Personal Security Teams for BN COs

[AdaptAndOvercome]

About a year ago, a specialist told me that his battalion commander in Iraq had a detail of soldiers who were his "personal security team", or bodyguards. Has anyone heard of this TTP, or was this guy pulling my leg?

[RTK]

About a year ago, a specialist told me that his battalion commander in Iraq had a detail of soldiers who were his "personal security team", or bodyguards. Has anyone heard of this TTP, or was this guy pulling my leg?

Let me ask you this; could you do your job in the village as a BN Commander without security?

PM enroute.

[jcustis]

It depends on how you define a personal security team...Do you envision a small group of troops who are flowing in and out of diamond and box formations around the BC as he moves on foot to visit a sheik? Or are you thinking about the larger concept of a task-organized element of soldiers who provide command and control within the BC's jump CP (I think your doctrine calls in the TACC or something), as well as mounted/dismounted security, depending on the situation?

Either way, those two profiles have been done. I think I still have the slideshow I used to train a small cell of Marines to do the former for my BC the last time over.

It is a status symbol to some degree, so if the BC believes he wants to increase that status when out and about among Iraqis, the train-up needs to be done right and not out of some handbook. Grab a trained and experienced MP who's worked this stuff in the past and ask him.

[selil]

Having done personal security detail for a judge in a relatively non-hostile environment I can't even imagine the task in a war zone. How many layers, how deep, counter-sniper or not, multiple mis-directions or not, force to destination or covert... gosh it must be a literal head trip trying to provide any true level of security on a single point target like a BC.

[AdaptAndOvercome]

To clear things up, the soldier I talked to was disgruntled that the BC got special protection. The sense I got from the conversation was the soldier felt the BC was not sharing hardship and danger with his soldiers.

The point of my post wasn't to ask for TTPs, but to solicit opinions on the necessity versus adverse effects to morale this special protection causes. Is this a "moral failure" on the part of the BC or a necessary precaution miscontrued by a junior soldier?

[RTK]

To clear things up, the soldier I talked to was disgruntled that the BC got special protection. The sense I got from the conversation was the soldier felt the BC was not sharing hardship and danger with his soldiers.

The point of my post wasn't to ask for TTPs, but to solicit opinions on the necessity versus adverse effects to morale this special protection causes. Is this a "moral failure" on the part of the BC or a necessary precaution miscontrued by a junior soldier?

The latter.

[Stan]

To clear things up, the soldier I talked to was disgruntled that the BC got special protection. The sense I got from the conversation was the soldier felt the BC was not sharing hardship and danger with his soldiers.

The point of my post wasn't to ask for TTPs, but to solicit opinions on the necessity versus adverse effects to morale this special protection causes. Is this a "moral failure" on the part of the BC or a necessary precaution miscontrued by a junior soldier?

Sounds to me like a misguided and naive soldier concentrating on something he has no business questioning. Better to work on his MOS-related skills.

Regarding TTPs et al, the SWJ's ROE are listed here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_conduct).

[MASON]

The security around a battalion CO is necessary on multiple levels. The security detail often functions as a squad does around its leader. The men understand or should understand that their security is interdependent despite individuals roles beyond personal and unit security. Certain operations and enviroments will predicate layers of security precautions, and even with that the enviroment is unforgiving. No Marine goes on patrol alone.

[walrus]

Adapt and Overcome:



To clear things up, the soldier I talked to was disgruntled that the BC got special protection. The sense I got from the conversation was the soldier felt the BC was not sharing hardship and danger with his soldiers.

Sir, I have something I need to share with you. As a very, very, junior soldier assigned to Btn HQ, I was overheard by the Btn Sargent Major grumbling to myself about having to get the CO a cup of coffee, clean his sidearm for him, etc.

The "little talk" I immediately had with said SM left me considerably wiser and my ego and posterior extremely bruised.

Of course the CO needs a protective detail. He is too busy thinking about YOUR protection to worry about his own.

And furthermore, a dead CO is worth considerably more to the insurgents than anyone else's sorry backside.

[J.C.]

I am suprised some people don't know about a Col PSD (Personnel Security Detactment). However, the PSD is ussually a plt. In fact my BN CDR's PSD has an office just beside mine. It's a mix of MOSs and it has a PSG but no PL.

