Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi

[wm]

Just saw this (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6968720.stm) on the BBC news site. Any thoughts on what prompted this and what the next steps are likely to be?


Radical Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr says he is freezing the activities of his Mehdi Army militia for up to six months in order to re-organise it.
He has also called on all its offices to co-operate with the security forces and exercise "self-control".

Analysts see the move as an attempt by Moqtada Sadr to regain control over his increasingly divided militia.

Do folks agree with the "analysts" mentioned in the story? If the militia has fractured, what is the cause? Is it a good news story for coalition efforts?

[kit]

I don't trust al Sadr enough to believe anything he says. He has an ulterior motive.

My guess is it's to lie low, giving the American's a chance to claim "progress" and begin withdrawing. After that's in motion (once started, it won't be stopped), he'll make his move take over the government.

[cmetcalf82]

My guess is it's to lie low, giving the American's a chance to claim "progress" and begin withdrawing. After that's in motion (once started, it won't be stopped), he'll make his move take over the government.

I believe Kit is quite right. The positive impacts of the current "surge" include the increased targeting of both AQ and Shia militia's. Thus by freezing the Mahdi Militia Sadr likely hopes to prevent further targeting and attrition of his militia. The likely long-term intent for Sadr is to retain a measure of military power in the event the U.S. Congress or Presidential elections force the U.S. to significantly or completely withdraw U.S. forces. If this happens Sadr and others must be prepared to contend with increased ethnic conflict as the Sunni and Shia continue to struggle for control. My guess is right now Sadr is betting on that drawdown as a consequence of reporting on political events in the U.S. Bottom line is Sadr must retain his military power to retain his influence.

[kit]

Bottom line is Sadr must retain his military power to retain his influence.


Which is just another way of saying Iranian influence.

In future, if we conduct similar operations in another country, we should just find the local equivalent of al Sadr, put him on the payroll and leave. That's a whole lot cheaper, faster and more effective than wrapping ourselves in ideologies and trying to "help" them into the 21st century.

[Ken White]

using them -- and they him -- but very few things in the ME are as they seem.

Most Iraqis are pretty xenophobic (as are the Iraniha), the schism between Persians and Arabs is deep and I suspect that if he hews too much to the Irani, his Mahdi Army will dump him -- and he knows it. He can use but not cleave to...

[Dennis]

I don't trust al Sadr enough to believe anything he says. He has an ulterior motive.

I don't disagree with that assessment, but it seems to me that this is a no win situation for him.

If violence does stop immediatelly due to this then there is absolutely no doubt in anyone's mind that the MM was behind a majority of the recent violence, not that there was a lot of boubt about that in the first place.

If it continues then it will be percieved that he has lost control of the group.

I think I will be more worried if this does reduce violence.

Even more so if due to the reduced violence, in conjunction with the withdrawal of British forces in the South, the US doesn't apply enough forces there.

[kit]

I don't disagree with that assessment, but it seems to me that this is a no win situation for him.

If violence does stop immediatelly due to this then there is absolutely no doubt in anyone's mind that the MM was behind a majority of the recent violence, not that there was a lot of boubt about that in the first place.

If it continues then it will be percieved that he has lost control of the group.

I think I will be more worried if this does reduce violence.

Even more so if due to the reduced violence, in conjunction with the withdrawal of British forces in the South, the US doesn't apply enough forces there.


Apply what forces there? We've commited all we have and sending some to the south would require taking them from someplace else in Iraq, leaving the door open for al Queda or some other group to return.

[Dennis]

Apply what forces there? We've commited all we have and sending some to the south would require taking them from someplace else in Iraq, leaving the door open for al Queda or some other group to return.

I am not disputing that fact; but if the British leave then we will have to cover down on it somehow.

[tequila]

Sadr suspends military operations (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/world/middleeast/30sadr.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES, 30 Aug.


