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Coldstreamer
09-01-2007, 07:19 PM
I'm about to take my company to Afghanistan next month, to an independent location away from my usual chain of command - great for autonomous command! - but will equally be very short on Int and surveillance assets other than what actionable stuff my guys and I can gather from our own framework patrolling. Linking in and making friends with all our allied and agency neighbours will be critical. Does anyone have any top tips about how I can optimise my processes, and achieve more focussed results. Gathering atmospherics is one thing...getting multi-source info properly analysed and turned into target packs at company level is another. My platoon commanders are all very green, likewise my company intel cell. My instinctive approach is slowly slowly catchee monkey - all the good Kilcullen 28 article stuff - but the last time I did this was Iraq, and at Div/ Bde level. Grateful for any pointers.

jcustis
09-01-2007, 08:05 PM
You've probably seen many of these considerations before, but here goes:

-Your smartest NCO should be the intel cell leader. He must have an aptitude for for data, statistics, faces, etc. A guy who follows sports scores and stats closely often proves to be the best choice.
-Build the depth required to operate the intel cell if one or two members take ill, are wounded, or simply need a break. The same folks cannot do it every day, on their own. They can fall into a rut of the same pattern, start to get sloppy, and worst of all, make mistakes that causes the men on the line to miss subtle things in the field. Along that line, one of the most critical things can be a Be-On-The-Lookout (BOLO) list. Any changes have to be promulgated to the maneuver elements as soon as possible.
-In the last few weeks you have to train and prepare, analyze the operations debrief script that your intel cell will work from when a patrol comes in. Sit back and ask yourself whether the information the script attempts to collect is actually beneficial. Put another way, are patrols going to be compiling information to satisfy a debrief, or compiling information and atmospherics that could facilitate follow-on missions in the field, and in-stride?
-Organize your command post to utilize both old school hardcopy and electronic target folders, as well as map, pen, and paper mission planning alongside your electronic planning tools. The enemy does not care that the generator just cut out.
-Train throughout the deployment, and keep personnel informed about not only your slice of the AO, but also the bigger picture of events that have occured elsewhere that may have an impact on your region (especially where transient bad guys may take up residence in your AO).
-Get your intel cell, battle captains/NCOs, and any other command post personnel out on aleaders reconnaissance, or at least out and about with a patrol once in a while. It goes a long way towards maintaining their situational awareness, perspective, and grasp of what the maneuver elements are dealing with every day. They should go out at least once a month, and preferably to all of the sectors within your AO.

Ken White
09-01-2007, 08:37 PM
LINK (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/organizing-for-counterinsurgen/).

LINK (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct06/Teamey-Sweet.pdf).

LINK (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine09/us/lessons_learned/art03.pdf).

LINK (http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/ProfWriting/tulak.pdf)

jcustis
09-02-2007, 01:55 AM
http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php

The Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency (one of the links on the page above) is also a very solid guide, and speaks to the intel-focused things you seem to be concerned about.

Tom Odom
09-05-2007, 02:15 PM
Go to CALL and look at the Company-level Stability Operatios and Support Operations series of newsletters. We used Brit TTPs heavily in Vols 1 and 3 by the way.

Vol 1 Command and Control--heavy on organizing for COIN
Vol 2 peacekeeping, EBo, and Security
Vol 3 Patrolling, Int, and IO
Vol 4 Counter-IED Ops
Vol 5 VBIEDs, Elections, PSDs
Vol 6 Tactical Marksmanship, Sniper, Counter-Sniper

Vol 7 will be COIN and Organizing for COIN with new material reemphasizing Vols 1 and 3.

See also Newsletter 07-01 Tactical Intelligence

Again go to Call and log on.

Best

Tom

Cavguy
09-05-2007, 06:03 PM
http://coin.army.mil

It also has the links to the CALL compilation of COIN knowledge. If you need specific research advice and work from CALL send me a PM.

Erick
09-13-2007, 02:50 AM
From my limited perspective, I'm very glad to see you'll have a co intel cell.

We were quite close to the flag pole but ended up developing the position of a co intel nco on our own. Being a NG entity and having a decent number of police officers / deputy sheriffs, many of whom had investigative experience, we had a group to draw from.

It was a fledgling effort, more could've been done but it was better than what we inherited.

Coldstreamer
10-31-2007, 02:27 PM
Been here a month. Fascinating op environment, esp the MN interaction piece. Many thanks for the advice and support from all.

C

Coldstreamer
12-10-2007, 04:52 PM
Not wanting to be all take and no give, this is the simple Int Collection plan we're using. It appears cyclical but is not; several phases take place in parallel, but it gives a framework (with thanks to Dave Kilcullen's 28 Articles..).

Phases. The following Phases will be executed to direct intelligence gathering efforts:

Phase 1.

Confirm what we think we know.

Take over existing relationships

Assess atmospherics and consent.

Report changes.

Phase 2.

Pursue answers to unknown questions.

Identify potential targets.

Develop Target Packs.

Identify Pattern of Life.

Phase 3.

Confirm Targets.

Establish Triggers

Exploit information from operations.

Reassess (return to Phase 1 Q 1)

Patrol Taskings. The Coy IO will generate specific intelligence tasks which will be allocated to patrols by Coy HQ.

Patrol Preparation. Detailed research on all available information held prior to patrols deploying is vital to ensure the patrol is able to judge developments in their target areas. The POC for area info is the IO.

Reporting. An initial hot debrief will be conducted by the IO following each patrol’s return. Patrol reports are to be submitted within 3 hrs of conclusion of hot debrief.

Very basic indeed, but basic is good in a rifle company where complex processes get bypassed or ignored. I've tried to distill the various areas of good advice into something more manageable.

C

Coldstreamer
12-10-2007, 05:17 PM
Targeting follows from collection, and merely serves to review:

Kinetic (kill or capture) targets (who? where? what evidence? what effect?)

Effects - 4 D's - Deter,Disrupt, Detain, Develop (more intel for subsequent ops - either by us or other agencies)

Non Kinetic targets (HA dropoff, CIMIC/CMA activities)

Effects - 4 Rs - Reassure (that we're there in local interests), Relieve (suffering, poverty), Regain (trust, consent, support, lost networks), Reinforce (Own FP through local sympathy/goodwill)

Harmonisation of the two (use NK activity to gather info on objectives or to conduct consequence managament after harder activities) and deconfliction to ensure mixed messages aren't being sent.

Slight risk of inventing my own doctrine on the hoof, but it seems to work for us!

Jedburgh
01-25-2008, 01:37 PM
Marine Corps Times, 18 Jan 08: Corps Creates Intel Cells at Rifle-Company Level (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/01/marine_company_intel_080117/)

....The C-LIC initiative, launched under the direction of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/) in Quantico, Va., will soon be battle-tested by California-based 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines (http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/fmf/3-4/), on its next Iraq deployment, slated for early 2008.

Today’s irregular warfare, with its lack of a uniformed enemy, makes intelligence gathering vital for enemy identification. To adapt to the emerging threat, infantry companies often create their own versions of ad hoc intelligence cells, said Vince Goulding, director of experimentation plans at the Warfighting Laboratory. But those individual efforts have been piecemeal, because the Corps had no standard training or equipment available, he said.

The new initiative for pushing intelligence analysis know-how down to the lower echelons, however, is about to change all that. Rifle companies will now be able to assess, analyze and disseminate information that they typically had relied on battalion or regimental command to produce.....

Tom Odom
01-29-2008, 08:10 PM
Got the word that Company-level Stability Ops, VOL 7, COIN is going up today (maybe tomorrow) at CALL. It contains 2 SWJ contributions: the first is an extract of the long piece we did on Kicullen's 28 articles Captains Kranc and Holzbach contributing; the second was CPT (nopw MAJ) Gwinn's Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon, first published on SWJ blog.

Best

Tom

Jedburgh
02-24-2008, 11:39 PM
Jan-Feb 08 Fires Bulletin: Organize for Intelligence: Company Intelligence Cells in COIN (http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2008/Jan_Feb_2008/Jan_Feb_2008_pages_14_18.pdf)

....More military intelligence Soldiers are needed to support companies within tactical battalions. Further, the need for enough “boots on the ground” to maintain effective coverage of and presence in a company AO makes it unlikely that a company commander could pull enough personnel away from line platoons to maintain a robust company intelligence cell. The solution to this dilemma lies in the company fire support team (FIST).

It is the company FIST’s versatility that makes it ideal to form the foundation of a company intelligence cell. In the COIN operations currently underway in Iraq and in addition to their traditional fire support tasks, FSOs and fire support NCOs (FSNCOs) are expected to assume responsibility at the company level for any or all of the following: targeting, air-ground integration, information operations, civil-military operations, psychological operations, employing enablers, public affairs and other functions. Effectively, company FSOs and FSNCOs in a COIN environment are fusion cells unto themselves. That being the case, it is not at all a stretch for the FSO or FSNCO to assume the intelligence role within the company.....

Cavguy
02-25-2008, 01:48 AM
Had this discussion at the last SWC Leavenworth get-together.

Agree a company needs an intel cell. In a pinch, and if available, the FS Team can fill it. Unless your FSNCO is not up to the job, like mine was. :wry:

Very few companies have an FSO in OIF. They've all been changed into platoon leaders of artillerymen acting as dismounted infantry.

I'd really like to see an analyst and a HUMINT guy added into each company - the first to process info higher and lower, and the second would give the commander the ability to run sources legally.

William F. Owen
02-25-2008, 09:17 AM
I'd really like to see an analyst and a HUMINT guy added into each company - the first to process info higher and lower, and the second would give the commander the ability to run sources legally.

One man cannot run a source. He can't identify, recruit, train, operate (task, monitor and debrief) and protect/recover an agent. All one guy can do is debrief someone once in a while. That means sit and chat. - what is more, a few armies cannot legally engage in agent handling operations, because of human rights legislation.

IMO Companies should focus on gathering for higher analysis and exploiting what is fed down to them. Coy level int is really a liaison task. There is no harm in having a specialist detachment at the Company level, but they are specialists, trained in Intelligence.

Jedburgh
02-25-2008, 12:16 PM
One man cannot run a source. He can't identify, recruit, train, operate (task, monitor and debrief) and protect/recover an agent. All one guy can do is debrief someone once in a while......
There are significant differences between fully structured agent ops and low-level source ops of the type that Cavguy is referring to. In neither case does "one man" truly run the op on his own. There has to be infrastructure in place to support him. However, at the tactical level, if that infrastructure is in place above Co level, then "one man" can do the job.

The caveat is that it would require an experienced HUMINT NCO to be effective. And even with the expansion of the field, there are nowhere near enough HUMINT NCOs - and even fewer with the appropriate experience - to provide effective fill.

Aside from manning issues, there will be no further discussion of the nuts and bolts of source ops on this board.

Thanks,

Ted

Cavguy
02-25-2008, 01:19 PM
Thanks Jed, I wasn't specific enough in my post.

I certainly believe the section as a whole must be bigger, I was mainly referring to the actual MI based augmentation, at a minimum. I'd like more, but a few actual MI NCO's plus platoon level intel augmentees can do it.

Good catch on the source. What you stated was what I meant, forgetting that "source running" to a CO CDR isn't the same as to a pro. I basically meant being able to recruit and pay informants, and give them low level tasks. THT's have this ability, but there aren't enough to go around, so the commander winds up "running" these low level sources, even though it's technically illegal. Having a HUMINTer (even better a team) in the company would allow him to create and develop informants in a more professional manner, and provide the expertise into keeping him out of trouble.

(trying to stay "above the line" in the discussion) ;)

William F. Owen
02-25-2008, 02:25 PM
I basically meant being able to recruit and pay informants, and give them low level tasks. THT's have this ability, but there aren't enough to go around, so the commander winds up "running" these low level sources, even though it's technically illegal. Having a HUMINTer (even better a team) in the company would allow him to create and develop informants in a more professional manner, and provide the expertise into keeping him out of trouble.


