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Jedburgh
02-21-2007, 08:35 PM
CSIS, 21 Feb 07: The British Defeat in the South and the Uncertain Bush Strategy in Iraq: Oil Spots, Ink Blots, White Space, or Pointlessness? (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070221_british_basra.pdf)

...In practice, any form of US action that ends in some form of “victory” means finding a strategy that allows the US to withdraw most US forces from an Iraq that is stable enough to have reduced internal violence to low levels that can be controlled by local forces, that is secure against its neighbors, that is politically and economically unified enough to function and develop as a state, and which is pluralistic enough to preserve the basic rights of all of its sectarian and ethnic factions.

Things in Iraq may have deteriorated to the point where none of the “least bad” options now available allow the US to achieve these goals. From a perceptual viewpoint, “victory” may already be impossible because most of the people in Iraq, the region, and Arab and Muslim worlds will probably view the US effort as a failure and as a partial defeat even if the US can leave Iraq as a relatively stable and secure state at some point in the future. The perceived cost of the US-led invasion and occupation has simply been too high in terms of local opinion...

...The British may not have been defeated in a purely military sense, but lost long ago in the political sense if "victory" means securing the southeast for some form of national unity. Soft ethnic cleansing has been going on in Basra for more than two years, and the south has been the scene of the less violent form of civil war for control of political and economic space that is as important as the more openly violent struggles in Anbar and Basra.

As a result, the coming British cuts in many ways reflect the political reality that the British "lost" the south more than a year ago. The Shi'ites will takeover, Iranian influence will probably expand, and more Sunnis, Christians, and other minorities will leave. British action will mean more pressure for federation and separatism, but local power struggles are more likely to be between Shi'ite factions than anything else....

Jedburgh
06-25-2007, 04:09 PM
ICG, 25 Jun 07: Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/67_iraq___lessons_from_basra.pdf)

...As the U.S. considers plans for Baghdad and other parts of the country, the lessons are clear. First, the answer to Iraq’s horrific violence cannot be an illusory military surge that aims to bolster the existing political structure and treats the dominant political parties as partners. Secondly, violence is not solely the result of al-Qaeda-type terrorism or sectarian hostility, however costly both evidently are. Thirdly, as Basra clearly shows, violence has become a routine means of social interaction utilised by political actors doubling as militiamen who seek to increase their share of power and resources.

Basra teaches that as soon as the military surge ends and coalition forces diminish, competition between rival factions itself will surge. In other words, prolonging the same political process with the same political actors will ensure that what is left of the Iraqi state gradually is torn apart. The most likely outcome will be the country’s untidy break-up into myriad fiefdoms, superficially held together by the presence of coalition forces....

Jedburgh
07-07-2007, 03:42 PM
...Basra teaches that as soon as the military surge ends and coalition forces diminish, competition between rival factions itself will surge....
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 6 Jul 07:

The Militia Politics of Basra (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373528)

Basra, the second largest and the richest city in Iraq, is at the brink of a major economic and political meltdown. Unless Baghdad succeeds in reaching a compromise over the country's governmental apparatus (especially over the issue of federalism), the southern city may become the greatest threat to the future of post-Baathist Iraq. Such a threat lies mainly in a struggle for power between Shiite militias and tribal forces who compete for control over oil resources, territorial domination and public capital (hospitals and schools), which are all leading to an erosion of security in a city that is the source of Iraq's economic life. Although much of this turmoil is a reflection of the unstable nature of the transitional process, the current situation in Basra may represent a future scenario for Iraq that is made up of political factionalism and devoid of a functional government.

At the center of Basra's meltdown lies the ongoing conflict between different Shiite factions, mainly vying for control over Basra's energy industry and oil smuggling. Domination over local governance through confrontation, and at times violence, has become the routine method of conducting politics in a city that appears to be breaking apart into territories governed by different militias. Such political conflict, however, also includes competing visions of post-Baathist Iraq, as each Shiite militia advocates a particular ideological agenda (regionalist, nationalist and sectarian), while seeking popular support from various segments of the Shiite community in Basra and other southern cities.....

Rob Thornton
08-19-2007, 01:58 PM
There is a small piece in today's Blatimore Sun (also reachable on the E-Bird)on the problems with pulling out of Basra as the Brits transition it to ISF. We should watch this one close.

Danny
08-19-2007, 05:15 PM
Do you mean this?

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/sns-ap-britain-iraq,0,3139234.story

I have been watching Basra for some time. I blogged on it here:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/07/23/calamity-in-basra-and-british-rules-of-engagement/

The Brits are in a tizzy about Cordesman calling the disaster in Basra a "defeat." So be it. Call it what it is.

MARBIOL
08-20-2007, 03:10 PM
To the readers of this Forum:

Thought you'd find these observations of interest since they are from a secular Shia university professor living in Basrah. I've been in regular contact with him by mail (since 1992) and email (2002-EARLY 2003; fall 2003 on) and met him 2 yrs ago in Canada at a conference. He was mentioned by name & quoted in a spr 05 NYT article of the restoration of marshes in southern iraq)

He was concerned about the LACK of action by our British allies VERY EARLY ON (late 2003) and warned me in early 2004 about Iran.

Here are some email excerpts:

(I have corrected some spelling, grammar—and cut out text not relevant to Iran).

12-12-05:

“I think the balance is changing against clerics and religious parties. They will have a share but not like January. They are putting tremendous effort to win. People don’t like them in the south. THEY WILL WIN BECAUSE OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE (my emphasis in caps). We need a change. It will be a disaster if they win”.

12-13-2005:
Two days ago a prof of soil sciences have been kidnapped and yesterday they found his body killed. These gangs came to him at midnight and take him to his death. I know the fellow... I believe his crime was to be a Dean of the College of Agriculture seven years ago. It is a chaotic country! MAYBE I AM ON THE LIST PREPARED BY PRO-IRAN GROUPS FOR KILLING. I am going to buy a gun to defend myself and my family. I feel really bad and sad. We need somebody to rescue us from this horrible situation."

