Kandahar Province: catch all thread [Archive]

Ken White

08-30-2007, 07:34 PM

CIDA claimed it gave aid to the hospital itself and was monitoring the hospital. Senlis visited and saw no CIDA aid in the hospital. Where does the sovereign Afghan government come into the picture here? They were not the ones CIDA supposedly gave the money to.

Aid is worse than useless if it doesn't reach the ground. If policymakers are told x dollars are being sent, the policymaker may make the false assumption that this money is doing good and no more is required. If x dollars are instead being stolen or never makes it to the ground level, the policymakers and taxpayers need to know this.

but I suspect you and I draw different lessons from that.

There is no way in most nations in the ME or many other parts of the world to insure more than incidentally that the aid money will in fact not be misappropriated. As that statement I just made has been true since 1947 and has been amply demonstrated again and again, I'm not sure that the taxpayers knowing this makes much difference and I am very sure that the policy makers knowing it has made absolutely no difference. We still keep trying to funnel money into such nations. Beyond an exercise in futility.

There is in every western nation a group of both governmental and non-governmental agencies who focus on obtaining and dispensing money in aid of something. Too often, they are merely self perpetuating bureaucracies who have done some good and a lot of harm. One merely has to spend time in a 'third world' country and watch these fools (not all but entirely too many) and their first world life style to come to the realization that too many (again, not all) are more focused on themselves than they are on the people they're supposed to be helping.

I've met a number of folks, gov and non-gov, who really cared and worked at it smartly. They did some good, sometimes under amazing handicaps. I've met more who did not do those things. They generally did more harm than good.

Most of the good programs aimed at getting the locals to help themselves and work their way out of the situation; most of the harmful efforts were grants and donations with few or no strings,

Idealism is responsible form much progress in the world. It is also responsible for much that is wrong and donated aid internally to the US or overseas has done as much harm as good. Altruism and generosity are great (seriously) but a level of simple logic is required in determining what is productive expenditure of funds and what is wasteful.

We are, as a nation, altruistic. However, we don't perform that simple logical exercise of determining whether an idealistic grant will just end up in a Swiss Bank account. Perhaps we should do that and better focus our efforts.

tequila

08-30-2007, 09:45 PM

Don't see much disagreement on this end.

One thing you and I agree on is that much aid infrastructure is basically self-perpetuating and often both donor nations and organizations have their own self-interest in mind rather than the interest of the populations being donated to. Much of our food aid, for instance, is in reality a form of subsidy for domestic agricultural producers that often has the effect of destroying markets for local agriculture.

A book I'll recommend again for the horrifically negative effects that foreign "aid" and "expertise" can inflict on Third World nations is The Economist's Tale (http://www.amazon.com/Economists-Tale-Consultant-Encounters-Hunger/dp/184277185X). Worth reading not just for the story but for the enormous difficulties involved in any aid situation.

Entropy

05-22-2008, 01:39 PM

A Violent Impediment:the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar province 2003-07 (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a793324547~db=all)

Abstract
Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.

davidbfpo

06-15-2008, 09:47 AM

A Taliban 'who dares wins' attack and hundreds of prisoners at liberty: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/2131235/How-Taliban-sprang-450-terrorists-from-Kandahar%27s-Sarposa-prison-in-Afghanistan.html

The last few paragraphs, from a Canadian need to be read:

Yesterday Canadians reacted with dismay at seeing their prison project in ruins.

"The message this attack sends is that the insurgents can act with relative impunity even into downtown Kandahar," said Colin Kenny, the head of the Canadian senate's committee on security and national defence, and a campaigner for more Nato troops to join the Afghan mission. The other message it sends is to the insurgent rank and file: if you get captured, we'll get you out."

davidbfpo

10-19-2008, 09:12 AM

An embedded UK reporter, with US NG unit; who fall victim to an IED on a road near Kandahar en route to Helmand: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3223963/Afghanistan-The-night-I-was-killed-in-action-by-a-Taliban-ambush.html

Accompanying video indicates how confusing post-explosion the attack was.

For an armchair observer a nunber of questions arise, notably why move at night? Nore, a moment of silence for the one KIA, 37yr NYState NG.

davidbfpo

Schmedlap

10-19-2008, 10:45 AM

When I read your question, I thought it was naive. Then I read the article and now I'm wondering the same thing. Here's why...

They had no night-vision goggles or flares, and some were standing in the beams from their vehicle headlights. Heavy machine-guns and grenade-launchers were hammering furiously in what the Americans call suppressive fire, to keep the enemy's heads down.
I remember the first and last time that I was the patrol leader of a mission and neglected to have my men bring night vision goggles. It was 8 years ago, in the Florida phase of Ranger School, and it was a well-earned reason for them to recycle me. I'd be curious to know 1) is this report accurate, regarding the lack of NVG's? and 2) if so, why didn't these guys have NVG's? I'm not sure if it matters whether their unit simply didn't have any or whether their patrol leaders didn't think they needed them - neither reason is good - but this strikes me as either bizarre or as sloppy reporting. How would a unit, 7 years into the Afghan conflict, not bring NVG's on a patrol whether it is day or night? On the other hand, if they were relying on their headlights, then I guess it is probable that they didn't have NVGs. I can think of no other sane reason to flip on white lights immediately after being ambushed.

I regularly check the Honor the Fallen (http://www.militarycity.com/valor/honor.html) webpage to see if any of my friends show up on the list. I just saw PFC Dimond (http://www.militarycity.com/valor/3773262.html)'s information posted yesterday. RIP.

Uboat509

10-19-2008, 02:32 PM

For an armchair observer a number of questions arise, notably why move at night?

I can't speak for Afghanistan or this unit but for our part we did our best not to let the enemy dictate things on the battlefield. It would not take the enemy long to figure out that they could move safely at night if we never did. Besides which, we are taught from basic on that the American Army owns the night and for the most part that is true.

As for the lack of NVGs, I can't say for sure but my bet is that they had them but they never got them out once the fighting started. NVGs can actually be a huge pain in the butt to use effectively in a fire fight and you still won't see as well as you can with white light. Add to that the fact that this unit did not appear to be all that well trained, what with standing in their own headlights and firing a lot of rounds, apparently at nothing, and you get a pretty good idea of why the reporter never saw any NVGs come out.

SFC W

Ken White

10-19-2008, 05:14 PM

You have to move at night -- if you don't, the bad guys will and one should strive at all costs to not let the other side control the tempo or be the initiator of action. Thus there is every reason to move at night and a strong incentive to avoid stasis.

There is, based on that article, little question in my mind that the unit involved was not well trained and did not perform well. American units in general are in fact trigger happy and we do fire far too promiscuously and easily -- penalty of having an overabundance of ammunition and the myth of 'suppressive fire' * .

Yes, NVG are a pain but they have great value, however, one can operate at night without NVGs, many forces have done that for thousands of years and those that did / do it well train to do so (even if you have NVG; what happens if you're out long enough to run out of batteries...), it's not difficult and one can see at night.

* As a MOH and two Navy Cross holder once said "...suppressive fire only suppresses if it is accurate fire..."

patmc

10-19-2008, 05:52 PM

My platoon provided convoy security in northern Iraq, and we usually travelled at night in an attempt to give the Iraqis better use of the roads during the day. Our convoys travelled with white lights, since it was pretty clear to the enemy which of the 20-25 veh convoy were US guntrucks, and which were TCN cargo trucks. It also let us spot IEDs. We always had NVG's in our vehicles though, but only used them during security halts when we cut our lights.

I find it hard to believe that any US unit in CENTCOM AO would not have NVG's. If they don't, their commander and S4 need to get to work. If they chose not to bring them, the leadership accepted too much risk. Its always better to have something and not use it. I even kept the NBC pro-suit in my bag in the trunk, knowing the .0001% chance I would need it, it was there.

davidbfpo

10-19-2008, 06:40 PM

Thank you all for the explanations for driving at night - as described here - and the other comments for my armchair understanding.

davidbfpo

ODB

10-20-2008, 12:01 AM

First let me say this is my opinion based on this side of the story, the author's perspective.

All the things that stand out in my mind come down to two things training and discipline or if you want to call it what it is "leadership". The first red flag in mind is the driver apologizing ahead of time for having never driven the vehicle before. There is absolutely no reason he should not have drive the vehicle before and the first time he does is in a combat situation, way to go leadership. Another red flag is soldiers standig in the head light beams. Absolutely nothing wrong with utilizing white lights but you'd never catch me standing in the head lights. Hey bad guys here I am, look at me. Absolutely many soldiers and units are horrendous when it comes to fire control and fire discipline. This goes back to many of my rants in other posts in how we do not train this enough. POSH training, safety training, and mandatory screenings take priority in todays Army, even during a time of war. I won't touch the NVD issue because too many uknowns and who knows if they weren't using them or if they didn't have them, or if some used them and some didn't.

