Officer Retention

[Patriot]

I wanted to share some of my observations on an issue that has become a major topic for Army leaders – officer retention. In the Army we hear a lot about retaining company grade officer and there have been a number of actions taken over the past few years to mitigate the high demand for company grade officers with their requirements.

These actions include eliminating OER (Officer Evaluation Report) blocking, promotion to captain at 39 months, expanded advanced civil schooling programs, extremely high promotion rates (99%) to captain and major (94-98%) and other proposals, i.e. bonuses for additional years of service.

The last proposal of bonus was generally taken as an insult. The $20,000 proposal for a captain translated into four months of pay, while junior enlisted bonuses sometimes equal their entire annual salary. Most of the captains took the proposal as half hearted from a bureaucracy that doesn’t ask their input nor solicit it. The measly amount of $20,000 was never going to entice any captain on the fence to stay in the Army, but would have been good for captains that had every intention of staying. For those that have made multiple deployments it would have been well earned.

So we’ve essentially created a system that doesn’t eliminate poor performers and promotes almost everyone. The captain’s are smart and they see weak performers getting promoted. Frankly, I’d rather see an unfilled assignment then fill it with a poor performer. I would prefer we protect our officer corps’ quality from weaklings by culling them out as we’ve done in the past.

If we’re serious about retaining company grade officers then let’s give them an incentive like $50,000 tax free or a guarantee of graduate degree of their choice in a school of choice or assignment of choice with Army schools of choice. It’s not about pleasing everyone; it’s about recognizing what’s at stake long term and making an appropriate commitment.

The first who get these options ought to be those officers who have made multiple deployments to combat. The combat issue brings to the surface a secondary topic. There are officers hiding in the Army who have avoided combat deployments. Whether they’re hiding in the training base (TRADOC), institutional, high headquarters, Korea, or some other place is irrelevant. After nearly 6 years of war there are too many officers with 2 or 3 deployments and others with none. Since the promotion rates are so high for captain, major, and lieutenant colonel there is no disincentive for not deploying, so they hide. Combat deployments are NOT about punching tickets, slapping on a right-shoulder patch and some medals or some other non-sense especially after nearly 6 years of war. At some point equity of deployment has to be factored. If someone thinks an officer should not be deployed because he/she is weak then they need to get a job at Wal-Mart and not in the Army. If an officer is afraid to deploy because of family separation or fear of combat Wal-Mart is hiring.

The problems in the company grade ranks will not stop there but will expand into the field grade ranks. As the Army promotes marginal performers to major and lieutenant colonel there is a negative incentive to all officers who see weak mid and senior grade officers. Just as incentives are important to retain company grade officers, the same applies to field grade officers. How much are you willing to provide to keep solidly performing majors and lieutenant colonels past 20 years? Right now the Army offers nothing. There are no incentives, other than the promise of promotion or command and for the vast majority these two incentives will never happen. But the Army needs a deep pool of experienced officers to stay beyond 20 years there is nothing to keep them and they, like the company grade officers, are exiting rapidly.

If we’re fighting a new war with a new modular Army using new tactics, equipment, and a new mindset it’s probably time to develop a new way of rewarding performance and a new way of sustaining the force to actually sustain the force. If the promotion rate to captain is 99% why have a centralized board? If the promotion rate to major is 98% why have a board? Under the current system the first time the Army tell an officer he’s not going to “make it” is the battalion command board in year 16 or 17.

[Dennis]

Sir,

I agree with all of your points. From my view, as a post command CPT, it has been troubling to see the advancement of a generation of officers with little to no selection process.

The most bothersome was to see peers who lingered on higher level staffs, mostly because lower level units did not want them, due to their lack of talent and potential. Then of course at some point said CPT must be given a command in order for him to attain his branch qualification and facilitate another number for promotion to the next rank.

In almost all circustances that this happened, the person involved spent barely a year, on paper, in command and their performance was, as expected, less than what is expected of a combat commanders.

Even more troubling was seeing this being done to units that were heading to combat. (Not that I disagree with replacing poor leaders, but rather the requirement to ever have "poor leaders" in the position at all).

I recognize that to some degree it is a numbers game but I think command quality at any level should never be sacrificed. Our soldiers deserve better than that.

[SWJED]

Cross-posted on the SWJ Blog - On Keeping the Best and Brightest (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/on-keeping-the-best-and-the-br/).

[Pragmatic Thinker]

This argument is nothing new and most of these "fixes" are temporary to keep the numbers at a reasonable level.

I am not sure the numbers support your claim that folks are "hiding out" in TRADOC. I know Fort Benning cleaned house about three years ago and replaced just about every NCO and Officer who didn't have a SSI-FWS on their right shoulder. Granted there are still some officers and NCO's out there who have avoided deployments but I think most of them are in the very senior grades (O-5 and above or E-9), it's hard to find too many O-3 to O-4's and E-4 to E-7's out there without some time in a combat zone. Again, there are probably some who got by with a 120 or 180 day deployment to Kuwait or Qatar but I am not convinced that folks can hide very easily. Especially since the implementation of dwell time, it is automatically annotated at HRC whenever they pull up your records.

This phenomena is nothing new all you have to do is find a Vietnam-era veteran and they will tell you the same stories. During times of war the Army retains and promotes just about everyone. They have to or otherwise people are forced to leave, and how can you justify getting rid of people during a war when your numbers mean everything? The real shame is lack of leaders effectively counseling and developing junior officers. How many times does someone get shuffled around a command because no one wants them? When was the last time an O-5 sat them down and truly laid out what was wrong and gave them guidance and direction to fix it? Of course, there are officers who do this but all too often the case is to shuffle them around staff positions or send them to higher headquarters.

Never fear though...these wars will end some day and then we will draw down and cut budgets. The mass exodus you are looking for will happen if you wait around that long, and that not too far off future will make the Carter years look like the Reagan years in comparison.

PT

[SWJED]

Army Offers Officers Incentives (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2886)

Army Development of Junior Leaders (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2950)

[Cavguy]

I am not sure the numbers support your claim that folks are "hiding out" in TRADOC. I know Fort Benning cleaned house about three years ago and replaced just about every NCO and Officer who didn't have a SSI-FWS on their right shoulder. Granted there are still some officers and NCO's out there who have avoided deployments but I think most of them are in the very senior grades (O-5 and above or E-9), it's hard to find too many O-3 to O-4's and E-4 to E-7's out there without some time in a combat zone. Again, there are probably some who got by with a 120 or 180 day deployment to Kuwait or Qatar but I am not convinced that folks can hide very easily. Especially since the implementation of dwell time, it is automatically annotated at HRC whenever they pull up your records.


PT,

Agree somewhat, but my initial shock upon arrival here at Fort Leavenworth was the sheer number of perm party officers (not ILE students, which are about 98% combat vets) without combat patches. Most of them outrank me, but I always want to ask - what hole have you been hiding in?

Branch has said that those with the higest dwell time will absolutely deploy next, so I agree, it will even itself. I have a post command, MAJ friend who never deployed. Commanded in Korea, a second command at Knox, and then AC/RC. He's getting his first downrange deployment early next year..... I guess the system is working. I think many of them, like my friend, simply had jobs that didn't deploy to SWA, and didn't volunteer to head downrange or were locked into other jobs.

I liked the USMC "Every Marine into the Fight" message that went out recently, the Army needs to do the same.

[tequila]

Following Cavguy's note: General: Deploy or risk promotion chances (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/08/marine_coleman_070815/).


Marines who have not gone to war should be concerned when promotion time comes around, a top Corps official said.

“I guarantee you ... if you have a six- to seven-year war and you don’t get to the war zone, you needn’t wonder what’s going to happen when it’s time for promotion,” said Lt. Gen. Ronald Coleman, deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs in Quantico, Va.

Coleman spoke at a Marine Corps Association meeting here Wednesday, where he told an audience of mainly retired and active-duty Marines that leathernecks who haven’t deployed to a combat zone need to find a way to get to the fight.

“If I’m on the promotion board, I’m going to make a note of that,” he said.
While some Marines have served three, four and, in some cases, five tours in Iraq, 40,000 still have not deployed, Coleman said. Some of those Marines are in the pipeline, including those making the transition from boot camp to infantry battalions.

In January, Commandant Gen. James Conway announced his plans to rearrange assignments so that every Marine is given the chance to go to war. At the time of his announcement, titled “Every Marine Into the Fight,” some 66,000 Marines — a third of the force — had not deployed.

[Ken White]

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Never fear though...these wars will end some day and then we will draw down and cut budgets. The mass exodus you are looking for will happen if you wait around that long, and that not too far off future will make the Carter years look like the Reagan years in comparison.
PT

Could happen, I suppose. As a survivor of Eisnhower's cuts and one who was in Florida, DC and Korea during the Carter years, I sure hope we do the absorbtion of cuts in funds better the next time than we did those two times...

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

The working percentage for active duty US Army personnel who have NOT deployed to either OIF or OEF is 40 percent. There was a USA Today article a few months ago about the phenomenon, but it didn't go below the surface of the factoid to explain why this was so.

For those of us who, after two or more deployments, have met many of our peers -- some of whom were promoted over us -- without combat patches, this figure seems about right.

Perhaps they're all on permanent profile.

[Cavguy]

The working percentage for active duty US Army personnel who have NOT deployed to either OIF or OEF is 40 percent. There was a USA Today article a few months ago about the phenomenon, but it didn't go below the surface of the factoid to explain why this was so.

For those of us who, after two or more deployments, have met many of our peers -- some of whom were promoted over us -- without combat patches, this figure seems about right.

Perhaps they're all on permanent profile.

A slide from Armor branch on HRC Website (https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/BRANCH_BRIEF_(WEBSITE_5JAN07).ppt) (as of Jan 07 - AKO Login Required) indicated that 72% of officers in Ranks CPT-COL in Armor have combat experience. Lowest YG's were 91-94 and 1980-84. That is the demographic that would have been in AC/RC, recruiting, or post command jobs during the first years of OIF. YG's 95 and later are tracking above 90% combat experience - the ranks where officers serve as PL's, XO's, and Commanders since 2003.

The skew of high experience in the 1984-1990 YG's is most likely because Desert Storm experience is counted, and the high density of BN/BDE CDR's, XO's, and S3's in those YG's in the 2003-2007 period. I haven't seen data posted on whether the combat experiencewas OEF, OIF, DS, Panama, or Grenada.

I imagine Armor Branch's trend is typical for other combat branches.

[Van]

As a reservist, I have volunteered to deploy repeatedly, only to be stone-walled by apathetic bureaucrats in uniform. I'd like one more promotion, and without a deployment, my chances are getting slimmer. I'll echo Cavguy that for some, maybe many of the folks that haven't deployed, it isn't for lack of trying. Frankly, I'm to the point where if I hear one more person complaining about a lack of volunteers in the reserves, I'll give an answer that is candid beyond professionalism...

Oh, BTW- According to LTG Caldwell, Commander Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, the current class of CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is 75% combat veterans as opposed to the fraction of one percent when he went through the course.

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

CavGuy, you forced me to boldly go where I've never gone before. Who knew?

I can't see if there is any way to drill the numbers down further, to see if the combat patches came from earlier expeditionary campaigns or not, but I would imagine that for most of us in the combat arms of a certain generation it doesn't really matter: We hit Panama or Desert Storm (check), then Restore Hope (double check), then either Kosovo/Bosnia or Haiti before at least two deployments to OIF (double check) or OEF (not yet).

As one might obviously realize, these were unescorted tours, so the wives weren't hiding out at the Osan O-club after spending the paycheck at the PX grocery.

I don't really mind doing the unescorted tours because I signed the contract and expected as much. It's particularly annoying to hear National Guard officers and senior non-commissioned officers kvetch about being sent anywhere, considering most of their units hadn't seen combat since the Battle of the Bulge.

I think a combat deployment every 60 years or so is OK.

But it's also fair to say that the current optempo has been destabilizing for an Army (and its officer corps) that is increasingly married, unlike for previous wars.

Not seeing one's spouse for two out of the past three years can be bad for morale, as are the inevitable scourges of divorce, child custody battles, et al, that radiate from the deployment like so many ripples in a besplashed pond.

[Cavguy]

But it's also fair to say that the current optempo has been destabilizing for an Army (and its officer corps) that is increasingly married, unlike for previous wars.

Not seeing one's spouse for two out of the past three years can be bad for morale, as are the inevitable scourges of divorce, child custody battles, et al, that radiate from the deployment like so many ripples in a besplashed pond.

Agreed. The discussion made me think of the branch brief from Armor, so I thought it may be relevant. And as stated earlier, I like the USMC message because it doesn't belittle those who haven't been, but makes clear that they should start finding a way.....

Ref the deployments, I hear you. I spent four of my six years in Germany (2001-2007) either deployed (OIF x2, KFOR) or deployed for training aka "Grafenfels") The family separation is hard, and doesn't help a marriage ..... Not to mention even the single guys who desire a life.

Welcome to the board. Make sure you introduce yourself in the appropriate thread, if you haven't already.

[Cavguy]

Oh, BTW- According to LTG Caldwell, Commander Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, the current class of CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is 75% combat veterans as opposed to the fraction of one percent when he went through the course.

I actually thought it would be higher now - interesting. I don't know if he was counting cross-service and foreign officers in the percentage though.

Thanks for the info.

[Rob Thornton]

Two Council Related Threads...

* Army Offers Officers Incentives
* Army Development of Junior Leaders


As was pointed out, we've done allot of thinking over this subject. I read Patriot's piece, and thought about it for the last couple of days.

Its one of these things where you know you have to have more qualified people to achieve the solution - which is to grow the officer corps to meet the OPTEMPO of the Long War, but at the same time you can't keep the people you want to keep because you can't grow qualified people fast enough to reduce the burden, and we are unwilling to go try something else besides incremental approaches toward retention.

We have a two-fold problem. Keeping what we have & growing more of it.

I think the solution may be one in the same. If you show the people currently serving that their worth means a great deal to the state by an investment strategy that speaks for itself, and is on par with the hardships they and their families endure for the freedom of their countrymen and their countryman's families enjoy, then perhaps they will continue to volunteer and deny themselves and their families the life that other Americans lead.

Once you have convinced the ones you already have, who are already risking all in the service of their nation, it stands to reason word will get out, and enough others will volunteer to meet our expanding needs.

I'd also submit that today's (and tomorrow's) battlefield, while as dangerous as any in its own way, requires a much broader, more mature and diverse skill set, with the ability to provide the type of innovation and creativity that private enterprise and OGAs covet, and are willing and capable of paying for. Companies have strategies for attracting and retaining talent that appeal to both the individual and their families. In some ways we do too, but our strategies are more inline with our requirements of the 1990s. Our need for the best and brightest have grown with our commitments, while our incentives and recognition of changing demographics have not kept pace.

The other day on Forbes Ben Stein was asked why we might have a tax increase and what we might do with it - he replied we should pay our military more, they are inadequately compensated for the job they do. I almost fell out of my chair - here is a well known financial guru on Fox, who the first answer out of the chute - is compensate the military adequately for the job they do! If he gets it, if that is his first answer out of all the things he could have said, why shouldn't legislators understand as well? Why would Stiller say that?

The first requirement for a civilization is security, without it, leisure time, art, economy,etc. will all fall to the barbarians. Our problem with officer retention should not be considered solely a problem which the military must fix, its far more important. It is a national problem. Its atrophy effects far more then just the uniformed services.

This does not necessarily mean a pay raise only, the plan would have to be holistic as mentioned before, and must appeal to the families as the demographics suggest - but a serious pay raise would immediately make the point about how much the nation values the services of its military.
Regards, Rob

[MattC86]

. . . growing more of it. . .

I think the solution may be one in the same. If you show the people currently serving that their worth means a great deal to the state by an investment strategy that speaks for itself, and is on par with the hardships they and their families endure for the freedom of their countrymen and their countryman's families enjoy, then perhaps they will continue to volunteer and deny themselves and their families the life that other Americans lead.

Once you have convinced the ones you already have, who are already risking all in the service of their nation, it stands to reason word will get out, and enough others will volunteer to meet our expanding needs.

. . .

The first requirement for a civilization is security, without it, leisure time, art, economy,etc. will all fall to the barbarians. Our problem with officer retention should not be considered solely a problem which the military must fix, its far more important. It is a national problem. Its atrophy effects far more then just the uniformed services.

This does not necessarily mean a pay raise only, the plan would have to be holistic as mentioned before, and must appeal to the families as the demographics suggest - but a serious pay raise would immediately make the point about how much the nation values the services of its military.
Regards, Rob

I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.

I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere so I'll keep it short, but at least from my perspective at Cornell, there is very little you could reasonably offer a lot of today's college students to become military officers. ROTC numbers are down, I am (so far, anyway) the only Cornell junior applying for Marine Corps PLC, and I know of almost no one who would entertain the idea. It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Matt,
Thanks for making a decision to serve!


I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.

It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.


I agree with you. I also agree with the your observation about youth, ambition and talent. What I am trying to say though is you have to change that sentiment, and you have to break down how you do that. It is probably not mono-causal since we are dealing with people's perceptions. I do think the first step in changing perceptions is by demonstrating the value you place on something. How do we do that in our society? When we really want to demonstrate how much something or somebody means to us, we sacrifice. How much does an education at the best University cost & why do people value it? How much does the best mechanic in town cost and why are people willing to pay him? How about food, automobiles, or anything else in our society? All of those things have some type of value and worth that translates and appeals to the general public. No matter if we are talking services or goods, we place value on things.

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

[Dennis]

Out of curiousity, what is the situation with the marine's in regards to mid-level officer retention?

[mmx1]

Out of curiousity, what is the situation with the marine's in regards to mid-level officer retention?

Can't speak personally to the retention levels or bonuses, but the Marines are behind the curve with respect to civilian graduate education. If I get a chance to get a sponsored Master's, it'll most likely be as a Major. Or I can try to squeeze it in on my own time and expense during a B-billet. Hard to admit, but I'm looking at my Army peers with some envy.

The official story is that any officer shortages are localized within particular grade/MOS combinations, not systemic as the Army's situation is. The following document outlines nothing as extensive as the Army has - incentive pay is limited to the aviation community (I recall hearing that they brought up helo incentives up to par with jets - there was previously a 2-3x disparity)
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2007/PDF/Chapter%202/Part%203/C&P2007Chap2pt3Enabling%20Capabilities%20Pg94-95%20Marine%20Corps%20Retention.pdf

[mmx1]

Hi Matt,

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

Having done recruiting at the other Ivy that starts with a C, you have to hit all those wickets, simply because of the level of ignorance that exists. Especially at elite universities, very few students know anyone in the military, so the first thing you have to do is clear the slate and set realistic expectations.
-No, you won't make comparable private sector pay, but you'll make comparable public service pay and the difference isn't drastic. Explaining BAH helps dampen the shock of putting a $26,000 base pay against, say, $60k + bonus as a first year analyst at a top firm.
-There is room for disagreement, particularly on ethical issues. The question "what if you get an order you disagree with" often comes up. It's not as though in the private sector, you can disobey your boss without consequences. But where we've gotten a black eye have been instances where no one stood up and said "this is wrong" - tied into the fact that William Calley was a college dropout.

To sell the military as not just something they can do but something they should do, we've hit on the role of college-educated officers as a moral compass. After all, our mandatory Contemporary Civilization course (a 1-year intro to western political philosophies), had its origins in a WWI course called "war studies" for cadets. Its purpose "rested on the fundamental principle that in the long run man's accomplishment can rise no higher than his ideals, and that an understanding of the worth of the cause for which one is fighting is a powerful weapon in the hands of an intelligent man. Indeed, I've come to appreciate the value of the class much more after commissioning, and have looked back on those works to reinforce my belief in and ability to explain why we're in this current fight. As Robert Kaplan puts it,


A frustrated warrior class, always kept in check by liberal-minded officers, is the sign of a healthy democracy.


Especially in a time when most people question our foreign policy, the "serving to defend" argument fails to carry water. Instead, we've refashioned it as a "shaping foreign policy at the ground level" argument. We will be overseas, and not necessarily for the right reasons - but you can do more good and have more influence as a JO interacting with foreigners than as a desk jockey at some other institution.

Ultimately, though, these young minds full of mush still have to adapt to a Martial lifestyle - one that is often alien to folks imagining themselves in a suit behind a desk somewhere. When your friends and family are aghast at such an idea, it's a lot of inertia to overcome.

I have to say I'm disheartened at hearing about the strains the military places on families. I didn't fully appreciate it when I joined and while it wouldn't have changed my decision, it would have given me some pause.

[CNP]

My first post since I joined SWC. By the way, I've enjoyed the exchanges I've read so far and appreciate the thoughtfulness of the comments on serious issues.

WRT bonuses, Navy's experience is quite different as Army is just starting down this road. We've been at it awhile - approx 1975 (I'm referring to specific lump-sum bonuses, not special pays like flight pay, sub pay, etc which are monthly adds that have quite a long history in the service).

My take-away from our experience is that the money, in and of itself, will never bring about a decision to stay for the people you really want to stay, but it will help prep the battlespace for the decision (particularly wrt spouse and family) if you get the amount right and keep it competitive.

What seems to work best in order to keep the best is a blended solution - meaningful operational tours with career recognition for those whose service merits it, advanced education opportunity and maintaining the proper balance between operational time (sea duty for us) and "home" time (shore duty).

Again, very different experiences going on now in Navy than with bulk of Army combat arms JOs, but the principles remain the same, I believe.

And, since in a very special way as Army goes so go the Armed Forces, I'm keeping a close eye on what is happening in my Army. Take care shipmates and all the best, JCHjr

[Patriot]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army. The pressures on the Army to expand to 48 BCTs, transfrom, and simultaneously fight a long war have required making changes in historically levels and rates of promotion which have directly impacted the perceptions of officers that the promotion system is currently not merit based. The impact of promoting marginal performers can not be overstated. Imagine a CPT that worked with a marginal performing CPT who is now a MAJ. How demoralizing is that? Solutions to problems such as these are not derived in Washington or at some bureau but through dialogue with the force to capture their perceptions.

If company and field grade officers are not asked their opioions, attitudes, and beliefs then their perception is the Army is not interested in what thay have to say. But their is a disconnect in the thinking of many officers on the "Army". The Army is really made up of two halves - one the one hand is the Department of the Army bureaucracy that runs all the personnel and administriva systems - OER, boards, LES, etc., and on the other hand is the "real" Army made of the unit you were in, the one you're in now, and the one you're going to be in. Making the distinction between the two is important because it helps you identify the source of the problem, which is not the unit Army. Again, if the bureaucracy ignores the force it will never figure out why officers are leaving is the first place.

[marct]

Hello Sir,


My first post since I joined SWC. By the way, I've enjoyed the exchanges I've read so far and appreciate the thoughtfulness of the comments on serious issues.

Welcome aboard!


My take-away from our experience is that the money, in and of itself, will never bring about a decision to stay for the people you really want to stay, but it will help prep the battlespace for the decision (particularly wrt spouse and family) if you get the amount right and keep it competitive.

What seems to work best in order to keep the best is a blended solution - meaningful operational tours with career recognition for those whose service merits it, advanced education opportunity and maintaining the proper balance between operational time (sea duty for us) and "home" time (shore duty).

I have a suspicion that it also relates to the concept of a "flexible career path". Ever since the demise of the "Organization Man" as a central cultural expectation (~1982 in Canada at the pop culture level), there has been an increasing expectation that each "job" (in the very old sense of the word) will give people new skills and network contacts that will be useful in finding their next "job", even if they stay in the same organization. A lot of recent research in career points to people choosing less money in order to gain favourable skills and network contacts, but only for a limited time (~2-3 years or so).

Many of the high tech firms got around the problem of retention by bypassing their HR departments in both hiring and career decisions. They adopted a mentoring model with hiring/project managers acting as mentors using a very dense network of weak ties as their basis, and this might be a model that the Army may want to adopt, at least in part (basically, it decentralizes a large part of the "individual career growth" responsibilities from HR to informal networks).

Marc

[Old Eagle]

Patriot --

Yes, it is demoralizing to see less than stellar officers move up the ranks. It is also troubling to see good officers leave, either voluntarily, or not.

If it's any reassurance, the system will correct itself once hostilities wind down. Since the Army intends to stay large, it will not happen with the same alacrity as post-Vietnam or post-Cold War, but it will happen. I was personally disappointed when the Army elected to use market forces to reduce the junior officer corps after the Cold War, rather than making the tough call to eliminate marginal performers.

When re-balancing does occur, it will not be perfect and it won't be "fair". Life ain't fair. As an observer/participant in several RIFs and SERBs, I can tell you from experience that it is heartbreaking to see some really outstanding officers selected to depart, while their less qualified peers survive.

It is incumbent on the senior leadership, starting at the bn level, to counsel young talent, develop it, and provide the OER/awards/etc to keep the talent motivated and moving up. That personal involvement is much more important than any systemic programs.

[Steve Blair]

Many of the high tech firms got around the problem of retention by bypassing their HR departments in both hiring and career decisions. They adopted a mentoring model with hiring/project managers acting as mentors using a very dense network of weak ties as their basis, and this might be a model that the Army may want to adopt, at least in part (basically, it decentralizes a large part of the "individual career growth" responsibilities from HR to informal networks).

Marc

The old regimental system (at least in the US Army) tended to work along similar lines. Obviously the effectiveness varied from regiment to regiment, but officers who didn't make the grade were "encouraged" to leave the service.

[Cavguy]

The impact of promoting marginal performers can not be overstated. Imagine a CPT that worked with a marginal performing CPT who is now a MAJ. How demoralizing is that? Solutions to problems such as these are not derived in Washington or at some bureau but through dialogue with the force to capture their perceptions.

Again, if the bureaucracy ignores the force it will never figure out why officers are leaving is the first place.

Agreed.

I'm not always a fan of everything posted over at Defense and the National Interest, but this article (http://www.d-n-i.net/fabius/generals.htm) captured what I had been thinking.

What we are seeing now is little more than the bill coming due from the issues identified and discussed in 2000-2001 when my peers were leaving the force in high numbers due many of the same issues we're discussing here. 9/11 caused a stir of patriotism and service that caused many to decide to stay in the army to fight the enemy. Hence, the low exit rates in 2002-2004.

Now the chickens are coming home to roost. The army never dealt with the issues in the 2000-2001 studies, and the stress on the force (which people thought was bad then!) has grown exponentially. The Army didn’t deal with the structural and generational issues.

In a way, a perfect storm is here. Officers are generally getting out for a mixture of the following reasons:

1) OPTEMPO. Many officers I know that left the army enjoyed their service, but just can’t handle the repeated deployments. It is particularly hard on those who were LT’s since 2002. Most are facing their third or fourth deployment, and they don’t have an “exit option” to a slower job in the immediate future. All they see are additional deployments. If married, this means usually having been deployed to training or war the majority of their marriage. If single, it means they have no opportunity to develop meaningful relationships.

The cumulative effect of deployments cannot be underestimated. The “12 months dwell time” between deployments is more aptly described as “12 months of lighting your hair on fire and running in circles” to prepare for the next deployment. In effect, soldiers really get between 4-6 actual months of deployment time at home, and only the leave period is truly restful.

2) Leadership Failure. This is the issue from the 90’s that remains unaddressed, and the link above has all the studies and essays that define it. 9/11 gave the army a "hall pass" on the issue. Many young officers I know exit because their first boss was a “bad” boss. The army has no institutional incentive (unless another Marshall comes along) to reform it’s officer training and leadership system with respect to junior officers. That attitude is derived from “After all, the system obviously works because it recognized *my* talent and made me a LTC, COL, General, etc., and those who didn’t get promoted didn’t deserve it anyway”

It does all come down to leadership, and many junior officers don’t see that their leaders or the army really care about them. It’s not because the words aren’t right, it’s the actions and “can-do”/”suck it up, it will pass” attitude that comes out. We’ve all watched leave cancelled, equipment shortfalls, training corners cut, etc. It communicates a very clear message. I was fortunate that in my most wavering time I worked for an exceptional battalion commander, who built the best team I’ve seen in the army and made the army “fun”. Even through 15 months of OIF. Unfortunately, he’s the exception.

3) The Peter Principle. 100% of my peers in my year group got promoted to major. I know my peers. 100% of us didn’t need to get promoted. My former company xo, who left the army, citied high promotions as a factor before he left. Pointing to a universally known, subpar peer of mine, he said “If the army’s willing to make him a major and put him in charge of troops again, this isn’t an army I want to be in”.

Jack Welch, the former CEO of GE, writes in his book “Winning” about the criticality of differentiation. If you reward everyone equally, the middle “good” performers lose their motivation quickest (the top generally perform that way because it’s in their nature) and leave the organization. Hence Welch ruthlessly culled the bottom 10%. It resulted in better performance in the organization because people knew performance was rewarded and incompetence and underperformance was cut.

The army is turning into a version of the Special Olympics – in promotions, OER’s, and medals. Everyone’s a winner, but some of us are still handicapped. There is no block check on CPT OER's anymore. Everyone of certain grades (with rare exception) gets a Bronze Star at the end of their OIF rotation, deserved or not, fobbit or not, role or not. When a medal doesn’t differentiate from the population, it loses its meaning. How can someone differentiate what I did for mine versus theirs? What do you tell a young Sergeant who patrolled Ramadi every day and got an ARCOM when individuals who never left the wire walk away with Bronze Stars? (Don’t get me wrong, some supporters deserve every bit of it for keeping the line supplied, but since everyone gets it, it’s meaningless)

4) A mismanaged war. Kaplan’s article, and LTC Yingling’s, describe this one well. Our junior officers see this all unfolding, they have been closest to the line, and seen the most suffering among their soldiers and peers. It's personal, painful, and emotional to them, and they want someone to blame. That's natural (to a point) in all wars.

That said, I remain optimistic. I think that, like after Vietnam, those that remain and went through the crucible as a junior officer will enact significant change on the system. And I think that today’s leadership are actually slightly more attuned to the issue than the Vietnam generation, and are at least beginning to try to find solutions. But I think the calculus is that for now it is easier to bribe them to stay in (bonuses, grad school) than to address the real systemic problems while at war.

Finally the whole discussion and GEN Cody brief reminds me of this (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=20029#post20029) incident with GEN Abrams while chief of staff in the early 70’s. Will our leadership be as perceptive?

[Ski]

There will be no solution until the Army leadership stops working off a "100% = success" system.

It's all about meeting numbers at this point. The entire Army, throughout all components, is becoming critically short on CPT's and MAJ's. Just look at the promotion rates over the last three years. It doesn't matter if you are the Morale and Welfare Officer at Ft. Greely, or the 977th Dishwashing and Laundry Company Commander, you're still going to make 04 without any difficulty, and 05 with a tiny bit of difficulty.

And since the Army has decided to expand by 35,000 pax, these strains will be accentuated rather than addressed because the focus is still on quantity, not quality.

[Van]

Footnote on the "Bad Bosses";

The tour where I decided to exit active duty ('99-'00), I had a BDE CDR who was a real 'go-to-war', light fighter, steely-eyed killer but had a command climate that made it clear that anyone without a ranger tab, anyone who wasn't an infantry officer, wasn't really worth his time, effort, or resources, and should be replaced by a "REAL" officer. In a light brigade, he might have been OK, but this was a mechanized BDE... I left that unit, and was back in the reserves a year later.

Fast forward six years... I did some drill days supporting an exercise, and COL Hoo-ah was in the same room as I was... He wasn't selected for BG, and all the Hoo-ah had left him.

I firmly believe that the heart of the problem is the 'flesh-trader' mentality of the Army's personnel system, treating all officers as interchangable with other officers of a given rank and specialty. That's what put an end to my time on active duty. The best example and most pathetic attempt at negotiation ever, was from my branch manager during my last phone-con with branch. This harassed, overworked/bumbling non-people oriented (you choose) individual couldn't wrap himself around the idea that there might be incentives other than my next assignment to pursuade me to stay on active duty, and that money was not the only reason I was leaving active duty.

[wm]

I firmly believe that the heart of the problem is the 'flesh-trader' mentality of the Army's personnel system, treating all officers as interchangable with other officers of a given rank and specialty.

Van,

I am sure that we all have some story (or stories) about a benighted branch assignment officer. But, these stories are just anecdotal symptoms of the big disease. The "flesh trader mentality" is not unique to the Army's personnel system. It has a much larger scope. It is best expressed in the discussions about reducing the "tooth to tail" ratio.

The miltary could have a very focused effort to match faces and spaces, put the best person for the job in that job. But to do so would require a much larger investment in people and time doing administrative/non-combat/tail sorts of things than our budgets allow. We see this fact in many places--reduction in lengths of time that folks are kept in training, the number of times that people are allowed to train, the move to replace manned with unmanned combat and surveillance vehicles being just a few examples. The point is that budgets drive us to do things we might not otherwise have chosen. However, I think that, to borrow Dr. Seuss's title, if I ran the circus, I'd spend a lot more of my money on the commodity most precious to any organization--the people and better systems to support their needs at the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy.

Lest I be accused of one-sided thinking, let me acknowledge that there are other considerations that may be more unique to the military's need to manage people at the least common denominator. These have to do with interoperability and continuity of operations. When a TOC gets blown away, one must hope that the leadership was not so specialized that it was irreplaceable. (I realize that this example has a fair amount of hyperbole.) Perhaps a better example would be Army Engineers--one of their explicit missions in the 1993 vintage FM100-5 from is "to fight as infantry when required." Too much specialization and selectivity in assignments run counter to these requirements.

We must find a the middle way.

[Dennis]

I agree with the points made by Cavguy as the source of the issues and I concur with Rob's approach to the problem.

The system is way to focused on the 50 meter target (retaining first term guys) at the expense and disillusionment of the 100-150 meter target (2nd term and career guys.

The system of rewards have to get back to encouraging long term buy in to the organization and not just doing your 2-4 years and taking your money or education and heading off to the private sector to make some real money.

It's about rewarding the right behavior, which in turn shows what the system values. Right now those who have been sacrificing and who continue to do so are not rewarded accordingly. The incentives that were recently proposed for young CPTs is a perfect example, focus on getting the new people to sign up for longer but no reward for those that are already committed and will likely stay for 20.

I know that I initially joined the Army as a way to ensure an acceptable quality of life for my family and because I wanted to be part of an honorable and respected profession. I really can't complain about the rewards I have recieved as I have been able to give my family a great quality of life and have had a BA and now a master's paid for by the Army. However, it is difficult to see others who have done less and likely will do less get rewarded more simply because we need the bodies.

I agree with Rob's assessment that we must make the military be an attractive profession to the masses. This is very difficult in an economic environment that offers much greater monetary opportunities in the civilian sector.

Although I too would like to remain positive about this, the pragmatic side of me feels that this really won't get better until the US economy takes another down turn and it becomes attractive again for those high quality people, who succeed in everything they do, to stay on board for the long haul.

[Van]

WM
The solution is imbedded in your restatement of the problem, if I may quote slightly out of context:

a much larger investment in people

There's the solution, but noone in a position to change things is ready to acknowledge that the baby is really this ugly.

Now just a little more of the story; at the time that I left the AC, my branch had THE worst retention rate for company grade officers. Was the Korean War era personnel management system the only issue? No. Was it a major issue? Yes. I'll agree that it is part of a bigger problem, but I believe that it is "the last straw" for many folks we should really be trying to keep.

[mmx1]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army.

That this is assumed to be fact is a problem in and of itself. I was answering marct's question, but the tie-in is that the shift in recruiting in the past decades away from the west and northeast and towards the south is hurting the diversity and quality of the officer pool - with the result that you have more poor performers demotivating everyone else and competing for the same slots come promotion time.

For example, compare the city of New York with Alabama. NYC has twice as many occupants and four times as many college students as the state of Alabama. But we have just 2 AROTC programs vice 10 in Alabama, producing 1/5th as many officers.
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-urbanchrtbk0702-14.html
The Army blames this on the difficulty of recruiting Northeast and urban students. But it's become a self-perpetuating prophecy. The closure and consolidation of urban ROTC units and the consequent shift in recruiting funds have dwindled the ROTC presence in major college towns like Boston and New York to a wisp - ROTC recruiting is practically nonexistent outside of the two home campuses.

The distribution of funding and programs makes sense from a numbers perspective to go after easier markets, but only under the dangerous assumption that every student is interchangeable - that the 200th student you add here is just as good as the 10th student elsewhere. When you're digging 20x as deep in one student pool vice another, don't be surprised at the results.

I find it ironic that we'll praise civilian graduate liberal arts education on one hand, holding up Petraeus' Princeton doctorate as an example, and then so quickly write off undergraduates from the same elite institutions as not worth the effort to recruit.

Public service will always have trouble competing with the private sector in terms of monetary compensation - and I worry about the day that the federal government becomes the most lucrative employer. But the problem today is that to many Americans, military service is considered distinct and inferior to other forms of public service.

