Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare [Archive]

LawVol

08-07-2007, 01:00 PM

This is a good article and quite clearly articulates the value of airpower's direct approach. However, I've read this before; not the document, the idea. Gen Dunlap has essentially said the same thing before and I know I've read it elsewhere.

This idea continues to emphasize airpower's lethal role to the near exclusion of its non-lethal role. To be sure, Gen Peck provided an outstanding discussion of how ISR, electronic warfare and the like contribute to the Irregular warfare fight, but his application of these skill sets is in support of airpower's lethal application. Read through the article again and you will see this. I counted one sentence that specifically addresses the true nature of COIN. It said:

By providing humanitarian assistance, medical support, and transportation for government officials to remote areas, airpower can promote the government’s credibility and improve the quality of life for its population.

If airpower is to play a significant and meaninful role in COIN, we must move past its lethal approach (which will necessarily be needed) to an approach wherein the indirect application of airpower is more than an afterthought. For example, less emphasis on lethal platforms might allow us to increase our airlift capability. This, in turn, might allow us to avoid some/all road convoys or provide some/more humanitarian assistance. Additionally, perhaps some of the money saved could go towward increasing our skills in law enforcement, construction, BEAR base capabilities and the like. This would permit the AF to take up some slack for our overworked ground forces. We have the capabilities to do civil affairs/humanitarian assitance type operations, but need to devote resources to this. Airlifting a combination construction and law enforcement team into a town on the heels of combat operation would make more of a difference is future stability than bombs on target.

The general's emphasis on developing "adaptive, creative, and knowledgeable" airmen is a breath of fresh air. I sincerely believe that we need people willing to challenge tradition in the spirit of improving our Air Force's ability to deliver more sovereign options in the fight ahead of us. And it is in this spirit that I respectfully offer my thoughts.

That being said, I do believe in the centralized control of airpower. Too many people ask for a specific platform rather than simply telling the expert what they are trying to acheive.

Tom Odom

08-07-2007, 01:08 PM

Ok I read the article. It is a catalog of buzz words and listing of ill-defined capabilities. Also I would say that General Peck was the guy who remarked that 3-24 showed too much concern over civilian casualties. See this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2351&highlight=Peck)

The Air Force wasn’t thrilled about the Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency document, which the service said gave short shrift to airpower’s capabilities, as proved in the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Maj. Gen. Allen G. Peck, commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, Ala., said he had seen the doctrine penned by Petraeus and Amos, and said that it reflected “a very two-dimensional view of how to fight a counterinsurgency.” If airmen had written it, it would be “different,” Peck observed.

The Air Force provides “maneuver” capabilities by backing up ground troops with kinetic and nonkinetic means, Peck noted.

The Air Force is working on its own COIN doctrine and is proposing to the Pentagon that a joint doctrine be developed. The Air Force version is on a fast track to be finished in August. The service is simultaneously pushing for a joint doctrine.

When that process is under way, “it will be helpful for us to have our Air Force doctrine in hand,” he said.

USAF agrees with Petraeus and Amos that air mobility is a powerful “asymmetric” capability and certainly endorses the view that ISR—air and space-based systems alike—are critical.

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

Steve Blair

08-07-2007, 01:26 PM

Ok I read the article. It is a catalog of buzz words and listing of ill-defined capabilities. Also I would say that General Peck was the guy who remarked that 3-24 showed too much concern over civilian casualties. See this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2351&highlight=Peck)

I stuck up a blog comment, but I agree that this is a collection of buzzwords that have been said before by others.

The AF really needs to break out of its centralized roles and missions mold and look beyond what's been done before and their own interests and see what they can bring to the table for COIN. I'm honestly not sure if the older generation officers can do it...it will be up to the folks in LawVol's group and some of the kids I see pass through there to put those changes forward.

You have hit on an interesting point, LawVol, with mention of airlifted civic action/construction teams. While airlift has its own limitations, it makes an outstanding surge or quick impact tool. Red Horse-type teams could be lifted into an area in the immediate aftermath of a battle or natural disaster to at least begin reconstruction. Medical teams would accompany them for immediate work. I'd envision a handoff to Army or Marine teams within a few days or weeks, but the AF's ability to airlift these assets makes them an ideal "first responder" type component for COIN.

As for Peck's "hand-wringing about collateral damage"...how would HE feel if the police smashed up his car in the process of giving him a parking ticket? It's only collateral damage....:)

LawVol

08-08-2007, 06:27 PM

I see a great "first responder" role for the AF in COIN operations that could take up alot of slack for the USMC/USA. The availability of airlift (a form of airpower even if some don't really want to emphasize it) means that AF assets can be inserted immediately into a given area to act as a stop gap and address emergency needs.

Imagine if you will a scenario wherein appropriate AF units are air lifted into a town in the immediate aftermath of combat operations. As green forces clear and move through this town, blue forces come in and establish law and order (something I'm writing on now), give medical care, begin to rebuild/repair infrastructure, etc. I wonder what difference this would have made in Iraq if used and planned for?

These are the things the AF needs to think about when it talks about the felxibility of airpower. Airpower's reach can extend much farther than a plane's wingtips.

slapout9

08-08-2007, 06:54 PM

LawVol,we already have one of these it is called the 82ND Airborne Divison. :)

Steve Blair

08-08-2007, 07:03 PM

LawVol,we already have one of these it is called the 82ND Airborne Divison. :)

LawVol's got a good point about using AF assets as immediate follow-on tools, kinda like the Navy uses Seabees. The 82nd's a combat asset (and in theory the national reserve strike force) so it's not likely to be used in that way unless there's no other real option (like now).