The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/moktada_al_sadr/index.html?inline=nyt-per) said Wednesday that he was suspending for six months his Mahdi Army militia’s operations, including attacks on American troops, only hours after his fighters waged running street battles with Iraqi government forces for control of Karbala, one of Iraq (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)’s holiest cities.

The surprise declaration was widely taken as a tacit acknowledgment of the damage done to his movement’s reputation by two days of Shiite-on-Shiite in-fighting, which killed 52 people, wounded 279 and forced thousands of pilgrims to flee birthday celebrations for the Mahdi, one of Shiite Islam’s most revered medieval saints.

Mr. Sadr’s aides declared an unequivocal end to all militia operations. Ahmed al-Shaibani, the chief of Mr. Sadr’s media office in Najaf, confirmed that this “includes suspending the taking up of arms against occupiers,” a reference to American-led coalition troops ...

[goesh]

Iran sees its coming influence and slice of the oil pie in Iraq after America cuts and runs
We will exit and Iran will step down from its nukes, that's the deal
to politically justify the exit, there has to be fewer attacks on our troops
this can only be accomplished by Sadr reining in the elements he controls
his orders for a cease fire have come from Tehran
he can now use American forces to purge his own ranks that have fractured and who are refusing to obey him, plus he will provide Intel on AQ
he will fully consolodate his power and be a minor Iranian Caliph in Iraq, though his luxary will never equal or come close to Saddam's
We never killed him because we knew Iran could and would at any moment if necessary

There is a real puppet master in Iran the likes the world hasn't seen in a couple of decades and it ain't Iran's President. Sadly his power has come from the clear dissent amongst State, DOD, CIA and the Presidency. Not one freakin' time were 3 out of the 4 on the same page in this war, the prerequisite for strategic implementation. As Bogart would say, " play it again, Uncle Sam"

[tequila]

Sadr May Revoke 'Freeze' on Militia (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/30/AR2007083001989_pf.html)- Washington Post, 31 Aug.


Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr told his followers Thursday that he would rescind his order "freezing" the operations of his powerful militia if military raids on his offices did not cease in the next few days, according to officials of Sadr's organization.

Sadr's message came the day after he issued a public statement to his Mahdi Army to cease its operations for up to six months so he could restructure the group. But Sadr was forced to reconsider after a raid Thursday by U.S. and Iraqi forces on his office in the southern city of Karbala led to the deaths of six Mahdi Army members and the arrest of 30 others, the officials said.

"When you see the enemy is attacking you, you have to defend yourself," said Alaa Abid Jiaara, a Mahdi Army member in Sadr's headquarters in Kufa, about 90 miles south of Baghdad. "Today we have seen the occupation forces and Iraqi forces violate the Sadr followers and their offices and holy symbols. This means it is the duty of the followers of Sadr to defend against them ..."

[Dennis]

http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070912543788.html


The secret dialogue has been going on since at least early 2006, but appeared to yield a tangible result only in the last week -- with relative calm in an area of west Baghdad that has been among the capital's most dangerous sections.

Negotiation with MM was actually happening much earlier than this. I had the Al Shulla area of Baghdad from AUG-DEC 05. The unit that was there previous to mine had established the contact and I continued the relationship. Our BCT was moved out to Abu Gharaib in Jan following the election. Up to that time I had been meeting pretty regularly with a rep from the local MM to manage and monitor the neighborhood watch groups in the town. We were able to make great strides but we pretty much left them and the town councils hanging when we handed the area over to the IA in Jan 06. By Feb all the towns that we were in previously were in full fledge kung-fu stance and we were moved back in by Mar.:o

[SWJED]

12 October New York Times - Relations Sour Between Shiites and Iraq Militia (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/12/world/middleeast/12mahdi.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) by Sabrina Tavernese.


In a number of Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad, residents are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia they once saw as their only protector against Sunni militants. Now they resent it as a band of street thugs without ideology.

The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war.

The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect...