[Steve Blair]

But the problem today is that to many Americans, military service is considered distinct and inferior to other forms of public service.

This is more a return of what has (sadly) been a typical American mindset. The military in general (and the Army in particular) was considered the refuge of unemployable scoundrels up until the Depression era.

But back to the problem of recruiting and the like at elite schools; you also miss out on some of the best and brightest from other states. These days it's very common for kids to go to out-of-state universities, and there you're really missing a promising recruiting pool. Often those kids are top-notch performers, and in some cases they come from states (like Montana) that still have a strong spirit of service. But if there's no ROTC, they can't take part in that and still attend the school they feel they've had to fight their way into.

[MattC86]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army.

Sir, my apologies; didn't mean to hijack your thread. I do want to respond to Rob, though.


Hi Matt,
Thanks for making a decision to serve!

Thank you. But only if they let me - I still gotta apply and pass OCS. . .






So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

Certainly the money is an issue - it's the right place to start. Beyond that, I'm not sure I can solve the problem; maybe just further diagnose it. The problem lies in part in what my peers value - and what their parents value. My parents are exceedingly unhappy about my decision, and they aren't nearly as shallow as some were about the importance of "Ivy League" status or any of that. It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains. The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.
So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.

I know - I didn't really solve the problem, just explained it more. Oh, well.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Matt,
You are going to make a very fine officer I think. We certainly appreciate your candor - it will serve you and those you lead well.
Best regards, Rob

[RTK]

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers?

Rob,

I know you've been in my professional neighborhood for a while and know what I do on a day to day basis. After over 400 new lieutenants over the last 10 months, I can safely say that the attitude won't change until the societal values change. I never would have thought to ask a senior branch-qualified captain the question "why" when given a specified task. Perhaps its a sign of me getting old. I actually called an LT "son" today in a derogatory manner. He's 7 years younger than me. I feel like I just turned into my father last night....:eek:

[Ken White]

It only gets worse...:wry:

[jonSlack]

It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains.

I think part of the problem is that being an officer in the military is no longer viewed as a profession but rather as just another management job that comes with the added "benefits" of being more dangerous, having crappier hours, and providing less pay.


The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.

How do you attract those college grads?

How about target them while they are still undergrads? I not talking about my stepping up current recruitment strategies.

Rather, lets send back high quality post-command captains and even junior captains for a second undergraduate degree. Introduce undergrads, many of whom may still be undecided about their post-graduation plans, to an officer not much older than them. Show the undergrads via first hand personal interaction that the military is not full of "homocidal neanderthals" but men and women who at the core are not much different than them. Additionally, the officers' main task would not be to actively recruit, their main task would be to earn a second undergraduate degree. However, through the social interaction that will happen in classes and study groups as well in extracurricular activities such as campus organizations, clubs, and intramural sports they are able to present a positive image of what a military officer is.

Basically, I think one of the the best ways, if not the best way, to change the negative perceptions undergrads may have of the military is by increasing personal contact and relationships with those currently serving in the military.


So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.

I do not know how much of an impact the call to service would have had immediaetly following 9/11. A think alot of the young people who would have been inclined to heed the call would have been the same ones who saw the "implied task" in watching 9/11 unfold live on CNN and were already looking into how to serve. Additionally, a call to national service now would also be ineffective as those who are willing to serve are already planning to serve. The "call" now may push some fence-sitters but I think more fence-sitters will end up being drawn in by the recruiting bonuses out there.

Reference money: I think money is atleast a partial answer to recruiting and retention at all levels. However, while I think the increased OPTEMPO requires bonuses as a reward/incentive for staying, I also think that a substantial increase in base pay across the board, E-1 to O-10, would be a signal that the military, and the nation, is willing to invest in servicemembers and that an increased level of financial compensation will remain over the long-term, not just as long as there is increased OPTEMPO. Additionally, if you intend to retain officers, and junior Soldiers and NCOs, by selling the military to be a longterm career the increased base pay would provide more financial promise than the current system of relying solely on bonuses. Increased base pay equals relatively guarenteed and predictable future financial compensation while bonuses are really just a short-term increase in base pay for as long as there is an increased demand and/or decreased supply caused by increased OPTEMPO or other factors.

[Stan]

Hey Matt !

I echo the praise of the others herein...Thanks for joining what I consider to be America's finest institution !!!



Certainly the money is an issue - it's the right place to start. Beyond that, I'm not sure I can solve the problem; maybe just further diagnose it. The problem lies in part in what my peers value - and what their parents value. My parents are exceedingly unhappy about my decision, and they aren't nearly as shallow as some were about the importance of "Ivy League" status or any of that. It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains. The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.

I recall our neighbors freaking out when my old man told them I was joining the Army. He blew it off, but not before giving them a load of Sierra for not wanting their son in the service of our country. Later in the 80s their kid joined anyway.

I don't recall if the issue was just money (back then it wasn't the greatest paycheck), but our neighbors were very worried about the status quo. Some colleges won't permit US Military recruiters to post ads or even let them address classes.


So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.

I fully concur with you. Following 9/11 would have been an ideal opportunity for a draft. Granted not all will remain after fulfilling their conscript periods, but those that remain want to, and that's paramount. At the very least, we will have a cadre of young educated folks that better understand the US Military, appreciate what others are sacrificing, and who are sufficiently trained to pick up a weapon and fight for the USA !

Regards, Stan

[marct]

Hi Matt,


Sir, my apologies; didn't mean to hijack your thread. I do want to respond to Rob, though.

Well, I don't think it is a topic hijacking :D. Actually, recruitment, retention, professional development and retirement are really all part of a unified system (along with a bunch of other areas).


The problem lies in part in what my peers value - and what their parents value. My parents are exceedingly unhappy about my decision, and they aren't nearly as shallow as some were about the importance of "Ivy League" status or any of that. It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains. The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.

Back in the 1950's and 60's, sociologists used to rank professions o their social status (I haven't seen any of those since the 1980's or so - then again, 'm not really looking for them). "Professions", as a group, all tend to have exemplars in popular culture that help to establish and maintain their status. This, in turn, "teaches" the younger professionals how to act. I remember reading a study of the Mafia years ago, and it turned out that a lot of them used the Godfather as their role model.

So, what role models do we have in popular culture for the military? Just in the TV show area, I can really only think of JAG and The Unit - neither of which is exactly the "normal". Then we have shows like Over There and, sorry, blanking on the name - it's a Vietnam era series, that tend to send out anti-military narratives or, if not full narratives,then at least anti-military tropes or schemas (which you also find to some degree in Jag and the Unit).

The big archetype that is missing is the old defensor hominem (Defender of Mankind - think the Archangel Michael in Roman Catholicism, Mithras in the Roman Legions, or Horus in Egypt). In a very weird way, this archetype has been co-opted by the anti-military crowd using a justification of the military attacks civilians therefore we protect humanity by attacking the military. This is probably one of the roots of the homicidal neanderthal stereotype (or "myrmidon" for the Ivy League types ;)).

The truly encouraging, to my mind at any rate, point is that for anti-military social movements to adopt this archetype, they have to be willing to act as if the were military forces (which we can see happening) - and they are freakin' incompetent in this role! Furthermore, that narrative when grabbed by the anti-military movements is quite unstable, and subject to a really good counter narrative that appropriates elements of their own position. A really good example of such a counter narrative ("Fight Fear") is the current series of recruitment commercials for the Canadian forces (available here (http://www.forces.ca/v3/engraph/coolstuff/mediagallery_en.aspx?bhcp=1), requires Flash 8).

You say that "The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads" and I both agree and disagree. Yes, certainly attracting college grads is a crucial component of countering that stereotype, but it also has to be done by media campaigns - counter narratives - and also by something similar to what JonSlack is suggesting. And, BTW, the counter narratives have to start early, e.g. kids cartoons and shows.

Let me toss out a final point here that has been touched on in a lot of the retention discussions and that is "family life". One of the key points about status and status displays, and now I'm using an evolutionary psych argument, has always been to attract and retain mates. Just from a quick gleaning of the other threads, one of the key retention issues for junior officers and NCOs appears to be related to either starting a family or keeping one together which has become increasingly difficult with the heavy op tempo. It's also damn hard to justify in terms of mating strategies. Think about it for a minute - "hi, marry me - I'll have a competitive salary and you'll only see me three months out of every year and, oh yeah, I'll be posted in that place where we are getting blown away." This is not a good argument that you will be around to help raise the kids (although it may be a good argument for other things :wry:).

So, how do we make the military (rather than the anti-military) "attractive" in the sense of mate selection? I'm not sure, although there are some areas that would help - dependents benefits, money, education for the entire family (esp. children), etc.

Marc

[Old Eagle]

Retaining best & brightest

With the obvious frustration at 100% promotion rates, you max out BZ selections for the best officers. Whatever Congress allows, you go for it. That's a motivator beyond $$$ and schools.

The ROTC dilemna

Most arguments are chicken and egg. We lost a lot when some of the fancy schools threw ROTC off campus. That said, I worked at a major Boston ROTC detachment back in the day. We had cadets from 5 Boston area schools, including Harvard, and commissioned only a few new LTs a year. Despite a HUGE waste of taxpayer money, the Army did the right thing and kept the program alive. So, does the Army close NE ROTC programs because we don't "like" that area of the country or do we close them because they are not sustainable?

By the way, read a similar argument about the Army's Chaplains Corps. Army recruits too many conservative, evangelical chaplains who produce too many conservative, evangelical soldiers. Hmmm. Can't wait to see the run from the liberal mainstream seminaries to the recruiting stations to offset that trend!

[Smitten Eagle]

Has anybody read the book "AWOL: The Unexcused Absense of America's Upper Classes from Military Service", by Schaeffer and Douquette.

I read it some time ago, and found it quite enlightening on two fronts:

1) The level of antipathy members of the professional class have against the military. These people would not admit to it openly--they "support the troops." But the second their son decides to take the commission, their true feelings come out.

2) Much of this antipathy is at least partly related to an isolation between the military officers and the professional/chattering class.

I can personally attest to some of this, as I'm sure many others can who read this forum. My wife is a good Minnesota liberal of the Garrison Keillor variety. Her father is a university professor, and her mother is professional as well. Their circle of friends who have anything to do with the military are from the Vietnam cohort--no one more recent, and their thoughts/feelings are colored by the Vietnam experience. They have not been updated in 40 years!

Indeed, it's bad when I'm introduced as a Marine Captain, and they ask me how long it took for me to make Sergeant. They were trying to humor me by giving the impression that they knew something about the military. Their level of knowledge only betreyed their ignorance.

Their ignorance is their fault, but our responsibility to fix. If the military has any professional ethic at all, it needs to fix its reputation as the abode of neanderthals (true or not).

So, bottom line, I think that the military's social standing is certainly related to officer retention and recruiting. I'm not sure increased salaries are useful except to the extent that it brings social repute to attract talent and to re-integrate the military into professional society. Likewise, I don't think civilian masters degrees are particularly useful except to the extent that they improve the military skill set of the soldier and to the extent that they increase positive interaction between the professional class and the military officers. This is key if we are going to be prepared to fight wars with armies with backing from the entire population, not just rural conservatives.

AWOL addresses these issues. Highly recommended.

Pardon the length of this screed. :o

[RTK]

1) The level of antipathy members of the professional class have against the military. These people would not admit to it openly--they "support the troops." But the second their son decides to take the commission, their true feelings come out.



On the other hand, as a good USMC buddy of mine told me a few days ago, "everyone has a story about how they were ALMOST a Marine."

:D

[MattC86]

Smitten, I haven't read the book, but from the description you gave, I can personally attest to those issues.

I'm from the North Shore suburbs of Chicago, and to put it mildy, it ain't military country. My high school had over 1000 kids graduate in 2004 - only one kid was going in (to West Point). No other officers, no enlistments, nothing.

And now, as I try to explain to my parents (my dad was at UC Berkeley in 1968, so figure that out) why I'm applying for PLC, all this same stuff comes out. They really got furious when I explained that they had always taught me the values of service, selflessness, and doing what is right, and now I was trying to do just that.

I think my mom is more just worried about physical safety, but in my dad you can see every stereotype he's ever had about the military (and Marines in particular) come to the surface.

The attitude with all these people you refer to is a "You're young and talented with all the greatest advantages in life - how could you ever throw it away to join up with a bunch of angry sociopaths with small brains."

And no matter what we do, that attitude will take a long time to dismantle, if indeed it ever happens.

Matt

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Could happen, I suppose. As a survivor of Eisnhower's cuts and one who was in Florida, DC and Korea during the Carter years, I sure hope we do the absorbtion of cuts in funds better the next time than we did those two times...

I am not holding my breath and when the axe falls on those budgets it usually cuts deep and fast...things like early retirements, no pay raises, no training funds, no repair parts...they're a commin' and probably not too far away either.

If the timing works out right the repubs can hope it happens under Obama or Hillary and shift all the blame to the Dems. Much like we heard during the early 90's under Bill Clinton with the draw downs initiated under Bush I. Of course, my pessimism is only couched by my sarcasm so who knows but like I tell the fellas in my office, "...all good things must come to an end", and this current boom in military spending will not be sustained indefinitely. If you're paying attention to the USAF, they are initiating another round of personnel cuts this year to make room for the impending budget cuts. However, for them it is a matter of having enough left over to pay for all the F-22s we will need for the next big air war.

PT

[AdaptAndOvercome]

About the distance between the officer corps and professional classes, I have been ruminating on that for awhile. Not long ago I was on an airplane and happened to sit next to a wealthy businessman and a lawyer, both from New England. I took that time to chat about world affairs and offer them a perspective from the profession of arms.

Towards the end of the flight, the businessman asked me what sort of things officers study to be ready for war. I happened to have my copy of Roots of Strategy and showed him a few diagrams from Frederick the Great's "Instructions to his Generals", explaining how the principles of war used in those maneuvers are applicable today.

By discussing warfare at an intellectual level, I think I removed many Vietnam-era stereotypes that these men had accepted for forty years. I think we need to engage professionals at the same level that their professions engage them.

That said, I believe there are many barriers between the military and the professional classes, and one very large one is terminology. Why do we say "land navigation" instead of orienteering? The word navigation has a maritime connotation. Adding the word "land" does not change the connotation, it only makes the term sound as though it were created by someone with a small vocabulary. Why do we say "human terrain" instead of "demographics" or "anthropology" when both of these are established and esteemed disciplines? Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline? Too often we invent new terms instead of consulting a thesaurus.

One of my friends argues that a profession must have terms which are used almost exclusively by that profession in order to be taken seriously. I agree. If I have to explain to someone what Clausewitz meant by tactics, I feel that I am acting as an ambassador of the profession of arms. If I have to explain that a VBIED is a car bomb or that a DFAC is a cafeteria or that HMMWV stands for High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (a term which could arguably be applied to a bicycle); I cringe inside because these terms are esoteric for the sake of being esoteric.

What's more, many officers I know are not very good with spelling, grammar, nor oration. I have seen many slide shows with 2-3 misspellings per slide and a few officers who used the phrase "in terms of" as a crutch. We cannot give the impression of war as a thinking person's game unless we show the same level of literacy as other professions.

To that end, the Army needs to spend time in its basic courses on grammatical instruction and writing. From my personal experience, the average high school graduate can only discern a subject from a predicate. They do not know the parts of speech, cases, nor how to diagram a sentence. If the officer does not receive any more instruction in college (which many don't), then that is the level of ability we see after commissioning. This makes instruction in language very difficult. Some people have an aptitude for learning languages; they can just "pick it up". I learn best through comparing the grammars, as I think do many people, but they are handicapped by their insufficient instruction. I, personally, suffered in my studies because the course work was written for learners who understand the mechanics of speaking naturally and do not need to be explicitly told the rules and phonetics of the language to become conversational.

Commanders must also encourage professional development through reading classics. The Art of War is a very short book, yet I have immense trouble convincing my peers to spend an hour reading it. They expect the Army to train them in everything they need to know. What they really need to know is that the body of martial thought is larger than any set of field manuals.

In conclusion, the Army can improve its retention of officers by using three methods to raise the esteem of the officer corps in the eyes of the professional classes. Firstly, encourage professional development through reading from BOLC I to the end of an officer's career. This will allow officers to engage other professionals in discourse at the theoretical level. Secondly, ensure that officers have writing and speaking skills comparable to other professions in order to remove any prejudices other professionals may have against them as uneducated. Finally, offer language instruction that takes advantage of the officers' mastery of English syntax. Other professionals will view a bilingual person as more educated than an unilingual one. Taken together, these measures will show the professional classes that the officer corps is a good place for young, ambitious, college graduates who yearn for more initiative and adventure than they could ever have in the private sector.

[RTK]

Adapt and Overcome,

I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms.



Towards the end of the flight, the businessman asked me what sort of things officers study to be ready for war. I happened to have my copy of Roots of Strategy and showed him a few diagrams from Frederick the Great's "Instructions to his Generals", explaining how the principles of war used in those maneuvers are applicable today.

I've seen and taught a lot of LTs this year (somewhere in the neighborhood of 450). Those with the most difficulty with their chosen profession have been those who can explain the strategic and operational level, but can't apply a basic battle drill or skill level one task, especially when under duress. There are varying levels of professional expertise. Certainly the new bank teller isn't an expert on the futures markets in Asia. Nor should the new officer in regards to the strategic application of applied kinetic diplomacy


By discussing warfare at an intellectual level, I think I removed many Vietnam-era stereotypes that these men had accepted for forty years. I think we need to engage professionals at the same level that their professions engage them.

I hope that I'm incorrectly reading into this that your assumption is that we don't. We do. Chances are you haven't been in the environment to witness or participate in it firsthand yet.


That said, I believe there are many barriers between the military and the professional classes, and one very large one is terminology.

Terminology is a barrier within the profession of arms as well, mainly due to individual discipline and understanding of one's job. Ask your average logistics officer the differences between seize, contain, hold, secure, and isolate and you'll get as many different answers as you will people.


Why do we say "land navigation" instead of orienteering? The word navigation has a maritime connotation. Adding the word "land" does not change the connotation, it only makes the term sound as though it were created by someone with a small vocabulary.

By definition, according to Webster's, orienteering is a sport. Navigation, as a transitive verb, is to make one's way over or through. As an intrasitive verb, it is to steer a course through a medium.


Why do we say "human terrain" instead of "demographics" or "anthropology" when both of these are established and esteemed disciplines?

Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?



Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline?

Take a look at the staff at SSI, CALL, SAMS, The Army War College, and any number of professional education establishments around.



HMMWV stands for High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (a term which could arguably be applied to a bicycle); I cringe inside because these terms are esoteric for the sake of being esoteric.

It's actually High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (ref. Army Technical Manual TM 9-2320-280-10)




To that end, the Army needs to spend time in its basic courses on grammatical instruction and writing.

Let me invoke my right to free speach on this one, since it's a call to change the program of instruction within my area of expertise.

Here's the bottom line; if you get this far through life with a mean age of around 22 for a brand new LT, do you really think that the schoolhouse is going to be able to undo in 85 days what you were deficient in receiving your first 22 years of life? There are a lot of things I can teach. I can teach actions on contact. I can teach platoon tactical tasks, fundamentals of maneuver, battle drills, and reporting procedures. I cannot do three things; I cannot teach character, I cannot bestow upon someone drive and initiative, and I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do.


Commanders must also encourage professional development through reading classics. The Art of War is a very short book, yet I have immense trouble convincing my peers to spend an hour reading it. They expect the Army to train them in everything they need to know. What they really need to know is that the body of martial thought is larger than any set of field manuals.

Two things on this.

1. The CSA has a reading list broken down level of experience/responsibility. It's available at AAFES and here (http://www.army.mil/CMH/reference/CSAList/CSAList.htm).

2. I'll tell you the same thing I told Fred Kaplan last month. As a Commander, I was much more concerned about whether my guys could secure a ground convoy than whether they could recite all 14 Chapters of Sun Tzu's Art of War.


In conclusion, the Army can improve its retention of officers by using three methods to raise the esteem of the officer corps in the eyes of the professional classes.

I wasn't under the impression that we were held in low esteem. In fact, I'm tired of getting phone calls of people outside the Army trying to hire me.


You come into this profession with a lot of preconcieved notions that may or may not pan out for you. Try not to get so myopic on that which the military is not. Make the most of what you have in front of you. After all, you're at the start line of a marathon.

[AdaptAndOvercome]

"I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms."

I am beginning to regret having made an introduction. One of the most enlightening posters here is marct who is an anthropologist. This site is so didactic because people from all different backgrounds contribute their diverse viewpoints. Before coming here, I would never have consulted an anthropologist for insights into counterinsurgency. Now, my horizons are much wider. I believe that the central theme of small wars is that in strength there is weakness; and in weakness there is strength. In the same way, every poster here has something worth saying no matter where he is from.

"I've seen and taught a lot of LTs this year (somewhere in the neighborhood of 450). Those with the most difficulty with their chosen profession have been those who can explain the strategic and operational level, but can't apply a basic battle drill or skill level one task, especially when under duress. There are varying levels of professional expertise. Certainly the new bank teller isn't an expert on the futures markets in Asia. Nor should the new officer in regards to the strategic application of applied kinetic diplomacy"

I don't think one proficiency excludes another. Anyone who can not perform basic tasks needs to be remediated, but I hope the people who are the best at basic tasks can also understand higher levels of war. As we said before, the promotion rate is so high that most lieutenants will become lieutenant colonels if they stay with the Army.

"I hope that I'm incorrectly reading into this that your assumption is that we don't. We do. Chances are you haven't been in the environment to witness or participate in it firsthand yet."

You are reading that the way I meant it. My experience is in the Northeast. Few people know much about the military, and the most professionally educated people often have the dimmest view. I would like to hear how we have been promoting our profession to those people if you'd like to share.

"Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?"

This is problematic because we are defining the environment based on our standard operating procedures instead of the other way around. Why can't we change OAKOC or say that OAKOC can analyze demographics as well?

"Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline?"

It was simply a suggestion for something we should investigate. Many people who teach at those institutions were in the military or have strong ties through family. What of everyone else?

"It's actually High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (ref. Army Technical Manual TM 9-2320-280-10)"

That's a strike against me for not checking that fact. Still, the term is very vague.

"I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do."

I was thinking more along the lines of BOLC I and Captain's Career Course doing this. I know time is short when they get to you.

"The CSA has a reading list broken down level of experience/responsibility."

It's a good list, but it needs more promotion. We need to work together to make sure that all officers continue their learning.

"As a Commander, I was much more concerned about whether my guys could secure a ground convoy than whether they could recite all 14 Chapters of Sun Tzu's Art of War."

Reading military classics is not about recitation; it's about learning a way of thinking. I have put my faith in the writings of great generals because there is a consistent thread across time, place, and culture. Sun Tzu (whether he was one author or many) put it most succinctly, so I encourage that as a starting point.

"I wasn't under the impression that we were held in low esteem. In fact, I'm tired of getting phone calls of people outside the Army trying to hire me."

Army officers do get a lot of very attractive job offers, but I still assert that the profession of arms is held in very low esteem in some quarters, notably New England. Since part of this discussion was about recruiting at Ivy League universities, I thought it was worth mentioning my discussion with the two men from the Northeast. Take a trip to Boston some time. It's a nice city, and I think you'll see what I mean.

"You come into this profession with a lot of preconcieved notions that may or may not pan out for you. Try not to get so myopic on that which the military is not. Make the most of what you have in front of you."

I've got a computer in front of me, and I think becoming a contributor to this site is the best thing I've done professionally in a long time.

Thanks to everyone for your time and responses.

[RTK]

I am beginning to regret having made an introduction...In the same way, every poster here has something worth saying no matter where he is from.

Let's be honest, your intro was thin gruel at best. So far your experiences are yours alone. You're going to have to overcome this feeling of inadequacy considering you'll be taking a platoon within the next two years full of junior enlisted soldiers and NCOs with 2 or 3 combat tours under their belt. You have to start somewhere.


I don't think one proficiency excludes another. Anyone who can not perform basic tasks needs to be remediated, but I hope the people who are the best at basic tasks can also understand higher levels of war. As we said before, the promotion rate is so high that most lieutenants will become lieutenant colonels if they stay with the Army..

They don't necessarily exclude another, but a book worm who can rattle off the 9 Principles of War who can't make a decision under fire is a problem. They may make LTC, but it doesn't mean they'll command anything. Making LTC isn't an automatic ticket to the command slate.


You are reading that the way I meant it. My experience is in the Northeast. Few people know much about the military, and the most professionally educated people often have the dimmest view. I would like to hear how we have been promoting our profession to those people if you'd like to share.

I spoke at a business conference on commuities of practice at Harvard about a year and a half ago about COIN principles and how they relate to the workplace. But, recall that we're an Army at War. The onus isn't on us to educate the masses. We live in a democracy and a volunteer Army at War. We have enough things to do right now than worry if Joe Shmedlap at Brown University understands what we're doing. The point is that our professional discussions, professional journals, and professional seminar process exists, is viable, and useful to our trade.


This is problematic because we are defining the environment based on our standard operating procedures instead of the other way around. Why can't we change OAKOC or say that OAKOC can analyze demographics as well?.

Because we've been conducting operations with a standardized format for over 50 years with a military education system that has been teaching the same standardized formats for just as long. Are you suggesting we change exisiting SOPs that have been in place for over some 50 years to adapt to society?



I've got a computer in front of me, and I think becoming a contributor to this site is the best thing I've done professionally in a long time.

Thanks to everyone for your time and responses.


You seem to have answers for everything, an attitude that may not serve you well in the future. Good luck to you.

[Rob Thornton]

Originally Posted by AdaptAndOvercome View Post
I am beginning to regret having made an introduction...In the same way, every poster here has something worth saying no matter where he is from.

A&O - This may seem counter-intuitive - but having thick skin is often critical to learning. You are going to meet all types of folks - some you will lead, others you will follow, some will be you your peers, some will shoot at you, etc:D - most will have something to say - in one way or another.

This is a pretty benign learning environment - nobody shoots at you (although you might get e-chewed on a bit:wry:) - so make the most of it by getting and staying involved. However, review your question or response before you post if you have doubt that is what you wanted say. Another good thing you can do is consider your audience - the folks you are posing the question to, or asking for a reply from - you'll be doing this as a leader / follower as well. I'm glad you introduced yourself - it helps remind us that there are a wide range of folks involved.

Make the most of forums like this - before, during and after - you'll find that your skills improve over time, and pretty soon you will give back plenty.

Best Regards, Rob

[Adam L]

Don't take any of this personally and remember that in most of your life people who are willing to seriously challenge your ideas and conceptions are few and far between (and more valueable than gold.) It is important to find out at some point whether or not people don't challenge because your ideas are good and accurate or, because they don't have time or patience to deal with them because they are not. We have all been in the later atleast a few times. Being new to the forums I've gotten into an argument or two over more technical areas than perhaps I should have been involved in. Defend your arguments, but avoid being defensive at all costs. Even though they may make remarks about your background its nothing personal, it just happens to be about your person.

Good luck,
Adam

[RTK]

Don't take any of this personally and remember that in most of your life people who are willing to seriously challenge your ideas and conceptions are few and far between (and more valueable than gold.) It is important to find out at some point whether or not people don't challenge because your ideas are good and accurate or, because they don't have time or patience to deal with them because they are not. We have all been in the later atleast a few times. Being new to the forums I've gotten into an argument or two over more technical areas than perhaps I should have been involved in. Defend your arguments, but avoid being defensive at all costs. Even though they may make remarks about your background its nothing personal, it just happens to be about your person.

Good luck,
Adam

Great post. Great guidance. It's going in my wallet.

[Stan]

"Improvise, Adapt and Overcome" - An unofficial mantra of the United States Marine Corps:

There's little in your user profile, so all I have to go on is your introduction and six subsequent posts. Honestly, with a user "handle" of Adapt and Overcome, I expected a tad more.

In the event you didn't already know...This motto is to remind troops how to perform under fire, even under the most dire conditions. But, it actually came from the fact that the Corps received Army hand-me-downs; thus poorly equipped. However and despite this set back, the Corps has been successful because of the creativity of her people and their overall attitude.

One could say that about all the U.S. Military branches.



I am beginning to regret having made an introduction. One of the most enlightening posters here is marct who is an anthropologist. This site is so didactic because people from all different backgrounds contribute their diverse viewpoints.

Your introduction says little to be regretful about. We accept the fact that you are still studying and we appreciate the fact you are joining the military. You could have told us what you are majoring in, your family status, where you come from, etc. It's hard to get a grip on things when there's so little to bite on. It's even harder to understand where you're coming from.

Frankly, it's beginning to sound like you have doubts about being a 2LT.


Let's be honest, your intro was thin gruel at best. So far your experiences are yours alone. You're going to have to overcome this feeling of inadequacy considering you'll be taking a platoon within the next two years full of junior enlisted soldiers and NCOs with 2 or 3 combat tours under their belt. You have to start somewhere.

I will echo RTK's comments just a bit. If you're having a hard time now, you're going to be in for a real shock with your first senior NCO experience, when he bites your head off.

You gotta start somewhere. It's that, or somebody will have to convey how you want your remains handled.

Good luck with your studies.

[Adam L]

Great post. Great guidance. It's going in my wallet.

Thanks, I always try to do my best.

Adam

[Adam L]

After making the above statement, here is my 2 cents. :D

Note: I meant to post this last night but I was just too tired.


They don't necessarily exclude another, but a book worm who can rattle off the 9 Principles of War who can't make a decision under fire is a problem.

I have to side with RTK on this, and I don't know if you are quite getting where he is coming from. I don't believe he was being literal when he was referring to reciting The Art of War. He has a point about his priorities. He has another point about book smart people being able to take tests and get the right answers and being incompetent in application. This can be seen in pretty much every area across the board. My favorite example of this is when teachers are required to take tests on Bloom's Taxonomy (in ed school normally) and don't understand that just because you can give answers on something doesn't mean you understand it. There is a difference between the ability to give answers about something and the capability to abstractly apply, modify, reapply, evaluate and modify is a logical leap many people will never make it. The reason I love this example is that Bloom's taxonomy is all about that.



By discussing warfare at an intellectual level, I think I removed many Vietnam-era stereotypes that these men had accepted for forty years. I think we need to engage professionals at the same level that their professions engage them.


I have to agree with RTK on this side. I have to point out that part of what may have lessened their preconceptions is you and your background (which I am assuming is similar to theirs.) I have found that when discussing with people with these notions about the military there is a bit of a psychological hold up on their part. The discussions are quite often very sanitized (due to the terms of art) and yet about a very brutal subject. It's a bit hard for many people to understand how people can discuss such bloody business so casually or unemotionally. They just don't understand that remaining objective is important. Many could understand a historian, but not someone who's opinions and conclusions potentially could save or kill someone.

Surgeons tend to have a similar problem. Normal people would not deal well with how many surgeons talk about what they do amongst others in their profession. Both in their sense of humor, which is very dark, and in their very calm, and quite often cavalier, demeanor. This is quite often a necessary attitude when performing risky surgeries. When you are performing a surgery where if you are1/20th of an inch off or not done inside 20 minutes the patients dies you cannot have self doubt. Surgeons learn (they do teach this in medical school) how to be diplomatic and how to talk to patients. This is no easy task and many never become adequate and very few master it. The military does not have the time to train officers in this area. I would bet a lot of what makes them good officers (in combat not politics) is what gives them trouble in this area.



To that end, the Army needs to spend time in its basic courses on grammatical instruction and writing.


Although I agree with RTK in that a lot of things come first this is a good point and I believe it has been looked at by the army (many years ago.) Many large tactical blunders in history have been due to issues stemming from misunderstood or misinterpreted orders. Unfortunately, this is a difficult task which ranks low on "need to do" compared to more bread and butter skills.

On the other hand perhaps we should look at most professionals (including the top of the class out of Harvard, Yale and Princeton.) Their grammar is not what it used to be. For that matter neither is their education. I don't want to go off on this tangent. I'll save it for later. :D



Commanders must also encourage professional development through reading classics. The Art of War is a very short book, yet I have immense trouble convincing my peers to spend an hour reading it. They expect the Army to train them in everything they need to know.


RTK is right here, but I have to ask should commanders have to push officers and potential officers. Shouldn't they expect a little initiative. I would dare to say that someone who makes no efforts to expand their capabilities and knowledge perhaps should be going into another profession. I should clarify that if the officer or potential officer is simply prioritizing and sticking to more meat and potatoes education initially I think that he may have a good idea (although if he is not yet in the military, with the exception of those in the most strained circumstances, I fail to find it plausible that some spare time for extra study cannot be found.



That said, I believe there are many barriers between the military and the professional classes, and one very large one is terminology.


No, acronyms are the biggest obstacles. It doesn't take a sociologist to guess what human terrain is, but what the hell is a COIN or CJTF. Why is it COIN and not CI? To a laymen that would seem more logical. A cop on the other hand would really be pissed of because he'd have to deal with CI meaning both criminal informant and counter insurgency.


"
You are reading that the way I meant it. My experience is in the Northeast. Few people know much about the military, and the most professionally educated people often have the dimmest view. I would like to hear how we have been promoting our profession to those people if you'd like to share.


Coming from the Northeast myself be careful about your statements. Say what you want about the Boston area but leave the rest the North East out (it's pretty big.) Look, you probably, like me, came from a nice upper middle class family, lived in a nice upper middle class neighborhood and went to nice upper middle class school. This tends to lead to meeting a lot of people who all live in little boxes on a hillside, whom all go to university and all become identical lawyers, doctors and investments bankers. (I must note for accuracy that my family wasn't one of the identical ones.) Also, quite often the people who talk the most about something are the most ignorant.

The Northeast I believe you are talking about lives mainly in the drift of the universities. NY for all its loud leftist talk is actually split pretty evenly. There are a lot of people going into the service, but I would have to admit most are enlisting. The issue of recruiting officers in the Northeast I will get to in a new post.

Sorry about this long post. I wanted to get my 2 cents in. Actually, let's be honest its at least 75 cents.

What happened to the cent symbol on the keyboard?

Adam

[RTK]

What happened to the cent symbol on the keyboard?


It went away with inflation...:D

[Adam L]

It went away with inflation...:D
LOL! :D

Good one!

[selil]

My favorite example of this is when teachers are required to take tests on Bloom's Taxonomy (in ed school normally) and don't understand that just because you can give answers on something doesn't mean you understand it. There is a difference between the ability to give answers about something and the capability to abstractly apply, modify, reapply, evaluate and modify is a logical leap many people will never make it. The reason I love this example is that Bloom's taxonomy is all about that.

It's interesting you mention Bloom. When he wrote his taxonomy back in the 1950's he got a lot of nasty comments. The idea that you could create a taxonomy of learning was preposterous. It had been done before, but there was a lot of people who considered knowledge to be like water and brains to be buckets. Knowledge was a quantity to be poured in not absorbed or used.

Now we accept Bloom and his hierarchy and apply concepts like outcome based education, and learning objectives to everything. Yet to often we find people down around level 1 or 2 defining, describing, reciting, instead of climbing up the ladder to synthesis. Get out the bucket and pour some more knowledge in so to speak.

Sun Tzu is great, but tell me how it relates to the current conflict and better yet give me a reasoned argument about how it was applied in a previous conflict and use that as a model in the future conflict that we don't know about. Tell me how the operation of a laser jet printer sitting on my desk is similar to the operation of a TOW 2 Missile System. Drawing correlations between disparate ideas to create new patterns of knowledge is what we are really trying to do.

I remember as a low and rough corporal watching as a lt. scrambled and couldn't figure out what to do when one of our guys walked backwards of a ledge on the rim of Lava Lake. I jumped down in the ditch and was doing the breathing, beating, bleeding number telling my buddy he was an idiot. The Lt. was standing there kind of looking numb. My staff sgt. took the Lt. and said "Sir, don't you think we should call for a corpsman", "Sir, don't you think you should call Company", so on and so on and so on. Perceived power rested on the gold of the Lt's collar but reality placed on staff sgts hands.

I don't blame the Lt. for freezing in such a mundane no fire no issue kind of situation. Somebody walking backwards off a cliff kind of caught me by surprise too. I watched the staff sgt. and learned you didn't have to beat the Lt. senseless and you never stop learning. I also learned that you can't teach an autonomic response to everything. Some things you just have to experience. When I've told this story in the past I also mention something else. I learned that in the Marines teamwork go's down and UP the chain of command. You can't learn that in a book.

[jcustis]

A very wise man (my 1st Bn cmdr as an officer) told me once that we are actually professionals because we have our own terminology, much the same as doctors, lawyers, and bankers do.

He believed that the ability to kick a football through uprights, dunk a basketball, or hit a homerun did not make one a professional, so I think differing terminologies are fine, and I see that you agree to some extent.

Grammar, diction, and eloquence are good for only three things in my mind. The first is writng a fitness report on a subordinate. Second, we have to be abe to write good awards. Finally, we must be able to write a good eulogy for our fallen brethren. All else is secondary.