On the other hand, the AF has assets that either aren't being used or not put to the best use they could be at this time. That, IMO, has more to do with the institutional outlook regarding assets. It's not a combat asset unless it can deliver some sort of ordnance (or spot for another asset that can deliver ordnance). This ignores the great impact airlift and airlifted assets can have in the total COIN environment. It may not have staying power, but that's not the point. It does have the ability to get needed supplies and tools to an area as soon as they're needed, and can be replaced by follow-on forces as they become available.

Air power advocates need to stop talking about full spectrum and actually do it. Airlift and "first responder" construction, medical, and relief forces are an important part of that spectrum.

slapout9

08-08-2007, 07:22 PM

Steve Blair

08-08-2007, 07:32 PM

Steve, that was meant to be kind of tongue in cheek. LawVol has excellent ideas. When his article gets published you will see. On a more serious note the process he is describing is basic Airborne Warfare close to what happed in Operation Powerpack in 65 in the Dominican Republic. Establish an Airhead and then bring in Airlanded reinforcements.

I know what you were up to, slap.....:D

And yeah, I know the airborne theory as well. It's just that over time the 82nd has changed focus somewhat, and I do think the AF is in a better position now (or could be in a better position) to use their non-combat assets to good advantage. That, and their position on collateral damage might change if they have to repair some of it....;)

Tom Odom

08-08-2007, 07:46 PM

LawVol,

Look at the chapter from my book that is on here on Op Support Hope (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v3/odom_journey.htm). The JTF was a no-BS joint effort using a USAF ALCE, AF medical, Army logistics, infantry, and C2. We also integrated SOF planning and other agencies, international organizations, French military, and NGOs.

Biggest issues of concern were:

Fuel consumption in the region--the French drained Africa with their contract Russian and Ukranian airlift. AMC ended up sending tankers to resupply certain fields as well as inflight refueling.

Infrastructure: Goma has a C5/AN124 capable airfield. That said tarmac space was very limited especially for wide bodies. This space dictated what could come in and when it could land.

Secondary issue was A/C handling. We had some MHE that the USAF initial team brought in. I had an AF Captain run a fork loader for nearly 72 hours straight until I had to order him to stand down and sleep. Also we really needed a "base in a box" concept for austere conditions. Stan worked the deal where we agreed to scrape an area clean of feces and bodies for a base camp.

C2--French radar and controllers working fist in face with Zairian controllers joined by US air controllers. Talk to Stan on here--he worked out the deal that got them all to work together. No small feat that and not an uncommon problem. US and UN air coordinators did the same over inside Rwanda at Kigali.

Security--not in the defense sense but in the ability to secure the airfield from 1.5 million refugees who were quite willing to chase jets on the ground to get a free lunch :eek:

hope that helps a bit

Tom

LawVol

08-08-2007, 08:57 PM

That, and their position on collateral damage might change if they have to repair some of it....;)

I actually laughed out loud when I read this one.

I also think that employing AF assets as "first responders" can be quite useful in future operations. If they could help in Iraq, they might aslo be useful in purely humanitarian situation like Darfur. The problem is that, for all the talk of thinking outside the box (or container for the pilots out there), we're not doing this. We need to look at an asset and ask, how can we use it for our mission rather than simply saying a particular asset is for x.

Tom, thanks for the tip. I'll check it out. The base in a box concept is essentially what our BEAR base teams do. They are based out of Holloman, NM and can deploy anywhere to set up a base from scratch. From what I know, they set up shop to get things going until our civil engineering folks can get something more permanent.

Slapout, in my world, jumping out of an airplane means someone screwed up!:D

slapout9

08-08-2007, 10:17 PM

LawVol, I agree that is why "Battlefield Airman" should go to jump school to learn how to be "Sky Soldiers."

LawVol

08-22-2007, 07:50 PM

Thanks for the suggetsion. It was an interesting read and nice to read something demonstrating how non-lethal airpower can have a positive effect (although, unless I misread, it appears that most was not USAF airlift; what a shame).

Too bad about the beer. It sounded like your JAG didn't want to do the work necessary to keep the good will gesture in play. There's nearly always a way to make it work, if the JAG takes the time to figure it out. I could've come up with a solution in two or three (may be four) beers.:D

carl

08-24-2007, 01:38 AM

I hope this is germane to this thread, but there is a need in the Congo that perhaps the Air Force could help with.

There were many more dirt and grass airstrips than you might imagine throughout the country. Many have fallen into disrepair or become overgrown to the point they can't be used even by light airplanes like a Caravan; or if we could get a Caravan in there it was with a reduced load. At some of these places, the people knew the importance of having a good runway but they didn't know what to do or how to do it. I could only give general suggestions and couldn't stay to oversee the work in any event (it is very important to have somebody there to watch over things.)

What if the Air Force put a blue suit version of Stan over there, somebody who knew what it took to improve a runway to the point an AN-26 could use it. He could stay around for a year or two fixing up strips. It wouldn't cost much money if only hand tools were used. There is plenty of labor available.

The benefits would be many. The towns would be connected to the outside world which makes a titanic difference to the economy. The people would know the Americans had something to do with improving the runway which could help us in the future. The Air Force would have a man who would have learned the countryside and the people in it, not just the capital and the big airports. And, I imagine if a strip could take an AN-26, it could take a Herc.

I saw this work once when USAAMRID set up some docs in Kole to do research. The strip wouldn't allow a Caravan to take off fully loaded, so the AAMRID logistics prep guy went to the store in Kinshasa, bought a bunch of handtools and wheelbarrows and flew them out to Kole. He recruited a work force and some supervisors locally, stayed for a few days to get things started and voila. In a few weeks they had a good strip (the docs kept an eye on things till it was done.) All this for less than $2,000 set up by a guy who couldn't speak French.

This wouldn't be Mach 2 yankin' and bankin', but it would be something the Air Force would be uniquely qualified to do that would benefit the Congolese and the Americans.

