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SWJED
09-15-2006, 05:06 AM
Moderator's Note

This thread was entitled 'Ungoverned spaces & State, Non-State, State Sponsored opportunities vs. our Interests' until 25th Sept 2012, when other threads were merged here and the title amended to 'Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses'.

The catalyst being remarks made by Ambassador Crocker over the future of Afghanistan, which have been moved here. There is a post at the end explaining what threads were merged.(ends)


15 September Washington Post - World Bank Lists Failing Nations That Can Breed Global Terrorism (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401859.html) by Karen DeYoung.


The number of weak and poorly governed nations that can provide a breeding ground for global terrorism has grown sharply over the past three years, despite increased Western efforts to improve conditions in such states, according to a new World Bank report.

"Fragile" countries, whose deepening poverty puts them at risk from terrorism, armed conflict and epidemic disease, have jumped to 26 from 17 since the report was last issued in 2003. Five states graduated off the list, but 14 made new appearances, including Nigeria and seven other African countries, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor, and the West Bank and Gaza. Twelve states, including Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, made both lists...

pcmfr
09-19-2006, 12:02 AM
I was surprised to see that Haiti was the only SOUTHCOM country listed. I would think a few others are contenders for the list, especially Paraguay, Guatemala, and Guiyana.

Rob Thornton
09-13-2007, 07:17 PM
One of the questions that Ambassador Crocker mentioned in his opening statement during his testimony to the Senate was the declared intention of Iran to fill any vacuum provided by the U.S. - but how much of a vacuum could they actually fill?

We cannot claim to control every square inch of Iraq, Afghanistan, the HOA, the Philippines, Columbia or any place we are currently operating in where we consider instability a threat. The local and national governments of these places cannot claim to either - but they are trying to work (with us) towards the level of control required to do prevent these spaces from growing and impacting other regions of their states, and eventually shrinking these spaces - or as a larger goal - shrinking what Thomas Barnett has described as "The Gap".

AMB Crocker's comments and today's press conference by the International Institute of Strategic Studies are framing an important question that extends beyond Iraq & Afghanistan. There are plenty of ungoverned spaces within geographically defined state borders all over the world. There are also states and non-state actors willing to exploit these areas, foment instability, and use them as staging areas, sanctuaries, and training grounds from which to pursue broader goals.

This is certainly should not be viewed as a "US only problem". However, because we have wide ranging interests of which some are vital and some are peripheral but linked to vital interest; because the U.S.is targeted based on our pursuit and defense of those interests; because we often stand as an impediment to the pursuit of national, regional or international objectives of non-state and states which have their own set of fear, honor and interests (as Thucydides described the reasons for which war is waged); and because the U.S. has the means to act; we are perceived as the counter to this problem.

What then should our policy goals be?

What are the means by which we should pursue those goals? How should / or should we adapt/transform our elements of National Power to meet these requirements? Does the military need to change - how much? Do we need an increase in our Diplomatic, Informational, Economic capabilities - how much?

What are the ways by which we should pursue these policies and employ our means to best effect? If a state cannot or will not act to prevent those states, non-state actors, state sponsored actors with goals that jeopardize our interests (and those of our allies) from operating in these ungoverned spaces - should we violate their sovereign borders in order to attack, defeat and destroy those organizations? This is certainly the subject of debate by 2008 Presidential Candidates - and I believe it is a very real decision that a President will have to make given the trans-national nature of groups to plan, recruit and train in one geographic location, but execute varying scales of terrorist attacks as part of their own agenda, or the agenda of their sponsor in areas across the globe.

What I have not heard a great deal of discussion about from Presidential candidates is a counter balancing plan that is able to build state capacity on the scale required to reduce the chances of having to make that decision. I do think the COCOMs are doing this, and I think DOS is working hard to do this as well, but are we doing this by adapting the means available to accomplish this? Do we have the right means required to meet the scope of the task?

Do we need to re-evaluate our policy and strategy to ensure we have a match that more gully meets the challenges as we are beginning to understand them? While I think we can make the case that we are evolving based on what works on the ground and by implementing the innovative and sometimes imaginative that occur at the tactical level, could we do better by adjusting our strategic framework so that we are better arranged to take advantage of those ideas, and also place the correct means where they are needed?

The last week has really raised good & needed questions that extend beyond Iraq, even though the question of our commitment there was the catalyst. Tonight the President will also discuss Iraq, Iran, Al Queda in Iraq - and possibly Hezbollah, Hamas, the region at large and our vital national interests - and many of these same issues will surface in the following days as the rationale for remaining committed is debated, and the question of what it all means get sorted out. We are starting to develop a national consciousness in regard to the threats of the 21st Century.

Thoughts?

Best Regards, Rob

Jedburgh
09-14-2007, 02:51 AM
....AMB Crocker's comments and today's press conference by the International Institute of Strategic Studies are framing an important question that extends beyond Iraq & Afghanistan. There are plenty of ungoverned spaces within geographically defined state borders all over the world. There are also states and non-state actors willing to exploit these areas, foment instability, and use them as staging areas, sanctuaries, and training grounds from which to pursue broader goals....
Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

I originally posted this in the Adversary/Threat sub-forum when it was first published, but I've cut it out and put here because I feel you've put a better start on the topic of discussion:

RAND, 23 Aug 07: Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf)

Since the end of the Cold War, failed or failing states and ungoverned territories within otherwise viable states have become a more common international phenomenon. Many of the crises that have required intervention by U.S. or international forces were produced by the collapse or absence of state authority. These ungoverned territories generate all manner of security problems, such as civil conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drug smuggling, piracy, and refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on U.S. military resources. The problem of dealing with ungoverned areas has taken on increased urgency since 9/11, which demonstrated how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies.

The objective of this RAND Corporation study is to understand the conditions that give rise to ungoverned territories and their effects on U.S. security interests and to develop strategies to improve the U.S. ability to mitigate these effects—in particular, to reduce the threat posed by terrorists operating within or from these territories. The study is based on an analysis of eight case studies.

Our research approach is as follows: We first identify and analyze the attributes of ungoverned territories, which we refer to as “ungovernability,” on the basis of four variables. Second, since not all ungoverned territories are equally hospitable to terrorist and insurgent groups, we identify and analyze what we call “conduciveness to terrorist presence” on the basis of four other variables. Using this two-part framework, we next conduct a comparative analysis of the eight case studies. Finally, we derive the implications of our analysis for the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Air Force.
To answer the question, the case studies in the book cover the following areas:

The Pakistani-Afghan Border Region

The Arabian Peninsula

The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc

The East Africa Corridor

West Africa

The North Caucasus

The Colombia-Venezuela Border

The Guatemala-Chiapas Border

Rex Brynen
09-14-2007, 04:04 AM
Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

To add another case study to the link Ted posted--not from the perspective of the counter-insurgent, however, but rather focusing on what strategies insurgent groups may adopt to obtain and maintain sanctuary in third countries:

Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/sanctuary/contents.html) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). The book is out of print now, and the link is to a web version of the text.

LawVol
09-14-2007, 01:10 PM
What are the ways by which we should pursue these policies and employ our means to best effect? If a state cannot or will not act to prevent those states, non-state actors, state sponsored actors with goals that jeopardize our interests (and those of our allies) from operating in these ungoverned spaces - should we violate their sovereign borders in order to attack, defeat and destroy those organizations?

I recall reading somewhere about how the rise of these combative non-state entities (e.g. terror organizations like Al Qaeda) are challenging the states' monopoly on war and thereby challenging the state as an entity itself. If the goal of these fundamentalist terror organizations is to establish a Caliphate wherein Islam rather than some notion of the nation-state rules, don't we need to tailor our response to account for this?

You raise an interesting point regarding sovereignty and the pursuit of our enemies. Many ungoverned spaces are located within bonafide nation-states. The fact that a portion of their land is ungoverned does not change the fact that it still belongs to them and they have certain rights to that area under international law. If we were to ignore this and invade, no matter how noble the cause, do we not assist in the break down of the nation-state at least on some small level?

The Darfur situation comes to mind. It is striking to me that some of those that oppose action in Iraq argue for action in Darfur. I'm not saying we should or should not go into Darfur, but we must remember that Darfur falls within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Sudan. While jumping in there may be a good idea, where do you draw the line at violating state sovereignty? Another issue that comes to mind is the hunt for UBL. Say we find him in Pakistan or any other country. Do we go get him even if the host nation says no? Maybe so, but that action has consequences and possibly breaks down the notion of the state. That being said, I do know that Israel did this in the Eichmann case, but I'm not familiar with the fallout, if any.

Thoughts?

slapout9
09-14-2007, 01:32 PM
I read the study that Jed posted on another thread and the case studies are interesting but the framework they use to identify and judge failing states is just as important. It is one of the most common sense methodologies I have seen. The report is worth the read.




LawVol You bring up a good legal point and I have a legal question for you. Is There in legal basis to apply the principle of when to use force that can override jurisdictional boundaries. I was thinking ability,opportunity, and jeopardy are the guidelines for use of force in many states both for LE and civilians??

LawVol
09-14-2007, 02:02 PM
There's an old adage that says if you ask two lawyers a question, you'll get three answers:D. What this means is that much of the law has gray areas that are open to argument. For example, the Bush adminstration argued that preemptive action in Iraq was legal because Iraq posed an imminent threat. Obviously, many have disagreed with this conclusion and continue to argue the illegality of the war. Those that adhere to that line of thinking would likely answer you question by saying that only an attack from a beligerent country would authorize a violation of that country's sovereignty (the theory being that they waived that sovereignty in the context of conflict by attacking another country).

I know of no legal basis for unilaterally entering a country in a military capacity to do things like administer humanitarian aid or to capture a terror suspect. I would think that even the Bush doctrine of preemptive action wouldn't cover this since the country itself would pose the threat. In other words, it is the terrorist that poses the threat not the country in which he is located. The humanitrian issue does not met this either unless someone can advance an argument that the humanitarian crisis poses a threat to a particular nation's sovereignty (i.e. its the equivalent of an attack).

With the terrorist example, I revert back to my comment I've shared before about treating the war on terror as a criminal rather than military fight. I think it would be easier to come to terms with various nations to allow an international unit (or international sponsored unit) to effectuate an arrest. However, I see many difficulties even with this.

Whatever the solution, I think we need to place it within a legal framework so that we do not weaken state sovereignty.

Rex Brynen
09-14-2007, 02:03 PM
he Darfur situation comes to mind. It is striking to me that some of those that oppose action in Iraq argue for action in Darfur. I'm not saying we should or should not go into Darfur, but we must remember that Darfur falls within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Sudan. While jumping in there may be a good idea, where do you draw the line at violating state sovereignty?

Those supporting intervention in Darfur generally do on R2P (responsibility to protect) grounds. The emergence and evolution of R2P since Rwanda and Kosovo is an interesting case of change in international norms, even if the concept is still vague and elastic enough (and constrained enough by national interests) to be a poor predictor of actual international behaviour.

The classic statement of this, of course, is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (December 2001) on Responsibility to Protect (http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf).

R2P, however, is all about protecting third-country populations from massive human rights abuse, on the grounds that state sovereignty is contingent on states providing a certain degree of protection to their own citizens. If they are unable or unwilling to perform that fundamental obligation of statehood, sovereignty fades as a consideration.

This is a rather different thing from intervention in failed or failing states for counterinsurgent or counter-terrorism reasons. Of course, responding to attacks emanating in third country sanctuaries is hardly anything new, and one can easily root it in centuries of international law and practice of jus ad bellum. No one in the international system, for example, had particular problems with intervention in Afghanistan against AQ and their Taliban allies after 9/11.

The larger complication lies, I think, when such actions:

1) Are preemptive, or

2) Are perceived as unnecessarily unilateral (for example, striking at UBL in Pakistan rather than asking the Pakistanis to do so).

3) Risk establishing precedents that others use or misuse ("well, if the Americans can do it, why not us?")

Finally, at the level of practice rather than doctrine, there is the fundamental "big picture" question of whether such actions cause more problems than they resolve, complicated by the law of unintended consequences. Israeli intervention in Lebanon against the PLO in 1982 resulted in the subsequent emergence of Hizbullah; an American strike against UBL could well destabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistani government; and so forth.

Jedburgh
02-15-2008, 03:53 PM
14 Feb 08 testimony by Angel Rabasa, one of the authors of the Rand pub linked above, before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:

Ungoverned Territories (http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2008/RAND_CT299.pdf)

....Building government capacity and expanding the central government’s writ into ungoverned territories is the work of generations. Many of these policies are difficult to implement. Nevertheless, if the United States works with its partners to implement them, then—despite individual failings and inefficiencies—the overall results would help to make ungoverned areas less hospitable to terrorists and much less conducive to their activities. Taken in tandem with policies to reduce the number and size of ungoverned territories, the results could mean enhanced constraints on terrorism, international organized crime, and other plagues that traditionally have been spawned and nurtured in ungoverned territories.

Ski
02-16-2008, 06:01 PM
I gave a brief two summers ago to some interested military personnel (I have to be vague here) about this situation.

The brief was built around Foreign Affairs "Failed State Index" - available here: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865

I simply said - look at the nations on the list and then tell me how many countries the US has been involved in over the last decade, and how many are we in today. That trend is not going to disappear anytime soon. They understood where I was coming from.

Mike Innes
02-17-2008, 12:38 AM
To add another case study to the link Ted posted--not from the perspective of the counter-insurgent, however, but rather focusing on what strategies insurgent groups may adopt to obtain and maintain sanctuary in third countries:

Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/sanctuary/contents.html) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). The book is out of print now, and the link is to a web version of the text.

I'd second that - Rex's book is the only one that I'm aware of that intelligently applies guerrilla warfare theories on sanctuary as an interface between state and non-state actors.

Take a look also at this Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report on Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe, 1993-2000 (http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2001/03789.pdf). It takes the theoretical framework from Sanctuary and Survival (http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/sanctuary/contents.html) and applies it to good use elsewhere.

I'd also suggest a look at my own edited book on the subject, out as of last summer, entitled Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9212) (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). It doesn't offer an overarching analytical framework in the way that Sanctuary and Survival does, and that wasn't its intent. The idea, instead, was to poke holes and raise questions with regard to the political orthodoxies of the last seven years on the subject of "ungoverned territories".


Rob, this issue of "ungoverned spaces" (and by extension, weak and/or corruptly governed) is a serious one, and one which significantly impacts US interests directly and indirectly. It is one which I deal with regularly, yet I find many not willing to conceptually deal with any threat which is not immediate.

I originally posted this in the Adversary/Threat sub-forum when it was first published, but I've cut it out and put here because I feel you've put a better start on the topic of discussion:

RAND, 23 Aug 07: Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf)

One thing I can appreciate about the RAND report is that it limits itself to ungoverned "territories", rather than using ungoverned "space", the more usual political handle which actually revolves around a much broader category of issues analogous to the complex physical, human, and information terrain of the Australian Army's Future Land Operational Concept: Complex Warfighting (www.defence.gov.au/army/hna/docs%5CComplex%20Warfighting%20(CASAC%20Endorsed%2 0May%2004).doc).

Where I think things get a bit more complicated, and bear a whole a lot more study, is with the problem of scale. It's good to be thinking in terms of sanctuary as a macro-level security issue and challenge of political legitimacy, development and governance. But there are more immediate and local dimensions of sanctuary, just as there are non-physical aspects to the issue. The best work I've seen on this so far is by Ron Hassner, a political scientist at Berkeley, who's been writing about insurgent uses of sacred sites, as well as comparative just war theory approaches to sanctuary. Citations as follows:


Hassner Ron E. "'To Halve and to Hold': Conflicts Over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.” Security Studies 12:4 (Summer 2003): 1-33.

_____________. “Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground (http://www.twq.com/06spring/docs/06spring_hassner.pdf).” Washington Quarterly 2:29 (Spring 2006): 149-166.

_____________. "Islamic Just War Theory and the Challenge of Sacred Space in Iraq." Journal of International Affairs 61:1 (Fall/Winter 2007): 131-152.

Problems of surrogacy and state sponsorship are certainly vexing. In international law, a "harboring thesis" places the burden of responsibility on states to ensure that their territories aren't made available to int'l/transn'tl criminal and terrorist organizations. Both Tal Becker and Dan Byman cover this pretty well in their respective books on states and state sponsorship. Where I think the logic fails is while it rightly emphasizes preventing state provision of sanctuary, it also neglects non-state actor acquisition and exploitation of sanctuary, absent state-level intent to support. Both Byman and Becker do this by looking to passive forms of support as a lowest common denominator, which to my mind stretches the credulity of the argument.

This ties back to another SWC thread on Hizbullah tactical effectiveness; basically, non-state actors evolve, demonstrate agency, etc., and this needs to be given at least as much consideration as the capabilities of states and their responsibilities under int'l law - especially since the logic of state failure/collapse, taken to its extreme, means that some states will be (and have proven to be) incapable of either actively providing sanctuary or preventing terrorist exploitation of their resources. At that point, non-state actor acquisition and development of sanctuary has to be the focus.

Jedburgh
03-25-2008, 07:01 PM
CSIS, 20 Mar 08: A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080320-barton-steephill.pdf)

The difficulties experienced during U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the increasing recognition of the threat posed by ungoverned spaces have once again placed fragile states at the forefront of the U.S. national security agenda. Yet, the United States remains ill-equipped to meet the challenges of stabilization and reconstruction. There is a lack of coordination and strategic engagement within the U.S. government and no clear legislative authority for an overall strategic plan.

This study—the first to examine the role of Congress in strengthening fragile states before, during, and after interventions—identifies key legislative and executive branch obstacles to effective stabilization and reconstruction operations and explores opportunities for a new grand bargain that embodies goals both branches support.....
Complete 93 page paper at the link.

Mike Innes
03-25-2008, 10:15 PM
CSIS, 20 Mar 08: A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080320-barton-steephill.pdf)

Complete 93 page paper at the link.

Thanks for posting, I look forward to reading the full report.

There was an interesting report in the Int' Herald Tribune a few days ago that touched on this. I wrote it up in the Complex Terrain Lab blog HERE (http://www.terraplexic.org/journal/2008/3/19/us-adopts-cold-war-tactic-against-terrorism.html).

Tom Odom
04-01-2008, 03:40 PM
Another history lesson I just put out:


"Only one option was left, as the Americans understood all too well. In the 1979 memo that described the weaknesses of the resistance, Brzezinski also explained that the United States had to “reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels….”28 Pakistan, which shared a nearly 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan, needed reassurance and encouragement because it was in a precarious position. Much as they had with the Iranians, the Soviets explicitly threatened to invade Pakistan if it became involved in the war. And much like the Iranians, the Pakistanis had other concerns, most importantly, ongoing disputes with India. These concerns meant that Pakistan went to great lengths to avoid open aid to the resistances. But that caution did not make Pakistan neutral in the Soviet-Afghan War, far from it.

In addition to becoming the temporary home for the millions of Afghan refugees who fled the war, Pakistan played the most important role in facilitating the resistance. Refugees were not the only ones who fled over the border. Most of the exiled Afghan resistance parties went to Pakistan and directed their efforts within Afghanistan from across the border in Peshawar. The rugged terrain and harsh conditions along the winding and mountainous Afghanistan-Pakistan border was in many ways an ideal boundary over which to fight and aid an insurgency. Hundreds of mountain passes connected the two countries, the terrain made it impossible to close all these routes across the border, and the harsh conditions helped protect fleeing rebels. As a result, Pakistan became the primary sanctuary for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Not only that, it also became the essential supply route for the weapons and materiel that kept the Mujahideen going throughout the war. Pakistan became the funnel to the resistance for the outside world."

We hear much talk of borders these days and the challenges inherent in their control, the risks associated with ignoring them, or the dangers implicit in their crossing. This installment of the JRTC BiWeekly History lesson uses the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper #17, Out of Bounds, Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare, by Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr. as a case study on the roles of external sanctuaries and insurgencies. Dr. Bruscino's study is in two parts. The first part is a case study of the Vietnam War and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. The second part is a relook at the Soviet experience in Afghanistan focused on the role of Pakistan.

I would highlight the second case study as immediately relevant to what is happening in Afghanistan today. Indeed you cannot understand events in Afghanistan if you do not see them as intertwined with events in Pakistan. As this case study proves that is hardly an emerging phenomenon as it has long been the case. Still recent events reinforce its currency. Finally Dr. Bruscino concludes his paper with a discussion of sanctuaries in irregular warfare and the need for a countervailing strategy to deal with them. The study can be downloaded at CSI OP #17 (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/bruscino.pdf).

Best

Tom

Vic Bout
04-01-2008, 04:31 PM
I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud

Stan
04-01-2008, 04:53 PM
I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud

Vic,
Intriguing thought ! I think Ken could tell you tons about Vietnam (along Cambodia's border) which would say, shed light on the lack of sanctuary for insurgents back then.

If I look at my time in Sub-Sahara, the only folks that remotely respected geographical borders were foreigners, either on PKO or other official missions (don't tell Rangers that).

I'd say "support base" rather than sanctuary...You can run, but you can no longer hide :D

Tom Odom
04-01-2008, 05:01 PM
I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud

No not at all. Good question on sanctuary versus popular support. I kinda separate classic guerrilla versus insurgent on that issue, the guerrilla not necessarily basing what he does on the need to increase or maintain popular support, the insurgent in contrast has to do just that.

Brascino emphasizes that the Soviets did adapt in Afghanistan and their brutal tactics in some areas did have the effects they sought. What hurt them the most was the issue of the cross border sanctuaries where the Muj could R&R at will (at least at first).

I know in addressing the threat from the Hutu camps along Rwanda's borders, they were a combination of refuge and host population, all catered by the UNHCR and the international community. As former refugees, insurgents, and counterinsurgents in two wars, the leaders of the RPF had no doubt that the camps were a threat, one that had to be addressed. When the international community failed to do so, they did. The results were and still are horrific in the Congo--but it allowed the RPF to win the COIN effort inside Rwanda. After years of meddling by Mobutu, the RPF leaders were more than willing to make that choice, especially if it got rid of Mo in the process.

Best
Tom

Ken White
04-01-2008, 07:38 PM
...
I'd say "support base" rather than sanctuary...You can run, but you can no longer hide :DParticularly in view of the fact that most such 'sanctuaries' are provided by nations that may have mixed emotions about doing so but on balance would prefer not to be viewed as a sanctuary. While the Nation, per se, would rather not, there were / are generally enough people who do support the cause to enable that support base to exist to one degree or another.

Cambodia is a good example; so is Thailand during the Malayan Emergency, Pakistan then and now, Haiti to the DomRep and of course, Laos -- which suffered the indignity as much due to the odd qualities of the US Ambassador of the time as any other reason.

In all those cases, the sanctuary provider broadly would have preferred to not be that but for either political or military reasons, was not able to do more than voice a pro forma objection. In the case of Thailand, continued British protests didn't do much good because the Thais were not able to control the border. So the SAS did some cross border stuff (so I was told by guys who were there and involved -- but it's well buried, I haven't been able to find it in writing anywhere). A lot of our Cambode and Lao ops are open source, more are not. Same's true with Pakistan.

The big difference today is that Turkey (small), Syria and Iran -- and probably to a limited and covert extent, Saudi Arabia -- are capable of denying sanctuary or support but choose instead to support it...