I think we'd be hard pressed to find a servicemember who left the service because they felt other professions held a prejudice against them as uneducated, or folks who have overlooked the military as a possible career for the same reasons. The reasons are a lot more primal and basic.

A man or woman is either going to be adventurous and take the plunge into the military, or they won't. That they come from a region like the northeast (where I attended college), bears little on the process if they already have it in their heart. They often do not have it in their heart due to the affluence they have enjoyed all of their life. Put another way, if you are close to your banker father and understand a bit about his profession, wouldn't you be more inclined to follow the same path as you become an adult? If you drove a Saab in college because it was handed down from Mom or Dad, you're going to feel that pull to follow in their footsteps because you want a Saab later on.

The Northeast is rife with family traditions. Same prep school path...same Ivy League education. "Well Biff, remember that there's that associate partner position waiting for you once you finish school...hmmm...hmmm." Recent military service may simple not be one of them, so it is difficult to maintain that chain.

Personally, I'd rather stand beside a chaw-chewing, backwards-ass officer or NCO who was a hard mofo and knew how to issue simple orders,than someone who could recite the significance of Waterloo. That's for the folks on the History Channel to take care of.

Don't get me wrong, I've thought long and hard about the issue of drawing the right folks into the officer corps. Society in general has changed since the 50s and 60s, and without a bipolar state opponent breathing down our necks, perhaps the issue of retention boils down to the fact that some members don't want to roll the dice for the third, fourth, or fifth time and die in the process. I dunno...

[slapout9]

Personally, I'd rather stand beside a chaw-chewing, backwards-ass officer or NCO who was a hard mofo and knew how to issue simple orders,than someone who could recite the significance of Waterloo. That's for the folks on the History to take care of.




Somebody say Amen....!!!!!!

[RTK]

Somebody say Amen....!!!!!!

I can't. I have a dip in. :wry:

[Adam L]

Amen... I think you pretty much summed everything up.


I can't. I have a dip in.

?I don't get it.?

[max161]

Sun Tzu is great, but tell me how it relates to the current conflict and better yet give me a reasoned argument about how it was applied in a previous conflict and use that as a model in the future conflict that we don't know about. Tell me how the operation of a laser jet printer sitting on my desk is similar to the operation of a TOW 2 Missile System. Drawing correlations between disparate ideas to create new patterns of knowledge is what we are really trying to do. .

Selil,

With all due repsect I have to take exception to your Sun Tzu comment. Sun Tzu (and Clausewitz for that matter) are not authors of "how to" books. They do not provide the answers to complex political-military problems within their pages. They stimulate critical thought and analysis. They can help you to learn how to think but not want to think. They are neither prescriptive nor proscriptive. Both authors contribute to the ideal leader that Clausewitz was trying to develop - one with coup d'oiel or the inner eye - e.g., the genius for war. A leader can only develop this through a combination of intellect/study combined with experience which is designed to create a commander (and leaders and staff at all levels) who can cut through the fog and friction of war and make the right decision at the right time. Every conflict can be analyzed using Sun Tzu and Clausewitz but the answer to the second part of your question is unanswerable. We don't directly "apply" Sun Tzu or Clausewitz in the Jominian sense (as in principles of war or a checklist or task list to accomplish) but through the study of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz military (and political) leaders are developed who can devise strategy, orchestrate campaigns and successfully execute operations across the spectrum of political-military conflict - and in today's realm of conflict as well.

Respectfully,

Dave

[Adam L]

That's not what he was saying. The Quote you have is an example of the type of thinking and extrapolation that Blooms Taxonomy seeks to evaluate. He was not attacking Sun Tzu or Clausewitz. He using the questions to demonstrate the type of analysis he was describing. Take a look at Blooms Taxonomy here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_of_Educational_Objectives). It is not the best description but you can get the idea.

Adam

[max161]

That's not what he was saying. The Quote you have is an example of the type of thinking and extrapolation that Blooms Taxonomy seeks to evaluate. He was not attacking Sun Tzu or Clausewitz. He using the questions to demonstrate the type of analysis he was describing. Take a look at Blooms Taxonomy here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_of_Educational_Objectives). It is not the best description but you can get the idea.

Adam

Adam,

I can see your point. Sorry I did not see it that way at first. Upon first reading it came across as an attack on Sun Tzu to which I will always take exception.

V/R

Dave

[Stan]

I can't. I have a dip in. :wry:


?I don't get it.?

Adam, allow me to clarify from the Urban Dictionary (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=dip)


Dip is a form of smokeless tobacco that is cut more fine than regualar chewing tobacco. Large amounts of nicotine are absorbed through the gums and mouth tissue and goes directly to the blood stream, creating a buzz that lasts around 15 minutes. This buzz only lasts until you become tolerant to the drug; people who are heavy users only receive a state of satisfaction and relaxation.

I'm however unsure just how much RTK needs for a buzz :D

[Adam L]

Adam,

I can see your point. Sorry I did not see it that way at first. Upon first reading it came across as an attack on Sun Tzu to which I will always take exception.

V/R

Dave
I'm exactly the same way.



Adam, allow me to clarify from the Urban Dictionary (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=dip)


Quote:
Dip is a form of smokeless tobacco that is cut more fine than regualar chewing tobacco. Large amounts of nicotine are absorbed through the gums and mouth tissue and goes directly to the blood stream, creating a buzz that lasts around 15 minutes. This buzz only lasts until you become tolerant to the drug; people who are heavy users only receive a state of satisfaction and relaxation.
I'm however unsure just how much RTK needs for a buzz :D


Thanks for the explanation!:D

Adam

[tequila]

Adam L - Don't feel bad. As a fellow New Yorker, I never knew what dip was until I went to School of Infantry.

[Adam L]

Adam L - Don't feel bad. As a fellow New Yorker, I never knew what dip was until I went to School of Infantry.
Thanks. I don't know if I felt bad, just really confused. LOL :D

Thanks,
Adam

[Tom Odom]

Adam L - Don't feel bad. As a fellow New Yorker, I never knew what dip was until I went to School of Infantry.


And one should never confuse dip with dipsh#t. :wry:

[slapout9]

Being from the cultural center of the Universe let me splain this stuff to y'all.

You Dip.....Snuff......from a can!

Dipping is the proper TTP to used against the target....a can a snuff!:D


Not to be confused with a chaw of tobacco. A chaw is bite of chewing tobacco. Or properly expressed as "I'm gonna git me a chaw of bacco"

[Stan]

Being from the cultural center of the Universe let me splain this stuff to y'all.

You Dip.....Snuff......from a can!

Dipping is the proper TTP to used against the target....a can a snuff!:D


Not to be confused with a chaw of tobacco. A chaw is bite of chewing tobacco. Or properly expressed as "I'm gonna git me a chaw of bacco"

Slap, You should be editing the Urban Dictionary (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=dip) for the folks in Lower Alabama, etc. :D

I thinks this dude's got a bit much in his mouth...aye ?

[slapout9]

Urban Dictionary????? sounds like a book for Yankees.

That picture is nasty:eek:

[Tom Odom]

Slap, You should be editing the Urban Dictionary for the folks in Lower Alabama, etc.

Urban in lower Alabame? Is that a trailer park? :D

[Stan]

Urban Dictionary????? sounds like a book for Yankees.

That picture is nasty:eek:



Urban in lower Alabame? Is that a trailer park? :D

Urban Dictionary makes up for what youtube lacks...class :D

LA is a trailer Park, Tom !

Goesh is on-line, and this will only get better :eek:

[wm]

Adam L - Don't feel bad. As a fellow New Yorker, I never knew what dip was until I went to School of Infantry.

Yawl boys grew up deprived. I was born and raised in the Hudson River Valley, but I managed to have a few excursions out of the Empire State when I was coming along that enabled me to know about dipping and chewing (or more correctly, chawin'). You might want to investigate things like Skoal and Copenhagen. The phrase "...just a pinch between cheek and gum. . . " comes to mind. Now the joys of Beechnut (and I don't mean the chewing gum) and Red Man are a wholely different matter.


Being from the cultural center of the Universe let me splain this stuff to y'all.

You Dip.....Snuff......from a can!

Dipping is the proper TTP to used against the target....a can a snuff!

Slapout,
While I agree about your locale as being close to the cultural center of the universe (actually I think it is in Scotland Neck, NC) you want to be careful talking about snuff outside of the US. When I was stationed in Germany, we used to do snuff rounds with the owner of our favorite Gasthaus--it definitely had no relation to dipping smokeless. Nose-blowing the next morning was always a disgusting experience.

[slapout9]

We always called a trailer park the county seat. Thats where the Guvmint is and all they do is sit around.

wm, I got kin folks in Maggies Valley,NC.

A pinch of snuff is the female TTP.

[wm]

We always called a trailer park the county seat. Thats where the Guvmint is and all they do is sit around.

wm, I got kin folks in Maggies Valley,NC.

A pinch of snuff is the female TTP.

No one sits around too much in a trailer parker during a tornado or hurricane. Seeing what the wind does to them explains why some folks call them "mobile homes."

I mentioned the "pinch" for those "rookies" from NY who probably aren't up to much more than that for starters.:D

[SteveMetz]

"Resources are over-stretched. Frustration is up, as families are separated and strained. Morale is down. Recruitment is more difficult. And many of our best people in the military are headed for civilian life...This is not the way that a great nation should reward courage and idealism...we will not be permanent peacekeepers dividing warring parties."

Governor George Bush, speech at the Citadel, September 23, 1999

[Ken White]

We always called a trailer park the county seat. Thats where the Guvmint is and all they do is sit around.

wm, I got kin folks in Maggies Valley,NC.

A pinch of snuff is the female TTP.

Here on the Redneck Riviairy, our Trailer Parks are used for more, er, exotic -- that's the word -- pursuits...

Not only that but their English is more refined up there, down here it's just "Gimme a chaw."

[Tom Odom]

Urban Dictionary makes up for what youtube lacks...class :D

LA is a trailer Park, Tom !

Goesh is on-line, and this will only get better :eek:

Now Stan,

That would depend on how low you want to get in lower Louisiana. Far enough and they either grow stilts or start to float.

WM,

The brave Redneck and courageous Cajun always defends his home by having his wife ride out the storm. Big wimmen make great trailer weights for tornadoes and hurricane winds. When it floods, well they're great floats.:D

Uh ohhh I better stop :eek:

Tom

[Adam L]

[/quote] Big wimmen make great trailer weights for tornadoes and hurricane winds. [/quote]

I thought that was what the 302 engine block on the front lawn was for? LOL :D

[wm]

I thought that was what the 302 engine block on the front lawn was for? LOL :D

You have so much yet to learn, Grasshopper. There is a great distinction between the use of a "yard car" and that of a "drivin' car."

[marct]

Hi Folks,

Coming from a place where snuff is meant to be only ingested after flipping ones lace shirt cuff back, I'm going to return to the A&O - RTK discussion because I think there are some very good points in it.




"I find your post interesting for a number of reasons. Given what I know about your background from your intro post, that you're going to get commissioned next year, and under the assumption that you are not prior service I have a few honest comments and observations. I say this, not to nit pick, but to enter into the honest and professional intellectual dialog that you infer is so lacking in the profession of arms."

I am beginning to regret having made an introduction.

Never regret coming on board - you may get hammered verbally (I know I have been a couple of times ;)), but you will certainly learn a lot about your chosen profession.

One of the things I hope you learn from the way RTK has reacted to your posts is something that every professional has to learn - regardless of their profession: there is a distinct difference between professional "expert knowledge" (the way a group thinks about what it does) and professional "operational realities" (the way a group thinks about immediate tasks).




Consider the first paragraph of the five paragraph Operations Order (Enemy, terrain, weather, friendly forces). By describing socio-demographics as terrain the factors of OAKOC can be applied. For instance, how can the civilian populace be an obstacle, how can they be "key terrain," what benefits to they afford in terms of observation (reconnaissance), how can they affect mobility corridors and avenues of approach etc....?"

This is problematic because we are defining the environment based on our standard operating procedures instead of the other way around. Why can't we change OAKOC or say that OAKOC can analyze demographics as well?

Well, it may be a pain in the posterior for non-military folks like me, but so what? Every profession defines its environment by its own SOPs. One of the things that really intrigued me was that someone in a particular discipline could get the reputation as a "brilliant innovator" by taking something from another discipline and applying it in heir own. By having the varying SOPs, every discipline can get an advantage if (and only if :wry:) they talk with each other.




"Do we discourage demographers, anthropologists, and other professionals from working with the military because we appear meddlesome, unwilling to respect the venerable terms used by the scholars of their discipline?"

It was simply a suggestion for something we should investigate. Many people who teach at those institutions were in the military or have strong ties through family. What of everyone else?

I think what discouragement there is comes not because of terminology - I believe that is more of an irritant - but from political and ideological stances within the academy. Honestly, of all of the professional groups I've been involved with, I find the military to be the lowest on the PC scale (loosely translated as "agree or scram").


"I cannot undo what your previous educators, friends, parents, or guardians failed to do."

RTK, believe me when I say "I feel your pain"! :wry: Teaching people to read, write and think at the undergraduate and post-graduate level, which is what a commissioned officer is, is something that should not have to happen. It highlights the travesty of an "educational system" that is more concerned with passing people than with teaching them. Since Selil made a reading recommendation, let me make one as well - Day of the Moron (http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18949) by H. Beam Piper. As a side note, back when I was doing my doctoral coursework I took a course in the Labour Process where I used the Piper story to illustrate my arguments. BTW, Labour Process Theory is very Marxist - read the story and you can guess how the prof in that course reacted :D.

However, while we cannot undo what has happened in the past, I believe that we have a responsibility to attempt to counteract its worst effects. Can we teach people basic skills? Sure, even though it is a "waste" (in the sense of not the most efficient use of our time) of our time to do so. I think it may be more important for us to consider interim F's that highlight the problem to the student and send them off somewhere else for remedial work. As a side note, I have been known to work with "problem students" for 3-6 hours a week individually to get them up to speed - not a very efficient use of my time, but the changes in the student were reward enough for me.

Marc

[Cavguy]

This is problematic because we are defining the environment based on our standard operating procedures instead of the other way around. Why can't we change OAKOC or say that OAKOC can analyze demographics as well?



All,

OAKOC has been amended with ASCOPE for human operations. You'll find it in FM 3-24. Para 3-19 and Appendix B beginning in para 10.

Area
Structures
Capabilities
Organizations
People
Events

A class of it can be found here (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/8442390) (AKO Files Link)

It's being taught currently at the MI school and at COIN seminars near you ... and should be making its way into BOLC 2. ASCOPE is to COIN what OAKOC is to HIC. You use it to make your overlays.

Also remember a lot of what you are taught in BOLC 1 is simply to develop your leadership and thinking for further education after commissioning. What you think the army is now and what the army actually is are two very different things - better and worse.

[slapout9]

Here is Rand study of IPB for Urban Environments on page 66 it explains how to use OAKOC for population analysis. Now it is ASCOPE:rolleyes: Oh well it is pretty interesting paper. The link is below.


http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1287.pdf

[RTK]

Got an e-mail a couple hours ago. Here's the deal.

3 year ADSO. 5 different options.

1. $25K, $30K, $35K bonus depending on branch

2. Graduate School

3. Ranger School/DLI

4. Functional Area/Branch of Choice

5. Post of Choice.

You pick one. Only one. It goes official tomorrow morning at 0730 EDT. I'll have my paperwork on my Squadron Commander's desk by 0735.

[selil]

what is "ADSO" and Ranger School is a Bonus?

[mmx1]

what is "ADSO" and Ranger School is a Bonus?

Active Duty Service Obligation

[selil]

Where do I sign? That's better than my faculty contract!

[Shek]

Got an e-mail a couple hours ago. Here's the deal.

3 year ADSO. 5 different options.

1. $25K, $30K, $35K bonus depending on branch

2. Graduate School

3. Ranger School/DLI

4. Functional Area/Branch of Choice

5. Post of Choice.

You pick one. Only one. It goes official tomorrow morning at 0730 EDT. I'll have my paperwork on my Squadron Commander's desk by 0735.

A quick correction - Ranger School is only a 1 year ADSO and DLI is a 3:1 ADSO (based on the number of days for language training - a 365 day course would yield three years of ADSO).

[wm]

DA sent out an earlier letter to FGOs about the letter that RTK just received. I've seen a copy, but since I was not an addressee, I feel uncomfortable posting it. Maybe someone else who received a copy might want to do so. I thought it was pretty interesting as an insight into the HRC "thinking" behind this incentive program.

[Ski]

Can someone shoot me a PM with the letter for Field Grades?

Thanks
Ski

[RTK]

Can someone shoot me a PM with the letter for Field Grades?

Thanks
Ski

PM on the way.

[slapout9]

RTK,if it is not to personal which one did you choose?

[RTK]

RTK,if it is not to personal which one did you choose?

I'm waiting on branch to get back to me about which bonus I qualify for since I was an engineer before I was an armor guy. The way the contract is written, the dollar value depends on the branch you were initially assessed onto active duty for. It's a difference of $5k for me. Update:I get the dollar value of the branch I was assessed at coming in, which is what my pessimistic mind thought would happen.

I went for the money. Here's my logic train:

1. Money Option: Seldom, if ever, will we see this again. While I don't
need the money and am not in debt, it will definitely help out the 401Ks and
college funds for the kids. Also could be a good excuse to take a well
needed kick ass vacation.

2. Graduate School: An option regardless of this contract. With my
undergrad GPA, I don't think I'm eligible for many of the programs anyway.
With $30K I could finance my own through distance learning and still have
cash left over. Plus, I'd like to get back to the operational Army. If I do
the grad thing, that will be almost 4 years out of the force consecutively.
I'd like to remain operationally relevent to the fight.

3. Military School: Ranger school? Nope. That's a young man's game and I
think I'm past my prime and tolerance level for some of the stupid crap they
pull there. Language School? I can continue to focus with the Rosetta
Stone program and test out at a post education center. Again, I'd rather
not take myself out of the fighting Army for the length of time requried to
make it worthwhile.

4. Branch of Choice: My board met last week for Functional Area. I'm
already in my second branch in 7 years. I'm happy where I'm at.

5. Post of Choice: There are a lot of other ways to influence post than
taking a 3 year ADSO. This might be the dumbest option on the list.

[Ski]

If you go the DL rotue (which I am doing through AMU), you can get up to $4500 a year in Tuition Assistance which in turn has a 2 year ADSO that starts the day you graduate. No need to spend your own cash.




I'm waiting on branch to get back to me about which bonus I qualify for since I was an engineer before I was an armor guy. The way the contract is written, the dollar value depends on the branch you were initially assessed onto active duty for. It's a difference of $5k for me.

I went for the money. Here's my logic train:

1. Money Option: Seldom, if ever, will we see this again. While I don't
need the money and am not in debt, it will definitely help out the 401Ks and
college funds for the kids. Also could be a good excuse to take a well
needed kick ass vacation.

2. Graduate School: An option regardless of this contract. With my
undergrad GPA, I don't think I'm eligible for many of the programs anyway.
With $30K I could finance my own through distance learning and still have
cash left over. Plus, I'd like to get back to the operational Army. If I do
the grad thing, that will be almost 4 years out of the force consecutively.
I'd like to remain operationally relevent to the fight.

3. Military School: Ranger school? Nope. That's a young man's game and I
think I'm past my prime and tolerance level for some of the stupid crap they
pull there. Language School? I can continue to focus with the Rosetta
Stone program and test out at a post education center. Again, I'd rather
not take myself out of the fighting Army for the length of time requried to
make it worthwhile.

4. Branch of Choice: My board met last week for Functional Area. I'm
already in my second branch in 7 years. I'm happy where I'm at.

5. Post of Choice: There are a lot of other ways to influence post than
taking a 3 year ADSO. This might be the dumbest option on the list.

[Dennis]

what's everyone's perspective on current EGSP folks not being eligible for the new incentives?

[Dennis]

So I guess I’ll play DA on this one, I’ll preface this by admitting that I am a YG99 INF officer who is not eligible because I’m in my final quarter of the 6 qtr middle east curriculum at the Naval Post Grad school. I was in the first round of the Expanded Graduate School Program which when initially advertised was the expanded ACS (advanced civil schooling) program. I am a straight IN guy and I pursued Grad school and the ME curriculum at NPS after my tour in Iraq out of a desire to further my depth of understanding of the region, culture and COIN under the assumption that I will be back there again sooner than I would probably like.

I guess the real issue I have with the new incentives program is the groups they have decided to exclude from the incentive. The main one being the BZ select group in YG99, the other being those who pursued a Master’s degree before it was designated a “retention tool”. This one really bothers me since apparently the skills that I will bring to my next assignments are not as relevant as those that the guys sitting next to me will bring to West Point as part of the ACS program.

Another issue I’ll bring up. Why is it based on your commissioning branch? In my case I was assessed a SC officer with a branch detail in IN. After a year I knew IN was my calling and IN is where I have been since, so I have never served a day as a signal guy but had I qualified for this I would have only received 25K rather than the 35K to my peers. RTK I believe you noted a similar circumstance.

I’m also pretty concerned that big army has chosen, much like the enlisted ranks, to focus on immediate fixes rather than long term ones. Now that the door is open for bonuses for the officer ranks I would guess that it is going to be necessary from here on out to give these kinds of bonuses to keep the needed numbers of officers in the Army.

I’m trying to understand why with such a large group that was included why such a small number were excluded and oh, by the way the ones excluded were the folks who supposedly are the best and brightest of these year groups. It just doesn't make sense that you offer the encentive to 5 YGs worth of officers, but you don't include the ones who were designated as the top 9.5% of the most senior YG being considered. Then you draw a distinction between those who are pursuing advanced educations, (note those who have a specified utilization tour following ACS are still eligible for another incentive).

I know you have to draw the line somewhere, I readily admit that YG98 folks are probably disappointed that they are just out of the consideration for this program, but shouldn't the reasons for where the lines are drawn be consistent with some of the ideas expressed in this thread?

Thoughts?
DWF

[Jimbo]

There are othe YG's that are even more irked about this than others.

Tom: You ain't living in Louisiana unless you are living south of I-10!

Some thoughts from my foxhole:

I agree with both RTK and adapt&overcome

RTK is correct in defining what you need to focus on when training new LT's.

A&O identified some very important shortcomings that have been the norm in the Army Officer Corps for a few years. Which I will address in my Texan manner of 'write'n, read'n, and numbers (we ain't ranked low in education for no reason)

Write'n
One of the great shortcomings in the Army is our inability to express ourselves in writing and speaking with langauge that resonates with policy makers. I was told this by one G.O. before he sent me on a tasker, and I have to agree with his assessment. As we advance, we have to understand that we are no longer just having to give "rally the troops" speeches. A retired G.O. reiterated this to a group of us earlier this week. While "the Army Writing Style" is important in training young cadets/officers in how to write effectively for military audiences, this writing style does little to showcase the breadth of intellectual talent that resides in the Army to outsiders. We need to up our game.

Read'n
We need to look beyond the CSA's reading list. It at best is a minimum, and some of those books have been on there for 17 years. Do young LT's need to be well versed in Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Fuller, Liddell-Hart and such? No. Should they begin to be exposed to these guys? By all means yes. I would also argue that if you are going to be PL then read Platoon Leader, and learn how to write an Operations Order, and just as importantly how to understand what you are told to do in Operations Order. I would also say that we as military professionals should probably read some basic stuff on political science and international relations since both have a direct impact on us, and as leaders we have to be able to explain why we are doing what we are to our soldiers, and at times to our fellow Americans. So we should read, and we should read more than the CSA list.

Math(That would be arithmetic for you yankees(I had to look it up))
Bottom line:
30 rds in a mag, 12 MRE's in a box, 1,000 meters in a click, 2 teams in a squad, 4 tracks in a platoon, 14 tracks in a company, and stay a click away from anything that goes "boom" if at all possible.

There have been some articles written on the "anit-intellectualism" of the Army in the 1990's. I tend to agree with these assessments of the Army at that time. As a company grade officer I was told focus on executing, not thinking. It was all about execution. This is a discussion that comes up often among my peers, and this was the experience for about 80% of us. These options of grad school and language school were unheard of and discouraged if you wanted to be an "operations" guy. I think the institution is changing (probably) for the better, those of you who have these options take good advantage of them.

[Rob Thornton]

Several articles out there today regarding pursuing end strength increases faster. Army and DoD leadership seem to agree on the need and the time line. What I found most heartening is that there is now mention of approaching retention with an understanding of the effects of both families and other opportunities. Extending things like educational benefits to families will help create a more inclusive culture - our families share the risks, and pressures and weigh heavily on decisions to stay or leave. Acknowledging that makes good sense - our families and service members offer a different kind of recruiting tool - they recruit and retain by both the silent influence they exhibit when considered by family and friends (in terms of how well the Army takes care of them) and they recruit and retain overtly by the strength of their association with the Army as the organization or family which provides opportunity for their spouse and family.

Which brings me to recruiting - my opinion is that we have often tried to compete with the Navy, Marines and Air Force on the terms of what makes each service special. When you look across the Army I'm not sure that is reflective of our strongest attribute (all our services have qualities that attract and recruit new service members). The Army is big, and it is diverse - we should consider that as a strength. We should market that as opportunity - because the Army is so big, and so diverse it constantly has needs that translate to opportunities - if you want to do something else within the Army - it can probably accommodate you. Within the Army are more specialized communities for those who are looking for that specifically.

Fortunately we are also now considering how to extend this diversity with education and opportunities outside the "uniformed" community. This is also in line with fostering leadership qualities harder to cultivate from an "inside only" perspective.

The Army is huge in terms of branches, functional areas, MOSs, etc. It is reflected in its ability to campaign and bring all the other "stuff" needed to sustain and build long term infrastructure.

We need to bring that picture of diversity and opportunity forward in our recruiting and discuss it with the leaders we want to retain. Big Army seems to understand the problem now and seems to be moving toward applying a broad strategy with resources toward managing the problem ( this is not one of those problems with a fire and forget solution - it must be constantly managed).

Best Regards, Rob

[Steve Blair]

There was a joke/truism/whatever going around in the early 1980s that actually gets close to this.

If you wanted to live in the same place for years and raise a family, join the Air Force.

If you wanted to travel (lots) and go to strange foreign places, join the Navy.

If you wanted to kill people, join the Marines.

If you weren't sure what you wanted to do, join the Army.

Now before any noses get out of joint, remember that this was a joke that was circulating in the military dependent community in the early 1980s, but I do think that like many of these things there is a grain of truth in it. At that time, and today to a degree, the Air Force is still the most stable in terms of deployment cycles and demands. The Navy still goes to a wide number of places. The Marines...well...they still do Marine things (and the kill people comment always referred to the fact that in terms of perception the Marines were giving you the chance to be a warrior, not save money for college). And the Army was big enough that it gave you the space and options to figure out what you wanted to do.

[Rob Thornton]

Why not combine aspects of our recruiting and retention campaigns?

We have stories to tell that matter. Many of our recruiting strategies have shied away from dealing with combat, but they are in fact the ones that matter the most. We have real heroes out there do and inspire extraordinary things.

They are across the spectrum in our Combat Arms, Combat Support , and Combat Service Support communities. We can show the combat patrols that go out, Civil Affairs influencing people, Intelligence soldiers providing critical analysis, Logisticians moving mountains to the people who need them, JAG personnel upholding morals and ethics, Surgical Teams and medics saving lives and limbs, MPs & Advisors working with indigenous forces, Helicopter crews working in dangerous and forbidding places, soldiers enabling civil authorities here in the United States, Leaders working across the Joint, Coalition and Inter-Agency spectrum to accomplish national security objectives.

We have a story to tell about who we are – and why it matters. We have the most challenging conditions to highlight what our people are capable of accomplishing.

We should tell these stories across the broad spectrum of the media- T.V., print, radio, the Internet, etc.
Best Regards, Rob

[Cavguy]

We have stories to tell that matter. Many of our recruiting strategies have shied away from dealing with combat, but they are in fact the ones that matter the most. We have real heroes out there do and inspire extraordinary things.

They are across the spectrum in our Combat Arms, Combat Support , and Combat Service Support communities.

Well said. I loved the new "Army Strong" ad campaign at first - thought it finally got to the heart of soldiering based off of the debut ad. Now every ad I see (in the middle of a war) depicts some guy in kevlar troubleshooting a router in a basement somewhere, or filing paperwork. WTF? Really soured me on the campaign. I understand the need to communicate that the Army has more jobs than combat arms, but it's almost silly in how it ignores - and could embrace - the conflict in Iraq and what soldiers can do there. I also think it detracts from the message credibility when the fact that probably 90% of new recruits will deploy to Iraq in their first years of service, yet the ad campaign (other than the original) doesn't acknowledge this at all.

[Ken White]

forgotten what Joe is like and read the WaPo, NYT and WSJ. They think Mr. & Mrs. America are worried about body bags. They aren't; they just want the job done quickly and correctly.

They also may -- just may -- be cuing in on the fact that the CSS area is suffering in both enlistments and reenlistments. That's true while the Combat arms are bringing in first termers and reups out the ying yang. My suspicion is that they do not know that latter fact and are concentrating on the soft skills to avoid "turning off the kids (while the blood thirsty little gits do not care!) and their parents (some, not many, of whom may care)."

There are about 20% of kids who want to go combat arms and will no matter what's going on and that applies to enlisted and officer accessions. Give 'em a job where they get to shoot at something that shoots back and holler a bit and they'll stay. Put 'em on the range or in the motor pool too often and they'll leave.

Most people, again, officer and enlisted, leave because they're disappointed.

P.S. Cavguy, you get my update on LTG Lee?

[jcustis]

Why not combine aspects of our recruiting and retention campaigns?

We have stories to tell that matter. Many of our recruiting strategies have shied away from dealing with combat, but they are in fact the ones that matter the most. We have real heroes out there do and inspire extraordinary things.

They are across the spectrum in our Combat Arms, Combat Support , and Combat Service Support communities. We can show the combat patrols that go out, Civil Affairs influencing people, Intelligence soldiers providing critical analysis, Logisticians moving mountains to the people who need them, JAG personnel upholding morals and ethics, Surgical Teams and medics saving lives and limbs, MPs & Advisors working with indigenous forces, Helicopter crews working in dangerous and forbidding places, soldiers enabling civil authorities here in the United States, Leaders working across the Joint, Coalition and Inter-Agency spectrum to accomplish national security objectives.

We have a story to tell about who we are – and why it matters. We have the most challenging conditions to highlight what our people are capable of accomplishing.

We should tell these stories across the broad spectrum of the media- T.V., print, radio, the Internet, etc.
Best Regards, Rob

You're absolutely right Rob, and ever since I saw this compilation, I thought we should have something similar: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZaSwVRY2DRs&mode=related&search=

Perhaps the services need a few new "Top Gun" movies with recruiters standing by in the lobbies on premier day.

[RTK]

You're absolutely right Rob, and ever since I saw this compilation, I thought we should have something similar: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZaSwVRY2DRs&mode=related&search=

Perhaps the services need a few new "Top Gun" movies with recruiters standing by in the lobbies on premier day.

Maybe even this one:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8pHsZqqZ2XE

[mmx1]

You're absolutely right Rob, and ever since I saw this compilation, I thought we should have something similar: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZaSwVRY2DRs&mode=related&search=

Perhaps the services need a few new "Top Gun" movies with recruiters standing by in the lobbies on premier day.

I could have done without the rock remix. I thought the originals were quite well done (though not quite along the lines of the current conversation about diversity of jobs).
Mechanized Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUxYXX7pFp4)
Light Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvgZU6UwoWY)
Air Assault Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=weudbL9tXCQ)
Armoured Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lfp-jqJB81U)

As far as diversity, you've got this from the Irish:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbOQgqK1TBc

[Rob Thornton]

From CavGuy;

Well said. I loved the new "Army Strong" ad campaign at first - thought it finally got to the heart of soldiering based off of the debut ad. Now every ad I see (in the middle of a war) depicts some guy in kevlar troubleshooting a router in a basement somewhere, or filing paperwork. WTF? Really soured me on the campaign. I understand the need to communicate that the Army has more jobs than combat arms, but it's almost silly in how it ignores - and could embrace - the conflict in Iraq and what soldiers can do there. I also think it detracts from the message credibility when the fact that probably 90% of new recruits will deploy to Iraq in their first years of service, yet the ad campaign (other than the original) doesn't acknowledge this at all.

Those 2 points you brought out are what really bothers me - first because it seems to ignore the heroic deeds done by folks (and they are across the CA/CS/CSS spectrum) in these wars and in support of them (in many cases even those lines are blurred) and second because the reality is we are at war - I want the folks who we are recruiting and retaining to see that although we are at war, we are surrounded by the most amazing volunteer soldiers around. I want parent to know what lengths buddies & leaders will go to to ensure that their sons and daughters will come home and will be taken care of. I also want the general public to hear and see the incredible stories that the media skips over in favor of death tolls, figures spent and the 15 second sound byte and images of carnage and destruction devoid of the context where soldiers fought for each other and what they believed in - we cannot entrust that to anyone but us - nor should we.

On an AUG 23rd speech at the National Press Club on C-Span - GEN Casey spoke about a SGT who he recently awarded the Silver Star to for heroism and bravery during a riverine patrol - this SGT took over a gun on the boat from an IP (probably a PKC - but he did not say) and returned fire to suppress the enemy ambush on the banks - the craft could not get through so they beached it on a bank and then took cover in a depression - the patrol leader told the SGT to find a way out - so the SGT left the cover of the position went up the steep bank of the river and ran smack into a heavy chain link fence. He proceeded to cut the fence and found it electrified - while under fire and receiving electric jolts through his body this NCO cut his way through the fence. He brought the patrol up and when one of the soldiers got caught in the hole he went back and with the gloves melted to his hands and under fire - cut his buddy out of the fence.

This type of bravery - the commitment to save a fellow soldier or innocent at the penalty of their own life happens far more often in Afghanistan and Iraq then we know - there are multitudes of other compelling stories about sacrifice just short of life and death - but sacrifice those hear should hear about.

If we want people to know who we are - then we should tell and show them. If we want people who can "Be, Know, Do" then we need to show them who to emulate. Not only do we need to know who our heroes and heroines are, the public needs to know - and in a big way.

I can think of know better way to convince people to serve then to show them it is possible to become more then a person ever thought possible through service to their fellow man and country.

Best regards, Rob

[Adam L]

Hi Matt,
Thanks for making a decision to serve!



I agree with you. I also agree with the your observation about youth, ambition and talent. What I am trying to say though is you have to change that sentiment, and you have to break down how you do that. It is probably not mono-causal since we are dealing with people's perceptions. I do think the first step in changing perceptions is by demonstrating the value you place on something. How do we do that in our society? When we really want to demonstrate how much something or somebody means to us, we sacrifice. How much does an education at the best University cost & why do people value it? How much does the best mechanic in town cost and why are people willing to pay him? How about food, automobiles, or anything else in our society? All of those things have some type of value and worth that translates and appeals to the general public. No matter if we are talking services or goods, we place value on things.

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

Rob, I know I am going back a ways but I haven't had the time to sit down and respond on this issue.

1. Our “best and brightest” is a complicated group to deal with as well as define. First, with the movement in the educational system too many of those who are truly of this sort are being discouraged and hurt. There is a trend towards (forgive me) “goody-two-shoes” book smarts over actual academic excellence. It is hard to find a subject which has not been destroyed under the name of “progressive education. (Niel Postman the father of “progressive education” has written about this.) Our best and brightest are no longer our best and brightest. Their educations have predominantly been myopic and are lacking in depth. I do believe with incentives there would be no problem finding potential officers for positions more in logistics, communications and other technical areas. On the other hand I believe that there will be difficulty finding those with good, let alone exemplary, potential for infantry (and other front line jobs.) Too many of them have had pragmatism, creativity (not in an artistic sense), common sense, mental toughness, the ability to cope with moral ambiguity and most importantly “pride” beaten out of them. We have indoctrinated a generation (or 2+/-) of people that think they are the most important thing. We have taken “don't be a hero” which used to mean “don't get yourself killed for stupid silly reasons”, but it did not mean “don't be a hero, save yourself at all costs.” Also, the concept of working form the inside is gone. Kid's say they want to stop certain “things”, but they wouldn't dare work from the inside where you can normally make the most difference. I know I am ranting a little, or a lot, on this but I really think these are the issues. I just don't know if many people are left (or available) who can psychologically, intellectually and practically deal with the moral as well as real world stresses. Here is the question I have to bring up: Are those we are considering our “best and brightest” really our “best and brightest?”
2. College isn't what it used to be. Too many people are in college today who don't belong there. Degrees are becoming less and less meaning full. Bachelors and Graduate degrees are becoming more and more specialized. We have invented disciplines which are ridiculous. We have turned psychology into a farce. As much as there are many exemplary professors one only has to look at the writings by the staff at many so called “top” universities to see the decline over the last 50 years. It's been really bad the last 20 years. I'm tired of literarature professors talking about how Blake's “Tiger, Tiger” is all about G-d. Anyone who has studied Blake knows this isn't true. The private sector hires the top graduates out of Harvard's law and business schools and pays them 120k (or more) starting wage. The problem is they don't know much and aren't worth pocket change. We have MBA's running around thinking they actually know how to run a company.

