and tend to speak the same way. This focus (I believe) tends to cause a certain amount of institutional blindness when it comes to doing things in different ways. All services suffer this to a degree (the FCS thread can be a good case in point with regard to the Army), and it doesn't help that in many cases technology is at best neutral in COIN.

If you've made your bones in a fighter or bomber, it can sometimes be a tough thing to admit that a transport MIGHT be the better option in some cases. And that's one of the things we kick around here; different ways of doing things. With AFRICOM on the horizon, it's best to kick ideas around now than learn things the hard way on the ground, IMO.

My take, anyhow.

Rob Thornton
08-10-2007, 07:12 PM
If you've made your bones in a fighter or bomber, it can sometimes be a tough thing to admit that a transport MIGHT be the better option in some cases. And that's one of the things we kick around here; different ways of doing things. With AFRICOM on the horizon, it's best to kick ideas around now than learn things the hard way on the ground, IMO.

Steve gets at the heart of it, I think we have to move past what we are doing and on to what we are beginning to understand may be required of us. In the case of lift I think we can determine some of those requirements by asking: How much? How often? What are we moving (could be lots of stuff military and commercial capacity)? Who are we moving it for? Where are we moving it to and from (things like infrastrucutre requirements come to mind)?

It may not be all organic. It might not be all air lift. Certainly, its not the only thing we want the AF to do for us (U.S.)

This is obviously not something that is just an AF issue. It is probably one of the reasons the services have to do some soul searching and hash out missions and roles. Its also a good that the discussion will be facillitated by the HASC. We have to start the discussion about matching policy with strategic & operational cabilities/capacity.

LawVol
08-10-2007, 07:13 PM
Okay, I have to call you on this as out of your experience lane. The "show of force" is actually effective in tactical operations. Once the enemy knows airpower is overhead, and ready for use, he breaks contact. We even used a show of force to stop a AQIZ attack on a friendly Sunni tribe east of Ramadi in late '06. We didn't have good enough PID to bomb or forces in the area, so we opted for a show of force. As soon as the insurgents got buzzed, they began displacing. We followed them and rolled them up.

Many a ground commander, including myself, has used a show of force when dropping a bomb is impractical or we detect something suspicious with no troops nearby. If you've ever been buzzed by a jet in the middle of a fight, it's bone shaking.

Kind of like my avatar's quote about paint rounds, "It scares the hell out of people". (but doesn't make "pretty pictures")

Okay, my comments regardng a show of force were in response to Culpepper's comments about a large air force as a show of force. I was speaking strategically. At that level, our show of force accomplishes very little. The enemy still pursues its goals and still seeks engagement. Sure it saves alot of lives in CAS, but that is not what I was talking about.


It's easy to sit here on the forum and criticize those dropping bombs - but if it was your soldiers chewed up and pinned down, you'd thank God for that CAS every day.


No one is dropping bombs as a first resort in Iraq, I assure you. And there's a lot of places we just won't drop no matter who's in contact.

First, I'll echo Tom Odom's comment that no one, including me, is making light of casualties; although I'll state that I shouldn't have to make this comment; as you do, I serve my country and grieve at every loss. That being said, the two comments seem, at first to contradict one another. They do, however, make my point. At the tactical level, it is easy to overlook the overall objective. The strategic level permits those not directly under fire to make decisions that those under fire cannot appreciate. This is probably why you cannot get CAS occasionally.

Tom: for the record, I used the term civilian casualties. I remembered our last conversation about this term vs. collateral damage.:D

Jim Stratton
08-10-2007, 07:34 PM
I second Tom's comments, but would also add that I'm looking for ways that the AF can contribute in a meaningful way early in the COIN effort without having to resort to kinetic methods. If we can find different ways to use what they bring to the table (rapid mobility and a good forward presence, although with the need for a long and heavy tail if they remain in place for any length of time) we may be able to avoid ground commanders having to call for tons of CAS.

