Company Level Int Led Operations

[Coldstreamer]

I'm about to take my company to Afghanistan next month, to an independent location away from my usual chain of command - great for autonomous command! - but will equally be very short on Int and surveillance assets other than what actionable stuff my guys and I can gather from our own framework patrolling. Linking in and making friends with all our allied and agency neighbours will be critical. Does anyone have any top tips about how I can optimise my processes, and achieve more focussed results. Gathering atmospherics is one thing...getting multi-source info properly analysed and turned into target packs at company level is another. My platoon commanders are all very green, likewise my company intel cell. My instinctive approach is slowly slowly catchee monkey - all the good Kilcullen 28 article stuff - but the last time I did this was Iraq, and at Div/ Bde level. Grateful for any pointers.

[jcustis]

You've probably seen many of these considerations before, but here goes:

-Your smartest NCO should be the intel cell leader. He must have an aptitude for for data, statistics, faces, etc. A guy who follows sports scores and stats closely often proves to be the best choice.
-Build the depth required to operate the intel cell if one or two members take ill, are wounded, or simply need a break. The same folks cannot do it every day, on their own. They can fall into a rut of the same pattern, start to get sloppy, and worst of all, make mistakes that causes the men on the line to miss subtle things in the field. Along that line, one of the most critical things can be a Be-On-The-Lookout (BOLO) list. Any changes have to be promulgated to the maneuver elements as soon as possible.
-In the last few weeks you have to train and prepare, analyze the operations debrief script that your intel cell will work from when a patrol comes in. Sit back and ask yourself whether the information the script attempts to collect is actually beneficial. Put another way, are patrols going to be compiling information to satisfy a debrief, or compiling information and atmospherics that could facilitate follow-on missions in the field, and in-stride?
-Organize your command post to utilize both old school hardcopy and electronic target folders, as well as map, pen, and paper mission planning alongside your electronic planning tools. The enemy does not care that the generator just cut out.
-Train throughout the deployment, and keep personnel informed about not only your slice of the AO, but also the bigger picture of events that have occured elsewhere that may have an impact on your region (especially where transient bad guys may take up residence in your AO).
-Get your intel cell, battle captains/NCOs, and any other command post personnel out on aleaders reconnaissance, or at least out and about with a patrol once in a while. It goes a long way towards maintaining their situational awareness, perspective, and grasp of what the maneuver elements are dealing with every day. They should go out at least once a month, and preferably to all of the sectors within your AO.

[Ken White]

LINK (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/organizing-for-counterinsurgen/).

LINK (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct06/Teamey-Sweet.pdf).

LINK (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine09/us/lessons_learned/art03.pdf).

LINK (http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/ProfWriting/tulak.pdf)

[jcustis]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php

The Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency (one of the links on the page above) is also a very solid guide, and speaks to the intel-focused things you seem to be concerned about.

[Tom Odom]

Go to CALL and look at the Company-level Stability Operatios and Support Operations series of newsletters. We used Brit TTPs heavily in Vols 1 and 3 by the way.

Vol 1 Command and Control--heavy on organizing for COIN
Vol 2 peacekeeping, EBo, and Security
Vol 3 Patrolling, Int, and IO
Vol 4 Counter-IED Ops
Vol 5 VBIEDs, Elections, PSDs
Vol 6 Tactical Marksmanship, Sniper, Counter-Sniper

Vol 7 will be COIN and Organizing for COIN with new material reemphasizing Vols 1 and 3.

See also Newsletter 07-01 Tactical Intelligence

Again go to Call and log on.

Best

Tom

[Cavguy]

http://coin.army.mil

It also has the links to the CALL compilation of COIN knowledge. If you need specific research advice and work from CALL send me a PM.

[Erick]

From my limited perspective, I'm very glad to see you'll have a co intel cell.

We were quite close to the flag pole but ended up developing the position of a co intel nco on our own. Being a NG entity and having a decent number of police officers / deputy sheriffs, many of whom had investigative experience, we had a group to draw from.

It was a fledgling effort, more could've been done but it was better than what we inherited.

[Coldstreamer]

Been here a month. Fascinating op environment, esp the MN interaction piece. Many thanks for the advice and support from all.

C

[Coldstreamer]

Not wanting to be all take and no give, this is the simple Int Collection plan we're using. It appears cyclical but is not; several phases take place in parallel, but it gives a framework (with thanks to Dave Kilcullen's 28 Articles..).

Phases. The following Phases will be executed to direct intelligence gathering efforts:

Phase 1.

Confirm what we think we know.

Take over existing relationships

Assess atmospherics and consent.

Report changes.

Phase 2.

Pursue answers to unknown questions.

Identify potential targets.

Develop Target Packs.

Identify Pattern of Life.

Phase 3.

Confirm Targets.

Establish Triggers

Exploit information from operations.

Reassess (return to Phase 1 Q 1)

Patrol Taskings. The Coy IO will generate specific intelligence tasks which will be allocated to patrols by Coy HQ.

Patrol Preparation. Detailed research on all available information held prior to patrols deploying is vital to ensure the patrol is able to judge developments in their target areas. The POC for area info is the IO.

Reporting. An initial hot debrief will be conducted by the IO following each patrol’s return. Patrol reports are to be submitted within 3 hrs of conclusion of hot debrief.

Very basic indeed, but basic is good in a rifle company where complex processes get bypassed or ignored. I've tried to distill the various areas of good advice into something more manageable.

C

[Coldstreamer]

Targeting follows from collection, and merely serves to review:

Kinetic (kill or capture) targets (who? where? what evidence? what effect?)

Effects - 4 D's - Deter,Disrupt, Detain, Develop (more intel for subsequent ops - either by us or other agencies)

Non Kinetic targets (HA dropoff, CIMIC/CMA activities)

Effects - 4 Rs - Reassure (that we're there in local interests), Relieve (suffering, poverty), Regain (trust, consent, support, lost networks), Reinforce (Own FP through local sympathy/goodwill)

Harmonisation of the two (use NK activity to gather info on objectives or to conduct consequence managament after harder activities) and deconfliction to ensure mixed messages aren't being sent.

Slight risk of inventing my own doctrine on the hoof, but it seems to work for us!

[Jedburgh]

Marine Corps Times, 18 Jan 08: Corps Creates Intel Cells at Rifle-Company Level (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/01/marine_company_intel_080117/)
....The C-LIC initiative, launched under the direction of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/) in Quantico, Va., will soon be battle-tested by California-based 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines (http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/fmf/3-4/), on its next Iraq deployment, slated for early 2008.

Today’s irregular warfare, with its lack of a uniformed enemy, makes intelligence gathering vital for enemy identification. To adapt to the emerging threat, infantry companies often create their own versions of ad hoc intelligence cells, said Vince Goulding, director of experimentation plans at the Warfighting Laboratory. But those individual efforts have been piecemeal, because the Corps had no standard training or equipment available, he said.

The new initiative for pushing intelligence analysis know-how down to the lower echelons, however, is about to change all that. Rifle companies will now be able to assess, analyze and disseminate information that they typically had relied on battalion or regimental command to produce.....

[Tom Odom]

Got the word that Company-level Stability Ops, VOL 7, COIN is going up today (maybe tomorrow) at CALL. It contains 2 SWJ contributions: the first is an extract of the long piece we did on Kicullen's 28 articles Captains Kranc and Holzbach contributing; the second was CPT (nopw MAJ) Gwinn's Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon, first published on SWJ blog.