As for it's use, it is critically importantant that your main link between Brigade and Batalion stay alive when he leaves the wire to go to meetings and soforth.

Plus, its not like it is extra security. NO soldier, marine, or trooper leaves the wire alone. You always role out in a convoy of guntrucks and joe's. SO, no matter who you are your always with your own PSD. Furthermore, when there on the FOB or not on mission its notlike there huvering over the BC.
In fact our PSD will go out on missions when not actively employed by the BC.

SO, I don't get his complant.

Recon 1-6 out.

[120mm]

I happen to know a BC who was so aggressive and self-less (and beloved by his men), that that his HHC provided PSD protection despite his objections.

[selil]

I never went shipboard as a Marine but I thought Marines did personal protection for the Captain on carriers and other bath tub toys too.

[Cavguy]

All commanders have a "PSD" these days, it's just good sense in Iraq.

For me as a company CO, whenever I traveled to a local national meeting with Sheiks, I created a target. The threat was not from the tribe hosting me but an external actor seeking a two-fer (or three, four, five). Usually one of my platoons escorted on the mission and performed joint security with the locals. My vehicle crew and my XO's crew provided my personal detail. My RTO was a senior E-5 and my tank gunner, who stuck on me tight. The other guys manned the truck and the long range radios .

On normal patrols, I would patrol with my platoons. I especially remember when one of my Infantry E-5's told me that if I ever entered a building first again, he would physically place me back with the HMMWV. A gentle reminder that CO's are supposed to command, otherwise you're an overpaid PFC if you get engaged. It's a balance you have to strike.

That said, during BILATs the goal is to secure your men through making friends with the locals. I used to tell my guys that we were making ourselves safer by chatting with the locals and drinking tea for hours.

[SGTMILLS]

Our BN Co had a PSD with him at all times. Our BN was scattered from Mosul all the way to Balad. He and the Bn CSM did itheir rounds every week. It's not like the PSD surrounded these guys 24/7. They escorted them from base to base. Every Bn level command movement absolutely needed "security"
I think we were the lucky ones, though. Our CSM and Bn CO actually went on missions with their troops. They did what the lower level troops did. I've had our CSM in my truck countless times (to my dismay) driving me (a lowly E-5) on missions.
Lead from the front, it stinks less.

[Uboat509]

Talking to guys in the infantry up here the consenus seems to be that it is an important job...as long as somebody else is doing it. If you are the one on PSD, then it just sucks.

SFC W

[redbullets]

In early 2005 I was invited to Baqubah by some cheeses at War Horse and was driven around the city for a couple of days by a BDE CDR's PSD. They were assigned to that role, 2 vehicles, three troops per. They were junior guys, pretty good at the task, but rather laissez faire about everything. Probably fed up with having to drive lots of VIPs and not-so-VIPs (like me) through what was then becoming a rather active IED alley.

Cheers,

[SGTMILLS]

That's funny, because we had to take "vip" and not-so "vip" personnel back and forth to bases all the time. we joked about NOT being a trailblazer patrol, and being a cabbie service. i guess we weren't the only ones.

[redbullets]

Yeah, its not hard to understand the views of the guys on the detail: "who the hell is this guy, and why am I going into harm's way to get him someplace?"

Cheers,

[neowolfe]

When headquarters asked my company to give up a few guys for PSD detail we sent them all our ####bags lol Its not like the LTC and Sergeant Major go out much anyways.

[RTK]

When headquarters asked my company to give up a few guys for PSD detail we sent them all our ####bags lol Its not like the LTC and Sergeant Major go out much anyways.

:mad::mad::mad:

[tequila]

:D There's a reason it's called Hide & Slide.

[sgmgrumpy]

neowolfe

Not sure why you posted such a degrading remark about your leadership and fellow soldiers, but from looking at your profile, I would say your probably going to have a short career in the Army.:rolleyes:

[Ken White]

that what goes around comes around.

IOW, I suspect SGM Grumpy is ko-rect...

[neowolfe]

wups my bad didnt mean to piss off the highers ill be going now. would one of you kindly direct me to a board where the lower end of the pay table can speak freely :)

[Stan]

When headquarters asked my company to give up a few guys for PSD detail we sent them all our ####bags lol Its not like the LTC and Sergeant Major go out much anyways.