Steve Blair

08-24-2007, 12:51 PM

That would certainly be a good mission for them! To date, most AF FID/COIN-type stuff I've seen deals more with advising pilots and setting up air forces. But I can see no reason why they shouldn't be interested in helping set up or repair an air-friendly infrastructure.

LawVol

08-24-2007, 02:17 PM

Rob Thornton

08-24-2007, 02:45 PM

LV,
Sounds like a good idea. It could be tied to a number of transportation infrastructure improvements aimed at improving mobility and access for humanitarian operations and economic developments. Working with NGOs, IOs and member states you might even be able to form a partnership that could facilitate future projects. AN economy of force effort that builds confidence and capacity.
Regards, Rob

Steve Blair

08-24-2007, 03:07 PM

Our RED HORSE folks could do this. While they normally are into heavy contruction and build full up runways, I would think they could easily build/repair hasty runways that could serve not only the needs of the local population, but could serve as emergency runways for future operations. Here is the Global Security version of what RED HORSE does. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/redhorse.htm

I like the idea and I think it fits perfectly into what I think is the key for the "long war." There is much talk in the combat arms about prepping the battlefield, but we seem to ignore this at the strategic level. Having recently set up AFRICOM, it would seem that the powers that be realize this will be a front in that war. Since this war will likely continue along the COIN continuum and the key to COIN is the people, why not prep the battlefield with them in mind? By helping the people now you accomplish several goals: good PR for humanitarian ops, hopefully help the people realize we're not the bad guys, give training to your units, create contingency airfields, bases, or whatever, and maybe prevent some conditions that lead to terrorism. Sure it'll be expensive as the projects start to accumulate, but certainly cheaper than not doing it and sending in combat troops later.

I knew Red Horse had that kind of capability. Using them for that sort of role would be good for all the reasons you point out AND it would create an environment that would be conducive to stability and internal airlift mobility. So much of the AF doctrine in this area seems to be directed toward making "mini-me" air forces that this might be too far "outside the box" for some. A shame, because it gives the AF a strong reason and capability to be involved in the non-kinetic side of COIN. In fairness, some of this may already be happening on a small scale, but it needs to move toward the center of AF COIN theory (IMO) and not reside in the dark corners.

Adam L

09-07-2007, 05:02 PM

I know I am skipping back a few coments and I must admit I haven't finished all of the material being discussed. I understand the imprtance and utility of airpower in COIN operations, but is the Air Force best suited to this? Should in fact the Army be allowed to obtain certain fixed wing capabilites exclusive to close air support and certain transport capabilities? I know this is probably going to piss off a lot of Air Force guys, but I am still a little perplexed about the choices in the structure and duties of the services. I understand the need for the Air Force in that it ensures that a service will dedicate sufficient funding to air power and research, but should this be limited to air supremacy, transport and larger ordinance bombing, particularily nuclear?

jcustis

09-07-2007, 05:20 PM

Adam,

I'd say you have a good case for the Air Force to play a supporting role, but not be the lead agent for COIN air requirements. The counter to that, however, is that COIN air support has been ably provided by air forces in the past, so there are precedents. It may simply be a matter of getting the supporting/supported elements on the same sheet of music.

BTW, nice pic of the SAS Willy Jeep.

Van

09-07-2007, 06:04 PM

Adam,
Once upon a time, there were Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Strategic Air Command (SAC). If I'm following your argument correctly, you're asking 'Why doesn't the AF to SAC stuff and the Army take back TAC?'

To an extent, this is a defacto situation. The Army has some short range fixed wing airlift, and CAS capabilities in the form of the AH-64 Apache and other attack helicopters. The AF has the big stuff; nukes, space stuff, stealth aircraft, long range airlift like the C-17s etc. AF Fixed wing CAS is already closely coordinated with Army folks through the Air Operations Center (AOC) which has an Army element participating in the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) process. In short (and probably over simplified) a mess of CAS is at the joint land forces component commander's disposal already.

In COIN, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, communications (much space based), and mobility are the AF's big strategic contributions, as well as operating as a 'firebase in the sky'. Given the AF's internal politics (the majority of the general officers being fighter pilots) this doesn't sit well, as it causes people to question the value of the F-22. Ironically, the ISR, Comm, and mobility capabilities provided by the AF are staggering advantages for us in COIN, and make the AF's contribution to current ops absolutely essential to any chance for success, even though their contribution doesn't get the big air play in the media (hence support from elected officials). These poor folks are between a rock and a hard spot trying to balance what Congress is forcing on them, their internal culture, the needs of COIN, and vigilence against future competitors in air power.

I've met GEN Peck but haven't spoken with him much, and I know one of his peers at AU, GEN Miller and have spoken with him a bit. GEN Miller is the smartest fighter pilot I've ever met, and consistently demonstrates a thoughtful long range vision not limited by service parochialisms. I would be very curious how much GEN Peck talked about this article with GEN Miller, as it demonstrates a similar level of thought and consideration to that consistently displayed by GEN Miller. GEN Peck was trying to strike a balance between the ugly realities of small wars and the needs of the Air Force to preserve its capabilities for conventional exercise of airpower. Given the bigger considerations of the AF, I think he did a pretty good job.

I was especially impressed with the penultimate section; "Developing Airmen for Irregular Warfare". For a pilot to emphasize the need for developing people is a bit of a change as they normally focus on their air machines. Stressing the development of leaders and human capabilities in the Air Force is a step in the right direction, and I hope the AF acts on these thoughts.