[skiguy]

Is this as big a thing as I think it is, (a Shiite awakening?) or am I making too much of it?


In a number of Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad, residents are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia they once saw as their only protector against Sunni militants. Now they resent it as a band of street thugs without ideology.

The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war.

The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect.

....

Among the people killed in the neighborhood of Topchi over the past two months, residents said, were the owner of an electrical shop, a sweets seller, a rich man, three women, two local council members, and two children, ages 9 and 11.

It was a disparate group with one thing in common: All were Shiites killed by Shiites. Residents blamed the Mahdi Army, which controls the neighborhood.

"Everyone knew who the killers were," said a mother from Topchi, whose neighbor, a Shiite woman, was one of the victims. "I'm Shiite, and I pray to God that he will punish them."

The feeling was the same in other neighborhoods.

"We thought they were soldiers defending the Shiites," said Sayeed Sabah, a Shiite who runs a charity in the western neighborhood of Huriya. "But now we see they are youngster-killers, no more than that. People want to get rid of them."

While the Mahdi militia still controls most Shiite neighborhoods, early evidence that Shiites are starting to oppose some parts of the militia is surfacing on American bases. Shiite sheiks, the militia's traditional base, are beginning to contact Americans, much as Sunni tribes reached out early this year, refocusing one entire front of the war, officials said, and the number of accurate tips flowing into American bases has soared.

Shiites are "participating like they never have before," said Major Mark Brady, of the Multi-National Division-Baghdad Reconciliation and Engagement Cell, which works with tribes.





LINK (http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/12/africa/12mahdi.php)

[tequila]

Sadr militia moves to clean house (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-sadr7dec07,0,2257435,print.story?coll=la-home-world)- LATIMES, 7 Dec.


Militia commander Abu Maha had studied his quarry carefully, watching as the man acquired fancy suits, gold watches and the street name "Master." Now, heavily armed and dressed in an Adidas track suit, Abu Maha told his followers it was time to act against one of their comrades.

A dozen of them gripped their assault rifles and headed out. The Master, accused of sliding into immoral behavior after stoutly defending Shiite Muslims in Iraq's sectarian violence, was about to learn that justice in the Mahdi Army could be very rough.

Fighters such as Abu Maha have taken on a new role in recent months in the militia of Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr. Instead of battling Sunni insurgents and U.S. troops, they are now weeding out what they consider to be black sheep within their ranks ...

[Dennis]

I think that what's going on right now is a practical response from Muqtada. Over the last 4 years if Muqtada has demonstrated anything it's that he is practical and flexible enough in basic ideology to cooperate or fight against just about any group if it suits the purposes of the Sadr movement.


This aspect is what I think doesn' get enough attention. Muqtada is more than a common street thug and there are some pretty good reasons why he has and will continue to have support from Iraqi's.

1. His personal lineage
2. The fact that the Sadr movement represents one of the only ones that is distinctely Arab, Iraqi, and Shia.
3. The focus on providing support and services to the Shia urban poor.
4. The perception that Sadr leaders have always stood, fought(physically or ideologically), and represented their constituency in the face of oppression while others have fled to exile.

What's holding Muqtada up is his ability to appeal to the merchant and elites of Iraq. These groups have been allying more with groups like SCIRI and follow leaders such as Sistani and Hakim. However, both of these are regarded as Iranian in origin and influence. If Muqtada is to take the Sadr movement to the next level he has to bridge the gap between appealing to the urban poor and also appealing to the elites.