This indicates a vast problem area, based on my experience, but I am not sure how I can usefully comment given Jedburgh's prescription - WHICH I FULLY AGREE WITH as concerns intent.

About all I can say is IMO, this is not something the company level should be involved in. I guess I'll leave it at that.

selil
02-25-2008, 02:35 PM
It kind of sounds like you all do it differently in the military than we did it in law enforcement. From the sounds of it you all have large centralized authority that takes in from a variety of channels information and feeds that down to the unit/solider level. In law enforcement an officer/detective receives information and feeds "some" of that information up into either a detective bureau or now I guess Fusion Centers (though those may be going away). My experience obviously is at the bottom of that chain, but our expected effectiveness was at the localized or even patrol area. Since I worked in the court/corrections bureau we interviewed prisoners for housing assignments and gained some valuable/actionable intelligence on near feudal associations. I'm likely way off base and my knowledge is several years out of date. It seems like if you are dealing with an insurgency that is a distributed, and loosely organized entity, that a distributed intelligence apparatus with centralized reporting would be much better.

slapout9
02-25-2008, 02:43 PM
selil, you head the nail on the head. Good LE Intel is run from the street up to the top. Which then can be added to the big picture, which sometime never comes back down but at least they know about it.

wm
02-25-2008, 03:16 PM
What Slapout and Selil are calling intel would be what I call situational awareness. Depending on your frame of reference, situational awareness is what you really want anyway, IMHO. At the company level , I suspect I'd want to know who the likely bad guys are in my AO, what kind of things they might be contemplating doing, and what "tools" they might be planning on using to do it. To get this type of info, I think the "cop on the beat" approach to collection and analysis is probably the right model. Sort of like this: "I heard on the street that the A St. Gang is thinking they want to have it out with the Oak Hill Ave boys on Thursday night with knuckles, pipes, and baseball bats. Joe X from A St. was seen playing with a .38 last week. Last three times they fought, they had their dust ups in one of the vacant lots in the industrial park near the river. " You don't need some high level intel system pushing stuff down to you to figure out what all that means. And, it probably won't get you that kind of data to analyze anyway, while your foot patrols and neighborhood visibility will.

In fact, the more stuff that gets pushed down to you, the harder it will probably be to separate the wheat from the chaff, if there's even any wheat in the delivery. Having an intel analyst, who is most likely going to be an E3, E4, or junior E5, there at the company is not likely to be much help in sifting either. They will probably not have enough experience to find the gems any better than anyone else just because they got some schooling at Huachuca. The HUMINT guy that Cavguy wants may be a little more senior, but I doubt will have the all source experience needed to provide a good overall picture.

Common sense, tempered with sufficient cultural awareness to understand what is different every day about the AO compared to being back home on the block, probably does more in developing the situational awareness needed to mount sucessful stability ops at the company level.

Ken White
02-25-2008, 03:51 PM
...........

Cavguy
02-25-2008, 06:08 PM
They will probably not have enough experience to find the gems any better than anyone else just because they got some schooling at Huachuca. The HUMINT guy that Cavguy wants may be a little more senior, but I doubt will have the all source experience needed to provide a good overall picture.


Great Post. What I have been insufficently articulating is what I want from the intel guy. I don't need someone telling me about my AO. I know and see that from walking and talking to the people every day in sector, and my patrol leaders have the "feel" for what is going on. Most "boots on the ground" leaders understand it far better than a junior enlisted or midgrade MI guy ever will. (Although there are the exceptions) What we consistently fail at is to capture that information higher and lower.

I see two major gaps. The first is a lack of ability to gain, manage, and utilize informers that constantly approach leaders. I like your "cop" analogy - the guy who will tell you about the drug gang on the "down low". It's the role of THT's to do, but because commanders don't have enough THT's they wind up doing it out of necessity, legal or not. Every successful commander I saw had his informers and sources. One can wring hands about whether they should, but to be successful and know your AO you need a few informers. Sorting through and evaluating their information is tough. Many informers don't want to talk to an E3 THT member, they want to talk to the boss or an officer. Having a HUMINT type on staff can help guide the tactical leaders through it, keep them out of trouble, and keep higher in the loop.

The second gap is someone to debrief patrols, package the reports, and send them higher in an MI friendly way. Someone who knows all the MI databases and systems and can pull from higher's (vast) resources. Imagery, mapping, social networking tools, ISR coordination, etc. He can be the agent for procuring information for the Platoons and a conduit for their info higher.

As I said, I'm less interested in an analyst to tell me what is going on than personnel to help in the above fashion.

Without MI help, the work is done by whoever the commander picks (FIST, Company Intel Cell, etc) who are "pickup artists" at the tasks. In COIN, the Army owes a commander a trained intel support team at the company level. My higher S2 was always defensive when I criticized his analysis, and he finally reminded me that I wasn't sending him much to help fill in his picture. The commander, XO, and 1SG are so consumed/exhausted/busy they need a full time pro to do it, not a Shanghai'd 11B, 19D/K, or 13F.

Read that amazing NYT article on Afghanistan yesterday, and ask yourself if that commander has time to compile and manage his intel cell. He needs a pro to help, IMO.

Jedburgh
02-25-2008, 07:16 PM
....Without MI help, the work is done by whoever the commander picks (FIST, Company Intel Cell, etc) who are "pickup artists" at the tasks. In COIN, the Army owes a commander a trained intel support team at the company level. My higher S2 was always defensive when I criticized his analysis, and he finally reminded me that I wasn't sending him much to help fill in his picture. The commander, XO, and 1SG are so consumed/exhausted/busy they need a full time pro to do it, not a Shanghai'd 11B, 19D/K, or 13F....
In this, the conventional Army (with substantial differences in context, admittedly) is trying to replicate intel support capabilities that exist in the SF Groups. Unfortunately for the conventional units, the MI slots (and the 18F positions) have long been a part of SF authorized fill, while the rest of the Army is trying to beg, borrow or steal MI soldiers to pick up the slack. I don't see the Army expanding the MI field further to formally fill this requirement.

So, the critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than the "pick-up artists" you are currently working with. And of the NCOs that do get sent over - you're always going to get a chunk who were let go to you for a reason.

Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

Cavguy
02-25-2008, 07:51 PM
Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

No real disagreements there, good points. An E4 or junior E5 MI guy wouldn't be very value added, unless he was really high-speed. (I've always thought E-6 was about right) I have some concerns on this approach. I guess I never had great results from the combat arms S2 NCOIC (MSG) in my experiences, he was more of an assistant S3 SGM than an intel NCO, in practical use. I would see an additional combat arms SFC in the company as quickly becoming a HQ PSG rather than an S2 guy, because in garrison, what would he do?

Understand MI's manning challenges. However, it sure does seem like we have tons of guys running around in intel at nosebleed level, and very few at CO/BN level for a bottom-up intel environment.

I guess I'm looking for an endstate - a competent company intel cell that supports the commander and the platoons that isn't taken from existing authorizations.

Ken White
02-25-2008, 08:15 PM
"I would see an additional combat arms SFC in the company as quickly becoming a HQ PSG rather than an S2 guy, because in garrison, what would he do?"Cavalry troops, Infantry and Tank Companies and even one Artillery Battery {shudder...), I never served in one that did not have in Garrison a training NCO, generally a SSG and tabbed to the job from the Squad or Section he normally would be leading. In Korea, the Domincan Republic and Viet Nam they effectively became the de facto S2-S3 NCO AND served as Co/Trp LnNCO to the Bn/Sqn TOC. And yes, the buck sergeants that picked up their Squads did great. So did the random SP4/SPC who thereby became a Team Leader...

Some of the Companies in the DomRep even appointed a Platoon leader as an Ops/Intel Officer. That worked okay and again the NCO that became the acting PL could handle it. Most units were short of LTs and had one or two PSGs (some were SSGs) playing PL in any event

I've always thought the Co/Btry/Trp Tng (Op/Intel) NCO position had such value that it should've been recognized on the TOE. Both in the DomRep and Viet Nam they also ran the local informers who we paid by collections from the NCOs and Officers. Horrors! :eek:

Last tour in Korea, 1975-76, peacetime, our Brigade S2, an MI Officer, became thoroughly upset with the refusal of the Division G2 to share Intel and set up his own Agent net -- oops, local informer net -- and it was effective. Division, for example, had no idea who in the ROK Army had authority to blow the bridges and tank traps in event of an attack -- but our Bde knew...;)

Problems? Call BR 549, Ken's Cycle Shop -- Wheels Reinvented :D

Tom Odom
02-25-2008, 08:25 PM
Cavalry troops, Infantry and Tank Companies and even one Artillery Battery {shudder...), I never served in one that did not have in Garrison a training NCO, generally a SSG and tabbed to the job from the Squad or Section he normally would be leading. In Korea, the Domincan Republic and Viet Nam they effectively became the de facto S2-S3 NCO AND served as Co/Trp LnNCO to the Bn/Sqn TOC. And yes, the buck sergeants that picked up their Squads did great. So did the random SP4/SPC who thereby became a Team Leader...

Some of the Companies in the DomRep even appointed a Platoon leader as an Ops/Intel Officer. That worked okay and again the NCO that became the acting PL could handle it. Most units were short of LTs and had one or two PSGs (some were SSGs) playing PL in any event

I've always thought the Co/Btry/Trp Tng (Op/Intel) NCO position had such value that it should've been recognized on the TOE. Both in the DomRep and Viet Nam they also ran the local informers who we paid by collections from the NCOs and Officers. Horrors! :eek:

Last tour in Korea, 1975-76, peacetime, our Brigade S2, an MI Officer, became thoroughly upset with the refusal of the Division G2 to share Intel and set up his own Agent net -- oops, local informer net -- and it was effective. Division, for example, had no idea who in the ROK Army had authority to blow the bridges and tank traps in event of an attack -- but our Bde knew...;)



And if I can get the Company-level Stability Ops Newsletter VOL 7 on COIN up, it goes into this arena in depth.

the Brits call the O/I short course for company NCOs a "collator course" ; works well for them. See CALL Newsletter 05-17 Company-level stability operations and support operations, Vol 1 Command and Control


Problems? Call BR 549, Ken's Cycle Shop -- Wheels Reinvented :D

I had visions of Orange County Choppers with a Ken Sr and a Ken Jr...

But who would play Mikey?

wm
02-25-2008, 08:49 PM
Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

Concur. In most units where I ever served, we had a "field first/operations sergeant" that we carved out of hide if need be. Quite often it was the platoon sergeant who had done a bang up job training his/her LT platoon leader or the PSG who was lucky enough to get an LT assigned who already "got it" and could afford to spare that Sr NCO to the company. I think most Bde and higher level staffs probably have a few senior NCOs playing staff "toadie/go-fer" who could be spared to become company operations sergeants (I'm sure that TRADOC units have a bunch, unless things have changed radically), which is what I think we are really advocating for. They might need a little training on how to brief and debrief a patrol and how to poke in the data into a standardized report to the Bn2 shop, but the learning curve would be much less than trying to get an E4 96B up to speed.

Ken White
02-25-2008, 09:11 PM
And if I can get the Company-level Stability Ops Newsletter VOL 7 on COIN up, it goes into this arena in depth.

Hopefully, it'll resonate at upper levels and not get lost...


the Brits call the O/I short course for company NCOs a "collator course" ; works well for them. See CALL Newsletter 05-17 Company-level stability operations and support operations, Vol 1 Command and Control

They're ahead of us on the Intel and Recon bits of what we do. The 'not invented here syndrome' needs to be cast aside and we can learn from them.

I've long contended the title 'first sergeant' needs to go -- it has not served us well. The senior, most experienced NCO in a Co size unit should be the Chief trainer AND the Co Ops TTP guru, call him the Operations Sergeant (or the Marines can call him a Gunnery Sergeant) and he needs an Asst, an SFC who is Intel knowledgeable (Do away with the Army's 'Master Gunner' and its clones...). The Supply sergeant should do all the beans and bullets stuff and there needs to be an Admin NCO, SSG, to handle all that paperless office and personnel stuff. All that is changing but not rapidly enough, old habits die hard and names send images...