Best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

Jan-Feb 08 Fires Bulletin: Organize for Intelligence: Company Intelligence Cells in COIN (http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2008/Jan_Feb_2008/Jan_Feb_2008_pages_14_18.pdf)
....More military intelligence Soldiers are needed to support companies within tactical battalions. Further, the need for enough “boots on the ground” to maintain effective coverage of and presence in a company AO makes it unlikely that a company commander could pull enough personnel away from line platoons to maintain a robust company intelligence cell. The solution to this dilemma lies in the company fire support team (FIST).

It is the company FIST’s versatility that makes it ideal to form the foundation of a company intelligence cell. In the COIN operations currently underway in Iraq and in addition to their traditional fire support tasks, FSOs and fire support NCOs (FSNCOs) are expected to assume responsibility at the company level for any or all of the following: targeting, air-ground integration, information operations, civil-military operations, psychological operations, employing enablers, public affairs and other functions. Effectively, company FSOs and FSNCOs in a COIN environment are fusion cells unto themselves. That being the case, it is not at all a stretch for the FSO or FSNCO to assume the intelligence role within the company.....

[Cavguy]

Had this discussion at the last SWC Leavenworth get-together.

Agree a company needs an intel cell. In a pinch, and if available, the FS Team can fill it. Unless your FSNCO is not up to the job, like mine was. :wry:

Very few companies have an FSO in OIF. They've all been changed into platoon leaders of artillerymen acting as dismounted infantry.

I'd really like to see an analyst and a HUMINT guy added into each company - the first to process info higher and lower, and the second would give the commander the ability to run sources legally.

[William F. Owen]

I'd really like to see an analyst and a HUMINT guy added into each company - the first to process info higher and lower, and the second would give the commander the ability to run sources legally.

One man cannot run a source. He can't identify, recruit, train, operate (task, monitor and debrief) and protect/recover an agent. All one guy can do is debrief someone once in a while. That means sit and chat. - what is more, a few armies cannot legally engage in agent handling operations, because of human rights legislation.

IMO Companies should focus on gathering for higher analysis and exploiting what is fed down to them. Coy level int is really a liaison task. There is no harm in having a specialist detachment at the Company level, but they are specialists, trained in Intelligence.

[Jedburgh]

One man cannot run a source. He can't identify, recruit, train, operate (task, monitor and debrief) and protect/recover an agent. All one guy can do is debrief someone once in a while......
There are significant differences between fully structured agent ops and low-level source ops of the type that Cavguy is referring to. In neither case does "one man" truly run the op on his own. There has to be infrastructure in place to support him. However, at the tactical level, if that infrastructure is in place above Co level, then "one man" can do the job.

The caveat is that it would require an experienced HUMINT NCO to be effective. And even with the expansion of the field, there are nowhere near enough HUMINT NCOs - and even fewer with the appropriate experience - to provide effective fill.

Aside from manning issues, there will be no further discussion of the nuts and bolts of source ops on this board.

Thanks,

Ted

[Cavguy]

Thanks Jed, I wasn't specific enough in my post.

I certainly believe the section as a whole must be bigger, I was mainly referring to the actual MI based augmentation, at a minimum. I'd like more, but a few actual MI NCO's plus platoon level intel augmentees can do it.

Good catch on the source. What you stated was what I meant, forgetting that "source running" to a CO CDR isn't the same as to a pro. I basically meant being able to recruit and pay informants, and give them low level tasks. THT's have this ability, but there aren't enough to go around, so the commander winds up "running" these low level sources, even though it's technically illegal. Having a HUMINTer (even better a team) in the company would allow him to create and develop informants in a more professional manner, and provide the expertise into keeping him out of trouble.

(trying to stay "above the line" in the discussion) ;)

[William F. Owen]

I basically meant being able to recruit and pay informants, and give them low level tasks. THT's have this ability, but there aren't enough to go around, so the commander winds up "running" these low level sources, even though it's technically illegal. Having a HUMINTer (even better a team) in the company would allow him to create and develop informants in a more professional manner, and provide the expertise into keeping him out of trouble.


This indicates a vast problem area, based on my experience, but I am not sure how I can usefully comment given Jedburgh's prescription - WHICH I FULLY AGREE WITH as concerns intent.

About all I can say is IMO, this is not something the company level should be involved in. I guess I'll leave it at that.

[selil]

It kind of sounds like you all do it differently in the military than we did it in law enforcement. From the sounds of it you all have large centralized authority that takes in from a variety of channels information and feeds that down to the unit/solider level. In law enforcement an officer/detective receives information and feeds "some" of that information up into either a detective bureau or now I guess Fusion Centers (though those may be going away). My experience obviously is at the bottom of that chain, but our expected effectiveness was at the localized or even patrol area. Since I worked in the court/corrections bureau we interviewed prisoners for housing assignments and gained some valuable/actionable intelligence on near feudal associations. I'm likely way off base and my knowledge is several years out of date. It seems like if you are dealing with an insurgency that is a distributed, and loosely organized entity, that a distributed intelligence apparatus with centralized reporting would be much better.

[slapout9]

selil, you head the nail on the head. Good LE Intel is run from the street up to the top. Which then can be added to the big picture, which sometime never comes back down but at least they know about it.

[wm]

What Slapout and Selil are calling intel would be what I call situational awareness. Depending on your frame of reference, situational awareness is what you really want anyway, IMHO. At the company level , I suspect I'd want to know who the likely bad guys are in my AO, what kind of things they might be contemplating doing, and what "tools" they might be planning on using to do it. To get this type of info, I think the "cop on the beat" approach to collection and analysis is probably the right model. Sort of like this: "I heard on the street that the A St. Gang is thinking they want to have it out with the Oak Hill Ave boys on Thursday night with knuckles, pipes, and baseball bats. Joe X from A St. was seen playing with a .38 last week. Last three times they fought, they had their dust ups in one of the vacant lots in the industrial park near the river. " You don't need some high level intel system pushing stuff down to you to figure out what all that means. And, it probably won't get you that kind of data to analyze anyway, while your foot patrols and neighborhood visibility will.

In fact, the more stuff that gets pushed down to you, the harder it will probably be to separate the wheat from the chaff, if there's even any wheat in the delivery. Having an intel analyst, who is most likely going to be an E3, E4, or junior E5, there at the company is not likely to be much help in sifting either. They will probably not have enough experience to find the gems any better than anyone else just because they got some schooling at Huachuca. The HUMINT guy that Cavguy wants may be a little more senior, but I doubt will have the all source experience needed to provide a good overall picture.

Common sense, tempered with sufficient cultural awareness to understand what is different every day about the AO compared to being back home on the block, probably does more in developing the situational awareness needed to mount sucessful stability ops at the company level.

[Ken White]

...........

[Cavguy]

They will probably not have enough experience to find the gems any better than anyone else just because they got some schooling at Huachuca. The HUMINT guy that Cavguy wants may be a little more senior, but I doubt will have the all source experience needed to provide a good overall picture.


Great Post. What I have been insufficently articulating is what I want from the intel guy. I don't need someone telling me about my AO. I know and see that from walking and talking to the people every day in sector, and my patrol leaders have the "feel" for what is going on. Most "boots on the ground" leaders understand it far better than a junior enlisted or midgrade MI guy ever will. (Although there are the exceptions) What we consistently fail at is to capture that information higher and lower.

I see two major gaps. The first is a lack of ability to gain, manage, and utilize informers that constantly approach leaders. I like your "cop" analogy - the guy who will tell you about the drug gang on the "down low". It's the role of THT's to do, but because commanders don't have enough THT's they wind up doing it out of necessity, legal or not. Every successful commander I saw had his informers and sources. One can wring hands about whether they should, but to be successful and know your AO you need a few informers. Sorting through and evaluating their information is tough. Many informers don't want to talk to an E3 THT member, they want to talk to the boss or an officer. Having a HUMINT type on staff can help guide the tactical leaders through it, keep them out of trouble, and keep higher in the loop.