Mike Innes
04-25-2008, 04:59 PM
Dear SWC Members - I'd like to draw your attention to a new post at the Complex Terrain Lab on state failure, by Stephen D.K. Ellis, the author of The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (http://www.amazon.com/Mask-Anarchy-Destruction-Religious-Dimension/dp/0814722199) (NYU Press, 1999; Hurst & Co Publishers, 2006). It's his first post to CTLab.

Stephen's CTLab bio is here (http://www.terraplexic.org/bio-ellis/)

The post on state failure is here (http://www.terraplexic.org/journal/2008/4/25/the-state-of-state-failure.html)

Best

Mike

marct
04-25-2008, 05:23 PM
Interesting post, Mike. I think it raises some really good points about he semantics of "failed/ing" vs "fragile" states.

Jedburgh
05-27-2008, 02:05 PM
RAND, 9 May 08: Breaking the Failed State Cycle (http://rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP204.pdf)

In their research and field experience, the authors have observed a wide gulf separating the treatment of the security problems of failed states from the treatment of those states’ economic problems. This, in turn, may impair treatment of political problems. Such disunity of effort in assisting failed states may suboptimize resource allocation, hinder coordination, and cause important demands to be neglected. With their different backgrounds—security, economic development, political systems, health policy, and institution-building—the authors felt that, as a team, they might be able to forge an integrated, general approach to rescuing failed states, recognizing that each specific case demands a tailored approach. After holding a seminar with representatives of the World Bank, the United Nations, development agencies, and several security organizations, the RAND team set out in search of ideas that would bridge the gap and thus permit more effective strategies and actions toward failed states.

The approach on which they settled was to identify certain critical difficulties that contribute to the cycle of violence, economic collapse, and political failure that ensnares vulnerable states. While such difficulties demand special attention, they often suffer from inattention—precisely because they fall into the crevasses between security, economics, and politics. Simply stated, the international community is ill equipped to treat the causes of state failure....

Fuchs
05-28-2008, 10:14 PM
Wow, counter-terrorism activities are so far away from the World Bank's responsibilities that this is ridiculous.

Jedburgh
05-28-2008, 10:47 PM
Wow, counter-terrorism activities are so far away from the World Bank's responsibilities that this is ridiculous.
The book, and this thread in general, is looking at the issue of failed/fragile states as a strategic enabling factor in the growth and spread of organized violence. It was never intended to take a narrow CT view.

The World Bank, despite its being a massive international bureaucracy - with all the problems inherent in that descriptor - at least recognizes the need to bridge the security-development divide. With the establishment of its Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,menuPK:511784~pagePK:64171540~piPK:64171528~the SitePK:511778,00.html) Group last year, it adjusted its structure and made an operational commitment to an attempt to more effectively address what it understood conceptually.

Ridiculous? No. Difficult, complex and destined to make plenty of mistakes along the way? Yes.

Jedburgh
07-29-2008, 02:53 PM
Foreign Policy, Jul-Aug 08: Failed States Index 2008 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350)

Whether it is an unexpected food crisis or a devastating hurricane, the world’s weakest states are the most exposed when crisis strikes. In the fourth annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and The Fund for Peace (http://www.fundforpeace.org/) rank the countries where state collapse may be just one disaster away.....

Jedburgh
04-15-2009, 05:35 PM
Berghof Research Center, 9 Apr 09:

Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/BERGHOF_BuildingPeaceAbsenceOfStates_ChallengingDi scourseStateFailure.pdf)

....This Berghof Handbook Dialogue will not present an additional compilation of definitions and/or theoretical approaches concerning failed, fragile or weak states, nor will it offer recipes or policy recommendations in a technical sense. Our intention is instead to present some food for thought on the general premises of these concepts and to point out dilemmas which mark the current discourse (and practice). The lead article asks poignantly whether it is the states (in the South) that are failing, or the analysis of research (undertaken mostly in the North) that is inadequate or incomplete. Given a situation where state-building efforts are more often than not designed by the North and introduced to the South, this question needs to be investigated. This implies critically and honestly identifying the potential, and limits, of external intervention....
Complete 98-page paper at the link.

Bob's World
06-24-2009, 07:11 PM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failed_state

There is a lot of talk these days about "Failed States."

The first question I've been mulling around in my head is:

1. Is this something that we really need to be concerned about, or are "failed states" simply a fact that is having unwarranted concerns attached to it by well meaning individuals seeking answers to complex issues who simply don't understand the nature of the problems we face?

For example, look at the definition of a failed state as provided in Wikipedia. By this definition, the Sioux Indian Tribe as it lived and dominated the northern plains of the current United States for some 100 + years was a "failed state." As, apparently, are most all tribal based governments.

There is no one leader who can speak for all, concepts of borders and control of terrain within those borders are completely inconsistent with Western, Westphalian concepts of what a proper state should look like, etc.

So my second question is this:

2. Are we dealing with a rash of failed states that must be "fixed" to prevent greater problems, or, are we merely seeing how the tools of globalization are enabling populaces whose concept of government was originally rooted in tribalism to reject the western concepts of borders and "proper" government that were forced upon them?

This is something that we need to talk about. Woven into it are concepts of "sanctuary" (is sanctuary something found in "ungoverned spaces or is it more accurately something found within some legal status, often provided by a border, or perhaps within a poorly governed populace?) or of "effectiveness of governance" (Does insurgency happen because governments suck at providing the services that westerners expect from their governments? or does insurgency arise from a place higher and less tangible on Mr. Maslow’s hierarchy in the realm of "respect" and what could better be described as perceptions "poor" governance coupled with no available means to resolve short of conflict?)

I, for one, believe that "failed states" are a natural evolution of governance for our times, and that it is the West that needs to learn finally how to engage with tribal constructs, and not simply default to forcing the tribes to look, dress, pray, and act just like us. We've gotten away with that for a couple hundred years, but I believe that era is over. Let’s instead help these populaces to operate within the terms of their own governmental constructs. Not only is it likely to be better received, but it is also likely to do a far better job of dealing with problems like "sanctuary" and "insurgency."

Steve Blair
06-24-2009, 07:31 PM
For example, look at the definition of a failed state as provided in Wikipedia. By this definition, the Sioux Indian Tribe as it lived and dominated the northern plains of the current United States for some 100 + years was a "failed state." As, apparently, are most all tribal based governments.

Historical nitpick - not so. Based on the wiki article's four points:
* loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein,
* erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions,
* an inability to provide reasonable public services, and
* an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

The Sioux were not a failed state. Their council system supported collective decisions (almost to a fault in some cases). Once they modified their existing cultural support system to deal with horses and other European imports they actually provided very good public services (if you count food and shelter as public services...for one example look at the ability of one major camp to absorb two major waves of refugees during the 1876 Great Sioux War). And if you count other tribes (as well as the various factions and divisions within the Sioux) as an international community of sorts, the Sioux actually did quite well. They came to a working understanding with the Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho, and traded with other groups as well. One could, however, take the position that most reservations could qualify as failed states, but that's a different thread.

Sorry...I had to take a whack at that statement, more to point out that I don't think a tribal system per se creates a failed nation. Where I think you begin seeing failed states is when outside intervention creates artificial borders and confuses an existing tribal structure (for one example, look at the reservation system that played a role in both initiating the 1872 Modoc War and led to the 1877 Nez Perce conflict...both resulted from either an ill-advised resettlement effort or attempting to force two traditional enemies to coexist on the same reservation).

The concept of governmental services is an interesting one, and should be looked at as much as possible from the standpoint of the population. Another Frontier example might be the 1874 Red River War. One of the major causes was the removal or restriction of a very important part of male Kiowa cultural development: the ability to earn honor through conflict (to include stealing horses from neighbors). This created a great deal of pressure on the so-called peace chiefs and allowed the various Kiowa warrior societies to gain in cultural power and eventually encourage their people into war. This also happened to a degree with the Southern Cheyenne in the late 1860s. In both cases you're looking at leaders (as understood in the traditional Western sense) being unable to provide a basic service for their people (the ability to earn honor through traditional means), which in turn undermined their authority within the tribe and created a sort of social insurgency led by the heads of the various warrior societies.

The fact is that in many places that house "failed states" the borders were drawn by a succession of European colonial powers and don't necessarily reflect the reality on the ground. It's that colonial legacy, IMO, that creates most of the problems. And, after all, the US shows up as a moderately failing state in the wiki article, as does most of Europe....:D

Bob's World
06-24-2009, 08:16 PM
This is, my perhaps inartfully stated, point. Something is not failed simply becuase it operates differently than us, nor is it failed if it rejects attempts to change forced upon it so that it would be like us.

I believe that both the current concept of "failed state" is flawed in its definition, as well as its potential consequence.

Old Eagle
06-24-2009, 08:23 PM
For an interesting discussion of "failed states" go to Foreign Policy magazine's website. They just published this year's report.

Bob's World
06-24-2009, 09:09 PM
For an interesting discussion of "failed states" go to Foreign Policy magazine's website. They just published this year's report.

Exactly my point. We even track and publish list of these states in major policy journals, yet is what we are focusing on really important for the reasons we focus on it?

I believe it is one more distraction from what we really need to be focusing on; or perhaps rather that we should simply take this as an indicator of change rather than an indicator of "failure."

For example, the states that currently exist across the trans-sahel are occupied by populaces that were "globalized" long before any westerner coined the phrase, or before any westerner even stepped foot in the region for that matter. Tribal systems controlled the flow of commerce through the region; and the overlay of borders by outsiders was irrelevant to that age-old process. A very similar situation exists in SEA where commerce moves as it always has between Malaysia, Indonesian and the Philippines. While it may upset our sense of western propriety and concepts of sovereignty that this happens without the control of some central government, it does not make these states "failed" or even "weak," they simply have different paradigms and standards.

We go in and demand that they do something that is not important to them in order to control the transit of things that are of concern to us. We develop elaborate schemes to "build capacity" to execute these functions, with little regard to how unimportant it is to the target audiance, and in fact, how counter-productive and disruptive it is to the local populace in general. Any measure that hinders the movement of "bad" things, hinders far more the movement of "good" things; thereby further alienating the very populace who's support you are trying to secure.

These same populaces may with equal credibility look to the west and point out that it is perhaps we that are the failing states, given the current series of crises that we are weathering. After all, their system is operating exactly as designed, while ours is floundering under mismangagement and abuse.

I believe we lack a certain empathy on this issue, and confuse "not like us" for "not right."

slapout9
06-24-2009, 10:30 PM
These same populaces may with equal credibility look to the west and point out that it is perhaps we that are the failing states, given the current series of crises that we are weathering. After all, their system is operating exactly as designed, while ours is floundering under mismangagement and abuse.


You are quite right. We are struggling for our national survival. Things are happening locally and nationally that have not happened in decades. We do not have a plan that I can see and what's more we never will because that would be to much like Communism:eek:.......But we have a plan....No A Strategic plan!!! for everybody else's country but ours. Time for some nice calming music:D

for your listening pleasure and cultural enhancement from Slapout,Al. The Soul Of The South and Strategic Center Of The Universe - 1965 Barry Mcgurire..."The Eve Of Destruction"





http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8SfiCnwF28&feature=related

Ken White
06-24-2009, 11:08 PM
To paraphrase Bob's World who said:
"Something is not failed simply becuase it operates differently than us, nor is it failed if it rejects attempts to change forced upon it so that it would be like us."Remember it doesn't have to be done the way you'd like to be okay...

We are not failed or even flailing, much less struggling for national survival -- no matter how bad the Politicians screw it up and they are sure doing their usual good job of that -- as for Communism; Guvmint Motors (GM) and the would be NSHSS (National Socialist Health System on Steroids) reject your aspersion. :D

Sheesh, lighten up, Folks.

P.S.

Bob, I agree with most of your points re: other nations -- and that 'failed state' is a bad and misleading term. One I think is too often used by various activist types, right and left, to promote generally dippy and flawed agendas of all sorts -- and of which little real good comes; most particularly to the 'failed state' in question...

And rarely to he who 'helps.'

IntelTrooper
06-24-2009, 11:23 PM
-- as for Communism; Guvmint Motors (GM) and the would be NSHSS (National Socialist Health System on Steroids) reject your aspersion. :D

Will the trains run on time, at least?

Ken White
06-24-2009, 11:44 PM
regardless of profitability or logic provided your Congressional delegation has enough clout. Isn't that enough? Why this carping over trivia like 'on time?' Tch, tch... :D

IntelTrooper
06-25-2009, 01:28 AM
regardless of profitability or logic provided your Congressional delegation has enough clout. Isn't that enough? Why this carping over trivia like 'on time?' Tch, tch... :D
Ah, absolutely true. And we wouldn't see them for 8 to 12 weeks, then suddenly every previously scheduled train would arrive at once. :o

But, sorry, back to the topic...

Ken White
06-25-2009, 01:44 AM
at the time and the northern route got twice daily service except for Sunday while you had to wait for every other Sunday that UP swapped off with Santa Fe to get all your trains... ;)

Uh, right. What WAS the topic? Ah, yes, Foiled States. :(

I still agree with Bob's World. Not at all sure that States who do not do it our way are necessarily failed, nor do I think we (the West in general) have either an obligation or even a right to interfere as often as we do. I know that most of the West's interventions have done harm as well as little good -- that's a matter of record. Bigotry is not expressed only by poor treatment or verbiage...

slapout9
06-25-2009, 03:26 AM
Not at all sure that States who do not do it our way are necessarily failed, nor do I think we (the West in general) have either an obligation or even a right to interfere as often as we do. I know that most of the West's interventions have done harm as well as little good -- that's a matter of record. Bigotry is not expressed only by poor treatment or verbiage...


See it's that moral thing again:D

Ken White
06-25-2009, 03:58 AM
no moral BS about it. ;)

Tom Odom
06-25-2009, 05:37 AM
Bob,

I served in a failed state as a defense attache charged with executing US policy that was simply impossible to apply in any meaningful way. That state was of course Zaire in Mobutu's declining years. Even before the Rwandan genocide finished sinking the Zairian ship, it was very clear the vessel was on the rocks and breaking apart. It had been doing so for years and US policy had sought to hold it together. We had done so for more than 30 years by the time I got on the ground but the end of the Cold War and 2 military mutinies had done what 3 decades of periodic rebellion had not done, namely driven Mobutu up country, leaving the state to collapse on itself.

US policy makers absolutely refused to see it for what it was: a non-state that had failed in its attempts (and ours as the West) to make it so. Because they refused to see it for what it was, we could not hope to address what it was going to become.

That is where I see the problem with the failed state moniker--most of the time the failed state was never a state to begin with. By that I mean a nation of people who saw themselves as a national body without having a gun at their collective heads. In these cases, we are not negotiating with governments, we are talking to individual leaders who may or may not actually control all, part, or none of the area in question. Our system of diplomacy including international diplomacy is built on the exact opposite premise: that governments control all regions and that if you plug into the correct government you can influence its behavior.

The reality is quite different and I would suggest that the classic application of gunpowder or gold is the answer in such cases, with the strong caveat that neither be applied unless absolutely necessary. Staying out is always easier than getting out. And if you do go in, go hard and get out before the dust settles.

Tom

slapout9
06-25-2009, 10:52 AM
The reality is quite different and I would suggest that the classic application of gunpowder or gold is the answer in such cases, with the strong caveat that neither be applied unless absolutely necessary. Staying out is always easier than getting out. And if you do go in, go hard and get out before the dust settles.

Tom


Now your talking!! That is how criminals with 3rd grade educations consistently take over areas/countries all over the world....follow me and prosper...... oppose me and you will die. It ain't pretty but it is very effective!

Steve Blair
06-25-2009, 01:44 PM
That is where I see the problem with the failed state moniker--most of the time the failed state was never a state to begin with. By that I mean a nation of people who saw themselves as a national body without having a gun at their collective heads. In these cases, we are not negotiating with governments, we are talking to individual leaders who may or may not actually control all, part, or none of the area in question. Our system of diplomacy including international diplomacy is built on the exact opposite premise: that governments control all regions and that if you plug into the correct government you can influence its behavior.

A much more concise statement of what I was rambling about above, Tom. Thanks!

Entropy
06-25-2009, 02:14 PM
US policy makers absolutely refused to see it for what it was: a non-state that had failed in its attempts (and ours as the West) to make it so. Because they refused to see it for what it was, we could not hope to address what it was going to become.

That is where I see the problem with the failed state moniker--most of the time the failed state was never a state to begin with. By that I mean a nation of people who saw themselves as a national body without having a gun at their collective heads. In these cases, we are not negotiating with governments, we are talking to individual leaders who may or may not actually control all, part, or none of the area in question. Our system of diplomacy including international diplomacy is built on the exact opposite premise: that governments control all regions and that if you plug into the correct government you can influence its behavior.

Great comment Tom.

I'll be bold here and suggest that we're making the same mistake in Afghanistan. We've been working hard - or trying to - on governance for many years now and it should be not surprise that success hasn't yet come. IMO the only way "Afghanistan" will survive as a state in the long term is through a loose federation and not the centralized government structure that now exists.

Tom Odom
06-25-2009, 02:53 PM
Great comment Tom.

I'll be bold here and suggest that we're making the same mistake in Afghanistan. We've been working hard - or trying to - on governance for many years now and it should be not surprise that success hasn't yet come. IMO the only way "Afghanistan" will survive as a state in the long term is through a loose federation and not the centralized government structure that now exists.

Thanks all first for the kind words.

I think you are on track here. I have not been there but I have read much of the history and I always brief it as a region which overlaps its nominal state neighbors. Maybe someday it will coalesce into a unified body; its history tells me that will not be done by force alone.

Best
Tom

Eden
06-25-2009, 03:09 PM
My reading of its modern history - say since the Moghuls - is that Afghanistan is less of a state than it is the intersection of competing empires. That is, it has been a buffer zone where various interests - Persian, Russian, British, Indian, Chinese, Pakistani, et al - bumped and ground against each other. They often found that having a a buffer was more convenient than having a shared border, one of the reasons that Badakhshan province looks the way it does. The fact that it is a buffer zone that is virtually ungovernable only makes it all the more effective. Afghanistan, in other words, is the product of a perfect storm of geography, politics, demographics, and culture.

That is also why I have always thought that we would be more effective if we thought of ourselves as one amongst several competing insurgencies, rather than as a counterinsurgent.

davidbfpo
06-25-2009, 03:47 PM
'Failed states' and 'ungoverned spaces' are not exclusive to the developed world, a point IMHO and reading the thread has not been explicit.

In many cities the extent of nation-state control is minimal; this has featured in a thread on Brazilian and Mexican cities. In the UK, albeit for a short period Republican urban areas in Northern Ireland were un-governed (not un-funded i.e. state benefits) and South Armagh (border county) for nearly all 'The Troubles' would fit the definition of 'un-governed'.

In policing terms you can find such areas are called 'No Go', which may have originated from Northern Ireland and of course denials they exist.

How about the Indian tribal territories in Canada? MarcT made this comment recently and IIRC referred to the Mohawk nation blocking a cross-border road.

Just a thought we need to watch closer to home.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
06-25-2009, 03:57 PM
'Failed states' and 'ungoverned spaces' are not exclusive to the developed world, a point IMHO and reading the thread has not been explicit.

In many cities the extent of nation-state control is minimal; this has featured in a thread on Brazilian and Mexican cities.

Excellent point! Personally, I think the whole idea of "ungoverned spaces" is a huge "so what?" 911 could have been planned in Canada. The whole premise of calling somewhere "ungoverned" seems to be a precursor for "we should govern it."

Ken White
06-25-2009, 04:51 PM
Tom:
...Our system of diplomacy including international diplomacy is built on the exact opposite premise: that governments control all regions and that if you plug into the correct government you can influence its behavior.Astute observation -- and you'd think after the last hundred plus years of 'intervening' to little good effect in many such conglomerations we'd learn a little something... :(

Eden:
...we would be more effective if we thought of ourselves as one amongst several competing insurgencies, rather than as a counterinsurgent.Equally astute. Kindred thoughts have been expressed about other places at other times in the memory of those living. Notable that the Marines effectively did that prior to WW II. :cool:

Appropos to both comments, some obvious good flowed form our WW II experience -- but so did a lot of really bad military AND diplomatic ideas; add too much wealth to that -- and here we are... :mad:

Bob's World
06-25-2009, 07:47 PM
Wow...great discourse. This is exactly what I felt needed to be fleshed out and discussed. Tom, your experience squares with my perception, so thanks for putting that on the table.

As we look to what this means in places like Afghanistan, I think it is fair to go back to our own doctrine of self-determination. Perhaps what the populace of Afghanistan needs is something that may very well qualify it for "failed state" status by metrics the West applies; yet to attempt to force it to look like a "real state" (in a Hollywood set kind of way...think of the scene in Blazing Saddles) on the surface, we actually set it up for even greater failure in terms of human suffering as that unsustainable situation returns through violent competition to a more sustainable norm.

Ken White
06-25-2009, 08:30 PM
... I think the whole idea of "ungoverned spaces" is a huge "so what?" 911 could have been planned in Canada. The whole premise of calling somewhere "ungoverned" seems to be a precursor for "we should govern it."Yep -- or it "simply must be governed as we are; anything less would be uncivilized..." Stupid egos and biases. Most of the uncivilized folks I've met have been a helluva lot more polite and honest than are most of the nominally civilized squirrels I run across.

They weren't always too clean -- but that's vastly over rated also. :D

Ron Humphrey
06-26-2009, 04:06 AM
Usually get a pretty common feedback which while it is not necessarily helpful does somewhat make sense.

If politicians are supposed to "sell" Americans on supporting efforts in other countries it a heck of a lot harder to put it in terms of slightly better but effectively in support of our interests vs better life(in our contexts)

Guess when the costs are so high they may not expect the Lamborghini but a good solid family sedan may do. Clunkers are a no starter
Just my interpretation of the main difficulty in actually approaching it the way we probably should

Bob's World
06-26-2009, 07:30 PM
What's ironic to me is, that though we look back at our policies for how we treated the Native American Tribes with both realism and shame, the polices we apply to dealing with "failed states" and nation building are remarkably similar in nature, execution, and effect.

Step one: Find someone to be in charge so that we can interact as governments on our terms.

Step two: Encourage mirror imaging in all aspect of life, as "proper" or "civiliized"

Step three: Accuse those who refuse to conform as "renegades" or "terrorists" and conduct capture kill operations against them with the Army.

Did we learn nothing? I know I've recommended it before on here, but the book on Crazy Horse and Custer does a great job of highlighting this policy in a way one can't help but see the parallels to our current policies. I sincerely doubt that is the hidden intent of the book, just a simple reality of how our GWOT policy is much like our Indian policy. "Clear-Hold-Build" sounds a lot like manifest destiny if you stop and think about it... Get rid of the renegade indians, secure the settlers and LOCs, build towns and subdue nature to our will. Ahh, civilization.

My suggestion would be to have a team develop an alternative COA that does not look like our past Indian policy.

Steve Blair
06-26-2009, 07:42 PM
What's ironic to me is, that though we look back at our policies for how we treated the Native American Tribes with both realism and shame, the polices we apply to dealing with "failed states" and nation building are remarkably similar in nature, execution, and effect.