Just a few things that stuck out to me.

Just somethings that struck me

Uboat509

10-20-2008, 01:49 AM

In fairness to the unit I don't know when this event took place but I do know that certain vehicles were hard to come by for the purposes of training, particularly for the ARNG. There just weren't enough of them to go around and most of those were in theater. A few were available for RA training but not many and a suspect that it would have been hard for those ARNG units to get them. That in no way excuses some of the other jackassery that apparently transpired.

Ken Said

Yes, NVG are a pain but they have great value, however, one can operate at night without NVGs, many forces have done that for thousands of years and those that did / do it well train to do so (even if you have NVG; what happens if you're out long enough to run out of batteries...), it's not difficult and one can see at night.

I did not mean to imply that NVGs were not valuable or that this unit did not need to be employing them. I was only offering a possible reason why they were apparently not using them.

SFC W

Ken White

10-20-2008, 03:09 AM

...I did not mean to imply that NVGs were not valuable or that this unit did not need to be employing them. I was only offering a possible reason why they were apparently not using them. SFC Wjust amplifying on what you and Schmedlap said and reminding some that one can also operate at night without NVG -- but you gotta train to do that...

Ken White

10-23-2008, 04:52 AM

An embedded UK reporter, with US NG unit; who fall victim to an IED on a road near Kandahar en route to Helmand: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3223963/Afghanistan-The-night-I-was-killed-in-action-by-a-Taliban-ambush.html
davidbfporaised by several at this LINK (http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/10/if-you-are-in-t.html). As usual, the first blush report is perhaps a bit overdone and as the dust settles, a bit more usually comes out. Without being there at the time, hard to say what's right...

Entropy

10-23-2008, 01:23 PM

Ken,

I read that piece over at Blackfive yesterday too. Even given their tendency to put a certain slant on things, I think they've raised a lot of legitimate questions about the article.

Ken White

10-23-2008, 02:46 PM

"Even given their tendency to put a certain slant on things."

Masterful!!! :cool:

Still, as you say, there are questions. Truth's probably somewhere in between -- it usually is... :wry:

William F. Owen

10-23-2008, 03:04 PM

I read that piece over at Blackfive yesterday too. Even given their tendency to put a certain slant on things, I think they've raised a lot of legitimate questions about the article.

The problem is while most of us can read the two versions, and get the drift of what actually happened, UK media is just about incapable of accurately reporting from the front line or even the rear. The need to "entertain" and sensationalise, is mind boggling. The levels of inaccuracy and invention are now at a serious level, and that leaves the general public, very poorly served.

Entropy

10-23-2008, 04:51 PM

The problem is while most of us can read the two versions, and get the drift of what actually happened, UK media is just about incapable of accurately reporting from the front line or even the rear. The need to "entertain" and sensationalise, is mind boggling. The levels of inaccuracy and invention are now at a serious level, and that leaves the general public, very poorly served.

I don't read the UK media all that frequently now, but when I do, I get the same impression you describe here. When I actually lived in the UK about ten years ago I remember it as you describe. Sadly, it seems nothing has changed.

davidbfpo

10-23-2008, 09:15 PM

Reporting from Afghanistan can be poor, often clearly dependent on press releases and guided tours. There have been several superb examples of reporting, such as the BBC TV hour long documentary on a Guards company with ANA troops (there was a post here) and the reports by Sean Langan (who was kidnapped earlier this year).

Even more remarkable, although made with massive help, was the multi-part documentary on a group of Royal Marines in training and then on active service.

I'd also mention the superb US reporting on isolated units in Eastern Afghanistan; grimly realistic and a couple of threads here.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen

10-24-2008, 08:07 AM

There have been several superb examples of reporting, such as the BBC TV hour long documentary on a Guards company with ANA troops (there was a post here) and the reports by Sean Langan (who was kidnapped earlier this year).

Even more remarkable, although made with massive help, was the multi-part documentary on a group of Royal Marines in training and then on active service.

I know some is good. However the overall standard is low basically because the media have no idea what they are looking at.

The RM doco was interesting but some of what was shown, was out of sync to the commentary added afterwards, and what went un-said was often of more interest, and failure to address these issues, could arguably mislead the public.

Ott

10-24-2008, 12:09 PM

I was the commander of the PMT that QRFed for CPL Diamonds team. I got there soon after the IED strike. Every one of them that I saw had NODs on. It was his first time driving outside the wire in a Cougar since it was a brand new vehicle in theater and they had spent the last week at KAF training on the vehicle. There was a couple headlights on, but one was so the medic could treat the men in the CCP and a civillian vehicle that had been abandoned next to the road. I haven't seen his video, but I imagine initially they were traveling with white light and didn't shut off their lights immeidately. They were in shock a bit since hundreds of pounds of explosives had just gone off around them and one of their men had been killed but their reactions were nonetheless completely proffessional. The reporter is a tremendous douche who tried to sensationalize the story. He also flat out lied in the article, as my medic made him a Priority C not an A, and a KIA would never be an A anyway.

davidbfpo

10-24-2008, 08:30 PM

Ott,

Thank you. first-hand professional knowledge puts the reporter to shame.

davidbfpo

Uboat509

10-29-2008, 01:52 AM

In hindsight I am withdrawing my earlier criticism. I was not there and one agenda driven article with a short video should not be the basis on which I make judgements. That is actually one of my rules and I broke it anyway. Bad SFC! :mad:

SFC W

davidbfpo

07-29-2009, 10:45 AM

Came across this concise explanation of the Canadian-Afghan role around Kandahar, with open source mapping overlay: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_05_11.html#006414

Note the article revolves around leaving a strongpoint - due to resupply problems, nothing by road and no helicopters.

davidbfpo

Cavguy

08-12-2009, 02:31 AM

Anyone else catch this? Thoughts?

About a year ago I advocated in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6064) (post 13) that we should worry about Kabul and Kandahar far more than villages like Wanat - that the enemy was politically mobilizing under our noses outside the FOB gate while we were distracted chasing Taliban in the hills. Now it will be harder if the Taliban effectively control one of Afghanistan's major cities.

From Abu M today:

http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/08/kandahar-falling.html

Is Kandahar Falling?
by Abu Muqawama

My friend Erica Gaston -- the pride of St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana -- is a lawyer and human rights researcher based in Kabul who has done some excellent work on civilian casualties. Here, in the Huffington Post, she gives me a nice shout-out before asking the kind of question that keeps me up at night:

Has Kandahar already fallen?

• Taliban intimidation has virtually curtailed any sense of normal life in Kandahar. Open support for the government, much less international forces, is an invitation for a night letter or worse. Government officials, teachers, and aid workers (those left) are regularly killed, assaulted, or otherwise harassed. Many of the pro-government clergy in Kandahar have already been assassinated or forced to go into hiding because of threats in the last few years. Girls cannot go to school without fear of attacks, the most notable being an acid attack on 15 girls going to school.

• After years of extreme security threats, frequent incidents of air strikes and nighttime raids, high government corruption and graft, and a dearth of government protection or services, the majority of the population, if not ideologically pro-Taliban, are against the international military presence and the Afghan government (at least in its current iteration).

• The Afghan government and the international community have virtually ceased to operate in any meaningful capacity in Kandahar due to extreme security threats. Afghan government officials do not move at all, except under tight security and in a limited security corridor. Attacks on Afghan National Police are routine - a friend who had just returned from Kandahar recently showed me a picture of an ANP officer with an ax to the back of the head.

• Most humanitarian workers and journalists have simply pulled out of Kandahar because they cannot operate under the intense security restrictions. Those who remain are prisoners to their compounds. The incidents that have happened when they do leave their compounds are chilling. A brave researcher, Paula Loyd, was doused in cooking oil and set on fire when she ventured out of her compound last year.

Ken White

08-12-2009, 03:17 AM

of years. It's been covered pretty well in the Canadian papers and on web sites there. Since it was in Canada's AO and as the US media had poor to no coverage in Afghanistan, it just fell of the radar here unless you ranged out a bit. I check most English language papers around the world instead of paying much attention to our frivolous excuses for news so the fact that Kandahar is still a problem is no surprise.

There's also the fact that Kandahar -- the province as opposed to Kandahar city -- is the Al Anbar of Afghanistan and the city is the Fallujah and Ar Ranadi combined. It's always been the problem child. As it was the initial Taliban stronghold obviously they're pretty well embedded in the region. I suspect Canada was asked to take over there not because it was a hotbed but to try a different approach. The TF they relieved from the 82d kept a lid on it but cleanup was not directed so did not occur. The Canadians did a great job but you can only do so much in an area only slightly smaller than West Virginia with one lonely little under resourced Battalion Combat Team -- even those as good as the Canadians are and with the other elements (all fairly small and mostly specialized or base security) working the area.