Incentives are a good and bad idea at the same time. While they may in fact get more officers we may not be getting them for the right reasons.
I understand the difficulties socially for officers serving one tour after another. I understand how it is hard to go so long without companionship, but should so many young officers have families so early on in their career. Traditionally in the service (I'm going back at least 45-60 years), especially among the elite, for officers to refrain from marriage until their early 30's if not later was quite common. Normally, by this point those who were not to stay in the service would have been settled in a civilian job, while those still in the service would have achieved a pay grade better suited to supporting a family. I am not preaching this, but I am commenting this is one of the differences now vs. historically. It is less and less common to have 8-12, let alone more, years separating couples in age today.
I think too many people on this site (from the military) are being too modest about their academic capabilities. Most students graduating from “Ivy League” institutions may be more polished (in certain very narrow areas) but I would not say that many of them are more intelligent, nor are most as knowledgeable. Whether or not you went to college I think that pretty much everyone I have encountered here wants to learn and is self starting. As the educational lingo says these days, “a life long learner.” I've always said that college can be a great learning experience but not necessarily beneficial to being well educated. A motivated person with basic academic skills (I should note that what I consider basic may be more lofty than what you would expect), or what a person should come out of high school with, merely needs a public library card and the will, determination and humility to surround oneself with those who are more knowledgeable than oneself to gain a first class education.
SEE THE REST NEXT POST

[Adam L]

Here is the rest of my post ^

I don't support a draft, not as it has usually been. We need to keep a good portion of our military purely professional. Also, I would suggest universal military service over a draft.
As far as “inspiring” kids (as it was put by ----) to join the service I really don't think much effort needs to be taken. It really is less a matter of “inspiring” them than it is getting them to understand the concept of service and sacrifice. One of the biggest problems today is kids and people in general can't deal with anyone being superior to them in any way shape or form. Due to this anti-intellectualism has peeked. Any mention of meritocracy is met with anger. People can't deal with the fact that they aren't the best. Today everybody's a “hero.” Suddenly a guy/girl who goes door to door raising money for medical research is a hero. We call people who go to breast cancer runs “heroes.” Someone who merely survives a bank robbery or an attack simply out of an instinct for self preservations is a “hero” Bill Maher of all people made a good point about this in his book “When You Ride Alone You Ride with Bin Laden.” To be a hero someone has to do something heroic. Heroes don't get caught in harms way they put themselves in its path. People who raise money or just do really good things are “good” people they may even deserve a Nobel Peace Prize, but they are not heroes. Not everybody can be a hero. It's nothing bad, it's simply what is. People want to be praised and told that their actions were great and heroic without having to sacrifice or risk sacrificing. There is also a lack of understanding of how men either possess too much pride or humility to accept the title of “hero.” 9/11 really brought this to the forefront. Cops and firefighters after the WTC attacks wouldn't call or consider themselves such. Their job is what they do. The term “hero” in their view was reserved to those who had died performing their duty or survived after knowingly performing beyond the expected call of duty. I have found with people that when people watch the news and hear about a man who jumps onto the subway tracks in front of an oncoming train to grab someone who fell onto the tracks, two auxiliary (unarmed) cops are shot to death attempting to subdue an armed gunman (who was already discharging his weapon) robbing several stores or when a man, for what ever the reasons made him capable of this act, jumps on top of a grenade to save his comrades there is often resentment that they themselves might be incapable to of such. Often there is also an attempt to demean these brave acts because they were “misguided” or some other term. I know I'm on a soapbox here but this I really feel is a problem.
[/quote]Likewise, I don't think civilian masters degrees are particularly useful except to the extent that they improve the military skill set of the soldier and to the extent that they increase positive interaction between the professional class and the military officers.[/quote] (Smitten Eagle) – I agree for the most part. Too many degrees just don't have ANY relevance to military skills. Sure, a degree in cognitive psychology (a real one not a lot of the B.S. They are teaching today) might come in hand in areas of intelligence work. We all can see the value of a masters in Arabic or Farsi. I must request that we find a better term than “professional class.” I also am critical of whether this is the right direction to go in order to foster healthy relations with this group.
9. [/quote] A really good example of such a counter narrative (“Fight Fear”) ist the current series of recruitment commercials for the Canadian forces (available here, requires Flash 8).[/quote] (mact) mact you are right on. Having lived in Canada when they first started coming on the air I have to say they were very good ads, in their cinematography and message, and from what I heard where helping enlistment both in quantity and quality of recruits. Of course, I was in Alberta. Our recruitment ads today are just terrible. Despite the money spent. First, are the ads trying to get people in for the wrong reasons (benefits.) Second, who thought these ads up. I understand the Navy and especially the Army have necessarily had to choose quantity over quality. That's the down side of being big. The Army first and foremost needs enough men. I do not understand the Marine Corps ad campains. Especially the last few they have tried and quickly pulled. I really think the Marines can get by with the least amount advertising. They have a reputation. The Marines (most probably everybody) should have ads more like the Canadian Forces. I must note that on other threads I have commented that the Marine Corp should not grow and possibly should shrink a little. The Marine Corp ads traditionally have had something to the effect of “if you make it” or “if you succeed.” This appears to be gone. Sorry to rant so much I just think who ever is making these ads needs their heads examined. Personally I think the HALO 3 ad has more potential if modified. (I'M JOKING – it sort of reminds me of some of the WWII recruiting posters)
10. [/quote]If Someone thinks an officer should not be deployed because he/she is weak then they need to get a job at Wal-Mart and not in the Army. If an officer is afraid to deploy because of family separation or fear of combat Wal-Mart is hiring. [/quote] (Patriot) – I agree 100%.
11. [/quote] No, you won't make comparable private sector pay, but you'll make comparable public service pay and the diference isn't drastic. Explaining BAH helps dampen the shock of putting a $26,000 base pay agains, say, $60k +bonus as a first year analyst at a top firm. [/quote] (mmx1) – Top firms dont start at 60k + bonuses. No, ist 100k + bonuses. They pay stupid money and they have been for 30 years.
12. [/quote] they should do, we've hit on the role of college-educated officers as a moral compass. [/quote] (mmx1) – I'm going to have to disagree a little here. I explain a little in #2.
13. On too many campuses, let alone almost everywhere else, you have self-rightheous (which is different than righteous, a great word that is almost unusable because of the connotations that have been attached to it) students performing, as they call it, “anti-recruitment. These students are not anti-war they are anti-military. They want to live in a nice perfect Utopia (wouldn't we all) and in order to do so they have brainwashed themselves to the point that they beleive if you act peacefully everyone else will. Unfortunately, this doesn't work. A military is going to be needed at least for the next few centuries. I believe these views are due to what I discussed in a few of my earlier points. What annoys most me about these people is they don’t want anyone of good caliber to enter the service and yet complain about the quality of servicemen the military.

I think that is almost everything. For now :) It's a bit long.

Adam

P.S. Sorry about the soapbox I get on a rant a few times in there :)

[Adam L]

If we want people to know who we are - then we should tell and show them. If we want people who can "Be, Know, Do" then we need to show them who to emulate. Not only do we need to know who our heroes and heroines are, the public needs to know - and in a big way.

I can think of know better way to convince people to serve then to show them it is possible to become more then a person ever thought possible through service to their fellow man and country.

Best regards, Rob

I agree with you for the most part. Real heroes make great examples and are good for recruitment and saving military programs from peace time cuts (LOL:D.) The only problem is you have too make sure you use the right one(s.) Every hero has their flaws and it must make sure that PR guys don't turn them into deity, or over publicize the wrong person. Nothing gets more publicity than a posterboy/girl. The last thing any of the services need is a posterboy/girl who gets some really bad press or has some dirt dug up. At this point the service mentioned would have tied its reputation to this person and its prestige would suffer a great setback.

This is why I would recomend highlight great actions by groups over that of individuals.

Adam

[RTK]

10. If Someone thinks an officer should not be deployed because he/she is weak then they need to get a job at Wal-Mart and not in the Army. If an officer is afraid to deploy because of family separation or fear of combat Wal-Mart is hiring. (Patriot) – I agree 100%.

Something I tell each class that comes through at various times in the course and is hung above my desk:

Leading Soldiers in this Army is a privledge, not a right. Each mission, each Soldier under your charge is a testament to your skill, ability, and willingness to abide by and exceed set standards. Meet the standard or learn to flip burgers.

[Adam L]

Something I tell each class that comes through at various times in the course and is hung above my desk:

Leading Soldiers in this Army is a privledge, not a right. Each mission, each Soldier under your charge is a testament to your skill, ability, and willingness to abide by and exceed set standards. Meet the standard or learn to flip burgers.
Amen

Adam

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Adam, Ryan,
I agree about the need to not lionize a person - we should emphasize the act they performed as it relates to values we identify with. I agree with you also about the need to highlight groups and units - but we must have examples of personal courage - while it is good to draw strength from one's group - it is often the individual, alone and unafraid that charts the course for the group and future generations. Leaders are often going to find themselves alone - it is the burden and responsibility of leadership that individuals are invested with the authority to make the final call. Is there some risk in this - probably, but we do say we like audacious leaders who can weigh the value of a risk and make good decisions.

I got to thinking about the 10-20 years of persistent conflict ahead figures I keep reading - and I was thinking about what that means for our society. I think one thing that must be considered is that there may be no peace dividend for at least a couple of decades - I've actually seen that brought up. Not that we should expect one, but to say that it is unlikely that there will be one only emphasizes the 10-20 years of war (or maybe they just meant "conflict").

My kids are 10, 8, 5, and 2 - by the 10-20 year marks my oldest will have lived in an environment where war/conflict could be perceived as "normal". If we have another child - they will be just old enough to serve by the end of the 10-20 year period.

As a nation - do we need to consider that? What are the values that will defend & preserve the freedoms and inalienable rights we are born with? The generation that will bear part of the burden is 10 and under. Do we understand the world well enough to prepare them for it?

I don't know the answers to those questions - but I think we (writ large) should consider them. I do take heart in the caliber of people in uniform, and I think their actions have acquitted them and their units well (there is always 1 or 2% I guess).

Perhaps a better way to the tell the story of their actions might be to tell it through the eyes and words of those it has impacted the most. We have to be forward looking in terms of recruiting and retention to insure we have the same quality of leader in 10 & 20 years as we have today - no easy task to be sure - but communicating the example may be a good start.

I really appreciate you weighing in - this is a good discussion,
Best regards, Rob

[Norfolk]

I agree about the need to not lionize a person - we should emphasize the act they performed as it relates to values we identify with. I agree with you also about the need to highlight groups and units - but we must have examples of personal courage - while it is good to draw strength from one's group - it is often the individual, alone and unafraid that charts the course for the group and future generations. Leaders are often going to find themselves alone - it is the burden and responsibility of leadership that individuals are invested with the authority to make the final call. Is there some risk in this - probably, but we do say we like audacious leaders who can weigh the value of a risk and make good decisions.

I got to thinking about the 10-20 years of persistent conflict ahead figures I keep reading - and I was thinking about what that means for our society. I think one thing that must be considered is that there may be no peace dividend for at least a couple of decades - I've actually seen that brought up. Not that we should expect one, but to say that it is unlikely that there will be one only emphasizes the 10-20 years of war (or maybe they just meant "conflict").

We have to be forward looking in terms of recruiting and retention to insure we have the same quality of leader in 10 & 20 years as we have today - no easy task to be sure

If it can reasonably be expected that there are about 10-20 years of persistent, "low"-level warfare that the military is facing, then the military will continue to be able to draw upon and recruit the minority of candidates for the officer corps who are motivated by the ideals of service to the nation, professional dedication and diligent self-improvement, and self-sacrifice for the common good, and retain them to the extent that the Armed Forces in general, and the Army and the Marines Corps in particular, are found by those same candidates to be living more or less in accordance to those ideals. That said, some of these candidates for the officer corps will be able to live with just being allowed to live up to these same ideals themselves, on a personal basis.

Granted, getting married and having a family is a BIG issue, and a lot of otherwise very dedicated guys who can justify their own self-sacrifices in order to stay in the military and try to excell there, just can't do the same when it means that their own family has to make the same sacrifices. Especially if after they've been in a while, they discover that in addition to all the work-ups to overseas deployments, repeated deployments overseas, trying to recover from each deployment, and having all the rest of the officer's burden to carry besides all this, that when all is said and done the service culture that they find themselves in just doesn't match their expectations, that the gap between the stated ideals of the service and what the service actually values is too great to justify such sacrifices. For the true believers, the guys the service needs most, this is potentially fatal; for those who in addition are married, it is lethal. The bad drive out the good.

These are the people the service needs to concentrate on recruiting and retaining, obviously, but it has to make a special effort to keep them happy - and I just don't know how you would do this in practice, given the overstretch the military has been suffering from for many years, even before the present wars. As for recruiting them in the first place, to a certain extent, 10-20 years of persistent warfare mitigates that problem somewhat, as the true believers will hear the trumpet call and respond - conversely, it will drive away many of those who are attracted to the officer corps for less noble reasons, such as an "education", or "experience" or a "career". A tough, no-nonsense, unglamourous, almost intimidating advertisement campaign that issues a blunt challenge to would-be-officers will attract the best, the true believers, and discourage the wanna-be's. Then the challenge for the service will be to live up to its own ideals in order to keep the best.

As for trying to increase the appeal to the "best and brightest" from across the nation's college campuses and the like, I'm afraid I have to agree more or less with Adam L, while going further by saying that we have a situastion there where not only the "Best and Brightest" are in considerable measure a parody of that phrase, but their minds are in effect poisoned and their moral consciences and characters malformed. Higher education is a decidedly mixed bag in North America, and colleges and universities are often, in some measure, little more than degree mills. An MA is not a reliable indicator in any way as to the intellectual vigour of an officer. And there is, of course, no shortage of exposure to the sort of ideological brainwashing that often passes for academic instruction (particularly in the Arts, but even in the Sciences too), and many kids are going to college already predisposed to this sort of tripe because at home they haven't been educated and raised in their own homes with a solid moral compass and a properly formed conscience and ethic of dedication and self-sacrifice. They go to school, join the Officer Corps, and then it's all about "My Career".

Look, I know that there is no way that the services, and especially the Army, can get by with just "True Believers"; there are just too many officer slots that have to be filled. But, taking a BIG risk by planning for 10-20 years of persistent low-level wafare (and dealing with any BIG war or wars that come along as best as can be done with what is available), this may present the Army, anyway, with an opportunity to try to attract more of the "True Believer" types, the kind who flock to the colours regardless of what everyone else thinks or does, while re-organizing the Army a little more along the lines of the Marine Corps, with a significantly smaller proportion of officers-to-enlisted men. This is a project for an entire generation, but if the best are to be both attracted to and retained for the officer corps, then they have to find professional satisfaction (to the extent practically possible), and those who feel a sense of entitlement as an officer, those who pursue their "Career" above all else, the bad ones are the ones that have to be driven out of a smaller, less ponderous, officer corps. Frankly, I can't imagine this ever happening, but a man can still dream.

[Rob Thornton]

Norfolk - good post - and it should be read and considered in its entirety - it is something to we should chew on for awhile.
Best regards, Rob

[jcustis]

I could have done without the rock remix. I thought the originals were quite well done (though not quite along the lines of the current conversation about diversity of jobs).
Mechanized Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUxYXX7pFp4)
Light Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvgZU6UwoWY)
Air Assault Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=weudbL9tXCQ)
Armoured Infantry (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lfp-jqJB81U)

As far as diversity, you've got this from the Irish:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbOQgqK1TBc

That Irish one simply kicked butt. A little bit of hittin' and rollin', some stuff getting blown up...all triggers that engaged a young lad's prima lurges. Who doesn't like that? :D

EDITED: I'm on a Youtube kick tonight. Unfortunately, we also have to contend with asshattery like this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BFNKzmqHjs&mode=related&search=Army%20Recruiting%20America

[jcustis]

Norfolk - good post - and it should be read and considered in its entirety - it is something to we should chew on for awhile.
Best regards, Rob

Concur.

I had a History professor in undergrad who taught a class on Vietnam. He and I clicked pretty easily. He wouldn't put up with any of the bleeding B.S. that some of my peers wanted to spout off about, as if they had a right to relive their parents' days.

It wasn't until the end of the course that I discovered he had served in Vietnam as an Army Ranger. He doesn't know it, but that class shaped a lot of my thoughts and impressions with regard to military service, and I see the merit in soldiering for the sake of soldiering. I had to overcome a lot of crap along the way, like the girlfriend who flat out asked me why I wanted to join the "white man's Army." (I was going Marine...duh!)

Adam and Norfolk hit the nail smack on the head regarding the best and brightest. That is so much a relative term and I see the paradox way too often.

Although the Rhodesians had more than their share of recruiting and retention issues, I've always dug this poster:

http://i30.photobucket.com/albums/c309/deftac03/BEAMAN.jpg

[Rob Thornton]

We were down your way today - I had the opportunity to actually spend some time going through the Nat'l Museum of the U.S.M.C. - this time I checked out the all the exhibits - you were right - very well done!

Two things stuck with me - the number of former marines who were for the period of time they were inside visibly transformed back to the young men they were once - be they at the WWII display, the Korean War, or the Vietnam. Like you said - its humbling.

The second thing was something I heard said behind me as I was headed out of the exhibits and into the main lobby. An older woman with her WWII aged husband observed that after WWII the nation as a whole slowly erased the responsibility of service from its national consciousness.

For those in the D.C. area its worth the trip down to Quantico - they have gone to great lengths to represent the hardships and challenges of service in our nations war while also heralding the spirit and character of those who answer the call. It makes no difference what your branch of service is, or even if you have served - the opportunity to consider what it takes to maintain our sovereignty and freedoms is worth it.

Also had lunch in Q-town at the Korean/Japanese place - it had not really changed since 87.
Best regards, Rob

[jonSlack]

WaPo - Army Offers Big Cash To Keep Key Officers (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/10/AR2007101002689_2.html)



More than 18,000 Army captains are eligible for the bonuses and more than a third of those have taken them since the new cash offer was announced on Sept. 13, senior Army officers said this week. An additional 900 officers have taken other incentives to stay on.

...

The Army's goal is for 85 percent of those eligible to stay on, either taking the bonus or another incentive such as attending graduate school or selecting their next post.

[wm]

Has Scott Adams (of Dilbert fame) captured HRC thinking about retention incentives with this cartoon (http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/archive/)?

[Rob Thornton]

Has Scott Adams (of Dilbert fame) captured HRC thinking about retention incentives with this cartoon?

Target, FFE.

I think of it as the QuickClot (http://www.z-medica.com/) approach.

[wm]

Target, FFE.

I think of it as the QuickClot (http://www.z-medica.com/) approach.

The only problem with the Quick Clot approach is that sometimes we forget to roll the patient over and see that the exit wound is many times much larger than the entry wound that we just patched (a la Snowden's terrible secret in Catch-22). Or, to continue the medical metaphor, we only palliate or alleviate the symptoms rather than applying a cure. Taking Acetaminophen may lower the fever associated with an infection, but it sure won't kill any of those germs.

[Cavguy]

Target, FFE.

I think of it as the QuickClot (http://www.z-medica.com/) approach.

Agreed. As I said over in the Yingling thread, the army has yet to address the "root causes", which are the issued identified in the 2000 CSA Study and other sources. OPTEMPO is a major factor driving people to the doors, but do an "exit survey" on those leaving and you find bad leadership as a constant as well - and the issues are the same as 2000.

The army I suppose has made serious reform "too hard" given the ongoing conflict, and with the supplimentals has more money than energy to devote to something as controversial as promotion/schooling/officer evaluation reform.

[Rob Thornton]

You know - it amazes me (and this is my very own personal opinion), we'll spend 35K to keep a guy - who may or may not have been going to stay, but we refuse to tell the civilians who we hire to represent us in areas involving family quality of life to be flexible in their policies with regard to soldiers on in between deployments. We have contracted out so many areas from housing and billeting to health and dental, to everything that can be in order to be able to put more teeth in our structure, but the cost is a bureaucracy staffed by people who have no clue what it is to serve, and worry about protecting their policies and pulling in a bottom line. We are doing the same with Dept of Defense Schools, DFAS (don't get me started on a story that could read "Carrie meets the Exorcist") and other areas, and its a shame. Somebody mentioned on the Blog regarding Sec Def Gates' speech that while he was giving his speech the main exhibition at the AUSA was the hardware - we talk a good game, but I'm not sure we really understand people, if we did we'd tackle the the tough problems instead of providing solutions that are only power point deep. Sometimes I wonder if we really believe we are at war - its not enough if the green suiters do, we've given up too much of our ability to take care of our own back at the home front in between deployments, and I'm not even sure we realized we did it - it must have sounded like a good deal when it was briefed.

One day we're going to look back and say, "damn, where did everybody go?", then we'll scratch our heads, dust off an old set of slides and roll out a fresh set of bonuses.

Take care of the soldiers and their families, and they will both take care of you. Mess with the family as a unit, don't ensure they are taken care of when ever and wherever possible, and you lose them both. Its sad when you see a train wreck, its even more so when you see it coming, realize it could be avoided, but know the guy in charge of the switch is either day dreaming, or looking at his watch and saying "that can't be a train - my schedule says no train due for ohhh......."

Best, Rob

[jcustis]

We are doing the same with Dept of Defense Schools, DFAS (don't get me started on a story that could read "Carrie meets the Exorcist") and other areas, and its a shame.

You know Rob, this hits home very hard for me right now. I'm due to PCS next year, and the decision behind my desired billets is dominate by whether the base has a DoDEA high school. They're just aren't many of them around in the Corps, yet that's important to me.

is it going to stop me from staying? Surely no, but I think you're right, and there may come a day when the teachers lose that bond with the parents they support, and then Johnny comes home black and blue from a bully that the teacher ignored for weeks on end. You should see the teachers at all of my daughters' schools. They are married to Marines, were raised by Marines, etc. They don't take crap from anybody, least of all a snot-nosed 5th grader.

And they make everyone stands and recites the Pledge of Allegiance everyday and make sure the Christmas play goes off as scheduled, not the damn "holiday" play.

[Norfolk]

You know - it amazes me (and this is my very own personal opinion), we'll spend 35K to keep a guy - who may or may not have been going to stay, but we refuse to tell the civilians who we hire to represent us in areas involving family quality of life to be flexible in their policies with regard to soldiers on in between deployments. We have contracted out so many areas from housing and billeting to health and dental, to everything that can be in order to be able to put more teeth in our structure, but the cost is a bureaucracy staffed by people who have no clue what it is to serve, and worry about protecting their policies and pulling in a bottom line.Best, Rob

Since WWII, the Armed forces have become a Corporation as much as anything else, with everything that that implies and entails, above all its culture. As far as these things are concerned then, the bureaucracy can only really see it how any other business would - as an HR/recruiting/staffing problem, and respond in kind - bonuses, incentives, more civilian education anyone?

Forces are "assets", dead civilians are "collateral damage", locating the enemy is "target acquisition"; for about half-a-century of more, the military has been "encouraged", even required, to compete for funding to civilian univeristies and the like to earn degrees in business administration, systems analysis (perhaps the two most onerous examples), ad nauseum. The Armed Forces Officer has not been professionalized; he's been "careerized", and above all, civilianized (or at least large swathes of the officer corps have long been so, effectively.

As such, those who are professionals at heart cannot help but loathe, not just dislike, much of the prevailing service culture, while those "careerists" are those most likely to be swayed by the offers of such incentives such as Bonuses offered by the Corporation (ie., the Army). Similarly, a Corporation has little to no interest in the family life and personal well-being of its employees, or even in a common corporate ethos that actually is real, not just contrived; while there are certainly senior leaders who understand and try to mitigate this, the overall corporate culture ultimately stifles this.

Rob, you are completely correct that the Army, as an institution, does not and cannot see, let alone really comprehend and appreciate, people. That's in large part because the Army is not so much an institution as a corporation. And countless people have been saying this for at least 40-some years.

[Rob Thornton]

nd there may come a day when the teachers lose that bond with the parents they support, and then Johnny comes home black and blue from a bully that the teacher ignored for weeks on end. You should see the teachers at all of my daughters' schools. They are married to Marines, were raised by Marines, etc. They don't take crap from anybody, least of all a snot-nosed 5th grader.

Amen - we recently moved off post for the move to Carlisle for BSAP where we moved to a nearby town because after 14 months deployed I decided to take the family with me vs. leaving them for another 8 months then going back to a high OPTEMPO job - my attempt to balance out my responsibility to the Army and my family life (BTW - so far it looks in the too hard to do column - the Institution is not geared to resource balance) - back on thread - anyway the school we wound up in had a good reputation and the corporate housing we leased had some good families in it (although I've about maxed myself out to make it happen - personal choice and worth it to us). My boy was having some problems getting integrated into the school - he'd never had problems before - he'd always done really well. So one day when I had driven back there on the weekend commute from Belvoir (location of current follow on school for new majors- also not "installationally" geared to the soldier returning from deployment and TDY enroute) I went and saw his teacher. Nice lady, good school, but no clue of what its like to be a service member, no real understanding of what deployments do to kids, no real empathy for kids whose parents do what we do, and not the same types of teachers we had at Knox. Kids were different too - they'd all been friends since Kindergarten - whereas kids on post know what its like to show up at a new post and have to make new friends, they know what its like to have a dad or Mom deployed, and they know at least one other kid whose mom or Dad did not come back. Military kids are special in that regard, and they deserve the very best - and so do their military parents - the last thing we want is for deployed Moms and Dads worrying about their kids and their spouses while they should be focused on the mission. Doing away with DoDS means kids being bussed off post in many cases and civilian kids being bussed on post as subject to local zoning rules. It also means local teachers paid by local standards vs. the quality of teacher who will commute for the extra DoDS money - it makes a difference.

Norfolk - you are absolutely correct - it is starting to feel like a corporation in all the ways we don't like,and all the ways that we profess we are different - honestly - it leaves you with a knot in your stomach.

Best, Rob

[Adam L]

I went and saw his teacher. Nice lady, good school, but no clue of what its like to be a service member, no real understanding of what deployments do to kids, no real empathy for kids whose parents do what we do, and not the same types of teachers we had at Knox. Kids were different too - they'd all been friends since Kindergarten - whereas kids on post know what its like to show up at a new post and have to make new friends, they know what its like to have a dad or Mom deployed, and they know at least one other kid whose mom or Dad did not come back.

I'm not surprised your boy had trouble getting integrated into his school. Kids in most regular communities today have no "social skils", but not in the pop-psychology sense. They have no basic pleasantries and are not taught to welcome newcomers. They are completeley hooked into thier own little groups. It goes beyond their disinterest in outsiders to thier actual capabilities of communication. It is very difficult for a newcomer to follow conversations, let alone comment on them, due to the over use of pronouns. Try listening to kids these days, you can't figure out whome, or what, they are talking about (its not because of the lingo.) Then go meet thier parents and you will understand why the kids are like this. Their interests are their life and if you are not part of it, you are not able to interface or get involved.

With all the touchy feely BS they put in teachers training, they have trained the empathy and sensetivity right out of them, and this is despite the fact that empathey and sensitivity have replaced academics when it comes to trianing teachers.

I am truly sorry your son is having trouble, and I wish you and your son the best of luck with this.

Adam

[Steve Blair]

This isn't really a new problem, either, Rob (sad to say). I faced it in the 1970s and 1980s as an Air Force dependent. The only time I was in DoDS was when we were in Germany. Every other time it was a local school near the base...and you always had two major groups: the AF kids and the locals. The locals had known each other since dirt and liked to gang up on the AF kids. I had friends who went to school in San Antonio, and it was far worse there. And no one in the support structure really seemed to care, either.

[Rob Thornton]

I just wanted to bring it up to highlight the "Kitchen 6" effect and her staff of K1, K2, K3, K4 on the retention issue. Its hard to qualify and provide weight for what appears to be subjective - but the effect is holistic with regard to the issue. If we spend our money to mitigate the K6 effect - it means making military life attractive to them in a manner that is not a fire and forget bonus. If you are going to have a persistent effect - you have to show a persistent commitment. It does not have to be large on the individual, day to day scale -i.e. a bonus every year, but it does have to show "why" its better - and this does not just mean repackaging diminishing benefits into an end of year statement - it means actually doing something novel.

But Steve and Adam you are absolutely right - and to go back to the Non-Linear aspect - if you take away stuff from the kids- there is a response far out of proportion to the perceived (on paper) deprivation - no questions - if I have to choose my family or my job, and I have options - I'll choose family. The incentives can compensate for some things however, but the belief has to be that things are getting better, not worse, and to foster that belief means matching the narrative with actions - which sounds allot like some of the methodology we use to describe LLOOs in COIN - how did that happen - oh yea- we're talking about people:wry: - go figure.

Best, Rob

[selil]

I had this long diatribe ready to post but I felt it was pedantic.

In summary.

If you use contractors for housing, services, etc. you remove billets to put military folk that can be used to rest and recuperate service members and employ family members.

Contractors on base just don't have that sense of urgency and they don't deploy as part of a team.

Schools k through 12 used to be on the base and now they're seeming to become a dying breed. BIG MISTAKE.

I've been told that officer wives clubs are the best thing for female spouses and the worst thing. The following spouse now isn't always a female, and they may be a doctor or lawyer.

I'm hearing a lot of grumbling from junior ranks about fears of downsizing like after Vietnam. Real or not it could have an effect.

[patmc]

From today's Early Bird

Raleigh News & Observer, October 28, 2007, Pg. 31

"A Fading Fighting Force"
Army battles big shortages, low standards

By Joseph L. Galloway

http://ebird.afis.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e20071029556833.html

Good article on the current problem facing junior officer and NCO's. Not enough people, equipment, or time to do more and more missions. The "bonus" has not had a real impact in my unit, where only those already planning to stay in have taken it. 3,000 to 6,000 short in next 3 years. This does not bode well for the republic.

[SWJED]

For those who do not have access to the Early Bird - Asking Too Much of Too Few (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/galloway/) by Joe Galloway.

[Norfolk]

This makes for rather discouraging, approaching the borders of grim, reading. Trying to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps during a war, without conscription (admittedly politically impossible), and while the majority of the junior officer corps is taking their release at the end of their initial 5-year committment (never mind the NCO's and the enlisted ranks), results in a completely schizophrenic condition in the Army. This seems to lead, almost inexorably, to a bad result. Sad.:(

[Rob Thornton]

Consider what else goes along with expanding the Army - you are going to have to create or pull senior leadership to meet those force structure requirements as well. You can promote - but their are problems with that as well - such as quality (it takes a while to make a good anything however much potential they have), and the new vacuums it creates in the force structure below, you can take/re-assign from career fields & functional areas - but then you take expertise you've invested into for a reason and place it back into ops & command. You can "not" advance folks so that they pull additional time in a given rank - but that just means more folks leave. You can fill billets with untrained and unqualified ranks without the authority to match the position. You can open up things a bit for more flexibility - enlarge your gene pool. All are alternatives - all are choices we'd rather not make in a perfect world. All of this while we've identified some short falls in our PME and ACS we'd like to shore up to better prepare our leaders for the challenges they face, along with exposing our junior leaders to operational and strategic thinking early in their careers.

Its tricky business justifying extreme measures toward retention & recruiting - its hard to measure who will stay and who will go, hard to lay out what it will take to keep them, hard to judge and portray how their families effect them. But just because its hard does not mean we can't change. We seem to be short on easy answers these days, I think all that might be left is hard choices.

Best, Rob

[RTK]

I got mine.

Then I found out two weeks later I have to do $24,000 of work on my house that won't be covered by insurance before it collapses. :D

I can only laugh at the cruel and typical irony in all this.

I am Army Strong.

[Ski]

There are rumblings out of the G1 community that certain NCO and Officer ranks are hurting very badly - and may take a decade to fix.

You want to expand the Army? Activate some ARNG BCT's and DIV HQ's for the duration.

If that's politically impossible, then maybe the war isn't that important.

[selil]

There are rumblings out of the G1 community that certain NCO and Officer ranks are hurting very badly - and may take a decade to fix.
You want to expand the Army? Activate some ARNG BCT's and DIV HQ's for the duration.
If that's politically impossible, then maybe the war isn't that important.

If the center of gravity of the public is not willing to support a war it's not the publics fault. Even the most ardent supporters of the military and the politics in motion are questioning trillion dollar cost estimates and administration tactics like faux new conferences. Linking disparate political agendas may not be fair but I've never known a soldier to whine about fair.

In a democracy the civilian leadership is required to make a case for a war and in this instance the trust of that case is eroding under public scrutiny. Similarly if the often mistaken "all volunteer Army" is not up to the task of waging a war based solely on an all volunteer force then that is a failure of the senior Army leadership. Federalization of the Army National Guard is nothing more than back door conscription that will likely result in breaking the back of the USANG much like the Army is feeling the pain now if it isn't already to late.

Contrary to popular belief the Army and military in general is not the foreign legion. An all volunteer military has certain rights to vote with it's feet and if those volunteers are saying family life in generational length warfare is important than we have to honor that. If the only way to keep a standing military is stop-loss or forced recall then we have already reached conscription status. You can't use stop-loss and all volunteer as policies at the same time and have credibility as a senior military leader.

If I had to have crazy ideas I'd ask a few questions.

Is the war in Iraq more important than forward deployment of troops in foreign lands? If so, then pull troops from forward deployment and abandon those bases. If not, then you've started a path to cyclical withdrawl from Iraq.

Is the war in Iraq more important than the war in Afghanistan? If so, then withdraw from Afghanistan and if not you've made a choice.

This leads us to some interesting conclusions.

The Army is about defense as well as offensive capability. As a citizen I am concerned that the current civilian and military leadership is chewing up the ability to protect my homeland and has abrogated the defense of America to foreign lands. If the threat of terrorism is so great then force projection can only work so long until the adversary understands the rules. The inter-service rivalries aside the Air Force can not protect against border jumpers and terrorists.

The most critical asset for the military of any branch is the human resource. The public and treasury can only stand so many space age robot warrior toys for the military. Sooner or later somebody is going to have to stand on a chunk of ground and defend it for living breathing people. You want and must demand that the person protecting others be of the highest standards possible. Criminals, and idiots create orders of magnitude parasitic drag on high performance organizations. Where the public is annoyed with expenditure on toys and gadgets they are appalled at war crimes and criminal acts by soldiers. We will be haunted by the specter of Abu Gharib prisoner abuse and Blackwater cowboys for years.

In the cauldron of warfare those charged with keeping the rank and file clean will only stand for so much abuse and mis-management by general staff and civilian leaders. A soldiers life is hard by the nature of the job it is not a leaders right to make that life punitive because we promote idiots to their highest levels of incompetence.

As much as we may wish to promote action for the exigencies of the service we can not do that in generational length war. We can not enforce volunteerism. We can not expect military service to be the only service applicable to those willing to serve society. We can not expect those who show the brightest, greatest, and most love for their country to give up home and family. We can not rob from our reserves and create defacto conscription. We can hold our civilian leaders accountable to make real choices and not false presumptions. We can realize that generational length warfare in Iraq may mean abandoning Afghanistan. We may not like it but a dysfunctional Army shed of it's backbone ranks may mean an isolationist international political environment.

[Cavguy]

Joe Galloway on the editorial page yesterday:

http://www.sltrib.com/Opinion/ci_7217865



The Army reportedly has a shortage of 3,000 captains and majors this year, and recently began offering them bonuses of up to $35,000 if they'd agree to remain on duty for an additional three years. The shortage was forecast to rise to 6,000 by 2010 as the Army tries to grow by 65,000.

Even with the offer of the cash bonus or free graduate school or their choice of assignments, the exodus of young officers continues to grow at a pace that worries commanders. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point was founded to educate career officers for the Army, and upon graduation each officer owes Uncle Sam five years on active duty. The hope is that most will remain for a full career, and historically just 28.8 percent have opted out after five years.

A total of 35 percent of the West Point Class of 2000 left the Army in 2005; 46 percent of the Class of 2001 left in 2006, and a staggering 58 percent of the Class of 2002 left active duty when their obligation expired this year. (emphasis mine)


Joe Galloway has been spot on throughout this mess since 2003. A tremendous reporter who has great love for the Army and soldiers.

[Rob Thornton]

Joe Galloway has been spot on throughout this mess since 2003. A tremendous reporter who has great love for the Army and soldiers.