Also have long believed the Company/Troop XO is a total waste of an Officer space as currently envisioned -- I've seen way too many units operate very effectively without one.


I had visions of Orange County Choppers with a Ken Sr and a Ken Jr...

But who would play Mikey?

Provide Mikey and I'll take the job... :D

jcustis
02-26-2008, 02:11 AM
In this, the conventional Army (with substantial differences in context, admittedly) is trying to replicate intel support capabilities that exist in the SF Groups. Unfortunately for the conventional units, the MI slots (and the 18F positions) have long been a part of SF authorized fill, while the rest of the Army is trying to beg, borrow or steal MI soldiers to pick up the slack. I don't see the Army expanding the MI field further to formally fill this requirement.

So, the critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than the "pick-up artists" you are currently working with. And of the NCOs that do get sent over - you're always going to get a chunk who were let go to you for a reason.

Personally, I think a good combat arms staff SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst on his first deployment.

Perhaps what is really needed is an effective O&I course for combat arms NCOs that is similar to the 18F course (the current Battle Staff course doesn't cut it).

The Marine Corps' efforts in just that direction (training a NCO in O&I matters) are the right stuff I think, and reading this thread has convinced me that I'd rather carve a guy out of my organization (it would be better to have the extra T/O slot nonetheless) as opposed to picking up a fellow of unknown quantity who I have to train as a shooter on top of getting him to understand me through implicit communication. Working from a good base of implicit communication will always serve as the better foundation.

William F. Owen
02-26-2008, 05:39 AM
the Brits call the O/I short course for company NCOs a "collator course" ; works well for them.


Excellent observation. In my day those guys stayed the hell away from HUMINT. In the early days of NI there were some spectacular disasters with people trying to "play spy" and getting innocent folks killed.

IMO, the Coy level Int bod should debriefed patrols, keep the logging and reporting up to date, handle the classified material, and brief the out going patrols - and you need at least 2 men at the company level to do it properly, especially if you have some sort of major drama going on.

Tom Odom
02-26-2008, 01:19 PM
Excellent observation. In my day those guys stayed the hell away from HUMINT. In the early days of NI there were some spectacular disasters with people trying to "play spy" and getting innocent folks killed.

IMO, the Coy level Int bod should debriefed patrols, keep the logging and reporting up to date, handle the classified material, and brief the out going patrols - and you need at least 2 men at the company level to do it properly, especially if you have some sort of major drama going on.

Agreed. Just getting that process set in semi-permanent stone would be a step forward.

Best

Tom

davidbfpo
02-26-2008, 11:09 PM
The post of Collator was my first venture into intelligence work in the UK police, in era of filing cards and typed briefing bulletins. Very crude on reflection.

Always found "selling" intelligence to colleagues hard, although it can be easier now. HUMINT was not a role we had, although far later in my career it was.

The best results as a collator came far later, nine years ago, when the post was at a smaller station, with about fifty officers. Even then the majority did not contribute to the intelligence picture.

Shortly after an excellent IT system arrived that enabled direct access to the data warehouse where much of the police information was held and the collator role evolved again. Plus analysts started to arrive and all manner of intelligence structures / systems.

I am an advocate of tactical intelligence as close as possible to the frontline officer, in person and providing help from IT systems. Company level I suspect in the military world.

davidbfpo

SFdude
03-26-2008, 06:37 PM
All,

I have been reading some of the discussions and articles on this site and had not thought to talk about my current thesis project until someone else suggested it.

I am conducting a survey to complete my data collection, and evaluate some of my ideas and recommendations on establishing and useing company intelligence sections. If you are interested in completing the survey please follow the link below and follow the online instructions. Please feel free to contact me if you have more ideas and opinions not covered in the survey. If you are interested in my findings or what I have learned so far please feel free to contact me directly.

The introduction below will give you an idea of what I am doing for my research and thesis. I am looking for individuals who have experience in OEF/OIF and other conflicts as company commanders, Battalion Staff, or intelligence experience with tactical units, during operational deployments.

thanks
LTC Paul Cuppett







Survey link: http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/?p=WEB227LJM8QRYW (if this does not activate please cut and paste)


National Defense Intelligence College Thesis Survey

1. Introduction. My name is LTC Cuppett; I am a Special Forces officer currently transitioning to Military Intelligence. As part of my transition schooling, I am attending the National Defense Intelligence College and completing a Masters in Strategic Intelligence. My thesis project is examining how to improve the intelligence capabilities of units conducting the local counterinsurgency fight. Based on the literature that I have read and personal experience, I feel the critical part of winning a counterinsurgency war, is dependent on the successful mission executed at the local level. Local by my definition, is the area of responsibility for a maneuver company. Usually the company area is a small city, several connected villages or a large neighborhood. In my research and past OIF experience, intelligence appears to be the key to successfully executing the local counterinsurgency mission.

2. Purpose. The following survey is being used to help determine how to best support maneuver companies with intelligence assets. The data from this survey will be compiled with previously collected data that has been gathered through observation, After Action Review’s and Lessons Learned articles. This data will first be used as data for my thesis argument, as part of the requirement for completing a Masters in Strategic Intelligence. I will share the findings of my research with action officers working this issue at the United States Army Intelligence School and Center along with the current Action Officer at the Army G2 office.

3. Attribution. The answers will be considered your personal opinion and not the views of your unit or the Army. Your answers will only be referenced by your position in a unit and experience. The information you provide in your answers will be kept confidential and will only be used to identify trends as part of the larger thesis research project.

3. Attribution. The answers will be considered your personal opinion and not the views of your unit or the Army. Your answers will only be referenced by your position in a unit and experience. The information you provide in your answers will be kept confidential and will only be used to identify trends as part of the larger thesis research project.

4. It is critical that the issues being examined in the survey be addressed by operational units and leaders. The data from the survey, thesis abstract or thesis will be available upon request for anyone participating in the survey. Please contact me at the address below to request a copy of any of the research data or written products. Thank you for your time and participation. This is a critical issue that I hope to assist in resolving.

5. Directions. Please follow the attached link to the online survey and follow the directions on the website. http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/?p=WEB227LJM8QRYW If you are unable to access the survey on the web, use the attached word document to complete the survey. Indicate your answer by either filling in a short answer or placing the corresponding letter of your answer in the space provided. Please return the survey by forwarding the email to my AKO account.


LTC Paul Cuppett
NDIC Student
(202) 231-3806
DSN 428-3806
AKO paul.cuppett@us.army.mil
SIPR paul.cuppett@us.army.smil.mil
JWICS yacuppj@dia.ic.gov

Tom Odom
03-27-2008, 01:40 PM
Paul,

Look at the following CALL products. They all cover the arena you are studying.


Newsletter 05-17 Company level SOSO Vol 1, Command and Control

Newsletter 05-27 Company level SOSO Vol 3, Patrolling, Intelligence, and IO

Newsletter 07-01 Tactical Intelligence

Newsletter 08-05 Company level SOSO Vol 7,Organizing for COIN

I would also suggest that you go to the CALL web site and search the CTC trends for the past 4 years using company and intelligence separately as key words.

best

Tom

Stan
03-27-2008, 02:00 PM
Colonel, Welcome aboard !
I would have gladly taken your survey, but didn't make it past the "Rank" drop down menu :(

A shame, that such a survey would not consider or include NCOs. I think you stand to gain quite a bit from NCO/SNCOs.

Good luck with your thesis !

Regards, Stan


All,

I have been reading some of the discussions and articles on this site and had not thought to talk about my current thesis project until someone else suggested it.

I am conducting a survey to complete my data collection, and evaluate some of my ideas and recommendations on establishing and useing company intelligence sections. If you are interested in completing the survey please follow the link below and follow the online instructions.

Vic Bout
03-27-2008, 05:16 PM
as a former 180A w/ intel experience in OEF/OIF I was dismayed that you had no Warrant Officers on the pull down. Lotsa my fellow warrants involved with that business.

marct
03-30-2008, 02:40 PM
Hi Paul,

This is more of a conceptual question, but can you define what limits you are placing on "Intelligence"? For example, are you including Human Terrain, local semantics, etc. in your definition or are you restricting it to a more "classical" military definition?

Marc

Jedburgh
03-30-2008, 03:39 PM
...This is more of a conceptual question, but can you define what limits you are placing on "Intelligence"? For example, are you including Human Terrain, local semantics, etc. in your definition or are you restricting it to a more "classical" military definition?
Marc,

At the risk of hijacking Paul's thread, I just wanted to state that I feel your question reflects a common misperception about Military Intelligence. What you refer to as "Human Terrain, local semantics, etc", are aspects of intelligence that have long been a piece of the MI collection and analysis puzzle, although using different terms over the years, and often neglected by the conventional Army side of MI. But even the conventional side paid attention to the "subject peoples" of the former Soviet Union and their potential for exploitation should the Cold War have turned hot. I trust that Paul, coming from the SOF side of the house, is more than familiar with past and current applications.

And as an aside, you can't get much more "classical" in a military sense than Ceasar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico, where he certainly covers the bases in analyzing the human terrain.

marct
03-31-2008, 01:42 PM
Hi Ted,


At the risk of hijacking Paul's thread, I just wanted to state that I feel your question reflects a common misperception about Military Intelligence. What you refer to as "Human Terrain, local semantics, etc", are aspects of intelligence that have long been a piece of the MI collection and analysis puzzle, although using different terms over the years, and often neglected by the conventional Army side of MI. But even the conventional side paid attention to the "subject peoples" of the former Soviet Union and their potential for exploitation should the Cold War have turned hot. I trust that Paul, coming from the SOF side of the house, is more than familiar with past and current applications.

I knew that they had been, but I wasn't sure if they still were, what with burgeoning specialist groups showing up - it was really for clarification.


And as an aside, you can't get much more "classical" in a military sense than Ceasar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico, where he certainly covers the bases in analyzing the human terrain.

LOLOL - And then there's my favorite Roman author, Tacitus and is Germania :D. One of the backburner projects I have kept simmering away for a decade or so is trying to analyze the relationship between ethnographic writing and military intelligence, going back to Xenophon and Tacitus in the West and THe Book of Barbarian Kingdoms in China.

(Sort of back to Paul's thread...)

One of the things I have noticed about the introduction of the HTTs was that they were at Battalion and Brigade level, and that does, in some ways, bother me. I see it as a potential organizational culture vector that pushes the human terrain away from the company level, at least in terms of analytics and resources, and that makes me concerned that it could decouple the human terrain from the people who have to move in it.

I really should have been clearer and not used the phrase "classical" :wry:. What I was getting at was an analysis of the human terrain that was fairly static (e.g. lists of people, placement in a static social system, etc.) rather than aggressively dynamic (which is much harder to do).

marct
04-01-2008, 12:31 PM
Hi Ted,


Marc, now that's something I'd be interested in giving a look-over. Although I enjoy reading the truly ancient, what I've found most useful in that regard is the memoirs, diaries and travel reports of the old Brit "Political Officers" (mostly covering the Middle East & Central Asia) in the late 1800s-early 1900s.

As I said, it's a backburner project at the moment. Part of the reason is that my Latin, Greek (for the Byzantine stuff) and Arabic just isn't up to the task of translating most of what I need :wry:. The memoires, diaries, travelogues, etc. are really interesting. I've always been partial to both the popular ones and the organized ones like the Jesuit Relations (http://puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/relations/).

For me, one of the more interesting things about them is the insights on how people built their taxonomies of the world in terms of perception (what do I see that makes a difference), understanding (verstehen) and explanation (erklaren). Sort of taking Bateson's definition of information ("a difference that makes a difference") and inverting it to analyze the cultural mindset of the producers of the document. If I can get a similar thing from the "other side(s)", that's when it gets really interesting, although so far I have only found one (the meeting between the leaders of the First Crusade and the Byzantine Emperor recorded by Fulcher of Chartres and Anna Comnenus).

At any rate, I'll stop side-tracking the discussion :D.