The second gap is someone to debrief patrols, package the reports, and send them higher in an MI friendly way. Someone who knows all the MI databases and systems and can pull from higher's (vast) resources. Imagery, mapping, social networking tools, ISR coordination, etc. He can be the agent for procuring information for the Platoons and a conduit for their info higher.

As I said, I'm less interested in an analyst to tell me what is going on than personnel to help in the above fashion.

Without MI help, the work is done by whoever the commander picks (FIST, Company Intel Cell, etc) who are "pickup artists" at the tasks. In COIN, the Army owes a commander a trained intel support team at the company level. My higher S2 was always defensive when I criticized his analysis, and he finally reminded me that I wasn't sending him much to help fill in his picture. The commander, XO, and 1SG are so consumed/exhausted/busy they need a full time pro to do it, not a Shanghai'd 11B, 19D/K, or 13F.

Read that amazing NYT article on Afghanistan yesterday, and ask yourself if that commander has time to compile and manage his intel cell. He needs a pro to help, IMO.

[Jedburgh]

....Without MI help, the work is done by whoever the commander picks (FIST, Company Intel Cell, etc) who are "pickup artists" at the tasks. In COIN, the Army owes a commander a trained intel support team at the company level. My higher S2 was always defensive when I criticized his analysis, and he finally reminded me that I wasn't sending him much to help fill in his picture. The commander, XO, and 1SG are so consumed/exhausted/busy they need a full time pro to do it, not a Shanghai'd 11B, 19D/K, or 13F....
In this, the conventional Army (with substantial differences in context, admittedly) is trying to replicate intel support capabilities that exist in the SF Groups. Unfortunately for the conventional units, the MI slots (and the 18F positions) have long been a part of SF authorized fill, while the rest of the Army is trying to beg, borrow or steal MI soldiers to pick up the slack. I don't see the Army expanding the MI field further to formally fill this requirement.

So, the critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than the "pick-up artists" you are currently working with. And of the NCOs that do get sent over - you're always going to get a chunk who were let go to you for a reason.

Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

[Cavguy]

Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

No real disagreements there, good points. An E4 or junior E5 MI guy wouldn't be very value added, unless he was really high-speed. (I've always thought E-6 was about right) I have some concerns on this approach. I guess I never had great results from the combat arms S2 NCOIC (MSG) in my experiences, he was more of an assistant S3 SGM than an intel NCO, in practical use. I would see an additional combat arms SFC in the company as quickly becoming a HQ PSG rather than an S2 guy, because in garrison, what would he do?

Understand MI's manning challenges. However, it sure does seem like we have tons of guys running around in intel at nosebleed level, and very few at CO/BN level for a bottom-up intel environment.

I guess I'm looking for an endstate - a competent company intel cell that supports the commander and the platoons that isn't taken from existing authorizations.

[Ken White]

"I would see an additional combat arms SFC in the company as quickly becoming a HQ PSG rather than an S2 guy, because in garrison, what would he do?"Cavalry troops, Infantry and Tank Companies and even one Artillery Battery {shudder...), I never served in one that did not have in Garrison a training NCO, generally a SSG and tabbed to the job from the Squad or Section he normally would be leading. In Korea, the Domincan Republic and Viet Nam they effectively became the de facto S2-S3 NCO AND served as Co/Trp LnNCO to the Bn/Sqn TOC. And yes, the buck sergeants that picked up their Squads did great. So did the random SP4/SPC who thereby became a Team Leader...

Some of the Companies in the DomRep even appointed a Platoon leader as an Ops/Intel Officer. That worked okay and again the NCO that became the acting PL could handle it. Most units were short of LTs and had one or two PSGs (some were SSGs) playing PL in any event

I've always thought the Co/Btry/Trp Tng (Op/Intel) NCO position had such value that it should've been recognized on the TOE. Both in the DomRep and Viet Nam they also ran the local informers who we paid by collections from the NCOs and Officers. Horrors! :eek:

Last tour in Korea, 1975-76, peacetime, our Brigade S2, an MI Officer, became thoroughly upset with the refusal of the Division G2 to share Intel and set up his own Agent net -- oops, local informer net -- and it was effective. Division, for example, had no idea who in the ROK Army had authority to blow the bridges and tank traps in event of an attack -- but our Bde knew...;)

Problems? Call BR 549, Ken's Cycle Shop -- Wheels Reinvented :D

[Tom Odom]

Cavalry troops, Infantry and Tank Companies and even one Artillery Battery {shudder...), I never served in one that did not have in Garrison a training NCO, generally a SSG and tabbed to the job from the Squad or Section he normally would be leading. In Korea, the Domincan Republic and Viet Nam they effectively became the de facto S2-S3 NCO AND served as Co/Trp LnNCO to the Bn/Sqn TOC. And yes, the buck sergeants that picked up their Squads did great. So did the random SP4/SPC who thereby became a Team Leader...

Some of the Companies in the DomRep even appointed a Platoon leader as an Ops/Intel Officer. That worked okay and again the NCO that became the acting PL could handle it. Most units were short of LTs and had one or two PSGs (some were SSGs) playing PL in any event

I've always thought the Co/Btry/Trp Tng (Op/Intel) NCO position had such value that it should've been recognized on the TOE. Both in the DomRep and Viet Nam they also ran the local informers who we paid by collections from the NCOs and Officers. Horrors! :eek:

Last tour in Korea, 1975-76, peacetime, our Brigade S2, an MI Officer, became thoroughly upset with the refusal of the Division G2 to share Intel and set up his own Agent net -- oops, local informer net -- and it was effective. Division, for example, had no idea who in the ROK Army had authority to blow the bridges and tank traps in event of an attack -- but our Bde knew...;)



And if I can get the Company-level Stability Ops Newsletter VOL 7 on COIN up, it goes into this arena in depth.

the Brits call the O/I short course for company NCOs a "collator course" ; works well for them. See CALL Newsletter 05-17 Company-level stability operations and support operations, Vol 1 Command and Control

Problems? Call BR 549, Ken's Cycle Shop -- Wheels Reinvented :D

I had visions of Orange County Choppers with a Ken Sr and a Ken Jr...

But who would play Mikey?

[wm]

Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

Concur. In most units where I ever served, we had a "field first/operations sergeant" that we carved out of hide if need be. Quite often it was the platoon sergeant who had done a bang up job training his/her LT platoon leader or the PSG who was lucky enough to get an LT assigned who already "got it" and could afford to spare that Sr NCO to the company. I think most Bde and higher level staffs probably have a few senior NCOs playing staff "toadie/go-fer" who could be spared to become company operations sergeants (I'm sure that TRADOC units have a bunch, unless things have changed radically), which is what I think we are really advocating for. They might need a little training on how to brief and debrief a patrol and how to poke in the data into a standardized report to the Bn2 shop, but the learning curve would be much less than trying to get an E4 96B up to speed.

[Ken White]

And if I can get the Company-level Stability Ops Newsletter VOL 7 on COIN up, it goes into this arena in depth.

Hopefully, it'll resonate at upper levels and not get lost...

the Brits call the O/I short course for company NCOs a "collator course" ; works well for them. See CALL Newsletter 05-17 Company-level stability operations and support operations, Vol 1 Command and Control

They're ahead of us on the Intel and Recon bits of what we do. The 'not invented here syndrome' needs to be cast aside and we can learn from them.