You know - he (Joe Galloway) also seems to have allot of relationships inside that provide context to the problem. I often worry that the way we collect and analyze content leads to latency (over analyzing and the need to look for silver linings as a mitigation strategy) in making decisions - the effect becomes a solution that was valid for a problem as it may have existed 6 months to a year ago, but now has festered and grown to a point where the proposed solution is a akin to a city's problem of completing a new 4 lane hwy for traffic that has grown to require 8 lanes - you never get in front of the problem that way.

We are great at getting the tactical initiative - but often suffer at the higher echelon - in this case where it alls for adapting the HR bureacarcy to the challenges it faces now and forward, vs. the problem as it existed in the past.

Hard work - but it has to be done.
Best, Rob

[jcustis]

Just got this snippet from an AAR of a recent SNCO selection board. It would appear that the Corps has started to turn the ship on the significance of MiTT folks:


4. Although not a precept for this board (and, of note, combat deployment was not addressed in the precepts, but rather: “bloom where you are planted” was), Marines who had served or are currently serving in these billets should be considered "highly qualified" for promotion and get top consideration for selection, as our national strategy and success in Iraq and Afghanistan literally depend on their success.

I do not know if the officer selection boards are applying the same rules of thumb, but there is hope.

[Ski]

We're on the same page.

Even if ARNG and USAR units were activated for the duration, you'd see recruiting suffer. The AC would have to apply the same standards for their soldiers - you aren't leaving until we're done - and that's a non-starter for them.

For the first time, I am starting to get seriously concerned about the long term health of the entire Army - AC, ARNG and USAR. The next five years are going to be exceeding difficult to be a Reservist, especially a Guardsman.




If the center of gravity of the public is not willing to support a war it's not the publics fault. Even the most ardent supporters of the military and the politics in motion are questioning trillion dollar cost estimates and administration tactics like faux new conferences. Linking disparate political agendas may not be fair but I've never known a soldier to whine about fair.

In a democracy the civilian leadership is required to make a case for a war and in this instance the trust of that case is eroding under public scrutiny. Similarly if the often mistaken "all volunteer Army" is not up to the task of waging a war based solely on an all volunteer force then that is a failure of the senior Army leadership. Federalization of the Army National Guard is nothing more than back door conscription that will likely result in breaking the back of the USANG much like the Army is feeling the pain now if it isn't already to late.

Contrary to popular belief the Army and military in general is not the foreign legion. An all volunteer military has certain rights to vote with it's feet and if those volunteers are saying family life in generational length warfare is important than we have to honor that. If the only way to keep a standing military is stop-loss or forced recall then we have already reached conscription status. You can't use stop-loss and all volunteer as policies at the same time and have credibility as a senior military leader.

If I had to have crazy ideas I'd ask a few questions.

Is the war in Iraq more important than forward deployment of troops in foreign lands? If so, then pull troops from forward deployment and abandon those bases. If not, then you've started a path to cyclical withdrawl from Iraq.

Is the war in Iraq more important than the war in Afghanistan? If so, then withdraw from Afghanistan and if not you've made a choice.

This leads us to some interesting conclusions.

The Army is about defense as well as offensive capability. As a citizen I am concerned that the current civilian and military leadership is chewing up the ability to protect my homeland and has abrogated the defense of America to foreign lands. If the threat of terrorism is so great then force projection can only work so long until the adversary understands the rules. The inter-service rivalries aside the Air Force can not protect against border jumpers and terrorists.

The most critical asset for the military of any branch is the human resource. The public and treasury can only stand so many space age robot warrior toys for the military. Sooner or later somebody is going to have to stand on a chunk of ground and defend it for living breathing people. You want and must demand that the person protecting others be of the highest standards possible. Criminals, and idiots create orders of magnitude parasitic drag on high performance organizations. Where the public is annoyed with expenditure on toys and gadgets they are appalled at war crimes and criminal acts by soldiers. We will be haunted by the specter of Abu Gharib prisoner abuse and Blackwater cowboys for years.

In the cauldron of warfare those charged with keeping the rank and file clean will only stand for so much abuse and mis-management by general staff and civilian leaders. A soldiers life is hard by the nature of the job it is not a leaders right to make that life punitive because we promote idiots to their highest levels of incompetence.

As much as we may wish to promote action for the exigencies of the service we can not do that in generational length war. We can not enforce volunteerism. We can not expect military service to be the only service applicable to those willing to serve society. We can not expect those who show the brightest, greatest, and most love for their country to give up home and family. We can not rob from our reserves and create defacto conscription. We can hold our civilian leaders accountable to make real choices and not false presumptions. We can realize that generational length warfare in Iraq may mean abandoning Afghanistan. We may not like it but a dysfunctional Army shed of it's backbone ranks may mean an isolationist international political environment.

[Ski]

As for the West Pointers leaving:

The ripple effects in the Officer Corps are huge. I think there are roughly 900 graduates per class, so losing 540 out of a single year group is a terrific blow to an already crippled officer manning system. Now add on a loss of 414 out of 900 for the 01 class, and then 315 for the 00 class - you have massive gaps showing in the officer corps. I suspect the ROTC grads are in the same boat.

How are we going to improve retention? It's not just Captains, it's Majors and E7's and E8's as well.

[Patriot]

After recently talking with senior pers types I've come to the conclusion that the medicine offered, monetary incentives for officer retention, is ultimately bad medicine for this illness. How many officers on the fence have opted to remain on active duty due to incentives? How many officers who were going to stay took the incentive anyway? It's the bang for the buck idea. If the benefit is worth the cost then the incentive is valuable. But I would venture to say that we've spent an enormous amount of money not in retention but in a backdoor one time pay raise for a very select group of officers.

Currently, we're paying earily shippers one year's salary up front, re-enlisting Soldiers up to E6 generous in-theater bonuses, paying Captains a one-time$25-35k. We need a serious discussion within the military community on the active duty conpensation system. The shortage of officers will not remain with Captains. The shortage bubble that currently hangs over Captains will migrate to Majors and if we are not careful will once again review this problem in 3-5 years time and again throw a pile on money at the problem.

A more creative program for all members of the active military is essential so we do not create a population of haves and have nots but reward those deserving of higher compensation. Currently, we treat every Captain as deserving when in fact there are some who should not remain and in previous times would never have been promoted.

We do not need to create an officer corps of mediocre performers simply because they are breathing and wear two bars. Incentive pay for green-tabs, advanced education, combat experience, special deployment compensations, special skills, and performance can create the right incentives even with current levels of OPTEMPO.

Here's something to think about - if every eligible Captain received the one-time incentive pay (about 18k Captains x $30k (average incentive pay)) it would cost the Army $540,000,000. But the reality is we will not retain enough Captains with this program and it will cost us over $300,000,000. That's a lot of zeros for zero.

My bottom line - There is no relief in the near term (out to 5-7 years) for a shortage of officers. Recognizing this we need to also recognize that not every billet will be or should be filled, not everyone will get their desired assignment, the mission of supporting combat operations (pre, during, post) is the first mission of all services, and finally creativitiy and not simply the same old medicine is what we need for the future.

[wm]

Over time, as part of the “peace dividend" that resulted from the West “winning” the Cold War, the active component of U.S. Army has been about halved. What is amazing to this writer is that during the same period, the size of the globe has not gotten any smaller, the missions of the Army have not decreased, and the number of potential enemies to be engaged has probably increased. Once the US faced a monolithic major enemy in a fixed location (the Soviet Union in Europe), with the potential for also having to engage several smaller enemies. Now, the US faces the lreality of dealing with a stateless enemy of global scope (terrorism) as well as an even greater number of smaller potential enemies, many of which have greater military capabilities than ever.
The response to the dissolution of the evil empire has been, “do more with less.” As anyone who has any understanding of the real world knows, doing more with less is not possible. What ends up happening is the system breaks by being overtaxed. A system may be able to surge for a short period, but after that surge it can no longer perform at optimum levels. The American military on the ground is near its post-surge point. It is now like an engine that has been run past its RPM redline—If we do not back off soon, it will need a major overhaul that could take it out of competition for quite a while.

[Norfolk]

Over time, as part of the “peace dividend" that resulted from the West “winning” the Cold War, the active component of U.S. Army has been about halved. What is amazing to this writer is that during the same period, the size of the globe has not gotten any smaller, the missions of the Army have not decreased, and the number of potential enemies to be engaged has probably increased. Once the US faced a monolithic major enemy in a fixed location (the Soviet Union in Europe), with the potential for also having to engage several smaller enemies. Now, the US faces the lreality of dealing with a stateless enemy of global scope (terrorism) as well as an even greater number of smaller potential enemies, many of which have greater military capabilities than ever.
The response to the dissolution of the evil empire has been, “do more with less.” As anyone who has any understanding of the real world knows, doing more with less is not possible. What ends up happening is the system breaks by being overtaxed. A system may be able to surge for a short period, but after that surge it can no longer perform at optimum levels. The American military on the ground is near its post-surge point. It is now like an engine that has been run past its RPM redline—If we do not back off soon, it will need a major overhaul that could take it out of competition for quite a while.

And the worst of it is is that while all this has been going on, the good are being driven out (or just plain getting out), and the bad are being kept (who do you think is most likely to stay in for those "bonuses" anyway?).

And just to add to this, I have the bad feeling that when Iraq is more or less over, or at least the US committment there is dramatically reduced, the Armed Forces will see more cuts in the future. I have no evidence for this, just a suspicion that some folks will be looking for another "Peace Dividend" in the not-so-distant future. It'll be thrice difficult for the Army to overhaul itself then.:(

[Rob Thornton]

and the bad are being kept (who do you think is most likely to stay in for those "bonuses" anyway?).

I know you did not mean it without some context, which is why I wanted to make sure folks know that some of the guys I see taking the bonus, are good folks and are just taking advantage of what I'll call "recognition of their worth". If they have made it to the rank of CPT, then they have probably been afforded the opportunity to deploy and serve with distinction. Our own RTK is a guy that falls into this category, and if I were holding the purse strings I'd pay him that and then some to make up for the "above and beyond" hard work he's done (BTW - the majority of his incentive was spent repairing his house that probably was in disrepair partly due to the fact that he spends a majority of his time, and energy away from while doing Army business. - if the Army had not come along and offered up the bonus he'd of had to come out of pocket - so did he really get an incentive?)

However, it is true I think that those who take the bonus were probably going to stay for awhile anyway - their rational for staying currently outweighs the rational for leaving. What we have to do is find ways to increase the rational for staying and decreasing the rational for leaving to the broader officer population - we might have to approach each officer on an individual basis either through the CoC (not through a survey) or through a personal communication (besides and email) that asks them what is required, and then finding ways to act on it. It'll require giving CDRs the same authority and latitude to retain their officers as we give them in making other decisions relevant to the mission and the health of the command. We've got to make this attractive to the families as well, and we've got to allocate money for that purpose beyond Installation maintenance and housing - make the money available and make it flexible so the community leaders can address the concerns of FRGs - this will make some uncomfortable who count each dollar and insist on following a process that does not allocate funds toward a problem until that problem has festered and migrated, or requires planning so far out that it cannot possibly predict what those problems will be.

We need to look at what things stress the families of deployed soldiers - in some cases for leaders its actually problems associated with other families who cannot who face a myriad of problems - I mention it because we have to make better services available for the spouses and families of all our soldiers - E-1 thru 06 (that covers everything in a BCT). We need better health and dental - no co-payments, and no waiting! We need free day care - that can be scheduled and available for a full day the day prior and and for up to three hours the day of - the spouses of deployed families are often running wide open - and trying to keep it together while their military spouse is gone for 15 months - not to include the time spent during the deployment train up, or the TDY that is endemic to an Army at war.

Speaking of that - we need our support infrastructure updated to match those realities - right now at DFAS if you turn in a voucher its upwards of 5-6 weeks before you get reimbursed for the money you spend doing what the military tells you to go do. This also creates stress in a family - above and beyond the time spent away - we now induce further financial stress because we have an inadequate pay system which forces money out of the soldier's pocket and cannot meet the time limit to reimburse them before their Govt. Credit Card bill comes due and they show up on somebody's hit list - not to mention the GCC is often capped and cannot cover the expenses unless they are paid month to month - more financial stress.

If we are going to send servicemen TDY enroute for anything over a month after they've been deployed - lets make our installation policies adaptable to bringing their families, and lets put it in their orders. This should be a no brainer - but we've just not caught our support systems up with the fact that the Army is at war.

We've got to reduce the stress on the families, and where possible within an Army at war, we need to reduce the stress on the leaders. I think if we spend our limited resources with this in mind, we'll create the conditions where we can change the proportion of the rational for staying or leaving.

Finally, I'd say tackle the tough issue of recruiting the folks we want to fill out the ranks for our expansion. Part of this is showing the types of benefits that demonstrate compassion for what we are asking our volunteer military to do, part of this is showing clearly that their are opportunities for those who may enter without a family, but can envision raising one in a military that is also in persistent conflict. We're going to require compatible pay, a retirement plan that truly incentivizes staying past 20, better educational benefits (I read something about overhauling the GI Bill in the E-bird today), and opportunity to excel (this one we got in spades). Ultimately, if we are going to grow the Army we are going to have to get more folks - a flash of the obvious, but it requires more then just getting them to sign up for a 4 year hitch. Only by replacing the officers we've lost, keeping the ones we have and filling those new billets will we be able to create the long term conditions to sustain a force of the caliber we require.

I know allot of guys who are in my shoes - they are coming to a cross roads - be it the 20 year mark, kids coming of high school age and tired of being displaced, a spouse who is stressed out and looking for the type of stability that allows them to do more then just survive when the other half of the parent team is deployed, TDY or training in the field. Their decisions are not entirely their own - their familes gets a vote. I heard an anecdote from a friend here on the SWC who told me he attended a dinner where a GO joked about seeing so many recently retired leaders now serving in other capacities - that GO may have been joking, but he knew what was up.

Patriot remarked we better do something before our CPT problem turns into a MAJ and LTC problem, I think we already have one, they've made up their mind, but have just not left yet - it ma not be a huge portion of that population, but at a time where we are trying to expand - every good officer is critical. As we go forward, those remaining will inherit ever increasing responsibilities because there will be less to shoulder them - more billets will go unfulfilled, but the work will likely increase, not decrease - the stress on both leaders, their families and the soldiers will increase. The rational for leaving will increase and the rational for staying will decrease.

An all volunteer service full of the "best and brightest" is a hard thing to sustain under good conditions, under trying conditions such as sustained war with no mitigation of the stress on individuals and families, it may be too hard - unless you take steps to compensate for what you are asking them to do. You know, there are allot of guys and gals who love the Army, but they love their families more. You gotta show these folks that we will take care of their families in a concrete manner that goes beyond the concept of placing the burden on the leaders and their spouses ala a FRG (command and spouse run Family Readiness Group), and ACS Centers (Army Community Services ) that are more aligned and staffed for a peace time Army.

The next three years are going to be critical I think - I heard recently that in 2010 a significant part of the federal work force is going to retire - the military, as always will be called on to fill gaps in creative ways at home or abroad; as such they will have employment opportunities to serve in other agencies. The challenges continue to grow.

Best, Regards, Rob

[Norfolk]

I know you did not mean it without some context, which is why I wanted to make sure folks know that some of the guys I see taking the bonus, are good folks and are just taking advantage of what I'll call "recognition of their worth". If they have made it to the rank of CPT, then they have probably been afforded the opportunity to deploy and serve with distinction. Our own RTK is a guy that falls into this category, and if I were holding the purse strings I'd pay him that and then some to make up for the "above and beyond" hard work he's done (BTW - the majority of his incentive was spent repairing his house that probably was in disrepair partly due to the fact that he spends a majority of his time, and energy away from while doing Army business. - if the Army had not come along and offered up the bonus he'd of had to come out of pocket - so did he really get an incentive?)Best, Regards, Rob

Rob,

Thanks for clarifying this on my behalf; I certainly did not intend to say that all bonus-takers were mediocrities. I apologize for my negligence. But I very much did intend to say that mediocrities would be those most inclined to take such incentives. I an unambiguous about that, and just as troubled by that fact.

There are only two ways to keep the good guys that are either leaving, or planning to leave; either impose universal conscription (not selective service) or drastically reduce the Arm'y committments - neither of which are possible; and give the good their due, drive out the bad, and let the good do their job the way they see fit - and that can be done. It would be very hard, but it can be done.

[Rob Thornton]

Norfolk -
I certainly agree we have to safeguard against accepting mediocrity as a substitute - the consequences of not doing so are final in the worst way - our profession simply requires the best, second best = second place in war that is unacceptable. I'm sure all our SWC knew what you meant - but we have many a lurker these days:)

Best, Rob

[MattC86]

Norfolk -
I certainly agree we have to safeguard against accepting mediocrity as a substitute - the consequences of not doing so are final in the worst way - our profession simply requires the best, second best = second place in war that is unacceptable. I'm sure all our SWC knew what you meant - but we have many a lurker these days:)

Best, Rob

Shelby Stanton talked about some of these problems cropping up forty years ago in Rise and Fall of an American Army which I just finished. . . the demands of war combined with the loss of skilled personnel, either from casualties, leaving the service, or (in Vietnam) one year tours, makes for ugly compromises. With need greatly expanded, and the pool of available personnel - or willing replacements - smaller, there's a huge gap between the needs and what can be fielded.

If enhancing the pay, benefits, and support given personnel is the answer (as Rob advocated two posts ago), the costs simply are going to be enormous, at least as I see it. The changing demographics of enlisted men and the officer corps over the decades since the pre-WWII Regular Army means that the size and scope of the support required - Rob mentioned daycare, improved access for medical and dental, etc - will be huge. And that increases pressures for streamlining elsewhere; like outsourcing combat service support and logistics functions, as Gen. Casey mentioned in the video clip where he answered (or sort of answered, or sort of not really answered) the question about LTC Yingling's article.

The short shrift, in funding and resources, is going to go somewhere, it's just a question of where.

Hopefully that didn't sound like I was upbraiding serving officers for having families to support . . .

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Middletown (NY) Time Herald-Record
October 31, 2007 (http://recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/section?Category=NEWS13)

Army Steps Up For Families
By Alexa James, Times Herald-Record

West Point — In his first six months as Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Casey Jr. traveled across the country, asking soldiers' families what they wanted from the Army.
What could the military create to make their lives better? What could they do to keep them enlisted?
The answer was always the same.
"(They) don't want fancy new programs," Casey told a crowd of officers, cadets and children gathered at a youth center at the United States Military Academy yesterday. "(They) want us to fund what we've got."
Casey was on post yesterday, along with Secretary of the Army Pete Geren, to sign the new Army Family Covenant, a mandate to improve family programs at military installations worldwide. It means bigger schools and day-care centers, better housing and health care, and more career and personal opportunities for the families attached to soldiers. The covenant also comes with money — $1.4 billion in 2008 to rebuild, refurbish and staff this higher standard of living.
This, Geren said, was the Army's belated commitment to catch up with the demands of today's soldier in an "era of persistent conflict."
"We're in the seventh year of the war in Afghanistan, as you all know better than I," Geren said. "We're in our fourth year in Iraq. We're in uncharted territory."
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the largest and longest conflicts the nation has faced using an all-volunteer force. To sustain the numbers it needs, the Army will have to win the hearts and minds of its troops' families.

The way this reads the desire is there by Army leadership to implement this - it may as Matt points out cost more then we predict - particularly to maintain in an Army we are trying to expand - however, this is a very significant step and I think if the Army can articulate its (the Covenant's) strengths while recognizing whatever limitations it has and publicize it around the Army - tell the families what it means, and perhaps get some feedback at the family level this will lay the foundation for building retention. Every installation is probably going to be a little bit different though - so there will need to be some flexibility built in.

This cannot appear as a "one-time" shot - it has to be seen a continuous commitment that will not waiver, that will show emphasis on soldiers and their families, and that will demonstrate unequivocally that while we want our soldiers to have the best tech on the battlefield to ensure our soldiers our equipped to win and survive, our quality people are the means by which we succeed - and to retain these talented and dedicated personnel we are willing to create and sustain the correct standard of living for them and their families.

If anybody can get a copy of the "Army Covenant", we should put it up.

Best regards, Rob

[tequila]

http://www.army.mil/Leaders/leaders/sa/images/ArmyFamilyCovenant_lo.jpg

[Rob Thornton]

Tequilla,
Thanks - looks like a good frame work to start from.
Best, Rob

[jcustis]

Oh bother.

I'm a deeply concerned that any "improvements" will get mired down by the pile of bureaucracy that shapes about eveything happening in the military right now.

I'll give a quick example: The Deputy Director position with the base Family Advocacy Branch was only recently filled after a 18 month gap. We definitely needed it, but it's only come around just now.

I believe that any of these great ideas also means that we have to change the culture of these supporting structures. We can improve the infrastructure that you can touch and feel pretty easily. It's more difficult to change the mindset of the folks who make that same infrastructure run. It may only be small rudder steers in some cases (like schools and such), but I know the medial side has been nothing short of an abyssmal mess for years, hence the multiple pages devoted to Tricare issues in each issue of the Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force Times.

We also need to tighten up our internal admin and pay situation immediately. I am thoroughly convinced that if IBM had employess that had to deal with some of the pay issues that our warriors face, mid-level managers would be getting fired wholesale. Having a bad pay experience has to be one of the greatest reasons for members leaving the force, hands-down.

We simply do not have the same controls to correct pay and admin situations like big business does, and it is unfortunately hurting us as a result.

[selil]

We also need to tighten up our internal admin and pay situation immediately. I am thoroughly convinced that if IBM had employess that had to deal with some of the pay issues that our warriors face, mid-level managers would be getting fired wholesale. Having a bad pay experience has to be one of the greatest reasons for members leaving the force, hands-down.

We simply do not have the same controls to correct pay and admin situations like big business does, and it is unfortunately hurting us as a result.

Let me give you a real world big business example of pay. As a senior systems engineer often I traveled every day of the week. My entire team traveled substantially. Monthly expenditures easily exceeded $25K per month per person. We had a pay roll clerk who thought it was his job to protect the company from the malfeasance and criminal intent of my crew.

Some of the younger guys working on my team didn't have $25K in savings to cover credit card bills each month. When pay started to hit the 90 day mark in delay I halted travel and basically stopped business. It took about three hours to replace the entire system of gatekeeper and replace it with a facilitator based person. From 90 days to two weeks pay processing or less in three hours. It was a chronic problem, but it took somebody in leadership standing up and saying no more.

Sometimes it just takes a leader not accepting piss-poor performance from support people who say they can't change. Change or seek employment elsewhere. What is the mission? Why accept garbage that negatively impacts that mission? When the Hayman Fire (massive Colorado forest fire) nearly burned down one of my team members house we pulled together the team not on the road and moved that members family out as he was in South America unable to get home. Even in big business you have to have heart, but you do whatever it takes to keep the staff on task. Pay, benefits, and family are pretty darn important.

We were fixing main-frames and telephone networks. Nobody was shooting at us (though there was that little incident at the Columbian Telephone Company), but my team got us done on time and under budget. As I told my leadership the least we could do is pay them on time.

[jcustis]

Excellent contrast Selil, but try as the silverbacks might to make the chimps square themselves away, the chimps simply hide behind a crotchety personnel officer, who in turn hides behind the blinding array of rules and regs that his E-2s and E-3s can't possibly learn completely, as well as the folks at DFAS.

Believe me, I've done the leadership thing many times over, like ensuring a married SNCO went in with married junior Marines when they were knocking out their deployment audits. If the admin clerk was more concerned about what he would wear to the E-Club that night, it was like beating your head against a wall.

[Norfolk]

Excellent contrast Selil, but try as the silverbacks might to make the chimps square themselves away, the chimps simply hide behind a crotchety personnel officer, who in turn hides behind the blinding array of rules and regs that his E-2s and E-3s can't possibly learn completely, as well as the folks at DFAS.

Believe me, I've done the leadership thing many times over, like ensuring a married SNCO went in with married junior Marines when they were knocking out their deployment audits. If the admin clerk was more concerned about what he would wear to the E-Club that night, it was like beating your head against a wall.

Terribly, terribly true. One of the Admin Clerk NCOs in my old Battalion was so incompetent that when he was briefly posted out of the Battalion, he was quickly busted down in rank by the higher-ups at his temporary posting. Shortly after he returned to the Battalion, he was promoted back to his old rank. Dealing with Base Wogs is more often than not an exercise in utter futility.

I believe Patton in late 1944 conducted a clear-out of his HQ echelons, and after removing 2/3 rds of them concluded that there had been no loss in efficiency.

I strongly suspect that as far as military families go, there is no substitute for having the full range of services that DoD used to provide, on or immediately adjacent to base. I know that this constitutes isolationism from the rest of society, but when much of the rest of society has difficulty even comprehending the stresses that military families are under, it leaves military families and especially children that much more isolated and vulnerable out in the mainstream if they have to access services there instead.

Self-contradictory as this appears on the surface, military families are in fact more isolated when having to fend for themselves out in mainstream society, than they are if miltary families as a body are isolated from mainstream society, by having the full range of services they used to get from DoD. "Saving" money by cutting back on or reducing DoD services to military families (and benefits to military personnel) has had perhaps the most devastating impact on retention and morale after the length and frequency of overseas deployments.

[Maggie]

I strongly suspect that as far as military families go, there is no substitute for having the full range of services that DoD used to provide, on or immediately adjacent to base. I know that this constitutes isolationism from the rest of society, but when much of the rest of society has difficulty even comprehending the stresses that military families are under, it leaves military families and especially children that much more isolated and vulnerable out in the mainstream if they have to access services there instead.

Self-contradictory as this appears on the surface, military families are in fact more isolated when having to fend for themselves out in mainstream society, than they are if miltary families as a body are isolated from mainstream society, by having the full range of services they used to get from DoD. "Saving" money by cutting back on or reducing DoD services to military families (and benefits to military personnel) has had perhaps the most devastating impact on retention and morale after the length and frequency of overseas deployments.

Try turning this around. This is a hot point for me, particularly when reading military discussions from my civilian side.

My sister and brother-in-law were in the Air Force. They had several overseas postings while serving, as well as posts in the US. When overseas they always--if possible--lived in the communities rather than on base to "make the most" of their time there. Did rather well too; when I visited them in Germany I was invited to dinner at their German landlord's home which I gather is somewhat usual re social customs there. However--when here they lived on base and rarely left it. As you point out, military families ARE isolated from mainstream society--and it seems by choice as well as circumstances.

And you go on to state that military families are in fact more isolated when they have to "fend for themselves" out in "mainstream" society. I blink at the implications behind this, not quite sure where to start.

DISCLAIMER: I don't begrudge the military their benefits and services. As far as I'm concerned it's part of the pay package for doing the job. However....

1)It makes no sense to slam society in general for their perceived lack of support for the military when it's extremely unlikely, given the numbers, that most of us will even meet a military family in day to day living. I'd not sure there is "fault" on any side, given that 1% is the number often cited as the military vs general population. How do us civilians get the chance to help support/mainstream (?, peculiar choice of words, given the usage in other fields)/or in general treat the military families as what they are, a part of our society, when for the vast majority of us "the military" is an abstract hidden away on a base few of us can even visit?

2)There needs to be an understanding on the military side that PERCEPTIONS are important if the military wants public support for military benefits. When talking to Joe and Jane Sixpack, who are trying to figure out how to pay for medical care on (it seems) negative income and who are worried about their own schools (fending for themselves?) one should remember that the PERCEPTION is that their taxes are going to fund benefits they don't get.

3)Try and remember that civilian families often have the same or similar stresses that military families do--even in wartime. There are civilian employees of many companies in the ME, for instance. Or even closer to home--my dad worked for a utility company and was sent, more than once, to work on construction at other plants away from home. A brother in law moved his family three times for an employer because jobs are tight in his field. Families of police and firefighters never know if their loved ones are going to come home each day. They die even when there's no war on. Coming home is not a given for anyone, comes to that. Traffic accidents claim over 50,000 civilians each year. A sister-in-law was killed in one four months after the wedding--an innocent bystander in a high speed police chase.


Yes, it's different being a soldier. But the solution is not to further isolate the military and refuse possible ways of building understanding between the military and the rest of us by stating that integration of military families within civilian society is bad for the families because we can't understand at all what military families go through.

[jcustis]

A bit of a shifting of gears, but this is recently in regarding the "weight" of a advisory tour compared to serving in an operational billet:


ALMAR 046/07
MSGID/GENADMIN/USMTF 2007/CMC WASHINGTON DC MM//
SUBJ/QUALIFICATIONS OF SERVICE AS TRANSITION TEAM MEMBER OR
/AS JOINT INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTS IN SUPPORT OF GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR//
POC/W.J. MCWATERS/MAJ/UNIT:HD MMPR-1/-/TEL:278-9703//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. CONCERNS OVER COMPETITIVENESS FOR PROMOTION BY
MARINES SERVING IN NON-TRADITIONAL OPERATIONAL BILLETS HAS INCREASED
WITH THE EXPANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSITION TEAM MEMBERS AND
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTS SUPPORTING JOINT/EXTERNAL OPERATIONS. PROMOTION
BOARD MEMBERS RECOGNIZE THAT MARINES ON TRANSITION TEAMS AND
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTS SERVE IN BILLETS OF VITAL INTEREST TO OUR WAR
EFFORT, AND THAT MARINES ARE FILLING THESE BILLETS IN LIEU OF KEY
OPERATIONAL BILLETS WITHIN THEIR MOS TRADITIONALLY COVETED FOR
CAREER PROGRESSION AND COMPETITIVENESS TOWARDS PROMOTION.
2. FY08 ENLISTED AND FY09 OFFICER PROMOTION BOARD PRECEPTS NOW
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF
SERVICE AS A MEMBER OF TRANSITION TEAMS OR JOINT INDIVIDUAL
AUGMENTS: "THE WAR ON TERRORISM HAS SEEN THE GROWTH OF BILLETS
TRADITIONALLY NOT FILLED BY MARINE OFFICERS (STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED
OFFICERS FOR ENLISTED BOARDS). OFFICERS (SNCOS) ASSIGNED TO NATION
BUILDING AND CRISIS OPERATIONS BILLETS ARE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS
OF OUR COUNTRY'S POLICIES. THE BOARD SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY DILIGENT
IN WEIGHING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF OFFICERS (SNCOS) SERVING IN
TRANSITION TEAMS (TT) AND JOINT INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION (IA)
BILLETS. SERVICE IN THESE CRITICAL BILLETS SHOULD WEIGH EQUAL TO
TRADITIONAL MARINE CORPS OFFICER (SNCO) BILLETS IN THE OPERATIONAL
FORCES SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM DURING BOARD
DELIBERATIONS."
3. THIS POLICY WILL CONTINUE FOR SUBSEQUENT USMC AND USMCR
PROMOTION SELECTION BOARDS. THE CORPS MUST CONTINUE TO SEND ITS
BEST AND BRIGHTEST TO FILL THESE CRITICAL BILLETS.
4. COMMANDERS ARE DIRECTED TO DISSEMINATE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THIS ALMAR TO ALL MARINES UNDER THEIR COMMAND.
5. SEMPER FIDELIS, JAMES T. CONWAY, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.//

That's nice to see. Does it mean that more bright and talented folks will volunteer or at least go gladly to these types of jobs? Time will tell.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Maggie,
I'm glad you took an interest in this from the perspective you offer. I'll try and answer a few of these.


How do us civilians get the chance to help support/mainstream (?, peculiar choice of words, given the usage in other fields)/or in general treat the military families as what they are, a part of our society, when for the vast majority of us "the military" is an abstract hidden away on a base few of us can even visit?

In most cases civilians can access military posts if they desire to do so - its generally a process of registering at the gate and getting a 24 hour pass. In the larger scale of things you get folks who like to live on and some who like to live off post/base - depends on how they view the housing, on post housing availability, and perhaps a desire to invest in real estate ( I have some friends who buy a house every post they go then try and rent them out.) My wife likes to live on post - this is in part due to the challenges of PCSing every so often and getting integrated so she (and our family of 4 children) can resume a more normal life as quickly as possible. You don't always get to pick when you PCS - it comes with the orders which are generated based off of circumstances derived from Army requirements. There often is no time for the military spouse to help the family get integrated - particularly now - units have only one speed right now - wide open. The spouse checks in to his new unit and might be deployed, sent TDY or involved in field training within 5-10 days - leaders are expected to suck it up - comes with the territory. The families are also wide open - by living on post some of that is mitigated because there are generally at least a few families who are already plugged in and willing to help out - they've been there, so they understand.


Try and remember that civilian families often have the same or similar stresses that military families do--even in wartime. There are civilian employees of many companies in the ME, for instance. Or even closer to home--my dad worked for a utility company and was sent, more than once, to work on construction at other plants away from home. A brother in law moved his family three times for an employer because jobs are tight in his field. Families of police and firefighters never know if their loved ones are going to come home each day. They die even when there's no war on. Coming home is not a given for anyone, comes to that. Traffic accidents claim over 50,000 civilians each year. A sister-in-law was killed in one four months after the wedding--an innocent bystander in a high speed police chase.

There are differences here - but I'll have to address why on a case by case basis. First, I have several friends and family members working as contractors in the ME - they are compensated much differently, can quit if they choose, and live under different rules and conditions. From my perspective - this is very different.

Yes civilian families do have to move to find work - my wife's father had to - they moved often - she hated it, and it caused stress - but they were generally together, not separate.

My own father is a retired police officer - 25 years with Nashville Metro PD - lots of that spent as a patrol officer - lots of danger there - but he'll tell you his line of work and mine are different - he would come home at the end of his shift, sleep in his bed, touch base - he had long hours - often spending almost a second shift in court- add in the 2nd job he kept to pay for things and did not see him nearly as much as I'd have liked - it eventually cost him his marriage. Police Officers, Firemen and other public servants are also not compensated justly.

Yes civilians do get killed here - driving in today's traffic with the way people abuse drugs, get consumed with their own world and an overall lack of common courtesy makes for a bad time - but when I get on 495, nobody is shooting at me, has an IED laid out in an ambush, is willing to drive a vehicle filled with explosive into me, etc. Also if the people do get in an accident, its unlikely that there is an RPG ambush waiting and that if they are taken captive they will get their heads cut off. It gives a whole new twist to the way you drive. Generally when people shoot at you or trigger and IED on you - its because you were the intended target.

All of these things happen in very compressed times with military families (in some cases all at once). When you get one, the current (since 2003) and quite possibly long term conditions in the world will require these families to line up and do it again, and again, and again - until either the military spouse gets out, retires, is killed, or the world becomes peaceful.

I'm not trying to be trite, but this is our perspective on how the world works. If you ask a small percentage of the population and their families to take on these circumstances for more then just a one time shot - or if we desire to build and sustain a professional military that is the best at what is does, takes the oath to defend the constitution and is willing to go where and when asked for the long term - its different then what we asked prior to 9/11.

Even within the military there are different standards of "quality of life" -or at least the perception of it - there are lots of people that might be willing to do some jobs, but not others - I know of no other job that suffers more at peace and at war then the rifleman in the ground services (or someone re-tasked to that job), but who in this war is the most critical in the aggregate - just one of many jobs where we need the best and brightest.



Yes, it's different being a soldier. But the solution is not to further isolate the military and refuse possible ways of building understanding between the military and the rest of us by stating that integration of military families within civilian society is bad for the families because we can't understand at all what military families go through.

I whole-heartedly agree with this - and we don't want to isolate ourselves by living within the military posts - its just the way we mitigate the effects of our profession on those we love. We try and engage the public where ever possible to promote understanding and keep the public informed on the issues which effect us all - in fact this is one of the reasons I write on this site. We cannot exist as a professional volunteer force without public support - we want the brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, fathers and mothers to take pride in their nation's military and support us in recruiting, funding, inter-action - we are your military. The issues of integration and segregation between the American general public and its military are probably expected given the nature of a professional, all volunteer military that has been at war for awhile and will probably remain so for some time to come. There is blame to go around for all.

Attracting and retaining the best people and the support of their families will remain a challenge - particularly when they have proven what a value they can be to any organization they decide to work within, have amazing self-confidence, and are openly courted by outside organizations. They see the incredible stress placed on their families and can offer no clear rational to them as to why they should stay when there are clear options which starkly contrast with their current quality of life, their absence and the constant circle of worry that spouses and children must undergo - with no end in sight. Within our community now - members, spouse and children all know lots of service members killed or severely wounded and the wives and children devastated by those deaths and wounds. For as big as the military is - its really a small community - we've gotten to know death better then we ever thought we would pre-9/11. Its weird - you know what you are signing on to do, you know that armies go to war, your told early on in your career by older vets who went to war "to look around the room - some of you will be killed while you serve", but you really cannot fathom it - and neither can your families - until the first or second friend or acquaintance is killed, then you start to understand what war costs - you can put a face on it. My own wife told me its like the soldier's wife and family dies too because they are removed from that military family - move back home (wherever that might be) and start over. Our spouses are strong but they all live in fear of that image of somebody showing up in a Class A uniform, and feel guilty when the car drives on - my wife told me a story about how her and what I called the bus-stop gang (the moms coffee clutch who put their kids on the bus in base housing) noticed 2 officers in class As trying to find a house in the neighborhood - and the range of emotions that they went through as the 2 men eventually drove to a street over. The last emotion - the one following rage, anxiety, fear, and relief was embarrassment - how dare they thought that they should think for one minute those men might be coming to tell them their husband or the friend of a husband might have been killed. Since the war began - scenes like this play out wherever there are deployed soldiers & sailors, airmen and sailors serving in OIF/OEF - this is a daily occurrence not in response to an event - just daily life - the scale has a quality unlike anything else. There are few jobs that require families to cope with that day in and day out while the media covers every second of it and adds to the stress.