This all depends on whose "Indian Policy" one examines. In yet another parallel, there rarely WAS a defined policy as such, and it shifted from year to year and was (without fail) poorly funded by Congress. Still, in an attempt to hit some historical balance, our policy was still much more humane than that of the Spanish. Not as good as the Canadian, perhaps, but there were different pressures at work in the US.

There is a danger in trying to draw very close historical parallels, at least in terms of policy. Where I tend to find more useful comparisons is in terms of process. In some ways the Indians suffered because the great wave of "humanitarian idealism" unleashed by the Abolitionist movement was directed their way after the Civil War. It was then that the "elevation" consideration became paramount, and many unachievable and culturally destructive policies and ideas took root. There are any other number of considerations that come into play as well...I'm just picking these out of the hat. But maybe we should stop and consider if in our zeal to "save the world from itself" we aren't repeating the same well-intentioned mistakes made by the various crusaders in the latter half of the 19th century.

slapout9
06-26-2009, 08:23 PM
Did we learn nothing? I know I've recommended it before on here, but the book on Crazy Horse and Custer does a great job of highlighting this policy in a way one can't help but see the parallels to our current policies. I sincerely doubt that is the hidden intent of the book, just a simple reality of how our GWOT policy is much like our Indian policy. "Clear-Hold-Build" sounds a lot like manifest destiny if you stop and think about it... Get rid of the renegade indians, secure the settlers and LOCs, build towns and subdue nature to our will. Ahh, civilization.

My suggestion would be to have a team develop an alternative COA that does not look like our past Indian policy.


We did learn a little bit at least in the South. The modern policy of giving Indian tribes certain Economic advantages and then let them run with it under a tribal government works very well at least in Florida and Alabama.


Bob's World, from where you are you should check out the Seminole tibes of South Florida, very interesting stuff going on with them.

Ron Humphrey
06-26-2009, 08:48 PM
the Seminole tribes of South Florida, very interesting stuff going on with them.

in sort of a Buy Indian kinda thing?

slapout9
06-26-2009, 09:41 PM
in sort of a Buy Indian kinda thing?

Not sure of any nation wide agenda(tribes do talk to each other) but like Alabama they have exclusive gambling rights on the reservation,can sell cigarettes without having to pay Federal taxes (which is a big deal lately) some have liquor rights as well. They have a Tribal form of government/business operation that is very advanced compared to the general Civilian concept of the Corp.

Uboat509
06-26-2009, 10:09 PM
Yep -- or it "simply must be governed as we are; anything less would be uncivilized..." Stupid egos and biases. Most of the uncivilized folks I've met have been a helluva lot more polite and honest than are most of the nominally civilized squirrels I run across.

They weren't always too clean -- but that's vastly over rated also. :D

Is it really ego and biases or is it the fact that terrorist organizations and other threats (eg. pirates) thrive in ungoverned spaces?

SFC W

Steve Blair
06-26-2009, 10:30 PM
Is it really ego and biases or is it the fact that terrorist organizations and other threats (eg. pirates) thrive in ungoverned spaces?

SFC W

I think (personally) that like anything else it's a combination. It also depends on the nature of the dominate group in the "ungoverned space." For example, the Pima tribal spaces would have been considered ungoverned by some standards, but were fairly peaceful due to the nature of the culture that inhabited it. By the same token, an area occupied a group that had a history of inter-clan feuding would be considered dangerous. Yet both territories would be considered ungoverned by some standards.

And slap, there are tribes outside of your area that have done some great things, and others that have not fared as well. Montana has a pretty diverse native population, and it's interesting to see the levels of contrast that exist between the Crow, Gros Ventres, Blackfeet, and others that have reservations here.

I think sometimes people forget that the Native Americans are in fact a group of pretty diverse cultures that don't often work and play well with each other, let alone outsiders. But we would do well to remember this, or at least look at our own backyard, before we start assuming that places like Afghanistan can respond well to, or even need, a central government as we see one.

slapout9
06-26-2009, 11:53 PM
And slap, there are tribes outside of your area that have done some great things, and others that have not fared as well. Montana has a pretty diverse native population, and it's interesting to see the levels of contrast that exist between the Crow, Gros Ventres, Blackfeet, and others that have reservations here.

I think sometimes people forget that the Native Americans are in fact a group of pretty diverse cultures that don't often work and play well with each other, let alone outsiders. But we would do well to remember this, or at least look at our own backyard, before we start assuming that places like Afghanistan can respond well to, or even need, a central government as we see one.

Some good advice Steve about tribes and how they play or don't play to together hmmmm sounds like Astan!! And as a side note the big fancy Hotel where Anna Nicole Smith's body was found is owned by the tribe and the whole complex is on the reservation and yes it was the tribal police that found the body:eek:

Ken White
06-26-2009, 11:57 PM
With respect ot ungoverned spaces and terrorist organizations and such, it really a question of how important a specific issue is to someone in the power structure. My basic point was that all too often, we Americans (or, more correctly, many Americans) think other people WANT to be like us. Most don't. That's true because of this: LINK (http://forums.houmatoday.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/8351034365/m/5091057098/r/5301048098).

davidbfpo
06-27-2009, 10:31 AM
I recall from my university days, around 1975, that there was a view that the UK becoming ungovernable was fashionable; Prof. Anthony King wrote a long article, alas not readily found on free websites. Much has changed since then, but the theme re-appeared recently.

Google then found a more contemporary article on the USA's favourite state, yes California, becoming ungovernable: http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13649050

Once again I echo Ken and others - look behind you!

davidbfpo

Bob's World
06-27-2009, 11:07 PM
ungoverned spaces are interesting, but it is poorlygoverned populaces that are dangerous.

Mack
08-27-2009, 08:49 PM
Great discussion.


Berghof Research Center, 9 Apr 09:

Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/BERGHOF_BuildingPeaceAbsenceOfStates_ChallengingDi scourseStateFailure.pdf)

Complete 98-page paper at the link.

Jedburgh,

Those are some really good articles on this topic and I wish it was required reading for Political Science 101.

I was going through my notes on the Berghof papers and came across this quote from "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?" by Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan (p. 15- p. 37):

"However, as Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings (2005, 388) point out: 'To say that something ‘fails’ or ‘is failing’ is a normative judgement that is only meaningful in comparison to something else; in this case, that something else is the existence of a westernised, ‘healthy’ state that, unfortunately, has little relevance to most of the states in question because it has simply never existed there.' Promoting the liberal state as the ultimate model is to ignore the historical context, and with it the fact of the rather recent historical emergence of the modern state (p. 18)."

I think that this quote highlights the sentiment in this thread.

In terms of security, I guess as long as territory 'X' has its own effective system to deal with "undesirables" (terrorists, drug traffickers, insurgents, etc.), and does not harbour individuals who pose a threat to national security, territory 'X' can be governed through a variety of ways (e.g. tribal structures, "hybrid states", and other informal/non-state forms of governance).

Jedburgh
06-04-2010, 02:32 PM
28 May 10: An Operational Definition of "Failed States" (http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/CRISE%20In%20Brief%205.pdf)

This In Brief aims to contribute to the operationalisation of the concept of ‘fragile states’ for use in development policy. Following a review of different definitions of ‘fragile states’, it proposes a three-pronged definition of fragility that broadly encompasses other classifications. Fragile states are defined as states that are failing, or in danger of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive socioeconomic entitlements or governance legitimacy. We show that many states are fragile along one or two dimensions, but rather few are fragile along all three, despite causal connections among them—a lack of comprehensive data in the most fragile countries may partly account for this. A consideration of how fragility, as defined, relates to some other significant development approaches to vulnerable societies indicates that fragility in its various dimensions corresponds most closely to failures on particular Human Rights. Yet, the Human Rights approach applies to all countries and embodies a particular way of approaching development, whereas ‘fragile’ states form a specific subset of especially vulnerable countries and the concept as such does not imply a distinct approach to aid and development.

davidbfpo
01-02-2011, 04:02 PM
In the 'How to build a state in a non state environment' thread, Slap challenged Bill Moore:
Bill Moore, if you were General in charge of fixin A'stan and could do anything you wanted.... what would do?

Bill responded and I want to isolate one point:
5. Push to establish an emergency zone of control in parts of Pakistan where the Taliban and other insurgents and terrorists seek shelter. Strategic comms are we're in Afghanistan to win, if you can't address these issues we will. I can hear the uproar now, but my narrative is these folks are killing coalition troops and Afghan civilians with immunity (with the exception of an occassional UAV strike). We're incompetent if we continue to allow that to happen, our patience doesn't extend into infinity. By the way our coalition in effort in Pakistan would be subordinate to me in a perfect world. Right now they're getting away with being PAKMIL lap dogs, while we do plane side ceremonies nightly.

SWC have discussed the concept and practicalities of sanctuary before IIRC. A cross-border incursion and / or a series of ground raids are seen as very different to drone strikes (later covered in:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7385 ). Plus several threads on "working" with the Pakistanis.

Doing "something" about the sanctuaries has become an issue again and Anatol Lieven has written in the NYT:


if American generals genuinely want to increase such raids, then it needs to be stated emphatically that this is not just a lunatic idea, but one that demonstrates how far senior American (and British) commanders have become obsessed with the war in Afghanistan at the expense of the struggle against terrorism as a whole.

Short summary:http://watandost.blogspot.com/2010/12/special-operations-in-pakistan.html and the original article:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/opinion/30iht-edlieven30.html

I did wonder if SWC would benefit from a thread with Slap's question posed differently: If you were the politician giving orders on fixin A'stan, what limits / conditions would you set?

I'm still pondering my own answer - from an armchair.

jcustis
01-02-2011, 06:29 PM
Doing something about the sanctuaries is very important, and I would be all over it if I had a hand in formulating the policy. To some degree, despite the logistical issues inherent, it just takes the guts to try and the planning acumen of several staffs to do the job. With all due respect to the process, that can be a Herculean effort, considering who controls the various ISR, maneuver, and aviation support assets in the theater.

My battalion conducted a 160km raid to the AfPak border area known as Bahram Cha and spent 24 hours or so disrupting a significant Taliban C2 and logistics hub. At the end of the day, the most significant result was the destruction of enough ammonium nitrate that could have made 2,000 IEDs

That raid wasn't actually a cross-border incursion, mind you, but given the sensitivity concerning Pakistan's potential reaction, you might have thought it was. The area sits virtually astride the border, and the effects of our fires had to be evaluated to avoid straying into Pakistan.

Sanctuaries create logistical breathing space for the enemy, in such a way that no matter how hard you try to focus on the population, it allows the enemy to husband resources, re-arm/re-fit, and employ that they've got all the watches but we have all the time sort of fighting technique to outlast you. Take that course of action away, and you may be able to force him to fight closer to your terms.

Fuchs
01-02-2011, 06:47 PM
I'd like to refer to
Musings about a military theory framework (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9841)

You can squeeze the opponent ever more and deny him ever more options, but the marginal cost of your effort explodes and the marginal rate of return approaches zero.

A six-year old can develop an eliminationalist strategy, and this should help us to question its wisdom.


I'd like to advise to go a bit 'Chomsky' and ask wtf the conflict is about.
Slapout's question for Moore was probably already wrong. A General should not decide what to do about AFG. It's simply not his job.

Entropy
01-02-2011, 08:16 PM
There are a lot of things we could do about the sanctuaries. Unfortunately, most of them require violating Pakistani sovereignty. So the question becomes, are the sanctuaries enough of a problem that we're willing to give Pakistan the middle finger, engage in actions that would be a clear casus belli, and deal with the resulting consequences? For ten years the answer has been no. I think the answer should continue to be no.

Fuchs
01-02-2011, 08:32 PM
There are a lot of things we could do about the sanctuaries. Unfortunately, most of them require violating Pakistani sovereignty.

Isn't this comical?

Violating some other countries' sovereignty was exactly what was done when AQ took sanctuary in AFG back in '01 - for the EXACT SAME REASON.


It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

slapout9
01-02-2011, 09:16 PM
Slapout's question for Moore was probably already wrong. A General should not decide what to do about AFG. It's simply not his job.

Slap, says you missed the point entirely. The question is entirely right. Bill Moore is not a General, we don't need any Generals, that is the problem IMO. Bill is a long time Green Beret...he doesn't think Conventionally he thinks Unconventionally which is the only way we have any chance at all IMO.

Dayuhan
01-02-2011, 10:19 PM
It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

Not all about nukes. As long as the US has a major military presence in Afghanistan they need supply routes through Pakistan. Can't manage the logistics just from air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. I can't see the Pakistanis firing off a nuke in response to a US incursion, but they could definitely shut down the supply lines.

jcustis
01-02-2011, 10:29 PM
Isn't this comical?

Violating some other countries' sovereignty was exactly what was done when AQ took sanctuary in AFG back in '01 - for the EXACT SAME REASON.


It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.

Hey, no one said we had to be realistic in looking at the problem and stick to keeping the gloves on? You can't hold me to the limits of our coercive or diplomatic power! :D

Ken White
01-02-2011, 10:32 PM
It's no wonder that certain people value nukes highly nowadays - the U.S. offers a reason for their procurement every day, eight years in a row.Likely will keep on doing so. The problem is that we used to do it at least a little better than we do nowadays... :rolleyes:

To address your earlier question and statement:
Isn't this comical?Yes -- or ironic. Or both. :D
Violating some other countries' sovereignty was exactly what was done when AQ took sanctuary in AFG back in '01 - for the EXACT SAME REASON.Sort of; close enough anyway. ;)

The sooner we realize that we cannot reform other nations and stop trying to do so, the better off we'll be. The answer to sanctuaries is quite simple -- tell the world that we will not tolerate them. If they then appear (and they will...) then we go in, lay waste, foment hate and discontent and depart as rapidly as we cam -- with an announcement that if it's tried again, we'll be back.

Strategic raids. Leave the low level FID to SF and State / USAid.

First, though, we've got to park the COIN / FID - mobile; stop trying to tell others how to act and determine what our true interests are. Wake me when that occurs... :wry:

Slap is right, we don't need the Generals to sort it -- those guys grew up in and are captives of a system; that system effectively started in 1917 and then shot its wad in 1945. It has for the most part and as an institution totally failed to keep up with events since that time, it's consistently a few days late and a bunch more than a dollar short. There have been individuals in the services who understood what was required but they and their ideas generally were shoved aside.

I do disagree with Slap on one point -- IMO, SF has done a little better since the early 60s but even they are not realizing their potential...

Anyone who thinks we've got much of anything right since DoD was created really needs to look at where we are and what we're doing -- and how long we've been there...

Bob's World
01-02-2011, 11:02 PM
Ken,

To be fair, prior to DoD, the U.S. could follow the lead of others. Easier to drive from the back seat than from behind the wheel. We've done ok, but yeah, SF and DoD and the U.S. as a whole is good, but not as good as we like to think we are, and not as good as we need to be. Tend to be to quick to believe our own PR.

Recognizing that is step one to getting a little bit better. But then you post nails it pretty well.

Steve the Planner
01-02-2011, 11:20 PM
Fuchs:


Slapout's question for Moore was probably already wrong. A General should not decide what to do about AFG. It's simply not his job.

Sly comment indeed. With many dimensions.

Regrettably, a general will be asked Slap's question despite that is actually one that far exceeds his pay grade, lane, expertise. The reason that would happen probably extends through our lack of precision in defining a mission within a country that is not actually within that country, and with intrinsic geopolitical, historical, cultural and diplomatic levels and linkages far beyond the scope of his assigned "battle space."

That problem is not one of Slap's making.

Ken is essentially proposing the only strategy that has ever worked (in the short-term) in and around the Durand Line---massive retaliation when it becomes so bad that retaliation is necessary.


The sooner we realize that we cannot reform other nations and stop trying to do so, the better off we'll be. The answer to sanctuaries is quite simple -- tell the world that we will not tolerate them. If they then appear (and they will...) then we go in, lay waste, foment hate and discontent and depart as rapidly as we cam -- with an announcement that if it's tried again, we'll be back.

Ken didn't even do any heavy lifting for this one. It is what the Brits and Pakistanis always used to "control" (read "limit extreme externalities") in the "sanctuaries." (He definitely didn't need to call Chuck Norris for input).

Extra-national sanctuaries do, however, raise the issue of substantial escalation with unpredicatable dimensions beyond some minimum temporary impacts.

Under the Powell Doctrine, we would be shifting from "breaking" countries in the mid-range (20-30 million) to a real one (160 million). A general could not even begin to calculate the dimensions of anything more than what Entropy has described as "not worth it."

Fuchs
01-02-2011, 11:25 PM
Slap, says you missed the point entirely. The question is entirely right. Bill Moore is not a General, we don't need any Generals, that is the problem IMO. Bill is a long time Green Beret...he doesn't think Conventionally he thinks Unconventionally which is the only way we have any chance at all IMO.

Actually your question was (my emphasis):


Bill Moore, if you were General in charge of fixin A'stan and could do anything you wanted.... what would do?

You wrote that - not my fault.

A Green beret is still no more qualified to answer the question than any other citizen. It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.
Your whole intro to your core question was leading into a wrong direction imho.

Steve the Planner
01-03-2011, 12:18 AM
Fuchs:


It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.

Excuse me?

One thing I learned about this board is that some threads are populated by folks who were or are on the ground, and have seen their respective pieces of the puzzle. By working together, they sometimes build a next level of insight (or just get to blow off ideas or steam).

One thing I learned from deployment to Iraq in that silly civilian capacity you referenced as the source of all omnipotence is that, there is no one home--- except, maybe the Wizard of OZ.

These folks with their puzzle pieces are, in many circumstances, the only ones who know what they know from the ground---and that's really all that is known in an environment where there is no underlying well-conceived strategy or plan to test against first contact with an opponent.

It's magical thinking to assume there is a Kissinger, or Bismarck to save the day.

Even Bismarck couldn't keep the three balls in the air---just respond to each dropped ball.

Steve

Fuchs
01-03-2011, 01:05 AM
Steve, a country with 308 million people has most likely ten thousands of people with the right brain to save the day, and likely hundreds with the right brain and a suitable background.
The system doesn't elevate them into the necessary position of power, but they are there.

There's little reason to think that any General, green beret, SWC forum user or whatever has the right brain because of him/her belonging to that group, though. It's furthermore for sure that they're not in the right position of power to save the day in AFG.



The 'small' people feed* the info upwards, and do the work. Their personal experience and personal training is specific and not comprehensive. Small people jobs (including generals) do not qualify for saving the day in macro problems. Other things such as great info research because of personal interest may qualify them, but not such jobs.


The 'big' people in the right jobs for saving the day may be the wrong people for the job, of course. Blame the system.

I'm not among the people who expect a happy ending anyway - I never did since Marines landed in Kandahar in '01.

---------------
And now away from who's competent to end the mess:


*
Does feeding info into a forum for the search for a suitable answer in a collective have promise? Maybe. I'm not sure that a large amount of information is necessary to make the right decision, though. (And with 'right' I mean of course the decision that I assume to be 'right'.)

You do operate under a specific assumption; the assumption that saving the day means to succeed.
I work under the assumption that saving the day means to cut the losses because continuing the involvement is orders of magnitude away from being justified by a cost:benefit analysis.
The SWC doesn't even discuss the right questions to even discuss how or why the involvement should be aborted. The SWC forum is still dominated by a military "mission was issued, we can do this! (somehow)" attitude.


You don't need nearly as much information for an abortion of the involvement as you need for developing hope for its continuation.



I wrote this two and a half years ago (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2008/04/reasoning-about-afghanistan-war.html):


Sometime, several hundred years ago, Europeans did a remarkable step in social development; they invented the Enlightenment. Reasoning became supreme over faith and ignorance.

I've seen some hints that reasoning might indeed be applicable to military affairs as well. In fact, it might even prevent stupid mistakes and disasters. Maybe we should try it. It's not fashionable to use any other part of the brain than the fear center to think about military affairs, but I don't care.

Just as an experiment and a test of our newly-discovered ability to actually think in objective terms about war and warfare - let's think about the commitment in the Afghanistan civil war.

I believe we need to answer (at least) the following five questions with “yes” (all of them) to feel that our support for the Western participation in the civil war in Afghanistan is justified:

1st: Can we expect that the Taleban have a comeback if we leave?

2nd: Can we expect that the Taleban would again harbor/support terrorists after a comeback (who fight us)?

3rd: Are these terrorists significantly more dangerous if supported by Taleban than without this support?

4th: Can we expect that our presence there keeps the Taleban away?

5th: Can we expect that our participation there hurts us less than would otherwise do additional terror strikes against us (killed & wounded citizens, economic losses)?

I would answer these questions at least three times with “No.”

(If we wanted to help foreign people who are in a serious economic situation, we can do so with much higher efficiency (same money, much more helpful effects) elsewhere first.)


See? A General's view on the problem is myopic unless he moves well beyond the horizon required for a General. The same applies to green berets and almost all jobs in the world.

To 'save the day in AFG' isn't about accomplishing a mission. It's first and foremost about getting the mission right at the highest level.

The whole endeavour looks like created by political brains shut off and on autopilot. The brains need to be activated again and the course needs to be determined by the pilot.
I don't really care about what the rudder thinks about the airflow. I want the autopilot switched off and the pilot's brain switched on.


Oh, btw. The last quoted text (above) should be very relevant to the thread's topic!

Dayuhan
01-03-2011, 01:21 AM
To 'save the day in AFG' isn't about accomplishing a mission. It's first and foremost about getting the mission right at the highest level.

The whole endeavour looks like created by political brains shut off and on autopilot. The brains need to be activated again and the course needs to be determined by the pilot.


True enough. All too often, though, the course is charted with more attention to domestic political imperatives than to the actual task at hand. Post 9/11 domestic politics demanded aggressive military action and they demanded that we cast ourselves as the good guys. Simply kicking some butt and leaving with a "don't make us come back", as Ken reasonably suggests, wasn't enough: we had to bring truth, justice, and the American way to those deprived of it. That was a mistake, born of excessive subservience to a presumed domestic political demand.

Bill Moore
01-03-2011, 03:33 AM
Posted by Fuchs,


You do operate under a specific assumption; the assumption that saving the day means to succeed.
I work under the assumption that saving the day means to cut the losses because continuing the involvement is orders of magnitude away from being justified by a cost:benefit analysis.
The SWC doesn't even discuss the right questions to even discuss how or why the involvement should be aborted. The SWC forum is still dominated by a military "mission was issued, we can do this! (somehow)" attitude.

I think more people here agree with you than disagree. We are generally too quick to define the nature of the problem to be solved, and then realize several hundred lives and billions of dollars later that we're trying to solve the wrong problem. You're also right that some of us have a military mindset for obvious reasons, and since we were given a mission (regardless of its feasibility) we're obligated to work on it. Don't mistake that for meaning we're blind to the larger issues, or that all even believe the conflcit at this point is helping us defeat/suppress extreme political Islam globally, and in fact may be making the situation worse. We can debate policy and state our opinions, but ultimately in accordance with an oath we all freely took we're obligated to follow orders and do.

IMO the poorly conceived policies we're pursuing are based largely on the naive pseudointellectual extremely liberal rhetoric coming out of think tanks like "Center for a New America Security" and similiar think tanks. This is idealism without ideas and policy without pragmatism, and furthermore it is largely disconnected from our original objective of revenging the 9/11 attacks (killing those that hit us), protecting the homeland and waging a longer term "global" (not restricted to a couple of geographical spaces that have been incorrectly identified as centers of gravities) war on terrorism/political extremism. This of course requires a very well thought out strategy instead of knee jerk reactions.