I suspect that your desire to cover the cities will be what we do. I also suspect that Jahangir and the boys will just go to the Hills for a bit. They will lose an urban battle; in the hills -- maybe, maybe not...

I suspect they know that.

Ken White

08-12-2009, 05:39 AM

at the LINK (http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/us-afstan-and-kandahar-whos-really-in.html).

rbn422

08-12-2009, 05:54 AM

Now that's a disquieting question...

Kandahar is getting a lot of attention in the press and blogosphere at the moment. In light of everything I've read in the last several days about the situation in the south, the situation seems fragile but not lost. I'm wondering if the sky has really started falling or if the reporting is just catching up with the situation there? I suspect that latter is the case. Either way, the challenge facing ISAF is monumental.

PS.- the Afghan Strategy Dialogue posts and comments on AM the last several days are fascinating reading for the diversity of opinions and personal experiences. (Added link to help: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama )

goesh

08-12-2009, 01:50 PM

I would integrate SFs types into the humanitarian/social service outreach components, the proverbial armed peace corps. Professionals in civilian attire, essentially turf guards, high risk, but the Taliban would be forced to escalate their opposition once services were flowing and ground was being gained - they couldnt bully and intimidate very easily when a wolf answers the door at the sheep's house - escalation on their part brings in rapid response teams capable of inflicting causalties and major disruption - a few may choose the hills over the easy duty of intimidating social workers - opinion only

Entropy

08-12-2009, 03:15 PM

I read that piece on Abu M's place and it had me scratching my head. I don't remember Kandahar being much different when I was there in 2005 and, IIRC, in 2007 the Taliban made a concerted effort to try to "take" the city through a variety of means. It's never wholly been under Taliban control nor has it ever been wholly secure - security has ebbed and flowed and changed with the times. This is to be expected since much of the Taliban's senior leadership come from the Kandahar area.

It appears to me many people now looking at Afghanistan were focused on Iraq 2004-2008 and so some events in A-stan seem "new" when, in reality, it's not new at all - Abu M among them. Things are certainly worse in Afghanistan, but it's more a matter of degree IMO.

Personally, I'm skeptical of a "secure the cities" strategy, which is something David Killcullen advocated a few months ago. We've basically held the cities for eight years and that hasn't worked out too well. If, as it appears, we going to fully "operationalize" a COIN strategy, then our focus, IMO, needs to be on the provincial and district centers along with villages on key terrain, and expand out from there.

Danny

08-12-2009, 03:23 PM

The reporting is just catching up with the situation. This is not new, nor is it news. Kandahar is troublesome. The answer is not to redeploy troops to Kandahar from the villages. The answer is another RCT in the Kandahar AO.

Securring the cities is what the Russians did. The roads were controlled by Taliban, logistics was a problem, and the Taliban were left unmolested in the countryside to recruit, train, and raise largesse for their effort. The cities became a prison for the Russians.

The Russians failed, and so will we if we attempt to secure the cities to the detriment of the villages and countryside.

And, um ... we need more troops. Or have I already said this a thousand times?

Danny

08-12-2009, 03:40 PM

Where do we get these troops, you might ask? Easy.

We stop the stupid and wasteful MEUs, which are nothing but a chance for a Battalion of Marine infantry to get drunk in yet another port city every week, and we send that Battalion to Kandahar along with some support, maybe a Marine Air-Ground Task force and support along with some Army intel. Presto! A RCT (or almost so)! And for probably less money that it would have taken to send them on a MEU.

I make absolutely NO apologies for insulting the practice of MEUs or the highly wasteful practice of sitting a Battalion of Marine infantry aboard an Amphibious Assault Dock for nine months. If we ever actually have a national policy where we intend to use "ready reserve" or "forces in readiness," then we can revisit this. For the time being, it's just a waste.

This practice must stop in order to properly man the campaigns.

Copperhead

08-12-2009, 04:40 PM

Not that you'd know it because apparently the entire US media is focused on USMC operations in Helmand, but the Army's 5/2 Stryker BCT has arrived and is already conducting operations in Kandahar. But you have to google it and/or check the Canadian newspapers to read about it.

davidbfpo

12-15-2009, 09:03 AM

Linked here from SWJ Blog as they are both valuable to this topic:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/arghandab-and-the-battle-for-k/#c006057 and earlier http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9154

Steve the Planner

12-16-2009, 02:34 AM

Forgive the historical analogy, but the Rulers of Qandahar alwys seemed to control the main fild of things down to Quetta and across to the Helmand.

I keep looking at a decentralized Afghan structure as nothing new, but the traditional Mayor (read Ruler) of Kabul, Mayor of Herat, Mayor of Qandahar thing.

Now,what does it mean to "control Kandahar? Take and control the city itself 24/7? A control line around the city, or a wall like Samarra?

My understanding was that there are many well-established neighborhoods, each with their own power structures. Do you engage enough of them, or, like the Brits in Baghdad in the old days, just hold enough neighborhoods to protect government and the polo club?

Does the city matter in an absolute sense, or is it just controlling the region, or precluding/limiting bad guys?

What's it worth? (Everything? Nothing?)

Steve

Pete

12-23-2009, 12:39 AM

From an Army Times article on 1/17th IN, a Stryker unit deployed in Afghanistan:

Battle has been joined in the valley because of its proximity to Kandahar city, a rich prize two miles to the east across a razor-backed ridgeline. Until this summer, insurgent control of the valley was unchallenged. Then 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, moved in, and the fight was on.

The vicious struggle in and around the Arghandab since the battalion’s arrival has killed 21 1/17 soldiers and more than 50 insurgents, led to a popular company commander’s controversial replacement and raised questions about the best role for Stryker units in Afghanistan.

It has also caused the soldiers at the tip of the spear that the United States hurled into the Arghandab to accuse their battalion and brigade commanders of not following the guidance of senior coalition commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal to adopt a “population-centric” counterinsurgency approach. And now, reeling from the deaths of their comrades and the removal of their company commander, the troops have been ordered out of the Arghandab, a move they say feels like a defeat.

To read the entire article click on the link below;

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/12/army_afghanistan_mixed_signals_122109w/

davidbfpo

12-23-2009, 04:04 AM

Pete,

Excellent catch and I moved the post to this thread on Kandahar - partly as earlier reporting on the campaign by the Stryker unit(s) were here too.

Sad to read that the Stryker unit is being withdrawn, perhaps for good reasons I.e. highway protection, but it does appear to be "mowing the lawn" from this seat faraway.

Appalling to read that in such an important campaign and location there was so little intelligence that they used open source material.

Pete

12-23-2009, 04:12 AM

Thanks for moving it--it's more in context within this thread. By the way, a step-grandfather of mine was in the 17th London during the First World War. He was one of the six remaining members of the original battalion still in the unit when the war ended. After the war he moved to Australia and then to San Francisco.

jcustis

12-23-2009, 05:48 AM

When it comes to articles that he pens for the MilitaryTimes rags, I hate Sean Naylor's writing. He wrote a good book in Not a Good Day to Die, but there is just something out of context and missing in pieces like this. He wrote an equally poorly-written article about my old battalion in 2006, when portions of it rotated to the Anah-Rawah area to relieve a Stryker Brigade that had been re-tasked out of Al Anbar. He tried to make the units look like unprepared fools, and they were the furthest thing from it.

When 1/17 got to the Arghandab, the insurgents were lying in wait in the green zone, armed with homemade bombs similar to those that have killed thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This came as a shock to 1/17 commander Lt. Col. Jonathan Neumann, who hadn’t anticipated being drawn into a fight in such constrictive terrain, where the troops learned quickly that they needed to dismount from their Strykers and patrol on foot.

This is a terrible point...if they were optimized to perform in an urban Iraqi environment, the rules don't change much when you get into constrictive terrain as Naylor describes. And even if the battalion did not anticipate it, the battle was joined because they had found the enemy...plain and simple. That's not the time to ask for a tactical time out and say, "Uhhhh, excuse me mister insurgent, could you please refrain from attacking me while I try to work key leader engagement and focus on the population?"

It seems Naylor has tried to highlight an issue with the tactics employed, and I'll grant that there isn't enough in the article to go off of, to tell whether the CLEAR phase was working seamlessly, since there seems to be some beef about taking ground but not holding it. The larger question now seems to be whether getting to the left of boom would have happened faster with a focus on the population as opposed to counter-guerilla ops. Sadly, Naylor's lack of examples of the specific types of operations he thinks fit in each of those categories, shows that he doesn't really know what either are all about.