I just wanted you to know how our perspectives are shaped. Glad your on the SWC.

Best Regards, Rob

[Norfolk]

I whole-heartedly agree with this - and we don't want to isolate ourselves by living within the military posts - its just the way we mitigate the effects of our profession on those we love. We try and engage the public where ever possible to promote understanding and keep the public informed on the issues which effect us all - in fact this is one of the reasons I write on this site. We cannot exist as a professional volunteer force without public support - we want the brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, fathers and mothers to take pride in their nation's military and support us in recruiting, funding, inter-action - we are your military. The issues of integration and segregation between the American general public and its military are probably expected given the nature of a professional, all volunteer military that has been at war for awhile and will probably remain so for some time to come. There is blame to go around for all.
Best Regards, Rob

Rob, isn't there that much more strain on military families when they have to send their kids to non-DoD schools and access non-Dod services? One of our members a week or two ago mentioned that his daughter found herself more or less on the "outside" in a non-Dod school because the kids there just can't relate to what her family's way of life is like. De facto isolation of military families from mainstream society is just a fact of life that, apart from the periodic media story, that society as a whole has little way or incentive to relate to military families. I bring this up not to be a contrarian, but to say that, practically speaking, how can military families "make it" without effectively being separate to a real, tangible degree, from mainstream society?

Government cuts to military personnel benefits and to miltary family services force said to seek the same in the mainstream, and military families have to deal with people that just don't understand where they're coming from, and often don't have the money to pay for the same benefits that they used to receive as part of taking "The Queens' Guinea".

In the English-speaking world, mainstream society has little way or even incentive to relate to the special problems of military (or for that matter LE/ES) families. How can they relate to what such families have to face? Why would they even want to? Traditionally, mainstream society has looked down upon the military, and largely ignored them. Military families of course, as a matter of sanity and survival, banded together and tried to look out for each other.

The sorts of benefits and services that the Government started to give troops and their families in the decades after WWII raised most of them out of real poverty; the reduction or elimination of these benefits and services makes a real difference to those same families. Cut the benefits and the services, send the kids to schools where they are treated as outsiders by teachers and students alike, and force them to seek and pay for services outside of the military, and it's no wonder so many troops find they have to get out. And the only way to keep such people is by restoring these benefits and services and some day bringing (in the future) overseas deployments down.

But practically speaking, I don't see how it really helps military families any to be integrated, as if that were actually possible, within the mainstream. Their circumstances, and the tendencies towards indifference to those circumstances by civilians, just naturally lead to military families grouping together and separating themselves to a noticeable degree from that mainstream. I just don't see how it works out any other way in practice for most military families.

[Rob Thornton]

Rob, isn't there that much more strain on military families when they have to send their kids to non-DoD schools and access non-Dod services? One of our members a week or two ago mentioned that his daughter found herself more or less on the "outside" in a non-Dod school because the kids there just can't relate to what her family's way of life is like

There was strain on my kids - the member was me - part of it is the rip em up and put em back down, followed by rip em up and put em back down we're currently going through - we're about done though (with regards to the current 8 month enroute odyssey we are on - one more rip em up and hopefully I can put em down for a good 2 1/2 to 3 years in a DoDs school at LVN. I think they'll be OK - kids are pretty resilient - but I plan on a more permanent arrangement down the road - its pretty important to my wife and me that the kids spend their teen years in the same school - pretty critical & formative time in their lives, and as such will reflect a change in our priorities - I mean, if we can't afford our kids the best opportunities for a future we're probably missing the broader point of life - but that is a personal opinion.

I do know some military parents who have put their kids in private schools (yea it cost them plenty, but they were willing to pay for the peace of mind) and good public schools off post and had good things to say about them - but this was back when things were different - back before 2003.

The broader point you make though is one I believe to be very valid. DoD schools make a positive difference to the educational and emotional health of those children whose parents are in a cycle of deployments - this is because having the services and people around who know what to expect and are watching for it makes a difference. Because their is greater interaction with the military parents and base leadership these teachers, counselors and school administrators become part of the military culture vs. having to have the kids adjust to people who may not understand the issues which effect our kids. This allows the deployed soldier some peace of mind on multiple levels - he/she knows his kids are better off, and he/she knows the stress on the spouse is less for similar reasons.

Best regards, Rob

Checking into the Army Covenant framework today - I think the Army Leadership understands and is committed to addressing some of the shortfalls we've let slip with regard to military quality of life issues like DoDS, etc. I think it was you who mentioned earlier that the these are not new things - these are things the military used to have, but fell away as political leadership cashed in on a "peace dividend". In some ways its like fore structure size - too often we take things for granted because we don't understand their value, the cost it takes to grow them or the rational for why they were put in place in the first place (Ken is a great American who has seen us go through this painful cycle many, many times who will also tell you in the aggregate policy level we just don't wise up :)- we just assume we don't need it anymore - when we do, we start looking around for somebody to blame.

[jcustis]

The broader point you make though is one I believe to be very valid. DoD schools make a positive difference to the educational and emotional health of those children whose parents are in a cycle of deployments - this is because having the services and people around who know what to expect and are watching for it makes a difference. Because their is greater interaction with the military parents and base leadership these teachers, counselors and school administrators become part of the military culture vs. having to have the kids adjust to people who may not understand the issues which effect our kids. This allows the deployed soldier some peace of mind on multiple levels - he/she knows his kids are better off, and he/she knows the stress on the spouse is less for similar reasons.

When I surprised one of my daughters at the end of school following an OIF deploy, her teacher cried with her when she ran into my arms. I in turn told her, and the teachers for my other two daughters, that they had my thanks for being a surrogate parent when I was gone.

These same types of teachers are very adept at handling those situations when Johnny or Sally's mother or father doesn't make it back to the ship. :(

[Maggie]

Hi Maggie,
I'm glad you took an interest in this from the perspective you offer. I'll try and answer a few of these.

Before I respond I'll tell you all that I had been mulling over the post I made over the last eight hours and actually asked that it be pulled a bit earlier tonight, believing it was both off topic and too heated a response to the post I was reacting to. I was told it wasn't and in fact elicted several replies--so here I am:eek:

My POV on this comes living not far from Pentagon and between Washington and Quantico, as well as all the other offical type things that are found in the area. I've mentioned that I've had family in the military although I have not served myself. This makes me a "tweener"--I can understand some of both sides but I am getting overly frustrated and tend to start yelling "Yes, but--" at the drop of a hat anymore.


In most cases civilians can access military posts if they desire to do so - its generally a process of registering at the gate and getting a 24 hour pass.

I try very hard not to ramble and therefore often perhaps leave out too much in these posts. I haven't been on base in recent years--when going to Andrews I had to both be on a list beforehand and provide a reason to be going on base, and this was before 9/11. I had family there and so didn't have a problem unless my sister forgot to call me in! Would someone just 'wanting to visit the base' really be allowed in these days to stroll around? And would that really provide much insight into the military life? That was my point, actually, that when families live on a base where access is controlled there isn't much contact with people day to day to build lines of support with. It becomes another version of town vs gown with a gate separating the two (which is actually a very common pattern, unfortunately).


There are differences here

Yes, big differences and this was a victim of my anxiety about rambling. What I am looking at is finding *similar* things to relate to. From where I sit on the other side of the fence the PERCEPTION is that things are SO different in the military that it's not possible for a civilian to understand the military perspective at all. I can be guilty of that same thing re the fire service but at the same time it makes me aware of the problem. "You're not _____________ so you can't understand" cuts off all dialogue right there.



I'm not trying to be trite, but this is our perspective on how the world works. If you ask a small percentage of the population and their families to take on these circumstances for more then just a one time shot - or if we desire to build and sustain a professional military that is the best at what is does, takes the oath to defend the constitution and is willing to go where and when asked for the long term - its different then what we asked prior to 9/11.[QUOTE]

Which is why I don't begrudge what the so-called "perks" are. I don't see them as "perks", I see them as necessities for those doing that job. I'm talking here about the perception between the two spheres which seem to be drifting further apart, not closer after 9/11. I don't see your answers as trite, either, I am concerned that perspectives be exchanged instead of stereotypes and common examples reach people where other examples might not.

[QUOTE]I whole-heartedly agree with this - and we don't want to isolate ourselves by living within the military posts - its just the way we mitigate the effects of our profession on those we love.

Which again is understandable but needs to be taken into account when talking to those outside. It's obvious you get get it :p but I've come across too many who don't on both sides. It makes perfect sense for many reasons but again, for many reasons it makes it hard for the general population to feel connected--and what I'm talking about here is pretty much all a discussion of emotional perceptions which are rarely amenable to logic.


We try and engage the public where ever possible to promote understanding and keep the public informed on the issues which effect us all - in fact this is one of the reasons I write on this site.

I see this as a big issue, perhaps even another topic :D, frankly I don't see what to do about it. My comment on this is NOT directed at this forum, or at any entity in particular, actually. "The public" in large enough numbers is not getting the message, and the old messengers--ie, newspapers/TV--are flubbing it. While the Internet does allow sites such as these, finding them is also a matter of already knowing what to look for. The first requirement is NOT asking a question, it is KNOWING a question needs to be asked. Take the COIN manual. I would venture a quess that most people have no idea such a thing even exists, never mind what it is. I had no idea either, until I started playing leap blog this summer after a chance comment on a totally unrelated forum let me know milblogs existed.


We cannot exist as a professional volunteer force without public support - we want the brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, fathers and mothers to take pride in their nation's military and support us in recruiting, funding, inter-action - we are your military. The issues of integration and segregation between the American general public and its military are probably expected given the nature of a professional, all volunteer military that has been at war for awhile and will probably remain so for some time to come. There is blame to go around for all.

Yes--and too many people seem to forget that, I agree. I also prefer to leave "blame" out of it; for me it's not a question of "blame", it's a question of how to illuminate the issues that cause division. Some of those issues are unavoidable, best find a way to work around them without worrying about whose fault it is.


Attracting and retaining the best people and the support of their families will remain a challenge - particularly when they have proven what a value they can be to any organization they decide to work within, have amazing self-confidence, and are openly courted by outside organizations. They see the incredible stress placed on their families and can offer no clear rational to them as to why they should stay when there are clear options which starkly contrast with their current quality of life, their absence and the constant circle of worry that spouses and children must undergo - with no end in sight.

After the third move my brother-in-law finally found a job with another company--and stayed put. It is entirely understandable that a soldier should decide that he or she has had enough. That makes it all the more important that the whys of benefits offered to soldiers are made explicit--which goes back to how to make the difficulties of military life clear to those outside. Which runs into what I acknowledge is a problem on "my" side of the fence, that those who volunteer, volunteer. What is missing over here is an understanding that those few carry the burden for many. Which again goes back to communication.

I don't know how much my perspective helps (!) but I am concerned enough about what appears to be a growing divide to speak up.

[Adam L]

My own father is a retired police officer - 25 years with Nashville Metro PD - lots of that spent as a patrol officer - lots of danger there - but he'll tell you his line of work and mine are different - he would come home at the end of his shift, sleep in his bed, touch base - he had long hours - often spending almost a second shift in court- add in the 2nd job he kept to pay for things and did not see him nearly as much as I'd have liked - it eventually cost him his marriage. Police Officers, Firemen and other public servants are also not compensated justly.

Yes civilians do get killed here - driving in today's traffic with the way people abuse drugs, get consumed with their own world and an overall lack of common courtesy makes for a bad time - but when I get on 495, nobody is shooting at me, has an IED laid out in an ambush, is willing to drive a vehicle filled with explosive into me, etc. Also if the people do get in an accident, its unlikely that there is an RPG ambush waiting and that if they are taken captive they will get their heads cut off. It gives a whole new twist to the way you drive. Generally when people shoot at you or trigger and IED on you - its because you were the intended target.


Rob, I agree with most of what you have said, but I have to point out one or two things. Yes, cops have it different from servicemen, but you cannot group all cops into one group just as you can't group everyone in the service into a single group. I grew up just outside NY and went to school in the city (a very nice section.) I've known some NYPD (mainly retired) officers and I have to say depending on your job and precinct, its different but it can be as difficult as many military positions (even now.) Cops who work in some of the really bad sections see and deal with horrors that are not of the scale of what soldiers are dealing with in Iraq, but they can be just as brutal. Overall the danger is less, but it never ends. When they're 70 and retired, most of them will still carry and worry who got out and might come after them or their family. Even though this is unlikely, it is something that will never leave their mind. For undercover officers this is only exaggerated (as is the danger.) Again, much of the police force does not have to deal with all of this, but a lot do. Cops are underpaid (starting wage for a cop is $24,000 which is bubkas in NY) and overworked. I am not demeaning the difficulty of military service in anyway, I am just pointing out that many big city cops are in similar positions. I also believe the NYPD has "officer retention" issues which are similar to the military's. The only reason NY still has a police force is because of its history and reputation. Every surrounding county almost doubles the pay. I know this has been off point, but I just wanted to toss this in. I also apologize for not discussing other public service jobs (firemen, ems, etc.) but this was the easiest.

I should point out that I have never met an officer who would ever compare thier job the military. Most I have known did thier time in the service before joining the force. I'm just trying to say don't bunch them all into one group. I guess what I have been saying is that although the stresses on the family itself are normally not as great, the cop spends a lot of time worrying about thier family. My point is although you worry about the difficulties your family is facing, you don't spend as much time worrying if some gang member or rapist you busted is going to go after your family. Again, this is not likely but it is a definite worry especially for undercover cops.

I still agree with you Rob (and everybody else who posted on this) I just like to point out these issues. This respone is not directed specifically at you. The respect for the stuff cops have to deal with has gone down hill. Personally I think many people think watching Cold Case, CSI, etc. gives them an idea of what its like.

Adam

P.S. I know I'm a little aggressive on this (and perhaps blowing it out of proportion,) but with the pay and benefit cuts the NYPD is suffering is abhorent. The NYPD will never go on strike though, so city council doesn't give a damn. They just worry about the teachers striking (they want a raise, again.)

[tequila]

I've known some NYPD (mainly retired) officers and I have to say depending on your job and precinct, its different but it can be as difficult as many military positions (even now.) Cops who work in some of the really bad sections see and deal with horrors that are not of the scale of what soldiers are dealing with in Iraq, but they can be just as brutal. Overall the danger is less, but it never ends. When they're 70 and retired, most of them will still carry and worry who got out and might come after them or their family. Even though this is unlikely, it is something that will never leave their mind. For undercover officers this is only exaggerated (as is the danger.)

I know a lot of current NYPD officers who are also USMCR and have deployed to Iraq once or twice. From what they have told me, nothing at work compares. The danger is not even close to the same. My own experience growing up in one of the worst neighborhoods of NYC during the homicide boom during the late 1980s - early 1990s (my hometown (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE2D91E31F936A35752C0A96F9482 60)as described in this NYTIMES story from back then).

The vast majority of cops carry off-duty due to cop paranoia and the ability to stop a crime in progress - not because they are specifically targeted. Actual vengeance killings of American police officers are incredibly rare, unlike in places like Iraq.

The pay issues in the NYPD are genuine but not really relevant to the broader discussion, since as you noted most tristate area departments pay much more and require far less stress and work. The NYPD is having major retention issues due to this, but this is really a department-specific issue.

[Ski]

My uncle was a cop in Philly for 30 years and was forced to medically retire after getting hit by a Chemlawn truck that left him with sever nerve damage in his feet and legs.

He was an accident investigation cop - one of about 20 for a city of 3+ million, and used to spend 16-20 hours a day working. Half of that was actually doing his job, half of it was in court.

Cops get the short end of the stick in our society - without any doubt.

I still think the isolation of the active duty military is a terrible problem, especially when it's a volunteer force that is 100% reliant on selling a message to the civilian populace in order to sustain itself with personnel -that has become more isolated from the Active component.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Maggie,
I'm glad you made the original post - I (and I don't think any of the rest of us) took it the wrong way - your other posts show you are quality folk - I think you raise some good issues, that if we were only talking amongst folks in uniform, or previously in uniform would not be raised. A discussion where everyone is in total agreement is not much of a discussion, and your questions show why society needs to have a better understanding of who are military is, the life they and their families lead, and consider what it takes to have a military. Too many equate people and hardware and spending in the same box. Its easy to do given the news media, the politics, Hollywood, etc. Public service in general is something the majority of our citizens seem no to really understand - they tend not to notice until something is not there vs. understanding what it takes to create and sustain it. I'm glad your here.

Best, Rob

[Steve Blair]

Maggie,

I liked your post because it points out something else as well...there are some folks within the military who don't know how civilians live these days. I say that because I work with military guys and see firsthand just how many problems they're going to have when they transition into jobs that don't have housing allowances, cost of living adjustments, or insurance plans (even though Tricare isn't great, it's better than what many of them will be facing). Being an Air Force brat I got to see both sides of the picture, and I'm convinced that there's almost as big a disconnect between the military perception of civilian life as there is the civilian perception of military life.

That's always something worth keeping in mind.

[Rob Thornton]

I got to thinking about when police cars always had 2 officers in them (partners) - and then one day -allot of departments decided 1 officer was enough - they had technology, etc. to mitigate it. The police department and FOPs told the local policymakers this was a bad idea - but the other side just could not see it their way. Later we had reason to question the decision - and we started to look at how individuals under stress make decisions vs. pairs and teams. We had to relearn what we already knew - quantity and quality do matter, and in cases making complex decisions that have life and death consequences for multiple parties - many departments have gone back to 2 officers in a patrol car.

Best, Rob

[Adam L]

I still think the isolation of the active duty military is a terrible problem, especially when it's a volunteer force that is 100% reliant on selling a message to the civilian populace in order to sustain itself with personnel -that has become more isolated from the Active component.

I agree completely with your comment. Yes, the isolation being experienced must be terrible.

Adam

[jcustis]

Maggie,

I liked your post because it points out something else as well...there are some folks within the military who don't know how civilians live these days. I say that because I work with military guys and see firsthand just how many problems they're going to have when they transition into jobs that don't have housing allowances, cost of living adjustments, or insurance plans (even though Tricare isn't great, it's better than what many of them will be facing). Being an Air Force brat I got to see both sides of the picture, and I'm convinced that there's almost as big a disconnect between the military perception of civilian life as there is the civilian perception of military life.

That's always something worth keeping in mind.

Hence the reason why retirement is frankly terrifying for me right now, and I am still a few years away.

[jcustis]

Moving back into the original thrust of this post...

I recently reviewed the message regarding the intermediate level school (Majors) selection process. It specifically sttes that recruiting station commanding officers who successfully complete their tour are automatically approved to attend resident PME.

Those folks no doubt have stressful jobs, but it makes me wonder if the advisory component of our officers and SNCOs will eventually receive similar consideration.

[Maggie]

Hey Maggie,
I'm glad you made the original post - I (and I don't think any of the rest of us) took it the wrong way - your other posts show you are quality folk - I think you raise some good issues, that if we were only talking amongst folks in uniform, or previously in uniform would not be raised. A discussion where everyone is in total agreement is not much of a discussion, and your questions show why society needs to have a better understanding of who are military is, the life they and their families lead, and consider what it takes to have a military. Too many equate people and hardware and spending in the same box. Its easy to do given the news media, the politics, Hollywood, etc. Public service in general is something the majority of our citizens seem no to really understand - they tend not to notice until something is not there vs. understanding what it takes to create and sustain it. I'm glad your here.

Best, Rob

Thank you, although I'm still a little dubious here about my point getting across. I am tact-challenged and detest terms like 'dialogue.':D In trying to be tactful and use current jargon I think I lost my focus.

I brought up situations that I considered might have points of reference that connect somewhere so that both sides trying to communicate to each other have a place to start. I didn't intend to negate the unique problems of the military. Perhaps my point might be better conveyed if I fall back on the venerable "hearts and minds" campaign tactics, with us civilians playing the villagers.:wry:

To use schools as an example, with the goal of improving quality of life re the retention issue:

"Local schools suck so we need our own". I assume the goal here is to convince the villagers--uh, civilians--to contribute tangible support in the form of lobbying congress to provide DoD schools again, and to support the increased funding needed to do this. Not a good idea to insult the locals with that goal in mind, particularly when it's not even uniformly true. A much better tactic is to leave that one alone. It leads naturally right into "Yeah, our schools suck so why do they get their own while we're stuck?" Lotsa answers to that particulalr question but none that necessarily would get the civilians to help out here. I understand the reasons given, even agree that most of them are valid--and yet every time I hear this one my own eyebrow goes up.


"Base schools are more sensitive to the concerns of military families". Yes and no, although this one is more promising. My area is extremely transient, with families moving in and out all the time, including children of military families who attend our public schools. The schools here also tend to have either a psychologist on staff or available through the school system and are used to dealing with issues similar to this. Small towns probably don't have the money for this and are more likely to suffer academically also because of lack of money. On the other hand, small towns near bases are more likely to be 'company towns' where the majority of students ARE military--in which case the 'more sensitive' point is moot. A better approach using this idea would be to borrow the idea of neighborhood schools that draw on shared ties and shared experiences/culture. This has worked for communities where bussing and school closings were involved. But, once again the local community still has to be considered--they are, after all, concerned about their children too. If a local school that depends at least in part on federal subsidies given for educating military children loses them because a DoD school opens on base (which doesn't accept local children) that isn't gonna sway public opinion favorably either. I think what I'm trying to say here is that welfare of one's children is a hot issue for *everyone* and something that needs to be handled carefully to obtain the desired result.

"My daughter's teacher cried with her." This is where I really wish I was more tactful. I understand that a person feels more connected with those who share the same experiences. But----the apparent assumption that civilians would not also share the this emotion with a student does not help in garnering support among those civilians. This attitude is natural; it goes back to the point you mentioned, talking among those who are in uniform or have been in uniform will naturally be exclusionary. But, once again, in reaching out to the non-military community it is counter-productive.

In my opinion, the point about public service that you mentioned is actually the biggest problem and it cuts across all levels of society. It IS unfair for a small number to bear the burden for so many but is it the difficulties of that life or the attitude toward public service that leaves so few to carry that burden? Even more importantly, what can be done to change that attitude?

[Mktennis]

Maggie said It IS unfair for a small number to bear the burden for so many but is it the difficulties of that life or the attitude toward public service that leaves so few to carry that burden? Even more importantly, what can be done to change that attitude?"

We can change that attitude by putting the faith of the executive back into the country. Many Western nations, most of whom I think we would consider not unlike us, have a national service. Greece, Sweden, Germany, et al. Their people allow this because they have faith that their country will use them in a sensible manner. I don't think that most Americans trust the executive (this one or past ones) enough. They fear the perceived willy-nilliness of past (and present) Presidents, and they don't want to give up their lives for something they don't believe in. If we could temper the foreign policy, the I think more people would put their trust in military service. Unfortunately, as the lone superpower, I'm not sure we'll be afforded the luxury.

[Steve Blair]

Maggie said It IS unfair for a small number to bear the burden for so many but is it the difficulties of that life or the attitude toward public service that leaves so few to carry that burden? Even more importantly, what can be done to change that attitude?"

We can change that attitude by putting the faith of the executive back into the country. Many Western nations, most of whom I think we would consider not unlike us, have a national service. Greece, Sweden, Germany, et al. Their people allow this because they have faith that their country will use them in a sensible manner. I don't think that most Americans trust the executive (this one or past ones) enough. They fear the perceived willy-nilliness of past (and present) Presidents, and they don't want to give up their lives for something they don't believe in. If we could temper the foreign policy, the I think more people would put their trust in military service. Unfortunately, as the lone superpower, I'm not sure we'll be afforded the luxury.

I think you really need to go back much further than this to understand the American reluctance to deal with national service. For most European nations (excepting Great Britain, which does not have national service) conscription in some form or another has been a way of life for the majority of their existence (if not before...Germany is one example). I don't know if you could call it trust in the executive as much as you could possibly describe it as a resignation to a reality that has been with them for literally centuries in some cases.

The United States, on the other hand, never maintained a large army until the end of World War II. If you look back, the early days of the Republic are littered with debates regarding the need for (and threat of) a standing army. The army was viewed as a dumping ground for new immigrants and the riff-raff of civilian life (witness the line from the 1800s - "soldier, soldier will you work? No indeed I'll sell my shirt"). Only in recent years (since possibly World War I and certainly since World War II) has it been considered an honorable profession (overall...officers sometimes held a higher position in popular regard than enlisted men). And when people talk about the post-Civil War congress having a number of members with military experience, it needs to be remembered that most of them were Volunteer officers and were in fact often hostile to the Regular Army and its needs. The navy has traditionally occupied a somewhat different position, based on the perceived need to protect US commerce, but they were still not held in high regard when compared to other occupations.

People often treat the status of the military these days as some sort of historical aberration. The fact is that the Cold War period WAS the aberration and what we're seeing now is really far more typical of the country's relationship with its armed forces. The 20,000-man (on a good day) Army was desperately overstretched on the Frontier, and we're seeing the same thing today. The more things change...:wry:

[Mktennis]

Correct me if I am wrong, which does happen often, but haven't the militias always been healthy? If this goes back to a national identity and ethos, wouldn't the NG still be at healthy levels?

[Steve Blair]

The militias were "healthy" when they were more or less social clubs and/or marching societies (which most of them were prior to the Civil War). Were they a dependable source of trained manpower (which was the intent of the National Guard...more or less, anyhow)? No.

Militias were also very erratic in terms of forming and stability. They went through various periods of "vogue" or being in fashion, but would then fade from the scene. And they were often criticized as being ill-trained and otherwise unsuited for active service.

[tequila]

Correct me if I am wrong, which does happen often, but haven't the militias always been healthy? If this goes back to a national identity and ethos, wouldn't the NG still be at healthy levels?

What Steve said, also said militias were rarely if ever deployed for true "expeditionary" service in combat zones, and certainly not for 12-15 months (or longer (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14980812)).

[Ski]

Yes, it is terrible,but not for the people who are on active duty, and who have become part of the system.

It's terrible because the country has significant geographic holes with active duty forces, especially the Army. The Mid-Atlantic, from Philadelphia north, through New England, has one major Active Army base, and that's Ft. Drum which is isolated on the Canadian border, hours from a major population center. As far as I can remember, the only other Army bases in New England/MidAtlantic are Pickatinny Arsenal, and Ft. Monmouth, and Monmouth is being brac'd and most of its functions moved to other bases in the South.

This is a problem because the Northeast is the most densely populated part of the country, yet the Army has almost no representation there. Most of the populace are like Maggie - they don't know how we live - because we either restrict access or simply aren't there.

Look at the number of ROTC dets in the NYC area...the biggest city in the entire country, the biggest metro area...and there is a single ROTC det. When the volunteer Army is dependent on, well, volunteers, wouldn't it be prudent to show the people you depend on how a soldier spends a day? Almost no one in the Northeast has this chance unless they actually join or have a family member who is in.

So, yes, it's a terrible problem. Isolation is never healthy.




I agree completely with your comment. Yes, the isolation being experienced must be terrible.

Adam

[Maggie]

The United States, on the other hand, never maintained a large army until the end of World War II. If you look back, the early days of the Republic are littered with debates regarding the need for (and threat of) a standing army. The army was viewed as a dumping ground for new immigrants and the riff-raff of civilian life (witness the line from the 1800s - "soldier, soldier will you work? No indeed I'll sell my shirt"). Only in recent years (since possibly World War I and certainly since World War II)


This is a point I have been wondering about. We have never had a large standing army, in fact it seemed to me that it has been almost a point of pride NOT to have one, and the "citizen soldier" was held up as an ideal. Once the wars were over everyone went home.....

[Maggie]

Maggie,

I liked your post because it points out something else as well...there are some folks within the military who don't know how civilians live these days. I say that because I work with military guys and see firsthand just how many problems they're going to have when they transition into jobs that don't have housing allowances, cost of living adjustments, or insurance plans (even though Tricare isn't great, it's better than what many of them will be facing). Being an Air Force brat I got to see both sides of the picture, and I'm convinced that there's almost as big a disconnect between the military perception of civilian life as there is the civilian perception of military life.

That's always something worth keeping in mind.

Um, yeah. But it goes back to being innies and outies--as it were. :wry: Each in group talks to each other. I've been at the fringe and blink at both sides, frankly. But it's that communication gap that's gonna get everyone.

[Maggie]

Most of the populace are like Maggie - they don't know how we live - because we either restrict access or simply aren't there.


Exactly. I don't know any anti military people, frankly. Most I know are perfectly willing to support the troops--except no one knows exactly how to do that either since most of us don't know military personally, nor have any knowledge of what goes on--or doesn't go on--within the DoD.

[Ken White]

your comments with interest, however, re: what goes on -- or doesn't go on -- within the DoD; most of us (including many working in the Pentagon) are in pretty much the same boat... :o

Having a Navy father (before, during and after WWII) and then myself been in uniform for a long time but in a different era (where, rightly or wrongly, the attitude to all travails was 'suck it up'), having gone to 12 schools (only one DoD) in 12 years and having four kids who hit almost as many (no DoD) with no apparent lasting damage and then having retired and gone to work as a civilian in the midst of large city that hardly knew we had any armed forces, I can see both sides.

I know where you're coming from and I also know where the guys are coming from. I'm not sure there is a way to bridge that divide. Nor am I at all convinced that it is a problem; certainly am not disposed to believe it is a significant problem. Still, discussions like this are the best possible thing for everyone involved.

In any event, thanks for your good posts and stick around -- ping us for some of the things we might take for granted that you do not.

Thanks.

[Maggie]

I know where you're coming from and I also know where the guys are coming from. I'm not sure there is a way to bridge that divide. Nor am I at all convinced that it is a problem; certainly am not disposed to believe it is a significant problem. Still, discussions like this are the best possible thing for everyone involved.


Urk. How shall I count the ways............

I'm not talking about singing Kumbayah together (I hate that song and I was never a flower child even when I was the right age) when I talk about "bridging the gap." I am simply talking about getting past the automatic shutdown that occurs when "Soldier" and "Civilian" meet, all too often. Talking about "Quality of Life" as re the retention issue is what got me interested enough to actually post because there didn't seeem to be many "real" civilians here:rolleyes:

I think it was Rob who pointed out that the military is OUR military and is drawn from the general population at large--who is then urged to support that military. Therefore, it would seem to ME that it's not in the best interests of either "side", particularly NOW, to either ignore or reinforce the growing separation. I am not a particularly complicated person: military comes from civilian, military needs support from civilian, military and civilian need to talk to each other at some level seems a pretty obvious chain.

In practical terms civilian votes outnumber military votes. For civilians to have any positive impact on issues affecting the military civilians need to

a)KNOW about the issues
b)have some idea about how the military feels about the issues
c)have some idea about how each option affects whatever the issue is

In other words--get a look inside the military world. To give a probably trite example....

I belong to Soldiers' Angels and it's been a real eye opening experience. I bring it up because it's a good example of how if people know there is a need within the military an awful lot of us will step up. That group has grown largely by word of mouth, although at this point it's hitting national radar. From my side it's very frustrating to hear there is a need for "support" yet have no idea how, what or why.

[Ken White]

Urk. How shall I count the ways............

I'm not talking about singing Kumbayah together (I hate that song and I was never a flower child even when I was the right age) when I talk about "bridging the gap." I am simply talking about getting past the automatic shutdown that occurs when "Soldier" and "Civilian" meet, all too often. Talking about "Quality of Life" as re the retention issue is what got me interested enough to actually post because there didn't seeem to be many "real" civilians here:rolleyes:

I think. :)

Agree on Kumbayah but I think the shutdown is simply adaptation on the part of both groups. While I was growing up, we lived both on and off base and like all service kids, I quickly discovered the "When in Rome..." rule. Things one did, talked about and the extra curricular activities one engaged in differed depending on where one lived. Some of the on base stuff simply didn't translate to the average civilian; that wasn't arrogance on either part, it was simply reality. Very different frames of reference.

After I entered the service I found the same pattern as an adult. The average civilian had little interest in the things one lived with, the minutia of life was totally different. During most of that time, the very artificial Cold War was ongoing and the draft brought in people who adapted, served well and got out. The armed forces were fairly large, most folks remembered WW II and the services were generally respected an there was some knowledge of service life around the nation.

After Viet Nam, no draft, services generally frowned upon by the vales of academe -- and thus, some inculcation of that in the kids in school -- all led to a lapse in knowledge and acceptance by many civilians. The services got defensive and did not help in some respects. As the services got smaller and as those civilians who were very supportive of the armed forces grew older, the rift grew deeper and wider. :(

Military folks are conservative. Not politically necessarily, my sensing is that the political liberal / conservative mix is broadly reflective of the nation as a whole but conservative in approach to most things. This is caused by a tendency to stick to things that have been proven to work as experimentation with new techniques or gear might fail and thus cause unnecessary deaths; thus 'new' stuff is regarded skeptically until it is proven to work and not be detrimental. Too conservative? Yeah but it's really deeply embedded in the culture. :o

This leads to a perception of Colonel Blimps and fusty Admirals that is not totally incorrect. That trickles down. Add to that a certain arrogance, the belief that what the services do is important and thus should be above question and you get a stand off attitude from the service people who are confronted with a civilian populace that is essentially skeptical of not only the armed forces as an entity but of the desirability or even the need for their existence. War, after all is evil. Simplistically, if there were no armed forces, there would be no war.

Doesn't work that way. As the Marines say, "Nobody wants to fight a war but somebody better know how."

Long way of getting to the point. The Armed Forces entail a vastly different life style and a slightly different view of the world. It is too easy to slip into a "The enemy is everywhere" mode and simply decide it is not worth trying to communicate with those who appear to be skeptical about ones net worth.

Back to that conservative thought process -- the armed forces try to connect with civilians at all levels. Sometimes the efforts succeed, sometimes they don't. Sometimes they blow the message but they do, as an institution, try to bridge that gap. They frequently -- not always but frequently -- do not see that concern reciprocated. I think there plenty of fault on both sides but I do not think either side, for the most part, is malicious in sustaining that divide.


I think it was Rob who pointed out that the military is OUR military and is drawn from the general population at large--who is then urged to support that military. Therefore, it would seem to ME that it's not in the best interests of either "side", particularly NOW, to either ignore or reinforce the growing separation. I am not a particularly complicated person: military comes from civilian, military needs support from civilian, military and civilian need to talk to each other at some level seems a pretty obvious chain.

He did and he's right, the military broadly reflects the nation from which it comes. While I think there are a very few people on both sides who want and foster that divide there are more on both sides who do not want that divide and really work to eliminate it. Unfortunately, I think the majority of folks on both sides are too busy or preoccupied to give it much thought. Thus I think its less a matter of design and more of one a lack of understanding created by the fact that it is not seen as a pressing concern by most.

My earlier statement that it was not a terribly bad thing was based on the fact that, other than the Cold War period, that divide has been there throughout most of our history and the nation has survived. That does not mean it's a good thing, it isn't. Nor does it mean that we shouldn't work to correct it -- we should. The good news is that a combination of todays immediate and visual communication, a chance to learn more exists. The bad news is that the DoD and armed forces public relations machine was slow to get to work on the issue. I think I see some movement in that direction and hopefully, they'll do a better job than they have in the past. If so, that will help with this:


"In practical terms civilian votes outnumber military votes. For civilians to have any positive impact on issues affecting the military civilians need to

a)KNOW about the issues
b)have some idea about how the military feels about the issues
c)have some idea about how each option affects whatever the issue is

In other words--get a look inside the military world..."

I agree and also think the initiative has to come from the services. I also believe they are starting to realize this and work on the problem.


"...To give a probably trite example...

I belong to Soldiers' Angels and it's been a real eye opening experience. I bring it up because it's a good example of how if people know there is a need within the military an awful lot of us will step up. That group has grown largely by word of mouth, although at this point it's hitting national radar. From my side it's very frustrating to hear there is a need for "support" yet have no idea how, what or why.

Not trite at all and that is a great program. Thank you for joining them.

No easy answers. You have a valid concern, you've identified a problem and you're doing something about it. That's what it'll take to fix it.