:mad:

Just a quick question: With your immense Army knowledge from 2 years active duty, how did you conclude that your Senior Officers and NCOs Don't get out much and don't deserve a professional PSD?

Tell me who your SGM is, we'll see that your duties are adjusted accordingly :cool:


wups my bad didnt mean to piss off the highers ill be going now. would one of you kindly direct me to a board where the lower end of the pay table can speak freely :)

You WERE on a forum where free speech is authorized, but you chose to pathetically post Bravo Sierra among professionals.

I hereby direct you to get out of my Army :mad:

[RTK]

wups my bad didnt mean to piss off the highers ill be going now. would one of you kindly direct me to a board where the lower end of the pay table can speak freely :)

Sure, how about here (http://www.nickjr.co.uk/shows/dora/index.aspx).

Let's break down your four posts thus far:

1. First one was an OPSEC issue in the making.

2. Second one was a poor technical suggestion considering the given equipment.

3. Third one was a smart-assed comment.

4. Forth was a confirmation that you don't see the bigger picture.

You haven't added anything to the forum. You're no loss to the Council. Pack your bags and move along.

[Stan]

Sure, how about here (http://www.nickjr.co.uk/shows/dora/index.aspx).

Hey, Just a cotton pickin' second...my 7-year-old daughter plays there :mad:

Besides, there's no forum :eek:

[skiguy]

When headquarters asked my company to give up a few guys for PSD detail we sent them all our ####bags lol Its not like the LTC and Sergeant Major go out much anyways.

You don't even have to read the whole thing, just read the preface and introduction to LTC Nagl's book "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" and then try and tell us he didn't get out much.

Too bad the Army won't take a 47 yr old man like me, I'd gladly replace you. Thanks for being a Soldier, but try to show more respect for your amazing, incredibly intelligent, and honorable leaders.

[Steve Blair]

Now I know LTC Nagl got out quite a bit, as do many other LTCs and SGMs...but do they all? I'm not pointing fingers, nor casting aspersions on anyone's bravery, but speculating on what are organizational realities.

One of the things that was noticeable during Vietnam by 1968-69 was the tendency of multiple-tour senior NCOs to find jobs in the rear...because they'd "been there and done that" enough times that they were wearing thin. Not all of them did, but there were enough that it got noticed. Perhaps our young trooper had the misfortune to serve in a unit that had some burned-out senior leaders. It does happen. And it also provides us with an example of what burned-out leadership can do to morale within an organization. It could also provide us with an example of how a poorly-motivated soldier can paint an organization. I don't assume that he's right in his comment, but at the same time history suggests that he may not be totally wrong.

Now before anyone saddles up their rant horse and sounds the charge, consider this: our force profile is VERY different from what it was in the 1960s. The troops are more motivated, better educated, and all that. But considering their generational profile they may prove less tolerant of those they feel might be doing less than they should...especially in leadership positions. The key word there is "feel." It's all a matter of perception, and we know how perception can shape "reality" in many ways.

My $.02 for the day.

[Stan]

Now I know LTC Nagl got out quite a bit, as do many other LTCs and SGMs...but do they all? I'm not pointing fingers, nor casting aspersions on anyone's bravery, but speculating on what are organizational realities.

One of the things that was noticeable during Vietnam by 1968-69 was the tendency of multiple-tour senior NCOs to find jobs in the rear...because they'd "been there and done that" enough times that they were wearing thin. Not all of them did, but there were enough that it got noticed. Perhaps our young trooper had the misfortune to serve in a unit that had some burned-out senior leaders. It does happen. And it also provides us with an example of what burned-out leadership can do to morale within an organization. It could also provide us with an example of how a poorly-motivated soldier can paint an organization. I don't assume that he's right in his comment, but at the same time history suggests that he may not be totally wrong.

Now before anyone saddles up their rant horse and sounds the charge, consider this: our force profile is VERY different from what it was in the 1960s. The troops are more motivated, better educated, and all that. But considering their generational profile they may prove less tolerant of those they feel might be doing less than they should...especially in leadership positions. The key word there is "feel." It's all a matter of perception, and we know how perception can shape "reality" in many ways.

My $.02 for the day.