Jedburgh
04-14-2008, 08:24 PM
Infantry, Mar-Apr 08: Suggestions for Creating a Company-Level Intel Cell (http://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/2008/2008_2/06_pf.pdf)

AKO Log-In Required

You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?......

William F. Owen
04-15-2008, 04:45 AM
You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?......

I think there is a world of difference between "creating a Coy Int cell" from within the Coy or BG, and having an "Int Cell" (4-6 guys) attached to the company for the duration. I favour bolt-on I-cells with the relevant skills all close to the boil. How you create and sustain such teams is a huge issue.

Perhaps each Brigade could have an COIN Int-Company, that deploys sections down to the company locations, as and when required.

Tom Odom
04-15-2008, 02:06 PM
I think there is a world of difference between "creating a Coy Int cell" from within the Coy or BG, and having an "Int Cell" (4-6 guys) attached to the company for the duration. I favour bolt-on I-cells with the relevant skills all close to the boil. How you create and sustain such teams is a huge issue.

Perhaps each Brigade could have an COIN Int-Company, that deploys sections down to the company locations, as and when required.

the units that do this (create an intel cell) report good results

The relevant CALL Newsletter 08-05 is up now on the CALL gateway for those with access.

Tom

Steve Blair
04-15-2008, 02:13 PM
the units that do this (create an intel cell) report good results

The relevant CALL Newsletter 08-05 is up now on the CALL gateway for those with access.

Tom

I would tend to suspect (and it's a suspicion, mind) that "growing" a cell would be better than bolt on, if for no other reason than the home-grown cell would understand the unit's AO, operating procedures, and so on. Any element coming from outside would have that additional learning curve to deal with. But that's just me. It also squares to a degree with some of the experience from Vietnam and the Philippines where units grew their own intel sections (although they weren't always called that) and developed a more responsive system of intel collection and (just as importantly) dissemination within the unit. The further removed it become, the less responsive it became.

wm
04-15-2008, 02:50 PM
I would tend to suspect (and it's a suspicion, mind) that "growing" a cell would be better than bolt on, if for no other reason than the home-grown cell would understand the unit's AO, operating procedures, and so on. Any element coming from outside would have that additional learning curve to deal with.

We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

Steve Blair
04-15-2008, 02:55 PM
We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

Quite true. Staggering such things would work well. So long as the intel is developed at the local level and can be acted on at the local level without it having to trickle up and back down a chain somewhere I'm a happy camper.:)

jcustis
04-15-2008, 03:11 PM
We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

This is so commonsense, it's almost embarrassing. I've mulled this over for a few minutes, and right now, I can see absolutely no good reason why this couldn't work as a win-win.

It may take some imagination to implement, but damn this makes too much sense.

Tom Odom
04-15-2008, 03:23 PM
And while I agree such linkups would be a good solution, reality in the form of Murphy's Law concerning scheduling TOAs among various elements with overlapping schedules has been a real problem.

Tom

William F. Owen
04-15-2008, 03:24 PM
We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.

My intention in advocating discussion of Bolt On Int Cells is to prevent the absorption of Infanteers into the "I" side of life. I can't see the difference between an Int Cell and any other attached arm. What is more if there was dedicated Sub-unit Intel grouping they could develop a deeper skills set.

Tom Odom
04-15-2008, 03:30 PM
My intention in advocating discussion of Bolt On Int Cells is to prevent the absorption of Infanteers into the "I" side of life. I can't see the difference between an Int Cell and any other attached arm. What is more if there was dedicated Sub-unit Intel grouping they could develop a deeper skills set.

And while the infantry has had some concerns, the use of infantry in such roles has proven quite effective. As I said earlier on this same thread, much of what is discussed as company intelligence operations is done by collators on the British side.

Again for those with access, look at CALL Newsletter 08-05.

Tom

Jedburgh
04-15-2008, 03:30 PM
We hear on other threads about the "learning curve" issue associated with unit rotations. Perhaps a solution would be to bolt on a newly arrived maneuver company to an existing intel cell that has been in country for 6 months or so. In other words, stagger rotations so that either the maneuver unit or its supporting intel team has enough time on station to bring the other element up to speed on the AO's peculiarities. I doubt a 2-week right seat ride during a RIP/TOA would be adequate.
Over a decade ago, working with a small multi-national group in an isolated location, as the U.S. intel guy, I was doing six month rotations, while the split team that made up the rest of the U.S. element was on 90-day rotations. We were staggered, so that it essentially worked out the way you described. I thought it was a good system at the time, although, of course, still subject to the personal leadership and individual capabilities vagaries that have already been discussed.

There is no good reason that it shouldn't work just as well in the Big Army on operational deployments. And that's why it won't happen....

wm
04-15-2008, 05:02 PM
There is no good reason that it shouldn't work just as well in the Big Army on operational deployments. And that's why it won't happen.... Why is it that folks with an intell background tend to be so cynical? ;)

To several posters' points about scheduling and staffing, I submit that it can work if folks want to make it work. Like most things worth doing, it will require some pain and suffering to implement--some intel teams will have to stay in theater longer than they would otherwise in order to get the overlap going. To Wilf's point, I think we need to require that these cells be staffed with 96/97/98 series MOS (or 35xxx or whatever other number the personnel weenies have decided to hang on Army intel specialists).

ODB
04-15-2008, 05:09 PM
I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down. How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies? It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level. Have seen the effects of conventional units playing this game, good people end up dead. IMHO this is another example of the political infighting within the Army itself. See we can do this, we don't need them, give us more funding, the list goes on and on. Everyone trying to do everyone elses job instead of their own. Like to see the TTPs on this one along with what schooling will be required. Will we create another institution or steal the seats from already existing courses?

Personally have yet to see an example of where this was needed? There are more intel assets in that country than anyone could imagine. Sounds like there is not good cross communication between them. Everyone keeps talking about situational awareness, well that includes knowing what assets you have available. Think passage of friendly lines coordination. There are a lot of basic tasks we do not do, simple because we think they are not cool. Get back to basics know who is operating in you AOR both FRIENDLY and enemy.

Please do correct me if I'm not seeing this correctly, reason I joined to gain knowledge and perspective. Thank you.

Steve Blair
04-15-2008, 05:17 PM
I can only speak to this from the historical perspective, but crossflow with intel has always been difficult for the Army. In Vietnam, to use one example, info usually flowed up the chain but often didn't come back down to the local units unless some sort of unofficial arrangement was made. There were cases (one occurred near FSB Ripcord) where a unit took serious casualties when they were hit by an NVA unit that a SigInt unit on Ripcord knew about but couldn't tell the local battalion about. After that unofficial arrangements were made, but officially intel continued to flow up and settle. This was a continuous problem with MACV/SOG intel as well, which went straight to the higher command levels and often never made its way back to units that could have acted on the information (later in the war some of the FOB commanders made the same accommodation with local units...and the fiction of a friendly guerrilla unit was created to facilitate the information shift).

It's great to talk about knowing the enemy, and in many cases units do. But their focus can be restricted by real or artificial terrain considerations (don't look behind the bamboo curtain...there are no NVA in Laos or Cambodia - just one example) or by operational concerns. Having a cell that focuses on just intel (be it local gathering, collating information, or what have you) might be worth at least trying. IMO, anyhow.

jcustis
04-15-2008, 05:21 PM
How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies?

Good question, but they are tied into battalion S-2 as the highest point in the hierarchy. The don't submit RFIs directly to higher HQs.


It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level. Have seen the effects of conventional units playing this game, good people end up dead.

Definitely has that potential, which is why it needs buy-in and a careful eye from the commander (battalion) to ensure things aren't getting loosey goosey.


See we can do this, we don't need them, give us more funding, the list goes on and on.

At least in the Marine Corps context, it's not so much that we don't need them, but rather that we don't have them (a sizeable S-2) or can't tap into them directly due to distance constraints b/n a Bn CP and the company COPs.


Personally have yet to see an example of where this was needed? There are more intel assets in that country than anyone could imagine. Sounds like there is not good cross communication between them. Everyone keeps talking about situational awareness, well that includes knowing what assets you have available. Think passage of friendly lines coordination. There are a lot of basic tasks we do not do, simple because we think they are not cool. Get back to basics know who is operating in you AOR both FRIENDLY and enemy.

You are absolutely right on all accounts, but a battalion isn't going to be able to influence better coordination and/or accountability at those higher levels, so it reverts to what it can do and changes those things it can change (sound like an AA meeting?)

wm
04-15-2008, 05:28 PM
I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down. How will these company cells be tied into the rest of the intel agencies? It's a dangrous game to be playing at this level.

I seed this as an off shoot of transformation and the general inability/undesirability to place a large enough force structure in place in theater to do the job right. We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly. I submit that an operations support cell (remember that training sergeant and company clerk to supplement the Bn PAC that every company seems to have taken out of hide in garrison? )can do a lot of the routine SA work, but it will easily be overwhelmed when the information (I meant that, not intelligence BTW) firehose from above is turned on to beef up SA at the company level.

William F. Owen
04-15-2008, 06:28 PM
And while the infantry has had some concerns, the use of infantry in such roles has proven quite effective. As I said earlier on this same thread, much of what is discussed as company intelligence operations is done by collators on the British side.

Again for those with access, look at CALL Newsletter 08-05.

Tom

I am not doubting their success. I went from Infantry to Intelligence, It's not such a big leap. My question and concerns are posed towards Sub Unit Int Cells becoming part of the TOE.

If they don't become part of the TOE then they'll remain a product of "ad-hocery" and skills will perish between deployments/Operations/Wars especially if they are not under pinned with some solid trade training

- unless the required levels of skills is such that no specialist training is required, the Int Cell is not part of the TOE, but takes men out of the platoons, and is only formed as and when required.

It may be that the later is considered the best option.

Tom Odom
04-15-2008, 06:32 PM
WM: but it will easily be overwhelmed when the information (I meant that, not intelligence BTW) firehose from above is turned on to beef up SA at the company level

That is not happening and that is the point. The traditional higher to lower in this fight does not work. That was apparent before we "transformed" the BCT; that transformation certainly complicated life. The company effort is centered on its AO and it drives the continual assessment process.


ODB: I personally am having a hard time accepting the fact you need company level intel cells. Very few units in the Army push missions up vs. missions being pushed down.

That too is happening as astute S3s at BN pick up on the fact that their line companies have the best operational grasp.

Again, I will suggest that if you have access you go read some of the material on this subject. If you don't have access, look at CPT Gwinn's article (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/organizing-for-counterinsurgen/) as an example. It is here on SWJ.

Tom

Ken White
04-15-2008, 07:28 PM
WM said:
We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly.To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.

wm
04-15-2008, 08:27 PM
That is not happening and that is the point. The traditional higher to lower in this fight does not work. That was apparent before we "transformed" the BCT; that transformation certainly complicated life. The company effort is centered on its AO and it drives the continual assessment process.



Tom,

The "traditional higher to lower never did work in my experience. If we try to make it work today with number of sensors available, we will overwhelm the poor company--my firehose. Maybe having some smart analysts who know how to pull data, know where to pull it from, and have the right pipes and wires to do so would be worth the investment at the company level, but let's not stick a DCGS terminal in every maneuver company.

wm
04-15-2008, 08:38 PM
WM said:To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.

Ken,
I can't disagree with your point about divisions' primary value being related to the total one and two button count out there (if I remember the section on GO strength in the US Code correctly the 3 and 4 button count is also a function of the total number of 1 and 2 buttons). However, the division (more accurately the GS elements of the DISCOM) still does some log stuff that I don't think the Army has figured out how to push down to the BCT without making the tail too big (which it probably already is anyway). And I'm not really sure how we ought to be structuring combat aviation from a C2persective either --But this thread is not about C2 and headquarters functions. ;)

ODB
04-15-2008, 09:26 PM
After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets. There is enough issues with those units who can and the agencies involved. Too many, tapping a shallow pool. The thought of many more people attempting to do this (which many already are)instead of going through the proper channels IMO is part of the problem, not a solution. When they do this and report it as intel, makes second sourcing it very difficult especially when many times it is the same source going to multiple locations to make money. The solution is hand these guys off to the proper entity to handle and all will benefit from it. Honestly I vehemently disagree with conventional forces tasking, training, paying......nothing else needs to be said.

jcustis
04-15-2008, 09:33 PM
After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets.