I've long contended the title 'first sergeant' needs to go -- it has not served us well. The senior, most experienced NCO in a Co size unit should be the Chief trainer AND the Co Ops TTP guru, call him the Operations Sergeant (or the Marines can call him a Gunnery Sergeant) and he needs an Asst, an SFC who is Intel knowledgeable (Do away with the Army's 'Master Gunner' and its clones...). The Supply sergeant should do all the beans and bullets stuff and there needs to be an Admin NCO, SSG, to handle all that paperless office and personnel stuff. All that is changing but not rapidly enough, old habits die hard and names send images...

Also have long believed the Company/Troop XO is a total waste of an Officer space as currently envisioned -- I've seen way too many units operate very effectively without one.

I had visions of Orange County Choppers with a Ken Sr and a Ken Jr...

But who would play Mikey?

Provide Mikey and I'll take the job... :D

[jcustis]

In this, the conventional Army (with substantial differences in context, admittedly) is trying to replicate intel support capabilities that exist in the SF Groups. Unfortunately for the conventional units, the MI slots (and the 18F positions) have long been a part of SF authorized fill, while the rest of the Army is trying to beg, borrow or steal MI soldiers to pick up the slack. I don't see the Army expanding the MI field further to formally fill this requirement.

So, the critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than the "pick-up artists" you are currently working with. And of the NCOs that do get sent over - you're always going to get a chunk who were let go to you for a reason.

Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

The Marine Corps' efforts in just that direction (training a NCO in O&I matters) are the right stuff I think, and reading this thread has convinced me that I'd rather carve a guy out of my organization (it would be better to have the extra T/O slot nonetheless) as opposed to picking up a fellow of unknown quantity who I have to train as a shooter on top of getting him to understand me through implicit communication. Working from a good base of implicit communication will always serve as the better foundation.

[William F. Owen]

the Brits call the O/I short course for company NCOs a "collator course" ; works well for them.


Excellent observation. In my day those guys stayed the hell away from HUMINT. In the early days of NI there were some spectacular disasters with people trying to "play spy" and getting innocent folks killed.

IMO, the Coy level Int bod should debriefed patrols, keep the logging and reporting up to date, handle the classified material, and brief the out going patrols - and you need at least 2 men at the company level to do it properly, especially if you have some sort of major drama going on.

[Tom Odom]

Excellent observation. In my day those guys stayed the hell away from HUMINT. In the early days of NI there were some spectacular disasters with people trying to "play spy" and getting innocent folks killed.

IMO, the Coy level Int bod should debriefed patrols, keep the logging and reporting up to date, handle the classified material, and brief the out going patrols - and you need at least 2 men at the company level to do it properly, especially if you have some sort of major drama going on.

Agreed. Just getting that process set in semi-permanent stone would be a step forward.

Best

Tom

[davidbfpo]

The post of Collator was my first venture into intelligence work in the UK police, in era of filing cards and typed briefing bulletins. Very crude on reflection.

Always found "selling" intelligence to colleagues hard, although it can be easier now. HUMINT was not a role we had, although far later in my career it was.

The best results as a collator came far later, nine years ago, when the post was at a smaller station, with about fifty officers. Even then the majority did not contribute to the intelligence picture.

Shortly after an excellent IT system arrived that enabled direct access to the data warehouse where much of the police information was held and the collator role evolved again. Plus analysts started to arrive and all manner of intelligence structures / systems.

I am an advocate of tactical intelligence as close as possible to the frontline officer, in person and providing help from IT systems. Company level I suspect in the military world.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

Infantry, Mar-Apr 08: Suggestions for Creating a Company-Level Intel Cell (http://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/2008/2008_2/06_pf.pdf)

AKO Log-In Required
You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?......

[William F. Owen]

You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?......

I think there is a world of difference between "creating a Coy Int cell" from within the Coy or BG, and having an "Int Cell" (4-6 guys) attached to the company for the duration. I favour bolt-on I-cells with the relevant skills all close to the boil. How you create and sustain such teams is a huge issue.

Perhaps each Brigade could have an COIN Int-Company, that deploys sections down to the company locations, as and when required.

[Tom Odom]

I think there is a world of difference between "creating a Coy Int cell" from within the Coy or BG, and having an "Int Cell" (4-6 guys) attached to the company for the duration. I favour bolt-on I-cells with the relevant skills all close to the boil. How you create and sustain such teams is a huge issue.

Perhaps each Brigade could have an COIN Int-Company, that deploys sections down to the company locations, as and when required.

the units that do this (create an intel cell) report good results

The relevant CALL Newsletter 08-05 is up now on the CALL gateway for those with access.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

the units that do this (create an intel cell) report good results

The relevant CALL Newsletter 08-05 is up now on the CALL gateway for those with access.

Tom

I would tend to suspect (and it's a suspicion, mind) that "growing" a cell would be better than bolt on, if for no other reason than the home-grown cell would understand the unit's AO, operating procedures, and so on. Any element coming from outside would have that additional learning curve to deal with. But that's just me. It also squares to a degree with some of the experience from Vietnam and the Philippines where units grew their own intel sections (although they weren't always called that) and developed a more responsive system of intel collection and (just as importantly) dissemination within the unit. The further removed it become, the less responsive it became.

[wm]

I would tend to suspect (and it's a suspicion, mind) that "growing" a cell would be better than bolt on, if for no other reason than the home-grown cell would understand the unit's AO, operating procedures, and so on. Any element coming from outside would have that additional learning curve to deal with.

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

[Steve Blair]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

Quite true. Staggering such things would work well. So long as the intel is developed at the local level and can be acted on at the local level without it having to trickle up and back down a chain somewhere I'm a happy camper.:)

[jcustis]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

This is so commonsense, it's almost embarrassing. I've mulled this over for a few minutes, and right now, I can see absolutely no good reason why this couldn't work as a win-win.

It may take some imagination to implement, but damn this makes too much sense.

[Tom Odom]

And while I agree such linkups would be a good solution, reality in the form of Murphy's Law concerning scheduling TOAs among various elements with overlapping schedules has been a real problem.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

My intention in advocating discussion of Bolt On Int Cells is to prevent the absorption of Infanteers into the "I" side of life. I can't see the difference between an Int Cell and any other attached arm. What is more if there was dedicated Sub-unit Intel grouping they could develop a deeper skills set.

[Tom Odom]

My intention in advocating discussion of Bolt On Int Cells is to prevent the absorption of Infanteers into the "I" side of life. I can't see the difference between an Int Cell and any other attached arm. What is more if there was dedicated Sub-unit Intel grouping they could develop a deeper skills set.

And while the infantry has had some concerns, the use of infantry in such roles has proven quite effective. As I said earlier on this same thread, much of what is discussed as company intelligence operations is done by collators on the British side.

Again for those with access, look at CALL Newsletter 08-05.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.
Over a decade ago, working with a small multi-national group in an isolated location, as the U.S. intel guy, I was doing six month rotations, while the split team that made up the rest of the U.S. element was on 90-day rotations. We were staggered, so that it essentially worked out the way you described. I thought it was a good system at the time, although, of course, still subject to the personal leadership and individual capabilities vagaries that have already been discussed.

There is no good reason that it shouldn't work just as well in the Big Army on operational deployments. And that's why it won't happen....

[wm]

There is no good reason that it shouldn't work just as well in the Big Army on operational deployments. And that's why it won't happen.... Why is it that folks with an intell background tend to be so cynical? ;)

To several posters' points about scheduling and staffing, I submit that it can work if folks want to make it work. Like most things worth doing, it will require some pain and suffering to implement--some intel teams will have to stay in theater longer than they would otherwise in order to get the overlap going. To Wilf's point, I think we need to require that these cells be staffed with 96/97/98 series MOS (or 35xxx or whatever other number the personnel weenies have decided to hang on Army intel specialists).