He can only accomplish this if he can attain designation as an "object of emulation" within Shia Islam. What's going on right now is more about Muqtada getting his ideological house in order to have the greatest appeal to all Iraqi constituencies. He has a built in base of support, due to the group he leads, however he has repeatedly hit a wall by either overplaying his military capability or reaching the limits of his base of appeal. If he is to move to the next level he must have credentials on par with his uncle and father who preceded him.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 7 Feb 08: Iraq's Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/72_iraq_s_civil_war_the_sadrists_and_the_surge.pdf )

.....Among Sadrist rank and file, impatience with the ceasefire is high and growing. They equate it with a loss of power and resources, believe the U.S. and ISCI are conspiring to weaken the movement and eagerly await Muqtada’s permission to resume the fight. The Sadrist leadership has resisted the pressure, but this may not last. Critics accuse Muqtada of passivity or worse, and he soon may conclude that the costs of his current strategy outweigh its benefits. In early February 2008, senior Sadrist officials called upon their leader not to prolong the ceasefire, due to expire later in the month.

The U.S. response – to continue attacking and arresting Sadrist militants, including some who are not militia members; arm a Shiite tribal counterforce in the south to roll back Sadrist territorial gains; and throw its lot in with
Muqtada’s nemesis, ISCI – is understandable but shortsighted. The Sadrist movement, its present difficulties aside, remains a deeply entrenched, popular mass movement of young, poor and disenfranchised Shiites. It still controls key areas of the capital, as well as several southern cities; even now, its principal strongholds are virtually unassailable. Despite intensified U.S. military operations and stepped up Iraqi involvement, it is fanciful to expect the Mahdi Army’s defeat. Instead, heightened pressure is likely to trigger both fierce Sadrist resistance in Baghdad and an escalating intra-Shiite civil war in the south.

Muqtada’s motivations aside, his decision opens the possibility of a more genuine and lasting transformation of the Sadrist movement. In the months following his announcement, he sought to rid it of its most unruly members, rebuild a more disciplined and focused militia and restore his own respectability, while promoting core demands – notably, protecting the nation’s sovereignty by opposing the occupation – through legitimate parliamentary means. The challenge is to seize the current opportunity, seek to transform Muqtada’s tactical adjustment into a longer-term strategic shift and encourage the Sadrists’ evolution toward a strictly non-violent political actor.....
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 7 Feb 08:

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373952)

As a political and military force, Iraq’s Shiite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Al-Sadr’s recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq. Against the backdrop of changing political alliances between Kurds and Sunnis, al-Sadr is transforming his movement into a new political phenomenon with implications for the country’s political structure and security dynamics. The consequences are also immense for Shiite Iraq, posing serious challenges to the conservative clerical establishment in Najaf.

Al-Sadr’s attempt to become an ayatollah follows his earlier call to suspend operations by his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (The Mahdi Army, or JaM) in the summer of 2007. Together with his decision to study in Najaf, this has marked a decisive new beginning in the organizational structure and leadership dynamics of the Mahdi militia. The decision to suspend JaM was made largely because of the outbreak of violence between Mahdi forces and the rival Badr Organization in Karbala in August 2007. The incident was a major embarrassment for al-Sadr, who had been seeking the support of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shiite Iraq’s grand cleric, and the conservative establishment in Tehran against the rebellious splinter groups within his own militia since 2005. The suspension, which came in August 2007, was a way to ensure his Shiite partners that he was willing to restructure his forces for the sake of Shiite unity at a time when US—or Israeli—forces seemed to be on the brink of starting a major military conflict with Iran.....

[tequila]

Sadr extends ceasefire (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7258469.stm)- BBC News, 22 Feb.


Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr has ordered the renewal of the ceasefire his powerful militia has been observing for the past six months.


He announced in August that his Mehdi Army would not attack rival armed groups or American forces in Iraq.

This was widely credited with reducing sectarian tensions and contributing to the recent overall drop in violence.

BBC Baghdad correspondent Jim Muir says the government and US military will clearly be relieved by the move.
US military officials have publicly recognised this contribution of the ceasefire as helping to stabilise parts of Iraq ...