I'd have to say ixna on running sources too, and we don't train these hard chargers for that. I think the more appropriate term would be "information" collection cell.

What you reference above is exactly how I helped train up a Reserve unit's cell during a pre-deploy work up. The best guys for this work have a penchant for data, like a sports junky who studies and memorizes box scores, for example.

Ken White
04-15-2008, 11:07 PM
After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.Well, more correctly, we can agree on that...
I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets. There is enough issues with those units who can and the agencies involved. Too many, tapping a shallow pool. The thought of many more people attempting to do this (which many already are)instead of going through the proper channels IMO is part of the problem, not a solution. When they do this and report it as intel, makes second sourcing it very difficult especially when many times it is the same source going to multiple locations to make money. The solution is hand these guys off to the proper entity to handle and all will benefit from it. Honestly I vehemently disagree with conventional forces tasking, training, paying......nothing else needs to be said.While disagreeing on this. In a perfect world, I'd agree with you but having worked both sides of the SF/Conventional fence, the problem is that just as all Battalions and Companies are not great, All A (and B) Teams are not great. I've always had a suspicion that too many Intel folks, when they were in Kindergarten, got a report card that said "Doesn't share well with others." The Intel side is spread too thin, in a war never has enough really well trained people and has a bad tendency to withhold info from users -- or tailor it.

So while I agree with you in principle, in practice a unit that wants to know what's going on its AO (particularly in an urban environment) has little choice; I've done it --as have thousands of others -- and it works. It works without disrupting the 'real' intel types, too.

Edited to add:

On re reading this after a good dinner, it seems more brusque than intended; few more thoughts:

Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing. I'd also note that nature hates a vacuum and something will rush to fill it. If units believe they're getting stiffed on Intel -- and many do (see below) -- they'll do something to fix that shortfall -- and I suggest three things about that. First, they should, it's a Commanders responsibility. Second, better to do it on an organized basis and exercise some control rather them have them do it under the table and possibly cause the problems you cite.

The third factor involves the Intel community (and to an extent the SO/SF community) and its operating methods. As a team Intel sergeant, I was several times ordered not to share Intel with neighboring units on the grounds that the guy who gave the order (An FA MAJ on an SF tour) determined they did not have the need to know -- even though usually they had specifically asked for certain info. I did what I was told but I did argue about it and I did not then and do not now, many years later, believe he made the right call. I have seen that syndrome many time both before and since that period. I have no problem with protecting sources and methods but I have too often seen those things used as a reason to deny needed intel to units. Knowledge is power and all that. I have also seen time and again reports by troops on the ground (Inf, LRS and SF) get ignored by Intel types at higher echelons even if multiple troop reports corroborated the item and they ignored it on the basis their technical means couldn't verify it. Numerous variations on those themes over the years. The point is that if the Intel guys want to do it all, they need to convince their customers -- the Troops -- that they're a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

I have also responded on intel (local, theater and national) driven ops and have found that errors exceeded accuracy by a factor of about 2:1.

I understand all that's better now. I'll accept that it may be better but I suggest, as I said above, there are not enough intel folks to do what needs to be done. If it needs to be done, better to do it with some control than ignore the problem. Intel driven ops need to share ALL the info they have with the guys doing the work; withholding and dissembling get people killed needlessly.

Ken White
04-16-2008, 01:30 AM
...However, the division (more accurately the GS elements of the DISCOM) still does some log stuff that I don't think the Army has figured out how to push down to the BCT without making the tail too big (which it probably already is anyway). And I'm not really sure how we ought to be structuring combat aviation from a C2persective either -- But this thread is not about C2 and headquarters functions. ;)I understand both issues and a few others are being worked -- and that there is some resistance to doing so. Plus ca change...:wry:

Be interesting to see how it works out over the next few years.

Ron Humphrey
04-16-2008, 01:32 AM
it very common for those who know not to know who needs to know until after they really needed to know it:(

ODB
04-16-2008, 03:11 AM
Orginally posted by Ken White:

Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing.

How easily terminology can make a difference, especially in dealing with this subject. Wonder if that has been the difference in some of the meanings and due to the terms used has misconstrued the point being made?


The third factor involves the Intel community (and to an extent the SO/SF community) and its operating methods. As a team Intel sergeant, I was several times ordered not to share Intel with neighboring units on the grounds that the guy who gave the order (An FA MAJ on an SF tour) determined they did not have the need to know -- even though usually they had specifically asked for certain info. I did what I was told but I did argue about it and I did not then and do not now, many years later, believe he made the right call. I have seen that syndrome many time both before and since that period. I have no problem with protecting sources and methods but I have too often seen those things used as a reason to deny needed intel to units. Knowledge is power and all that. I have also seen time and again reports by troops on the ground (Inf, LRS and SF) get ignored by Intel types at higher echelons even if multiple troop reports corroborated the item and they ignored it on the basis their technical means couldn't verify it. Numerous variations on those themes over the years. The point is that if the Intel guys want to do it all, they need to convince their customers -- the Troops -- that they're a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

I believe this truely gets to the heart of the problem. An old S3 of mine always told S2 "You look like you got a secret in your pocket and your not sharing." This happens all too much. Understandable at some levels but also avoidable. Experienced this in Afghanistan between conventional forces on an op and OGA on an op in the same area at the same time with neither knowing prior. This should have been handle at the G level staff prior, we were OPCON to the division. One of my biggest frustrations is simply no one is more special than someone else and if done correctly everyone looks good. Just don't understand the mentality of these folks.

Completely agree there is a huge intel problem and unfortunately those who have the ability to change it are not here reading this. A lot of it comes down to personal relationships and the ability to interact at levels beyond email.

Great posts and love drawing from others experience. Thanks

Jedburgh
04-16-2008, 03:20 AM
....Maybe having some smart analysts who know how to pull data, know where to pull it from, and have the right pipes and wires to do so would be worth the investment at the company level, but let's not stick a DCGS terminal in every maneuver company.
Given the length of the thread, I'd just like to reiterate what I said a page of posts or so ago:

The critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And there isn't going to be anytime in the forseeable future. In any case, the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than those non-MI troops you already have who you've tasked to perform the mission in the absence of formal intel support. And in the rare instance where you do get an MI NCO sent to work at the company level in an combat arms unit - five will get you ten that he was let go to you for a reason.

Personally, I think a good combat arms SFC/MSG who is already settled in the unit has far more capability to fill that operational need than a SPC/SGT MI troop who comes in as a new attachment to fill a temporary need. Learning "databases and systems" is the easy part - being able to integrate it into an operational context is quite another. An experienced NCO is always going to be better at putting it into context for the commander than a cherry analyst learning the ropes.

Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing.
Critical differentiation. Running sources is significantly different than handling a walk-in, or even just talking to people on patrol. The company needs to know how to handle all that raw human information coming in from the indig, and they have to have somebody to put it together. When someone suddenly decides to spill, you can't wait for someone else to come in from outside and handle it - you have to be able to do it in-house, and in a manner that would encourage other indig to do the same thing in the future.

Again - we've probably come to the limit of what may be discussed appropriately on the human sources subject on the open forum. ALCON: please avoid going any deeper with this aspect of the topic.

Ken White
04-16-2008, 03:24 AM
...Completely agree there is a huge intel problem and unfortunately those who have the ability to change it are not here reading this. A lot of it comes down to personal relationships and the ability to interact at levels beyond email...that trend will continue. Right now, the personal relationships do make a difference.

Oh, FWIW, the incidents I mentioned; I was a very young SSG. Less than a couple-three years later, I'd have ignored him and slipped it to them anyway; gotta do what's right -- which may not always be what your boss wants... :D

ODB
04-16-2008, 03:32 AM
Oh, FWIW, the incidents I mentioned; I was a very young SSG. Less than a couple-three years later, I'd have ignored him and slipped it to them anyway; gotta do what's right -- which may not always be what your boss wants...

Oh how true......no reduction boards for me anymore.....if only more knew their power and used it for good. Too many career oriented in the ranks today, made it further than I ever thought I would. Everything from this point is just a bonus.......:D

A wise old man once told me "Do what your rank can handle".

William F. Owen
04-16-2008, 04:35 AM
Critical differentiation. Running sources is significantly different than handling a walk-in, or even just talking to people on patrol. The company needs to know how to handle all that raw human information coming in from the indig, and they have to have somebody to put it together. When someone suddenly decides to spill, you can't wait for someone else to come in from outside and handle it - you have to be able to do it in-house, and in a manner that would encourage other indig to do the same thing in the future.

Without getting into detail, this is exactly what manifested itself in the early days of Ulster/NI and is a source of my concern. Back in he 1970-75 time period, Coy and even BN Int was a cowboy game by all accounts, with BN IOs/S3 s running informal networks of HUMINT, and at some human cost.

In my experience, -ideally- I am not sure you would want someone engaging in the process described without having been selected and trained for that task

davidbfpo
04-16-2008, 07:40 AM
"Walk-ins" are a much neglected aspect of law enforcement intelligence gathering and there are examples in UK mainland policing, during the Irish Troubles, where the "walk-in" was rejected and later found to be costly. They happen in the criminal, as distinct from ideological arena. The ability to listen is the key, perhaps police officers are better at that than soldiers? The "walk-in" has made their decision by time they reach you, ensuring their security is necessary and determined by the situation. Once the initial downloading has been given and needs independent / trained assessment the "walk-in" can leave (in the UK).

The biggest snags with "walk-ins" are that it maybe a one-off, there are those who like to talk - the Walter Mitty factor, potentially are a deception (rare in ordinary law enforcement) and the information is known to very few, leading to issues of verification and follow-up.

An alternative to "walk-in" is the confidential and usually anonymous phone or email and now text/SMS hotline. Crime stoppers being the most well known and in Northern Ireland this was prominiently advertised on security force vehicles - although I am not aware of how effective it was. Alas instead of talking to a person it is an ansaphone.

Slightly off topic, Company Level Int Ops, maybe.

davidbfpo

Ron Humphrey
04-16-2008, 12:32 PM
While avoiding implications in current AO's I think there are some good examples from detention that point to where the expectations for formal training are often overdone.

A good officer learns to know the "terrain" simply by actually being in it. For those of us who took the time to listen to concerns of the population within the context of understanding that there were usually agendas at play it was very simple to track what was really happening in the jailhouse. If you learn the names of inmates and simple groupings as in who belonged to or hung out with what groups then it became much easier to identify and address issues much sooner. If you haven't seen someone around that usually does X at Y time on any given day then maybe you keep an eye out for G who usually does Y with X every day and if you have developed a basic rapport you end up with some discussion during which you can ask G why X isn't doing Y that day.

For most anyone this is a natural habit and so with just a little fine tuning can become an effective tool. It doesn't and should always be a difficult or tedious as it is often made out to be, and I'm concerned we do ourselves and our soldiers a disservice when we don't admit that. I would doubt many of the enlisted in MI wouldn't tell you that if others have concerns that they are getting in over their head they have little to no problem coming to you and saying : "Hey whats the deal"

Just my 1 1/2 ...

wm
04-16-2008, 12:37 PM
The critical issue is manning. There simply aren't enough analysts / collectors to go around. And there isn't going to be anytime in the forseeable future. In any case, the majority of MI troops who do get cut away to work at Co level are going to be junior enlisted - and at that level (with the exception of the rare few with true natural talent) they're not going to have any more ability than those non-MI troops you already have who you've tasked to perform the mission in the absence of formal intel support. And in the rare instance where you do get an MI NCO sent to work at the company level in an combat arms unit - five will get you ten that he was let go to you for a reason.