Steve, I agree with you. Not all 0-5s and E-9s get out and about. However, a PSD is not dispatched just the same in today's Army, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The visiting senior Os and Es in Goma with Tom and I had an impressive PSD, and rightfully so. Did they need a PSD ? How would I know ? Am I right to question Army procedures and bitch in an open forum ? No, I am not.

What an Army CO does when given a tasking should not include sending duds on a PSD detail or a high visibility team anywhere on God's green earth.

I'll stop here by saying that this is policy, and an individual with 2 years in enlisted service has little-to-no idea what that entails. It does come later with years of time in service and rank.

Perception or understanding ?

I welcome his supported response instead of a 4-post-bitchin'-session, and I'm certain that his first 6 months in Iraq (his words) will change his views forever.

Regards, Stan

[Steve Blair]

I know where you're coming from, Stan. And I agree about a lack of discipline. Just wanted to toss out a touch of different perspective for our non-military readers and the like...:)

For the record, I'm not crazy about drive-by posters, either. One liners may be cute for blog responses or chat rooms, but they suck major pond scum when it comes to message board conversations. This kid may or may not stick around long enough to "get it," but hopefully others will.

[Cavguy]

Now I know LTC Nagl got out quite a bit, as do many other LTCs and SGMs...but do they all? I'm not pointing fingers, nor casting aspersions on anyone's bravery, but speculating on what are organizational realities.


I'll state that in the course of two tours and 29 months in Iraq, all maneuver commanders up to BDE level were out almost daily, maybe taking 1 day off a week. This applies under under 1AD, 2ACR, 101st ABN(AA), 172d Stryker, 1 MEF, and 2 MEF.

I have never seen the "helicopter commanders" of 'Nam lore or anything else. My OIF 1 commander patrolled twice daily and was at the forefront of every fight against the Sadr Militia in April-June 2004. My OIF 05-07 commander was out daily and lived in the same compound with his IA BDE CDR and town mayor in Tal Afar. I lived an outpost in the Tal Afar Granary with my IA BN CDR.

I never saw any other units where the commander could be described as a fobbit. The logistics CO's didn't get out as much, but I know they took convoys as well. They also didn't have responsibilities for terrain outside the wire. Log units may be different, but almost every combat arms commander I have seen is out there in his sector almost daily up to BDE Level. Even the Division GO's were flying and accompanying patrols several times a week. BG Neller, 1 MEF ADC, was constantly on the road in Anbar with his PSD. BG Oates in the 101st was the same.

I just haven't seen it. Maybe there are a few "fobbit" maneuver commanders out there, but it's by far not the norm.

Rob, RTK, and other soldiers may want to chime in with their experiences.

[Steve Blair]

Always good to get as many perspectives in as possible. Like I said, I wasn't pointing fingers but rather probing for posts like yours. My contention has always been that the Army (at least at the sharp edge of things) is learning MUCH faster this time around than they have during any other conflict in their history, and it's good to see field-side experiences backing this idea up.

[Cavguy]

Always good to get as many perspectives in as possible. Like I said, I wasn't pointing fingers but rather probing for posts like yours. My contention has always been that the Army (at least at the sharp edge of things) is learning MUCH faster this time around than they have during any other conflict in their history, and it's good to see field-side experiences backing this idea up.

I heard the lore of the helicopter CO's from ROTC forward, and I think it was beaten into the post-Vietnam generation to lead from the front as one of the carryovers from the frustrated junior commanders in Nam.

[RTK]

Rob, RTK, and other soldiers may want to chime in with their experiences.

Both OIF I and OIF III I saw the Squadron and Regimental commanders and CSms in the populace daily. Very seldom were they not "outside the wire." They led from the front, engaged the populace, got blown up quite a bit, and did their jobs as commanders and Soldiers. I'd follow them anywhere because of it.

[Ken White]

but were very much point of time in the war, unit and type organization peculiar. Many of those who tried to scuttle to the rear were not so much multiple tour types but WW II and Korean veterans who had been there and done that in a prior war -- and who were old, out of shape and were tactically rusty because they had been hiding out in homesteading jobs in the odd nooks and crannies of the Army for years. In short, most line units were better off without them. The Army is over-ranked in any event (IMO).