In some ways the longer we stay in Afghanistan the harder it is to leave, and this is true especially after you commit general purpose forces to combat. I think bringing in GPF initially for a major punitive raid, to include pursuing AQ into Pakistan while we had enough international consensus to do so after the 9/11 would have been appropriate, and we could have redeployed the GPF shortly after that and call it a win (a battle, not a war). Of course going after the safehaven in Pakistan isn't so easy now, and it goes back to the old saying, "make a hard decision now, or a harder one later."

Everyone has great hindsight, probably why we don't see folks wearing glasses on the back of their head, but consider if we did what I envisioned above, and then left some SOF elements, USAID and State Department folks (as Ken suggested) to assist the emerging Afghanistan (staying out of their internal politics) what would have unfolded? Especially if we promised to bring the big stick back if needed to beat up on someone (now we have credibility). Then if the assistance didn't work out we would quietly leave without fanfare and lay the blame squarely on the shoulders on of the Afghans where it would have belonged. Instead we took ownership of the mission (the flawed Powell Doctrine) and now any failure will be seen as our failure with the associated repercussions at the strategic level. At this point I don't know if it takes more courage to stay or leave? Nor do I pretend to know if the right answer is to stay or leave.

Reference my comment, as David said, he only extracted one of several proposals that would have to be done collectively to have any chance of success (and they were rough ideas to stimulate debate, they were not intended to be a complete strategy by any stretch). None the less to Fuchs point, I think the greater risk to our military strategy (since that is the strategy we are pursuing currently) is continuing to ignore the safe havens. This is so obvious that a 6th grader would recognize it, and his dad would have a very hard time explaining to him why his brother died in a conflict that we're not committed to winning. Strategy as you know touchs a lot of a domains, things, places and people. Some of it is exceedingly complex and some it is very simple (don't try to make it more complex than it is in that case).


A Green beret is still no more qualified to answer the question than any other citizen. It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.
Your whole intro to your core question was leading into a wrong direction imho.

It may not have been the ideal question, but it was the question and it is a question that our military leaders are being asked. I personally don't see a lot of civilian political leaders jumping out of the woodwork with better ideas do you? In one respect this is the essence of the problem, we're overly stovepiped in so called centers of excellence as reflected in our so called elements of national power, diplomacy, information, military and economic and then within the military by lines of operation. Each with its own objectives and its own bureaucracy, which is not well synched as a collective whole into something that we would recognize as a coherent national level strategy. Sadly, there is more focus on protecting rice bowls than there is on building consensus and a workable strategy. You're absolutely right, the type of headgear you wear doesn't qualify you for this, but neither does a wearing a suit, or sporting a Phd diploma on your wall. In the end we just need the right person (lady or man /in uniform or out of uniform) who has a realistic vision, the resources and sufficient authority to implement the strategy. Unfortunately things don't work that way in the American system.

Entropy
01-03-2011, 04:45 AM
Fuchs,

I'm not sure why you're fixated on the word "general" in that question. It could be asked of anyone.

Bill,


None the less to Fuchs point, I think the greater risk to our military strategy (since that is the strategy we are pursuing currently) is continuing to ignore the safe havens. This is so obvious that a 6th grader would recognize it, and his dad would have a very hard time explaining to him why his brother died in a conflict that we're not committed to winning.

We haven't ignored the safe-havens. We've known about them since late 2001. Musharraf explicitly and publicly denied us the ability to do "hot pursuit" in early 2002. The problem isn't that we're ignoring the safe-havens - the problem is that we are unwilling to deal with the consequences of violating Pakistani sovereignty.

Bill Moore
01-03-2011, 05:16 AM
We haven't ignored the safe-havens. We've known about them since late 2001. Musharraf explicitly and publicly denied us the ability to do "hot pursuit" in early 2002. The problem isn't that we're ignoring the safe-havens - the problem is that we are unwilling to deal with the consequences of violating Pakistani sovereignty.

We're aware of them and we're not doing anything about them (that means we're ignoring them) because a suspected/known State sponsor of terrorism says they're off limits. That brings up the question, are we fighting a war against terrorism and all their sponsors/supporters, or are trying to isolate an already isolated country and build a nation? Everyone agrees to some degree that is more than a simple homegrown insurgency that is restricted to the geographical boundries of Afghanistan. It is also a State proxy war, not just against us, but with the longer term strategic goal of achieving a perceived strategic advantage over India. It also involves numerous non-state actors coming to the Jihad like moths to a flame, just as they did during the Soviet occupation. There are a lot of stake holders in this conflict, this is not a simple internal insurgency like we saw in Malaya, and we won't win it in the villages alone.

William F. Owen
01-03-2011, 06:00 AM
You can squeeze the opponent ever more and deny him ever more options, but the marginal cost of your effort explodes and the marginal rate of return approaches zero.

A six-year old can develop an eliminationalist strategy, and this should help us to question its wisdom.
If you mean a strategy of attrition, then you have access to a very gifted six-year-old. Attrition works better than anything else. It's great, but you need a really good army and a a very good intelligence service to do it.

Additionally, your attrition has to be set forth in line with the policy, so you have to be very careful who you kill/capture and why.

Steve the Planner
01-03-2011, 09:01 AM
Fuchs:

Not quite. I was absolutely committed to the belief that, by 2008, in Iraq we ran the risk of creating more trouble than we were solving.

There comes a point when extrication is essential, and we reached that point in Iraq, but it was very hard to accomplish the departure.

With unpleasant news from Iraq (especially the plight of Christians, and where the Turkmen may settle out when the smoke clears), but remain morally and intellectually committed to the belief that our continuation was not a plus.

Afghanistan is much more complex, and rapid and complete departure is not a self-evident option for a productive conclusion, let alone the fact that the US perceives a continuing interest in the game.

What intrigues me is the debate about SWAT or not. The fact that an Afghan Win under our current strategy is predicated on incursions which are not acceptable raises the fundamental question about our current strategy (or bag of tactics).

Within actual constraints (included limited incursion, and, thus, safe havens for opponents AND Budgets), what credible mission and enduring tasks can be accomplished?

There is an answer (however limited and inconclusive) that lies between the current unsustainable strategy and cut and run. Most likely, it turns on reconciliation and political horse trading with the folks we call enemies today. Most likely, too, the answer is probably never a "final answer." Thus, the deterence/retribution sweeps are always an option.

Fuchs
01-03-2011, 11:43 AM
If you mean a strategy of attrition, then you have access to a very gifted six-year-old. Attrition works better than anything else. It's great, but you need a really good army and a a very good intelligence service to do it.

Additionally, your attrition has to be set forth in line with the policy, so you have to be very careful who you kill/capture and why.

Here comes the kill'em! faction.


Wilf, to eliminate an irritation or opponent is among the most expensive approaches if not the most expensive approach itself (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/04/we-do-it-wrong.html). You'll often end up losing more than you gain by such a course of action.

War can only be justified if it's the smaller evil than peace, for it's inherently destructive. A strategy needs to offer the prospect of being the course of least net damage to yourself (and your allies). An eliminationist approach regularly fails at this.

The problem is especially obvious if one aims for total elimination. The costs for defeating the last 10% are many times as great as the costs for defeating the first 10% of an enemy. This is especially true if said enemy can become ever more elusive.

The TB can turn into a Mafia or political party mode until the Westerners leave - there's no practical way to really eliminate them if they evade our efforts of eliminations like that.

The simple "let's eliminate them all" idea is primitive, worthy of a drunk or child and certainly not the way to go because it's way too expensive in an affair that offers very little gain.

----------------------------------------------

In the end, let's not forget this:
The Taliban are merely the guys who insisted on granting AQ the privilege of hospitality before AQ officially accepted responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. The TB are no threat to us in themselves, and their relation to threats against us (=jihadist offspring) becomes only worse if we fight against them. They did not attack us - we attacked them. (Btw, by the same rationale Cuba would be justified to attack the U.S., so we're not even remotely as clear-cut good guys in this conflict as about half of the Westerners seem to believe.)

A really, really smart leader (instead of GWB) would not have forgotten this in 2002 and would have settled the conflict in negotiations with the Taliban in exile back in 2002, under condition that they disassociate themselves from AQ in theory and practice.

Instead, GWB and clique were drunk with operational victory, wallowed in the myth that a job was unfinished in '91, forgot how much they hated Clinton's nation building in Yugoslavia and continued the AFG adventure with few resources and a maximalist goal.
The German government was stupid enough to follow this really, really stupid and primitive path and to adopt essentially the same maximalist mission statement.


To be honest and frank, an attrition to zero approach looks terribly out of place to me in this context.

And sanctuaries? Well, AQ can simply relocate. AQ in Pakistan is the unimportant loud-mouth franchise central. The real AQ threat are the cells which are dispersed in 60 countries, almost all of them having cooperative police and intelligence services. To go into SWAT for AQ is therefore not even remotely worth the costs of the endeavour.
TB in SWAT - not really relevant, for they are only a threat to us as long as we insist to stay in their region.

Bob's World
01-03-2011, 11:53 AM
I confess, I cringe every time I hear someone say the term "ungoverned spaces" and the word "sanctuary" in the same sentence. Needless to say I cringe a great deal, and typically in the presence of some high-ranking government official or subject matter expert on Insurgency who is busily explaining the concept or their approach to resolving some sanctuary or another.

I think it is important to understand that there are both physical and functional components to sanctuary, and that the most powerful components are found in legal/cultural obstacles and in the willingness of a populace to not assist the state in enforcing the rule of law.

Attached here is a simple (I am no artist) diagram to attempt to help make a few critical points regarding sanctuary in the AFPAK region for the Taliban and AQ.

Perhaps the first point that needs to be made is as obvious as it is overlooked: These two organizations have very different missions; one comes from this populace and the other is a guest within this populace; and therefore have very different requirements for sanctuary, and very different aspects to the sanctuaries they currently enjoy.

AQ Sanctuary in AFPAK is the easiest to resolve, as it comes solely from the hospitality of the Taliban/pro-Taliban Pashtun populace. When the Taliban decide to evict AQ, they must go and find their sanctuary elsewhere (which they will undoubtedly do, as their mission is no way reduced by being evicted from the AFPAK region). They will still retain the sanctuary of their outlaw and non-state status, and they will still have influence with poorly governed populaces around the globe. Some of those populaces are self-governed, as in Somalia, the Maghreb, and Yemen. Some are just small pockets and individuals within largely well-governed populaces, such as in Europe and North America.

So: For AQ, we can evict them from AFPAK if we work through the Taliban, but even if successful in that effort they will simply operate from other sanctuaries so long as the conditions that support their existence continue to influence populaces, organizations and/or individuals to be willing to break the law in support of them.

Taliban sanctuary is different as their mission is different and as they come from this populace. They too enjoy the sanctuary of being outside the law and of being a non-state actor; but their sanctuary comes from a much broader slice of the populace of these two states. They are on the "friends and family" plan, and are woven inextricably into the fabric of this bi-state society. The border issue is actually the easiest one to resolve, as it is a simple matter of a bi-lateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan narrowly tailored to this single issue. The outlaw status and their ties to the populace are facts that can be dealt with as well. I would caution, however, that merely removing this one legal obstacle and acting more aggressively to “defeat” the Taliban will most likely strengthen other key aspects of their sanctuary.

Outlaw status is resolved by simply bringing them inside the law. Grant a pardon (with clear conditions, such as the eviction of AQ with the turning over of certain key AQ members bringing very clear benefits as well). Once inside the law, the Taliban are constrained by the law, at least as much as anyone is constrained by the law (right, Mr. Karzai?? Wink Wink) in this culture.
The sanctuary provided by the populace is also one that can be addressed, but by bringing the Taliban inside the law the biggest hurdle is cleared. This then allows a massive reduction of coalition presence, which brings down the next largest hurdle. The final hurdle is getting GIROA to make substantive changes that provide equal rights and opportunities to the Pashtun populace that are provided to the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek populaces of the Northern Alliance.

Of note, none of these are military missions. This is all head of state/diplomatic in nature. So long as the lead rests with the military, the military will not address these issues, as they are not in the military’s lane. The military will do what militaries do. It will seek to “Clear-hold-build” where they can; or deny through ISR and fires where they cannot. That is no way to deny sanctuary. That is the way to build and strengthen sanctuary. This is a mission that the military must pass back to the Department of State and the President for action.

slapout9
01-03-2011, 01:10 PM
Actually your question was (my emphasis):



You wrote that - not my fault.

A Green beret is still no more qualified to answer the question than any other citizen. It's a political job. It's a job for statesmen and their advisers (and I don't mean career uniform wearers here).
It's a problem for a Kissinger, Machiavelli, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower guy.
Your whole intro to your core question was leading into a wrong direction imho.

I'll try an explain it another way. I wanted Bill's high level opinion if he was in charge of everything, that is all. It's an American thing:wry: Kissinger!!!you must be kidding his thinking from the 70's is the very bedrock of why we are in this mess.

Steve the Planner
01-03-2011, 01:24 PM
Slap:

Seems to me that Kissinger to Brezinski were who I studied in policy classes. Right. Very mixed results.

Wasn't it Zbig who had the great idea to lure the Soviets into Afghanistan, and laid the foundation for the Taliban, and their later activities?

Fuchs:

You forgot to mention that the Taliban are the AFGHAN folks who opened the door for AQ.

As you point out, the Diminishing Returns/Escalating Costs of ZERO Taliban means one hell of a lot of dead Afghan "brothers," sons and fathers. Not a great strategy, in the end, for winning Pashtun hearts and minds.

I, for one, would leave Kiss/Zbig out of the equation for a bit while I tried to gather solutions from Generals, Majors, and Walking Men (Rory Stewart, etc..). Anybody but the wise old hands that created much of this.

Entropy
01-03-2011, 02:22 PM
Fuchs,

A really, really smart leader (instead of GWB) would not have forgotten this in 2002 and would have settled the conflict in negotiations with the Taliban in exile back in 2002, under condition that they disassociate themselves from AQ in theory and practice.

I understand that 2002 was a long time ago, but that strategy simply wasn't possible then for a whole lot of reasons.


We're aware of them and we're not doing anything about them (that means we're ignoring them) because a suspected/known State sponsor of terrorism says they're off limits.

We're not doing anything? We're doing as much as can be expected under the circumstances. How much is attempting to get at AQ worth it to you? Are you willing to fight the Pakistani military? Are you willing to see the end of all Pakistani cooperation? Under such conditions what are the chances that we'd actually be able to effectively go after AQ?

In short, people are not ignoring the sanctuary - rather two administrations have come to the conclusion that the benefits of giving Pakistan the middle finger are not worth the costs. We've made a choice - that is not ignoring the problem.

To tag onto Bob's comments, the areas we're talking about in Pakistan are unique in some ways. Although they are part of "Pakistan" on a map they are actually more like colonies and are still administered through the Malik system introduced by the Brits (although this system has, not coincidentally, substantially broken down over the past decade). The Pakistani military hadn't set foot in those areas for decades until late 2001. Pakistan considers this their "sovereign" territory but they've never exercised true sovereignty. Furthermore, they don't have the capacity to excercise true sovereignty even if they wanted to.

That is a big part of our dilemma - we can recognize the actual limits of Pakistani sovereignty, say, "hey, you can't control this area at all" and intervene without Pakistan's consent, or we can continue to recognize Pakistan's de jure sovereignty knowing that their actual capacity to administer these areas is very limited. We've consistently chosen the latter path while trying to goad Pakistan into do more while allowing us to do more as well. The choice we made hasn't worked out well, but I think the alternative would have been (and would be) worse.

We might want to consider the possibility that this problem doesn't have a solution and factor that into our strategy instead of continuing to beat our heads against the wall. Ten years on, the Quixotic pursuit of Pakistani sanctuary denial sounds to me like a south Asian version of the underpants gnome strategy.

William F. Owen
01-03-2011, 02:34 PM
Here comes the kill'em! faction.
We prefer the terms "Classical" "Orthodox" or "Fundamentalists." You cannot change War or what works best in warfare. Warfare is conducted via killing. How that is best done is the only thing up for debate. There are no kinder of less bloody ways of war that can ever work.

War can only be justified if it's the smaller evil than peace, for it's inherently destructive. A strategy needs to offer the prospect of being the course of least net damage to yourself (and your allies). An eliminationist approach regularly fails at this.
Not true. What you state is just you personal belief. It has no bearing on War itself. War is how you advance or resist a policy via killing. Strategy makes no distinction or rules about cost effectiveness, though low cost for great gain is nearly always sought, as who would do otherwise?

The problem is especially obvious if one aims for total elimination.
I never advocate total elimination. I advocate seeking attrition in terms of what serves the policy. I also want attrition conducted in such a way as it breaks the will of the opponent to resist my policy via violence.

Backwards Observer
01-03-2011, 02:35 PM
Anybody but the wise old hands that created much of this.

Well, it seemed like a good idea at the time.

U.S. Aid For Afghan Freedom Fighters Overdue - The Heritage Foundation, Feb 1, 1984 (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1984/02/us-aid-for-afghan-freedom-fighters-overdue)


The Afghans have no realistic chance of frustrating Soviet designs on their country unless they receive the military tools they need to force Moscow into meaningful negotiations. This will not happen until bureaucratic resistance within the U.S. government is overcome. Furnishing aid to the Mujahideen would send a reassuring signal to nearby states that Washington is able to recognize and safeguard its own interests as well as those of its friends.

Fuchs
01-03-2011, 03:20 PM
We prefer the terms "Classical" "Orthodox" or "Fundamentalists." You cannot change War or what works best in warfare. Warfare is conducted via killing. How that is best done is the only thing up for debate. There are no kinder of less bloody ways of war that can ever work.

Not true. What you state is just you personal belief. It has no bearing on War itself. War is how you advance or resist a policy via killing. Strategy makes no distinction or rules about cost effectiveness, though low cost for great gain is nearly always sought, as who would do otherwise?

The problem begins with the perception of "war" and "warfare". People think of winning by defeating the enemy once they think of war (well, at least the people from powerful countries).
It's a conflict, and the root of the conflict is surprisingly small. I doubt that war(fare) is a good approach in this hyped-up conflict at all.

Statesmen have largely lost the skill of negotiating a peace after the total wars till '45. The negotiation of a peace is nevertheless the historical normality, while the annihilation or defencelessness of the defeated party is the historical exception in wars.
You emphasize the annihilation/disarmament route way too much and neglect the politics/negotiation approach. Likewise, you're overly focusing on killing as a means to achieve disarmament or annihilation of an organized opponent.
Warfare is not only conducted via killing, it's actually a rather small part of warfare and always has been. It's spectacular and easily attracting interest, but it's still only a small part.

Skilled land forces regularly take more POWs than they score KIAs.

Skilled statesmen end wars when a satisfactory end-state was accomplished in negotiations.


"Strategy makes no distinction or rules about cost effectiveness, though low cost for great gain is nearly always sought, as who would do otherwise?"

To pursue an endeavour that kills thousands under the assumption that the endeavour will cause more harm than good to even your own people means that the person who is responsible for this is a mass murderer and criminal of epic proportions - and the person is obviously doing it wrong.

Of course war has to be about seeking the path of least damage to your people (and your allies). All else is evil and utterly dysfunctional.

-----

Besides; I'd also like to point out that the Kosovo Air War was certainly not basing its success on killing. Deaths were side-effects and not a central intent at all. It was won by those who decided to conduct it like that.

Your claim
"There are no kinder of less bloody ways of war that can ever work."
was hereby proved to be false for any interpretation of your words that goes beyond the understanding of killing as side-effect of inflicting destruction.
Your focus on killing has no robust theoretical or historical foundation. It serves only the purpose to emphasize killing, and this purpose is misguided because there ARE other promising and most certainly also superior ways than focusing on killing.


One more example to help why this focus on killing is misguided. Germany's military resistance did not break apart in early 1945 because it had taken too many casualties. It had inflicted much, much more on its enemies and defeated many enemies without inflicting many KIAs at all (Poland, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Greece all fell without suffering any in itself even remotely decisive quantity of KIA!).
Instead, its resistance broke apart because of psychological exhaustion and the fact that its military power was quantitatively constant, and had a mixed qualitative development over the war years while its opponents multiplied their forces quantitatively and qualitatively.
That was wasn't won by the soldier pulling the trigger to kill - it was won by the industrial workers and managers (and it was of course lost by an idiotic statesman by piling up too many foes at once).


Honestly, I was surprised that you threw your usual slogan at me, for you certainly should have understood by now that kill! kill! kill! hypothesis it doesn't work on me.
Someone wrote on this forum that most military theory is rubbish. Well, the kill! kill! kill! hypothesis certainly is.

Backwards Observer
01-03-2011, 04:45 PM
If at first you don't succeed.

U.S. Aid For Afghan Freedom Fighters Overdue - The Heritage Foundation, Feb 1, 1984 (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1984/02/us-aid-for-afghan-freedom-fighters-overdue)


Furnishing aid to the Mujahideen would send a reassuring signal to nearby states that Washington is able to recognize and safeguard its own interests as well as those of its friends.

Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan Bring Long-Term Problems - The Heritage Foundation, Oct 5, 2009 (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems)


President Obama must take the long view and avoid shortsighted policies that undermine U.S. friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan while encouraging America's enemies.

Makes sense, I guess...

Bill Moore
01-03-2011, 05:29 PM
Backwards Observer, thanks for the post it was good for a chuckle. We tend to think our keen foreign policy insights today will stand the test of time, but normally and usually not too far down the road we're left wondering just what the heck were we thinking? Why didn't we see that coming? :D

Fuchs your comments are begining to become somewhat amusing. Germany wasn't defeated by attrition? Um? The Allies were closing in on Berlin from all sides and the German army was now drafting boys as young as 15 years old to fill their ranks due to attrition, but that approach obviously lacked intellectual rigor, and in the end didn't have much to do with our total victory that resulted in a more peaceful Europe, even during the subsequent Cold War. What was the mechanism that defeated Germany then? Japan may not have been defeated by attrition but after the second atomic bomb was dropped it was the fear of unacceptable attrition that brought them to the point of unconditional surrender and again relative stability for many years hence.

I'm not even sure what you're talking about regarding Germany's near bloodless victories in Poland, Greece, etc.? First off our initial victories in Afghanistan and Iraq were also relatively effective and "relatively" few casualties and destruction, but unlike the Germans in Poland we didn't implement the final solution and start purging these societies of all their undesirables. The reality is Germany occupied numerous countries and faced continued resistance in each to varying degrees. German responses to resistance were considered somewhat brutal by our standards. One German Soldier gets killed, then set number of civilians in the area are murdered to send a message to the resistance, which generally worked to a large extent. Maybe this is a tactic you recommend based on your deep intellectual appreciation of conflict?

You also did a fine job recreating history concerning Al Qaeda and our initial involvement in Afghanistan back in 2001 and 2002, I agree another set of leaders may have handled the problem differently, but over time the enemy would have adapted. Unfortunately Bob's World's approach about addressing underlying causes/drivers for this conflict (I'm talking about AQ, not the Taliban) won't work, and we need to take off our politically correct blinders and realize they want the world to submit to their version of Islam and Shari'a law. The driver for the conflict is that we're not all a bunch of radical Mullahs. The Taliban is another story, and it is another example of an enduring conflict changing shape and color over time and now we wonder just what the heck we're doing again.