Sounds like a basic force structure problem to me. Last time I checked, MI was an inverted pyramid (or maybe a diamond)--a few entry level folks and a whole pile of more senior folks telling them what to do or analyzing the fruits of the junior folks' efforts. This is a paradox, methinks: We need lots of experienced folks to be good analysts, but we don't access enough folks to give them the experience they need to be good.

Randy Brown
04-16-2008, 02:24 PM
As someone with one boot daily in the Army Lessons-Learned community, and one in a BCT intel shop on the M-day side, I've found this thread extremely enlightening. I've been inspired to write-up a short article on "company intel ops resources" for a monthly Lessons-Learned Integration (L2I) newsletter I edit for the Iowa Army National Guard.

I'm writing for two purposes:

To ask for your help in identifying articles and resources I should mention in my article.
To ask for any insights as to how the Army's new "Every Soldier is a Sensor" (aka "ES2"--the Army still can't get enough of squared and cubed acronyms, observes the "L2I" guy) individual Warrior Task can best be trained/implemented.

(By the way, is the ES2 concept--"it's not just the Intel soldiers who need to keep their eyes and ears open"--really all that new? I've got a bundle of cigars wrapped in a map of Antietam that says it isn't.)

References on Company-Level Intel

1LT Cola's article on "Suggestions for Creating a Company-Level Intel Cell" (Infantry, MAR/APR 08) will probably be the lead-in to my article, and Tom Odom has earlier in this thread pointed out a couple of CALL pubs that are worth their weights in precious metals. these are:

07-01 "Tactical Intelligence" newsletter
07-26 "Tactical Site Exploitation"
08-05 "Company-level Stabilty Operations and Support Operations"

(The commander-and-staff verion of CALL's "best-selling" First 100 Days series also covers some applicable intel and TSE stuff in brief. There are also some relevant and user-customizable GTAs.)

I've also seen cited here 1LT McGovern's "Organize for Company Intelligence Cells in COIN" (Fires Bulletin , JAN/FEB 08). And, of course, there's the Dr. Kilcullen's "28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" (Iosphere, Summer 06)

What have I missed?

Every Soldier is a Sensor

ES2 briefings and resources are available as part of the First Army Commander's Toolkit, which deploying commanders use to plan and document their unit's mobilization training. This is a CD-ROM that is/has migrated to a Web-based tool; I'm pretty sure that, if you need a copy, CALL either has or can get the latest for you. There are resources, regulations, and requirements for each Warrior Task and Theater-Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT). ES2 is one of these.

While ES2 training seems to sync with much of the discussion in this thread--soldiers don't run sources, but they do encounter informants; most soldiers aren't analysts or even collators, but they are collection-assets--the real, hands-on stuff seems to deal only with tactical questioning: "how to ask non-leading and compound questions" kind of stuff.

Beyond the tactical-questioning piece, and maybe the nuts-and-bolts on how to bag-and-tag enemy information, are there any areas on which a battalion- or company-level commander should focus "ES2" training, SOP-development, and other efforts? Any general (OPSEC, you know) suggestions on how best to train ANY of these skills?

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your comments.

Jedburgh
04-16-2008, 03:46 PM
Randy, I also suggest you copy this same post on the BCKS COIN Operations forum (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=62317). You may also find the thread on Battalion Level and Below COIN Products, Tools & SOPs (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=520019) to be of interest.

Tom Odom
04-16-2008, 03:58 PM
Tom,

The "traditional higher to lower never did work in my experience. If we try to make it work today with number of sensors available, we will overwhelm the poor company--my firehose. Maybe having some smart analysts who know how to pull data, know where to pull it from, and have the right pipes and wires to do so would be worth the investment at the company level, but let's not stick a DCGS terminal in every maneuver company.

WM

We are not advocating a company intel plug for the national fire hose. As I have said this is about collating and analyzing intel gathered by the manuever company in its own AO and then passing that collated/analyzed to higher. The taps into the national system should stay at BN and BCT via the S2 sections.

Tom

wm
04-16-2008, 04:36 PM
WM

We are not advocating a company intel plug for the national fire hose. As I have said this is about collating and analyzing intel gathered by the manuever company in its own AO and then passing that collated/analyzed to higher. The taps into the national system should stay at BN and BCT via the S2 sections.

Tom

Maybe I'm not getting it or maybe we are just using different language to say the same thing. Your post above seems to me to be sort of what I was saying about the company needing the ability to maintain situational awareness and understanding of what is happening within its defined AO. I'm not sure of the need to pass this on to higher, except as a form of institutional record keeping--Why do we need to have companies sending along PERINTREP, Daily INTSUM, etc to Bn? Spot reports and daily opreps are more germane IMHO. The Bn 2 needs to sit with the 3 and glean appropriate data from those reports. The entire Bn staff needs to ensure the companies know the CCIR (Commander's Critical Information Requirements) and respond to them. As far as I can recall, CCIR include both enemy and friendly info.

What I am suggesting that seems somewhat new is sometimes (oftentimes?) companies need more support than they can generate locally. To get it in a timely way, they ought to be able to go straight to the source, but they probably need someone smart enough to know where that source is. In an efficiently and effectively networked environment, a company should not need to pass an RFI up through Bn and Bde. It should be able to pull what it thinks it wants/needs directly from any entity in the intel community. This is what I understand as timely/responsive (AKA "actionable") intelligence.

However, given the Byzantine/"need to know" shackled world that is the intel community, asking a maneuver guy to keep track of who is the "go to" guy for info, is asking too much. So maybe we should give the maneuver element an intel knowledge manager (perhaps "expediter" is a better term), someone who knows the intel filing cabinets well enough to go pull data out of the files for whomever he/she supports directly and then explains how good (or not so good) the info might be.

Ken White
04-16-2008, 04:48 PM
Works for me and has been done before -- successfully.

I think a part of the problem is that all of us are saying pretty much the same thing with minor variants based on personal experience and preference -- and that happens in the operating world constantly. All Intel entities, all Battalions and Companies, even all ODA and ODB are not equal; some will always do some things better than others -- and differently than others. Seems to me the key is to not overstructure the process and to accept variations on the theme that the personalities of the day and time make work. :confused:

Tom Odom
04-16-2008, 06:10 PM
Maybe I'm not getting it or maybe we are just using different language to say the same thing. Your post above seems to me to be sort of what I was saying about the company needing the ability to maintain situational awareness and understanding of what is happening within its defined AO. I'm not sure of the need to pass this on to higher, except as a form of institutional record keeping--Why do we need to have companies sending along PERINTREP, Daily INTSUM, etc to Bn?


You are overstating the use of the intel cell; it is not an "S2 section" in the company. As for passing on the information to higher, that is the source of most intel and it is not mere record keeping. No one is advocating a series of intel reports like you suggest. What does go up is an AO assessment/sitrep and it is not necessarily daily. If the BNs do not get the intel from below, they have very poor SU of their AO. The same holds true for the BDEs.

Tom

George
09-08-2008, 06:52 PM
Got the word that Company-level Stability Ops, VOL 7, COIN is going up today (maybe tomorrow) at CALL. It contains 2 SWJ contributions: the first is an extract of the long piece we did on Kicullen's 28 articles Captains Kranc and Holzbach contributing; the second was CPT (nopw MAJ) Gwinn's Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon, first published on SWJ blog.

Best

Tom


It seems CALL is only available for US Military, not for civilians nor Soldiers from abroad. Is there a way to access these pages anyway?

George
Royal Netherlands Army

Tom Odom
09-08-2008, 09:15 PM
It seems CALL is only available for US Military, not for civilians nor Soldiers from abroad. Is there a way to access these pages anyway?

George
Royal Netherlands Army

Through your military attache in the US. Takes some effort and time but it happens.

Tom

Jedburgh
04-06-2009, 09:56 PM
The initial draft of TC 2-19.603 Company Intelligence Support Team (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?id=780758), dated 13 Mar 09, is now available for review.

AKO log-in and BCKS registration required

RichC82
05-28-2009, 06:32 PM
Howdy all,

New to this board, but the subject of company level intel is one of my focus areas.

I think everyone is pretty much saying the same thing- like was earlier stated. I agree with Tom's last post though in that the purpose of a COIST (Company Intel Support Team) is NOT to replicate the BN/BDE S-2 reports or methods of operation. Neither should the COIST be involved with MSO (military source ops). The basic principle is just to be able to provide an accurate tactical view of the battlespace.

Without a COIST, the lowest level you have analysts is the BN where (as I am sure we all know) folks tend to be removed from the real tactical details of the COIN fight.

The COIST should not waste time trying to produce 'intelligence products', but should focus on organizing and passing data to the BN S-2 shop. This data is just info on personalities, patrol debriefs, tactics, and the operating environment in general. Through passing this data, the BN S-2 will have a better picture and should be able to coordinate HUMINT, work targeting ops, and provide a more accurate picture to the BDE S-2 shop.

In addition to all the printed resources on the subject of COIST already mentioned here, I would reccomend contacting the Asymetric Warfare Group prior to your deployment. Lets just say they will be able to square you away based upon timely and relevant experience in theater.

Coldstreamer
06-06-2009, 06:30 PM
My battalion is (probably) going to return to Afgh this autumn.

From the last time, the big 'take away' was not to rely on any form of external specialist augmentation. Simply not enough experts to go around - and they're problably expert in the wrong thing for your needs at company level.

Given the likely nature of our tasks - company 'ink spot' efforts within an BG AO, and limited scope for meaty BG level manoeuvre, we've elected to convert our Recce Platoon into ISTAR Sections for the Company Groups. Each recce sect will have tac-intel, tac-questioning and other skill sets trained into it, above and beyond their surveillance and recon training.

ISTAR Sects will work shifts, with about half beasting the int picture, collating and sifting the rifle pl patrol reports and various other feeds. The other half will be out on the ground with the rifle multiples or on pre/post op sensor type tasks. They'll alternate between roles with staggered handovers, so that the guys doing the link analysis, putting the target packs together and the patrol briefs and debriefs will also be going out on the ground, chatting people up and keeping all patrol activity 'int-led' and collection focussed.

So far so good in terms of training and prep. The guys have also grasped the nettle big-style, realising the nature of the effort there. Not, repeat, NOT HUMINT of any form, merely good old fashioned, focussed Int Led Ops.

Will let you know how it progresses. But following Kilcullens '28 Principles', recommendation of putting your best soldier in the int jobs, its what we're doing - in a manner that keeps their other skills employed. If its successful, we'll look at keeping it a permanent capabilty.

Ken White
06-06-2009, 07:09 PM
Far, far more productive than the too common American practice of making them a CP Guard or Cdrs escort.

Nah, it's a GREAT idea! :cool:

slapout9
06-06-2009, 09:14 PM
My battalion is (probably) going to return to Afgh this autumn.

From the last time, the big 'take away' was not to rely on any form of external specialist augmentation. Simply not enough experts to go around - and they're problably expert in the wrong thing for your needs at company level.

Given the likely nature of our tasks - company 'ink spot' efforts within an BG AO, and limited scope for meaty BG level manoeuvre, we've elected to convert our Recce Platoon into ISTAR Sections for the Company Groups. Each recce sect will have tac-intel, tac-questioning and other skill sets trained into it, above and beyond their surveillance and recon training.

ISTAR Sects will work shifts, with about half beasting the int picture, collating and sifting the rifle pl patrol reports and various other feeds. The other half will be out on the ground with the rifle multiples or on pre/post op sensor type tasks. They'll alternate between roles with staggered handovers, so that the guys doing the link analysis, putting the target packs together and the patrol briefs and debriefs will also be going out on the ground, chatting people up and keeping all patrol activity 'int-led' and collection focussed.

So far so good in terms of training and prep. The guys have also grasped the nettle big-style, realising the nature of the effort there. Not, repeat, NOT HUMINT of any form, merely good old fashioned, focussed Int Led Ops.

Will let you know how it progresses. But following Kilcullens '28 Principles', recommendation of putting your best soldier in the int jobs, its what we're doing - in a manner that keeps their other skills employed. If its successful, we'll look at keeping it a permanent capabilty.