The perceived disconnect between Tunnell’s approach and McChrystal’s guidance has led to intense frustration in Charlie Company. One young soldier said all the squad leaders in his platoon “have done COIN fights before, and they’re pissed that we’re not doing COIN properly.”

Again, how is COIN "done properly"? It is so situationally dependent that the blurb above makes me a little sick to my stomach. The COIN fight they "did before" might mean nothing compared to the COIN fight they are in now, and it is time for folks to realize that you have to sense what is going on, adjust, and be very flexible. Going into these types of ops with an assumption that everything is going to be fine, based on previous experience, is a recipe for disaster. Not surprisingly, the window of heavy casualties resulting from IEDs ranged from July to October, very close to the "first 100 days" window when things are always most dangerous.

But lower down the rank structure, 1/17 soldiers said that a major factor behind the battalion’s difficulties in the Arghandab was the failure of their battalion and brigade commanders to adhere to McChrystal’s published counterinsurgency guidance, which states up front: “Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will not be won by destroying the enemy.”

The thrust of that quote, and what it means to me, is that you cannot remain focused on the enemy the entire time and ignore the people and the support base they can be swayed or coerced to provide. But Chrissakes, when the enemy presents himself, it is time to engage him and start the FINISH phase, or have we forgotten that FIND-FIX-FINISH is a subset of CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD?

As the casualties from IEDs began to rise, so did the troops’ anger with what they viewed as their leaders’ failure to prepare them for the threat.

“The extent of the IED threat was a surprise to us all,” Kassulke said. “The enemy we faced in the Arghandab adapted to our TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures] faster and more effectively than anyone expected.”

I'm sorry, did I just read what I think I read? From my armchair corner, this is a flaky quotation. Not prepared? I don't understand what is so challenging about countering the IED threat. Any troop who has been through a PTP workup the past five years (for either AO), has the basic level of understanding to operate in that IED environment, as far as I'm concerned. There is a lot more to defeating the cycle and getting to the left of boom, however, and if that was the issue, I could understand. This article presents none of those issues.

Sadly, Naylor hits a foul ball with this piece.

I suppose that this article opens this thread up to the question of what primary conditions are required to focus on a population-centric COIN effort. From this thin bit of reporting, did any of those conditions exist if the enemy still had the freedom of maneuver to mass and conduct larger-scale operations? Finally, what role do kinetic operations play in trying to gain access to the population? Naylor makes it sound that commanders like Kassulke wanted to focus on engagement in spite of the fact that the enemy was staring them right in the face. It doesn't have to be a all-or-nothing proposition and never has been. Perhaps this speaks to what Col Gentile was trying to say after all.

BruceR

12-23-2009, 08:40 PM

@JCustis:

A couple issues with what you wrote:

Some would argue Arghandab, which was very low-violence and pro-government compared to the rest of the South until this summer, didn't require a "Clear" phase this year, so much as a reinforcing of the "Hold" already in place by ANSF supported by ISAF. Obviously the commander of 1/17 disagreed, and probably for excellent reasons; I'm merely pointing out your and his assumption that a Clear was necessary, which some of Naylor's sources appear to see as the primary point of contention here.

I'm also not sure that when the enemy "presents himself" entirely in the form of IED attacks on you whenever you're in restrictive terrain, that there's really anything to "Find-Fix-Finish" in the traditional sense without a heavy application of Pop-centric COIN at the same time. Obviously the Finding in that case will rely heavily on gaining local support, which, again, some of Naylor's sources seem to see as the problem.

Two of the big issues the 1/17 CO was probably dealing with that Naylor doesn't mention were the tangle of competing land claims in Arghandab, which makes it even more difficult to procure property for basing than usual in Afghanistan, combined with an unwillingness to take over public property like schools and district centres for that purpose and undermine an area where development and local governance was at least until recently working, after a fashion. They also would have had very few ANSF to work with. Given those limitations, which would have effectively prevented the rapid creation of the kind of dismounted patrol bases and security stations this kind of dense agricultural area needs (it really is mostly non-permissive to LAV-sized vehicles) and the distance of the main base (Frontenac) from the populated area, the battalion commander may not have seen any realistic alternative to sweep-and-pull-back ops in the early months. Sometimes grass-mowing may seem like all you've got.

That said, the fact that the enemy will occasionally "mass into platoons" (largely in my experience to overrun isolated ANP stations at night) but never uses direct fire against ISAF (and even then only when they're dismounted), only that steady rain of IEDs, which is their TTP throughout the Zhari-Arghandab area, doesn't necessarily equate to them having sufficient "freedom of maneuver to mass and conduct larger-scale operations" for COIN to be set aside entirely, either.

The coalition's fear in Arghandab, with a working economy, a successful development effort, and a neutral or positively inclined population, was that it would turn into Zhari next door, where repeated sweeps and kinetic activities against suspected IED layers rapidly shut down the basis of that economy through depopulation and property damage and undermining of local governance, making it even more fertile as an insurgent hiding and recruiting location, as well as negatively impacting Kandahar City itself with a new influx of unemployed and angry young men. Any overly aggressive series of ISAF "counter-guerilla" clear ops in theory could come with those kinds of unintended side effects in this terrain.

Pete

12-24-2009, 04:39 AM

Here's to you, soldiers of the 1-17 in Afghanistan

By David Ignatius
Washington Post
Thursday, December 24, 2009; A15

BASE FRONTENAC, AFGHANISTAN--It's a week before Christmas Eve, and the chow hall of this forward operating base north of Kandahar is decorated with twinkling blue and white lights for the holidays. There are posters of Santa and a snowman on the walls, and in the center of the room there's a big sign that exhorts the soldiers: "Enjoy Meal." Christmas will be "a day to take your boots off" for the 800 members of the Army's 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment based here, says their commander, Lt. Col. Jonathan Neumann. It also will be a day to remember the 21 comrades who have been killed since the battalion arrived in August, and the 41 who have been seriously wounded.

The 1-17 has the grim distinction of having lost more soldiers in action than any other battalion in the Army since Sept. 11, 2001. The men's names are recorded on a concrete slab in the center of the compound, bearing the legend "Fallen But Not Forgotten."

"After a catastrophic incident, you come together and take care of your brothers," says Neumann. "Then you resolve to get back to the mission at hand." Christmas will be a moment to relax -- a day of sports, award ceremonies and a special meal. But because of combat rotation, the battalion will have to celebrate it over a series of days.

I traveled here with Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was making a holiday visit to the war zone. Amid the twinkling lights of the mess hall, he addressed the soldiers of the 1-17, their automatic rifles stowed under the meal tables.

"I know you've been in a very tough fight, and I'm aware of those you've lost," Mullen told the troops, assuring them: "We have the right strategy." He met afterward with a small group from units that had been especially hard hit.

This holiday season is a good time to remember these faraway soldiers. The debate over Afghanistan has provoked strong feelings, pro and con. But the country seems united in its appreciation for a military that has been suffering the stresses of war, without complaint, for the past eight years.

Soldiers are usually stoics. But the members of this battalion seem highly motivated. The sergeant of a platoon that lost nine men in two weeks asked to reenlist after a memorial service for his buddies. On the day Mullen visited here, the admiral reenlisted 10 soldiers.

The base lies in a dusty plain surrounded by jagged peaks. Nearby is the Arghandab River, which feeds a lush area of orchards and mud-walled agricultural plots that the soldiers call "the green zone." That's where the Taliban fighters hide and where the battalion has fought some of its toughest battles.

When the battalion arrived on Aug. 7, about 150 Taliban fighters were well entrenched. Neumann says his soldiers had to "fight our way to the people." By early November, the situation had begun to change. The Taliban's cadres had been killed or had scattered, their supply caches had been destroyed -- and the local population began providing intelligence.

That's the model the Obama administration hopes will be replicated in other population centers as the United States sends in 30,000 more soldiers. One thing that's painfully clear when you visit this base is that success won't come cheap. The new strategy will mean more battles, more targets for roadside bombs, and more dead and wounded American soldiers.

The White House debate over Afghanistan took place as the battalion was suffering its worst casualties. The policy-wrangling directly affected these troops, but it became "white noise," says their commander. "We knew there was a debate in Washington, but there's always a debate." The 17th Infantry has a history of tough fights. Its nickname, the "Buffaloes," dates back to the Korean War, where it fought in the battle of Pork Chop Hill, a bloody push to win territory that arguably had little strategic value. But even that conflict was easier to measure than the one the Buffaloes are fighting now. "Here, it's one small incident at a time," says Neumann.