Their numbers are also overstated. Senior officers and NCOs hugging the Fire Bases and Base Camps or seeking rear area jobs was a minor issue but it was virtually non-existent in 65-66 and got only slightly worse as each succeeding rotation came in and the Army dipped further in the pool of RC unit advisers, multi year Recruiting tour types and others who had been away from TOE units for many years and who were considerably older than the norm and than is true today. Even so, many of those old guys got out with great frequency. Far more myths in the 'history' books about Viet Nam than there should be...

Phone calls and e-mails from my son when deployed to both the 'Stan and Iraq the last five years agree with RTK. Most Commanders and senior NCOs were getting out a great deal and generally not in the interfering mode. The few that did not are again a unit personality / individual proclivity problem.

To corroborate another thing Steve said, as a long time observer of the scene, post Viet Nam there were accessions in the 70s of what would eventually be senior NCOs in the 90s that were of less than stellar quality. Most of them are now gone but a few are still in. They got promoted due to keeping their nose clean and doing little but surviving long enough to get time in grade and get relatively easy promotions. Their successors, recruited in the 80s and 90s are a different kettle of fish entirely. Most are sharp and go-getters.

Still, there will always those who believe as did Eisenhower's Army Service Force Commander at the end of WW II; "Now we can get back to real soldiering" or Grand Duke Constantine Petrovich Romanov; "I detest war, it spoils armies." They like the neatness and order of peacetime 'soldiering' and of a large conventional opponent they can talk about and not have to fight. COIN is messy and everyone is not really flexible enough to cope. Usually those types get spotted and forced to behave properly but a few will always slip through.

They just need to get nailed by Commanders and other Senior NCOs.

[Dennis]

I will echo Cavguy and RTK, from my view during OEF IV and OIF III, CDRs and CSMs were out on a regular basis. Leading from the front as they should.

DWF

[Cavguy]

Still, there will always those who believe as did Eisenhower's Army Service Force Commander at the end of WW II; "Now we can get back to real soldiering" or Grand Duke Constantine Petrovich Romanov; "I detest war, it spoils armies."


Can you point me to a book source for these quotes - google has failed me. I want to use them in a paper.

[Stan]

To corroborate another thing Steve said, as a long time observer of the scene, post Viet Nam there were accessions in the 70s of what would eventually be senior NCOs in the 90s that were of less than stellar quality. Most of them are now gone but a few are still in. They got promoted due to keeping their nose clean and doing little but surviving long enough to get time in grade and get relatively easy promotions. Their successors, recruited in the 80s and 90s are a different kettle of fish entirely. Most are sharp and go-getters.

Hey Ken, Great detailed post !
Ya know, those would be some real crusty ol' folks now, if they were senior NCOs in the 90s :eek:

Are they allowed to still be around 25 years later :D

Jokes aside, you hit the nail on the head. The senior NCOs from my days in the early 70s were a sad case for the Army as well as for me in an ADA Battery.

The caliber of people we have today will not stand for Os and Es hangin' around watching the others work - as it should be today.

Regards, Stan

[Ken White]

Can you point me to a book source for these quotes - google has failed me. I want to use them in a paper.

The War Between the Generals (Irving). Unfortunately, I gave my copy to one of my sons and I can't give you the page number. Irving has been discredited as a holocaust denier and he's sort of anti UK /US in tone but that book came out long before he went off the deep end and while some of it has been refuted, most agree his anecdotes are probably correct because that was his specialty as an amateur historian; gossip. I should have said "or words to that effect," as well -- my quote was accurate in intent but it's been a while, 25 years or so, since I read the book so it's probably not verbatim. That recollection, like the source of the other is good enough for a forum but not for a paper. :(

The Grand Duke Constantine quote is from Strategy Page (LINK) (http://www.strategypage.com/cic/docs/cic164a.asp). Hutchinson gets wild now and then but he does do a lot of research, I suspect it's probably true. Like you, I had no luck on Google but I did turn up this LINK (http://www.aatseel.org/100111/pdf/program/2004/abstracts/kucherskaya.htm) to a paper that suggests he might well have said that and more... :wry:

The Wikipedia article would seem to bear that out... LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Duke_Constantine_Pavlovich_of_Russia). Not much help and I'm sure you saw both.