If you haven't already I would read the newTACTICS for COIN Manual, link is below.

http://usacac.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/coin/archive/2009/05/07/tactics-in-coin-fm-3-24-2-published.aspx

William F. Owen
06-07-2009, 05:24 AM
Given the likely nature of our tasks - company 'ink spot' efforts within an BG AO, and limited scope for meaty BG level manoeuvre, we've elected to convert our Recce Platoon into ISTAR Sections for the Company Groups. Each recce sect will have tac-intel, tac-questioning and other skill sets trained into it, above and beyond their surveillance and recon training.

That is extremely interesting. I have to say, it is probably a good solution to the problem that was created by the British Army's way of doing things, but that's life.
Brits being Brits, it will no doubt be a roaring success, and after several hard blinks, it may have considerable merit.

In some ways it is back to the future. Back in 1918/19, the Bn Snipers and Observers worked directly for the IO, so as the tasking and reporting all worked smoothly.... but all that went away once Snipers became "special.."

Coldstreamer
06-07-2009, 05:34 PM
We're ALL speshul!

Thanks for the encouraging words. We'll see how it goes. Its always easy to get excited about a 'new' idea - we need to stay focussed on getting the product collected and turned around so our ops are targeted and relevant.

Wilf - you're so right about WW1 first principles being right first time. We made an uber effort to keep the Int Cell/IO team tied in with the ISTAR and recon bit in prior training - and that was our start point. But also as you say, most of our ingenuity is forced from other areas being suboptimal...making a virtue of necessity...Like I say, I'll keep you posted on how it goes.

Meh
08-21-2009, 01:22 AM
Gentlepersons (very PC),

I shall be spending a good amount of time in Afghanistan over the next year, researching company-level intelligence cells. I'll be working for the military, so I'm out to find TTP best practices.

If you know any people worth communicating with - and especially if you know any currently deployed units I should be interviewing/embedding with - please send me a pm.

davidbfpo
08-21-2009, 03:03 PM
Try: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5139 and http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3797

davidbfpo

IntelTrooper
08-21-2009, 05:21 PM
What are your questions?

Michael C
08-21-2009, 07:13 PM
My best advice is to talk to platoon leaders and then squad leaders. If an intelligence cell, whether division, brigade or battalion, or company, doesn't get out and patrol then it never really understands the AO it is trying to provide intelligence to. Too often intelligence shops preach bottom-fed intelligence but practice top down distribution.

Meh
10-15-2009, 08:55 PM
Recently got back from six weeks of research in-theatre, including approx. half the time down south with a line inf. bn. Fascinating stuff. Michael C, you're quite right. I went out on a good number of patrols, and saw the disconnects.

Much more in-country research to follow - mid-December to mid-January and April through August.

In the meantime, I'm looking at the history of int cells. I think I've found most of the related articles, but there are certainly still large holes in the story. Any contacts would be appreciated.

I'd also love a chance to send anyone who's had int cell experiences a list of questions (the more responses, the better the overall data).

Finally, if anyone is interested in discussing my more detailed impressions, please feel free to PM me.

Tom Odom
10-16-2009, 05:33 AM
Look at CALL products on this subject: there are seven company-level handbooks and a tac intel newsletter I put together from the JRTC Ops Grp CALL Cell working with our Brit excange officer and materials from OPTAG. that was in 2003.

Issues abound yes; consistency in application is one of the greatest

Tom

Meh
10-26-2009, 02:15 PM
Look at CALL products on this subject: there are seven company-level handbooks and a tac intel newsletter I put together from the JRTC Ops Grp CALL Cell working with our Brit excange officer and materials from OPTAG. that was in 2003.

Issues abound yes; consistency in application is one of the greatest

Tom

Cheers!

sgmgrumpy
10-26-2009, 04:22 PM
CALL is/was producing a CoiST Manual from all of them when I left. Having seen the NTC CoiST Manual, they are invaluable to the Company level Soldiers. Units should get them in the hands of the Units well in advance to deployment to the CTCs though.

sandtalker
11-24-2009, 07:08 PM
My task has trained most if not all of the Army units with a CoIST that are currently deployed. We have numerous examples of unit developed SOP as well as lessons learned from various deployments. One thing we try to capture from every unit is what tasks the Company teams are actually perfoming as well as what communication systems they use to share information with other Companies and the BN level. I would be interested in what practices you observed while you are there.

jcustis
11-25-2009, 05:07 AM
You need to get a hold of a point of contact with the Marine Corps' Center for Lessons Learned. There is a document in their possession (I cannot recall if it is part of a discussion forum thread) that details a CLIC product generated by a 23d Marines (right Regt?) battalion team that built something called C-Server from scratch.

This html-based application was just one piece of the puzzle with establishing effective CLIC production. I think it was around 2005-2006 vintage, and never went mainstream, but the Reservists who built it really did get it.

I don't have contacts beyond that, but you are welcome to embed with our battalion for a while, as we are about to start working the CLIC training program to build out our cells.

Shoot me a PM with your questions, if you still need input. I've been around since the CLIC was a buzzword for the Corps in late 2003. Not sure if that's when your timeline begins...

Part of our problems stem from the transmission path. Not being able to push information up, down, or laterally is a death blow to the effort.

Meh
11-29-2009, 01:14 PM
Cheers for all the replies, folks! Various PMs sent.

Woland
12-07-2009, 10:10 PM
Gents, a pleasure to be welcomed aboard this inner sanctum.

Hopefully I can offer something here and there. By way of brief background, I served in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province, as an all source J2 analyst (NCO) attached to 3 Commando Brigade between Sep 08 and Apr 09. Our particular cell had reasonably comprehensive access to closed source reporting from various collection agencies and our role was simply to analyse it and attempt to answer the commander's questions. Our outlook was somewhat more strategic than tactical, so perhaps I'm not the chap to ask about TTPs, but we produced as much output on politics as we did the insurgency. I worked on a variety of topics whilst deployed, in simplistic list form I would say regional influences (Iran, Pak), reconciliation, the insurgency/narco 'nexus,' Quetta and senior leadership matters and part way through the tour, influence ops (we were unbelievably bad at this, by the way), took up most of my time.

I've also got some thoughts about pre deployment training for int personnel and how the whole J2 things works (or doesn't) and I might also have some unclass powerpoint presentations lying around somewhere from briefs I've given since. I'm not in the same line of work now, unfortunately, so there may be some gaps in knowledge which have developed, but I'm only too keen to impart whatever I can.

Again, it's a pleasure to be aboard.

jcustis
12-08-2009, 08:13 AM
I am very interested in your thoughts about the training for intelligence personnel, as I am struggling to light a fire under my intelligence section and the OIC to get something going in the right direction...and I'm having a very tough time getting him steered straight.

If you could review this article: http://tiny.cc/JmFa9, either through your own assessment or recommendation of this article to former counterparts who could lend a hand, and then confirm whether it fits the Helmand situation, that would help me considerably.

Also, you used the term "influence ops." Could you provide more detail as to what that means?

Oh, and welcome aboard. Your background seems remarkably a lot like mine when I first started out.

Woland
12-08-2009, 10:45 AM
jcustis,

Hi, when I click the link you give it takes me to a map of villages under Taleban control, I'm not sure that's quite what I should be looking at. I'm only too happy to have a look at the article you mention.

Influence ops - Good question! I had next to no guidance on this, but in general, the idea was to look for opportunities to launch non-kinetic, 'soft effects' operations designed to cause disruption. It might be easier to provide examples.

The first job I worked on was an instance where a commander had been killed and the fighters beneath him effectively split into two separate networks. It was decided that this could be an 'in' and if we could stick the needle in somewhere, it might be to our advantage. So from the J2 point of view I was required to do the initial analysis, including comprehensive views of how we got to where we are, what might be the results of a certain course of action. The J3/5 side of it was left to someone far better paid than me. That op did launch but we didn't receive any reporting to give us a clue as to whether or not it had been successful. The time these things take to get in full swing, the red tape, the legalese, is not to the advantage of influence ops given that the dynamic you want to affect might disappear as quickly as it turned arrived.

Another was reports of Baluch fighters turning up in Central Helmand. Locals had a derogatory nickname for them and someone, somehwere, thought this might be a good place to stick a needle. Foreign fighters were uniformly unpopular amongst locals. A third example was an individual in Gereshk who was understood to be a disruptive, rogue sort of figure. The possibility of looking at a way to see if we could get him promoted was investigated.

In the broader sense there was no doctrine on how to do influence and the kinetically minded people did not necessarily see it as particularly worthy. I fact, I was in one meeting (sat quietly at the back) when influence was being discussed and one officer said 'well, if you kill someone you influence them, which is why influence should be a sub set of fires.' The idea that targeting was targeting was targeting meant that my direction was to replicate the process for preparing a kinetic target for the influence ones, which seemed bizarre to me. Influence is terifically more complicated, with endless potential for different desired effects, various dynamics subject to constant change, it may be aimed at a collective rather than an individual. Call me old fashioned, but kinetic targeting really only has one desired effect and applying its doctrine to influence ops is inappropriate.

All this could be addressed with solid 'soft effects' doctrine behind it. They tried to run before they could walk. It might be better now, but it was crap when I was there.

marct
12-08-2009, 02:51 PM
Okay, I hate to say it, but that is just a dumb way to run influence ops! If you have to use a targeting analogy to sell it, then a better one would be to target neuron chains in an individuals' brain or target other people's perceptions of that person.

Woland, you're certainly correct that influence ops are a lot harder that kinetic ops but, still, they aren't that hard to do in practice (hey, I've been doing them on the civilian side for 30 years now under various headings: politics, teaching, market research, music, etc.).

The first step is pretty much always the same: figure out the rules that structure the areas "stories", both "mundane", day-today stuff (think real life soap operas) and "special situations" (think warrior ethos stories). That gives you the base structure after you've got ~50 stories in each main area. Then you figure out which ones are valorized and which ones are denigrated. Analyze the key differences between those, and that gives you your wedge point. Now look at the decision points that shift the emotional vector, and that should give you your content for the wedge. This lays out your general plan in overall terms.

Now, to operationalize it, you need a credible way for ascribing specific choices, or an interpretation of those choices, to your target. Sometimes that can be pretty simple: for example, the more "serious" a person is, the easier they are to hit with humour. Start circulating little ditty songs which poke fun at them while, at the same time, put out a series of dirty jokes about them as well and counterpoise that with occasional "serious" pieces, and you can pretty much drive a person to distraction (BTW, use radio and word of mouth viral vectors for this type of op). That, BTW, is a classic smear campaign and, depending on your content, you can force them into taking certain types of action.

Woland
12-09-2009, 02:12 PM
I agree entirely. I argued this time and time and time again with people far more senior and better paid than me and my reward was a crap annula report which said I was 'an extremely capable analyst who nevertheless can be difficult for superiors to deal with.' Yep, thanks. Anyway, the whole set up had no influence specialists, no-one with your 30 years of experience, no-one with any idea of what sort of doctrine to operate to. It was all guesswork and created to replicate the kinetic process. Insane. When given this role ('Non-kinetic targeteer' was it's official title, believe it or not) I said with incredularity that it looked like a hastily conceived expeirment to me, and the staff officer I was speaking to said 'you're absolutely correct' and then said something about me needing to do as I was told. But despite him admitting this, he still wanted to 'go operational' ASAP. And I sighed and thought 'ohhhhhhh Christ...'

So no wonder we were pissing in the wind. Totally amateurish. It's thoroughly depressing to think of even now.

jcustis - I've every intention of having a look at the article, which I've now located. I'll get round to it in the next few days, hopefully.

marct
12-09-2009, 02:25 PM
You know, I got my initial "training" in the area by coming from a political family :wry:. Grassroots, applied politics (not Political [pseudo-]"Science") is all about influence operations, especially in the artificial hothouse of multi-party elections (we usually have between 3 and 12 candidates in any riding in Canada). I've often thought that the best way to screen for someone who would be a good IO type person would be to ask them about their volunteer grassroots political activity growing up - then screen them out if they have a PoliSci degree :D!