There's a scraggly Christmas tree atop one of the prefabricated trailers where the soldiers of the 1-17 bunk when they're not out on missions. It's not a place any of us would want to spend the holidays, but in conversations with soldiers here, I didn't hear any complaints.

In this season of peace, here's a holiday toast to people everywhere who don't have that blessing today.

*****

Today SWJ Blog has a commentary piece from Wired which discusses the recent article on the 1/17th in Army Times. Click on the link to read it.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/12/can-us-troops-run-mcchrystals-soft-power-playbook

MikeF

12-24-2009, 04:52 AM

I was a member of 5-73 CAV, 3BCT, 82nd (ABN). Out of some 450 paratroopers, we had 24 KIA and 100 WIA in the cauldron of Diyala Province during the Surge.

Here's to you, soldiers of the 1-17 in Afghanistan

By David Ignatius
Washington Post
Thursday, December 24, 2009; A15

BASE FRONTENAC, AFGHANISTAN--It's a week before Christmas Eve, and the chow hall of this forward operating base north of Kandahar is decorated with twinkling blue and white lights for the holidays. There are posters of Santa and a snowman on the walls, and in the center of the room there's a big sign that exhorts the soldiers: "Enjoy Meal." Christmas will be "a day to take your boots off" for the 800 members of the Army's 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment based here, says their commander, Lt. Col. Jonathan Neumann. It also will be a day to remember the 21 comrades who have been killed since the battalion arrived in August, and the 41 who have been seriously wounded.

The 1-17 has the grim distinction of having lost more soldiers in action than any other battalion in the Army since Sept. 11, 2001. The men's names are recorded on a concrete slab in the center of the compound, bearing the legend "Fallen But Not Forgotten."

"After a catastrophic incident, you come together and take care of your brothers," says Neumann. "Then you resolve to get back to the mission at hand." Christmas will be a moment to relax -- a day of sports, award ceremonies and a special meal. But because of combat rotation, the battalion will have to celebrate it over a series of days.

I traveled here with Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was making a holiday visit to the war zone. Amid the twinkling lights of the mess hall, he addressed the soldiers of the 1-17, their automatic rifles stowed under the meal tables.

"I know you've been in a very tough fight, and I'm aware of those you've lost," Mullen told the troops, assuring them: "We have the right strategy." He met afterward with a small group from units that had been especially hard hit.

This holiday season is a good time to remember these faraway soldiers. The debate over Afghanistan has provoked strong feelings, pro and con. But the country seems united in its appreciation for a military that has been suffering the stresses of war, without complaint, for the past eight years.

Soldiers are usually stoics. But the members of this battalion seem highly motivated. The sergeant of a platoon that lost nine men in two weeks asked to reenlist after a memorial service for his buddies. On the day Mullen visited here, the admiral reenlisted 10 soldiers.

The base lies in a dusty plain surrounded by jagged peaks. Nearby is the Arghandab River, which feeds a lush area of orchards and mud-walled agricultural plots that the soldiers call "the green zone." That's where the Taliban fighters hide and where the battalion has fought some of its toughest battles.

When the battalion arrived on Aug. 7, about 150 Taliban fighters were well entrenched. Neumann says his soldiers had to "fight our way to the people." By early November, the situation had begun to change. The Taliban's cadres had been killed or had scattered, their supply caches had been destroyed -- and the local population began providing intelligence.

That's the model the Obama administration hopes will be replicated in other population centers as the United States sends in 30,000 more soldiers. One thing that's painfully clear when you visit this base is that success won't come cheap. The new strategy will mean more battles, more targets for roadside bombs, and more dead and wounded American soldiers.

The White House debate over Afghanistan took place as the battalion was suffering its worst casualties. The policy-wrangling directly affected these troops, but it became "white noise," says their commander. "We knew there was a debate in Washington, but there's always a debate." The 17th Infantry has a history of tough fights. Its nickname, the "Buffaloes," dates back to the Korean War, where it fought in the battle of Pork Chop Hill, a bloody push to win territory that arguably had little strategic value. But even that conflict was easier to measure than the one the Buffaloes are fighting now. "Here, it's one small incident at a time," says Neumann.

There's a scraggly Christmas tree atop one of the prefabricated trailers where the soldiers of the 1-17 bunk when they're not out on missions. It's not a place any of us would want to spend the holidays, but in conversations with soldiers here, I didn't hear any complaints.

In this season of peace, here's a holiday toast to people everywhere who don't have that blessing today.

*****

Today SWJ Blog has a commentary piece from Wired which discusses the recent article on the 1/17th in Army Times. Click on the link to read it.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/12/can-us-troops-run-mcchrystals-soft-power-playbook

Pete

12-24-2009, 05:40 AM

You may be right about the casualty figures. My late dad spent 30 years at the Washington Post from 1956 to 1986 and one of his cardinal rules was to avoid using superlatives in news stories because someone out there will prove you to be wrong. He was a combat veteran in World War II and was also one of the earliest staff members of Stars and Stripes-Pacific in Japan in 1945. Not all of the ad hominem remarks these days about journalists and the MSM are true.

jcustis

12-24-2009, 05:55 AM

I'm also not sure that when the enemy "presents himself" entirely in the form of IED attacks on you whenever you're in restrictive terrain, that there's really anything to "Find-Fix-Finish" in the traditional sense without a heavy application of Pop-centric COIN at the same time. Obviously the Finding in that case will rely heavily on gaining local support, which, again, some of Naylor's sources seem to see as the problem.

Agreed, and perhaps all the more reason to stay afield, instead of commuting to work along a constrictive route.

Given those limitations, which would have effectively prevented the rapid creation of the kind of dismounted patrol bases and security stations this kind of dense agricultural area needs (it really is mostly non-permissive to LAV-sized vehicles)

Since I am in the USMC's LAV community I'm curious what your assessment of restrictive is, as it relates to the platform. As for establishing patrol bases, they already have them in the form of the vehicles themselves. Employ some shallow entrenchment at night in a coil and wholla!...you've got the basic force protection you need.

Any overly aggressive series of ISAF "counter-guerilla" clear ops in theory could come with those kinds of unintended side effects in this terrain.

I agree wholeheartedly, but when a 1,500 pound HME IED is employed:

That said, the fact that the enemy will occasionally "mass into platoons" (largely in my experience to overrun isolated ANP stations at night) but never uses direct fire against ISAF (and even then only when they're dismounted), only that steady rain of IEDs, which is their TTP throughout the Zhari-Arghandab area, doesn't necessarily equate to them having sufficient "freedom of maneuver to mass and conduct larger-scale operations" for COIN to be set aside entirely, either.

I'd call that a large-scale operation. It might not be a platoon-sized element maneuvering around at will, but I find it a large-scale op nonetheless.

It looks as though you drifted in to the SWC as a result of a Google string hit when researching material for your blog. That's great, but please find the introduction thread and post a little bit more about yourself.

Finally, you appear to have a knowledge of LAVs that can assist with my understanding of employment constraints in AFG (personally, I don't believe there are any real constraints save deep mud :D), and I invite you to an exchange of PMs to learn more about what you know. I'm also impressed if you in fact generated a mod for CC2. Thumbs up for that!

Pol-Mil FSO

12-24-2009, 09:50 AM

@Maj Custis:

In response to your last post:

I'll leave it to Bruce Rolston to respond to your request for bio information, but I want to say that I consider him to be the most authoritative source for information on Kandahar as well as one of the best sources of information on working with the Afghan National Army. In my opinion he and Joshua Foust (on the RC-East AOR) are the gold standard in the blogosphere for Afghanistan issues.

Arghandab District is restrictive in terms of vehicle access because of the nature of the road network. Apart from one primary north-south paved road, many of the roads have width and load bearing restrictions that prevent use by large and heavy military vehicles. The valley has an extensive canal network with most of the bridges being footbridges that will not take any kind of motor vehicle other than a motorcycle. Dismounted foot patrols are the only way to access many zones in the valley. An example of the problems associated with vehicle use in the Arghandab - in June 2008 7th SFG lost three members who drowned when the road surface gave way and pitched a RG-31 MRAP upside down into a canal.

Bruce is exactly on the mark about land use issues inhibiting establishment of combat outposts or small patrol bases. In addition, there is strong local resistance to having a patrol base as a neighbor because of the belief that such bases are IED and RPG magnets, a sentiment that I heard expressed at several shuras in the Arghandab District in 2007-2008. Finally, patrol bases should involve co-location with ANSF personnel, a requirement that may rule out your field-expedient patrol bases of LAVs with concertina perimeters.