2-22-06:

“We are safe till now. We live day by day. The British troops at last wake up. I wonder if they have a chance to achieve things. They left Basrah so long to be very dangerous even to them. BASRAH IT WILL BE THE BATTLEPLACE WITH IRAN. God bless and save us. After the British caught several police men the wave of killing stopped—hope forever. BUT EVERY PERSON KNOWS EVERY MONTH NEW LIST OF NAMES TO BE KILLED COME FROM IRAN. They used certain cars, sometimes police cars,and police men perform the assassination”

1/14/07 “We are living under constant bombardment of Al Mahdi army shelling to the British and American consulates. By the way we are under the regime of Shiite Taleban. It is the same as that of Afghanistan with no big difference.”



7/18/07: “i did not told you about what we face during June in Basrah. Previously I you told we have the intention to leave our house to another one more safer but it is very difficult. In first week of June mortar shell fell in front of garage ,thanks god the shrapnel hit the iron door, I depot of fuels for the generator and barrel of kerosene beside the car full with gas., The worse turn up during the third week of June when mortar shell hit the second floor roof. thank god only the rim and water storage, That happened at night . The house was full of smoke,water and dust coinciding with power cut ie in darkness. Imagine the situation. Now no bombs we are feel safe for a while [note: in Syria].


Another "penpal" just got out of Basrah to Kuwait, but is having trouble getting his family out.

From 2/3/05--Much more hope and optimism----now lost
DEAR STEVE THE FEAR IS AWAY ANDI TOOK ALL FAMILY FOR ELECTION EVEN THEIR IS A THREAT OF BOMBS AND TERRORIST BUT NEVER THE LESS WE WENT AND VOTE AT THE END IT IS BEUATIFUL TO FEEL FREE TO CHOOSE WHAT ONE THINK IT IS RIGHT, WE THANKS U.S. FOR THAT AND HOPE TO KEEP HELPING IRAQI PEOPLE IN PROCCESS OF DEMOCRACY WITH OUT U.S. WE WILL RETUR BACK TO DANGER AND DARK AGES .WE ARE SAFE FOR TIME BEING HOPING THE SITUATION WILL BE IMPROVED .

Such a depressing change .

section9
08-21-2007, 03:31 PM
When the Brits pull out, I don't see any choice but for us to go down there and secure it.

Cordesman's assessment was right. The response of the British Army and the commentariat surrounding the Brown Government was to call Anthony Cordesman a right-wing neocon.

Anything but.....

Question: will we have enough Mojo in Anbar to pull forces from there to go down south? It will definitely have to be an overwatch kind of thing, as I think the Iranians have decided that they want to get a stranglehold on our supply lines.

The Brits are great and all, but the Brown Government wants out, ASAP.

Rob Thornton
08-21-2007, 04:26 PM
There is probably a decision point about when & if to step in and reinforce Iraqi Security Forces. I'd think it would have several COAs on how to do so.

However it may mean allocating resources that might have been planned for elsewhere.

I just don't know enough about BASRA regarding its transition. It certainly brings up some of the problems of working with partners (any partners) who have their own political timetable - sooner or later partners must consider their other interests, commitments and for democracies especially - public will.

I don't know if you can hold up what happens in Basra as a model for future transitions - each city seems to be unique. However, I do think there are probably some lessons to be considered as we watch it. If it does go badly, the first questions may be why and if anything that was not done or was done wrong could have prevented it from going bad - somethings are problems with solutions - somethings are just conditions. That might lead us to a whole host of other questions that inform any larger scale transition plan.

The problem with any plan that calls for a vacuous style withdrawal is there is no flexibility to adjust to changing conditions because it would be difficult to really understand the causal relationship between events since everything goes at once. This is why a phased withdrawal that is contingent on setting at least some local, provincial and national conditions is paramount to reducing the amount of violence/friction/etc. It is critical. A transition should not be a source of additional instability that provides the enemy an opportunity to easily fill the vacuum left behind.

We've identified that we have long term vital interests in the Middle East for a number of reasons. Even if tomorrow we (the U.S.) somehow found an alternative energy source it would be sometime before we could replace our hydro-carbon industries, and far longer for evolving world economies to do so. Since our economy is tied to the global economy, it will continue to be vital to us to foster stability in the region. Iraq is a piece of that.

I hope nobody takes this as a swipe at the Basra transition - I'm just thinking how this event can inform the larger transition plan, and how this is (and will always be) also a civil-military issue for our policy makers who may not understand the fog, friction & chance associated with such decisions.

Articulating this in September is going to be a real challenge. We have some good folks in Congress. I hope they understand that as Gen Petreaus answers their questions he is providing them with his best military advice to achieve U.S. policy interests, and safeguard our most precious resources.

tequila
08-24-2007, 05:38 PM
British troops on verge of long-awaited pullout from Basra (http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,,2155361,00.html)- GUARDIAN, 23 Aug.


Britain's long-awaited and much-postponed pull-out from the Basra palace, its last remaining base in the Iraqi city, is imminent, sources have told the Guardian.


The move, which is symbolically significant and will improve the safety of British troops, is expected to take place within the next two weeks and may come within days, officials say. An announcement will be made by the Iraqis.

The decision to hand over the palace to Iraqi forces comes at a time of growing criticism by elements in the US military of Britain's role in southern Iraq. The criticism is dismissed by British military commanders ...

tequila
08-27-2007, 12:54 PM
Militia moves on police center as Brits leave (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/08/ap_basra_070826/) - AP, 27 Aug.


Shiite militiamen from the Mahdi Army took over the police joint command center in Basra on Sunday after British soldiers withdrew from the facility and handed control to the Iraqi police, witnesses said.
Police left the building when the militiamen, loyal to anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, arrived, the witnesses said.

The British military disputed the reports, saying they had been in contact with the Iraqi general in charge of security in Basra, who has said the Mahdi Army was not there.

But the witnesses said the Mahdi Army emptied the building — taking generators, computers, furniture and even cars, saying it was war booty — and remained there in the early evening.

The British military had maintained a small number of soldiers at the command center to help train Iraqi police.

However, the British withdrew Saturday night “in the framework of the plan for the handover” of British positions in the city to Iraqi control, said British spokesman Maj. Matthew Bird ...

Granite_State
08-28-2007, 01:10 AM
Here's a question: is the British retreat from Basra, which is certainly what it looks like, a serious blow to the British counter-insurgency approach, supposedly perfected over decades in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Aden, Malaysia, and many other theaters? Softly softly, berets instead of helmets, and rapid enlistment and cession of control to local elements seems to have worked no better than much heavier U.S. tactics in Anbar, and indeed, probably worse.