If I can get hold of the kid, I'll get him to check the book and I'll also look for more on the Romanov quote.

[Ken White]

Kid is on a short deployment and I haven't had a chance to hit the book store to check out the "We can get back to real soldiering" quote. Did go to dinner a couple of nights ago with an old - old friend who recalled the quote and said he was pretty sure it was alleged to have been said by this guy:

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._H._Lee).

Will keep looking.

[SGTMILLS]

I can only speak from the two tours I have done in Iraq, so here it goes...
1. Our BDE CSM is an OUTSTANDING leader. Like I said in an earlier post, he was constantly on missions.
2. Our CO went on missions a bunch of times, but only at his convenience. (rightfully so)
3. Our First SGT went on a total of 3 missions, but everyone knew he wasn't up for the task, he was just doing his time. The reality of this is that we knew that going in. Our PLT SGTs made up for it. The lower ranks caught on about half way through the last tour. We explained it away and kept the lowers off the subject.
Our CO did NOT have a PSD, but our mission was not heavily laden with tasks requiring him to be on the forefront. The only reason the CSM had one is because he had troops in 3-4 different AO's.
To sum up my explination...i can see how some first timers, or newbies can get fed up with poor leaders, but the "poor leaders" are few and far between. The fix? Strive to be a better soldier than those leaders. Hell, strive to be a better leader than the good ones. Every soldier can take notes from good leaders on how to, and from poor leaders on how NOT to.

[Uboat509]

I am confused. What were your 1SG and CSM doing on missions? I could see if it was a company mission having the 1SG but other than that he should not be there. 1SG and CSM are administrative positions. THe PSGs shouldn't be making up for the 1SG. It is their job to lead their platoons, not the 1SG. Personally we can't stand it when the company SGM or BN CSM come on missions with us. They are a distractor. For that matter the Company Commander should be staying out it unless it is a company mission. If it is a platoon mission, the platoon already has a leader, one who does not need his boss standing over his shoulder. I can understand going out once in a while just to check on things but more than that and they are in the way. Look at it this way. When the company commander goes out with a platoon he no longer can focus as effectively on the company mission, he is focused on the platoon he is with and a commander's job is to be where he can have the greatest effect on his entire AO.

SFC W

[Ken White]

1SGs don't have nearly as much admin stuff to do as they used to and they are, in theory, the most experienced NCOs in the Battery, Company or Troop.

Somebody had the bright idea that that talent and slack time could be put to good use if the 1SG became the senior trainer for the unit. It's taking hold slowly, I think. Thus, for the 1SG to wander about during operations makes sense. All will not do that job well but most will. Same applies to an extent to the CSM position; a lot of practical and tactical knowledge there (or should be...), shame to not put it to use now and then. Like anything else, a little common sense must be exercised -- and a lot of non-interference with others jobs is required.

Other'n that, I agree with your comment

[Rob Thornton]

These days things are very distributed - you might have a platoon out to a COP for a few days on QRF, or partnered up with ISF doing 24-72 hour of continuous operations. Companies occupy some pretty large AOs - same with BNs/TFs and BCTs. Some companies have been tagged as permanent augmentees to TTs, some just flat made into TTs. The 1SG and CSM are the eyes of experience - as such they provide many things including balance to a command team. Where a CDR may only do one tour with the unit, the 1SG may well have been within the BN or BCT for the last tour - he knows the unit and the personalities in ways the officer might never know. Since the battlespace is so big and the tasks on the CMD team so many, the CDR and his senior SNCO might be tag teaming to keep up and check on things.

While you can get info via FM, email and BFT, sometimes the only way to really communicate and understand something is to go look - plus it gets you back to the reality of what is going on. Its another one of those things that have to be balanced - the trick is to be available without being a burden - as you said, you are getting paid to do your job, not those of your subordinates.

Best Regards, Rob

[SGTMILLS]

I am confused. What were your 1SG and CSM doing on missions? I could see if it was a company mission having the 1SG but other than that he should not be there. 1SG and CSM are administrative positions. THe PSGs shouldn't be making up for the 1SG. It is their job to lead their platoons, not the 1SG. Personally we can't stand it when the company SGM or BN CSM come on missions with us. They are a distractor. For that matter the Company Commander should be staying out it unless it is a company mission. If it is a platoon mission, the platoon already has a leader, one who does not need his boss standing over his shoulder. I can understand going out once in a while just to check on things but more than that and they are in the way. Look at it this way. When the company commander goes out with a platoon he no longer can focus as effectively on the company mission, he is focused on the platoon he is with and a commander's job is to be where he can have the greatest effect on his entire AO.