Not bad for the successors of Army officers like Carl Spaatz and "Hap" Arnold (had to let the Army voice out of its box after talking Joint for so long :) )

Adam L

09-08-2007, 08:08 AM

In repsonse to Van:

Not really. What I was asking is why close air support (most effectively A10's) and any aircraft which is necessary for COIN operations are not available to the Army. I believe this is only to become more of an issue as I strongly believe that there will again be propellared support aircraft in service. They will most likely be operated and maintained near the front. Recent aviation diesel technology advances will allow it to use fuel used by almost any vehicle. Within 10 years we could have a scenario where an aircraft and small support crew are indeed attached to individual companies. I do believe the AF should be repsonsible for most of the issues you mentioned. I believe the AF should focus on air supremacy, transport and larger ordinance bombing. On the other hand the army should never be forced to, as in Vietnam, purchase fixed wing craft against congressional spending rules.

Generals Peck and Miller may be excellent examples of the kind of men needed to ensure inter-service cooperation, but unfortunately men of their caliber can not be ensured. That is what I am concerned.

In repsone to jcustis:

Able is not always what it should be. Also, getting people on the same page as I am sure you know and have experience with is no small task. This is especially so when you have generals on either side having a a pissing contest. Whether more men have died meaninglessly because of generals incompitence or arrogance is unkown. We only have to look at the last fifty years to see this. The goal of this concept is to accomplish what the creation of the AF was supposed to do, reduce inter-service fighting.

TWC

09-08-2007, 07:34 PM

In repsonse to Van:

Not really. What I was asking is why close air support (most effectively A10's) and any aircraft which is necessary for COIN operations are not available to the Army. I believe this is only to become more of an issue as I strongly believe that there will again be propellared support aircraft in service. They will most likely be operated and maintained near the front.

Adam,

What is the problem you are trying to solve? Van presented the current joint solution pretty well, so what is the issue? I see two major problems with your thoughts:

1. I don't believe the next 10-15 years is going to have massive amounts of US ground forces employed around the world executing COIN operations...instead (and this is backed up by national security documents) we should prepare for numerous small teams of US forces conducting FID (including ground, maritime, and aviation FID) around the world to help other partner nations execute their own COIN/CT operations. Therefore, why conduct another drastic overhaul of Army force structure for a situation that is not expected to be encountered.

2. Are you saying that current US Army field units are not being properly supported by the air component (both USAF and USN)? The only reason I can see a requirement for change is if the status quo isn't working.....and I think it is (there have been numerous studies that support that point as well).

Bottom Line: COIN is hard and the Army has a large challenge in organizing, training, equipping, and employing ground forces to handle irregular warfare...while still being able to counter major combat operations (FCS anyone). I think the last thing our nation needs is to make the US Army a COIN-only force, and instead we must always operate in a joint interdependent team. (i'll step down off my soapbox now:-)

Adam L

09-08-2007, 09:28 PM

First

1. I don't believe the next 10-15 years is going to have massive amounts of US ground forces employed around the world executing COIN operations...instead (and this is backed up by national security documents) we should prepare for numerous small teams of US forces conducting FID (including ground, maritime, and aviation FID) around the world to help other partner nations execute their own COIN/CT operations. Therefore, why conduct another drastic overhaul of Army force structure for a situation that is not expected to be encountered.

1. I do not believe we will have massive amounts of US ground forces involved in many conflicts. I believe that we will have US forces conducting FID around the world in supprot of other nations COIN.CT efforts. This I think is given.

2. I believe that we will be forced to conduct operations in many nations (especially African nations with out legitimate governments) without their consent. In those cases we will most likely be using a small force of men. Air support will be crucial. Looking at the history of many such operations conduct by many nations is that top heavy commands that integrate forces or different sections of services have caused problems.

2. Are you saying that current US Army field units are not being properly supported by the air component (both USAF and USN)? The only reason I can see a requirement for change is if the status quo isn't working.....and I think it is (there have been numerous studies that support that point as well).

Yes and No.

1. I beleive that all efforts and capabilities are being exhausted in support and have been adequite.

2. With the exception of A10's and C130's current fixed wing aircraft are too fast to give supprot in an urban environment. They also can not take abuse. The F35 (when it enters service) with its composite construction will be a write off with even small hits. It is almost impossible to repair carbon fiber peices in this case. A single scratch or bullet hole no matter how insignificant WILL lead to structural failure unless dealt with. Composite material are unimaginably strong and can deal with unimaginable streses, but not shock. Due to the high cost of the construction and repair of these aircraft Congress will not take kindly to losing any.

3. Helicopters are very effective but have thier limitations especially in endurance and capacity. They are slower flying and more vulnerable to ground fire. Due to the inherent instability of their design they are difficult to keep aloft when severly damaged.

4. Although ordinance like the JDAM are impressive they are far from perfect, and a 2000 lb. bomb that misses can kill a lot of non-combatants. Any bomb guided or unguided will be more accurate from lower altitude and lower speeds. Collateral damage whether from artillery shells or bombs helps the enemy.

5. I should have been more accurate in what I said. First, I do believe the Army should have more fixed-wing capabilities. Second, the USN and USMC should have A10's for CAS. With their structural rigidity, low stall speed and engine power there is no reason a variant capable of naval landings can not be developed. After a few discussions with aeronotical engineers I am convinced with a few aerodynamic tweeks it can be made capable of STOL.

6. Is the status quo working and effective? Yes Could be improved? That's why am talking about this. Please, do everthing tou can to destroy every illconcieved or illegitimate idea I have. If we come across 1 in a 1000 that you can't destroy perhaps its something to look at.

Bottom Line: COIN is hard and the Army has a large challenge in organizing, training, equipping, and employing ground forces to handle irregular warfare...while still being able to counter major combat operations (FCS anyone). I think the last thing our nation needs is to make the US Army a COIN-only force, and instead we must always operate in a joint interdependent team. (i'll step down off my soapbox now:-)

I am not saying make the US army a COIN-only force. I am saying they should have and are wing(s) that are trained specifically for the operations. Also, I am not saying the Army should go out and create its own training program. Use the AF and USN/USMC training programs and find out what works best.