[ODB]

I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down. How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies? It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level. Have seen the effects of conventional units playing this game, good people end up dead. IMHO this is another example of the political infighting within the Army itself. See we can do this, we don't need them, give us more funding, the list goes on and on. Everyone trying to do everyone elses job instead of their own. Like to see the TTPs on this one along with what schooling will be required. Will we create another institution or steal the seats from already existing courses?

Personally have yet to see an example of where this was needed? There are more intel assets in that country than anyone could imagine. Sounds like there is not good cross communication between them. Everyone keeps talking about situational awareness, well that includes knowing what assets you have available. Think passage of friendly lines coordination. There are a lot of basic tasks we do not do, simple because we think they are not cool. Get back to basics know who is operating in you AOR both FRIENDLY and enemy.

Please do correct me if I'm not seeing this correctly, reason I joined to gain knowledge and perspective. Thank you.

[Steve Blair]

I can only speak to this from the historical perspective, but crossflow with intel has always been difficult for the Army. In Vietnam, to use one example, info usually flowed up the chain but often didn't come back down to the local units unless some sort of unofficial arrangement was made. There were cases (one occurred near FSB Ripcord) where a unit took serious casualties when they were hit by an NVA unit that a SigInt unit on Ripcord knew about but couldn't tell the local battalion about. After that unofficial arrangements were made, but officially intel continued to flow up and settle. This was a continuous problem with MACV/SOG intel as well, which went straight to the higher command levels and often never made its way back to units that could have acted on the information (later in the war some of the FOB commanders made the same accommodation with local units...and the fiction of a friendly guerrilla unit was created to facilitate the information shift).

It's great to talk about knowing the enemy, and in many cases units do. But their focus can be restricted by real or artificial terrain considerations (don't look behind the bamboo curtain...there are no NVA in Laos or Cambodia - just one example) or by operational concerns. Having a cell that focuses on just intel (be it local gathering, collating information, or what have you) might be worth at least trying. IMO, anyhow.

[jcustis]

How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies?

Good question, but they are tied into battalion S-2 as the highest point in the hierarchy. The don't submit RFIs directly to higher HQs.

It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level. Have seen the effects of conventional units playing this game, good people end up dead.

Definitely has that potential, which is why it needs buy-in and a careful eye from the commander (battalion) to ensure things aren't getting loosey goosey.

See we can do this, we don't need them, give us more funding, the list goes on and on.

At least in the Marine Corps context, it's not so much that we don't need them, but rather that we don't have them (a sizeable S-2) or can't tap into them directly due to distance constraints b/n a Bn CP and the company COPs.

Personally have yet to see an example of where this was needed? There are more intel assets in that country than anyone could imagine. Sounds like there is not good cross communication between them. Everyone keeps talking about situational awareness, well that includes knowing what assets you have available. Think passage of friendly lines coordination. There are a lot of basic tasks we do not do, simple because we think they are not cool. Get back to basics know who is operating in you AOR both FRIENDLY and enemy.

You are absolutely right on all accounts, but a battalion isn't going to be able to influence better coordination and/or accountability at those higher levels, so it reverts to what it can do and changes those things it can change (sound like an AA meeting?)

[wm]

I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down. How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies? It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level.

I seed this as an off shoot of transformation and the general inability/undesirability to place a large enough force structure in place in theater to do the job right. We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly. I submit that an operations support cell (remember that training sergeant and company clerk to supplement the Bn PAC that every company seems to have taken out of hide in garrison? )can do a lot of the routine SA work, but it will easily be overwhelmed when the information (I meant that, not intelligence BTW) firehose from above is turned on to beef up SA at the company level.

[William F. Owen]

And while the infantry has had some concerns, the use of infantry in such roles has proven quite effective. As I said earlier on this same thread, much of what is discussed as company intelligence operations is done by collators on the British side.

Again for those with access, look at CALL Newsletter 08-05.

Tom

I am not doubting their success. I went from Infantry to Intelligence, It's not such a big leap. My question and concerns are posed towards Sub Unit Int Cells becoming part of the TOE.

If they don't become part of the TOE then they'll remain a product of "ad-hocery" and skills will perish between deployments/Operations/Wars especially if they are not under pinned with some solid trade training

- unless the required levels of skills is such that no specialist training is required, the Int Cell is not part of the TOE, but takes men out of the platoons, and is only formed as and when required.

It may be that the later is considered the best option.

[Tom Odom]

WM: but it will easily be overwhelmed when the information (I meant that, not intelligence BTW) firehose from above is turned on to beef up SA at the company level

That is not happening and that is the point. The traditional higher to lower in this fight does not work. That was apparent before we "transformed" the BCT; that transformation certainly complicated life. The company effort is centered on its AO and it drives the continual assessment process.

ODB: I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down.

That too is happening as astute S3s at BN pick up on the fact that their line companies have the best operational grasp.

Again, I will suggest that if you have access you go read some of the material on this subject. If you don't have access, look at CPT Gwinn's article (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/organizing-for-counterinsurgen/) as an example. It is here on SWJ.

Tom

[Ken White]

WM said:We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly.To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.

[wm]

That is not happening and that is the point. The traditional higher to lower in this fight does not work. That was apparent before we "transformed" the BCT; that transformation certainly complicated life. The company effort is centered on its AO and it drives the continual assessment process.



Tom,

The "traditional higher to lower never did work in my experience. If we try to make it work today with number of sensors available, we will overwhelm the poor company--my firehose. Maybe having some smart analysts who know how to pull data, know where to pull it from, and have the right pipes and wires to do so would be worth the investment at the company level, but let's not stick a DCGS terminal in every maneuver company.

[wm]

WM said:To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.

Ken,
I can't disagree with your point about divisions' primary value being related to the total one and two button count out there (if I remember the section on GO strength in the US Code correctly the 3 and 4 button count is also a function of the total number of 1 and 2 buttons). However, the division (more accurately the GS elements of the DISCOM) still does some log stuff that I don't think the Army has figured out how to push down to the BCT without making the tail too big (which it probably already is anyway). And I'm not really sure how we ought to be structuring combat aviation from a C2persective either --But this thread is not about C2 and headquarters functions. ;)

[ODB]

After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets. There is enough issues with those units who can and the agencies involved. Too many, tapping a shallow pool. The thought of many more people attempting to do this (which many already are)instead of going through the proper channels IMO is part of the problem, not a solution. When they do this and report it as intel, makes second sourcing it very difficult especially when many times it is the same source going to multiple locations to make money. The solution is hand these guys off to the proper entity to handle and all will benefit from it. Honestly I vehemently disagree with conventional forces tasking, training, paying......nothing else needs to be said.

[jcustis]

After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets.

I'd have to say ixna on running sources too, and we don't train these hard chargers for that. I think the more appropriate term would be "information" collection cell.

What you reference above is exactly how I helped train up a Reserve unit's cell during a pre-deploy work up. The best guys for this work have a penchant for data, like a sports junky who studies and memorizes box scores, for example.

[Ken White]

After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.Well, more correctly, we can agree on that...I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets. There is enough issues with those units who can and the agencies involved. Too many, tapping a shallow pool. The thought of many more people attempting to do this (which many already are)instead of going through the proper channels IMO is part of the problem, not a solution. When they do this and report it as intel, makes second sourcing it very difficult especially when many times it is the same source going to multiple locations to make money. The solution is hand these guys off to the proper entity to handle and all will benefit from it. Honestly I vehemently disagree with conventional forces tasking, training, paying......nothing else needs to be said.While disagreeing on this. In a perfect world, I'd agree with you but having worked both sides of the SF/Conventional fence, the problem is that just as all Battalions and Companies are not great, All A (and B) Teams are not great. I've always had a suspicion that too many Intel folks, when they were in Kindergarten, got a report card that said "Doesn't share well with others." The Intel side is spread too thin, in a war never has enough really well trained people and has a bad tendency to withhold info from users -- or tailor it.