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 25 Mar 08:

Moqtada al-Sadr’s Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi Ceasefire (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374057)

.....Without the central arbiter figure in Moqtada al-Sadr, the Jaysh al-Mahdi is likely to further fragment as deeper splits are created within the ranks. Al-Sadr’s absence leaves a power vacuum susceptible to being filled by informal players. According to an Iraqi intelligence report, Iran is one of the main beneficiaries of al-Sadr’s new religious ploy. The IRGC holds great influence within a large faction of the JaM. With al-Sadr’s temporary absence, Iran may be inclined to sway JaM commanders to opt out of the ceasefire to confront Awakening Council fighters and/or U.S. troops. As an insurance policy in gaining a greater share in JaM policy, Iran may decide to further infiltrate and seek influence over militia commanders—redefining local Shiite loyalties.

External factors have much influence on what becomes of JaM. One such variable is the Awakening movement, which has developed into a militia that arguably surpasses and threatens JaM supremacy. The rise of Awakening power has contributed to obvious splits within JaM. Targeted assassinations against Awakening members have been blamed on a growing number of splintered factions from the Shiite militia. According to intelligence corroborated by sources belonging to the Awakening councils, rogue elements of the JaM have been sponsored by the Iranian Qods Force in starting “armed activities” against Awakening members.

Another variable is the potential disintegration (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=4396)—rather than rise—of the Awakening councils. Awakening commanders are threatening to rejoin the Sunni insurgency and back al-Qaeda if Iraq’s central government does not integrate their fighters as part of the country’s security forces with permanent payrolls. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government is resisting that call, claiming that the movement is largely made up of yesterday’s terrorists. An increase in the number of Sunni insurgents would compel Shiite militiamen to break away from al-Sadr, simultaneously pressuring al-Sadr to lift the ceasefire—a prospect leading back to sectarianism.....

[William F. Owen]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7313894.stm

Seems like things are hotting up a bit.

[Ron Humphrey]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7313894.stm

Seems like things are hotting up a bit.

These things have to be addressed and it's good to see the Iraqi government trying to address it themselves. We'll just have to wait and see how it ends up.

[jcustis]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7313062.stm

That article link from the page posted earlier reads so much like an analysis of the goings-on in Muqdisho and the factions under Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and some sideline wranglings and deal-cutting from Osman Atto.

Different circumstances for sure, but the violence plays out so much the same. I don't suppose these guys will be wearing wedding dresses, kapoks, or run around with four AK-47 magazine taped together....:rolleyes:

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 1 Apr 08:

What Direction for the al-Mahdi Army after the Basra Offensive? (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374071)

....The problem with the Basra offensive is that it only adds complexity to the already fragmented state of Iraqi politics. First off, the military operation can intensify intra-Shiite conflicts, exacerbating the factionalism that has dominated Iraqi politics since the December 2005 elections. While the United States openly backs other Shiite militias like the Badr Corps and helps organize and arm Shiite tribal forces in the Awakening (sahwa) movement, the Sadrists will only be motivated to reinforce their military operations against perceived American threats. Since most of the Shiite militias are class-based military organizations, the SIIC-Maliki-backed military attacks on a Mahdi Army supported by the urban poor will only bolster class tensions in a country that is already fragmented by tribal divisions. The irony here is the way in which the expansion of factionalism and militia politics is occurring under the very surge strategy aimed at suppressing militia power in order to jump-start the political process, a key to achieving security in Iraq. Oddly, the renewed political process has only added to a conflict-ridden political situation that has poured fuel on the flames of militia rage in the southern regions.

Secondly, the Basra fighting may in fact enhance the military prestige of the Mahdi Army among the urban poor and certain tribal regions. As a nationalist, Moqtada can strategically use the Basra affair to bolster his leadership credentials and emerge stronger than before as an anti-occupation leader whose appeal may transcend beyond the Shiite community. But the most problematic feature of this military operation is how the recent events have in fact reduced the opportunity for the Sadrists to become a fully legitimate political movement with non-violent operational activities. The most problematic aspect of the recent fighting is the possible reversal of the five-year process that saw the gradual incorporation of Moqtada and his followers into mainstream Iraqi politics.....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 4 Aug 08: Sadr and the Mahdi Army: Evolution, Capabilities and a New Direction (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080804_jam.pdf)

....If Sadr is excluded from Iraq’s political process, feels the process is unfair, or chooses to mix politics with violence, the JAM could again become a major threat. Sadr’s future strength will also depend heavily on how well the Iraqi government build’s on the success of the Iraqi security forces to provide local security, government services, and economic opportunity – particularly for the massive number of Shi’ite young men who are unemployed or underemployed.