I really am talking more about CAS in urban environments which are quite often COIN situations. In open battle the US Army and USAF are going to blow the hell out of anything in the way. I hold the uptmost confidence in them.

I also should note that the discussions about the development of a prop driven aircraft for COIN support is a bit tunnel visioned. Prop driven support due to its lower cost, endurance and abilites will become more prevelant in CAS. It is unlikely we will be fighting a war in the future without air supremacy (thanks to the AF.) Due to this we have to worry less about their vulnerabilities due to their low speed. Prop driven CAS aircraft can be operated and maintained much closer to the front.

Adam L

09-08-2007, 09:45 PM

I am not trying to be on a soapbox or anything, sorry if I come off that way. I am aware I am coming at everything from an odd and I must admit nieve point of view. I felt odd posting on this site initialy but after Rob's post I decided it was OK. My hope is that every idea I come up with goes down in flames. I just figure that perhaps 1 in a 1000 times it may give somebody an idea or cause them to look at something a little differently. I have a somewhat odd background. I have had the chance of meeting some very unique people over the years. I've had the privilege of meeting a lot of very interesting aeronautical engineers let alone just engineers. I admit I am probably looking at problems from fourty years ago but most of the veterans I have had the honor to known and met are from that time if not long before. I am very critical of modern technology and composites because I have worked with them and know just how fragile they are. One of my greater paranoias is that modern technology is actually devolving the military. Over the last 100 or so years the military has slowly moved away from its staunch seperation of officers and enlisted men and has realised that most of the battle is fought and won at a lower rank. With modern communication, gps and cameras I am afraid more and more officers will override the judgment calls of men in the field not understanding that they are not getting everything.

Again I am calling it paranoia. On the other hand just because you think everybody is out to get you doesn't mean they aren't. LOL.

Van

09-09-2007, 01:14 AM

jcustis

09-09-2007, 03:06 AM

PGM small diameter bombs

Saw those for the first time on that Military Channel show Weaponology. They look pretty versatile. They need to get them within payload specs for Global Hawk, Predator, and the future generation of UAVs if they are not already there.

pcmfr

09-09-2007, 06:05 PM

SOCOM is in the process of arming just about everything that flies in their inventory, both manned and unmanned, with some sort of PGM. Within a couple of years, the SOCOM CAS/ISR joint Air Force will be remarkably capable for COIN, not to mention CT.

Adam L

09-09-2007, 07:17 PM

They are certainly impressive devices and a bargain (30K a piece) for what they are. My only concern is that from the videos of their impacts that I've seen on the Military Channel, and people say there's nothing to watch with 500 channels, or any literature that I've seen on it I don't believe they were designed, more accurately programed, to significantly increase their angle of atack before impact. I am concerned about their abilites to avoid obstacles, in an urban scenario, when released from a longer distance (the claimed 60 miles.)

The fact that they have been able to get the guidance systems costs down so much is by far the largest leap made by this project.

I love the Global Hawk concept but I don't know if we want to spend $48 million a piece.

If they can get these things to fit on the Predator they have a real masterpiece.

Adam L

09-09-2007, 07:38 PM

Not much to add to the philosophical piece of the discussion, the ATO/ITO process works well, and there are enough Air Force guys who "get it" that I am confident that things will work well for the next 10-15 years.

Re: air frames - A S**t hot tactical air control party (TACP) and an on-call B-52 stacked with PGM small diameter bombs sounds like a robust CAS capability for COIN. It stays above air defense, has a good CEP, and enough payload to service a bunch of targets. The A-10 and AC-130 are awesome, but not the only tools in the kit.

How many B-52 bombers are still in service? With the empasis and publicity on UAV's and fighter-bombers how many do you think will be in service in 20 years? I don't think we even have any bomber concepts in development these days.

Also, it only takes a few at the top to screw everything up.

Ken White

09-09-2007, 08:02 PM

How many B-52 bombers are still in service? With the empasis and publicity on UAV's and fighter-bombers how many do you think will be in service in 20 years? I don't think we even have any bomber concepts in development these days.

Also, it only takes a few at the top to screw everything up.

To answer the second, probably none.

As to your first statement, see this LINK (http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123024081). Note it does not go into detail; manned / unmanned, etc.

The answer to your last statement is; true -- but no one has figured out a way to not have some folks at the top in one form or another... :wry:

Adam L

09-09-2007, 08:31 PM

I was under the impression that they killed the 2018 bomber plan about 6 months ago and that the plan is to skip this in favor of an interim concept for now, entering service in 2018 (based on either f22, x23, f35 airframe,) with a next generation bomber entering service after 2030.

I'll look for the press release I saw.

Ken White

09-09-2007, 08:42 PM

as is true with all big ticket programs. Plus, the news media are not a reliable source on that (or much of anything, for that matter...) :o

Adam L

09-09-2007, 09:26 PM

True, I can't decide who's more trustworthy the media, public relations people or politicians. They're all rotten in my book.

I am pretty sure about this though. I don't think congress was going to be willing to fund a high cost program of this sort without imediate cause to do so. Even if there was I think they would claim otherwise. Congress has turned in to one big affirmative defense trial with the battle of the "expert testimony." Only differences is instead of psychologists (we don't know what happened to the psychiatrists*) we have "experts" and "thinktank analysts." May I present you the hired guns of the 21st century.

*I understand cognative psychology(ists) and the area but I just don't trust anyone who calls themselves a "mental health proffesional" and hasn't had to spend much time with real nutcases (in the psych ward) like psychiatrists have to during residency. For that matter even the psychiatrists are going down hill today. They seem to have lost all site of the reality that sometimes common sense trumps psychobabble. Sorry, I'm on a soapbox.