The Financial Times covered this to some extent:
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto082020071349599778&page=1


"A soft approach to the population when you are talking about counterinsurgency is one thing, but it doesn't work when you [are up against] a large and dedicated military force," he says. The model that worked in Northern Ireland would not work in southern Iraq because of the thousands of militiamen who were challenging UK forces: "There were several hundred activists in Northern Ireland – that was not what you had in southern Iraq."

Seems to me, and maybe this is stating the obvious, that it's further proof that almost all of what we talk about here, like "population-centric" vs. "enemy-centric operations," levels of firepower, role of indigenous security forces, etc., depends almost entirely on the situation. Maybe there are some broad counter-insurgency principles, from the likes of Thompson, Galula, Kitson and others, but even these seem to make a lot more sense in the classical Communist insurgency case.






Of course, the article also says this:


The actions of UK troops also had on occasions inflamed local sentiment, the two men said in a report on the British experience in southern Iraq. In Maysan province, one of the four for which the UK had responsibility, UK forces upset locals by their efforts to collect heavy weapons. Elsewhere, house searches for explosives using dogs caused considerable anger.

"Despite their reputation for 'community soldiering', British soldiers had crossed local red lines without knowing it," the two authors concluded. They "did not know enough about the cultural environment [they] were operating in".

jcustis
08-28-2007, 02:02 AM
All I can say is that instability in the Basrah-Nasiriyah-Rumalliyah area scares me.

I fought for Safwan Hill (just SW of Basrah on the border) and passed through the area twice in mid 2003 and 2005. Mahdi control would be a very bad thing.

The one plus is that much of the area is very barren, which makes for better kinetic (i that's what it takes) operations should folks decide to get uppity in the area.

tequila
08-28-2007, 08:31 AM
As British leave Basra, militias dig in (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0828/p01s03-wome.htm)- CSMONITOR, 28 Aug.



The last contingent of British soldiers based in the center of this southern city will leave by Friday, says a senior Iraqi security official, adding that a deal has been struck with leaders of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army to ensure their safe departure.

As they pull back to a base outside Basra, the British will leave a vital provincial capital in the throes of a turf battle between Shiite factions – one that Mr. Sadr's militia appears to be winning.

"By the end of August, there will be no presence for British forces at the palace or at the joint coordination center. Both will be in the hands of the Iraqi government," says the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the matter. "I think it's best if they leave, because they did nothing to stop the militias, which were formed in the womb of their occupation." A spokesman for the British military in Basra confirmed that a small force left the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC), site of a British-Iraqi security task force, Saturday. He declined comment on the timing of the pullout of 500 soldiers from a compound of four Saddam Hussein-era palaces that are located on the strategic Shatt al-Arab River. The buildings have been occupied by coalition troops since the start of the war in 2003.

Ahead of the pullout, an agreement between British and Iraqi authorities resulted in the transfer of more than two dozen Mahdi Army prisoners from British to Iraqi custody, according to the security official. They were then released by an Iraqi court in an attempt to pacify the militias during the highly symbolic handover of the palaces to Iraqis, he said. The British did not comment on any arrangements ...

Rob Thornton
08-28-2007, 11:59 AM
Hey GS,


Here's a question: is the British retreat from Basra, which is certainly what it looks like, a serious blow to the British counter-insurgency approach, supposedly perfected over decades in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Aden, Malaysia, and many other theaters? Softly softly, berets instead of helmets, and rapid enlistment and cession of control to local elements seems to have worked no better than much heavier U.S. tactics in Anbar, and indeed, probably worse.

I think its a fair question. No strategy or tactic should be applied on the basis of where or when it worked last until the current conditions have been considered in order to make adjustments.

I think though this is more of a matter of GB's domestic politics interrupting a strategy that requires considerable time as the problems which bred the violence and insurgency are uncovered, addressed and given time to be worked out. I watched a program on PBS last night called the "Anti-Americans" (filmed a couple of years ago) where British, French and Polish citizens were asked to remark on the U.S. At the time of the filming, I got the feeling the British did not see their interests in being part of a coalition in Iraq. Its a difficult thing to articulate why a long term commitment is required to the average citizen of any country. Its also difficult if your military is not quite as large - our Marines are larger then most countries entire military.

tequila
08-28-2007, 12:23 PM
British public opinion was always against (http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0903-02.htm)the war in Iraq. It's hard to remember nowadays, but pretty much the only countries where public opinion was in favor of the original invasion were the United States, Israel, and Kuwait.

Given the current American policy of attempting to "co-opt" Sunni insurgent groups and tribal militias, I am less eager to criticize the British so much for essentially pursuing the same policy --- advanced by a year or so --- in Basra. Yes, they have handed over power in the south to a conglomeration of Shia tribal and party militias that will fight for power once the British have gone. What exactly do you think is going to happen in Diyala and Baghdad when the U.S. draws down the surge forces next year? Does anyone seriously think that AQI is the only thing that keeps Iraqis apart?

That the British position looks endangered is hardly surprising, but does anyone believe that the 1920 Revolution Brigades or the Anbar tribes have suddenly converted into believers in the American project in Iraq?

Tom Odom
08-28-2007, 12:38 PM
Here's a question: is the British retreat from Basra, which is certainly what it looks like, a serious blow to the British counter-insurgency approach, supposedly perfected over decades in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Aden, Malaysia, and many other theaters? Softly softly, berets instead of helmets, and rapid enlistment and cession of control to local elements seems to have worked no better than much heavier U.S. tactics in Anbar, and indeed, probably worse.

The Financial Times covered this to some extent:
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto082020071349599778&page=1

Seems to me, and maybe this is stating the obvious, that it's further proof that almost all of what we talk about here, like "population-centric" vs. "enemy-centric operations," levels of firepower, role of indigenous security forces, etc., depends almost entirely on the situation. Maybe there are some broad counter-insurgency principles, from the likes of Thompson, Galula, Kitson and others, but even these seem to make a lot more sense in the classical Communist insurgency case.