So while I agree with you in principle, in practice a unit that wants to know what's going on its AO (particularly in an urban environment) has little choice; I've done it --as have thousands of others -- and it works. It works without disrupting the 'real' intel types, too.

Edited to add:

On re reading this after a good dinner, it seems more brusque than intended; few more thoughts:

Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing. I'd also note that nature hates a vacuum and something will rush to fill it. If units believe they're getting stiffed on Intel -- and many do (see below) -- they'll do something to fix that shortfall -- and I suggest three things about that. First, they should, it's a Commanders responsibility. Second, better to do it on an organized basis and exercise some control rather them have them do it under the table and possibly cause the problems you cite.

The third factor involves the Intel community (and to an extent the SO/SF community) and its operating methods. As a team Intel sergeant, I was several times ordered not to share Intel with neighboring units on the grounds that the guy who gave the order (An FA MAJ on an SF tour) determined they did not have the need to know -- even though usually they had specifically asked for certain info. I did what I was told but I did argue about it and I did not then and do not now, many years later, believe he made the right call. I have seen that syndrome many time both before and since that period. I have no problem with protecting sources and methods but I have too often seen those things used as a reason to deny needed intel to units. Knowledge is power and all that. I have also seen time and again reports by troops on the ground (Inf, LRS and SF) get ignored by Intel types at higher echelons even if multiple troop reports corroborated the item and they ignored it on the basis their technical means couldn't verify it. Numerous variations on those themes over the years. The point is that if the Intel guys want to do it all, they need to convince their customers -- the Troops -- that they're a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

I have also responded on intel (local, theater and national) driven ops and have found that errors exceeded accuracy by a factor of about 2:1.

I understand all that's better now. I'll accept that it may be better but I suggest, as I said above, there are not enough intel folks to do what needs to be done. If it needs to be done, better to do it with some control than ignore the problem. Intel driven ops need to share ALL the info they have with the guys doing the work; withholding and dissembling get people killed needlessly.

[Ken White]

...However, the division (more accurately the GS elements of the DISCOM) still does some log stuff that I don't think the Army has figured out how to push down to the BCT without making the tail too big (which it probably already is anyway). And I'm not really sure how we ought to be structuring combat aviation from a C2persective either -- But this thread is not about C2 and headquarters functions. ;)I understand both issues and a few others are being worked -- and that there is some resistance to doing so. Plus ca change...:wry:

Be interesting to see how it works out over the next few years.

[Ron Humphrey]

it very common for those who know not to know who needs to know until after they really needed to know it:(

[ODB]

Orginally posted by Ken White:
Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing.

How easily terminology can make a difference, especially in dealing with this subject. Wonder if that has been the difference in some of the meanings and due to the terms used has misconstrued the point being made?

The third factor involves the Intel community (and to an extent the SO/SF community) and its operating methods. As a team Intel sergeant, I was several times ordered not to share Intel with neighboring units on the grounds that the guy who gave the order (An FA MAJ on an SF tour) determined they did not have the need to know -- even though usually they had specifically asked for certain info. I did what I was told but I did argue about it and I did not then and do not now, many years later, believe he made the right call. I have seen that syndrome many time both before and since that period. I have no problem with protecting sources and methods but I have too often seen those things used as a reason to deny needed intel to units. Knowledge is power and all that. I have also seen time and again reports by troops on the ground (Inf, LRS and SF) get ignored by Intel types at higher echelons even if multiple troop reports corroborated the item and they ignored it on the basis their technical means couldn't verify it. Numerous variations on those themes over the years. The point is that if the Intel guys want to do it all, they need to convince their customers -- the Troops -- that they're a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

I believe this truely gets to the heart of the problem. An old S3 of mine always told S2 "You look like you got a secret in your pocket and your not sharing." This happens all too much. Understandable at some levels but also avoidable. Experienced this in Afghanistan between conventional forces on an op and OGA on an op in the same area at the same time with neither knowing prior. This should have been handle at the G level staff prior, we were OPCON to the division. One of my biggest frustrations is simply no one is more special than someone else and if done correctly everyone looks good. Just don't understand the mentality of these folks.

Completely agree there is a huge intel problem and unfortunately those who have the ability to change it are not here reading this. A lot of it comes down to personal relationships and the ability to interact at levels beyond email.

Great posts and love drawing from others experience. Thanks

[Jedburgh]

....Maybe having some smart analysts who know how to pull data, know where to pull it from, and have the right pipes and wires to do so would be worth the investment at the company level, but let's not stick a DCGS terminal in every maneuver company.
Given the length of the thread, I'd just like to reiterate what I said a page of posts or so ago:

The critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And there isn't going to be anytime in the forseeable future. In any case, the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than those non-MI troops you already have who you've tasked to perform the mission in the absence of formal intel support. And in the rare instance where you do get an MI NCO sent to work at the company level in an combat arms unit - five will get you ten that he was let go to you for a reason.

Personally, I think a good combat arms SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst learning the ropes.
Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing.
Critical differentiation. Running sources is significantly different than handling a walk-in, or even just talking to people on patrol. The company needs to know how to handle all that raw human information coming in from the indig, and they have to have somebody to put it together. When someone suddenly decides to spill, you can't wait for someone else to come in from outside and handle it - you have to be able to do it in-house, and in a manner that would encourage other indig to do the same thing in the future.

Again - we've probably come to the limit of what may be discussed appropriately on the human sources subject on the open forum. ALCON: please avoid going any deeper with this aspect of the topic.

[Ken White]

...Completely agree there is a huge intel problem and unfortunately those who have the ability to change it are not here reading this. A lot of it comes down to personal relationships and the ability to interact at levels beyond email...that trend will continue. Right now, the personal relationships do make a difference.

Oh, FWIW, the incidents I mentioned; I was a very young SSG. Less than a couple-three years later, I'd have ignored him and slipped it to them anyway; gotta do what's right -- which may not always be what your boss wants... :D

[ODB]

Oh, FWIW, the incidents I mentioned; I was a very young SSG. Less than a couple-three years later, I'd have ignored him and slipped it to them anyway; gotta do what's right -- which may not always be what your boss wants...

Oh how true......no reduction boards for me anymore.....if only more knew their power and used it for good. Too many career oriented in the ranks today, made it further than I ever thought I would. Everything from this point is just a bonus.......:D

A wise old man once told me "Do what your rank can handle".

[William F. Owen]

Critical differentiation. Running sources is significantly different than handling a walk-in, or even just talking to people on patrol. The company needs to know how to handle all that raw human information coming in from the indig, and they have to have somebody to put it together. When someone suddenly decides to spill, you can't wait for someone else to come in from outside and handle it - you have to be able to do it in-house, and in a manner that would encourage other indig to do the same thing in the future.

Without getting into detail, this is exactly what manifested itself in the early days of Ulster/NI and is a source of my concern. Back in he 1970-75 time period, Coy and even BN Int was a cowboy game by all accounts, with BN IOs/S3 s running informal networks of HUMINT, and at some human cost.

In my experience, -ideally- I am not sure you would want someone engaging in the process described without having been selected and trained for that task

[davidbfpo]

"Walk-ins" are a much neglected aspect of law enforcement intelligence gathering and there are examples in UK mainland policing, during the Irish Troubles, where the "walk-in" was rejected and later found to be costly. They happen in the criminal, as distinct from ideological arena. The ability to listen is the key, perhaps police officers are better at that than soldiers? The "walk-in" has made their decision by time they reach you, ensuring their security is necessary and determined by the situation. Once the initial downloading has been given and needs independent / trained assessment the "walk-in" can leave (in the UK).