Fuchs
01-03-2011, 06:00 PM
Fuchs your comments are begining to become somewhat amusing. Germany wasn't defeated by attrition? Um? The Allies were closing in on Berlin from all sides and the German army was now drafting boys as young as 15 years old to fill their ranks due to attrition, but that approach obviously lacked intellectual rigor, and in the end didn't have much to do with our total victory that resulted in a more peaceful Europe, even during the subsequent Cold War.

(16 y.o. boys - and the Russians did this pretty much since late '41. Moreover, Germany had used 17y.o. Germans and even younger Russians as paramilitary workforce back when it looked as if it was winning. Besides - didn't the British send a 17 y.o. into Desert Storm?)

Look at the figures.
The Wehrmacht had more tanks, more subs, more fighters, more pilots, more artillery, more machine guns, more APCs - almost more of everything - in early 1945. Most of it was better than in 1939 as well.
The losses on the other side were worse on part of the Allies (especially SU) and thus hardly decisive.
It was an example of overpowering, not an example of disarming up tot he point when the military fell apart (which was well beyond the point at which every sane government would have had agreed to peace).

Germany was unable to resist in 1945 more because its opponents had grown so much in power than because of its losses.
If losses had been decisive, France wouldn't have surrendered, but the Soviet Union would have.

Germany would have been in a hopeless position in early 1945 even if some genie had restored all its losses at an instant. That would have allowed for a hell of a counter-offensive, but the outlook would still have been terrible.

Moreover, the tide began to turn in late 1942, long before the really serious losses of material (other than soft motor vehicles) began and long before the vast majority of the personnel losses occurred.
WW2 had even been a relatively low casualty war till late '41 for the Axis.


CvC was a bit too specific when he focused on disarmament for victory - he looked at the extreme (or at last wrote about it to communicate his idea).
Conventional wars are often being won by overpowering, and rarely by actually destroying the enemy (or even killing most of his soldiers).

Entropy
01-03-2011, 06:04 PM
Bill,


Unfortunately Bob's World's approach about addressing underlying causes/drivers for this conflict (I'm talking about AQ, not the Taliban) won't work, and we need to take off our politically correct blinders and realize they want the world to submit to their version of Islam and Shari'a law.

Who thinks that AQ doesn't want that? AQ has, after all, made it pretty clear. There are no political blinders regarding what AQ wants, IMO. What there is is a difference of opinion regarding what kind of threat AQ poses and, by extension, what resources and attention are required to mitigate the threat as well as the best way to go about it. AQ's desires, by themselves, are not a threat to anyone. Their capabilities are very limited and fall far, far short of what would be required to cause one nation to submit to them much less the world.

Bob's World
01-03-2011, 06:17 PM
Bill,

Nothing PC driving my positions, nor "MC" (militarily correct iaw what the FMs and the GOs tell me I am supposed to think) either. While I recognize very well the overarching role of Islam in the lives of those who are the primary target audience of AQ, this attempt at Caliphate is no more about spreading Islam than any of the other Caliphates were. Power, Land, Money, & Politics were the goals then and now; and Islam the ideology to motivate the masses to carry the mail in those endeavors.

(And with all due respect for my Muslim brothers who believe I am an Infidel for my Christian beliefs, I am not so sure that Islam was not cooked up soley for the purpose of motivating such conquests in the first place. In God we trust, but men who employ the name of God for their own personal gain I tend to judge with a bit more caution; be they TV evangelists or modern day prophets...)

AQ's role today is little different than that of the Soviets during the Cold War in their conduct of UW to stir up insurgent fervor among the populace in states where the West had more sway with the current government than they do. UW works when the populace is ripe for insurgency based upon their relationship with their government, not so well in other places. Communism was an effective ideology for insurgency in Europe and Asia; but fell flat in the Middle East. The radical version of Islam applied by AQ works much better there.

No, my perspective may be wrong, but it is based in cold, hard pragmatism. I listened to the "experts" on how this is all about Islam, read the books, weighed it against everything else I have learned and studied on history, insurgency, etc; and it just doesn't wash. Look how little sway AQ has in SEA. Malaysia and Indonesia sorted out most of their colonial political issues and have little need for what AQ is selling. The Southern Philippines are yet unresolved, so it holds more promise there. This is politics, these are nationalist revolutionary insurgencies; and this is AQ acting like a state to conduct UW.

The ideologues have it wrong. I stand by that. Will radical Islamic practices follow the movement if the political issues are not defused in advance? Certainly, but no more than radical Christianity spread across the globe in the effort to throw off the poor governance of the Holy Roman Empire in Europe. Once the political mission was resolved, Protestantism mellowed as well; I see little difference in the current dynamics in the Islamic world. Except that now it is the Non-Empire Empire of the US being challenged as the current bag holder for Western Colonialism, with its inappropriate degree of influence and control of the governance of others being challenged. Not much different than the Pope's similar network of control and influence over Europe 500 years ago.

The Pilgrims were a bunch of religious zealots, dressed in black, with no tolerance for the religious beliefs of others and notoriously abusive of the rights of women. They mellowed. The Taliban are little different, and they will mellow as well. As to AQ? They have no populace, they have no state. They borrow what they need in that regard, and that is the basis of their sanctuary, as it takes them outside the "effective range" of our current tools of statecraft. If AQ ever acquired a State, if AQ ever created a "Caliphate" they would destroy the bulk of their sanctuary in the same blow, and quickly have to toe the same line that weak states have to toe everywhere.

You want to deny AQ sanctuary in AFPAK? Talk to the Taliban. Make them an offer they can't refuse and AQ will be on the next thing smoking. Where they go next? Ahh, that is the real question.

omarali50
01-03-2011, 06:50 PM
It seems to me that there is no general rule, here or elsewhere.
But the crucial issue may be identifying the enemy and knowing what he wants in each case (its not a she in Afghanistan).
I have no inside information, but I have a number of leftist pakhtoon friends and they make two points that may appear contradictory.
1. There is a jihadist core in pakistan (not in "sanctuaries" alone, but in the govt, in the Islamist parties, especially in the intelligence agencies) and they are fleecing the Americans while ruthlessly protecting their minimum interests (even if that means sacrificing a lot of foot-soldiers).
2. Pakistan is not a very strong state. No one in the ruling elite actually wants to try to fight off an unhappy America or even to survive without monthly handouts. The bluff works only because America lets it work.
If both points are correct (and I vacillate between believing both and being skeptical) then the problem is never going to reach some imaginary worst-case scenario. Point two trumps point one.
Having said that, in the interest of full disclosure, I would add that as an American I dont see what all of this has to do with any imaginary "war on terror". There is no enemy out there that needs this response. Even if this is being done for Israel or for oil, its a waste of effort. Israel has problems closer to home and is a big boy and should handle its own problems. The oil comes from the gulf, not from Afghanistan. Much smaller investments in carrots and sticks and other measures would keep Islamist terrorism in manageable bounds in the west.
All this is only meaningful if the US is worldcop and wants to do some social engineering in a bad neighborhood. Otherwise, why bother? Let them kill each other or make peace or make love or whatever. India is at risk, but they think they are big boys too. Besides, if they could handle kashmir in the nineties, they should be able to handle X or Y in the future as well.

slapout9
01-03-2011, 07:01 PM
The oil comes from the gulf, not from Afghanistan. .

Some say it's not directly about oil, but indirectly about oil because of the proposed pipeleine? Your thoughts on that aspect.

omarali50
01-03-2011, 07:01 PM
To reiterate: there are many "worst case scenarios" and slippery slopes, but the ruling elite in pakistan is not totally crazy. When push comes to shove, they always pick option A. They know what side their bread is buttered. Some craziness is good for business when all you are selling is nuisance value.
And, yes, I am sure there are nicer ways of putting this.

omarali50
01-03-2011, 07:06 PM
I have never really figured out what that means. Pipelines will presumably ship oil from central asia to China or India. Let them police the pipelines. If they can.
And if people want a big cop to keep order in the neighborhood, then big cop sahib shouldnt have to spend his own pocket money on the job. Something like that.
Honestly, I suspect that some of this strategic value BS is cooked up by someone who wants a canteen contract for his cousin in the next war. Something like that. I am exposing my ignorance, but I really cannot figure it out.

Bob's World
01-03-2011, 07:11 PM
Oil is a global market. People who have it need to sell it, people who need it need to buy it. All we every really wrestle over is who gets what cut of the profits. What government, what corporations, etc.

Corporations love the stability that comes with dictators, so we tend to back keeping dictators in power where corporate interests are high. I suspect since that has worked so well, we have applied the same stability principle to other areas where different types of interests are at stake, like access to key LOCs such as the Red Sea and Suez.

The real issue at play in GWOT is not an effort to expand extreme versions of Islam onto the unwilling; but rather to dislodge extreme versions of capitalism that have served to disrupt local processes of governmental legitimacy. Both will run hand in hand for a while, but once the causation of governance is addressed, the motivation of extreme Islam will quickly subside as well. If history is any judge, anyways.

(The poor fellas at Exxon didn't even send me a Christmas card this year.)

slapout9
01-03-2011, 07:29 PM
The real issue at play in GWOT is not an effort to expand extreme versions of Islam onto the unwilling; but rather to dislodge extreme versions of capitalism that have served to disrupt local processes of governmental legitimacy.

Yep, they don't like Globalization, that is why they chose the Twin Towers,the very symbol of Global Domination from New York.

Infanteer
01-03-2011, 07:59 PM
Wow, what a good thread - there are a few distinct discussions going on, so I'll start here:


The real issue at play in GWOT is not an effort to expand extreme versions of Islam onto the unwilling; but rather to dislodge extreme versions of capitalism that have served to disrupt local processes of governmental legitimacy. Both will run hand in hand for a while, but once the causation of governance is addressed, the motivation of extreme Islam will quickly subside as well. If history is any judge, anyways.

That's how I understand it - if I recall correctly, AQs big targets were "apostate dictatorships" in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia (these were the two states that spurned OBL and Zawahiri). Eliminating them and cleaning up The House of Submission was the policy and sticking it to the U.S. to rile up the Islamic masses is the strategy. I believe that Michael Sheuer detailed all this with his use of primary sources in his books.

The whole global caliphate is more like the "ideological chatter" on the fringes of the mission; similiar to our side talking about democratizing the world.

That being said, this refers to AQ the group (an NGO I guess), which may have seen its goals and organization change in the last 10 years (I'm not too current on it). AQ the movement, which lives in the West and everywhere else, is a different beast altogether. I'm not sure taking one down will affect the other anymore.

Infanteer
01-03-2011, 08:23 PM
I never advocate total elimination. I advocate seeking attrition in terms of what serves the policy. I also want attrition conducted in such a way as it breaks the will of the opponent to resist my policy via violence.


CvC was a bit too specific when he focused on disarmament for victory - he looked at the extreme (or at last wrote about it to communicate his idea).
Conventional wars are often being won by overpowering, and rarely by actually destroying the enemy (or even killing most of his soldiers).

I think you two are arguing past each other.

I read Wilf as saying the proper application of violence as overpowering the enemy. Certainly, reading around the Small Wars world shows this to be true. The Plains Wars, the Riel Rebellion (a Canadian example), the Phillipine Insurrection or the Tamil Insurrection provide examples.

In none of these examples were the insurgents "destroyed" - nobody claimed they were. Fuch's description of "defeat" as a psychological condition that comes long before total destruction is correct (I see some of Storr's arguments here) and I don't think anyone disagrees with that either.

So, violence correctly applied serves as one means amongst others (although at times the primary means) towards the political ends of making an other side cry uncle and conforming to your policy goals. What's the argument? I don't think anyone is arguing NOT to fight when faced with armed resistance.

The big question is what we could probably call a "threshold for defeat" - when does a group of people stop fighting? From the general flow of discussions here on the SWJ, Bob's World has placed this line far to the right, saying that small wars - more particularly insurgencies - can't be resolved by violence. This would mean that the "threshold for defeat" is almost on par with "destruction"; you can't get rid of a feeling of resentment. Others have argued that enough force can convince people to change their ways; this would slide the "threshold for defeat" a little further to the right, away from "total destruction". I'm willing to bet that the location of the "threshold" varies from people to people and war to war.

Infanteer
01-03-2011, 08:27 PM
Yep, they don't like Globalization, that is why they chose the Twin Towers,the very symbol of Global Domination from New York.

Did they target the WTC due to a fear of globalization? Was the target selected after reading some Thomas Freidman and seeing a true threat to the safety of ones immortal spirit?

Or did big, well-known towers just serve as a large enough target of opportunity to stick it to someone supporting people who pissed you off.

I've always understood it to be the latter.

Fuchs
01-03-2011, 09:11 PM
Fuch's description of "defeat" as a psychological condition that comes long before total destruction is correct (I see some of Storr's arguments here) and I don't think anyone disagrees with that either.

What's worse; you don't need to defeat the hostile forces in war. It suffices to defeat their government.

There's no way how this could be reconcilable with Wilf's crusade against any type of 'indirect approach'.
Except that he's funnily advocating an indirect approach himself by addressing the enemy leadership (and their might in form of followers) through killing instead of addressing them or their policy directly. (No, killing them does not address them, for their successor will still be determined, and careful. To exploit their fears such as possible loss of power or fear for their people would 'address them'.)




I've got no problem with Wilf, knowing him for the better part of the last decade, but I have a problem with his theoretical arguments (crusades) of the last two years.

The sanctuary issue is a proper topic for this; I doubt that anything would be gained by closing down the sanctuaries or even by killing even most or all enemies in there.
We would only drive the others deeper into the underground, at great costs for us. We're better off if we stay away from them. The AQ in Pakistan is no problem for us and the TB don't seem to be interested in major extra-regional activities.
In fact, the sanctuaries are helping us much; our intelligence services would probably petition against a crackdown because it's so damn useful to observe which young people visit Pakistan these days.
A global network without at least one special central node would be much more difficult to keep under surveillance - especially if their connections break down to their motivation and ideology.


This is a hydra type of conflict anyway. Hack & slash against these enemies won't work.
We can turn some of them into irrelevant enemies simply by avoiding their neighbourhood and we need first and foremost a torch against the others - a sword alone won't do, no matter how much we try. Finally, we should question the whole stupid conflict (the mission) before we do anything.

I suggest to search a more global political torch than the rather regional H&M approach that was way too much insurgency-specific and wouldn't have been decisive in the greater picture even if successful in AFG..

slapout9
01-03-2011, 09:44 PM
Did they target the WTC due to a fear of globalization? Was the target selected after reading some Thomas Freidman and seeing a true threat to the safety of ones immortal spirit?

Or did big, well-known towers just serve as a large enough target of opportunity to stick it to someone supporting people who pissed you off.

I've always understood it to be the latter.

I think since they had already tried to blow up the Towers once already it is the former, they were determined to finish what they had started.

jcustis
01-03-2011, 10:21 PM
This thread is following a very interesting track at the moment, and there seems to be a noticeable pattern, and I tend to group the various positions into one of three camps.

First, there is the realist camp that advocates continuing to strike the insurgents, and focusing on terrain and the enemy, and not so much the people.

Second is the idealist point of view, which orients on the population as the center of gravity and focuses on separating the insurgent from the population through a combination of better governance, development/prosperity and security, but also recognizes that the insurgent may be capable of coming to the negotiating table to work towards settlement.'

Finally, as far as I can see, there is the isolationist camp, which tends towards a belief that we should marginalize the insurgent by reducing our involvement altogether. This view can blend some aspects of the first two thought processes, but the fact remains that the issue of the Taliban and their connection with AQ is not worth the toil to try and defeat the various components of the problem. Better to focus on containing the problem, rather than be dragged won by it.

I think neoconservatism got us into Afghanistan, but has died out as the residual argument for us staying there.

I know these are not neatly organized containers, and that much of what people argue has various permutations, but can folks ID other systems at play that allow for arguments to be organized?

Bob's World
01-03-2011, 10:32 PM
I have to go with Infanteer on this one. The symbolism of those twin towers, standing there at the gateway of the greatest city, of the greatest nation, represented the greed, power, and hubris of the American people in the second half of the 20th Century. They represented so much of the "why" behind the tremendous controlling presence established by the U.S. around the globe, a presence that remains the greatest in the Middle East as it has not evolved or rolled back there nearly to the degree it has in Europe, Asia or even Latin America. What better target than the WTC if one just wanted to walk up this great Tiger of a country and kick it square in the balls?? The targeting of the Pentagon, as the hub of the military forces that have enforced those control measures, and the unfulfilled targeting of the Capital/White house all make tremendous symbolic sense.

That said though, I believe that there certainly are those who are attracted to AQ's movement that do fear globalization; and perhaps those are the most deeply religious of their supporters. Just as the invention of the printing press unleashed an information age that led to the reformation of Christianity, with the associated tremendous social and political upheavals of that era; so too is the information technology fueling globalization placing reformatory pressures on Islam as well. There will be those who press for change and those who cling equally steadfastly to maintaining an exaggerated, and probably largely fictional and romanticized version of how they believe Islam is supposed to be. This is the great friction within Islam that will likely grow and forever change the face of that culture, the balance of power, and beliefs of the faithful in ways that are impossible to predict and totally and completely independent of the political objectives of AQ. It is like the monster wave crashing toward the shore that AQ is riding to serve their own ends. But such a wave can pick up everything in its path. I really think we need to do a better job of understanding both dynamics separately, as well as how they interact together, but to not conflate them as one homogeneous dynamic, because they are not.

Their world is changing in ways that are scary and unpredictable, and that will lead to powerful and unpredictable reactions in some. We can't do much about that and should not attempt to do so. We can, however, assess and adjust our foreign policies and relationships in the region to be less controlling and more respective of local dynamics of popular will and governance. As Dave Maxwell says... something about not wanting to be the minnow caught between two copulating whales.

Bill Moore
01-03-2011, 11:02 PM
I see a lot of random thoughts (mine included) discussing strategy or more accurately strategies for fighting AQ, Taliban, stablizing Afghanistan, etc., which in my view points to the heart of the problem. What are we trying to accomplish in Afghanistan? What is the policy? We have apparently have a plan for Afghanistan that is largely (not completely) disassociated with our fight against AQ, yet as we can all see from the points made previously one moment we're discussing how to stabilize Afghanistan and the next we're discussion how to defeat AQ. While there is somewhat of geographical nexus of the two strategies in Afghanistan, they are still largely two separate strategies. Regarding Afghanistan, and the question I was asked initially that apparently kicked this discussion off was what would you do patrol leader? I assumed the question was regarding Afghanistan, which is what our men and women on the front lines (not those in the FOBs) are trying to do. I tend to agree with Bob's approach about making a deal the Taliban can't refuse, but as he stated that can't be done because the ISI refuses to allow the Taliban to cooperate, so where does that leave us? If you're being attacked by forces that enjoy safehaven in Pakistan like the Haqanni Network, Lashkar e taiyyba, and numerous Taliban factions (their leadership enjoys residence in Pakistan, there bomb making schools are in Pakistan, and there not all in the FATA), do you ignore the issue and continue to try to nation build in hopes that this will eventually somehow defeat the forces that are destablizing Afghanistan (of course you could argue we're the force destablizing Afghanistan)? I remain open to alternative views, but I haven't seen any arguments to convince me that this is feasible.

If you asked me how to defeat AQ, I would propose a different approach that is largely SOF/CIA led working through proxies to disrupt and destroy their networks. I only need a few small toe holds in Afghanistan and other locations to disrupt the safehavens Pakistan, especially if we work a deal out with the Taliban, which we might be able to do if we leave them alone. Of course that would be a betrayal of our allies within Afghanistan who have put their lives and their families lives on the line to support our efforts to build a better Afghanistan and it would piss off India, because we would have sided with a State Sponsor of terrorism (make a deal with the devil) to get after AQ. Of course any strategy that seriously addresses AQ must be global, to include Europe, the U.S., Africa, the Middle East, etc. There is a valid so what question if we finally do kill or capture AQ's senior leadership that we think is in Pakistan. I don't think anyone will believe the war is over with.

While I may not agree I think everyone is making valid points depending upon what problem you may be trying to solve.

Infanteer
01-03-2011, 11:51 PM
What are we trying to accomplish in Afghanistan? What is the policy?

The million dollar question!

I think AQ fell off the "reasons for staying in Afghanistan" list sometime ago; I don't know if this was inadvertant or not. It would be an interesting survey to compare policy statements WRT Afghanistan and Karzai from 2001 to 2011 to detect changes.

Unfortunately, I think the answer to the million dollar question at the present time is framed by many policymakers, targetting a fickle public, as "rebuild Afghanistan under its elected government". This makes for great soundbites and shows care for the priniciples of liberalism of democracy for humanity....

...and is also is completely unrealistic. We are setting ourselves up for failure if we define victory in terms of inked-thumbs and girls going to school - yet these are the metrics and images we choose to define it by. For some reason, the current attitude seems to be one of "there's an insurgency, let's counter it!" as opposed to "do we need to be here?" "White man's burden" redux?

So you get a poor military who is looked upon to lead this effort (despite all the pithy phrases in doctrine saying the military is only a supporting effort) and does what it does best; provides military solutions. Nothing like turning a series of tactical tasks (clear, hold, build) into a strategy.

JJackson
01-04-2011, 12:12 AM
1. There is a jihadist core in pakistan (not in "sanctuaries" alone, but in the govt, in the Islamist parties, especially in the intelligence agencies) and they are fleecing the Americans while ruthlessly protecting their minimum interests (even if that means sacrificing a lot of foot-soldiers).
2. Pakistan is not a very strong state. No one in the ruling elite actually wants to try to fight off an unhappy America or even to survive without monthly handouts. The bluff works only because America lets it work.

Is this what is going on? I think there are two elites the Military and political dynasties.
1] I would see as the Military who are good Muslims but not Jihadists. Their primary interest relates to India and while they are very happy to use US tax dollars to beef up their forces they want them as protection against their enemy not the US’s (the same is going on in Yemen).
2] Is the political class, and all who get rich through their patronage. They have a very difficult task they want to feather their own nests with those nice US tax dollars but their electorate are absolutely clear who their enemy is - the US and India probably in that order. How do you do enough to appease the Americans without getting lynched by your own people and without letting a US or Indian proxy establish itself on your northern flank.
What has not been discussed much is China who are very close to the Pakistanis and also have a vested interest in not having a US or Indian proxy in Afghanistan. To date they have not needed to take any action in their own interest but if the US makes its attacks on its Pakistani allies more overt or India looked like gaining significant influence that may change and needs to be factored in.

slapout9
01-04-2011, 12:45 AM
I have to go with Infanteer on this one. The symbolism of those twin towers, standing there at the gateway of the greatest city, of the greatest nation, represented the greed, power, and hubris of the American people in the second half of the 20th Century. They represented so much of the "why" behind the tremendous controlling presence established by the U.S. around the globe, a presence that remains the greatest in the Middle East as it has not evolved or rolled back there nearly to the degree it has in Europe, Asia or even Latin America. What better target than the WTC if one just wanted to walk up this great Tiger of a country and kick it square in the balls?? The targeting of the Pentagon, as the hub of the military forces that have enforced those control measures, and the unfulfilled targeting of the Capital/White house all make tremendous symbolic sense.