SFC W

Ok, well, i guess i didn't explain it correctly. Yes, the CSM went out on missions, but i can only assume it was to evaluate how each patrol was handling themselves, then to take the best TTP's from each patrol and impliment them as SOP for the BN. still, the 1SGT was a poor leader, in that, his information was either a falsehood, or completely contradicted what he had said the previous day. I was only comparing him to the CSM, whom we saw almost every week.
I agree that the CO didn't need to be out there, and we didn't like any of the higher ups on our patrol, but it happened.
The lower enlisted had noticed the lack of ability and the inconsistencies in the 1SGT, so my point is that our PSGT's then had to explain the 1SGTs actions. The point i was trying to make must have gotten lost in the translation, so here it is...Poor leaders (no matter where they are in the chain) can make for a poor example for younger troops. That lack of ability translates into a less-effective unit, unless the rest of the leadership can make up for it.
I have gotten waaayyy off topic here, so i will stop, now. THANKS!!

[Stan]

Hey Sergeant Mills !



The lower enlisted had noticed the lack of ability and the inconsistencies in the 1SGT, so my point is that our PSGT's then had to explain the 1SGTs actions. The point i was trying to make must have gotten lost in the translation, so here it is...Poor leaders (no matter where they are in the chain) can make for a poor example for younger troops. That lack of ability translates into a less-effective unit, unless the rest of the leadership can make up for it.
I have gotten waaayyy off topic here, so i will stop, now. THANKS!!

Since we're slightly off topic, a final comment if you will.
You folks should have never permitted your 1SG (that used to be the correct abbreviation for a First Sergeant in my days) to drag his Alpha. That equates to a total collapse of the NCO system that the US Army and her Officers and Enlisted depend on. By permitting Top to coast into retirement while on active duty (assuming that's what you're saying) literally translates to the 'lower ranks' that the other NCOs are not only aware of the situation, but worse, condone said.

In my days, Top was out and about kickin' Alphas and foremost, our mentor.

Lastly, if your SGM or CSM was at all physically present, he would have noticed your 1SG's inactivity and/or inaction. I won't pretend to comprehend why and E-9 would watch and permit a 1SG loaf in a war zone.

Regards, Stan

[SGTMILLS]

Hey Sergeant Mills !



Since we're slightly off topic, a final comment if you will.
You folks should have never permitted your 1SG (that used to be the correct abbreviation for a First Sergeant in my days) to drag his Alpha. That equates to a total collapse of the NCO system that the US Army and her Officers and Enlisted depend on. By permitting Top to coast into retirement while on active duty (assuming that's what you're saying) literally translates to the 'lower ranks' that the other NCOs are not only aware of the situation, but worse, condone said.

In my days, Top was out and about kickin' Alphas and foremost, our mentor.

Lastly, if your SGM or CSM was at all physically present, he would have noticed your 1SG's inactivity and/or inaction. I won't pretend to comprehend why and E-9 would watch and permit a 1SG loaf in a war zone.

Regards, Stan

Stan...
Your guess was as good as mine as far as our first shirt dragging "alpha" all i know (being a lowly E-5) was that i was not going to let his actions (or lack thereof) affect how my team reacted to myself, or our squad leader, or Plt. SGT. As far as our CSM, his efforts and concerns were about the soldiers, not the leaders. I can't speak for him as to why he let Top act the way he did. We came back w/ 100% and i do not attribute any of that to 1SGT. Our TTP's and BOG thinking got us all home safe. All is in the past, and we are getting an outstanding 1SGT very soon. Essayons.:)
SGT Mills

[Stan]