Regards,
Ken

[Sargent]

I don't think one proficiency excludes another. Anyone who can not perform basic tasks needs to be remediated, but I hope the people who are the best at basic tasks can also understand higher levels of war. As we said before, the promotion rate is so high that most lieutenants will become lieutenant colonels if they stay with the Army.

I am coming late to the discussion, but as I was reading through the logs, I found this comment interesting.

The lieutenant's responsibilities are no more "basic" than the general's. They simply have a different point of view to deal with. Strategy is not, per se, more complex or difficult than tactics. Perhaps because the one is associated with a junior rank while the other is associated with senior rank and experience the assumption is easy to make -- this division of labor probably has more to do with physical, rather than intellectual, capabilities. However, from an intellectual perspective, there is nothing that defines one as "basic" and the other as "advanced."

Personally, I've learned more from Rifleman Dodd than I have from many works of big thinkers. I prefer the memoirs of company grade personnel to the big chessboard histories.

As you continue your personal education in these areas, consider Earl Wavell's advice to Liddell Hart, on how the latter ought to do military history: "I think I should concentrate almost entirely on the 'actualities of war' -- the effects of tiredness, hunger, fear, lack of sleep, weather... The principles of strategy and tactics, and the logistics of war are really absurdly simple: it is the actualities that make war so complicated and so difficult, and are usually so neglected by historians." (Quoted in Holmes, Acts of War, p.7)

===

Retentions issues...

More money will always be welcomed, but we've made our commitment, so it's not a deciding issue.

I also don't think it's the pace of the deployments that is really the problem. Rather, what is truly difficult is the inability to plan beyond this week. Example: my husband just finished a deployment at the end of July. His parent unit to which he was returning turned down his request to forego dwell time and take another deployment that would have started in October because he was told he was needed at the unit. Fine, so we moved from RI to CA and had an expectation of some stability. On his third day back at work he was told he'd be deploying again in April. Add in a few other complications, and now my son and I will be moving back east. While this move will make my dissertation work a bit easier (school's in DC and I'll be in Newport, so I'll have the War College's resources at hand), it's a whole lot of upheaval we did not need and could have avoided had we known that this was going to happen.

We would be willing to accept deployment "for the duration." It would be a cost and a burden we could plan for. But the current system just whipsaws us around, making everything that much more difficult.

===

Civil-military divide...

On the one hand, I know first hand that even the most tree-hugging, liberal New York civilians can have great respect for military personnel and show a tremendous level of support. The wide and diverse group of my family and friends who supported my husband's first MiTT deployment was truly astounding.

I do think it's difficult for anyone not living the life to understand the full range of complications and burdens associated with the life. However, I think even within the military there can be a bit of ignorance of what some folks are going through. For example, if a person knows someone who's been deployed primarily to a FOB then it's going to be very hard for them to understand the stress of a different, more combat-intensive deployment. Most of them would be horrified at the idea that, after so many days of waiting for the knock on the door that you begin to wish it would just happen, if only because then that stress would be gone.

And we ought to remember that the majority of the families are _not_ associated with the military -- the demographics of the Marine Corps, for example, are such that the majority of the guys deploying are single, and so the families are civilians living all over the country. Many of the people going through the stress of deployments have no military community upon which to rely for support.

Alternatively, I think that there is even difficulty for the military member to understand the stresses the families are under. My husband has no idea what it's like to attend a funeral, sit at a hospital bedside, or help a young Marine cope with being taken away from his buddies because he's been wounded.

===

And that's enough from me for now -- I have to go wash my car, to clean off the ash and get it ready in preparation for trip number four across the country in as many months. I am running out of routes to take...


Cheers,
Jill

[Maggie]

Retentions issues...

More money will always be welcomed, but we've made our commitment, so it's not a deciding issue.

I always wonder how much dissonance occurs in discussions not by conflicting ideas but by unrealized differing definitions of words. Been thinking about this one....

My kids are 25 and 29. I've watched and listened to them and their friends as they've grown up (at times:eek:). They are bright, conscientous and hardworking--but their ideas about careers and "life plans" differ greatly from my parents' generation. They are definitely committed to whatever job they have at the moment, but not one of them envisioned staying with one job or one company for their entire working career. One of my daughter's friends went ROTC in college and right at the moment is very happily engaged in learning to fly C130's. He is totally committed to this activity, is happy to be in the AF(:D)--but has no plans to make the military his entire career. I've read that the services are losing their academy graduates at an alarming rate in the 'mid-level' years, so to speak. I wonder if both money and quality of life issues are irrelevent for this generation? That if perhaps there isn't something else, at least in part, behind this? From listening to them I can see quite easily that an individual would decide to go military for a certain period of time, commit fully to that path for X number of years and then move on, having completed that piece of a career path. Doesn't even conflict with patriotic reasons for serving, in that they've done "their part" and it's someone else's turn. This in fact was part of the discussions I had with my son while he was going through the process for the Naval Academy. He wanted to serve, he wanted to go with Navy--but he seemed to think that perhaps two tours would be "enough". Many of the recruitment ads in fact foster that idea, in that they talk about serving one's country while getting an education that would serve them in civilian life later on. The implicit (sometimes explicit) assumption being that they would in fact move on.



On the one hand, I know first hand that even the most tree-hugging, liberal New York civilians can have great respect for military personnel and show a tremendous level of support. The wide and diverse group of my family and friends who supported my husband's first MiTT deployment was truly astounding.

Yep--but given the oft quoted number of 1% actually serving even a circle of family and friends doesn't raise the "actual contact" numbers by much. And support of someone known personally doesn't automatically translate into support for the military in general.


I do think it's difficult for anyone not living the life to understand the full range of complications and burdens associated with the life.

Actually, in a literal sense I don't think it's possible for anyone to fully understand someone else's life. My POV IS skewed on this; I was in high school when the Vietnam War imploded and I don't ever want to see what happened to military members then happen again. What I am talking about here is letting the civilian into the circle where those efforts can help or ameliorate the problems. I think the Valour-IT program going on now is a good example--laptops and voice activated software is being purchased for wounded soldiers. Whether the military should provide them is another question, they aren't right now. In the past the need wasn't known "outside", nor was the support offered to help out.


And we ought to remember that the majority of the families are _not_ associated with the military -- the demographics of the Marine Corps, for example, are such that the majority of the guys deploying are single, and so the families are civilians living all over the country. Many of the people going through the stress of deployments have no military community upon which to rely for support.

And these days the National Guard is being deployed for "regular" combat tours--and those elements don't even have a home base with a community at all, like the active duty military does. Which makes it even more important these days to get the rest of us involved.

[QUOTE]Alternatively, I think that there is even difficulty for the military member to understand the stresses the families are under. My husband has no idea what it's like to attend a funeral, sit at a hospital bedside, or help a young Marine cope with being taken away from his buddies because he's been wounded.[/QUOTE}


No. But that's where we can help, at least assist those of you who are doing just that.

Maggie

[Maggie]

After I entered the service I found the same pattern as an adult. The average civilian had little interest in the things one lived with, the minutia of life was totally different. During most of that time, the very artificial Cold War was ongoing and the draft brought in people who adapted, served well and got out. The armed forces were fairly large, most folks remembered WW II and the services were generally respected an there was some knowledge of service life around the nation.


Yep. There are 21 in my generation--about half did at least one tour, only one did 20, the rest were scattered in between. I would say here, though, that the attitudes could be vice versa. When I would complain about moving my sister wouldn't get that moving my household several states COULD be a bit more complicated that her having the AF move her household several states.:rolleyes:


As the services got smaller and as those civilians who were very supportive of the armed forces grew older, the rift grew deeper and wider. :(/QUOTE]

I think what I'm reacting to the active dislike for the military and the circling of military wagons reactions that occured after Vietnam.

[QUOTE]This leads to a perception of Colonel Blimps and fusty Admirals that is not totally incorrect. That trickles down. Add to that a certain arrogance, the belief that what the services do is important and thus should be above question and you get a stand off attitude from the service people who are confronted with a civilian populace that is essentially skeptical of not only the armed forces as an entity but of the desirability or even the need for their existence. War, after all is evil. Simplistically, if there were no armed forces, there would be no war.

That simplistic attitude is all too common to too many areas. It's THE big reason I never turned into a wild eyed college student.

Have you ever come across a book __Voltaire's Bastards__? I can't find my copy at the moment but I seem to remember some discussion of this in re the military as well as beauracracies in general. This is, however, not a practical attitude in my opinion--on either side.



I think there plenty of fault on both sides but I do not think either side, for the most part, is malicious in sustaining that divide.

No. And perversely, that makes it harder to get around.


My earlier statement that it was not a terribly bad thing was based on the fact that, other than the Cold War period, that divide has been there throughout most of our history and the nation has survived.

I can understand that--but. It appears to me, on this side, that conditions have and are changing. I think it's the increasing activation for and use in combat now of our National Guard units that began to raise the questions NOW for me. Military service--in peacetime--was "ordinary" for my family and there weren't the problems that are now coming up. For whatever reasons the existing standing army with its core of career professionals was not enough and we need a broader base now, simply because the National Guard units in general don't have even the support of base communities to come back to. They have to depend on the civilian communities they live among *as civilians* before they were activated and to do that those communities need to be more cognizant of what's going on in the military world. Learning what these units lack has made me more curious about just how things are going in the regular forces too, and it's been a bit eyepopping curiosity trip to find out.

And no, it has nothing to do with the fact that it was National Guard troops lacking and not 'regular' military that got me involved. It was the fact that returning National Guard troops and their families were more vocal that let me know that there were problems.

Regards,

Btw--it isn't just the DoD PIO's are slow, government PIO's are not on the ball generally. NASA's has been a dud for years.

Maggie

[Ken White]

... When I would complain about moving my sister wouldn't get that moving my household several states COULD be a bit more complicated that her having the AF move her household several states.:rolleyes:

Obviously a lot of variables, moving with a rental truck versus full service and such but the principal difference it would seem to me is the cost factor and even then some companies (and Civil Service, if they pay for the move) do that and give you more per diem as well. Moves are moves and they all have hassles, service frequencies can get to you...


Have you ever come across a book __Voltaire's Bastards__? I can't find my copy at the moment but I seem to remember some discussion of this in re the military as well as beauracracies in general. This is, however, not a practical attitude in my opinion--on either side.

Yeah, read it when it first came out back in the early 90s IIRC. wasn't too impressed, Saul made some good points but he's unnecessarily pessimistic in my view. You're right, though, it is not a practical attitude and both side IMO seem to inadvertently work to stereotype their differences...

Weird.


No. And perversely, that makes it harder to get around.

That's the crux of it, road to hell is paved with good intentions -- and flawed judgment.


I can understand that--but. It appears to me, on this side, that conditions have and are changing. I think it's the increasing activation for and use in combat now of our National Guard units that began to raise the questions NOW for me. Military service--in peacetime--was "ordinary" for my family and there weren't the problems that are now coming up. For whatever reasons the existing standing army with its core of career professionals was not enough and we need a broader base now, simply because the National Guard units in general don't have even the support of base communities to come back to. They have to depend on the civilian communities they live among *as civilians* before they were activated and to do that those communities need to be more cognizant of what's going on in the military world. Learning what these units lack has made me more curious about just how things are going in the regular forces too, and it's been a bit eyepopping curiosity trip to find out.

And no, it has nothing to do with the fact that it was National Guard troops lacking and not 'regular' military that got me involved. It was the fact that returning National Guard troops and their families were more vocal that let me know that there were problems.

Yes and maybe. I think a lot depends on the location. In most of the south where the Guard has strong support, the whole community effectively becomes the 'base support structure.' IF it's not a major urban area; if the unit is from a large city, it gets lost. I suspect that is true across the country and if you live in the DC-Boston corridor, you are nothing but a large city...

Where I live, when units have been activated, the newspaper and TV stations go all out in support, letter and package drives while deployed, reporters go visit, the whole bit. Always a big well attended farewell and welcome home parade or ceremony. Couple of badly wounded guys have had new, handicapped equipped houses donated. Different world...:wry:

Having said that, the urban units do have a problem, no question and the armed forces vary widely (and from locality to locality) in how well they support the Reserve Components. Generally that's been spotty at best, it is improving but not enough and not rapidly enough IMO. :rolleyes:


Btw--it isn't just the DoD PIO's are slow, government PIO's are not on the ball generally. NASA's has been a dud for years.

Maggie

I know, the whole government PIO effort has been steadily sinking into the gutter, I think. This administration is the worst I've seen for getting message out but none in the last 40+ years has been very good IMO. They are slow, way too politicized and just aren't very bright. Just like the media they work with. :mad:

Regards,
Ken

[Abu Suleyman]

I usually like to be a problem solver, but in this case I have no suggestions. Unfortunately, this is a vicious cycle. Many people who get out of the military do so because of a poor command environment (including me). Do you suppose that more or fewer people will want to stay in under these automatically promoted buffoons?

I am reminded of a man who went through his Officer Basic Course three times, because he was such and idiot. The military offered him a medical honorable discharge, which he refused. When I asked him why he didn't take it, since he was obviously so ill suited to life as a soldier, he replied that he knew he couldn't get a job outside, so he had to stay in. That man is now a Captain. How many people are going to want to stay in after working with him?

I suppose that the upshot of this is that something has to be done soon, and it will have to be drastic.

[Penta]

I suppose that the upshot of this is that something has to be done soon, and it will have to be drastic.

Such as...?

C'mon, don't leave us hanging! You've got me envisioning shooting every nth O-3 at random until we've thinned out the herd sufficiently.:D

[Abu Suleyman]

Such as...?

C'mon, don't leave us hanging! You've got me envisioning shooting every nth O-3 at random until we've thinned out the herd sufficiently.:D

Fair enough. How about every tenth O-3, instead of at random. That seemed to work for the Romans. :)

I think there are several possibilities, but all of them include either dramatically altering the structure or size of the military or both. Including but not limited to:

Conscription including of officers
Mass direct commission (recruiting your battalion, brigade, division commanders directly from the civilian world)
Contract military (Think of the signs from the 1800's 'join the xxx brigade', the privateers, or perhaps even Blackwater type)
Dismantling the current military education structure
Mass recalls of past officers (basically a draft of people who have already served)

Now I am not necessarily advocating these measures, but they are illustrations of what I mean when I say drastic. They have all been done in the past in the United States, and with varying degrees of success.

The real solution is probably something I haven't listed here though. I believe that with as small a pool to draw from, and with as small a mentor pool as we have that the changes that will be needed can't happen without massive influx of new blood. Otherwise, we are merely inbreeding the same problems, over and over again. What makes the good people get out, makes more good people get out, leaving more bad people to set the policy, and then making more good people get out.

It occurs to me that we could also simple RIF out everyone that doesn't measure up, and build a force from there as well, but that would leave our country woefully unprepared as well.

[marct]

I am reminded of a man who went through his Officer Basic Course three times, because he was such and idiot. The military offered him a medical honorable discharge, which he refused. When I asked him why he didn't take it, since he was obviously so ill suited to life as a soldier, he replied that he knew he couldn't get a job outside, so he had to stay in. That man is now a Captain. How many people are going to want to stay in after working with him?

I suppose that the upshot of this is that something has to be done soon, and it will have to be drastic.

I think there was a solution used in 'Nam that is applicable to this individual :cool:.

Seriously, though, how could he be allowed to remain? I know that some people who can work well in the military are hopeless at civilian jobs, but this is just ridiculous!

[Old Eagle]

I hope that through forums like this you can find support and understanding. Many of us have shared your frustrations at various times in our lives/careers. All I can offer is that it usually gets better and the dedicated folks like you are the key to the future.

Some of us lived through the dark days at the end of the Viet Nam war. The Army was not a happy place to be. In dealing with the personnel challenges the Army, Like Thos. Edison in discovering the light bulb, never failed, but discovered many potential solutions that didn't work. We upped direct commissions (not always a bad solution), increased OCS, went to 24 mo. TIS promotions to CPT., and numerous other techniques. The overall quality of the Army also sucked. Race riots (Yep, I said riots), drug cartels, lack of training and equipment. Pretty ugly.

It took years to return to equilibrium. After we threw out hundreds of officers, we ended up short. 10% of my IOAC class were active duty recalls. One of the other co cdrs in my bn was an RC "volunteer". But eventually, we got back on track through a lot of hard work.

Hang in there. Vent to us. Be part of the future.

[Rob Thornton]

Old Eagle has some real wisdom there. I've done my share of venting and working my way through problems within the SWC community (which BTW has provided me a place to think on things and get feedback and insights). It amazes me though that I always come back to the idea that I have a hard time imagining myself doing something else besides being a soldier - its the company we keep I suppose, or the idea of doing something that matters.

I got an encouraging "mass" email from HRC today regarding some of the incentives for CPTs - I say it was a mass email, but it did appeal to me on an individual level. I'd like to post an excerpt from that email & highlight some of the positive things within it. I believe it signals a strong commitment by the Army to retain its its company grade leadership.


The most encouraging feedback we hear from our captains is how much they appreciate their senior leaders taking the time to just sit them down and say thank you. They pass along their gratitude for being appreciated and for the recognition of their many contributions this program provides.....

Our young captains need to know there is full understanding of the great sacrifices they have made and a focused effort to address these long deployments.

There was a good deal more in the email regarding the incentive menu available to CPTs of the target year groups, but the most important thing I think is the emphasis placed on people, and the invaluable role leadership plays in retention. This is going to take a little time to gain visual traction, but I think we'll see it. I don't think within my 11 years as an officer I've seen a more personal appeal from HRC - to me this means retention of officers has become a real priority - for the right reasons. What I mean by that is that the message was not a generated response to a shortage of officers in a given grade, but as an acknowledgment that the role of leadership has regained its rightful place within our Army culture as the fulcrum by which other things are accomplished.

The appeal of more senior leaders to reach out to more junior leaders is not an act of desperation, but one to extend the type of "taking care of our own" philosophy that we normally only see in tactical level families to the broader installation and institution - or the Army as a whole. I think we have to adopt the idea that "we" are the Army, and if we want it better we're going to have to look after each other. If a more senior leader discovers or is told of a problem he or she may be the only person who can help solve it, or at least make it visible and consider the broader implications - we can't wait for the "bureaucracy" to catch up - taking action is not what bureaucracy does - it just provides the framework through which leaders can act.

We have a host of challenges ahead - there is a whole generation of junior leaders whose entire life in the Army has been the cycle of deployment to war. They have done incredible work often with the most spartan resources - time in particular. Sooner or later we're going to have to go back to something that will not feel normal to that generation of leaders - one that where its OPTEMPO will still make for some deployments, hopefully will also account for some time to refit, train and bring ourselves back into balance. It will create its own brand of friction, and we will need leaders like you around to lead them.

Best Regards, Rob

[Schmedlap]

Do we really have a retention problem with Captains or do we simply have too many staff positions for them to fill?

[Cavguy]

Do we really have a retention problem with Captains or do we simply have too many staff positions for them to fill?

Both. In reality, we have a shortage of captains to available assignments. The attrition rate is horrendous right now - the guys exiting have been run into the ground since 9/11 and are voting with their feet. I've read over sixty percent of the West Point 2002 class filed exit papers as soon as eligible. That's striking.

It is true the COIN enviornment has created many more captain staff positions previously unknown - Battalion IO Officer, Battalion S5, Battalion S9, extra Battle Captains, planners, etc. MiTT teams are an unresourced requirement pulled out of existing authorizations. I haven't even started on all the TDA (stateside training) assignments such as basic training companies and staff, reserve training billets, observer/controllers, recruiting command, and garrison staff not getting filled because of the priority to "deployed" assignments out of necessity. And it's not limited to captains - for example Fort Leavenworth is working at a fraction of its pre-2003 authorized military manpower - mostly due to MiTT assignments. I read from Armor branch that the equivilant of eight combat brigades worth of Armor officers are on MiTT assignments.

One can argue whether there are too many staff billets - you don't have to look far to find some fat to trim. But largely those have been eliminated and muscle is being cut, especially in TRADOC. That muscle is being replaced largely by contractors that generally don't have the OEF/OIF background to add to the training base, and other issues when you replace serving soldiers with retired ones.

Finally, there's the "Special Olympics" of promotions like my year group. The YG 97 Promotion rate to MAJ was a year early and over 99% were selected. Every Armor officer in my YG was selected. Not all of us deserved to be promoted.

All these choices have long term effects on the force. The debate is whether the Army has reached the "tipping point" where the costs of these decisions become irreversable for a generation ...... some say we've already tipped, some say we're on the cliff, and some say the army will hold together. I personally think we are at that point now. I came within a hearbeat of leaving and was convinced to stay in with an assignment giving some family stability - during my assignment to Germany since 2001 I spent 46 of 70 months deployed away from my wife and son. I loved the Army - but there comes a point when the cost is too high, especially when the nation has not made the war a true national priority or asked service from anyone else.

[Ski]

This is a problem that will not be fixed for a long time.

The reduced officer manning levels at TRADOC occured under Shinseki's term as CSA. Remember when he dictated that all Divisional and below units will be manned at 100%? That cut TRADOC down to 50% of their authorized manning levels, and some Corps and higher level units were also severly impacted (Corps FA BN's especially). I submit that TRADOC needs to be expanded soon in order to meet the expanding Army - if the Army can actually recruit and retain 547K of personnel.

The CPT issue is a much broader problem as Cavguy deftly illustrates. The holes in the CPT rank today are going to be the holes in the MAJ/LTC/COL/GO levels of tomorrow. Are their staff billets that can be cut - oh hell yes. Why a DIV HQ requires 1000 people to man it is truly a mystery to me.

Plus there is job statisfaction to take into account - once Company Command is complete, for the most part, you are out of troop leading positions forever. Very few people actually command battalions and even less BCT's. Plus the command tours are so short because "everyone has to get their shot" and damn you to hell even if you are the second coming of Audie Murphy, Rommel and Wellington combined. There's an Auckenlick, Clark and Meade waiting behind you and "he needs to get his shot." As long as this mentality exists, and the best commanders are not kept in command positions, I suggest that we will never be truly successful in war. We'll muddle through at best.

[RTK]

I subscribe to the Office Space theory, that some of these guys will work just hard enough not to get fired.

Ryno and I see it day in and day out. Generation Why has a sense of entitlement that can't be paralleled with anything in history. Guys like Ryno and I tend to shake them out of their tree. Often we're the first two people to tell and 22 year old that he's all jacked up....the first in his life.

Someone once told me that being in the army was the best job on earth because "all you had to do was do your job and people would notice you as a hard charger. Put in even just a little effort and you look like the Second Coming of Christ."

I'm beginning to see where he was coming from.

[RTK]

I submit that TRADOC needs to be expanded soon in order to meet the expanding Army - if the Army can actually recruit and retain 547K of personnel.



It's going to have to happen sometime in the next three weeks, since they added another class this year for the Armor School and we're at about 70% of what we need in terms of instructors right now. I have guys that will get 4 days off between May and September next year. And this is the assignment for "guys to recharge their batteries."

[Ski]

You know as well I do that it's not going to happen.

And the cycle continues to degenerate into a spiral.



It's going to have to happen sometime in the next three weeks, since they added another class this year for the Armor School and we're at about 70% of what we need in terms of instructors right now. I have guys that will get 4 days off between May and September next year. And this is the assignment for "guys to recharge their batteries."

[Rob Thornton]

Ref CMD opportunities & expansion - I think the initiative to grow the force may open those opportunities quite a bit - in fact I wonder where we'll get enough of the right grades to fill them out. My guess is we'll have to come out of hide - meaning more TRADOC and like billets will get filled by contractors, and/or some of the folks filling career field tracks will have to bounce back and forth, or cross back over. Depends on what big Army decides is the priority.

Lots of tough choices coming up - whatever else it is - it will be interesting.

Best, Rob

[Stevely]

You know as well I do that it's not going to happen.

And the cycle continues to degenerate into a spiral.

How did we ever come to this? I know there are plenty of explanations, but it's one of those things that despite all that, and despite that I understand at some level (at least I think I do) at least some of those explanations, I can't understand, down in my gut, how it is that we came to this sorry impasse.

We reduced the size of the Army to a ridiculously small number in vain hopes of a "peace dividend" in the 90s, smoked Rummy's dope and thought we could make up for numbers with gizmos, and then with nothing left but a rump Army to fight two major conflicts simultaneously, we frittered away (are frittering away) the Army's future, we're eating its seed corn. I get that.

What I don't get down in my gut is how can it be that it seems no longer possible to increase the size of the Army back to, say, what it was in the first Gulf War? The Army is half the size it was when I was on active duty, yet it seems to me, we're spending even more money than we did then, and merely to increase the force 60k or so seems an impossible task. Something just doesn't add up. We spend incredible sums, but our ROI in terms of real military power seems to get less with every passing year.

A cynic might say that we have indeed undergone Transformation, but we have transformed ourselves into a force increasingly incapable of sustained combat.

[Norfolk]

How did we ever come to this? I know there are plenty of explanations, but it's one of those things that despite all that, and despite that I understand at some level (at least I think I do) at least some of those explanations, I can't understand, down in my gut, how it is that we came to this sorry impasse.

We reduced the size of the Army to a ridiculously small number in vain hopes of a "peace dividend" in the 90s, smoked Rummy's dope and thought we could make up for numbers with gizmos, and then with nothing left but a rump Army to fight two major conflicts simultaneously, we frittered away (are frittering away) the Army's future, we're eating its seed corn. I get that.

What I don't get down in my gut is how can it be that it seems no longer possible to increase the size of the Army back to, say, what it was in the first Gulf War? The Army is half the size it was when I was on active duty, yet it seems to me, we're spending even more money than we did then, and merely to increase the force 60k or so seems an impossible task. Something just doesn't add up. We spend incredible sums, but our ROI in terms of real military power seems to get less with every passing year.

A cynic might say that we have indeed undergone Transformation, but we have transformed ourselves into a force increasingly incapable of sustained combat.

Well, I think it got to this firstly because the Army was pushed too far for too long, and now it's stuck facing long-term institutional damage that's too late in the day to fix, and of course in the short-term it, and for the same reason, it can't hold on to its own people anymore - they're burned out or their families are. And this same situation extends to the USMC, the British Army, the Royal Marines, and the Canadian Army. They've all been Red-lined for so long that the machine is now breaking down, for real.

The other problem is that, simply, those who wanted to join the military, already have done so, and the rest by and large aren't really interested; they're interested in themselves, not so much their country. So when the people that you can attract to the military are already leaving, there's not very many willing people to replace them, except for some people who don't think that they have anywhere else to go.

Things have gone back to the old days, where there is this strong tendency in English-speaking societies to look at the military and consider them as just a bunch of people who can't make it in civilian life. Having driven away so many of our own who were willing and able over the past several years, we're stuck with dropping standards to try to scrape up those who we ordinarily would not want and would not accept. And that just reinforces those old views of the military as a dumping-ground of society's ne'er-do-wells.

The final reason for all this goes back to that famous quote from that story about Vietnam, where the one returned soldier says to his buddy beside him "It's not touching anybody." Just because Iraq and Afghanistan are constantly in the news just obscures the fact that society at home doesn't feel a thing, doesn't have to do a thing, and doesn't have to be involved one way or the other. It's the Military's War, not Society's. Society has simply opted out of the War.

[Cavguy]

Well, I think it got to this firstly because the Army was pushed too far for too long, and now it's stuck facing long-term institutional damage that's too late in the day to fix, and of course in the short-term it, and for the same reason, it can't hold on to its own people anymore - they're burned out or their families are. And this same situation extends to the USMC, the British Army, the Royal Marines, and the Canadian Army. They've all been Red-lined for so long that the machine is now breaking down, for real.

...

The final reason for all this goes back to that famous quote from that story about Vietnam, where the one returned soldier says to his buddy beside him "It's not touching anybody." Just because Iraq and Afghanistan are constantly in the news just obscures the fact that society at home doesn't feel a thing, doesn't have to do a thing, and doesn't have to be involved one way or the other. It's the Military's War, not Society's. Society has simply opted out of the War.

Great post and well said. I knew the Royal Army was in trouble, I didn't know the Canadian Army was also having issues. Is it simply OPTEMPO or does it have the "disconnect" issues being dealt with by the US Army?

[Norfolk]

Great post and well said. I knew the Royal Army was in trouble, I didn't know the Canadian Army was also having issues. Is it simply OPTEMPO or does it have the "disconnect" issues being dealt with by the US Army?

In a word, both. Plus the fact that the Army had already burnt itself out in 10 years of non-stop ops in the Balkans leading up to A-Stan. The Army was not a shell in 2001, it was a husk.

[goesh]

The fact of the matter is high tech has not reduced poverty, crime, mental illness, social unrest, corruption, inequitable distribution of goods and war. How much Officers per se have suscribed to technology as the real venue for attaining Utopia remains to be seen and it may be a variable previously unconsidered in this matter of attrition. Let's face it, you couldn't get a more severe existential dilemma then the shock 'n awe of high tech meeting IEDs and suicide vests. It has to be a real letdown for some, that amidst the usual bungling and incompetency and horrors of war, the failure of high tech to win the day comes raining down upon the weary shoulders.

[wm]

In my Army of the 70’s and 80’s, we did this really stupid thing . Every quarter, we would go to the field to exercise for 3-5 days. We went flat out, balls to the wall, for those 3-5 days—no one slept and we all ran around with our hair on fire getting stuff done. On the last day, we would have some form of “war ending event” like authority to release nukes, declare ENDEX, pack up and roll back into garrison. For the next week or so, we would work at half time schedules recovering from the exercise. Then we would get ourselves geared up to do it again next quarter. It was rather pathetic to watch our performance degrade by the last day of these wonderful exercises. The bad news is that I do not think my senior leadership ever got it. They seemed to think that we would be able to maintain that 24 hour a day (with a few 5-10 minute catnaps) OPTEMPO indefinitely. I think our more recent efforts in DS and OIF went so fast that they confirmed to seniors that the 3-5 day exercise model that we had trained to really works in practice.

Now, however, I think the chickens are finally coming home to roost. Our forces burn themselves out because they are trying to operate with a force structure developed to implement the “3-5 day push, then rest for a week” format. Long-term operations just do not fit that model. As an example, I suggest a look at the way Petain rotated forces through Verdun to get an idea of what it really takes to sustain a military force that is engaged in sustained combat operations. (I chose the French at Verdun in particular because even though we are involved in active offensive operations in Iraq, I contend that we are actually more like a besieged force.) Then, we might get a better picture of the force structure that we need.

The really bad news for us right now is that, unlike the French and British in 1917, we do not have another nation waiting in the wings with a host of fresh troops to get us over the crisis.

[selil]

The fact of the matter is high tech has not reduced poverty, crime, mental illness, social unrest, corruption, inequitable distribution of goods and war. How much Officers per se have subscribed to technology as the real venue for attaining Utopia remains to be seen and it may be a variable previously unconsidered in this matter of attrition. Let's face it, you couldn't get a more severe existential dilemma then the shock 'n awe of high tech meeting IEDs and suicide vests. It has to be a real letdown for some, that amidst the usual bungling and incompetency and horrors of war, the failure of high tech to win the day comes raining down upon the weary shoulders.


Actually I disagree with a few of those (see emphasis added). High tech jobs and the knowledge economy has created entire cities across the planet. In India, China, Malaysia, South Africa where there was desolate poverty now their are burgeoning high tech cities. Japan is a good example of a mixed industrial and high tech economy. Technology is nothing but tools and whether it is a tractor or a function call in "c#" building tools will always alleviate poverty, and build an economy. It is that act of creation that feeds the engines of commerce.

Now as to waging war? A grunt in the dust is at some point going to have to stand on a piece of ground and say I claim this. I fear that COIN will always follow "shock and awe" and will always be doomed to failure. After reading much and thinking about what you all say about small wars and COIN I keep getting this nagging suspicion that COIN can only be successful if implemented as part of a larger diplomacy effort and not after a full on invasion. I have much more to learn but unless you are invited in by at least a less hostile government COIN seems to get expanded to general peace keeping and appeasement both tactics doomed to failure in a hostile nation.

[goesh]

I think maybe the spectacular growth variable of high techery (new word?) is negated, or at least checked, by the exponential growth of slums.


http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/06/27/2139/

"The shanty towns that choke the cities of Africa and Asia are experiencing unstoppable growth, expanding by more than a million people every week, according to the “state of the world’s population” report
.................
It maintains that over the next 30 years, the population of African and Asian cities will double, adding 1.7 billion people - more than the current populations of the US and China combined.
.................
In this new world the majority of the urban poor will be under 25, unemployed and vulnerable to fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic. "

This might make COIN irrelevant, who is to really say, and conventional methods needed to deal with upheavals of this potential magnitude could bring about attrition rates higher than what we see now.

I'm certainly not suggesting a return to lance and sword warfare but I think there is a psychological factor of attrition when too much dependence is placed on high techery, something we don't fully understand and something not adequately addressed to date. In my time, there was some logic to the loss of a man dying from shock and blood loss because the medevac choppers couldn't get there fast enough. Is the loss in any way magnified when on-the-spot, state of the art responses fail? I don't know, maybe not, but I'm nagged by the discrepancy of IED/AK/RPG/suicide vest V nano seconds/satellites/real time/smart weapons and what it adds to PTSD.

[Ski]

Another new article on the slow decay of the Officer Corps. Not a good sign at all.

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0712.tilghman.html

[MattC86]

No, it's not; and it's just going to get worse.

McCaffrey's AAR called for a 800,000 man active-duty Army. Unrealistic, of course, but there it is. They just approved a 90,000 man (or was it the 74,000?) increase.

All of which is, as Gen. McCaffrey said, persons with drug use histories, moral waivers, low education or mental capacities, etc., who should not be in the Army.

Couple that with a loss of good officers, and I think the recipe is for disaster.

Matt

[Norfolk]

Even if Iraq "stabilizes" sufficiently within a couple years to allow a drawdown to 50,000-100,000 troops, the sheer strain of that will just continue to aggravate things. Within about 2 years, I imagine, we will have a pretty good and fairly solid indication of what we can expect for the next 20-30 years with regards to the circumstances and qualities of the Army's Officer (and NCO) Corps.

[selil]

No, it's not; and it's just going to get worse.

McCaffrey's AAR called for a 800,000 man active-duty Army. Unrealistic, of course, but there it is. They just approved a 90,000 man (or was it the 74,000?) increase.

All of which is, as Gen. McCaffrey said, persons with drug use histories, moral waivers, low education or mental capacities, etc., who should not be in the Army.

Couple that with a loss of good officers, and I think the recipe is for disaster.

Matt

Add in mission creep, legislative "silver bullet" mentality, highly restrictive ROE, and massive contractor capitulation.

[wm]

Add in mission creep, legislative "silver bullet" mentality, highly restrictive ROE, and massive contractor capitulation.

Not to worry folks.

Blackwater has offered to fill the leadership vacuum with the folks it is having to send home for killing dogs belonging to NYT reporters and being involved in other assorted "drive by" shooting incidents. CACI is going to do all the intel and EPW handling duties for a mere pittance of what we now spend for ASAS-Lite and the various versions of DCGS. And the Air Force's new cyberwarfare inititiatives will so paralyze any enemy's C2 systems that future wars will become impossible to conduct. :D

[selil]

Not to worry folks.

Blackwater has offered to fill the leadership vacuum with the folks it is having to send home for killing dogs belonging to NYT reporters and being involved in other assorted "drive by" shooting incidents. CACI is going to do all the intel and EPW handling duties for a mere pittance of what we now spend for ASAS-Lite and the various versions of DCGS. And the Air Force's new cyberwarfare inititiatives will so paralyze any enemy's C2 systems that future wars will become impossible to conduct. :D

Now we know what really happened to the roman empire.

[wm]

High-Profile Officer Nagl To Leave Army, Join Think Tank

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

One of the Army's most prominent younger officers, whose writings have influenced the conduct of the U.S. troop buildup in Iraq, said he has decided to leave the service to study strategic issues full time at a new Washington think tank.

Lt. Col. John Nagl, 41, is a coauthor of the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations, which has been used heavily by U.S. forces carrying out the strategy of moving off big bases, living among the population and making the protection of civilians their top priority.

A Rhodes scholar, Nagl first achieved prominence for his Oxford University doctoral dissertation, which was published in 2002 as a book titled "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam." The introduction to a recent edition of the book was written by Gen. Peter Schoomaker, at the time the Army's chief of staff.

Nagl led a tank platoon in the 1991 Persian Gulf war and served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 as the operations officer for an Army battalion in Iraq's Anbar province. "I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency," Nagl told the New York Times Magazine in January 2004, "until I started doing it."

After serving in Iraq, he became an assistant to then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. Next, under the stewardship of Gen. David H. Petraeus, now the top U.S. commander in Iraq, he helped produce the Army's counterinsurgency manual. He then became the commander of a battalion in Fort Riley, Kan., that teaches U.S. soldiers how to train and advise Iraqi forces. He has continued to have a high profile, with interviews on National Public Radio, "The Charlie Rose Show" and "The Daily Show With Jon Stewart."