I thought that is what I said?

slapout9
01-04-2011, 12:52 AM
Finally, as far as I can see, there is the isolationist camp, which tends towards a belief that we should marginalize the insurgent by reducing our involvement altogether. This view can blend some aspects of the first two thought processes, but the fact remains that the issue of the Taliban and their connection with AQ is not worth the toil to try and defeat the various components of the problem. Better to focus on containing the problem, rather than be dragged won by it.



I would tend to fall in this category with some exceptions. We really need to have a Kill Bill Laden Vol.3. We also should be better preparing the nation for the fact that we may get hit again. We need to strengthen our economy and vastly reorganize(maybe get rid of) the Department of Homeland Silliness. Homeland Security.....who thought of that? that sounds like something Hitler would have had....really sucks IMO. Really need to get a grip on the Mexico situation,which may not seem to be connected but it is through various Drug Links.

Dayuhan
01-04-2011, 01:04 AM
If you mean a strategy of attrition, then you have access to a very gifted six-year-old. Attrition works better than anything else. It's great, but you need a really good army and a a very good intelligence service to do it.

Additionally, your attrition has to be set forth in line with the policy, so you have to be very careful who you kill/capture and why.

Attrition doesn't have to be achieved by killing and capturing. In my neighborhood we've had a Communist insurgency running since the 60s. At its peak, in the later years of the Marcos dictatorship, they had roughly 25,000 armed fighters. Now they are down to under 5000. That attrition was brought about not by military action, but by the removal of the dictator and a gradual renewal of confidence in the political process: the rebels weren't killed, they just stopped rebelling. The rebellion remains active primarily in areas where governance is still dominated by feudal dynasties. The key to the final stage in the attrition process will be the application of coercive force: not against the rebels, but against the dynasties.

Of course you won't ever convert the ideological core, but their followers are fighting for reasons, and those reasons often have little to do with ideology. Remove the reasons, and you get attrition without killing anyone. Leave the reasons in place, and you don't just have to kill insurgents, you have to kill them faster than they are replaced, and you have to find them among a populace that's likely to be on their side.

If your policy is producing substantial armed resistance among a populace, it's worth considering the possibility that your policy sucks.


Outlaw status is resolved by simply bringing them inside the law. Grant a pardon (with clear conditions, such as the eviction of AQ with the turning over of certain key AQ members bringing very clear benefits as well). Once inside the law, the Taliban are constrained by the law, at least as much as anyone is constrained by the law (right, Mr. Karzai?? Wink Wink) in this culture.

Very simple, if the Taliban choose to participate. If they don't recognize your law, if they don't see you as being in a position to grant pardons or make demands, this won't get anywhere. There's more to making a deal than offering it and assuming the other side will go along with whatever you offer. Why should they?


The symbolism of those twin towers, standing there at the gateway of the greatest city, of the greatest nation, represented the greed, power, and hubris of the American people in the second half of the 20th Century. They represented so much of the "why" behind the tremendous controlling presence established by the U.S. around the globe, a presence that remains the greatest in the Middle East as it has not evolved or rolled back there nearly to the degree it has in Europe, Asia or even Latin America.

What exactly do we control in the Middle East?

slapout9
01-04-2011, 01:05 AM
What's worse; you don't need to defeat the hostile forces in war. It suffices to defeat their government.


Colonel Warden's been saying that for years.

Fuchs
01-04-2011, 01:23 AM
Colonel Warden's been saying that for years.

Maybe, but his most famous recommendations are very different.

slapout9
01-04-2011, 01:44 AM
Maybe, but his most famous recommendations are very different.

I have never seen any, other than the fact that you may have to attack other targets in order to get to the government/leaders.Which ones are you talking about?

Fuchs
01-04-2011, 02:00 AM
I have never seen any, other than the fact that you may have to attack other targets in order to get to the government/leaders.Which ones are you talking about?

Pretty much that one.
I understood his recommendation as akin to a shotgun shock attack. He proposed to press five acupressure rings at once and after five steps the enemies' heart will explode.


My approach to offensive strategic air war is very different.
It has been observed that certain strategic air war actions have mixed track records and some even trigger the opposite of the intended reaction.

My concept accepts that, is fine with it and exploits it. I intend to write an article draft for submission to a journal soon, the early draft was written in blog style and is thus obviously unsuitable for a journal article.


Part of my approach is as always to avoid as much net damage as possible in order to protect the own people (and allies) against the terrible effects of war (and the risk thereof) as much as possible. To me, that's the point of the exercise of thinking about war. I despise unnecessary escalations and wasn't impressed by Warden's shotgun approach.

Backwards Observer
01-04-2011, 05:41 AM
Colonel Warden's been saying that for years.

I liked the COL Warden article you posted recently that was advocating a moral approach to strategic paralysis. He seems like a beautiful dreamer (in a good way).

My pedestrian observation is that systems targeting seems to be inhibited when the system doing the targeting and the system being targeted are operating in different conceptual realms.

So-called Eastern "systems" may be said to float ephemerally within subtly-defined interpersonal relationships between human-type beings conducted in a usually opaque and indirect manner bordering on the incomprehensible. A direct approach is more often than not skipped around and using "Western" style indirectness to understand "Eastern" style indirectness seems to further add to the chaos and potential for misinterpretation.

History suggests that the resulting frustration on both sides tends to end up with a system response that defaults to targeting the people themselves. Sort of a cross between Kipling and Phung Hoang.

Possibly the same can be said of any systemic collision characterised by conceptual differences and a lack of symbolic sympathy.

William F. Owen
01-04-2011, 06:21 AM
Attrition doesn't have to be achieved by killing and capturing. In my neighborhood we've had a Communist insurgency running since the 60s. At its peak, in the later years of the Marcos dictatorship, they had roughly 25,000 armed fighters. Now they are down to under 5000. That attrition was brought about not by military action, but by the removal of the dictator and a gradual renewal of confidence in the political process: the rebels weren't killed, they just stopped rebelling.
......and? I agree with all that and its completely immaterial to my argument.

You're case, as stated is that altering the policy (removal of the dictator) altered the rebels reason for violence. So what?
I am only ever talking about conditions where you need to sustain and enforce the policy, and thus the condtions relevant to winning conflicts.

If you want to change the policy to stop the war, then OK. War is about enforcing or resisting a policy. You only alter it when the enemy forces you to.

William F. Owen
01-04-2011, 06:28 AM
You don't need to defeat the hostile forces in war. It suffices to defeat their government.
I agree. So would Clausewitz.
If you want to defeat a political entity that is using violence, then you use superior violence in return.
99% of leaderships give up, when there military wing can no longer prosecute active military operations. We have 5,000 years of proof.

Dayuhan
01-04-2011, 08:51 AM
If you want to change the policy to stop the war, then OK. War is about enforcing or resisting a policy. You only alter it when the enemy forces you to.

Can't you alter a policy because you realize that it's ineffective, counterproductive, stupid, or all of the above? If we only evaluate and modify our policies if we're forced to, we're probably creating many of our own problems.

William F. Owen
01-04-2011, 09:31 AM
Can't you alter a policy because you realize that it's ineffective, counterproductive, stupid, or all of the above? If we only evaluate and modify our policies if we're forced to, we're probably creating many of our own problems.
Sure as hell! Clausewitz said it.
"If the Policy is right - that is successful - any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect, then the policy itself is wrong."
Paret, page 608

Bob's World
01-04-2011, 12:35 PM
Clausewitz is a good reference on war. I will never challenge or argue that point.

Where we get mixed messages is when we apply him to things that are not war. A football coach, for instance, could apply Clausewitz in a helpful way as a supporting resource, but not as the driving guide for how to produce a winning football team.

Same holds true for much of what we engage in today.

Going after AQ is not a "war" even though it is called a "War on Terrorism"; it is really much more a law enforcement action that has been granted (or merely taken) expanded authorities and been tasked to the military and the intelligence communities to take lead on. Giving a problem to the military does not make the problem into a war, nor does the military getting itself into combat situations in the pursuit of that problem make it a war. That aspect of the mission remains largely an expanded law enforcement problem, and as such, like the afore mentioned football coach, Clausewitz is helpful, but it does not drive what must be done and it would be dangerous to apply it as a driving resource.

To a lesser extent, but also, IMO, true is that the intrastate violence between a government and its populace that defines Insurgency and COIN is not "war" either.

Certainly in its most violent forms insurgency appears very warlike, but in certain stages a caterpillar looks a lot like a centipede, but that does not make it one. The differences that are critical lie in the reasons of causation for the conflict and the nature of the relationships between the parties, as well as the fact that both are drawing upon the support of the same populace in a competition for governance. It is far more an illegal, often violent, election than a war; but I think is best categorized as a Civil Emergency.

This civil emergency approach is a helpful reminder to responders that civilian leadership still holds the reins, that the host nation is the lead, and that high violence is merely a mix of tactical choice and a phase to be worked through in route to less violent efforts aimed at reducing the friction in the troubled society. Calling such situations "Wars" and passing the problem to military leadership to resolve is a recipe for disaster.

We came to this habit during the past few hundred years of Colonialism. Colonialism was marked by some external party that had established itself, or some local government that answered to them, in charge. These illegitimate governments were and are often challenged. In such a case, the insurgent is not really an insurgent, but is more a guerrilla fighter challenging some external state power. That is fairly a war.

The question for Afghanistan is, do we want control, do want to wage guerrilla war to establish and sustain our control; or do we want to evolve from such colonial approaches and recognize that the best Afghanistan for the west is an Afghanistan governed of, by and for the people of Afghanistan. I argue that it is the latter, and in that case, it is not war. Clausewitz is interesting and helpful, but to apply him literally to such a problem is a recipe for disaster.

U.S. COIN, even with the current Population Centric tactics that dominate it, is still a derivative of European and early US approaches to waging war to sustain control over the populaces of others through the defeat of their guerrilla forces. It is not about insurgency, and it is not in fact COIN at all. It is a colonial intervention manual, a guerrilla warfare manual, and needs to be labeled as such.

We don't need a new COIN manual, we need a manual that is actually about COIN. The primary keeper of that manual should probably be the Justice Department, by the way, rather than Defense.

William F. Owen
01-04-2011, 12:58 PM
To a lesser extent, but also, IMO, true is that the intrastate violence between a government and its populace that defines Insurgency and COIN is not "war" either.
War is merely violence for a political aim/the redistribution of political power. I cannot see how you can separate War from Armed Rebellion. Yes, I hold armed rebellions to have distinct characteristics, but I cannot see how it functionally differs from "war" or why a Government would not treat is as war. Armed rebellions have best been resolved by military force. What's wrong with that?

I can also never see how a rebellion or an insurgency can and of being so, be legitimate. Legitimacy is subjective to the opinion of the person claiming to have it. It is not objective or definable.

Bob's World
01-04-2011, 01:15 PM
War is merely violence for a political aim/the redistribution of political power. I cannot see how you can separate War from Armed Rebellion. Yes, I hold armed rebellions to have distinct characteristics, but I cannot see how it functionally differs from "war" or why a Government would not treat is as war. Armed rebellions have best been resolved by military force. What's wrong with that?

I can also never see how a rebellion or an insurgency can and of being so, be legitimate. Legitimacy is subjective to the opinion of the person claiming to have it. It is not objective or definable.

I have no problem with stating that "war is merely violence for a political aim/the redistribution of political power." What I am saying is that not all violence for that purpose is war. Just as love making involves placing Tab A into Slot B; not all such couplings are love making.

(and no, I am not advising Wilf to "make love, not war"!!) :D

John M. Collins publishes the following definition of war:

"Declared or Undeclared combat of strategic significance that exposes one or more nations to defeat."

Now, if he had said "exposes one or more governments to defeat", insurgency would fit. But a nation is far more than the government. If a nation must address its own government illegally or even violently it is a bad thing. A dangerous thing. But it does not expose that nation to "defeat" but rather to a change of governance. Many a nation has profited in the long run from such forced changes that the previous government was not willing to adopt of their own volition.

I believe England was one such state, and also suspect that one would be hard pressed to find an Englishman who takes the position that the English nation was "defeated" by Mr. Cromwell.

slapout9
01-04-2011, 02:25 PM
Pretty much that one.
I understood his recommendation as akin to a shotgun shock attack. He proposed to press five acupressure rings at once and after five steps the enemies' heart will explode.


Close but it is more like making the brain explode or put it under through anesthesia. It would be much more precise and would or could involve a lot of non-lethal or less than lethal technologies. But because you are dealing with a complex system you can never know exactly what will cause the system to collapse so you need to strike across the rings at the same time or as close as possible to that. As we are finding out it does not have to be done by Air Power, Guerrillas do it very well.

slapout9
01-04-2011, 02:31 PM
History suggests that the resulting frustration on both sides tends to end up with a system response that defaults to targeting the people themselves. Sort of a cross between Kipling and Phung Hoang.



That is deep man;) but you get it. The moral question is supreme, are we going to protect Americans or are we going to protect a foreign population in a way that still leaves are population at risk? Its kinda like Chemo-therapy you may have to destroy some of the good cells in order to get all of the bad cells to insure that the greater system will survive.

Entropy
01-04-2011, 02:57 PM
Before this thread becomes yet another debate about the nature of warfare, let's get back to sanctuaries for a just a minute - Pakistan in particular.

Here's the way I see things:

1. Our strategy is based on the assumption that creating a viable state in Afghanistan will prevent AQ from returning to establish a safe-haven.

2. The safe-haven in Pakistan, like a cancer that never quite gets killed off, makes the establishment of #1 extremely difficult. If you can't kill or coopt the cancer, it will continue to spread to Afghanistan at every opportunity.

3. For ten years a host of plans and strategies have been floated about how to deal with the Pakistani safe-haven and so far they have all failed. What I've seen over the last couple of years are simply rehashed efforts marketed as new initiatives.

4. In light of that history is it reasonable to expect the US to be able to deal with the safe-haven, by whatever method (Kinetic or "lets-make-a-deal"), within a relevant timeframe - ie. the next few years?

5. If not, then where does that leave our strategy for creating a semi-stable state in Afghanistan?

Bob's World
01-04-2011, 03:14 PM
Well, to take this cancer line a bit further, allow me to offer a slightly different take.

The sanctuary of Pakistan is not the cancer, it is some organ where the cancer cells are most resilient to treatments of chemo therapy, and an organ that cannot simply be cut out and discarded.

The cancer is the Taliban, a cancer caused by the carcinogenic practices of the government of Afghanistan.

Our approach is to radiate the hell out of cancer cells wherever we find them; put the body onto a path to healthy eating and exercise; but totally ignore the chain-smoking activities of the same. The futility of attacking the symptoms of the disease, while working desperately to build up the resistance of the body to the disease, while pointedly ignoring the primary causation of the disease should be obvious. Perhaps someday it will be, as it is in treating actual diseases today. As to political diseases, we are still in the dark ages in our understandings and treatments.

Bill Moore
01-04-2011, 07:00 PM
Bob,

Eventually you will have to make up your mind, and also realize that your solution is not one size fits all. The Taliban didn't gain power originally strictly due to an ineffective Afghanistan government post Soviet era, but obviously the ineffective gov contributed to it. The Taliban gained power militarily (not politically) that was enabled by support from Pakistan, as you previously wrote was primarily based on Pakistan's strategic interests concerning India. You also said the Pakistan government wouldn't allow the Taliban to compromise with ISAF (only 3% have, that is a stunning success at reconciliation), because they have larger regional strategic interests, so in fact Entrophy is correct.

Once again the conversation drifts back to the Taliban and further and further away from AQ.

slapout9
01-04-2011, 07:46 PM
Once again the conversation drifts back to the Taliban and further and further away from AQ.

Thats right. It's the Drain the Swamp theory. Except you know what happens when you drain the Swamp? THE DAMN ALLIGATORS GET OUT! and they eat people! If you kill the alligators(Bill Laden and the Acuna boys) or put them in the Zoo you don't have to drain the swamp(Talibans). And you know something else about Alligators you CAIN"T negotiate with them, they will not change or become nice because they have a good Swamp(government) they will always be Alligators and they will always eat people.... unless you eat them first,sell their hides and eat the meat or get all fuzzy and stuff and keep them in a Zoo.

I used to go here as a kid, used to go to school with some of the owners kids. They used to have a big sign inside that said "Don't feed the Alligators...they think "you" are the food"

http://www.gatorland.com/

Bob's World
01-04-2011, 08:05 PM
Bill,

Not sure what your point here is, but I've never suggested that one size solution fits all, only that all insurgencies share a common causation. There are other forms of informal conflicts, such as what is going on now in Mexico with the drug cartels; or those for control of diamonds in Africa; that are not insurgencies. Similarly, as I pointed out earlier today, Colonial counter guerrilla operations are not COIN either; not if they are executed with the goal of sustaining some friendly, locally illegitimate government in power. FM3-24 is really a Colonial counter-guerrilla warfare manual.

As to the Taliban, you are right, I have said and stand that I believe that Pakistan will resist efforts at reconciliation and sees it in their best interest to keep a string on the Taliban as their agent to maintain a degree of control over Afghanistan. I don't think anything anyone can do to change how they perceive that national interest. In fact, our efforts to bring India into Afghanistan must surely make them want to pursue that interest with even greater effort.

But there are a wide range of powerful indicators that the Taliban is open to reconciliation. But as the Ahmed Rashid "The Way out of Afghanistan" piece points out so well, it is complicated (Via SWJ or directly with:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/way-out-afghanistan/?page=1 ). Any solution must address the very real fears of the minority groups that make up the Northern Alliance to guarantee that they will not once again be subjugated to Pashtun rule. Pashtuns must have confidence that they will not be forced to be subjugated to Karzai's cronies, or to Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc. But I suspect the indicators are that if the right guarantees can be made, if the right constitution to codify clear roles, barriers, rights, roles, etc can be crafted; that they would gladly end their current deal with Pakistan to participate once again legally in their own country. Giving up AQ is what they have to bring to the table to entice the US to broker this deal. But we have to shed our commitment to the preservation of the Karzai regime. That is the anchor around our neck. We need to take better account of the national interests of Iran, Pakistan, and the other countries bordering on Afghanistan who all have their own national interests and populace ties that reach across those fuzzy borders.

The fact is that Gen Petraeus is conducting a massive suppression operation currently. We are not executing "Population-Centric COIN," we are conducting "COIN symptom suppression." Combining massive development, night raids, and clear-hold-build operations in Afghanistan; coupled with drone strikes into Pakistan; so create a window of suppressed symptoms that allow us to declare success and withdraw on schedule. He may well succeed in that. But that will not accomplish the mission against AQ, and that will not resolve the insurgency in Afghanistan either. It will get us out, but it is a cop out.

All I am saying is that the mission is AQ. The key to AQ is the Taliban; and the key to the Taliban is a comprehensive reconciliation program. That gets us out of AFPAK.

Then we can get on to dealing with the much larger problem of the growing support for AQ across so much of the Middle East, the Stans and N. Africa. Defeating AQ in Pakistan is not enough, they will go elsewhere or others will step up to replace them. We have to address the policy issues feeding those conditions.

Fuchs
01-04-2011, 08:17 PM
Once again the conversation drifts back to the Taliban and further and further away from AQ.

It's a strong, strong current of irrationality.


I can remind people as often about a certain fact (that the Taliban only became our enemies when we attacked them for harbouring AQ in AFG and that this condition ended almost a decade ago as) I want. It never does the magic.


We've got a big green hammer. The nail that scratched us was nowhere to find, so we hammered another nail. That one was sunk in the wood long ago, but we keep hammering and hammering - it's so useless and stupid. :mad:

davidbfpo
01-04-2011, 08:43 PM
I was slightly anxious when I started this thread, partly as for reasons lost to me SWC has of late refrained from a debate on AFPAK and so far - apart from a couple of posts all is well - we have stayed on the main subject.

The main subject? Given the issues faced, what are the policies and strategy on achieving our poorly stated aims in Afghanistan, given that our non-state opponents have a sanctuary over the Durand Line in parts of Pakistan (whatever their quasi-independent status)?

In my "armchair" I shall quickly leave the region and return home. In Western Europe in particular public support for the Afghan campaign is minimal, reflected in the slow draining away of national military contingents. The impact of the body count in Western Europe is IMHO the largest factor, in the USA it is two-fold - the body count (heaviest to date for the USA) and the financial cost.

Crossing the Durand Line is not an option. Entropy's posts have made that clear, politics, strategy and logistics combined. The military - the American in reality - will have to adjust their strategy and as Jon Custis has illustrated with his post on the deep raid, within Afghanistan, there maybe options to hurt our opponents.

Others far more expert, as in the original post, speculate that any ground incursion across the Durand Line, will lead to a violent reaction within the Pakistani military (leaving aside the local response). IMHO I would expect that such actions in Western Europe would be widely seen as illegitimate and few governments could remain actively committed in Afghanistan.

I shall now dig into my "armchair" and watch how SWC responds.

davidbfpo
01-04-2011, 09:17 PM
Mike Few has touched upon this subject, in a SWJ link on 'Solitude and Leadership':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/01/solitude-and-leadership/

Thanks to a RCP mailing, from a similar article 'How Little the U.S. Knows of War' in the WaPo by Richard Cohen, I only cite the last paragraph:
The Great Afghanistan Reassessment has come and gone and, outside of certain circles, no one much paid attention. In this respect, the United States has become like Rome or the British Empire, able to fight nonessential wars with a professional military in places like Iraq. Ultimately, this will drain us financially and, in a sense, spiritually as well. "War is too important to be left to the generals," the wise saying goes. Too horrible, too.

Link:http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/01/04/how_little_the_us_knows_of_war_108425.html

Dayuhan
01-04-2011, 10:59 PM
This civil emergency approach is a helpful reminder to responders that civilian leadership still holds the reins, that the host nation is the lead, and that high violence is merely a mix of tactical choice and a phase to be worked through in route to less violent efforts aimed at reducing the friction in the troubled society. Calling such situations "Wars" and passing the problem to military leadership to resolve is a recipe for disaster.

This is certainly true in a "conventional COIN" situation, where we intervene to assist an existing government threatened by insurgents. It is not necessarily true in a regime change situation, especially in the early stages, where there is no civilian leadership. We may put some civilians on the chair and call them "leadership", but until and unless they actually lead, that's a hollow label, and we remain in the lead, holding the reins. We may try to deceive ourselves into believing that the latter phases of regime change are just COIN as we knew it before, but it's a bit of a charade and nobody else is going to be fooled.


The question for Afghanistan is, do we want control, do want to wage guerrilla war to establish and sustain our control; or do we want to evolve from such colonial approaches and recognize that the best Afghanistan for the west is an Afghanistan governed of, by and for the people of Afghanistan. I argue that it is the latter, and in that case, it is not war.

I certainly agree that it is the latter, but before we get "an Afghanistan governed of, by and for the people of Afghanistan" there's likely to be a whole lot of Afghans killed by other Afghans: the people of Afghanistan don't necessarily agree on how and by whom they want to be governed and there's no reason to expect such agreement to come easily or peacefully. If we want to go this route we also have to accept that Afghanistan or a substantial portion thereof may be controlled by people who will willingly shelter our enemies. If we want to go that route we have to wonder why we went there in the first place, since before we went there was already government of and by Afghans. Maybe not for all the Afghans, but that goes with the territory.