Ken White

09-09-2007, 10:49 PM

Interesting and fortuitous juxtapositioning... :D

Spooky, even...

I'd say the answer to your conundrum is "all of the above."

You may be correct but hard to say what the future might hold with respect to perceived cause or need -- not to mention that Congress is usually willing to fund high cost goodies that are produced in multiple Districts. Pork is pork, whether it's in WV or Johnstown for the 'public good' or in Costa Mesa and Spartanburg for 'protection for the American way of life.' We have a long -- too long -- history of not buying an item due to Congressional failure to see a need only to buy it later in large quantities for more money...

I have a neighbor who's a practicing Psychiatrist and based on numerous conversation the last few years, she totally agrees.

Adam L

09-09-2007, 11:56 PM

I can't stand the pork. It just ain't Kosher.

Rex Brynen

09-10-2007, 12:01 AM

True, I can't decide who's more trustworthy the media, public relations people or politicians. They're all rotten in my book.

It may just be because I'm a political scientist ;) ...but I think its enormously easy to blame the "politicians" for things. Most--certainly not all, but most--that I know or have worked with show enormous commitment, energy, and intelligence.

If they appear to pander to the narrow desires of their constituents, it is because of the way we've designed the system, and because we reward at election time those that do most successfully. Surely that makes it our fault if we feel they're pursuing wrong-headed priorities.

I could offer a defence of the media as well, but I try to limit myself to one unpopular group per post :D

Ken White

09-10-2007, 01:21 AM

It may just be because I'm a political scientist ;) ...but I think its enormously easy to blame the "politicians" for things. Most--certainly not all, but most--that I know or have worked with show enormous commitment, energy, and intelligence.

If they appear to pander to the narrow desires of their constituents, it is because of the way we've designed the system, and because we reward at election time those that do most successfully. Surely that makes it our fault if we feel they're pursuing wrong-headed priorities.

I could offer a defence of the media as well, but I try to limit myself to one unpopular group per post :D

with respect to any meaningful defense. :D

I basically agree on the Politicians and the fact that much of the apparent venality of most 9nat all, as you said) is simply systemic -- in both our countries, different as the systems are. However, I think there's another factor that intrudes and is little appreciated. Their Staffs.

Most legislative staffers are hired for their nominal expertise in the area of concern, this is particularly true in the Committees of the Parliament or of congress. Most such staffers have an agenda and the legislator, lacking subject matter knowledge, is pretty much at their mercy. This has an often pernicious effect. Most often, I'd say... :rolleyes:

Adam L

09-10-2007, 02:08 AM

Yes, in our republic with its strong democratic tradition the people are too blame in the end. Still, that does not excuse the actions of politicians.

Most--certainly not all, but most--that I know or have worked with show enormous commitment, energy, and intelligence.

1) I would say that most politicians, since I don't know the politicians you have know or worked with I cannot comment on them, are above average intelligence but, they are not as far above as they used to be. Most are unaware of their own ignorace, and too many lack humility. At the time Jerold Ford was considered unintelligent for his position and now look at where we are. By todays standards he's Nixon. There used to be a higher standard.

2) Yes, the people are responsible. Too many districts are electing people who are, "One of us." Not in that they are truly from their district (unlike Hillary who is NOT a NY person) but as in being average. Districts (a long, long time ago) used to send the best they could offer. It was a point of pride. They sent the person best qualified to make decisions on their behalf. People where willing to admit their ignorance of government and the issues before it, but at the same time they took it as a matter of pride to send someone who could meaningfully contribute to government. Part of the standard for a politician used to be that they should be better than us, not in a personal sense but in their ability. Part of the reason Congress has always been filled with lawyers is because they were often the best educated and qualified. I should note that I do not believe that one necesarilly has to be that intelligent, but they must know their limits and posess humility. Reagan didn't have much up there but he somehow pulled it together by finding people who were qualified. A few good examples of people who just don't belong in politics: Mayor Nagin, Ted Kennedy, Nancy Pellosi, Harry Reid, Dan Quayle, John Ashcroft, Tren Lott and of course he who shall not be named. Like you I do not wish to be too unpopular. :D

3) Yes, the people are responsible. We only care about our district, not the country.

I could offer a defence of the media as well, but I try to limit myself to one unpopular group per post

I must admit I do have respect for the press, but unfortunately they don't exist any more. They have been devoured by the media, and giant conglomerates.

Sorry, I'm on a soapbox. Its just CNN, FOX and all of them are eating my brain and shooting the TV just doesn't help! :D

Why do we defend politicians?

If they can't defend themselves how can they defend America? :mad: LOL.

Wouldn't that be a great Anti-Campaign add.

Sorry, if I sound serious I'm not actually this rough in real life. I'm just kvetching.

Rob Thornton

10-09-2007, 10:22 PM

CHARLIE ROSE: Yes, but we what, 300, or 110 CIA and 200 special forces, the combination of that. But we had the Northern Alliance troops too.

DAVID KILCULLEN: Exactly. And my old boss, Hank Crumpton, who was a key player in that campaign, often says that, you know, the Afghans won against the Taliban. All we did was to enable them, using very flexible, agile approach, with small numbers of troops on the ground, and linking that to the (inaudible) system.

CHARLIE ROSE: And how much air power?

DAVID KILCULLEN: Well, air power -- there is a fascinating debate going on right now in the counterinsurgency community about the role of air power in counterinsurgency. Let me just -- we can talk about that later if you like. But let me just kick off that topic by saying that one of the things that Hank says is the most useful air asset they had in that period was, in fact, the C-130, that could deliver -- they could talk to a tribal leader or.