Stan...
Your guess was as good as mine as far as our first shirt dragging "alpha" all i know (being a lowly E-5) was that i was not going to let his actions (or lack thereof) affect how my team reacted to myself, or our squad leader, or Plt. SGT. As far as our CSM, his efforts and concerns were about the soldiers, not the leaders. I can't speak for him as to why he let Top act the way he did. We came back w/ 100% and i do not attribute any of that to 1SGT. Our TTP's and BOG thinking got us all home safe. All is in the past, and we are getting an outstanding 1SGT very soon. Essayons.:)
SGT Mills

Glad to hear the you and your team picked up the slack !
I enjoyed the video you sent, Thanks !
Regards, Stan

[KH]

Hello all, first post here, great forum by the way. I fully believe that maneuver BDE/BN/CO commanders not only need a PSD, but it is also irresponsible to not have a dedicated one. I would not confuse a PSD with bodyguards. A PSD is the entire combat patrol that gets the CDR from the FOB/COP to the place he has to go. Most meetings that he attends will only involve him a a few selected individuals (CA/S2/FSO etc., and 1-2 close in security personnel). The remainder of the PSD has to be able to secure the vehicles and perform local security.

Any commander worth his weight will spend a lot of time outside the wire, that leaves three options; (1) use one of the BNs platoons for the mission, (2) create an adhoc patrol every time, or (3) have a dedicated PSD.

(1) Using one of the BN's platoons reduces the available combat power in sector for the duration of the mission. Even if the mission is scheduled/planned you have just reduced maneuver forces in sector by one. Or even worse you are using a platoon that is supposed to be refitting which is not fair to the soldiers. Add to that, is trying to figure out how the CDR and his crew fits into the platoon and its SOPs, the CDR is not organic to that unit and attachments can throw off well understood reactions and drills and endager soldiers.

(2) Creating an ad-hoc organization is an even worse option. This option results in patrols that do hot have set SOPs and is collective training event for every mission. This presents the most danger to the CDR and the soldiers on the patrol. I would never recommend this option unless there wasn't any other choice.

(3) A dedicated PSD creates an integrated combat patrol that has set SOPs and understands their roles and missions. A PSD can be generated with HQ (PLT/CO/Staff) assets for the most part. Using command crews, HQ/Staff personnel (or hijacking a few specialty platoon personnel) alllows a CDR to have a reliable PSD that knows how to maneuver, react to contact, provide local security, etc.. As it is a dedicated organization the soldiers know what is expected of them and who is supposed to be doing what in any given situation. As with any normal platoon, their practiced and well rehearsed SOPs are what matter most during contact.

KH

[SGTMILLS]

Glad to hear the you and your team picked up the slack !
I enjoyed the video you sent, Thanks !
Regards, Stan

It was our whole company. I give it up to each and every NCO for not letting a weak link get in the way of us all coming home.
I have seen fantastic NCO's and i have seen subpar NCO's. We just gain what we can from both, and drive on!

[Waterman]

Excellent board, gentlemen. I was looking for something like this to dovetail with my self-education in history and military affairs. Until I happened upon this, I was despairing of ever finding reasoned, rational, civil and informed discourse on the subject matter.

It seems that the young originator of this topic is dealing with perhaps at least two realities: (1) he cannot see the big picture relative to his commanding officer's responsibilities that would require a PSD and is resentful; (2) he is assigned to a unit in which the command element unnecessarily or without authorization uses a PSD as a status symbol. A first sergeant or battalion S-1A who doesn't want to ride with a convoy to pick up the mail, for example, but rather mounts his own vehicle element with attached PSD to perform that task.

As to the role and quality of personnel assigned to PSD, I can only add that in my experience, limited as it is, such people were also expected to properly plan and brief the mission to the PL/OIC, gather information during their mission, execute the mission, perform a competent post-mission briefback, and examine lessons learned for application to the next mission. This goes for grunts and tankers as well as NSW, reconnaissance, and SF types. Especially in this type of conflict, everyone is an intelligence-gatherer and everyone needs to be on board.

A bunch of surly, skeptical, and cynical admin, supply or motor T types who were disengaged from their cots, daydreams, or regular duties by the company gunny or unit senior chief for a poorly planned mission would have been unacceptable. The poster's unit leadership is clearly at fault if, as he says, personnel with no clear understanding of or appreciation for the mission were utilized.

In LIC/COIN, everybody makes a difference and as near complete as possible an understanding of the mission is essential. This is not Willy's and Joe's war.