Of course, the article also says this:

While I agree with much of what the Brits advocate in COIN and irregular warfare, they are not perfect and the ones I listen to, say that up front. I would say the greatest factor undermining British ops and expectations in southern Iraq was the issue of duration, complimented by British history in Iraq. It was obvious to the Iraqis and the Brits alike that the UK's forces would not be staying. Up until recent drawdowns, British forces were fairly easily accepted as the Shias waited for them to exit. Certainly there was a very dark side to Shia corruption and militia activities in the south but compared to Anbar, there was no comparison. I would characterize what is happening now as clearing the battleground for what is coming, a settling of scores and levelin of ambitions until a leader or two is left standing, one probably with ties to Iran.

Finally I would say that the British approach to COIN is built on the assumption that the peoples in question do indeed see themsleves as a people defined by the nation-state versus tribe against a religious matrix. The Brit approach and ours is supposedly shoring up the legitimacy of the government to govern; the Shia have not accepted the central government as the legitimate holder of such power.

Best

Tom

SWJED
09-03-2007, 11:12 AM
3 September London Times - British Troops Pull Out of Their Last Base in Basra City (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article2374396.ece) by Michael Evans.


The final 500 British troops in Basra city last night withdrew under the cover of darkness from their base, a former palace of Saddam Hussein.

The highly symbolic pullout from Basra Palace began at about 10pm local time. Residents then reported seeing helicopters overhead and a convoy of eight tanks, six Land Rovers and five other large vehicles, possibly armoured personnel carriers, approaching the main British airport base from the palace shortly before midnight.

The streets of the city were largely deserted, and the convoy of troops from the 4th Battalion The Rifles was not attacked. Troops at the palace suffered daily attacks over the summer, with nine members of The Rifles being killed since May 21.

Basra airport will now be the only base for the 5,500 soldiers still serving in southern Iraq. With the palace base handed to the Iraqis, the Government is expected to announce that the British presence in Iraq will be reduced by 500 within the next few weeks...

The pullout came as two of Britain’s most influential generals during the Iraq war delivered scathing attacks on the Americans for their handling of the campaign after Saddam’s defeat. Major-General Tim Cross, who supervised reconstruction projects alongside his American counterparts in 2003, joined General Sir Mike Jackson, former head of the Army, in criticising the US for ignoring British advice. General Cross, a Royal Engineer, is retired but he was a hugely respected figure in the Army and had unrivalled experience in dealing with postwar nation-building. He revealed that he gave advice to Don-ald Rumsfeld, the former US Defence Secretary, about the size of the force needed to tackle the challenges after Saddam’s downfall, but was ignored.

The attacks by General Jackson, the former Chief of the General Staff, in his autobiography, and General Cross, in an interview with the Sunday Mirror, have laid bare the anger felt by the British military over the way that Mr Rumsfeld dismissed all the warning signs of a potential disaster in Iraq.

Although much has been said about the failures of the American strategy in Iraq, not least by Sir Jeremy Green-stock, the former British Ambassador at the United Nations and later Tony Blair’s special envoy to Baghdad, the strong criticism from the two generals has added to the growing sense of a rift between Washington and London...

tequila
09-10-2007, 09:51 AM
Smuggling thrives in Basra (http://iwpr.net/?p=icr&s=f&o=338511&apc_state=henh)- IWPR, 7 Sep.


Police and government officials are accused of taking a cut of the lucrative oil smuggling business run by clans and overseen by militia groups in the southern city of Basra.

Rival Shia groups have divided up control of the city’s resources - including the country’s only seaport as well as its largest oilfields – in a precarious power arrangement which could implode at any time. The warring militias control the illegal oil exports from Basra, the gateway to Iran and the Gulf states, and are reportedly linked to global networks.

Maritime police complain they lack resources to capture the smugglers, but others accuse police of cooperating with mafia gangs to smuggle oil. Some local officials say they are under orders not to arrest gang members because of their links to the authorities and the militias.

Analysts blame smuggling for causing high inflation in Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city, with the prices of everyday products soaring and living conditions deteriorating for most of inhabitants.

The Rumaila oil fields south of Basra are said to produce 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, of which 400,000 barrels are for domestic consumption and 1.2 million are exported ...

Excellent, detailed article outlining the Shi'i party factions in Basra and the mechanics of oil smuggling, which also involves corruption on the Iranian side of the border.

MattC86
09-10-2007, 05:06 PM
How soon do we expect to see the full withdrawal of British troops, now that they're at the airport?

And what do we expect MNF to do about the British departure? Surely they're not planning on ceding the southern portion of the country to the Mahdi Army or whatever group of bozos is currently licking their chops in anticipation, right?

Not that I know what forces are available. . .

Matt

JJackson
09-11-2007, 12:06 AM
Thanks for the link Tequila.
Very interesting little article and insight in to the endemic corruption and the way it relates to the groups jockeying for power and influence. Basra, as the first area in which the fledgling Iraqi institutions have been given a go at running things for themselves, is going to be an interesting experiment. Unfortunately it is not the ideal place to conduct this experiment as it is so important to the Iraqi economy and to supply lines for forces up country. Apart form that I suspect it will be fairly typical in the way power will be divided up between the Government, Army, Police, Militia groups and local families/clans etc. The only major factor not acting in this arena is inter Sunni/Shia/Kurd factors which will have to be overlaid in some other areas. British forces might be invited in to assist in the removal of extra-national players trying to muscle in on the action but I very much doubt any interference with the gravy train would be brooked. In this particular situation a coast guard presence may work but the smugglers would probably find a work around or return to direct assault on forces operating them. Attempts to rid an entire country of an entrenched system of graft and patronage is a little beyond the mandate or capabilities of the coalition forces and the advantages of an honest economic and governmental system is something they will have to workout for themselves over the next century or two.

tequila
09-13-2007, 10:29 AM
Petraeus sees no need now for US troops in Basra (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gx3RbX-CnAK5rKEmfTpVPnksA64w)- AFP, 12 Sep.

According to Petraeus, our plans for Basra are ... to do nothing. Tom Ricks said yesterday that Basra today is what Baghdad will look like in a year. I think we'll be lucky to get that, frankly.

tequila
09-17-2007, 10:18 AM
Basra: after the British (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0917/p01s08-wome.htm)- CSMONITOR, 17 Sep.



When British forces took Basra on April 6, 2003, their artillery damaged a statue of an Iraqi soldier straddling a writhing shark. It was commissioned by Saddam Hussein to commemorate the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Looters have stolen the soldier.