The biggest snags with "walk-ins" are that it maybe a one-off, there are those who like to talk - the Walter Mitty factor, potentially are a deception (rare in ordinary law enforcement) and the information is known to very few, leading to issues of verification and follow-up.

An alternative to "walk-in" is the confidential and usually anonymous phone or email and now text/SMS hotline. Crime stoppers being the most well known and in Northern Ireland this was prominiently advertised on security force vehicles - although I am not aware of how effective it was. Alas instead of talking to a person it is an ansaphone.

Slightly off topic, Company Level Int Ops, maybe.

davidbfpo

[Ron Humphrey]

While avoiding implications in current AO's I think there are some good examples from detention that point to where the expectations for formal training are often overdone.

A good officer learns to know the "terrain" simply by actually being in it. For those of us who took the time to listen to concerns of the population within the context of understanding that there were usually agendas at play it was very simple to track what was really happening in the jailhouse. If you learn the names of inmates and simple groupings as in who belonged to or hung out with what groups then it became much easier to identify and address issues much sooner. If you haven't seen someone around that usually does X at Y time on any given day then maybe you keep an eye out for G who usually does Y with X every day and if you have developed a basic rapport you end up with some discussion during which you can ask G why X isn't doing Y that day.

For most anyone this is a natural habit and so with just a little fine tuning can become an effective tool. It doesn't and should always be a difficult or tedious as it is often made out to be, and I'm concerned we do ourselves and our soldiers a disservice when we don't admit that. I would doubt many of the enlisted in MI wouldn't tell you that if others have concerns that they are getting in over their head they have little to no problem coming to you and saying : "Hey whats the deal"

Just my 1 1/2 ...

[wm]

The critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And there isn't going to be anytime in the forseeable future. In any case, the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than those non-MI troops you already have who you've tasked to perform the mission in the absence of formal intel support. And in the rare instance where you do get an MI NCO sent to work at the company level in an combat arms unit - five will get you ten that he was let go to you for a reason.

Sounds like a basic force structure problem to me. Last time I checked, MI was an inverted pyramid (or maybe a diamond)--a few entry level folks and a whole pile of more senior folks telling them what to do or analyzing the fruits of the junior folks' efforts. This is a paradox, methinks: We need lots of experienced folks to be good analysts, but we don't access enough folks to give them the experience they need to be good.

[Randy Brown]

As someone with one boot daily in the Army Lessons-Learned community, and one in a BCT intel shop on the M-day side, I've found this thread extremely enlightening. I've been inspired to write-up a short article on "company intel ops resources" for a monthly Lessons-Learned Integration (L2I) newsletter I edit for the Iowa Army National Guard.

I'm writing for two purposes:

To ask for your help in identifying articles and resources I should mention in my article.
To ask for any insights as to how the Army's new "Every Soldier is a Sensor" (aka "ES2"--the Army still can't get enough of squared and cubed acronyms, observes the "L2I" guy) individual Warrior Task can best be trained/implemented.

(By the way, is the ES2 concept--"it's not just the Intel soldiers who need to keep their eyes and ears open"--really all that new? I've got a bundle of cigars wrapped in a map of Antietam that says it isn't.)

References on Company-Level Intel

1LT Cola's article on "Suggestions for Creating a Company-Level Intel Cell" (Infantry, MAR/APR 08) will probably be the lead-in to my article, and Tom Odom has earlier in this thread pointed out a couple of CALL pubs that are worth their weights in precious metals. these are:

07-01 "Tactical Intelligence" newsletter
07-26 "Tactical Site Exploitation"
08-05 "Company-level Stabilty Operations and Support Operations"

(The commander-and-staff verion of CALL's "best-selling" First 100 Days series also covers some applicable intel and TSE stuff in brief. There are also some relevant and user-customizable GTAs.)

I've also seen cited here 1LT McGovern's "Organize for Company Intelligence Cells in COIN" (Fires Bulletin , JAN/FEB 08). And, of course, there's the Dr. Kilcullen's "28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" (Iosphere, Summer 06)

What have I missed?

Every Soldier is a Sensor

ES2 briefings and resources are available as part of the First Army Commander's Toolkit, which deploying commanders use to plan and document their unit's mobilization training. This is a CD-ROM that is/has migrated to a Web-based tool; I'm pretty sure that, if you need a copy, CALL either has or can get the latest for you. There are resources, regulations, and requirements for each Warrior Task and Theater-Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT). ES2 is one of these.

While ES2 training seems to sync with much of the discussion in this thread--soldiers don't run sources, but they do encounter informants; most soldiers aren't analysts or even collators, but they are collection-assets--the real, hands-on stuff seems to deal only with tactical questioning: "how to ask non-leading and compound questions" kind of stuff.

Beyond the tactical-questioning piece, and maybe the nuts-and-bolts on how to bag-and-tag enemy information, are there any areas on which a battalion- or company-level commander should focus "ES2" training, SOP-development, and other efforts? Any general (OPSEC, you know) suggestions on how best to train ANY of these skills?

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your comments.

[Jedburgh]

Randy, I also suggest you copy this same post on the BCKS COIN Operations forum (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=62317). You may also find the thread on Battalion Level and Below COIN Products, Tools & SOPs (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=520019) to be of interest.

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

The "traditional higher to lower never did work in my experience. If we try to make it work today with number of sensors available, we will overwhelm the poor company--my firehose. Maybe having some smart analysts who know how to pull data, know where to pull it from, and have the right pipes and wires to do so would be worth the investment at the company level, but let's not stick a DCGS terminal in every maneuver company.

WM

We are not advocating a company intel plug for the national fire hose. As I have said this is about collating and analyzing intel gathered by the manuever company in its own AO and then passing that collated/analyzed to higher. The taps into the national system should stay at BN and BCT via the S2 sections.

Tom

[wm]

WM

We are not advocating a company intel plug for the national fire hose. As I have said this is about collating and analyzing intel gathered by the manuever company in its own AO and then passing that collated/analyzed to higher. The taps into the national system should stay at BN and BCT via the S2 sections.

Tom

Maybe I'm not getting it or maybe we are just using different language to say the same thing. Your post above seems to me to be sort of what I was saying about the company needing the ability to maintain situational awareness and understanding of what is happening within its defined AO. I'm not sure of the need to pass this on to higher, except as a form of institutional record keeping--Why do we need to have companies sending along PERINTREP, Daily INTSUM, etc to Bn? Spot reports and daily opreps are more germane IMHO. The Bn 2 needs to sit with the 3 and glean appropriate data from those reports. The entire Bn staff needs to ensure the companies know the CCIR (Commander's Critical Information Requirements) and respond to them. As far as I can recall, CCIR include both enemy and friendly info.

What I am suggesting that seems somewhat new is sometimes (oftentimes?) companies need more support than they can generate locally. To get it in a timely way, they ought to be able to go straight to the source, but they probably need someone smart enough to know where that source is. In an efficiently and effectively networked environment, a company should not need to pass an RFI up through Bn and Bde. It should be able to pull what it thinks it wants/needs directly from any entity in the intel community. This is what I understand as timely/responsive (AKA "actionable") intelligence.

However, given the Byzantine/"need to know" shackled world that is the intel community, asking a maneuver guy to keep track of who is the "go to" guy for info, is asking too much. So maybe we should give the maneuver element an intel knowledge manager (perhaps "expediter" is a better term), someone who knows the intel filing cabinets well enough to go pull data out of the files for whomever he/she supports directly and then explains how good (or not so good) the info might be.