Nagl said in a brief telephone interview yesterday that he has filed his papers requesting retirement. "I love the Army very much," he said, but he added that he decided to leave after discussing his future with his family. "It's not the strain of repeated deployments," he said, but "a belief that I can contribute perhaps on a different level - and my family wants me to leave."

He said he plans to become a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a centrist think tank recently founded by Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy, Clinton-era Pentagon officials. Nagl said he looks forward to working with them. "I hope to focus on national security for the remainder of my days," he said. "Obviously you don't have to do that in uniform."

Nagl's departure is a serious loss for the Army, said retired Marine Col. T.X. Hammes. "He's a serious student of warfare, he's smart, he's articulate, he's successfully led troops in combat, and he's worked at the highest levels of the Pentagon," said Hammes, himself the author of a book on contemporary war. "The Army just doesn't have that many officers with his set of qualifications."

Fred Kaplan has a story (http://www.slate.com/id/2182263/nav/tap3/)on Slate as well

[SWJED]

I posted a blurb on LTC Nagl's retirement to the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/nagl-to-leave-army/) with links to reaction so far...

[Ski]

Received an e-mail on Friday - ARNG and USAR Captains are now getting retention bonuses if they have the right Branch.

$20K for three years in the USAR, $30K for three years in the ARNG. Chaplain and JAG's can be Majors and still get the bonus.

Can post more specifics Monday when I have access to the work e-mail.

[Cavguy]

Washington Post "Outlook" Sunday

"Love It. But I Have To Leave It." by John Rogers (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/14/AR2008031403390.html)


I'm a captain in the U.S. Army, an institution I love and respect, and one that has made me a better man ...

All these lessons will, I'm convinced, make me a better friend, a better husband and, one day, a better father.

But after four years, I've decided to resign my commission and leave the Army.

And I'm not alone. Many other captains I know are making the same decision, or considering it. Let me be clear: I'm not a spokesman for some mythical "United Bureau of Captains Leaving the Army." But as I've talked with other captains, attended conferences with superiors on this issue and listened to my peers' reactions to what I've written here, I've heard a collective echo arising from the ranks of captains who are leaving. My reasons for this decision strike a chord with many of them.

Those reasons are threefold: First, I'm about to get married, and I want a family. Second, I can earn as much or more in the civilian world as I do in the Army. And finally, my experience with war has left me feeling angry, frustrated and mismanaged.


Nothing much new stated here, but well written. I sympathize and can't blame many for the choice. I was actually working with a headhunter in 2006, planning to leave after my last Iraq tour. I had a last minute change of heart (and plum assignment) that kept me in. It wasn't that I disliked the Army, I just couldn't keep doing it to my family.

As the five year anniversary of Iraq approaches, there is no sight of slowing down unless a Democrat gets elected, and even then I am sure reality will temper their desires to get out. The twenty nine months I spent in Iraq, 4 of 6 years between 2001-2007 spent away from home really takes a toll, and we all know it isn't slowing down in the near future. Some can call it whining, but that's what's driving many of the best I know away.

One of my criteria for voting for John McCain would be if he will do what the Bush administration has refused to do - make this a national effort and sacrifice. The military and certain civilian agencies have bourne all the hard suffering for Iraq, and civilians have only sacrificed their "peace of mind" and asked to go shopping. If Iraq is as important as its advocates make it, it requires a national approach.

I'm not optimistic though.

[Ski]

Is it an existential struggle or not? If not (and I agree that it is not), then you will not get the public to buy into the cause.

Add in the "E" of DIME - 1% of the population serves in uniform, with let's say another
.5% as civilians supporting the military whether through contract or through DAC-like functions. Still leaves 98.5% of the populace out of the loop. As the economy gets worse, fuel prices rise, unemployment rises, and the dollar weakens, do you think the people will stand for $700B defense budgets? My guess is no. Example - look at the Bonus Army and the use of the Army to squelch that concern.

We have paid for this war with borrowed money. We will pay it back one day. Raising taxes helps but takes time.

The #5 investment house, Bear Stearns, had their stock close last Thursday at $57 a share. It was sold today, the entire company, for $2 a share. If the #5 investment house is having this problem, I guarantee you the other investment houses are in the same boat. Citibank is in dire trouble as well.

Economics run everything. Don't get the economy back on track, and the American people will vote for individuals who will get us out of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unless, of course, a President emerges who can convince the people that the war is really worth fighting for...good luck.

[selil]

Don't take this as SPAM please... But, one of the stories on my BLOG has gotten hit a bunch of times (5K?) and big percentage are from .mil/.gov . It has to do with economic collapse. I'm writing a follow up (a slow torturous process). I'm NOT an economist though I'd buy one lunch who I could bounce some systems theory off of.

The big issues for officers in the future will be enlightened self interest. Is the realized/perceived stability/reward worth the hassle of being an officer? The fact is that what they see might not be what they get, and in general the rewards may be fleeting if not absent for leaving the military.

[Ken White]

Had three friends, Two Captains and a 1LT who got out at the height of Viet Nam for all the reasons in the Rogers OpEd. Lost track of one but the other two regret their decision. The one on his third wife is particularly bitter at himself -- and the condo share in Naples (FL), the house on Fripp Island and the big house in Kentucky he lives in during the summer don't seem to compensate...

There's not going to be any national effort on Afghanistan or Iraq -- no politician's going to bite on that. Nor, IMO, should they. It's not existential, just pest removal, always tedious and ugly so there's no justification for a national effort.

The regular or professional Armed Forces just have to suck it up as a territorial imperative as they have had to do many times in our past. I can sympathize a bit with the RC who have been confronted with a sweeping change to historical precedent but, at the end of the day, everyone in the AC and the RC has the choice of leaving or staying (well, sort of...) and they have a right to make that choice.

That said, it's not whining on the part of those who determine to leave. People have totally legitimate and understandable complaints about the current status; many want to put their family at least in the picture if not in paramount position and the Armed forces make that extremely difficult. Always have. That's unlikely to change, I think it's the nature of the beast.

Those that want more stability, family time or coins and less hassle will leave -- as they should. I think we should all wish them well. The masochists will stay and do their best and life will go on, the system will adapt and survive. We should also all wish those that stay well.

I wish both batches well. The job is, after all, not for everyone. Nor should it be.

[Ski]

Well stated Ken. It is up to the Army and the people who form the Army to adapt accordingly.

[Cavguy]

Well stated Ken. It is up to the Army and the people who form the Army to adapt accordingly.

Only problem is that there are quickly becoming not enough willing to do it in order to meet the national security strategy .... then what? Gets us back to the "if it's really important, then treat it as such" argument.

[Ken White]

illogical. The essential problem with that tack is that word "important." to whom and how much so become the determinants. It is difficult for many in the west to understand the ME and in the view of most westerners, reason dictates that what is normal to the ME is just not good thinking. I submit the thinking there is different. It is not necessarily bad, just very different. Thus most in the west cannot understand that in the ME a light probing attack is the standard method of warfare and that such attacks are designed to find the weak spots.

Witness the foolishness immediately after 9/11. Why don't they love us? We need to address the poverty and the autocratic governnace in the ME...

Totally missed the point.

In any event, I strongly doubt that any national consensus can be developed to or for a 'national commitment.' I do not think that is needed but I do think that leaving the ME precipitously would send a very bad message and we would live with the consequences for years. As my kid said when he got back form OIF 2, we can leave but if we do we'll go back in 10 or 15 years. Subsequent tours have not changed his mind. Thus the Army and Marines have to cope with it and are not likely to get much help.

As to the departure, I hear you and it is worrisome, Believe me I'm not making light of it nor am I being flip when I say I've seen it before; same thing happened during Korea and even more so during Viet Nam. So, to me it's understandable, acceptable -- but it is not going to be the end of the free world as we know it. Last time I checked, I think about 15% of the Army were Commissioned -- whereas a long held working norm for Officer strength as a percentage of total in a functional Armed Force has been between eight and ten. So I suggest there's some slack in there. I'd also suggest that many want the rather comfortable peacetime norms to be continued -- to include the Per folks -- but that probably isn't sustainable so the Army, near as I can tell, has not itself adapted fully to being at war -- though in fairness, I see signs that it is starting to do so.

A lot of the angst mirrors this:
" "We're ruining an Army that took us 30 years to build," Republican maverick Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., told a group of reporters at a recent conference."more than it does the real effect which may not be quite so dire.

Not to mention that the Army he's trying to protect is now gone, period. never to return -- and IMO, that is a good thing. It wasn't really as great as it likes to think it was. Good but not great. It may be tired and stretched now but it's better than it was eight years ago. A lot better...

And you guys did it.

[Jones_RE]

Our available resources are going to have to determine the national strategy and not the other way around.

Personally, I think we're better off with an Army that is shorthanded but populated by motivated, high quality individuals than an Army that fills all of the slots on its org chart by watering down its most important officer and NCO slots.

If I remember correctly, my grandfather (who was enlisted Army) served for a time in Vietnam as an officer. If the shortage of captains is that critical, we're probably better off promoting smart NCOs whether permanently or on a temporary basis than we are trying to keep the bottom 10% of the school trained officers.

[Cavguy]

Our available resources are going to have to determine the national strategy and not the other way around.

Personally, I think we're better off with an Army that is shorthanded but populated by motivated, high quality individuals than an Army that fills all of the slots on its org chart by watering down its most important officer and NCO slots.

If I remember correctly, my grandfather (who was enlisted Army) served for a time in Vietnam as an officer. If the shortage of captains is that critical, we're probably better off promoting smart NCOs whether permanently or on a temporary basis than we are trying to keep the bottom 10% of the school trained officers.

You're assuming those getting out are the bottom 10%. I'd say there's an even distribution across - some of the best LT's (now CPTs) in my BN bailed out, a few of the ok, and some of the bad.

Categorizing all those who leave as the bottom 10% seriously misreads the situation. Our bigger worry is only the bottom 10% stay . Promoting from the ranks is an option.

Also to Ken's earlier - we're having heavy attrition in the E-5/E-6 arena as well, but we're throwing massive re-up money at them, which is holding them in. Shoot, we pay $40k now to first term enlistees.

[Ken White]

jealous of them and that, you're quite wrong. I was, at the time quite happy with my $360.00 reenlistment bonuses for each burst of six years. Did I mention that I was really quite happy. Did I mention they were 360 lousy dollars? That's 360, no string of obscene zeros , just 3.6..0 pathetic little dollars. No sirree, not at all envious. Nope. :mad:

:D

On a serious note, more power to 'em and I'm happy for 'em on the Re-up bonus side; less thrilled with the initial entry bonus but hopefully that won't do too much damage or last too long. My son's last tour was as a 1SG and he had a good retention rate even before the bonuses went as high as they are today -- his big concern was the impact on families. That was a ball buster during Viet Nam for Officers and NCOs. Divorces and debts went through the roof and I'm sure it's equally bad today...

Veet Nam screwed up the Army big time. Lot of guys got out earlier than they'd planned, I figure the Army was fairly good until they lost their way over there and I'd stick around until it got back on its feet, did that, never regretted staying.

There were a few times in the early 70s when I questioned my sanity, though... :o

I think it's very much an individual preference and tolerance thing and the preference and tolerance of the wife in question if there is one have a big impact.

I do not question the turmoil and trauma caused -- and I don't like it any more than anyone else -- I'm merely saying that, no platitude, no jibe -- this too will pass. We've been there before; that doesn't make it one bit easier to take right now and I know that but I do believe that those that want to go deserve all the thanks in the world and good wishes; those that decide to stay get the good wishes -- and a tougher job. :wry:

What's that old saw; "They told me to cheer up, things could be worse." "So I cheered up and sure enough, things got worse..."

Illegitimi non carborundum...

[Steve Blair]

Our available resources are going to have to determine the national strategy and not the other way around.

Except that this has never been the case...

During the Indian Wars there were periods where the Army as a whole was not paid for almost a year because Congress failed to pass the proper military appropriations. No supplemental spending bills in those days. Even when pay was flowing, it often didn't arrive for four-five months. The whole Army at that time was the size of a large division (say 20k tops...including officers and EM), and it was tasked with securing the entire Western US. They had some bonuses for EM back then....an extra dollar a month if they reenlisted (which made base pay a whole $14 per month...less charges for clothing, the laundress, and any sutler's bills). But on the whole it was a damned good army...good enough to serve as the bedrock for the force that was sent to the Philippines and later World War I.

We've never done a good job with matching strategies with resources. But we always seem to discover that those resources go a lot further than we thought they would.

[jcustis]

Those that want more stability, family time or coins and less hassle will leave -- as they should. I think we should all wish them well. The masochists will stay and do their best and life will go on, the system will adapt and survive. We should also all wish those that stay well.

This is a re-tread statement from what I think I said earlier in the thread, but this is exactly why someone needs to expend more energy to figure out why people stay...not necessarily why people leave.


Categorizing all those who leave as the bottom 10% seriously misreads the situation. Our bigger worry is only the bottom 10% stay . Promoting from the ranks is an option.

Also to Ken's earlier - we're having heavy attrition in the E-5/E-6 arena as well, but we're throwing massive re-up money at them, which is holding them in. Shoot, we pay $40k now to first term enlistees.

CG, that is by far one of the sharpest points I think anyone has made on this board. So simple, yet it's been right in front of our faces for far too long. I know of tons of sharp young men who would, following the exact same MOS and follow-on career training that all infantry officers receive, make a damn fine platoon commander and company commander down the road. Controlling close air support is about as difficult a task out there across the specturm of small-unit tatical combat operations, and if hard-charging enlisted men can be trained as ETACs/JTACs, then the capability to promote from the "other ranks" is there...we just apply the resources to develop that capability.

When you get an enlisted guy, who has some time in service under his belt that pushes him over the 10+ yr mark by the time he is a captain, I think you'd be more likely to find a guy who desires to stay until he hits at least the twenty mark. I could be in left field on that, but that's my hunch.

This business of retention and initial accessions is an odd one. On the one hand (in my former capacity as a site admin at MarineOCS.com) I would see quite a few young people with interest in the various officer commissioning programs that the Corps has to offer. I don't understand why the Marine Corps is currently offering loan repayment as some sort of incentive to get these college-age kids on board. Maybe the actual numbers of interested folk aren't high enough, but that doesn't square with rumblings that lieutenants are going to start being billeted 12 to a suite at O'Bannon Hall (new construction, extra student companies, etc. ?) for the near future, and that throughput out of The Basic School is somewhat backed up, with commisioned officers hanging on the timeline for when they can actually get to TBS and start training.

I will say this one last thing and then get off of my box. It applies to enlisted retention and bears some relationship to what Ken said about wishing them well.

As a company commander, I had my head up my ass about enlisted career retention until I had the unit career retention specialist sit down with me and give me a class on bonuses, lateral moves, the whole nine yards. I became smarter, but I still wasn't efficient until I took off the "well look what staying in the Marine Corps can do for you" cape and started to just talk with each Marine, on more of a man-to-man basis. I also did more listening in the process, and let them addres their reasons and thought process as they saw it.

I'd get a lot of the "well, my uncle is a manager at this plant, and he says I can get a job there while I start school." At that point I could have tuned out the rest of what he was saying, considering I could have simply assumed he had a job already locked in. Instead I would probe and ask some fairly pointed questions, like whether they had submitted an application for the upcoming school year at the local community college, or if they knew how to start using their MGIB benefits. Even with a mandatory separations/transition class, I was routinely shocked b just how many of these Marines really had no idea how to get onto civvy street and not just survive, but thrive.

I'd offer resume-proofing assistance, mock job interview assistance, etc. as we continued the discussion, because I wanted them to succeed regardless of their long-term career choice. It was disappointing that many of them told me they were interested in doing some extra work on their stuff, but the motivation eventually faded away.

The point to all this is that enlisted and officer accessions (and retention to some degree) are like renewable energy in a way, but we have to pay close attention to how we are replenishing the resource. If Joe Marine leaves the Corps, gets married and starts a family within a year of separating, we either have the potential to reap what we sow in 18-20 years, or that veteran Marine will not serve as the foundation for his children to take an interest in military service (it doesn't have to be the Marine Corps). Even with the bad apples, their children won't necessarily be bad apples, so I think there needs to be some outreach in that realm as well. One of the most rewarding phone calls I've ever received came from one of my 10% "####birds" that I had to kcik out of the Corps for drugs and other violations. He had been a good Marine during the invasion, had worked hard during his first 3 years, then sort of took a nose-dive. He had called just to tell me that he thought my taking the time to talk to him on the eve of his departure straightened him out a bit, and he realized the opportunity lost but didn't blame the Marines for his problems. If I could capture that sentiment and bottle it, it would make for a great "get your life straight" elixir. :D

[Ken White]

"This is a re-tread statement from what I think I said earlier in the thread, but this is exactly why someone needs to expend more energy to figure out why people stay...not necessarily why people leave."

True. As he said earlier, we know and understand why they leave and we sort of understand why some stay (for various reasons depending on how well we know the individual or his or her situation). What we don't have a handle on is the broad 'why.'

I think that applies as a matter of need to both Officers and to Peons...

Speaking of Peons and harking to their elevation to commissioned status, here are some random thoughts:

Why do Platoon leaders need to be commissioned -- I understand the training (of them) aspect but that isn't the vital thing many imagine, there have been many who skipped that step for one reason or another. Seems to me to be somewhat of a waste of an expensively trained officer.

Why do over man most Staffs other than to meet the archaic requirements of the bureaucratic staffing guides.

Why can't we pay a guy or gal extra money for doing a good job instead of having to promote them in rank?

Do we have too many ranks? Both Officer and enlisted. Shouldn't the number of ranks in both categories be based on level required by echelons of employment. For NCOs, Individual troop / Team / Squad / Platoon /Company / Higher -- that's five or six ranks, not nine. For Officers, Company / Battalion / Brigade-Regt / Higher; that's four to six, not ten or eleven.

How smart is up or out?

A look at all those items quickly tells us that a personnel system designed to easily 'manage' large numbers of people and provide 'incentives' to enter and stay may not be what we really need...

Goes back to J Custis; Why do they stay?

[Ski]

Custis - good story will follow up with one of mine own I think may be valuable.

Had three E4's in my tank platoon in the California Guard in the mid-90's. All three had been in the AC, all three were still in their twenties and wanted to stay in the Guard. We had an opportunity to get some people into the State OCS program and these were the three guys I thought had the capability to become officers. One had come out of
2ID, one had come out of 3rd ACR, and the last had been a 1CD Desert Storm vet.

I sat all three of them down at the same time, told them that they had the opportunity to go to OCS if they wanted. I told them they were the three best enlisted soldiers in the platoon, and they showed me and the Company Commander enough promise that OCS was an option. I told them that either way, I think you will all be superb NCO's if you don't want to get involved in the OCS program.

One guy went into the program, he's now a Company Commander. The two other guys left the company within 18 months to transfer into MOS's they wanted to work in - one went Aviation and the other went to a MP Company. All three of them, however, told me that I was the first officer who ever gave a crap about their career, and tried to make them better. I think if you sit down with people, regardless of rank, and show interest in their lives and careers, you can get a lot out of them. It sounds simple but I don't think it happens as much as I would like.

[selil]

Why do Platoon leaders need to be commissioned -- I understand the training (of them) aspect but that isn't the vital thing many imagine, there have been many who skipped that step for one reason or another. Seems to me to be somewhat of a waste of an expensively trained officer.



Didn't we have this discussion way back when like during the strategic corporal thread, or maybe the platoon discussion? I'm not sure if it was via pm or a post but somebody mentioned or linked to something that said the officer at the platoon level is relatively new. Sorry I'm being vague but search returned to much to look through.

[Eden]

Good lord, I feel old, posting this, but here goes:

When I commanded a battalion, I took an hour each to counsel my lieutenants and captains each time I rated them. This is what I had been taught to do, and I felt this was the minimum effort I could put forth. My first go 'round, I was stunned to learn that probably 75% of them had never been counseled, and most of the rest had had pro forma sessions at best. Even the ones I raked over the coals were pathetically grateful to get some kind of feedback.

My own experience as a Lieutenant Colonel was disillusioning. In four years, two of which I spent as a battalion commander, I received maybe thirty minutes of counseling from my senior raters. I don't mean just formal counseling, I mean total one-on-one feedback. One senior rater saw me for the first and only time when I came in to sign my efficiency report. My two-star senior rater, having just effectively spiked my career, spent almost three minutes telling me what a great command team my wife and I had been before hustling me out of the office.

Now, I'm not just venting my spleen. My point is that when deployments are long, pay and benefits are so-so, and the work is back-breakingly hard, what is it that keeps people in? I would say two things: a sense that the mission is overwhelmingly important, and the ties of camraderie. I personally lost that a few years back and got out five years before I had to.

As a senior officer with no chance for promotion and no opportunity to go back to troops, I foresaw two or three tours on staffs in my future. Not the Army I signed up to serve in. My senior leaders appreared disinterested in me, so how could what I was doing be important? I therefore resolved to do one last tour in Afghanistan and get out.

The young captains I led were in the same predicament. They were told they were the backbone of the officer corps, but their leaders never invested a great deal of time in developing them; even those who didn't particularly need it felt the lack. They were constantly told they were trusted, but they couldn't run a range without an overweight civilian watching every move. They were told to develop soldiers with initiative, but had to personally sign off on risk assessments every time a soldier took a three-day pass. As a result of all this they discounted what leadership told them about their future prospects and never really felt that they were - as they are - the vital future of the Army.

Developments over the last twenty years have also led to a loss of that sense of mission that keeps people in despite all the hardships. We have created so many programs - for alcohol dependency, abuse, finances, etc - that leaders no longer solve soldier's problems, they just refer them somewhere. We have created a sense of entitlement among soldiers that didn't exist in the past, and this erodes any sense that what I am doing, what my unit is doing, is more important than any personal problems I may have. I suspect that Iraq and Afghanistan and the War on Terror have renewed that sense of mission in a certain slice of the Armed Forces, and may be keeping as many in as they are driving out.

What can we do? I don't know what we can do in the officer corps, but I do have two suggestions for the NCO corps, where I think the problems are similar. First, I would eliminate all Sergeant Major positions above brigade level. Why we take our finest NCOs and turn them into glorified personnel clerks is beyond me; keep these guys with soldiers where they can motivate and inspire and teach, which is what they do best. Give them merit pay and raises for seniority by all means, but get them back where they can actually contribute. Secondly, imitate the British Army's Late Entry Commission program, where senior NCOs - maybe a little long in the tooth for humping rucksacks or changing track - are made captains and majors and assigned to training, recruiting, and other slots where we are hurting for captains and majors. This would alleviate the shortage of officers while giving these guys a chance to make a greater contribution than they do as the G-5 Staff Sergeant Major.

[CR6]

the majority of those who are leaving are those who are better (and in some cases, best) suited to leading the Army now and into the future.

Norfolk,

We haven't interacted on these boards, but I read what you post with interest and appreciate your analysis and understanding of history. That said, what is the substantive basis for your statement quoted above? Most every officer I know has anecdoteal stories about good guys who left the service for various reasons, but I don't know of any quantitative analysis (if it were even possible to do one) that shows the majority leaving the Army are the better leaders. Is this based off an analysis of the level of combat experience held by these officers vice their peers? Leadership positions held? A comparrison of ACOM OERs to COM OERs? If it's an assumption, what are the facts upon which it is based? That only the duds with no options will stick around? (True in my case, but let's not sell the rest of the US officer corps short!)

[Norfolk]

Norfolk,

We haven't interacted on these boards, but I read what you post with interest and appreciate your analysis and understanding of history. That said, what is the substantive basis for your statement quoted above? Most every officer I know has anecdoteal stories about good guys who left the service for various reasons, but I don't know of any quantitative analysis (if it were even possible to do one) that shows the majority leaving the Army are the better leaders. Is this based off an analysis of the level of combat experience held by these officers vice their peers? Leadership positions held? A comparrison of ACOM OERs to COM OERs? If it's an assumption, what are the facts upon which it is based? That only the duds with no options will stick around? (True in my case, but let's not sell the rest of the US officer corps short!)

Hello CR6,


First off, I intended no offence to anyone, and I apologize for causing any.

Admittedly I don't have a formal study sitting in front of me stating that X-number/percentage of such-and such rated officers have taken their leave of the Army. But I have seen the official figures posted on these boards of junior officer classes who have taken their releases - the latest and most startling being that of the class of 2002 in which 57% of the Army's officers who entered that year have taken their releases. Undoubtedy that will include a good many of the best. It will be itnersting to see what the retention and release figures for the class of 2003 will be.

I have also listened to the statements made by other serving officers here on these boards, from Cavguy to Rob Thornton to 120 mm, et al. about not only how so many of the good one's they've seen go, but also how they've struggled with the decision to leave or stay while seeing their peers or subordinates go. That, and having witnessed what happened to the Canadian Army under many of the same stresses back in the 1990's, and I think a fairly decent picture of what is happening to the junior and future senior leadership of the U.S. Army is starting to take form. We are unlikely to get a formal report from the U.S. Army explicitly stating that it has lost either a significant proportion or even the bulk of its best young officers. But something much more substantial than just a bunch of horror stories about officer retention is going on.

[CR6]

I intended no offence to anyone, and I apologize for causing any.



None taken. You come across as a consumate pro.




Admittedly I don't have a formal study sitting in front of me stating that X-number/percentage of such-and such rated officers have taken their leave of the Army. But I have seen the official figures posted on these boards of junior officer classes who have taken their releases - the latest and most startling being that of the class of 2002 in which 57% of the Army's officers who entered that year have taken their releases. Undoubtedy that will include a good many of the best. It will be itnersting to see what the retention and release figures for the class of 2003 will be.

We are unlikely to get a formal report from the U.S. Army explicitly stating that it has lost either a significant proportion or even the bulk of its best young officers. But something much more substantial than just a bunch of horror stories about officer retention is going on.

This links to a JAN 2007 GAO report (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07224.pdf) on officer accesions and retention. Without addressing the "quality" issue, there are some interesting stats on overall retention in various Fiscal Years by various year groups. Some precipitous spikes in departures, but overall decent retention by commissioning source overall. Very interesting to see the similarities in FY 2001 and FY 2005 on page 31.

[Norfolk]

Thank-you for your patience with me, CR6, and again I am sorry for my thoughtless and careless words; no insult was intended to the Officer Corps of the U.S. Army, but having reflected on my previous statements, it is clear that I went too far.:o I beg the pardon of all whom I have offended.

The GAO statement that you have provided, CR6, is good enough for me.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
As I am reposting the (unoffensive) part of a previous post, as I am hoping that the offensive post will be deleted shortly:

jcustis' post is excellent, even outstanding - and why indeed don't the Armed Forces (throughout the English-speaking world) commission more from the ranks? As Patton himself said, it takes 10 years for an officer to begin earning his pay. There is a good case to be made for taking talented and experienced sergeants and offering them commissions. And in addition to their mastery of their craft, there is, as jcustis said, the likelihood that these guys are in for the long haul. And that's because they are more likely to view the military as a calling, a vocation, or a profession, rather than as a career - careers can change, but a calling is rather more resilient.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=42483#post42483)
You're assuming those getting out are the bottom 10%. I'd say there's an even distribution across - some of the best LT's (now CPTs) in my BN bailed out, a few of the ok, and some of the bad.

Categorizing all those who leave as the bottom 10% seriously misreads the situation. Our bigger worry is only the bottom 10% stay . Promoting from the ranks is an option.

Also to Ken's earlier - we're having heavy attrition in the E-5/E-6 arena as well, but we're throwing massive re-up money at them, which is holding them in. Shoot, we pay $40k now to first term enlistees.

During the 1990's, the Canadian Armed Forces, and especially the "Army", suffered the almost wholesale loss of its best and most experienced officers and NCOs - not to mention ordinary soldiers. This was partly due to "Peace Dividend" reductions, partly due to massive over-committment to overseas "Peacekeeping" missions that virtually burned the Army out, and partly due to the Department of National Defences policies of conducting "purges" (that was indeed the actual word used in a few statements by DND officials) of those elements within the military who most felt that it was a calling, not just a career - because those elements were most definitely not PC.

By 1995, there was not a single officer left who had experience manoeuvring a Brigade, let alone a Division, and shortly afterwards even the experience of Battalion manoeuvre was something that only a few of the older senior officers could claim - and none of the younger field-grades. I read some CF College papers these days, some of them calling for capabilities that we still had back in the early 90's, and these guys are writing as if the CF never had them in the first place. The younger Captains and Majors, who were not in and never new the "old" Army prior to the mid-1990's, have little idea of what there was before their time, because most of those who knew are long gone. Standards throughout the Army, and especially the Infantry Corps, suffered a precipitous decline, right from the individual-level on up to Company-level, which formed the upper-limit of training in the Army. The Armed Forces as a whole suffered a loss of public esteem from which they have never fully recovered, and recruiting standards have been lowered to the point where as long as you are not disabled, physically or mentally, and possess Canadian citizenship, you pretty much are guaranteed acceptance - and you need no personal references either.

And this goes to Cavguy's point. It isn't just, or even mostly, those that the U.S. Army can best do without who are leaving; [Note: the following part is edited] quite a few of those who are leaving are those who are better (and in some cases, best) suited to leading the Army now and into the future. At present, there is a dearth, becoming serious now, of officers who have actual experience manoeuvring Brigades and Divisions, and even Battalions. Once Major-Unit and Formation-level Combined Arms practical know-how is lost or seriously degraded, it's hard to get it back. The Canadians, for example, for the last few years have been engagaed in the arduous task of trying to relearn and remaster Combined-Arms at Battalion-level, with some attempts at Brigade-level; Division-level is not going to happen, but needs to.

The U.S. Army, by a combination of operational over-committment (unavoidable of course) to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the concomittant loss of the [Note: Edited] a significant part of its younger, better officers (amongst others), is at increasingly serious risk of a talent gap not only at subaltern-level, but most especialy at field-grade and flag officer level - where they can do the most good if they were to make it that far.

Edit Note: This part was just so people don't wonder what happened to an older post.

[Ken White]

...
This links to a JAN 2007 GAO report (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07224.pdf) on officer accesions and retention. Without addressing the "quality" issue, there are some interesting stats on overall retention in various Fiscal Years by various year groups. Some precipitous spikes in departures, but overall decent retention by commissioning source overall. Very interesting to see the similarities in FY 2001 and FY 2005 on page 31.was that the much hyped loss of Captains is there but is not nearly as far out of the norms as the noise would lead one to bleieve.

Even more interesting is the fact that equally loud screaming about Majors is apparently true -- but doesn't affect the combat arms, other than FA much at all -- the losses are in the CS and particularly the CSS arena.

Since I've long contended that our Log tail is way, way too big, I can live with that... :D

Nor does the report address the ideal number of Officers overall in relation to the total force; if it did, I suspect they might infer that our reliance on significant Officer over staffing across the board to meet a potential mobilization goal might be better modified and that goal achieved in other ways.

World War II in northern Europe is still defining the US Army... :(

[jonSlack]

We are unlikely to get a formal report from the U.S. Army explicitly stating that it has lost either a significant proportion or even the bulk of its best young officers. But something much more substantial than just a bunch of horror stories about officer retention is going on.

I personally doubt that an analysis on staying and departing company grade officers based on an objective assessment of their performance is currently feasible due to problems with the OER system. The main problem, in my opinion, is "grade inflation" in junior officer OERs driven either by a fear of damning a junior officer with only "faint praise" or the inability of some Raters or Senior Raters to be the "bad guy" and give a poor evaluation to an officer who truly deserves one.

That being said, I do not know if there are any alternative systems that can truly remedy the current problems with the company grade officer OER system and which are free of similar or more serious problems of their own. Also, while I have not rated a junior commissioned officer, I can understand the difficulties some, if not many, Company Commanders have or would have in some how "ranking" their Platoon Leaders and XO if they all are accomplishing their assigned mission as well as properly caring for their Soldiers.

[Steve Blair]

OERs have been inflated pretty much since they began giving them. Same with EPRs. No one wants to consider the fact that doing one's job with a basic level of competence is AVERAGE performance. I think it has something to do with the compulsion to consider everyone special and therefore not average. It's a nasty cycle, and isn't fair to either the person doing average work or the person who's outperforming just about everyone in the unit. But I can't honestly see it changing much in the near future.

I tend to agree with Norfolk that the current exodus is worrying. It's happened before, and the institution survived it, but it also hamstrung development and progress for many years.

And Ken...I'd say that World War I is still defining the Army...which is even more depressing.:(

[wm]

OERs have been inflated pretty much since they began giving them. Same with EPRs. No one wants to consider the fact that doing one's job with a basic level of competence is AVERAGE performance. I think it has something to do with the compulsion to consider everyone special and therefore not average. It's a nasty cycle, and isn't fair to either the person doing average work or the person who's outperforming just about everyone in the unit. But I can't honestly see it changing much in the near future.

(

The problem with, at least the Army's, performance evaluations is that the person being evaluated is judged for performance in a specific, local position but is measured against a global population. We need to get over that hurdle. I doubt anyone has ever seen a rater or senior rater write "This officer did an average job in this position, but then even the best officer in the force would not have done much better." That is the issue to overcome in evaluation reporting IMHO.

[Rob Thornton]

Some of you have probably seen these, but its always fun to go back and read the list of great staff officer quotes (http://www.greekchat.com/gcforums/archive/index.php/t-54509.html).

Best, Rob

[Cavguy]

NY Times, 21 March

Sovereigns of All They’re Assigned, Captains Have Many Missions to Oversee (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/world/middleeast/21captain.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=army+captains&st=nyt&oref=slogin)


JISR DIALA, Iraq — During the war in Iraq, young Army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the “ground-owners.” In practice, they are power brokers.


Many in the military believe that these captains are the linchpins in the American strategy for success in Iraq, but as the war continues into its sixth year the military has been losing them in large numbers — at a time when it says it needs thousands more.

Most of these captains have extensive combat experience and are regarded as the military’s future leaders. They’re exactly the men the military most wants. But corporate America wants them too. And the hardships of repeated tours are taking their toll, tilting them back toward civilian life and possibly complicating the future course of the war.


Good article. Captures the issues well. Great point about the year at home not being a break. I found Iraq more relaxing than the year at home, current ARFORGEN resembles "light your hair on fire and spin" for 12 months.

On a related note, a buddy who works with personnel in DC stated that as a total force (active and reserve), we are 10,000 CPT's short of anticipated requirements. Not sure of breakdown active/reserve shortages.

Hacksaw brought up another observation made earlier - about filling the shortage by promoting from the ranks. Right now, OCS is pretty much wide open for anyone who meets the basic requirements. It was when I was a CO, and I understand they've even lowered the bar some more. Pretty much all who want to become an officer can right now, if they're willing to invest the effort. So the shortage includes that of willing NCO's/enlisted to make the transition.

My RTO/Tank Gunner in OIF was that way. Tremendously smart. Good judgement, and I told him he needed to become an officer. He laughed and stated that after watching all I put up with over the past year, no way!

[sandbag]

When I went to my second battalion assignment at Fort Hood in 1997, the battalion had about 30 LTs assigned to it. Before I left Hood for the advanced course in 1999, a dozen of that number had left the service for Corporate America. Back then, the main reason my peers left was an Army culture problem: junior officers (myself included) routinely chafed under micromanagement and a perception of a "zero defects" culture (real? Imagined? Who knows?).

Fast forward to now. We see similar rates of junior officers "popping smoke" for civilian life, but the stated reasons are a lot different. I'm not being an apologist for the Army's ham-fisted approach to officer retention. Rather, I argue that for an organization that puts on airs that they are the equal of any corporate personnel division, "HRC" is still the train wreck as it was when it was known as "PERSCOM". $20 large to keep a kid in that is on the fence, just to throw him back into the meat grinder? No thanks, were I said young officer. If your branch's "Branch Chief's Notes" page on the HRC website reads anything like mine, it says something like:

TAKE WHAT WE GIVE YOU. IF YOU'RE LUCKY, WE'LL GET YOU AN RFO A MONTH OUT.

As laughable as it was when Hernandez told officers via the Army Times circa 2004: "I haven't been, but suck down a couple more rotations, because I said so".

Bitter ranting? Nope; I'm still in, I've pounded my share of sand, and I do what I do because I love the people in the Army. The machine itself, not so much. The young Captain in the Washington Post a couple of weeks ago is expressing his generation's reason for leaving in a clear, recognizable message.

I'd like to see the Army listen. I know I'm listening.

[Ski]

I had a chance this past week to talk with someone from RAND about this problem.

The first thing out of his mouth:
"We insult our Captains when we give new recruits up to $15,000 more than the Captains. We expect the Captains to carry more responsibility and more accountability, then we go and offer them less money than someone who had been in high school a week before signing up for his first enlistment. It's no surprise to me why the Captains are leaving with policies like this..."