But the shark, meant to represent Iran, remains.

The Islamic Republic's influence is indeed felt throughout Basra, Iraq's second-largest city where Shiite parties, militiamen, and criminal gangs all are locked in a vicious fight for power. The streets in the provincial capital are even abuzz with talk of Iranian-trained sleeper cells at the ready.
With the British exit earlier this month (http://the%20british%20exit%20earlier%20this%20month/), which some analysts say is a prelude to the 5,500-strong contingent's complete withdrawal from Iraq, comes great uncertainty for this city: Will Iran bolster its strategic foothold? Will the Shiite militias control the streets? Is the Iraqi Army strong enough to mediate the fight between rival parties?

What happens here may provide a window on the future for the rest of Iraq ...

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 03:30 AM
I've been assaulted by thousands of Shiite militia. It didn't work out well for them. They haven't been able to overrun anybody, or even inflict serious casualties. Our PUC for the Sadr Rebellion credits my unit with over 1500 militiamen killed. We lost seven soldiers. They didn't even knock out one of our M1's. .

I'd be interested in your take on the recent fighting. It's not our armor or our guys, but it seems as though the militias may have learned a few things during their cease fire.

A closely held U.S. military intelligence analysis of the fighting in Basra shows that Iraqi security forces control less than a quarter of the city, according to officials in both the United States and Iraq, and Basra's police units are deeply infiltrated by members of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
(http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/28/bush.basra/index.html)
"This is going to go on for a while," one U.S. military official said.

http://i.l.cnn.net/cnn/2008/POLITICS/03/28/bush.basra/art.tank.afp.gi.jpg

Cavguy
03-29-2008, 05:11 AM
I'd be interested in your take on the recent fighting. It's not our armor or our guys, but it seems as though the militias may have learned a few things during their cease fire.



No doubt. Despite my earlier, never underestimate an enemy's ability to learn, just as we have. Sadr fighters introdouced the deadly EFP's into theater with help from Iran, and pulled off the murder/kidnapping against the CA team in Kerbala with similar support.

Where they suffer is in the rank and file, the average Sadr fighter is a 13-20 year old male, uneducated, and with no formal military training. Case in point was the number of RPG's shot at us - most didn't detonate because the kids firing them had never been trained to remove the safety pin, just handed an RPG and told to shoot an American.

I've watched Sadr fighters charge right at a tank with nothing but an AK. They're brave, but lack tactical acumen or even good sense. That's in contrast to my experiences fighting Sunnis, who tend to be relatively savvy tactically. In any mass uprising, that's going to hurt the Sadrists. It will be interesting to see how much organization and training their cells have done for the masses.

The issue with the Iraqi Army facing them is twofold - most of the Iraqi Jundis are Shia, and Sadr supporters. (not the officers, but the joes). They also generally lack armored vehicles (they have some T-72's in Baghdad), and indirect fire support. Their attached TT's can bring in coalition airpower. But they've never had to employ combined arms before, especially in urban. Will be an interesting test on how far they've come. Some IA units are better than others, with the former Peshmerga units being the best. Overall, at BN and below level, they're pretty good tactically.

Just my observations.

MattC86
03-29-2008, 10:27 AM
The issue with the Iraqi Army facing them is twofold - most of the Iraqi Jundis are Shia, and Sadr supporters. (not the officers, but the joes). They also generally lack armored vehicles (they have some T-72's in Baghdad), and indirect fire support. Their attached TT's can bring in coalition airpower. But they've never had to employ combined arms before, especially in urban. Will be an interesting test on how far they've come. Some IA units are better than others, with the former Peshmerga units being the best. Overall, at BN and below level, they're pretty good tactically.

Just my observations.

I'm wondering if in anyway the current Basrah fighting can be compared to ARVN operations in Laos in 1971-72. Additionally, the first day's reports were that IA was doing alright, but most of what's come out in the last 24 hours has made the situation seem worse than originally presented. At least from what I've seen.

Anyway, in regards to the Lind bit, I agree that it's got a high degree of absurdity. However, going along with the mantra of never underestimate your enemy; if it gives a few commanders pause and makes them think a little bit harder about what Iran might try to achieve in such a "nightmare" scenario, and improves our readiness, preparation, and alertness, then I think the piece accomplished something.

And it was kind of fun to read, goofy as it was.

Regards,

Matt

PhilR
03-29-2008, 11:22 AM
The problem in Basra City is that we don't know exactly what is going on in there. Its a black hole (to give the Brits their due, they may not be in the city, but they are not sitting out at the airport--they are doing ops along the border and in other areas).
Also, the Mahdi Army (JAM) is not a monolith. In fact JAM in Basra is probably only tenuously linked to the larger JAM (Sadr's powerbase is more up in Sadr City). I would not assume that events in Basra are linked to the current up-tick in Sadr City in any real planned manner. I have not heard or read anything about the Sadr ceasefire writ large. This could be an actual extention of the "cleansing" that Sadr wanted to effect through the ceasefire in order to bring his movement more under control. The snippets of news reporting are always misleading.
Basra is a place that the Government must control if it is to control Iraq. This fight probably had to come at some time. The government may assess that they want to have it while the Coalition Forces are still here in some strenght and holding the Sunni threat at bay (which the Government interprets as the Concerned Local Citizens or Sons of Iraq). For the past few months, the Iraqi leadership has been trying clean up the Army units (moving non-locals in) and the Police in Basra. Arguably, they have probably been more successful in the former than the latter. It would also be interesting to see where the Governor of the Province is in all of this (Fadhila Party-neither Sadrist nor associated with the ruling coalition). If you remember news reports from last year, Maliki tried to get him removed, but failed. There was tentative coming to terms between the two. Also not reported is whether the oil flow has been greatly affected. I'm guessing not. The pipelines don't run through the city and the unsaid "Prime Directive" of competing groups in Basra Province has been to not stop the oil flow--too many people from all sides are making money on it.

Ken White
03-29-2008, 03:59 PM
I'm wondering if in anyway the current Basrah fighting can be compared to ARVN operations in Laos in 1971-72...shooting at each other.