[Ken White]

Works for me and has been done before -- successfully.

I think a part of the problem is that all of us are saying pretty much the same thing with minor variants based on personal experience and preference -- and that happens in the operating world constantly. All Intel entities, all Battalions and Companies, even all ODA and ODB are not equal; some will always do some things better than others -- and differently than others. Seems to me the key is to not overstructure the process and to accept variations on the theme that the personalities of the day and time make work. :confused:

[Tom Odom]

Maybe I'm not getting it or maybe we are just using different language to say the same thing. Your post above seems to me to be sort of what I was saying about the company needing the ability to maintain situational awareness and understanding of what is happening within its defined AO. I'm not sure of the need to pass this on to higher, except as a form of institutional record keeping--Why do we need to have companies sending along PERINTREP, Daily INTSUM, etc to Bn?


You are overstating the use of the intel cell; it is not an "S2 section" in the company. As for passing on the information to higher, that is the source of most intel and it is not mere record keeping. No one is advocating a series of intel reports like you suggest. What does go up is an AO assessment/sitrep and it is not necessarily daily. If the BNs do not get the intel from below, they have very poor SU of their AO. The same holds true for the BDEs.

Tom

[George]

Got the word that Company-level Stability Ops, VOL 7, COIN is going up today (maybe tomorrow) at CALL. It contains 2 SWJ contributions: the first is an extract of the long piece we did on Kicullen's 28 articles Captains Kranc and Holzbach contributing; the second was CPT (nopw MAJ) Gwinn's Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon, first published on SWJ blog.

Best

Tom


It seems CALL is only available for US Military, not for civilians nor Soldiers from abroad. Is there a way to access these pages anyway?

George
Royal Netherlands Army

[Tom Odom]

It seems CALL is only available for US Military, not for civilians nor Soldiers from abroad. Is there a way to access these pages anyway?

George
Royal Netherlands Army

Through your military attache in the US. Takes some effort and time but it happens.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

The initial draft of TC 2-19.603 Company Intelligence Support Team (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?id=780758), dated 13 Mar 09, is now available for review.

AKO log-in and BCKS registration required

[RichC82]

Howdy all,

New to this board, but the subject of company level intel is one of my focus areas.

I think everyone is pretty much saying the same thing- like was earlier stated. I agree with Tom's last post though in that the purpose of a COIST (Company Intel Support Team) is NOT to replicate the BN/BDE S-2 reports or methods of operation. Neither should the COIST be involved with MSO (military source ops). The basic principle is just to be able to provide an accurate tactical view of the battlespace.

Without a COIST, the lowest level you have analysts is the BN where (as I am sure we all know) folks tend to be removed from the real tactical details of the COIN fight.

The COIST should not waste time trying to produce 'intelligence products', but should focus on organizing and passing data to the BN S-2 shop. This data is just info on personalities, patrol debriefs, tactics, and the operating environment in general. Through passing this data, the BN S-2 will have a better picture and should be able to coordinate HUMINT, work targeting ops, and provide a more accurate picture to the BDE S-2 shop.

In addition to all the printed resources on the subject of COIST already mentioned here, I would reccomend contacting the Asymetric Warfare Group prior to your deployment. Lets just say they will be able to square you away based upon timely and relevant experience in theater.

[Coldstreamer]

My battalion is (probably) going to return to Afgh this autumn.

From the last time, the big 'take away' was not to rely on any form of external specialist augmentation. Simply not enough experts to go around - and they're problably expert in the wrong thing for your needs at company level.

Given the likely nature of our tasks - company 'ink spot' efforts within an BG AO, and limited scope for meaty BG level manoeuvre, we've elected to convert our Recce Platoon into ISTAR Sections for the Company Groups. Each recce sect will have tac-intel, tac-questioning and other skill sets trained into it, above and beyond their surveillance and recon training.

ISTAR Sects will work shifts, with about half beasting the int picture, collating and sifting the rifle pl patrol reports and various other feeds. The other half will be out on the ground with the rifle multiples or on pre/post op sensor type tasks. They'll alternate between roles with staggered handovers, so that the guys doing the link analysis, putting the target packs together and the patrol briefs and debriefs will also be going out on the ground, chatting people up and keeping all patrol activity 'int-led' and collection focussed.

So far so good in terms of training and prep. The guys have also grasped the nettle big-style, realising the nature of the effort there. Not, repeat, NOT HUMINT of any form, merely good old fashioned, focussed Int Led Ops.

Will let you know how it progresses. But following Kilcullens '28 Principles', recommendation of putting your best soldier in the int jobs, its what we're doing - in a manner that keeps their other skills employed. If its successful, we'll look at keeping it a permanent capabilty.

[Ken White]

Far, far more productive than the too common American practice of making them a CP Guard or Cdrs escort.

Nah, it's a GREAT idea! :cool:

[slapout9]

My battalion is (probably) going to return to Afgh this autumn.

From the last time, the big 'take away' was not to rely on any form of external specialist augmentation. Simply not enough experts to go around - and they're problably expert in the wrong thing for your needs at company level.

Given the likely nature of our tasks - company 'ink spot' efforts within an BG AO, and limited scope for meaty BG level manoeuvre, we've elected to convert our Recce Platoon into ISTAR Sections for the Company Groups. Each recce sect will have tac-intel, tac-questioning and other skill sets trained into it, above and beyond their surveillance and recon training.

ISTAR Sects will work shifts, with about half beasting the int picture, collating and sifting the rifle pl patrol reports and various other feeds. The other half will be out on the ground with the rifle multiples or on pre/post op sensor type tasks. They'll alternate between roles with staggered handovers, so that the guys doing the link analysis, putting the target packs together and the patrol briefs and debriefs will also be going out on the ground, chatting people up and keeping all patrol activity 'int-led' and collection focussed.

So far so good in terms of training and prep. The guys have also grasped the nettle big-style, realising the nature of the effort there. Not, repeat, NOT HUMINT of any form, merely good old fashioned, focussed Int Led Ops.

Will let you know how it progresses. But following Kilcullens '28 Principles', recommendation of putting your best soldier in the int jobs, its what we're doing - in a manner that keeps their other skills employed. If its successful, we'll look at keeping it a permanent capabilty.

If you haven't already I would read the newTACTICS for COIN Manual, link is below.

http://usacac.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/coin/archive/2009/05/07/tactics-in-coin-fm-3-24-2-published.aspx

[William F. Owen]

Given the likely nature of our tasks - company 'ink spot' efforts within an BG AO, and limited scope for meaty BG level manoeuvre, we've elected to convert our Recce Platoon into ISTAR Sections for the Company Groups. Each recce sect will have tac-intel, tac-questioning and other skill sets trained into it, above and beyond their surveillance and recon training.

That is extremely interesting. I have to say, it is probably a good solution to the problem that was created by the British Army's way of doing things, but that's life.
Brits being Brits, it will no doubt be a roaring success, and after several hard blinks, it may have considerable merit.

In some ways it is back to the future. Back in 1918/19, the Bn Snipers and Observers worked directly for the IO, so as the tasking and reporting all worked smoothly.... but all that went away once Snipers became "special.."

[Coldstreamer]

We're ALL speshul!

Thanks for the encouraging words. We'll see how it goes. Its always easy to get excited about a 'new' idea - we need to stay focussed on getting the product collected and turned around so our ops are targeted and relevant.

Wilf - you're so right about WW1 first principles being right first time. We made an uber effort to keep the Int Cell/IO team tied in with the ISTAR and recon bit in prior training - and that was our start point. But also as you say, most of our ingenuity is forced from other areas being suboptimal...making a virtue of necessity...Like I say, I'll keep you posted on how it goes.