If we take a "pure" approach to these things, then yes, we should look purely for an outcome that suits the people of the place. If we're involved, though, that means we have some sort of interest in the outcome: if we didn't we wouldn't be there in the first place, and if we're going to end up setting that interest aside we shouldn't have gone there in the first place.

slapout9
01-04-2011, 11:08 PM
2. The safe-haven in Pakistan, like a cancer that never quite gets killed off, makes the establishment of #1 extremely difficult. If you can't kill or coopt the cancer, it will continue to spread to Afghanistan at every opportunity.



You could put up an Alligator fence as in mine the border between A'stan and Pak'stan.

Entropy
01-05-2011, 12:52 AM
Bob,


Well, to take this cancer line a bit further, allow me to offer a slightly different take.


Ok, where does that get us in terms of the sanctuary in Pakistan and our AfPak strategy?

David,


I was slightly anxious when I started this thread, partly as for reasons lost to me SWC has of late refrained from a debate on AFPAK and so far - apart from a couple of posts all is well - we have stayed on the main subject.


I pretty much agree with your comment. Well said.

Slap,


You could put up an Alligator fence as in mine the border between A'stan and Pak'stan.

The Soviets tried that. Not only did they heavily mine the border, but they also made it a kill zone - anyone in the border area could be killed on sight. Even if our ROE allowed the use of such methods, they probably wouldn't work and would end up killing a lot more civilians than fighters.

Bob's World
01-05-2011, 01:49 PM
I'll fall back to my original post, that the first step in coming up with a plan for effectively dealing with any "sanctuary" is to understand that sanctuary is much more than some "ungoverned space" and to understand and deal with the specific aspects that contribute to providing the sanctuary one is concerned with.

The Taliban sanctuary issue is VERY different than the AQ sanctuary issue, though both share the same space.

If we focus on the AQ sanctuary issue, which should be our focus, my take is that it is primarily a sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and one that the Taliban can evict them from at will. Given that, the key for the US is to engage with the Taliban and see if there is a way to cut that deal. Sides deals will need to be cut with Afghanistan and Pakistan to get them to go along, but neither of those governments can deny AQ sanctuary without also working through the Taliban.

Bob

William F. Owen
01-05-2011, 02:03 PM
The Soviets tried that. Not only did they heavily mine the border, but they also made it a kill zone - anyone in the border area could be killed on sight. Even if our ROE allowed the use of such methods, they probably wouldn't work and would end up killing a lot more civilians than fighters.

Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Bob's World
01-05-2011, 02:15 PM
Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Yes, all true, but to what effect? Most Taliban live 24-7 in Afghanistan. What comes across the border often simply drives in through official border crossings and travels along the highway until it gets to its destination. No barrier system has any effect on what is probably 90 % of the Taliban problem; and No effect on any of the AQ problem.

Not to mention to adverse affect that driving such a wedge straight through the heart of the Pashtun populace and territory would have. They can ignore the irritation of the Durrand line when it is merely a line on a map. Turning it into a physical disruption of their daily lives is not a good idea if one is seeking to reduce the Pashtun-based insurgency in Afghanistan.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 02:30 PM
The Taliban sanctuary issue is VERY different than the AQ sanctuary issue, though both share the same space.


Bob

There's the Alligator again. Kill the AQ alligator and the Taliban are not going to be such a problem, then it might be possible to cut a deal but until then it want. Why should they cut a deal if the situation hasn't changed?

Bob's World
01-05-2011, 02:47 PM
First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Second, we really won't know what it takes to get the Taliban to enter a truce with Karzai to come to some compromise and hand us (or at least evict) AQ until we ask them.

Next time we fire a drone missle into some guys bedroom window, we should tie a note to it...or better yet just talking to them.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 03:00 PM
First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.



Didn't the Taliban exist prior to Karzai?

Fuchs
01-05-2011, 03:07 PM
@Slapout:
He referred to the TB insurgency, not to the TB in general.


First, the Taliban insurgency is not caused by AQ, it is caused by the current Karzai government that we are protecting.

Add the Western troops as well, for except a few hundred of them they are not Muslim and thus an ideal target for propaganda which in turn helps them a lot to generate recruits, motivate leaders and motivate supporters.

I still think that the TB were pretty much in a hopeless situation back in 2002, they had no real chance to have a comeback in AFG unless we Westerners propped them up with our presence.


Moreover, a smart strategist would have garnered a real political, probably a real paramilitary opposition in AFG that could absorb the inevitable opposition and dry out the pool for the TB at least in AFG.

Such things aren't in our repertoire, though.



An anecdote, to show the benefit of superficially paradox and certainly selfless actions in another example (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/04/karzai-acting-strange-finally.html):


I bought a gift booklet for a friend years ago - it was about Japanese wisdoms. The quick test-reading was satisfactory, and I recall one story very well. It was impressive.
A successful, famous Japanese leader worried that his highly successful reign might cause a very tough beginning for the future reign of his son. He began to act foolish up to a point where nobody saw the great leader in him any more and everybody got impatient about the succession. He finally died and his son proved to be a highly successful prince as well.

The lesson is of course that sometimes you need to shed some prestige to achieve what you want. This readiness to sacrifice something is crucial (and it doesn't always need to be whole armies in war). The West may do exactly this; step back, allow Karzai to gain in the process.


The ability and readiness to sacrifice a bit - a pawn for a queen, some ground in Schlagen aus der Nachhand - is incredibly important at times.
It's also a mark of a true strategist.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 03:22 PM
@Slapout:
He referred to the TB insurgency, not to the TB in general.



Whats the difference?

Entropy
01-05-2011, 03:37 PM
Just because the Soviets lack skill and brains does not mean we do. You can build obstacles for less cost and time that it takes to build the same length of Highway.
It would be perfectly possible to build a credible obstacle barrier on the AF-PAK border.

Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

Bob,


If we focus on the AQ sanctuary issue, which should be our focus, my take is that it is primarily a sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and one that the Taliban can evict them from at will.

I generally agree with your "sanctuary within a sanctuary" construct, but it's actually multiple sanctuaries within a sanctuary. AFAIK, the Taliban (talking Quetta Shura here) don't have direct control over AQ and so I am skeptical that Taliban have the ability to give them up even if they were inclined to. There are a lot of groups that could take them in (HiG, Haqqani, LeT, etc.). I'm perfectly willing to play a game of "let's make a deal" with the Taliban but I think I'm quite a bit more skeptical than you are that going after the second-tier sanctuary (TB) would do much.

If you think TB engagement will solve the sanctuary problem, then it would be useful if you could explain how that would actually work.

Bob's World
01-05-2011, 03:39 PM
The Taliban were the government of Afghanistan until such time as we assisted the Northern Alliance in driving them into exile in Pakistan. There was little in the way of insurgency for the next several years.

Following Karzai's sham election and the production of the current disaster of a constitution we clearly announced to the world that the government would not draw it's legitimacy from the governed, and that only those who met Karzai's approval would be allowed to participate all of that changed. Taliban-led insurgency grew steadily following those political actions. We then responded by building foreign presence to protect that government from insurgency, at which point the resistance aspect of the insurgency surged as well.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 03:59 PM
As David would say from my armchair. September 10th the Taliban were just fine. On September the 12th they were the enemy. The differentiating fact was AQ. We have an Alligator problem and the big Alligator is Bill Laden and his family of Alligators is in Saudi Arabia.

COIN is Poli-Tricks, it is occupation by indirect means and they (Taliban) don't like it. Kill the Alligators and the fish will like you:wry:at least they want bite you. I think the Taliban are scared of AQ, that is why they put up with them. Remove that threat and stop occupying their home and things might just work out.

Steve the Planner
01-05-2011, 04:07 PM
Borders, boundaries, obstacles.

Entropy's response begs deeper questions and answers not within our capability.


Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

The Maginot Line was built out of expedience, and a hopeless effort to substitute technology for manpower, and practical solutions.

Stable borders are part physical and part accepted and meaningful: Dividing one recognized place from another, or one people from another.

Having spent much of my young army life staring at East German watchtowers, I find it hard to believe that, in the Durand application, we could still be having a debate about building an Iron Curtain to force a division that is neither accepted nor definable by reasonable practice.

IMO, perhaps the best way to end the division would be to create it. First, we divide these two places by walls, dogs, mines, machine gun emplacements---essentially a huge public works project comparable to the Great Wall and visible from satellite.

During construction, we employ tens of thousands of contractors, builders, suppliers on both sides of the line, of necessity carving out new roads across the entire area for supplies, and worker encampments.

Do the math on the sheer amount of labor and logistics needed to man and control the checkpoints. That, of itself, creates links never imagined, and defies credibility that either the enfeebled Afghans or unconcerned Pakistanis would ever support, staff or pay for.

Assuming it is ever completed, we funnel all trade through a few key checkpoint Charlies while cutting off centuries old informal connections on both sides, forcing ancient towns, peoples and relations to either "find a new life" or find a new way through the obstacle.

Finally, when all is said and done, some other political consequence, perhaps, in part, driven by the wall itself, causes a political realignment in this haphazard and unnatural border. The result: Like Hitler retaking Rhineland, driving through the forest to Bastogne, or bypassing the Maginot, it becomes a very large paperweight.

Whose wall is this, after all?

Whose actual short-term objectives are going to be addressed by it?

We really should try to go a little beyond just making this stuff up. No?

slapout9
01-05-2011, 05:38 PM
IMO, perhaps the best way to end the division would be to create it. First, we divide these two places by walls, dogs, mines, machine gun emplacements---essentially a huge public works project comparable to the Great Wall and visible from satellite.

During construction, we employ tens of thousands of contractors, builders, suppliers on both sides of the line, of necessity carving out new roads across the entire area for supplies, and worker encampments.

Do the math on the sheer amount of labor and logistics needed to man and control the checkpoints. That, of itself, creates links never imagined, and defies credibility that either the enfeebled Afghans or unconcerned Pakistanis would ever support, staff or pay for.




Thats why I suggested Aerial Mining, it could be done. Combined with some 1st World War style Air Policing....it's possible.Something to think about anyway.

Steve the Planner
01-05-2011, 05:55 PM
Slap:

My big concern about aerial mining is that, afterwards, the international community will force us to de-mine. At that point, if not already, the US Empire would truly collapse from the cost.

But, I really believe that creating it, whether as a physical or dense mine environment, will absolutely bring things to a head (of unknown dimensions), and be a big step to a Final Answer.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 06:02 PM
Slap:

My big concern about aerial mining is that, afterwards, the international community will force us to de-mine. At that point, if not already, the US Empire would truly collapse from the cost.

But, I really believe that creating it, whether as a physical or dense mine environment, will absolutely bring things to a head (of unknown dimensions), and be a big step to a Final Answer.

There is always what was called "interference" bombing (gets rid of the mine problem) they essentially dropped what amounted to hand grenades but not to kill but to keep them confined to certain areas. Keep the Alligators inside their swamp, but if they come out they get skinned.

Entropy
01-05-2011, 06:23 PM
Bob,

I agree that the structure of the Afghan government is a disaster that has caused a lot of governance problems. At the same time, that's the structure the Afghans who participated in the 2004 Loya Jirga picked. And while the structural governance problems are a huge factor - maybe even the biggest - they aren't the "cause" of the insurgency all by themselves. After all, Hekmyatar, Haqqani and the Quetta Shura leadership decided to fight long before the current government existed.

Regardless, we can debate coulda-shoulda-woulda's all day, but that doesn't get us anywhere going forward. It's my contention that at this point the sanctuary problem is a bridge to far and we can no longer base our strategy on closing down the sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Slap,

The problem with mining is that mines can't tell the difference between combatants and noncombatants. There is a lot of legitimate cross-border traffic and mining would end up killing a lot of those people. Plus, extensive mining is going to give insurgents access to free high explosives. Overall, I think costs greatly outweigh the benefits.

PS: The border with Pakistan is 1500 miles. We don't have enough air assets where "interference bombing" would be effective.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 06:43 PM
PS: The border with Pakistan is 1500 miles. We don't have enough air assets where "interference bombing" would be effective.

Well get some more:)

Backwards Observer
01-05-2011, 08:06 PM
There is a lot of legitimate cross-border traffic and mining would end up killing a lot of those people. Plus, extensive mining is going to give insurgents access to free high explosives.

Slap, just out of curiosity, wouldn't someone who professes to hold the moral level of war as the most important be more concerned with the above part of Entropy's statement than the one you quoted?

When you write "moral", I'm assuming that to mean "not whacking civilians". Are you using it in another context; such as in "whacking civilians until they submit to our superior morality"?

Bob's World
01-05-2011, 09:15 PM
Entropy,

It's more than "shoulda-woulda, whatever"; as I am sure you will agree that it has been a couple generations since this country has had a governance with broad acceptance. It stands to reason that resistance groups are well formed, hell the current government was a resistance group.

A couple books that give good insights into how a populace reacts to such drastic changes of governance as come from revolution, and key factors setting limits on power, protecting rights, how people are selected to lead, who is eligible, term limits, etc are:

"The Summer of 1787" by David O. Stewart; and

"Unruly Americans" by Woody Holton

Now, yes, Afghanistan is not America, and any constitution must be tailored to the populace and culture, but there are some fundamental dynamics at work.

Dynamic one: The new government tends to prepare an initial constitution designed to PREVENT what was deemed as bad in the last government. At least it did in both the US and Afghansitan.

For the colonies, this was any form of centralized authority; so all sovereignty was vested in the separate states. It was more a treaty between sovereign nations than a constitution of a united nation.

For Afghanistan it was the opposite, it was power in decentralized warlords.

Both initial documents were short-sighted over-reactions. For the Colonies, while it sufficed (barely) to muddle through the war, the wheels quickly fell off once that rallying issue was resolved. Inflation through the roof, no credit, no effective taxation, no ability to implement laws that served the majority as they required a consensus, etc. Daniel Shay in 1786 was but the tip of the iceberg with his rebellion. A few years later New England was seriously considering succession, and of course the Southern States ultimately did. Even with a new constitution that was brilliantly crafted bringing such diverse parties together is difficult. But under the Articles it would have never happened.

This is where Afghanistan sits today. It sits as America sat in January of 1787. Internal rebellion, ineffective governance, diverse interest groups all pulling in different directions, perhaps a majority of the populace wanting to go back under British/Taliban rule, and surrounded by foreign nations who were all working their own agenda for their own national interests.

The Afghan George Washington was sadly assassinated just prior to 9/11, but it takes more than one man to build a nation. Seeking a truce to bring in members of rebel groups to work with the current government to build upon the foundation of their current constitution is just smart governance. It is smart COIN. The US helps best by taking a neutral role. Karzai is losing ground with his Northern Alliance team as it stands, for him to reach out to the Taliban would likely be the straw that breaks that camel's back. The Northern Alliance wants peace, but not at the expense of risking becoming subjugated once more to Pashtun rule or Taliban extremes of governance.

Someone has to be the bigger man. Currently the bigger man is working diligently to suppress the insurgency so that he can go home. My argument is that we need to stop taking sides, become more neutral, and work to resolve the insurgency. We can do this, but we have to relinquish control to do so.

slapout9
01-05-2011, 09:21 PM
Slap, just out of curiosity, wouldn't someone who professes to hold the moral level of war as the most important be more concerned with the above part of Entropy's statement than the one you quoted?

When you write "moral", I'm assuming that to mean "not whacking civilians". Are you using it in another context; such as in "whacking civilians until they submit to our superior morality"?

No, you got it right. My suggestions were just to see IF it was even physically feasible to do it. IMO we have already gone past any moral sense as to what we should do. Nobody seems to agree with me as to what we should actually be doing.

carl
01-06-2011, 12:50 AM
I wanted Bill's high level opinion if he was in charge of everything, that is all.

Slap:

I hope you don't mind carl's low level opinion if he were in charge of everything.

The first thing would be to require the government of the United States to fully recognize and publicly acknowledge that we cannot resolve this thing unless the Pak Army/ISI butts out. Then we would wholly commit ourselves to making them butt out, short of going into Pakistan militarily. I am inclined to think Omarali50's bluff calling would work, but we have never had the nerve to do even that.

If we could not do both of those things, I would leave Afghanistan ASAP, making provisions for 500,000 to 1,000,000 special entry and permanent US residency visas for all the Afghans who were foolish enough to work closely with us and their families. As for the rest of them, make a special radio broadcast saying "Tough luck for you. Fooled 'em again."

Then after bugging out, I would reduce the size of the Army by 60% (but doubling the size of the Green Berets, only them not the rest of specops) and spend all of the money saved on the Navy and the Air Force.

Finally, after that, I would require that for the next 60 years every single piece of official US gov correspondence having anything at all to do with foreign relations begin with this statement "Do not trust the government of the United States (English speaking nations, heed this also)."

That is what I would do.

Steve the Planner
01-06-2011, 01:04 AM
Carl/slap:

I remember a House hearing on Iraq in early 2008. McCaskell(?) was asking very pointed questions about the $300 cost per head for the SOIs, and the effectiveness of paying folks not to make war on us.

I think a lot of observers (myself included) thought, initially, that she was criticizing the program. By the end, though, I'm sure she was just trying to understand whether it wouldn't be cheaper to pay-off the bad guys, and end the engagement. (More as a theoretical construct).

How much would it cost, instead, to just bribe all the bad guys not to get on a plane to NYC, or let anybody else do it?

Like Barbary Pirates, just pay them a few billion a year, instead of having to build the Great Wall of Afghanistan (pay it out of the avoided debt service on the $200 billion or so it would cost?).

carl
01-06-2011, 01:35 AM
How much would it cost, instead, to just bribe all the bad guys not to get on a plane to NYC, or let anybody else do it?

The author of Insurgent Archipelago argues that these guys are sort of like Hofer's true believer, they are trying to plug a hole in their souls. I don't think money would plug the hole.

Steve the Planner
01-06-2011, 03:44 AM
The burning pit in the Talib soul is the fact that we are there.

If that were solved, the burning pit in their coin purse (after our payola stops) is just as easily solved by legal currency, as by poorly laundered drug profits.

A true leader of his people will take the cash, and take steps to make sure it isn't threatened by someone under his control/influence.

Bill Moore
01-06-2011, 04:26 AM
Posted by davidbfpo,


Crossing the Durand Line is not an option. Entropy's posts have made that clear, politics, strategy and logistics combined. The military - the American in reality - will have to adjust their strategy and as Jon Custis has illustrated with his post on the deep raid, within Afghanistan, there maybe options to hurt our opponents.

Others far more expert, as in the original post, speculate that any ground incursion across the Durand Line, will lead to a violent reaction within the Pakistani military (leaving aside the local response). IMHO I would expect that such actions in Western Europe would be widely seen as illegitimate and few governments could remain actively committed in Afghanistan.

I agree that Entrophy has made some strong arguments, but I disagree that crossing the Durand Line is not an option, it is always an option and it is a legitimate option if we're being attacked by elements seeking safehaven there and Pakistan refuses to do anything about it. If Pakistan supports it as widely reported in the open press, then in my view that would be an act of war or something very close to it (promoting violence to achieve political aims).

The worst case assumptions about repercussions if we launched punitive raids into Pakistan are just that assumptions. They have to be evaluated against the assumptions of what will happen if we don't take action (and Pakistan continues not to address the issue) to see what the risk versus gain really is in the short and long term.

I much rather see Pakistan address these issues, but is that realistic? First off do they have the means to do so? Most reports indicate that the Pakistan military is fully extended conducting aggressive COIN and CT operations, so they're not sitting back and simply watching this, they're fighting hard. The question is we can really expect them to conduct operations in the badlands anytime in the near future (next two years)? Also is it is in Pakistan's interest to do so? Unlike the U.S. they're probably thinking of long term strategic goals, and they still want influence in Afghanistan to use as advantage over India.

I think the issue here is this whole mess is extremely complex. This isn't simply one war (us against the Taliban, or us against terrorism) where good guys are fighting bad guys, there are multiple conflicts, and mulitple nations and non-state groups have multiple interests and this all converges in interesting and challenging ways.

Do I think an incursion into Pakistan would be helpful? It depends on what we're really trying to accomplish. If we don't know, then I agree we shouldn't make the problem worse with a half ass effort with no real end in mind. On the other hand if it contributes to our strategic objectives then perhaps it is the right choice. I think it is clear that none of us can really provide a helpful answer only opinions based on our varied experiences, but the option is clearly not off the table.

slapout9
01-06-2011, 04:35 AM
carl,Steve,everybody else, the more that respond the better. I wanted Bill Moore's opinion so I asked him directly. That doesn't mean that anyone should hold anything back that they would like to contribute.

Some of my personal thoughts.

1-Omarali50 is a pretty smart guy and I have said before we are being played for suckers. If they want fight the Taliban why should we....whats in it for us?
2-Our problems at home are becoming far more serious than those over there,we may be only millimeters away from financial collapse and or major civil unrest.
3-carl's idea of saying AQ is gone from A'stan and they don't want to fight the Taliban and they don't want us there, so lets come on home amy be what finally happens. I am biased, I have kin folks over there being shot at and I am not real sure what it is all for.


Time for some music
Freda Payne "Bring the Boys Home"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OU0qdbcHmpw

Bill Moore
01-06-2011, 05:41 AM
carl,Steve,everybody else, the more that respond the better. I wanted Bill Moore's opinion so I asked him directly. That doesn't mean that anyone should hold anything back that they would like to contribute.

No other opinions are authorized, they'll only create additional confusion and indecision. Just do what I recommended, then call me and let me know how it worked out. :D

William F. Owen
01-06-2011, 05:53 AM
Ok, given enough resources anything is possible. I submit that the requirements to effectively close the border are beyond our current capabilities much less Afghans. The Afghans can't even fund their own security forces, much less a huge, complex border security system.

You don't need to "close the boarder.

a.) In a lot of places, terrain is impassable.
b.) In a lot of places, all that is need is an 3-stand 8-coil barbed wire fence, and/or a 3-m dike.

What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so.

carl
01-06-2011, 06:01 AM
The burning pit in the Talib soul is the fact that we are there.

I wasn't referring to the Taliban. I was talking about the guys who are inclined to get on the plane to NYC. All of them have been pretty well off. They were doing it for something other than money. That is why I compared them to the true believer.

Taliban & company don't like us, that is true. But the thing that really sets them off is they aren't in charge like they used to be.

Bob's World
01-06-2011, 11:58 AM
I wasn't referring to the Taliban. I was talking about the guys who are inclined to get on the plane to NYC. All of them have been pretty well off. They were doing it for something other than money. That is why I compared them to the true believer.

Taliban & company don't like us, that is true. But the thing that really sets them off is they aren't in charge like they used to be.

1. Carl is right in that "The Taliban" didn't get on planes; 3/4 of those guys were Saudis. Just as most foreign fighters who went to fight under the AQ flag in Iraq after our invasion there were Saudis. On 9/11 we were some 60 years down the road of meddling significantly with politics and survival of the Saudi Royals. There populace produces a long line of guys who are wiling to leave home and do harm to that perceived contributor to their grievances at home. The Saudi government has long supported letting such men go, or arresting without warrant or habeas corpus those who attempt to stay and act even slightly subversive on the home front.