Rob Thornton
03-29-2008, 04:19 PM
Matt - you'll have to put some meat on that (tell us what is on your mind) if you want folks to weigh in on that.
Best, Rob

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 05:21 PM
Here's a look inside Sadr City from the Washington Post. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/28/AR2008032803810.html) It seems as though Cav Guy was right on the mark.

Some people over at Abu Muqawama seem to think that Iran is squeezing Sadr. (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/03/battle-for-basra-us-forces-take-lead.html)

and to make things confusing, a Washington Post columnist is reporting the exact opposite (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/28/AR2008032802819.html?nav=rss_opinions/columnsandblogs?nav=slate):

"Sadr wants to fight, but he also wants to talk. I'm told that he sent a verbal message through an Iraqi intermediary last month to Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq. The gist of the message was that the Mahdi Army in the Baghdad area was no longer under Sadr's control but Iran's. The United States apparently didn't answer this message, but at some point, through some channel, America will need to talk with Sadr and the forces he represents."

Rex Brynen
03-29-2008, 06:30 PM
the Mahdi Army in the Baghdad area was no longer under Sadr's control but Iran's.

I'm not sure the word "control" ever applies to contemporary Iraq, especially as it pertains to the role of external actors.

Influence? Sure. Allies? Yes, although always temporarily. Control? Underestimates the local dynamics, and the extent to which the locals and supposed "clients" are able to use (and even abandon) the externals and supposed "patrons" as vice-versa.

Reference: see "al-Anbar Awakening, US control over..."

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 06:44 PM
Rex:

Do you think that Iran is squeezing Sadr, that they somehow requested/approved/aided the attack on Sadr's troops? (Ahmadinejad was in Baghdad at the beginning of the month.) If Sadr did communicate with Paetreus, maybe he knew it was coming?

Rex Brynen
03-29-2008, 07:10 PM
I don't doubt that Iran has picked up a lot of greedy and/or disaffected JAM elements over time, and that has made Sadr nervous. Then again, there are other reasons for him to want to claim that any action by JAM against the US was by pro-Iranian elements not under his control.

I suspect that Tehran is ambivalent about the Basra operation. If it works, it strengthens the position of their most reliable Shiite ally, ISCI/Badr. If it doesn't work, it makes them all the more valuable in exerting influence over Sadr/JAM. Sadr elements are likely to be offering all sorts of IOUs in exchange for cash and weapons right now.

Indeed, as far as I can see they are the only ones who can't lose out of recent events, no matter how they unfold.

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 07:32 PM
Sadr elements are likely to be offering all sorts of IOUs in exchange for cash and weapons right now.

That's what I was thinking. I was also thinking that without Iranian weapons, JAM can't keep fighting.

MattC86
03-29-2008, 08:01 PM
shooting at each other.

Rob and Ken, you are both correct, obviously.

Perhaps my history or my perceptions are wacky, but essentially, the IA and Iraqi Police are conducting the ground operation in Basra on their own, albeit with support from US warplanes, advisors, etc. Similar to the ARVN invasion of Laos in 1971 - an "independent" operation with US support but not direct assault-echelon participation, that was a test of the government's strength and legitimacy as well as the actual abilities of the army itself.

The attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail was a pretty big failure, and the Vietnamization was shown to not be progressing as well as Americans would like.

In that sense, I see a comparison to Basra. Not only is the operation providing a major test of the indigenous security forces, but if they are shown to be extremely wanting (as the ARVN was) it will have further impact on US domestic support, as well as the legitimacy of the Maliki government.

That was my intent. If I'd been going for the people-shooting-at-other-people comparison, I would have picked a less obscure example ;)

Regards,

Matt

Ken White
03-29-2008, 08:57 PM
the few corollaries. Urban vs. jungle; Two moderately trained and competent Armed forces vs. one less well trained against a group of semi-trained irregulars; Armor and air mobile ops vs. mostly dismounted urban combat; massive US air and artillery support vs. a little; two (sort of nations) in a fight in a third nation vs. a civil disagreement in one; we probably didn't push this on the HN vs. one that the HN didn't really want to do; and so on...

More difference than similarities.
In that sense, I see a comparison to Basra. Not only is the operation providing a major test of the indigenous security forces, but if they are shown to be extremely wanting (as the ARVN was) it will have further impact on US domestic support, as well as the legitimacy of the Maliki government.If is a big word; "extremely" wanting is likely to be in the eye of the beholder; impact on US domestic support will have little real effect on much of anything; and the legitimacy of the Maliki government is determined by how it got in power, not by events that occur after it is in power -- though such events can affect its durability and / or survivability, different things.

With respect to the Laos incursion, the real object lesson was not the progress or lack of it of "Vietnamization," it was the failure of the US Army to properly train the Viet Namese or to assist them with detailed planning that was far beyond their capability. In fairness to MACV, XXIV Corps and ARVN, undue and quite wrong pressure by the Bobsey twins of Kissinger and his idiot Mini-Me, Alexander Haig caused a major rush and arguably contributed significantly to the failure just as much as the fact that the south VN fought in Battalions and had NO experience in even Brigade ops, much less multi Division. Dumb political battle and essentially a US fomented effort as opposed to a real local desire...

The fact that the high vis units, Ranger Bns, Airborne Bns and Marine Bns were used was a political failing by both US and VN cdrs.

MattC86
03-29-2008, 09:55 PM
Well, my perspective was far more from a strategic level than tactical, anyway. I am well aware of the enormous differences in the details of the actual operations - although I would contend that both also are examples of the HN forces' raison d'etre; more conventional combat in the case of the ARVN and urban combat/anti-militia COIN for the IA.

My comparison is solely based on the strategic impact of a HN visibly and unquestionably taking the lead in a major combat operation with only limited American support. Both the ARVN and the IA are sticking their necks out farther than they did in previous operations. Thanks for, as usual, helping to clarify what I'm trying to say.

However, on this


impact on US domestic support will have little real effect on much of anything; and the legitimacy of the Maliki government is determined by how it got in power, not by events that occur after it is in power -- though such events can affect its durability and / or survivability, different things.

we continue to disagree.