As for the Naylor article, I suspect that the situation is more complicated than presented in this piece, but I also wonder if there is too much of an enemy-centric focus. The Alokozai in the Arghandab District did have an intelligence net and a militia force that seemed to be somewhat effective in 2006-2007, at least to the point that the Taliban was not actively challenging control of the district. Maybe the priority should be placed on strengthening the Alokozai and assisting them in regenerating these capabilities?

The shift of the Stryker Brigade to securing Highway One may be a better fit for a vehicle-heavy unit but it also illustrates one of the basic dilemmas in Afghanistan – the fact that the Taliban use of IEDs has forced ISAF to devote significant resources, in both maneuver elements and intelligence assets, to the counter-IED operation to keep the MSRs open. As the Taliban likely intended, these are resources that cannot be used to contest Taliban efforts to gain control over the population.

jcustis

12-25-2009, 03:45 AM

As for the Naylor article, I suspect that the situation is more complicated than presented in this piece, but I also wonder if there is too much of an enemy-centric focus. The Alokozai in the Arghandab District did have an intelligence net and a militia force that seemed to be somewhat effective in 2006-2007, at least to the point that the Taliban was not actively challenging control of the district. Maybe the priority should be placed on strengthening the Alokozai and assisting them in regenerating these capabilities?

They emphasis on Alokozai structures may have the most merit indeed. I wonder at the same time though, if coalition forces might be forced nonetheless to adopt enemy-centric approaches in the wake of successful population-centric approaches. If we subscribe to the Sexton model of how the Taliban take over a village (yup, that piece has gained a ton of traction with me :D), I think we could expect to see the Taliban exert effort to regain control if the district/area in question is truly worth it.

This makes me wonder what made Arghandab District worth it to the Taliban; to the point that they employed an IED campaign on that scale to defend their interests.

In addition, there is strong local resistance to having a patrol base as a neighbor because of the belief that such bases are IED and RPG magnets, a sentiment that I heard expressed at several shuras in the Arghandab District in 2007-2008.

An excellent IO target if I ever read of one. Siting patrol bases, either temporary or HESCO-based, is potentially critical enough that we need to get past those reservations somehow.

davidbfpo

12-30-2009, 07:55 PM

Hat Tip to Pol-Mil FSO,

Bruce who posted (No.17)is a Canadian OMLT leader who has just been in Kandahar Province, his blogsite is:http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/ which I have just started reading through.

He links to an open source account of the fighting by Carl Fosberg: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/talibans-campaign-kandahar the summary is IMHO faraway a good, easy read.

There is also a commentary on Bruce's blogsite on the 'Army Times' article recently and I noted this remark on the Arghandab valley:
trying to keep on side a population that until recently was strongly pro-government.A point that was missing from the 'Army Times' article IIRC.

davidbfpo

01-01-2010, 02:55 AM

Update, no a response to the 'Army Times' article on the Stryker brigade operations: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/one-week-with-task-force-buffa/ added here for continuity.

Icepack6

01-04-2010, 10:45 PM

Recieved the following through forwarded email; cannot attest to its veracity:

If the generals training the Afghan Army and Police can train them well enough to occupy these villages cleared by our warriors things will improve in Afghanistan. We all need a police force of some size whether it be in Afghanistan or in our own home town. When our warriors depart to clean up another village or area, the one just left must be occupied by friendlies with guns; otherwise the Talaban will be back. Training the Afghan Army and Police will take a lot longer than one might surmise. Patience is needed. That does not seem to abound in this society.

From an in-country Company Commander of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines.

I finally have a minute to sit down and write a letter concerning the past few weeks here in Now Zad. I wanted to make sure that I got the word out to everyone, so please send this out to friends and family that I may have missed on the distro list. I first want to say how incredibly proud of my boys I am. These Marines have been amazing and continue to be amazing. Between them and the amazing support staff that we have in 3/4 that allows us to do quite literally whatever we want to the Taliban, this has almost been an easy operation.

Here are the up sides:
1) Not a single Marine was killed or seriously wounded during this operation.
2) We have taken more ground, run off more Taliban, liberated more villages, and seized more weapons and Home Made Explosives than has ever happened in Now Zad. One of the caches of HME that we blew up was over 1100 lbs of HME (for a reference, that's over 16 "Mine-Proof" vehicles completely destroyed) and it was the largest find in Helmand Province. Ever.
3) We air inserted two companies, behind enemy lines, while my company went straight up the gut of the enemy's defense on the ground. The enemy was so terrified that he abandoned his stockpiles and ran away to where he thought he was safe. Some of them ran right into the arms of the British Battalion to our East, some of them we have hunted down since they ran. More importantly, we have begun to HOLD the ground by immediately building coalition positions in strategic locations all over the valley and partnering with the local Police and Army units. Let's not forget, the infantry is a TERRAIN based organization. We don't have to kill people in order to do our job, only if those people don't want us on that specific piece of dirt and wants to come get a taste.
4) We aggressively sought out and crushed a Murder and Intimidation racket that was going on in our AO. (M&I campaigns are used when the enemy has no other tactic but overwhelming fear to instill on the local population. The 'night letters' that were being delivered said things like:
"If you accept help from Coalition Forces we will kill your children one by one..." Except that Marines got to the letter writers first. Whammy.
5) We have re-opened a once deserted town to the people and have begun to pay them to clean it up. Quick cash infusion + Heavy labor for young men + promise of more work = no young guys re-enlisting in the Taliban. One of the key components of this plan was to instantly follow up with a Civil Affairs Group that would handle local national problems that weren't related
to the Taliban (food, shelter, work, etc...)
6) We have begun Medical Programs for the locals with what supplies we have. Those supplies are limited, but they are able to cover things like burns, and kids stepping on mines (yes, we MedEvac them just like we would a Marine), and skin rashes, and even an infant with pneumonia who is just fine, now.
7) Our engineers breached a mine-field that had completely frozen other forces. Our Danish friends brought some tanks to help us out and they were able to break up one or two ambushes for us. Nothing is cooler than getting ambushed and having tanks with you to respond. Nothing
8) Your Marines stayed on point, in the freezing cold weather, with the rain soaking them to the bone, to hunt down the Taliban who had been abusing, killing, and stealing from the people of the Now Zad Valley.
9) We are bringing back government into Now Zad, so people have an alternative than the Taliban to settle their legal disputes, and have someone to hold accountable for a lack of medical coverage, and to go to with their grievances about farming and commerce and security. They won't NEED us to hold them up any longer.

If all of this sounds like hubris, maybe it is. But I'm so proud of my Company and my Battalion for the planning and the execution and the follow through that they have done. Be proud of your Marines, they did good work in December. Merry Christmas to everyone. Much Love to all, let your friends know, we're winning and it feels good.

slapout9

01-05-2010, 12:16 AM

Icepak 6 you need to find more emails like that one;)

davidbfpo

03-25-2010, 03:02 PM

An open source provincial overview and added to a separate thread as the city of Kandahar maybe the next major target of the ISAF surge.

Link:http:http://www.nps.edu/programs/CCS/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Kandahar_Provincial_Overview_Jan09.pdf

The mapping of who is in control dates from January 2008 and I expect many who read this know it may have changed.

There is another, recent thread 'Wheels coming off the bus in Kandahar?', which refers mainly to the recent fighting: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8082 and at least five other, older threads on Kandahar.

Via http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/there is a Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan - Quarterly Report to Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 31, 2009, which alas has no up to date map and some interesting benchmark gaps: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r12_10/index.aspx?lang=en

There are some national maps on MG Flynn's presentation, up to December 2009, that give an overview, but not down to district level: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9578

Anyone else who knows of a more current provincial map or open source items please add them here.

davidbfpo

03-27-2010, 04:52 PM

NYT article from SWJ Roundup: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/asia/27kandahar.html?hp

Only 5 of 17 districts in the province are accessible for government officials. Four districts are completely under the control of the insurgents, according to Nader Nadery, deputy head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. Alas there is no map and the website has no apparent details.

davidbfpo

04-03-2010, 12:39 PM

Steve Coll's column on Kandahar and a certain local politician's future. Note he was accompanying Admiral Mullen on tour.

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/04/kandahar.html#comments

davidbfpo

04-09-2010, 07:30 PM

hat tip to al Sahwa for a short review of the campaign:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04/shifting-focus-to-kandahar.html

Ends with:
Ultimately, though, there will be no enduring success in Kandahar (or Afghanistan at all) until we're able to establish an effective and legitimate alternative to the Taliban's shadow government.