If it makes you feel any better, it's the same sort of crap in the CF from what I hear.

Woland
02-23-2010, 10:24 AM
Let’s take a totally hypothetical situation. All resemblances to real life or real persons are entirely coincidental…ahem

At six months notice you are to be an NCO assigned to a brand new role as an Intelligence Officer for an infantry company in a FOB or PB of a province of Afghanistan, which for the purposes of this we’ll call Helmand. See how I said none of this is based on a real life scenario?

The details you have about your job are thin on the ground. You don’t yet know where you’re going or in support of whom. You have not yet met any of the personalities you’ll be working with or for. You don’t know the disposition of your company commander, for instance, and cannot yet begin to be disturbed iby his desire to smash everything, or to be encouraged by his more population centred, delicate approach. His IRs might be totally enemy centric, or he might appreciate that between himself and the enemy is a pretty important entity called ‘the population.’

During your deployment, you connectivity to online open sources will be essentially zero, though you will receive a number of other reports from higher formation int cells and assorted collection assets. By far your most important stuff, though, will come from patrol reports and sometimes you’ll head outside the wire yourself to get a flavour of the lie of the land. You plan to attend shuras and meet influential local personalities and have begun to think about some of the fundamental questions you’d like information on from the locals; have there been changes in the village population? If so, why? What are the most important problems facing the village? Who do you believe can solve your problems? What should be done first?

So if you’re a Company commander with a J2 specialist at your disposal, what are you going to be looking for from him?

I’ve been deliberately as unspecific as possible because for this job I’ve got a blank canvas. I’ve not got uncooperative hierarchies to particularly worry about, nor loads of brass interfering. As far as the J2 goes, it’s me running the show it seems. Although necessarily there will in that scenario be a degree of learning on the job, especially if deployed to an area I’m not overly familiar with, there are certain considerations I’d like at the forefront of my mind. Very close to the top of the list is to ask other practitioners what they would be looking for from a chap like me. You’re a crowd worth listening to, so please fire away.

I open it up to the floor.

davidbfpo
02-23-2010, 07:41 PM
Woland,

Some of the ground you describe was truly churned over for productive effect in this long-running thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3797

Woland
02-25-2010, 12:10 PM
Thanks David, I'd missed that thread and found it very useful indeed. I've also happened upon the article Coldstreamer (I suspect) wrote on Coy level int for SWJ.

I'm not 100% guarnteed to be doing this job as yet, it's 50/50 at this stage between that and a similar role (ish!) for different customers at a much more strategic level. That's the job I'll b able to take to very easily given past experience, but not so the Coy level one.

The most useful thing I read in the above thread was the comment that as a commander you are not looking for your J2 fella to tell you about your own AO. This makes patently good sense and suggests he may be looking more for the J2 guy to run a little int shop, almost.

But anyway, I would envisage making considerable improvements to the process of passing on low level int upwards and also the reciept of higher stuff which comes down. I mean, this whole job could be very non-demanding if all I'm wanted for is to look after secret docs, receive reports from above and send int back up in the same direction. But I'd like to think there is more I can offer than that.

As well as what's cited in the thread above, I'd be grateful if there are any more reading recommendations or thoughts the community may have.

davidbfpo
02-25-2010, 08:36 PM
Taken from:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9669&page=3


The smart commander, and his supporting staff, asks not "what do you know?", but "what do I need to know?" It is not about information; it is about important information. That data that leads to a decision point.

davidbfpo
02-25-2010, 09:12 PM
Woland,

Just a few thoughts from an armchair and using a hypothetical, local example - a posting to a new local intelligence post in the "outback":

1) Search out the new OiC and his operations NCO. talk to them, maybe understand them as much as they know you.
2) Do this on the principle of 'Know your customer'. Have they written anything, previous record and knowledge of the area?
3) Know your interpreter and local agencies.
4) Go to the new post beforehand and talk to your predecessor.
5) Get plenty of maps and photos - the latest editions.
6) What can the "boots on the ground" report on? Think hard on this; recent Helmand footage shows a patrol going 400-600m from a base and avoiding the locals.
7) Work out what parts of the area have been ignored; maybe people. Is that a valid judgement? If so helps to focus your efforts.
8) Can material provided from higher levels be used? Peter Clarke, ex-UK CT police commander, discusses this in a Colin Cramphorn lecture a few years ago.
9) Identify those "boots" that can be relied upon to fulfil tasks.
10) Think hard what can you do. Set targets and dump them if required.

Adieu

MikeF
03-03-2010, 01:55 PM
Copied here from the TRADOC thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8486&page=9 as I thought it may have something to offer, especially given MikeF's experience in Iraq.


I have to say, I'm really intrigued by this "Design" stuff because it's proto-form "Systemic Operational Design" failed under fire in real operations, in terms of being unable to produce clear and concise orders.
The classic being the one that told an Infantry Brigade Commander to "Render the enemy incoherent within the operational area."

Moreover, what I read about "Design" makes no sense. I've come to the conclusion that planning is the product of skilled people, based on experience. "Understanding the problem" cannot be held to be a separate or discrete process, as in military operations you have to plan for not having understood the problems correctly, because the enemy is trying to make a mess of your plan - and often you have to compensate for your guys making a mess of your plan!!!

Hi Wilf,

I agree. Much of the late 1990's systems based problem solving techniques were useless in the field. Even down on the battalion level, I've received orders that said we were focused on security, governance, economics, and no social reforms. I'd say, "No Sh*t, but what do you want me to DO?" I rarely got a response.

Design, as I understand it is a means to take a complex situation, sort through it, and finish with a simple order. In terms of MDMP, it's a way to really wrestle and determine your facts and assumptions before jumping into IPB and COA development.

Here's a brief outline of how I did it on the company level for y'all's critique.

Phase One: Shaping the Environment

1. Understanding the Environment
- Conflict Ecosystem- fill in the bubbles of Dr. K's chart.
- Cultural Immersion- develop empathy and understanding of the internal stakeholders' grievances and vulnerabilities
- Prepare a General Area Survey. How did/do the previous and current stakeholder's define the problem?
- Develop a Hypothesis on the Situation

2. Testing the Environment
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to gather intelligence to confirm/deny hypothesis.
- Conduct leader engagements to gather intelligence to confirm/deny hypothesis

3. Defining the Environment
- Full out planning process. Facts and Assumptions are determined based off initial efforts and decisions are made. Commander determines how the world is and how he wants to influence it. Simple OPORD is endstate.

4. Influecing the Environment
- Develop the Message
- Conduct Psychwarfare to get the truth out
- Conduct Deception operations as needed to assist in your initial penetration during clearance.
- Disruption Operations. Targeted raids, ambushes to prepare the environment by disrupt the enemy's infracstructure, maneuver, and morale.

davidbfpo
04-04-2010, 09:26 PM
Hat tip to al Sahwa blog for this reflective commentary on continuing US and Iraqi SOF actions - when an Iraqi warrant is required before action.


At the onset of the new year (January 2009), units deployed in Iraq could no longer capture and detain insurgents without a signed warrant from an Iraqi judge. The transition was a painful but necessary process. Collectively, we put our heads together to develop ways to prolong our pressure on the terror network under this new system. Prior to Jan 2009, if we had actionable intelligence on any insurgent, we simply put together a plan and executed it. The exploitation from the detained individual would usually lead us to our next operation. This targeting model became unsustainable post Jan. 2009.

Link:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04/warrant-based-targeting-iraq-model.html

Red Rat
04-19-2010, 10:14 AM
Woland,

I concur with how MikeF set about doing things. U tried to do it like that in Iraq as a company commander - but I suspect my attempt was somewhat messier then Mike's!

As a company commander in Iraq I looked for my Int NCO to do the following:

Provide in-depth detailed 'narrative' advice, by this I mean understand what story we had written in my patch in the previous 2 years and how it was playing out now. To do this he needed to know what we had done, the bad guys had done and the locals had done in the previous 2 years. Importantly he also needed to know what we hadn't done (but may have promised) as well.

Understand the environment in terms of the complex interaction and inter-relationships of key players; good, bad and neutral.

Allow me to bounce op ideas off him and be strong enough to influence my op design. I expected my int boys to work closely with influence ops.

Be opinionated. I did not want to know what had happened in the previous 24 hours in terms of a straight forward regurgitation of facts. I wanted to know why things had happened in the previous 24 hours, what that meant for us and what we should consider doing about it. I wanted analysis, assessment and recommendations - all clearly labelled as such.

Influence higher and laterally. I always took my J2 in to the main FOB with me to work bde and bn J2 in order to see what they could do for us and us for them. It also enabled me to influence things. J2 (British) continues to be very stovepiped and we have to break these down.

Hope this helps.

RR

davidbfpo
04-20-2010, 07:36 AM
SWC invariably focus on "fixing" the enemy and intelligence, so where does evidence fit in to your company intelligence cell? I am mindful of the UK experience in Ulster, assuming it has been retained; but in Afghanistan the host nation retains the right to prosecute.

If evidence is sought, no required - who will handle that?

See Post 7 above, which I've copied here from another thread - as it is a topical illustration.

Red Rat
04-20-2010, 09:17 AM
Continuity: If you do get the post you need to influence immediately the handover takeover process, from the commander's recce onwards. I am perenially disappointed as to how badly we are are handing over information and intelligence between ongoing and outgoing units. One source of continuity could be the Afghans that you are working with (try not to change all your systems overnight on the basis that the previous unit's were no good, the Afghans will have only just got used to the last lot...)

Working with Afghans: The afghans will probably know a great deal more then you do as to what is happening. Under 'Partnering' all operations are joint and we are supposed to be joined at the hip at all levels. You will need to consider how you are going to pool intelligence and make best use of each others capabilities.

Evidence: - That should be more G3 (operations) lead and much will be SOP with regards to (physical) evidence collection and use of warrants etc. I have a briefing tomorrow on the current state of the Afghan legal system so I should be better informed then (I sit opposite the Operational Law branch so have a direct line in if you have any queries here).

RR

SWJ Blog
06-18-2013, 08:02 AM
Targeting and Intelligence at the Company Level: Lessons Learned from a CoIST in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/targeting-and-intelligence-at-the-company-level-lessons-learned-from-a-coist-in-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/targeting-and-intelligence-at-the-company-level-lessons-learned-from-a-coist-in-afghanistan) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog
07-25-2013, 06:36 AM
Grey Targeting at the Troop/Company Level: Using the CoIST to Understand the Human Terrain (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/grey-targeting-at-the-troopcompany-level-using-the-coist-to-understand-the-human-terrain)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/grey-targeting-at-the-troopcompany-level-using-the-coist-to-understand-the-human-terrain) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
10-30-2013, 12:36 PM
There is a June 2013 SWJ article Targeting and Intelligence at the Company Level: Lessons Learned from a CoIST in Afghanistan - which comments on US practices and was updated today that:
..the Marine Corps has institutionalized the concept of the "company level intelligence cell (CLIC)" in both doctrine and with a change in the infantry company's T/O. An 0211 intelligence analyst is now a permanent member of the HQ Platoon.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/targeting-and-intelligence-at-the-company-level-lessons-learned-from-a-coist-in-afghanistan#comment-40865

davidbfpo
01-14-2015, 06:39 PM
A number of posts have been moved here, on the last page; they are reflections on what intelligence was needed and how to get it.

The original thread envisaged a stand alone company intell led operations, all these new posts refer to working in a larger command and influence operations, but this is the best place for them.

SWJ Blog
03-25-2015, 05:20 AM
“Why COIST Matters” (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/%E2%80%9Cwhy-coist-matters%E2%80%9D)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/%E2%80%9Cwhy-coist-matters%E2%80%9D) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
12-27-2015, 12:57 AM
Several threads again merged, some from SWJ Blog and others which had the magic word 'company' in. The thread title has become Company Level Intelligence Led Operations (so various words can be captured when searching).