First, I think that while it's easy to dismiss US domestic opinion - fickle and unreliable though it may be - it is a mistake to do so. The resurgence of support for the war in the wake of this idea that the surge "turned the corner in Iraq" (not stated by General P or Sec. Gates but constantly repeated by the right-wing parts of the media) will likely be hit hard if the perception is that the IA fails in Basra. Obviously a lot of that depends on other factors, including the al-Sadr, the cease-fire, etc., etc., But if support begins falling again, the pressure on the next president, particularly if it is a Democrat, will be enormous to begin drawing down immediately and without regard to the situation on the ground. As a result, as always, we still are playing for the crowd at home, and it's risky to discount the importance of public support. We remain, after all, a democracy. At what point does consistent public opposition to a war take precedence over the government's prosecution of that effort as the elected decision makers in our country? I don't know the answer to that. But regardless, a return to consistent majority opposition to the war could not be anything but detrimental.

Secondly, legitimacy, both in foreign eyes and in Iraqi eyes, is very much determined by the actions of the president once he takes office. There's no historical political structure that confers accepted legitimacy onto the winner of an election like in a well-established democratic state. When large segments of a country oppose the government with armed force, clearly there's a lot to be desired in terms of governmental legitimacy. The Shi'ite militias, across the spectrum (not just the JAM, but primarily) are not just a threat to the "survivability" of the Maliki government. Their participation in the political process, regardless of the leader, gives legitimacy to the system. Without it, just like without the participation of the Sunni tribes, the head of government is not viewed as a legitimate national leader.

So it's not just for the survival of Maliki, but for the strength and stability of the democratic system in Iraq. That's the legitimacy question.

Regards,

Matt

Ron Humphrey
03-29-2008, 10:12 PM
Matt,

Although some of the characterizations of the situation are understandable and maybe even likely; who's helping who and why etc. I think there is one thing we can all bet on.

The militias will not win this one. It seems pretty obvious considering the various elements reviewed even in this thread that the main players all have a somewhat win/win option available and along those lines it would seem unlikely that the militias would be the overall victors.

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 10:35 PM
Matt:

For what it's worth, your argument makes sense to me. I've always thought there was a huge difference between us joining someone else's fight (which usually works out well) and asking others to join our fight.

Ken White
03-29-2008, 10:39 PM
Well, my perspective was far more from a strategic level than tactical, anyway...Strategic or operational? Not sure there was or is much strategy invovled in either. YMMV.
we continue to disagree.Okay, we can do that.
Secondly, legitimacy, both in foreign eyes and in Iraqi eyes, is very much determined by the actions of the president once he takes office...In other words, it's in the eye of the beholder. One way to look at it.
So it's not just for the survival of Maliki, but for the strength and stability of the democratic system in Iraq. That's the legitimacy question.Two separate issues, I think...

Not to mention that 'democracy' in the ME will always be inherently unstable and unlike its western approximations -- there is and will be no counterpart.

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 11:00 PM
Not to mention that 'democracy' in the ME will always be inherently unstable.

How much money and blood should we invest in supporting something that is inherently unstable?

Ken White
03-29-2008, 11:08 PM
How much money and blood should we invest in supporting something that is inherently unstable?on what you're investing the blood and money for. Is it a stable democracy? That would seem to merit X amount of both. If the prospect of achieving that is less than good; then X-p or perhaps even 0 would seem appropriate. If OTOH, you're investing those two things in something else and a democracy of some sort is simply a desired but not imperative by product; that sort of changes the equation, doesn't it?

Rank amateur
03-30-2008, 12:02 AM
a democracy of some sort is simply a desired but not imperative by product; that sort of changes the equation, doesn't it?

True enough, but I think that most of the guys here are fighting for freedom and democracy. It really makes me angry that they're being lied to: even if it doesn't make them angry.

Of course, if most of the people here agree with Ken about the reasons why you're fighting I guess I should have a beer, chill and thank you all for being so nice to me, helping me learn and for all the intelligent conversation.

Ron Humphrey
03-30-2008, 12:11 AM
True enough, but I think that most of the guys here are fighting for freedom and democracy. It really makes me angry that they're being lied to: even if it doesn't make them angry.

Of course, if most of the people here agree with Ken about the reasons why you're fighting I guess I should have a beer, chill and thank you all for being so nice to me, helping me learn and for all the intelligent conversation.

There has more often than not been cost of blood and treasure in fighting wars somewhere other than our backyards. The fact that the battle is there instead of here and may not result in good ol American style democracy so to speak does not really have anything to do with whether they are defending our democracy. They are doing what they do in order to assure we get to continue to enjoy what we have without suffering at the hands of those they are fighting.

Thats the crux of what Ken is pointing to. It's not always a zero-sum math problem being addressed but more often than not has to do with so may variables in the ether that although one may not be privy to, really do matter a lot to the end result of it all.

Ken White
03-30-2008, 12:54 AM
True enough, but I think that most of the guys here are fighting for freedom and democracy. It really makes me angry that they're being lied to: even if it doesn't make them angry.

Of course, if most of the people here agree with Ken about the reasons why you're fighting I guess I should have a beer, chill and thank you all for being so nice to me, helping me learn and for all the intelligent conversation.of them accept the reality that Ron cites above. A lot of that 'fighting for freedom and democracy' stuff is political hype but it's mostly true if you put it in context. There's also the fact that what may be freedom for some doesn't seem like it to you but to them it's a major change and improvement. Lots of relativity out there.

I'll also suggest one more time that you continue to ascribe thoughts to me that are grossly incorrect, or in this case, placed out of context in a pejorative mode. If you need to do that, fine. :cool:

If you're angry, perhaps you should figure out why you are and work on that. I'm pretty sure most of the guys don't think they're being lied to so if that's all you're angry about, I suspect you can relax a bit.

Presley Cannady
03-30-2008, 05:08 PM
Not to mention that 'democracy' in the ME will always be inherently unstable and unlike its western approximations -- there is and will be no counterpart.

Democracy's western approximations range from the streets of Sao Paolo and Cali to Germany, Greece and Italy in the 1970s and 80s to the quiet hills of Vermont. At some point, the literature really needs to stop abusing the word "stability."

Ken White
03-30-2008, 05:23 PM
Democracy's western approximations range from the streets of Sao Paolo and Cali to Germany, Greece and Italy in the 1970s and 80s to the quiet hills of Vermont. At some point, the literature really needs to stop abusing the word "stability."but it sure is a lot more elusive than most would like -- and even the quiet hills of Ben and Jerry can be disrupted on occasion. Instability is, I think, a pretty normal human condition and we're just sort of spoiled in the greater west, have been for a while -- but there's no guarantee at all that will continue indefinitely...