Sylvan

04-09-2010, 07:33 PM

hat tip to al Sahwa for a short review of the campaign:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04/shifting-focus-to-kandahar.html

Ends with:

AWK doesn't count?

davidbfpo

04-09-2010, 07:59 PM

Sylvan,

AWK does feature in the commentary, this is one part:
In essence, real power rests with just two families who have prospered under the presence of American forces in the past eight years. One of them is the family of President Hamid Karzai, who is represented here by his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who heads the provincial council. The other belongs to Gul Agha Shirzai, the former governor of Kandahar, and his brothers Bacha Shirzai and Razziq Shirzai, who have gotten lucrative security and construction deals with NATO forces. Residents and elders accuse the families of persecuting rivals and excluding all other tribes from access to power. Their domination has undercut any popular backing for the government or the foreign forces supporting them.

On my read AWK's role does feature.

Sylvan

04-09-2010, 08:06 PM

Sylvan,

AWK does feature in the commentary, this is one part:

On my read AWK's role does feature.

I spent 5 months in Kandahar City (not KAF).
Shirzai is the popular leader for most of KC. Karzai's powerbase was to the North. Our fortunes fell when Shirzai was removed as Governor from Kandahar and moved North.
This is not a shared power-broker deal. This was a muscle move to emplant Karzai's younger brother to take over predominance over Kandahar City. While there have been some pay-offs to avoid civil war, Karzai used his control over the Tajik ANA to ensure Shirzai knew his place.

As to my original comment, AWK doesn't count as either a legitimate or effective counter to the Taliban. Shirzai was. And that is, IMHO, why things went to crap in the South.

davidbfpo

04-09-2010, 08:15 PM

Thanks for that point. Local legitimacy in Afghanistan is IMHO a very different concept let alone practice when compared to our Western experience. More importantly you've been there and I sit faraway in an armchair watching.

Rex Brynen

04-26-2010, 04:34 PM

UN pulls some foreign staff from Kandahar (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/un-pulls-some-foreign-staff-from-kandahar/article1546879/)

United Nations withdraws half of its twenty foreign staff, orders local workers to stay home in wake of blasts

Sonia Verma
Kandahar — Globe and Mail Update
Published on Monday, Apr. 26, 2010 10:38AM EDT

The United Nations has withdrawn roughly half of its twenty foreign staff from Kandahar City and ordered its local Afghan workers to stay home, underscoring a growing sense of insecurity in this southern city.

The move came just a few hours after militants detonated three bombs in downtown Kandahar City Monday morning, killing two civilians and wounding two others.

“We’re re-evaluating the security situation and have pulled some of our staff to Kabul,” confirmed Susan Manuel, director of communications for the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

The decision was made based on a “combination of information and action,” she said. Ms. Manuel described the new measures as temporary but would not specify when staff would resume their postings.

Monday’s attacks signified the Taliban’s latest effort to show their strength in the city that is both their spiritual birthplace and the staging ground for a major NATO military offensive this summer.

As coalition troops ramp up operations ahead of a broad military surge meant to take decisive control of the area, Taliban insurgents have also stepped up attacks with a series of brazen assassinations and bombings.

Since April 12, at least 20 civilians have been killed in Kandahar City, including prominent Afghan politicians and civilians including children.

The attacks have become almost daily occurrences, rattling residents already deeply wary of the coming NATO operation, billed as the make-or-break battle of the war....

Sylvan

04-26-2010, 04:53 PM

Replace AWK with Sherzai.

Success and failure in Kanadahar rests with the Afghans themselves.
The ANSF is strong enough to do whatever is needed. What is lacking is a legitimate representative of both the Kabul govnermnent and the people of Kandahar.

MikeF

05-07-2010, 12:30 PM

Nato gambles on collaboration with Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7118538.ece)
Anthony Loyd, Kandahar
Times Online

Nato has taken one of the biggest gambles of its mission in Afghanistan by reluctantly deciding to collaborate with Ahmad Wali Karzai, the notorious power-broker of Kandahar — despite allegations that the half-brother of the President is involved in the drugs trade....

Senior coalition officers would prefer to see the back of Wali Karzai but they have come to the conclusion that their only option is to work with him. They are trying, in the words of one officer, to “remodel” a man accused of running a private fiefdom in the south.

“The plan is to incorporate him, to shape him. Unless you eliminate him, you have to [do this],” said a senior coalition official involved in planning what is viewed as this summer’s make-or-break military operation in Kandahar. “You can’t ignore him,” he added. “He’s the proverbial 800lb gorilla and he’s in the middle of a lot of rooms. He’s the mafia don, the family fixer, the troubleshooter

I suppose this has been a long time coming. This Karzai seems to be the main sphere of influence that bridges the underground world of A'stan. He knows everyone through family, trade, and relationships. From a military planning viewpoint, we tread lightly with these types of dudes waiting for the appropriate timing to properly shape. We did the same thing with Muqtada al Sadr and the Ayatolla Sistani.

Recently, I've wondered if waiting too long to talk is the wrong approach. I just watch HBO's new documetary Sergio (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I9UD7ZD7TJ0) based on Samantha Power's book "Sergio: One Man's Fight to Save the World (http://www.amazon.com/Sergio-Mans-Fight-Save-World/dp/0143117777/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1273235126&sr=8-1)."

Sergio Vieira de Mello was the head of the UN mission in Iraq until he was killed, but before that, he worked throughout conflict zones with great success in Cambodia and East Timor. He was fascinated with the intellectual mind of evil men, and his approach upon arriving in country was to go talk to everyone. He did not wait.

Perhaps, we could learn some lessons from the UN :wry:.

v/r

Mike

John T. Fishel

05-07-2010, 01:03 PM

MikeF

05-07-2010, 02:15 PM

Mike, from some really capable Brazilian diplomats.:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

PS, of the UN, I have always said that it is (1) less than the sum of its parts and (2) if it didn't exist we would vave to invent it.

True. Today, I'm sorting through Dr. Metz's two recent monographs (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=22) on Iraq decision making. It is interesting to learn about timing on decision making processes and how some capable men like Sergio intuitively knew it.

It would seem that Ahmad Wali Karzai understands the game as well.

Entropy

05-07-2010, 02:31 PM

The plan is to incorporate him, to shape him. Unless you eliminate him, you have to [do this]

Is the coalition "shaping" Karzai or is Karzai "shaping" the coalition?

Danny

05-07-2010, 02:33 PM

This is a blunder of gargantuan proportions. As I said in a post myself (because I saw this coming), the criminals must all be killed, the drug rings marginalized and it made so dangerous that they cannot operate, and the crime families dysfunctional. This includes Karzai's brother. If we actually do this (as described in the article) then we lose Kandahar. I don't care if some shade of "security" is brought to Kandahar. We are siding with criminals, and criminals they will remain. When we leave Kandahar, we will leave with Soldiers having their legs blown off, hearing damaged, and some will perish. In the end, it will have been for nothing because the people will be longing for the justice that the Taliban bring when they come in and kill Karzai's brother.

I hate to be so negative, but I saw this coming and spoke out against it. We have chosen the wrong path.

MikeF

05-07-2010, 03:23 PM

Is the coalition "shaping" Karzai or is Karzai "shaping" the coalition?

I'd submit that we should not dismiss the capability of GEN Patraeus. He is no fool; however, some senior coalition official might be receiving an ass-chewing over that comment. It's like showing your hand to the table at a poker game.

Worst case, he can call Ryan Crocker out of retirement for some back-up.

davidbfpo

05-29-2010, 10:55 PM

A somewhat different, if provocative article by Greg Mills (a South African commentator on COIN):http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/27/kandahar_through_the_talibans_eyes?page=0,0

davidbfpo

08-13-2010, 09:30 PM

Mark Urban, one of the BBC's better correspondents, was on Newsnight on the 11th this week reporting from Kandahar, a few passages:

In recent months Nato and Afghan authorities have sometimes appeared tongue-tied about the progress of Operation Hamkari, their attempt to secure the place. Contradictory stories have appeared saying it has been shelved, it is entering a higher gear, or it is hopelessly bogged down.

Operation Hamkari has indeed been underway for four months. It involves a series of ambitious initiatives by Nato and it has not been scaled back. But while the security drive is happening, it is less clear that it can keep to schedule or that people in the city have yet registered any positive effect.

The fighting in Arghandab has already cost many casualties - American and Afghan. One reporter recently embedded with troops there for two weeks told me: "Counter insurgency is impossible there - the local people have cleared out and the soldiers get hit almost as soon as they leave the base."

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8902527.stm and to his short blog comment:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/

Sorry I expect the film report will not work for many.

Dayuhan

08-14-2010, 07:05 AM

"Counter insurgency is impossible there - the local people have cleared out and the soldiers get hit almost as soon as they leave the base."

Why should that make counter insurgency impossible? If the local people are gone and the insurgents present and aggressive, wouldn't that be an ideal environment to engage and defeat insurgents without imposing civilian casualties?