Tom's point about Peck's comments comes close to another point as well: at times the AF does muff its case when going public. As a service they focus on technology more than any other, and tend to speak the same way. This focus (I believe) tends to cause a certain amount of institutional blindness when it comes to doing things in different ways. All services suffer this to a degree (the FCS thread can be a good case in point with regard to the Army), and it doesn't help that in many cases technology is at best neutral in COIN.

Steve, I recently sent one of my officers on a deployment to JTF-HOA, and as you are probably well aware, he related how all the services there are "contributing in a meaningful way early in the COIN effort without having to resort to kinetic methods." Efforts in the Pacific (PI, Indonesia, etc.) in support of OEF are doing the same things. The ANG's State Partnership Program is also a great example. Almost every state ANG bureau is partnered with a nation around the world and they hold bi-lateral exercises and support in crisis situations. So, I'd say the AF is already doing what you call for in many ops that aren't on the front page of the NY Times.

Here's my problem with what you call "institutional blindness" in the USAF. Certainly within the service, and without if what I've read on this site reflects widespread views of the AF, there is an effort to doctrinally define how the AF can contribute to COIN. That's too narrowly focused. If all USAF officers are expected to do is elaborate on how our service can contribute, we're ceding the intellectual debate on how to do COIN in general to others. USAF officers bring a unique vision to problem solving as a result of service culture and upbringing, and not applying that vision to the wider problem of solving the tactical, operational, and strategic problems presented by COIN hurts the national effort towards designing effective COIN campaigns. There are lots of reasons why this is and as a 17 year serving officer I'm well aware of them

Culpeper
08-10-2007, 07:44 PM
"To you, a hero is some sort of sandwitch, not some nut who takes on three Tigers!"

I just love that movie. I am sure Ted Turner does too, hence it shows at least twice a month on TBS/TNT.

All tankers secretly want to be Oddball. :eek:

Oddball: Well, yeah, man, you see, like, all the tanks we come up against are bigger and better than ours, so all we can hope to do is, like, scare 'em away, y'know. This gun is an ordinary 76mm but we add this piece of pipe onto it, and the Krauts think, like, maybe it's a 90mm. We got our own ammunition, it's filled with paint. When we fire it, it makes pretty pictures, scares the hell outta people! And we have a loudspeaker, when we go into battle we play music, very loud. It kind of... calms us down.

Cavguy
08-10-2007, 07:49 PM
First, I'll echo Tom Odom's comment that no one, including me, is making light of casualties; although I'll state that I shouldn't have to make this comment; as you do, I serve my country and grieve at every loss.

I wasn't trying to point at anyone in specific, and I didn't mean to offend - please accept my apology. :( I was simply saying what is sterile here is not as easy on the ground. Regarding the "show of force" mission, it is a piece that is available in a toolkit.


That being said, the two comments seem, at first to contradict one another. They do, however, make my point. At the tactical level, it is easy to overlook the overall objective. The strategic level permits those not directly under fire to make decisions that those under fire cannot appreciate. This is probably why you cannot get CAS occasionally.


Yes, and that is why we need to focus on getting our junior leaders indoctrinated with the COIN mindset so they understand the implications of making that call. Everything depends on where you are fighting. In Tal Afar 2006, we only employed 4 hellfires and 1 JDAM in 10 months. In Ramadi 2006-2007, we probably did ten times that. Why? One enviornment was extremely kinetic (initially, until we flipped the tribes) and one wasn't.

What I learned there is that air and artillery PGM fires can be effective in a COIN enviornment, *if* used correctly. Should they be the first resort, or even the middle one? No. But they are a tool. Understanding the implications of each tool used in COIN is key, and then making the correct decisions.