DAVID KILCULLEN: . and say, hey, what do you need? Well, people or assistance of various kinds, or food, medical supplies.

CHARLIE ROSE: And the Taliban had no means to shoot them down?

DAVID KILCULLEN: Yeah, well, they did, but we had air superiority. I mean, this is the thing. And I'm sure we're going to get into this. A lot of Army guys say, you can't solve complicated social and political problems from a flight level of 20,000 feet using guided bombs, and therefore the Air Force doesn't have a big role in counterinsurgency. OK?

That is so not true. For a start, the armies of the Western world haven't shown ourselves particularly good at solving those problems either. So it's not an air power-land power thing. It's about how we adapt to a very complicated environment.

But secondly, everything is easy if you assume air superiority. You don't need an air force to deny air superiority to a modern joint force. And you know, guys.

(CROSSTALK)

DAVID KILCULLEN: Sorry. Guys who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan will tell you that one of the most fundamental elements in that campaign was working out the system that allowed the Soviets to maneuver and operate in the hinterland of Afghanistan, and overstressing that system, particularly the air system, by the introduction of high-tech surface-to-air weapons that allowed us to essentially overstress the Soviets.

CHARLIE ROSE: Which we provided for the mujahideen?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Yes. And so you know, there's this assumption that if air power doesn't have a role in counterinsurgency. If air is doing its job right -- and you need a big air force and a powerful air force to do that -- if it's doing its job right, the ground guys shouldn't really notice it. What they should notice is the air support, the close air support for them when they are fighting the enemy. They should notice the ability to move troops around. They should notice the logistic support. But that sits under a bubble of air superiority, and I'm not -- we ignore that factor at our peril, because any smart insurgent knows that we require that, and will turn against us.

And this from SWJ’s COIN round up (http://www.afa.org/magazine/oct2007/1007edit.asp)

It is a strong presentation, showing that USAF’s thinking has deepened and matured. It delivers a sharp punch to the view that the US needs only ground forces —small, simple, and mostly suited to commando raids. Indeed, airpower is portrayed as pivotal.

This claim does not sit well with everyone. The Army and Marine Corps concept of irregular war ascribes far more value to, well, themselves. That is, to say no more, a debatable proposition.

Without question, certain valuable capabilities are unique to airpower. The doctrine paper cites three advantages that, while not always obvious, may prove vital to US success.

Minimal intrusiveness. Introduction of a large US ground force is a highly visible act, often breeding political resentment, especially in Muslim lands. US troops quickly become targets for attack by insurgent bullets, bombs, and broadcasts. This amounts to a grave weakness for a force engaged in irregular warfare, in which support of “the people” is of paramount importance.

These are two very good discussions on what Airpower can be used for in COIN. I could do without the rhetoric in the second piece:

This claim does not sit well with everyone. The Army and Marine Corps concept of irregular war ascribes far more value to, well, themselves. That is, to say no more, a debatable proposition.

However, there is some truth to it - and unfortunately service parochialism is not an uncommon attribute unique to any one institution. It does not diminish the the value of the questions and observations put forward in the larger article, and when read in conjunction with Dave Kilcullen's piece I think it provides a tool for leveraging the Joint force.

Best Regards, Rob

slapout9

10-09-2007, 10:35 PM

Rex Brynen

10-09-2007, 11:20 PM

Quick thoght for everyone my sources say the Air Force is looking at the British position in Iraq in 1919 and how Air Power was used to allow a final settlement. They think Air Power could be used in a similar way in the current Iraq situation.

Presumably they're well aware that this largely involved the punitive bombing of civilians. To quote future Air Marshal Arthur "Bomber" Harris from his time as an RAF squadron leader during the Iraqi uprising (http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,939608,00.html):

"The Arab and Kurd now know", reported Squadron Leader Harris after several such raids, "what real bombing means within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out, and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured, by four or five machines which offer them no real target, no opportunity for glory as warriors, no effective means of escape."

Tom Odom

10-10-2007, 12:43 AM

Hi Rob and everyone else, I will posts some more later tonight I still have afew things to attend to. But like MacArthur I shall return. Quick thoght for everyone my sources say the Air Force is looking at the British position in Iraq in 1919 and how Air Power was used to allow a final settlement. They think Air Power could be used in a similar way in the current Iraq situation.

Presumably they also look at it as a case of pure suppression in the name of maintaining the Empire--it worked when you could get away with for a while. But Iraq never became a stable gem in the imperial crown. Johnny Frost (2d Para--Arnhem) begins his memoirs discussing how screwed up RAF policy was in Iraq prior to WWII.

Then in certain quarters we beat up the evolution of the Baath movement and wonder where it got some of its ties to Hitler's Germany. I mean really the Iraqis had every reason to absolutely love the British the same way the Egyptians did. We could in a similar vein cast Hiroshima and Nagasaki as pre-emptive COIN via airpower.

Anyway, Slap hope things are OK fpr you and yours

Best

Tom

slapout9

10-10-2007, 01:12 AM

Hi All, back for a little while. I don't think the Air Force has a real Air Power theory. I think part of them have a Bomber theory and part of them have a Fighter theory, but since Warden retired they have lost what was becoming a general theory of military power but that has changed rather dramatically. I think it is on page 111 (The Air Campaign) where Warden list 5 general circumstances where Air Power should be and should not be used as the main force. Two instances in particular: If a land objective needs to seized fast, ground forces are the key force, the second is a guerrilla war where Air Power doesn't have anything to target in the traditional since.

Thanks Tom, things are starting to level out.