Or is it assumed that "counter insurgency" consists by definition of winning hearts and minds...?

davidbfpo

08-20-2010, 09:35 PM

The occasional, perceptive bloggers at al-Sahwa score again with this article on Kandahar and what is reality on the ground.

Link:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/08/greed-and-grievance-in-kandahar.html

Yes, the article is critical of AWK, his brother in Kabul and that good governance for too many Afghans is making money, peddling influence etc.

Jedburgh

01-13-2011, 02:15 AM

Lowy Institute, 16 Dec 10: Afghan Voices: How Afghans View Coalition Military Operations in Kandahar (http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1478)

If there is one overriding reason why locals have little confidence in US-led operations in Kandahar it is the continued failure of American and coalition forces to understand local context and dynamics and the impact of their stalled operations on the local population. Instead of narrowly focussing on a particular area, the coalition needs to understand Kandahar province, and the south, as a whole....

IntelTrooper

01-24-2011, 04:55 PM

Disclaimer: The assessment provided is the author's alone and does not necessarily reflect my opinion nor the views of the SWC.

How Short-Term Thinking is Causing Long-Term Failure in Afghanistan (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/how-short-term-thinking-is-causing-long-term-failure-in-afghanistan/70048/#)

"In Afghanistan, second and third-order effects are largely overlooked," Morgan Sheeran, a Sergeant First Class who teaches at the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul, told me. The result, Sheeran said, is that decisions are often made in the moment without understanding their long-term consequences.

The men of Tarok Kalache were enraged by their homes' destruction. "These dudes were extremely angry," Captain Patrick McGuigan, a subordinate of Flynn, later told Stars and Stripes. "The elder (of Tarok Kalacheh) wouldn't even talk to me for three weeks, he was that [angry]." Some compared the U.S. force to the Soviet occupiers. But leveling the village was just the beginning.

Bob's World

01-24-2011, 05:37 PM

"The war in Afghanistan is, ultimately, a tactical war, fought at the local level over year-long deployments. When those small, tactical decisions are made for the wrong reasons, it can add up to big, strategic failure."

This is true, but only because:

A. Lead for operations is in the hands of a military headquarters, and such headquarters do not take on political objectives and are also subject to the effects of regular rotations; and

B. Current COIN doctrine, so rooted in the colonial experience, defines success as the preservation of the current regime through a construct of "warfare;" and

C. Failing to fully appreciate the causal effects radiating outward from the Karzai government, we create a functional sanctuary for the government to operate from. This protects and emboldens them to act with ever greater impunity toward their own populace, with little incentive to identify and address areas requiring substantive changes, or to seek reasonable reconciliation with the insurgent leadership of the issues that are most central to their illegal challenge and resistance.

davidbfpo

01-24-2011, 09:43 PM

Abu M has two relevant posts on the discussion of COIN tactics in Afghanistan, the first 'Exum and Foust on Tactics in Afghanistan', link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/01/exum-and-foust-tactics-afghanistan.html and part two 'If you only read one thing today ...', link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/01/if-you-only-read-one-thing-today.html

I tried to follow it initially and gave up - a storm with The Beltway?

Oiten the Viking

04-08-2011, 04:48 PM

This is one of many on the growing TTP. VBIED, then SVIED and then RPG/MG Assault team on ANSF.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/04/taliban_suicide_assa_4.php

davidbfpo

07-12-2011, 10:07 AM

The BBC is reporting:
The half-brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been assassinated in Kandahar, officials say.

Ahmad Wali Karzai, a leading power broker in the country's south, was shot dead at his home in a blow to Nato's battle against the Taliban in the area.

He was shot twice by his long-time head of security Sardar Mohammed, who was himself killed almost immediately.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14118884

Given the lack of updates on this thread I am unsure if anything much happened in Kandahar city itself and there was a comment by an ANP officer the insurgency had been it's worst recently.

Added later, SWJ item:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13770

TDB

07-12-2011, 05:47 PM

The power vacuum left by his death could cause more trouble than the Talbian. If the Taliban are behind it, this really is a master stroke of luck.

davidbfpo

07-12-2011, 07:31 PM

Hat tip to Abu M to a short piece at the end of June, which refers to AWK being locally nominated as the next provincial Governor, which President Karzai rejected:http://harpers.org/archive/2011/06/hbc-90008134

davidbfpo

07-13-2011, 08:17 AM

The former EU envoy in Afghanistan adds a portrait of AWK:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8633302/Death-of-Ahmad-Wali-Karzai-leaves-Afghan-power-vacuum.html

Ends with:
Nato made a kill or capture campaign targeted at the Taliban leadership a key feature of their surge in Afghanistan. Of late the Taliban have taken a decision to repay in kind, targeting key figures in the Afghan Government security apparatus. With the creation of this vacuum in Kandahar they have indeed claimed their most valuable scalp yet.

Methinks that securing the population may have to alter, securing the elite better and then the population!

jcustis

11-28-2011, 05:37 AM

More at the Army Times link:

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/11/army-report-blames-lapses-on-stryker-commander-112711w/

A snippet:

Report blames lapses on Stryker commander
532-page report finds colonel ignored doctrine, proper procedure in leading undisciplined BCT
By Michelle Tan - Staff writer
Posted : Sunday Nov 27, 2011 9:06:28 EST

The frustration and confusion that permeated the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, was so pervasive that the brigade almost wasn’t certified to deploy, and senior commanders in Afghanistan lost confidence in the brigade commander’s ability to lead, according to an Army investigation.

The 4,000-member brigade, commanded by Col. Harry Tunnell, was rife with lapses of discipline, misdirection and mixed signals about its mission in one of the most important regions of Afghanistan.

Much of the blame is put on Tunnell, whose lack of emphasis on administrative matters such as command inspections and urinalysis “may have helped create an environment in which misconduct could occur,” the investigation found.

The environment created the setting for a series of deadly events:

• Five soldiers from one platoon in 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, were accused of killing innocent Afghan civilians “for sport.” Four of the soldiers have been convicted for their involvement in the deaths.

Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs, the accused ringleader, was convicted Nov. 10 of 15 counts, including three counts of premeditated murder, and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The court-martial of the fifth soldier is scheduled for January.

• One soldier died from a vehicle rollover in part because he was not following regulations requiring seatbelt use.

• Seven soldiers and an interpreter were killed when a platoon ignored procedure and failed to dismount from their Stryker before driving over a “suspicious chokepoint” — when the platoon directly in front of them did so to minimize the risk of being hit by a roadside bomb. A massive bomb hidden in that chokepoint was “detonated by a patient triggerman,” an officer from the unit told investigators.

• About 15 soldiers from the same platoon are accused of regularly smoking hashish in their housing units and even in one of the unit’s Strykers.

As a result, at least eight soldiers — five officers and three senior noncommissioned officers — have been recommended for letters of admonition, memoranda of reprimand or letters of concern.

The inside story of the brigade came in a scathing 532-page report obtained by Army Times. Brig. Gen. Stephen Twitty, the investigating officer appointed to determine the command climate within the brigade and whether it had any causal relation to the alleged criminal activity, describes a brigade that was rife with turmoil from the start.

Bob's World

11-28-2011, 12:41 PM

I served in RC South under general Carter and worked with him and BG Hodges on a daily basis. I also worked closely with Harry Tunnell and his staff. I'll just offer this: I have not read this lengthy report, but from the highlighted quotes I have seen there is a middle perspective that is not addressed very well.

Harry and his Brigade did indeed "clear" the Arghandab valley; though when he would tell me that he "defeated the Taliban in the Arghandab" I would tell him that I believed he overstated the effects of their actions. (But this is no less true of the Clear-Hold-Build operations later pursued under the team led by Carter and Hodges). As to the follow-on mission Harry was given to keep the highways open from East to West across Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul; and North to South from upper Kandahar down to the border crossing at Spin Boldak, there is a "Feasibility" assessment that needs to be applied to bridge the gap between BG Hodges and COL Tunnell. There is probably 50% of the populace of that region that lives with in a few miles (walk over and plant an IED at night range) of that route. Strykers are well suited to running up and down roads and engaging threats; such units are not well suited, nor nearly large enough to engage the vast, diverse populaces along that route in "pop-centric COIN" and convince them that they have no need to attack the ISAF forces that were bringing Northern Alliance forces and governmental officals down to rule over them.

I don't think Harry was right in his perspective, and he was a powerful, dynamic, outspoken advocate for what he felt was the most effective employment of his command. I never heard or saw him disrespect his seniors; only disagree professionally as was his duty. I never saw or heard of him disobeying any orders; only fail to meet expectations that were arguably not feasible to begin with.

Not taking sides, but as I said, there is a middle ground that is not well addressed in what I have seen on this so far.