It is also important to note that Iraq’s current Shi’ite political parties gained power in elections with closed lists of candidates and won largely on the basis of a sectarian coalition. None have really had to campaign for office on the basis of merit or clear policies and goals. None have had to be judged on the ability of their basis to serve a given constituency, and none have had to participate in open local and provincial elections.

This makes it very difficult to judge the future balance of power between leading factions like Al-Da’wa, the SIIC, and the Sadrists if honest elections are held with open lists of candidates. It makes it equally hard to judge what will happen if elections are not held or are not felt to be fair. It is equally difficult to look beyond the prospect of local elections in 2008 and national elections in late 2009, and judge how effective Iraq’s current and future central; governments will be in serving Iraq’s Shi’ites. So far, the central government has been as ineffective in meeting Arab Shi’ite needs as those of Arab Sunnis.

The unknowns shaping the balance of power in terms of violence are matched by those shaping the balance of power in terms of religious influence, local and national politics, governance, local security and the rule of law, and economics. Intra-Shi’ite power struggles over all these issues are a certainty and will almost certainly play out over at least the need half decade. Whether this will lead to intra-Shi’ite violence, and how it will affect Iraq’s broader sectarian and ethnic tensions, is beyond any reasonable ability to predict. Only time can provide the answers.....
Complete 32-page paper at the link.

[Darksaga]

From the BBC


Mehdi Army to give peace a (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7548543.stm)chance?

Influential Iraqi cleric Moqtada Sadr is expected to use Friday prayers to tell members of his Mehdi Army militia that they should stop carrying weapons for the time being.

The BBC's Crispin Thorold in Baghdad assesses this latest move by the Shia leader.

The war is not yet over for the Mehdi Army, but the Shia militia appears to be giving peace a chance.

Moqtada Sadr's spokesman has told the BBC that until the future status of US troops in Iraq is decided, no member of the Mehdi Army may carry weapons on the streets.

[MSG Proctor]

This is a demonstration not of Moqtada al Sadr's strength, but of (a) the strength of Grand Ayatollah al Sistani, and (b) the power of religion in the contemporary Middle East.

Sadr grabs the headlines, but Sistani is the true wielder of influence. Sistani was supposed to issue a fatwa (probably already has) defining the duty of Iraqis to submit to the government's authority. He is against the 'occupation' but not by military means. Sadr's tack is to employ bellicose rhetoric and limited displays of force to keep the followers of the Sadr Trend (his father's movement, Moqtada does not have any serious influence as a cleric, only as a militia leader) fired up and supportive. Sistani as one of the four Grand Ayatollas comprising the Najaf Marja (supreme theological council) is far more influential and posits true Shiaism as 'quietist' not activist - viz a viz eschewing direct political involvment in state affairs.

While Sistani is against the presence of CF on Iraqi soil, he is also against clerics running the state (as in Iran) and against the wanton spillage of Iraqi blood. Sadr's stand down of JaM probably has more to do with his aspirations to become an Ayatollah (which requires submission to the current Marja) and less with political jockeying against the CF.

[Schmedlap]

What is the current policy regarding how we refer to Sadr's militia in public statements? I always asserted that we should refer to it as "Sadr's militia", since referring to it as the Mahdi Army/JAM seemed to lend it undue credibility as having legitimate religious justification, rather than being a bunch of well-meaning Shia misinformed and misled by Sadr and his fellow money-hungry thugs. But then I was told to get back into my box.