As a step in the approval authority in Ramadi, we turned down certain munitions to units in contact for precisely those reasons. But let's not make the mistake of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Regarding FW recon for IED's, it isn't terribly effective. But I wholly support having CAS overhead. We could always get CAS on station within 15 minutes to support units in contact, even for a "show of force". In MND-N it was USAF F-15's and F-16's, in Ramadi it was AV-8's and F-18's. As long as it brought a gun and a JDAM (preferably the 250lb kind), we were happy. :D

Tom Odom
08-10-2007, 08:05 PM
Oddball: Well, yeah, man, you see, like, all the tanks we come up against are bigger and better than ours, so all we can hope to do is, like, scare 'em away, y'know. This gun is an ordinary 76mm but we add this piece of pipe onto it, and the Krauts think, like, maybe it's a 90mm. We got our own ammunition, it's filled with paint. When we fire it, it makes pretty pictures, scares the hell outta people! And we have a loudspeaker, when we go into battle we play music, very loud. It kind of... calms us down.

After having the outhouse blow up on them...


God Almighty!

You guys smell like you fell
into a dung heap.

It kind of makes you homesick, don't it?

It does kind of, doesn't it, old buddy?

Full script available at Kelly's Heroes (http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/k/kellys-heroes-script-transcript-clint.html)

Stan
08-10-2007, 08:26 PM
After having the outhouse blow up on them...



Full script available at Kelly's Heroes (http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/k/kellys-heroes-script-transcript-clint.html)

Ya know Tom, I doubt the paint trick works very well any more. Thanks for the memories and link !

Kelly and crew need to try some vintage 109s, 110s and M1s. We've improved the munitions since then :rolleyes:

Edit: Forgot the great jpeg and why the North won't go South !

slapout9
08-11-2007, 12:09 AM
LawVol, You might like this about Airpower in Small Wars.


http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/spr05/read.html

Culpeper
08-11-2007, 05:02 AM
We will never be able to prevent innocent people getting killed in an air strike. But with today's precision that number is at an all time low. As for innocent people getting killed in such things as tribal areas. Well, how much does innocent count for? I mean some of these tribes do love a good fight. So much so that they can certainly and inadvertently end up with a bomb on their roofs. Nobody says we have to be fair in all our fights. If Lt. Michael Murphy, Petty Officer Danny Dietz and Michael Axelson were here today they might have a thing or two to state about the opportunity cost of fighting fair in these types regions. Having too much air power in a small war may be a jagged little pill to swallow and if that means the opposing force doing what comes natural and manipulate mistakes that may result than we will just have to take the pain. There is no rule that states that we must win on all fronts. Air power ends up saving lives in the long term. And not just life on our side of the barrel. In hindsight using "The Bomb" on Japan may be viewed by many as a huge mistake and a gross misuse of air power. But at the time it was a necessary evil and who knows it may come to that again. And I would bet some of us in America and a whole lot of people in Japan would have never been born if we hadn't dropped them. I realize that throwing in the A-Bomb as a compare and contrast for a small wars topic may be too much but I think everyone can at least catch my drift. The Japanese culture at that time was just way too aggressive. Sort of like certain factions of Islamic culture today. The Japanese were cutting off heads then and today it is these fanatics. If people can't figure out that it is because of them that our bombs are falling in their backyard than more power to them. There is nothing we can do about that other than what we are currently doing. Which is make an effort to minimize injuring and killing innocent people with air power. And I believe we do this at the loss of life on our own side. That is our true opportunity cost and the one I value the most. I dread hearing that innocent women and children were killed alongside the enemy. I dread even worse finding out that we suffered a loss because we gave something or someone the benefit of the doubt to prevent the loss of innocent life for this is what we do best.

Tom Odom
08-11-2007, 01:39 PM
We will never be able to prevent innocent people getting killed in an air strike. But with today's precision that number is at an all time low. As for innocent people getting killed in such things as tribal areas. Well, how much does innocent count for?

In WWII which you next bring up, you may be right.


In COIN, the "innocent" are the objective of the fight. If killing them amounts to an "OOPS" and no more, then plan on staying there because you are creating targets as you go,

In a strategic sense, indifference to such casualties--particularly in a COIN--is disastrous as an IO. Eeven in WWII, we did make the effort to portray the day bombing in Germany as precision where the Brits went to area bombing. Of course in the Pacific, it was a different war with an different culture and after LeMay took over it became total.

Tom