Presley Cannady
03-30-2008, 05:59 PM
but it sure is a lot more elusive than most would like -- and even the quiet hills of Ben and Jerry can be disrupted on occasion. Instability is, I think, a pretty normal human condition and we're just sort of spoiled in the greater west, have been for a while -- but there's no guarantee at all that will continue indefinitely...

Depends on where in the West you live. The US has the highest homicide rate amongst OECD nations, and half of that occurs in cities like my Big Apple. My point is that "stability" is as much a nonsense word as "normalcy" as used in political discourse. In fact, I'd go as far to say it's a word scholars can use without being reflexively attacked for lazily "normalcy" around. It permits well paid, supposedly bright folks at CSIS to make criticisms about policy by appealing to ridiculously idealized caricatures of Western democracy that better resemble "Leave It To Beaver" or "Richie Rich" than anything in the real world.

Watcher In The Middle
03-30-2008, 07:48 PM
...other issues which exist, which are being ignored (or not understood) by the media. For example:


Iraq takes licensing step, but E&P fiscal policy murky
Ferruh Demirmen

The invitation extended early this month by Iraq’s Ministry of Oil to international oil companies (IOCs) to preregister by Jan. 31 for exploration and production licensing rounds has no doubt attracted much interest in the industry (OGJ Online, Jan. 3, 2008).

In its announcement, the ministry requested the applicant companies to provide a comprehensive list of information, from company bylaws to tax compliance record to HSE policy. The ministry will use the information to select those companies that will be allowed to compete for upstream projects in the country. The scope of information requested for qualification may set a new standard in the industry.

But IOCs are still mainly in the dark as to Iraq’s fiscal policy. Timing of the first licensing round is also unclear.

Link to Article (http://www.ogj.com/display_article/317630/7/ARCHI/none/none/1/COMMENT:-Iraq-takes-licensing-step,-but-E&P-fiscal-policy-murky/site_license.cfm?sl=petrobras)

Iraq made the first set of awards on 03.27.2008:
1. Royal Dutch Shell - Kirkuk (10 Bil Bbl. reserves)
2. Shell / BHP Billiton - MIssan (3 Bil Bbl. reserves)
3. Chevron/Total - W Qurna 1 (15-20 Bil Bbl. reserves)
4. Exxon Mobil - Zubair (5 Bil Bbl. reserves)
5. BP - Rumaila N and Rumaila S - (16 Bil Bbl. reserves)

Note that (1) is up North, the other four are all in the South. To get the process started, you have to have stability. Basra is the gateway for commerce - if it's substantially under militia control, the whole effort is going to be stillborn.

This could easily explain the Maliki government's abrupt effort to take control from the militia elements in and around Basra.

Then throw in one other factor. The Interior Ministry has been heavily influenced, if not controlled by employees who are allegedly supporters of JAM and Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Could the crackdown possibly be a way for the Maliki government to identify al-Sadr supporters within the different Ministries, and have them fired from their jobs?

Talk about a conundrum - Politics vrs. Religion vrs. Big money economics.

Thoughts?

Bill Moore
03-30-2008, 09:32 PM
Talk about a conundrum - Politics vrs. Religion vrs. Big money economics.

The underlying importance of the oil fields cannot be overlooked in Iraq cannot be overlooked. Kirkuk remains a potential flash point until an acceptable deal is made on how to share the wealth from their oil fields. According to business journal reports the recent Shi'a unrest in the South has significantly disrupted oil flow in the South (the largest and most productive fields). Regardless of the reason for the conflict (religion, ethnic conflict, political struggles), the grand prize for any of these groups appears to be gaining control (or influence) over the oil fields for obvious reasons. That begs the question, how do you choke off their funds if you have to buy their product?

None of this is new, there have been and are similiar conundrums around the world. However, I don't believe Sad'r is so popular that he can't be marginalized (I reserve the right to be wrong). The Shi'a areas under Sad'r control are ghetto's, so this is a case where the Iraqi government "could" offer them a much better deal than Sad'r, if they can defeat his militia. Sad're is already calling for a cease fire of sorts, like he did after the fiasco in he created in Karbala. He has a habit of frequently miscalculating.

Ron Humphrey
03-30-2008, 10:14 PM
...other issues which exist, which are being ignored (or not understood) by the media. For example:



thinking your a lot closer to tracking then many out there(IMHO);)

tequila
03-31-2008, 09:17 AM
Firsthand look at Basra shows value of white flag (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/middleeast/31basra.html?pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES, 31 March.


I walked, ran and crawled into central Basra on Thursday, constantly dropping to the ground because of gun battles between Mahdi Army (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/mahdi_army/index.html?inline=nyt-org) militiamen and the Iraqi Army and the police.

The rest of my stay in the city went like this: On Friday evening, the hotel I had somehow found open was showered with bullets, smashing glass on several floors and knocking pieces out of the stone facade. The next morning, Iraqi Interior Ministry forces in a part of the city they supposedly controlled were ambushed with heavy weapons at a hotel 50 yards from mine. On Sunday morning, after I had hired someone to drive me out of the city, an Iraqi soldier fired at our tires but missed. We did not stop.

Iraqi forces started their assault on the Shiite militias in Basra on Tuesday. Whatever the initial goal of the operation, by the time I arrived in Basra it was a patchwork of neighborhoods that were either deserted or overrun by Mahdi fighters. There were scattered Iraqi Army and police checkpoints, but no place seemed to be truly under government control.

...

Somehow I found another driver to take me within a couple miles of the city center, which I had been told government forces controlled. When that driver would go no farther, I had to walk, but by then I saw trucks filled with Mahdi Army members speeding through the streets wearing black masks and carrying AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.

Gun battles broke out unpredictably, so I ran or walked when it was quiet, then dropped down and sought cover when I could hear shooting. After 45 minutes or so, I came upon the Rumaila Hotel in a central neighborhood called Ashar. Amazingly, it was open, with six or seven guests inside and a couple of employees. I was so exhausted I didn’t think twice, just checked in.

The next day I moved around as much as I could. The common observation was this: There was nowhere the Mahdi either did not control or could not strike at will ...