Here is a link to chapter 9 of "The Air Campaign" for some reason the pages are not numbered, so scroll down to the section on Sea Power to read the section I was refering to. The whole chapter is good if you want to read all of it to really get the point.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp09.htm

Steve Blair

10-10-2007, 01:15 PM

Actually, Slap, I think you're mistaken about the Air Force and the air power theory. What we've been seeing since McPeak and Desert Storm/Gulf War I is a regression to the classic air power theory...that is, a unified air force that is capable of destroying any opponent and achieving victory cheaply through the air. Don't forget that Mitchell was a proponent of integrated air power, even though it's his bomber experiments that got him the most notice. Spaatz was also a unified air guy, and LeMay pushed to absorb TAC in the late 1950s (though it was more for a diversified atomic strike capability). They've been adding new layers (space and cyberspace), but the idea has remained very consistent since the early days.

Warden was more articulating a general theory of application, but it was very much in line with the core air power theory. If you notice, they don't really change the way they do business...they look for ways to fit current affairs into that business structure. Again...for many it's a matter of finding targets for ordnance.

It's a shame, too, because there is some innovative thinking that goes on in some corners of the organization (as our own LawVol has shown through his own writings). But it has yet to gain real traction in the air power sandpit.

slapout9

10-10-2007, 01:51 PM

Norfolk

10-10-2007, 03:27 PM

Hi Steve, you are right. It is just my interpretation about the bomber mafia and fighter mafia. Warden reorganized the Air Command and Staff College just before his retirement to try to implement his theory of a Unified Theory of Conflict (my interpretation) since then they have pretty much gone back to business as usual.

I feel so horn-swoggled, slapout.;)

But if Warden himself was trying to clarify things and set things right, then maybe someone down the line will pick up on his Unified Thoery of Conflict. As you know the man personally, I'm sure your take on his intentions are quite correct. There may still be hope for the Higher Air Force types and COIN. I'm just not going to hold my breath while I'm waiting for it to happen.:wry:

Steve Blair

10-10-2007, 04:27 PM

I really wish that when Warden revised "The Air Campaign" he would have done some deeper thinking and gotten rid of many of his (poor) historical examples. The thinking there is so deeply rooted in traditional Air Power talk. For example:

First, territory is a dangerous enchantress in war. Serious wars are rarely won by capturing territory, unless that territory includes a vital political or economic center of gravity, the loss of which precludes continuing the war. The capture of France in 1940, significant though it was, did not win the war for the Germans. France was not the center of gravity of the anti-Axis coalition -- even before the United States entered the conflict. After World War II, the United States, not Western Europe, became the center of gravity in any conflict between the Soviets and the western powers. Territory may well be the political objective of a campaign, but it rarely should be the military objective. Territory will be disposed of at the peace conference as a function of the political, military, and economic situation at the war's end.
Even though he trots out the capture of France, he ignores the fact that Hitler didn't consider France the center of gravity for the anti-Axis coalition. It was a piece that had to be taken to either attack Great Britain or to secure his back door for the fight with what he considered his real enemy: the Soviet Union. And if territory "rarely should be the military objective" then we're in trouble. While he only mentions 2-3 cases where air power shouldn't be the main option, he finds more cases where air power should be the main option and goes into more detail to support his case. He also ignores cases where Navy air was more suited for a task...focusing on Kenny's operations supporting MacArthur and ignoring the carrier raids into the Sea of Japan (and other areas) that did much to cripple Japan's coastal shipping and throw off its defensive planning. He also ignores the non-combat impact of air power. Airlift and other assets can have a major impact in COIN, yet he says air power is of marginal use against a self-sustaining guerrilla enemy. Traditional air power perhaps...a non-traditional application certainly not!

I always took Warden's Unified Theory as being more an argument for total air power cloaked behind the talk of jointness that the Air Force often brings out when it wants to absorb or claim primacy in a function or area. "The Air Campaign" has some very sound operational dictums in it...some are even visionary. But he falls short when he starts looking at elements beyond targeting and targeting theory (and his 5 Rings and COG talk is really about targeting).

We use "The Air Campaign" as a textbook for a course here, so I've read it more times than is likely healthy....:wry: I'll stop now....:)

slapout9

10-10-2007, 09:13 PM

I feel so horn-swoggled, slapout.;)

:

Norfolk, Dawg boy I new you were from Alabama.:)

I am trying to get the word out... here is a link to check out.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4065

Steve Blair, You do know that the 5 rings theory had not been invented when he wrote the Air Campaign don't you? That whole theory came later on, even though their are elements in the Air Campaign. Besides you should come to the course, get all those rich college folks you know to pony up some cash!! Warden and his theory have been used in the design of several war games and I know you are into that so you would fit right in.

Pretty good article here on how people were starting to learn and apply the theory.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/bence.html

Norfolk

10-11-2007, 12:07 AM

Norfolk, Dawg boy I new you were from Alabama.:)

I am trying to get the word out... here is a link to check out.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4065

Steve Blair, You do know that the 5 rings theory had not been invented when he wrote the Air Campaign don't you? That whole theory came later on, even though their are elements in the Air Campaign. Besides you should come to the course, get all those rich college folks you know to pony up some cash!! Warden and his theory have been used in the design of several war games and I know you are into that so you would fit right in.

Pretty good article here on how people were starting to learn and apply the theory.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/bence.html

slapout, and a country boy, and my old man was born just outside Huntsville, just that was in ON, not AL, sorry to say. But I don't much care for Yankees either:D, and I have been to East and Central Tennessee (though I hear that some of the folks in East Tennessee were Yankee sympathizers during the Recent Unpleasantness), but sadly I did not cross the state line and head to Montgomery.:(

This is a short, sweet, and to the point short essay on the vital elements of Air Power Strategy that even a knuckle-dragging brute such as myself can follow; Norfolk paraphrase Euripides - "UGH!". This is a good read, and its brevity just adds to its charm.

And thanks slapout for the link to Warden's seminar.:)