2. Since 9/11 we have been playing catch-up in the AFPAK region with our meddling. The Taliban probably were largely neutral, with equal parts positive and negative toward the US on 9/11. After all, we'd helped them during the Soviet invasion and generally left them alone. Our biggest fault being that we were godless sinners who meddled too much in the lives of Arab and Persian Muslims, but they, of course, are neither Arab nor Persian. Today is another story. Who would be surprised today if a major terrorist attack took place to hear that many of the perpetrators were Taliban? What has changed, and who changed it?

3. As to what really sets them off, I suspect it is much more HOW they were removed from power, and then the subsequent government that was formed and protected by us that is designed to prevent them from ever regaining power in legal fashion. We can surely all appreciate how we'd feel in our own respective countries if some foreign power came in, and through sheer overwhelming military power enabled the minority opposition party to sweep into power; and then stayed and protected that party as they established a government around a man selected by that foreign power and helped him to create a constitution that vested virtually all power in that man and blocked any legal recourse for blackballed leaders to rise up on the back of popular support. Who helped that minority party recruit and train a "national" police and military that was recruited 95% from their ranks, and then sent out into the region of the party that was thrown out to suppress those who dared to act out illegally to complain about the same.

(This, by the way, all contributes to the "perceptions of illegitimacy" and the denial of the "hope" of legal recourse to effect change that I see as the two primary causal factors of insurgency locally. For the US it is this type of manipulative controlling foreign policy design and enactment that I see as the primary causal driver of act of international terrorism against us as well.)

The Taliban were not and are not the enemy. They were just between us and what we needed to do to get at AQ. They hesitated in helping us, and we weren't in a mood to wait and talk about it at the time. It's never too late to refocus and get back on track. It's not too late for the Taliban, and it's not too late for the U.S. If we wait for Karzai, or the Northern Alliance, or Pakistan to call a truce and work this out, it will never happen. It is simply not in the best interests of any of those parties to do so. The Status quo works great for them so long as we are willing to keep paying and playing. If we are too burned by our actions to step into a neutral role, then someone else, but I shake my head in wonder at mentions of the Saudis playing that role. England or Russia? No way with their histories there. China? Open the door to expanding the Great Game? That is an option that may sound workable initially, but will have hard consequences in the long run. It falls to the U.S. Despite our recent faux pas, we still have the power and credibility to step into a neutral role, call for a cease fire and provide a security bubble for a new Constitutional Loya Jirga to take place within.

What does it hurt to try? Or, we can just launch into another fighting season, with record budgets and record casualties, and record assassinations of governmental officials. We'll probably put up new records as to night raid and drone strike kills, acres "Cleared", and development projects executed as well, but to what effect?

To try the first is to turely support Afghan COIN in a civil emergency. To continue with the latter is to wage Colonial anti-guerrilla warfare to sustain our man, coupled with efforts to suppress the symptoms of the insurgency. That is not "COIN." We are at a cross roads, and we still have options.

Steve the Planner
01-06-2011, 01:33 PM
Bill:


think the issue here is this whole mess is extremely complex. This isn't simply one war (us against the Taliban, or us against terrorism) where good guys are fighting bad guys, there are multiple conflicts, and mulitple nations and non-state groups have multiple interests and this all converges in interesting and challenging ways.

Not to mention inter-tribal conflicts and past resettlement issues---the Pashtuns resettled from the South to solidify control in the North. In the west, we rely on "voting by feet" as the means of distributing people to places; forced resettlements---as was a routine practice in these conflict areas as a process of political subjugation---is something we haven't quite got our heads around.

Slap:

State and local fiscal years start on June 30, with budgets up for adoption in the month prior. Absent Stimulus offsets, the real financial/service bloodbaths will begin. Several knowledgeable financial advisors have pointed to state/municipal bond defaults as the next big wave, equal to Goldman Sachs, etc... (Many of these are also underwriters on the bonds).

Bob:

I suspect the transition will be rapid from "The Taliban are not our enemy," to something like, "The Taliban are our trusted allies...." if further domestic financial scandals push the need for an immediate face-saving exit.

Fuchs
01-06-2011, 02:30 PM
You don't need to "close the boarder.

a.) In a lot of places, terrain is impassable.
b.) In a lot of places, all that is need is an 3-stand 8-coil barbed wire fence, and/or a 3-m dike.

What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so.

http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html (http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html)

William F. Owen
01-06-2011, 02:43 PM
http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html (http://www.boingboing.net/2011/01/03/two-girls-race-to-to.html)

So? I can't see how this is relevant to the discussion?

Fuchs
01-06-2011, 04:15 PM
I found "What people forget is that border obstacles work and have been proven to do so." too optimistic and have set a somewhat subtle and short counterpoint.

I could have written a lot about how border obstacles are really useless without proper control (just the same as with battlefield obstacles - they're ineffective unless defended).
There were many examples of border obstacles that were politically counter-productive or simply failures and you simply suggested a much more optimistic view.


Just one example: To seal off the border against all illegitimate travel even only at bottlenecks would
- led to great corruption among border agents and customs, so that illegitimate crossings are being ignored
- lead to attempts of smart smugglers to defeat the border security concept
- turn the border regions which profit a lot of the smuggling into additional violent enemies
- draw away resources (such as some of the few non-corrupt, competent and loyal commanders) away from other tasks.


It's furthermore not simple (enough) to control a border, even if the terrain is difficult to negotiate.The mere surveillance of hundreds of kilometres of mountain border requires thousands of non-corrupt, loyal and at least somewhat competent (such as proficient with observation and communication tools) men.

- - - - - - - - - -

IIRC there was an attempt to get a grip on the TB and weapons smuggling two or three years ago. IIRC that attempt was given up when a certain smuggler tribe picked up its AKs and began to take IED DIY classes.

Bob's World
01-06-2011, 06:01 PM
If on were to build a fence, where exactly should it go?

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Maps/afghan.map.htm

The bottom map, dated 1849 probably lays out the most sustainable borders; but as they say, "you can't un-F*%# that goat."

Best any thoughts of fence building or border sealing be set aside. The senseless money pit is deep enough already.

Bill Moore
01-06-2011, 06:59 PM
It is not impossible to significantly enhance border security, and while fences and other physical security measures can play an important role, it is still part of a much larger whole that involves the all nations touching that border. Some the military see border defense as a series of physical barriers covered by observation and fires. That is a defensive position, not border security. There are several significant shortfalls in that region of the world that will take to fix, but I would argue investment in building capacity In systems not tied to the military may actually result in more return
Consider all factors to create a system that provides security in depth across different domains. Some examples would include (focusing on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border):
Each nation develops laws that make smuggling illegal (a lot of it isn’t right now, so when we ask these governments to stop it, what are they supposed to do? Act outside the law?).
The concerned nations must develop a robust enough legal structure to prosecute serious violators (those smuggling lethal aid, illegal narcotics, etc.), instead of the catch and release stuff we’re doing now, which simply tells the world this is a low risk venture.
There is a requirement to develop a national ID card and associated database (and if the individual has been detained before, any relevant biometrics data).
Information sharing mechanisms (in place now, but again a lot of this simply isn’t in violation of the country’s laws, or is in violation of the law in one country and not the other).
Robust public affairs to inform the relevant public of the new laws and the consequences if caught, because laws don’t serve as deterrents if the targeting audience isn’t aware of them.
Despite the comments to the contrary, physical barriers and other technology do play a critical role in border security if they’re well designed, but they must be part of a larger effort. There are case studies available showing where this has worked, but keep in mind no solution is perfect. Remember the adage, don’t let perfect become the enemy of good enough.
Border security is definitely one of the means to reduce threats coming out of sanctuaries. Of course border security isn’t just at the border, it also include airports and where relevant seaports of entry. I think U.S. border security is far from perfect, but a hell of lot better than it was since 9/11 against relevant threats. Illegals from Mexico are not relevant threats, they’re a political issue tied to economic issues, not terrorism.

Bob's World
01-06-2011, 07:13 PM
One problem we westerners have, is that many of the people we see as least civilized, or most "failed" in their ability to form functional states (as measured by such metrics as border security); are those who have been "globalized" for hundreds or thousands of years, and it is just the West that is catching up. The Tri-border area of the Sulu Sea; the Maghreb across Africa; the trade routes across Central Asia. All areas where today AQ finds the type of disorganized formal governance and supportive populaces for their message and operations.

We go in, and say "you all need to become more like the West in how you deal with borders, otherwise you are a failed state."

Meanwhile it is our own systems of commerce and interactions in the West that are evolving to become more like these areas that never bought into the concepts of crisp, sharp divisions to begin with. It could just as easily be the other way around, that these people say to the West "no, actually it is you that needs to evolve to become more like us."

Given the realities of our own border security efforts we are already more like them than we care to admit, and the hypocrisy is not lost on many. We really need to evolve in our definitions of what "success" looks like, as our current metrics don't fare well under the harsh light of day.

Just an observation and a dynamic that I find interesting.

slapout9
01-06-2011, 07:23 PM
No other opinions are authorized, they'll only create additional confusion and indecision. Just do what I recommended, then call me and let me know how it worked out. :D

Your points about Pakistan are important. They are not really in control of their?/:wry: country so it is not really Pakistan.... it is........Gatorland. And as long as the Gators come across the border and attack our troops we should go after them. This goes to a much deeper point that I have been talking about and that is you cannot fight these networks like they are countries. Wherever there is a swamp they will go hide in it, and if you drain the swamp they will just go to another swamp. But you can kill em and skin em!

What kind of a Strategy would allow thugs to attack our troops and then run across some imaginary line in the sand and just thumb their noses at us and say you can't catch me over here:mad: We need to go Gator hunting or go home. Harqqani is the big Gator and we need skin him and wipe out his nest!

Operaion Gatorland needs to start now.

slapout9
01-06-2011, 07:27 PM
One problem we westerners have, is that many of the people we see as least civilized, or most "failed" in their ability to form functional states (as measured by such metrics as border security); are those who have been "globalized" for hundreds or thousands of years, and it is just the West that is catching up. The Tri-border area of the Sulu Sea; the Maghreb across Africa; the trade routes across Central Asia. All areas where today AQ finds the type of disorganized formal governance and supportive populaces for their message and operations.



Yea, they are swamps. So either kill the Gators when they overpopulate or stay out of the swamps to start with. Or fence them in!

Bill Moore
01-07-2011, 03:22 AM
Posted by Bob's World,


Given the realities of our own border security efforts we are already more like them than we care to admit, and the hypocrisy is not lost on many. We really need to evolve in our definitions of what "success" looks like, as our current metrics don't fare well under the harsh light of day.

Just an observation and a dynamic that I find interesting.

Our borders are as secure as they need to be in general. Afghanistan's isn't. Striving for perfection is a goal that I hope we never achieve in our country because we'll be in a permanent police state if we do, but we need the ability to surge security during an emergency and we have that. That is legitimacy, something you're generally pushing except when you make counter points about your own arguments:confused:. It really doesn't matter to our national security if a few thousand illegals come into the U.S. to work.

On the other hand we need the intelligence and means to stop the cartels from coming across. Read my comments carefully, I didn't say to focus on every person crossing the border illegally. Some things simply aren't important, you want to narrow your efforts on what is perceived as a threat to your State (our mission is still focused on Afghanistan the State, not Afghanistan the place with no borders, no government, no economy, etc.). Borders were not invented in the West, but unfortunately the West is responsible for drawing some very illogical borders. That is two separate things.

It took time, but when the drug trade was identified as a threat (depending on your point of view) to national security we significantly enhanced our ability to slow that trade down over time (it won't happen tomorrow), without stopping Mexican families from coming across to .

Target your border security on specific threats.

I think we have done a good job of keeping most undesirables out with our watch list also. Again no system is perfect, but to simply throw your hands up and pretend this that Afghanistan is practicing an advanced stage of globalism is defeatism. I'm getting concerned because you're starting to sound like a typical mainland European. They're always come up with some pseudointellectual rubbish as an excuse on why something can't be done. 99% of their execuses don't stand up to cross examination.

You're a lawyer man, tighten up on your arguments! :D

carl
01-07-2011, 05:15 AM
3. As to what really sets them off, I suspect it is much more HOW they were removed from power, and then the subsequent government that was formed and protected by us that is designed to prevent them from ever regaining power in legal fashion. We can surely all appreciate how we'd feel in our own respective countries if some foreign power came in, and through sheer overwhelming military power enabled the minority opposition party to sweep into power; and then stayed and protected that party as they established a government around a man selected by that foreign power and helped him to create a constitution that vested virtually all power in that man and blocked any legal recourse for blackballed leaders to rise up on the back of popular support. Who helped that minority party recruit and train a "national" police and military that was recruited 95% from their ranks, and then sent out into the region of the party that was thrown out to suppress those who dared to act out illegally to complain about the same.

I don't know if the Taliban are quite the wide-eyed innocents you make them seem (exaggeration for effect alert;)). They lost their power in the same way they gained it and the same way they are trying to regain it, through violence. They were hosting AQ before 9-11 and AQ attacked us several time before 9-11. They knew that and should hardly have been surprised if the foreign power got fed up and came in to attack them and their "guests". If they are miffed because the legalities weren't honored, they aren't the hard cases they appear to be.


The Taliban were not and are not the enemy. They were just between us and what we needed to do to get at AQ. They hesitated in helping us, and we weren't in a mood to wait and talk about it at the time.

The didn't hesitate in helping us. They refused. And the ISI encouraged them to refuse. At the time all those bodies were still moldering in the wreck of the World Trade Center. You bet we weren't in any mood to wait for them to get back to us.


Despite our recent faux pas, we still have the power and credibility to step into a neutral role, call for a cease fire and provide a security bubble for a new Constitutional Loya Jirga to take place within.

I am still skeptical that any of this would work but you may be right, it might be worth a try, especially if it could be worked in such a way to peel off part of Taliban & company from the Pak Army/ISI. What kind of security bubble do you envision, where and who would be allowed into it?

Bob's World
01-07-2011, 12:20 PM
I didn't say they were innocents, merely that they are not our enemy. As to how they came to power, that is not dissimilar to how the U.S. came to power as well. If legal means are denied, then illegal means become the only recourse. Currently, Illegal means are the only recourse to any who have issue with the Karzai regime as well.

But as to your last question, who would one exclude? As many wars are began at the peace table, as are ended; typically through the moralistic condemnations of the victor over the vanquished. We should remember that in this case, there are no victors or vanquished. How would the U.S. feel if it were us that were excluded? That actually makes more sense than excluding senior reps from Haqqani or the Taliban; but any exclusions would create distrust and de-legitimize the output, so I'd not exclude anyone with standing, and I would not allow GIROA to exclude anyone with standing either. There are the official parties, GIROA, the Coalition, and concerned neighbors with shared borders and populaces that all need a seat. So too reps from all of the formal opposition groups. Also ethnic, tribal, family, regional, and religious representatives as well. After a long, circus-like series of meetings that may well last days; a principle output would be the selection of the representatives to participate, advise or observe the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

This follow-on Jirga would be much smaller and focused on getting to a workable form of governance. This could last months. (Their own "Summer of 1787" to hash things out). I would ban the U.S. from taking any positions as to type of governance or the role of religion in governance; but to instead focus on the protections of rights, and the establishment of process, roles, procedures, etc that prevent they types of abuses of government that cause such insurgencies. All of this tailored for this culture, these people. Also there would need to be referees to step in when power is abused to push some self-serving agenda. Once they have a product that no one is happy with, but everyone can live with, they will be close to what right looks like.

While all of this were going on, similar Shuras of smaller scale would be going on in each of RC AORS, with scheduled development projects being reassessed, and refined to ensure that they serve the entire populace. Similarly service contracts currently pouring the vast majority of cash into the pockets of the Karzai network would be reassessed as we learned more clearly who was being excluded from participation and sought more equitable distributions.

I would also recommend a new coalition be formed to oversee the fragile peace, that is far less Western than the current Coalition. Iran and Pakistan would have prominent roles, China and India less so. I'd bring in Russia and reduce the US role. A new balance of interested stakeholders. Allowing them to keep an eye on each other as much as anything else, to help temper their own behind the scenes manipulations.


Otherwise, I have my own biases.

I think that District officials should be selected by the citizens of that district through a process that they have trust in; and that those officials should owe their patronage to those people.

The same at the Province level. Tear down the Ponzi scene of the current system where every official at all levels owes his patronage to the President.

I'd vastly reduce the National security forces, with quotas established by region for the Tashkils of the ANA, ANP, ANCOP, etc. I would move those Tashkils down to the province and district level for state and local police; and to the Province level for the ANA to form an Afghan National Guard that would make up 1/2 to 3/4 of the Afghan Army. All recruited locally, and employed locally with Province Governors as their commanders in chief. All federally funded (and controlled through that funding) by the central government.

I would consider a system similar to that in Lebanon to guarantee percentages of key interest groups in key positions. Perhaps with a 100 year expiration date. Key being to forge systems one can trust in, even when no one trusts anyone in the system.

None of this, of course is soldier business. And that, of course is our current problem. We've given a governmental problem to the military and the military has quite naturally militarized it. We gave a South Asia problem to the West, and the West quite naturally Westernized it. This would be very hard, and it could easily fall apart. But it could work as well, and it offers a much more enduring solution than continuing our current course seems to offer.

Dayuhan
01-07-2011, 02:11 PM
I didn't say they were innocents, merely that they are not our enemy. As to how they came to power, that is not dissimilar to how the U.S. came to power as well. If legal means are denied, then illegal means become the only recourse. Currently, Illegal means are the only recourse to any who have issue with the Karzai regime as well.

I don't see how this is about "legal" or "illegal". It wasn't when the Taliban took power, nor was it when the Taliban lost power. It still isn't. It's just about power and the means by which power is taken. "Legal" is just what the people who have power at any given time happen to want.

This whole idea of a Constitution as the answer and a grand inclusive Constitutional Loya Jirga as the road to the answer sounds wonderful to the western ear... but do Afghans see a Constitution as the answer? Where is this idea coming from; where is the impetus coming from? If it's from us, what chance does it have of succeeding?

Bob's World
01-07-2011, 02:31 PM
This is less "western" than one might think. Besides, it is the content that makes something western or Asian, or whatever, not the package. Governance exists everywhere in some form, it varies in nature and extent. A Constitution is a guide to governance that creates structures that protect rights and build trust.

Here is a recent opinion piece from the region on this topic. Granted, this writer has his own strong biases, but it is one of many windows into this issue that we need to look into.

http://www.opinion-maker.org/2011/01/why-karzai-questioned-the-constitution/

It highlights the lack of trust the people have in government and the fact that too much power is already in Karzai. That alone is enough to flunk a constitution as failed in doing what it most needs to do.

As I say, the Afghans did as Americans did with our articles of Confederation: They created a document to prevent what they hated/feared about the previous government, not what they needed to move forward as a nation. Such evolution is probably necessary, as it was really an act of insurgency (illegal politics) when the team assembled to update the articles instead set out in secret to produce an entirely new system of government. It is time in Afghanistan for a similar evolution in governance. To avoid it, is to mire in revolution instead.

Besides, what else do we have to offer the Taliban in exchange for them withdrawing their sanctuary to AQ?

As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once said, "if we desire respect for the law, we must first make the law respectable."

slapout9
01-07-2011, 02:46 PM
I don't see how this is about "legal" or "illegal". It wasn't when the Taliban took power, nor was it when the Taliban lost power. It still isn't. It's just about power and the means by which power is taken. "Legal" is just what the people who have power at any given time happen to want.


Agree 100%. Power and who has it,is the only fact of reality that matters right now.

Bob's World
01-07-2011, 03:15 PM
Agree 100%. Power and who has it,is the only fact of reality that matters right now.

Insurgency is no more and no less than the Illegal challenge for leadership. If our only concern is who is most powerful (which has seemed to be a trend in US foreign policy of late), then we need only step back and see who that is.

Our presence only artificially tips that scale toward GIROA. Let's just go, and come back once the dust settles to work with whoever the "most powerful" turns out to be.

"Might" may well allow one to do as they wish, but Might does not alone make what one does right.

Power is often illusory, and always temporal. True power lies in the people, and the people will always get the final vote; but such unconstrained pursuits of power are typically deemed barbaric and unacceptable in modern society.

Better to impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people. This is not impossible, it's just hard. And again, the military's role is a supporting one.

slapout9
01-07-2011, 04:17 PM
Better to impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people. This is not impossible, it's just hard. And again, the military's role is a supporting one.

1-What is just constraint of law? By who's definition?

2-How is law enforced? sooner or later it's guns and money.

Bill Moore
01-07-2011, 05:16 PM
:rolleyes:
Power is often illusory, and always temporal. True power lies in the people, and the people will always get the final vote; but such unconstrained pursuits of power are typically deemed barbaric and unacceptable in modern society.

There are some similiarities here to the Philippines when we were supporting Marcos, a corrupt tyrant that most of us who worked in the Philippines at the time hated. Most of agreed we would probably be communist insurgents if we lived in the villages and the government only took from the people and gave nothing back in return.

The arguments for continued support to Marcos were the old school arguments. Yes he's a bastard but he is our bastard. He is anti-communist. He supports the U.S. bases (although we had to pay through our nose and the Philippine people didn't see much of that money. If he leaves the communists will take over and the world will end as we know it, etc.

Real progress against the communists didn't start until Marcos was removed from power by the people. The bases closed for several reasons, they were too expensive, they were unpopular with the Filipinos, and the volcano laid waste to them anyway.

I know we're digressing from the safe haven thread, but Bob always does that :rolleyes: to us. My point is a good part of our effort appears to be making Karsai successful, much as we did Marcos. In hindsight supporting Marcos was the wrong answer, he may have been our bastard, but he was the wrong bastard for the Philippine people no matter how much money we threw at him.

Assuming it is even possible to disengage from Karzai, what would happen if we stopped supporting him? How would it play out over time? If he was replaced by a popular uprising or a military coup would it make matters worse, or start the real process of recovery? Are there any potential leaders on the near horizon who could do better?

slapout9
01-07-2011, 05:21 PM
Assuming it is even possible to disengage from Karzai, what would happen if we stopped supporting him? How would it play out over time? If he was replaced by a popular uprising or a military coup would it make matters worse, or start the real process of recovery? Are there any potential leaders on the near horizon who could do better?

Karzai, why not say he needs to retire due to health reason and then get somebody that can rally the laregest part of the population?

Bill Moore
01-07-2011, 05:30 PM
Slap,

My point is to disengage from "their" politics, and stop being obstacle to political change. Let the Afghans form their own government and evolve it as "they" see fit.

slapout9
01-07-2011, 05:43 PM
Slap,

My point is to disengage from "their" politics, and stop being obstacle to political change. Let the Afghans form their own government and evolve it as "they" see fit.

I am following. I should have said let "them" get somebody they can rally behind. Let karzia retire was/is a nice way for us to disengage from the whole thing, let him keep the money he stole and go retire somewhere and then we should but out.

Fuchs
01-07-2011, 06:32 PM
I am following. I should have said let "them" get somebody they can rally behind. Let karzia retire was/is a nice way for us to disengage from the whole thing, let him keep the money he stole and go retire somewhere and then we should but out.

... and don't forget to tell the intelligence services to earn some of their pay by taking the fortune away from the corrupt Exiles.

Bob's World
01-07-2011, 07:33 PM
All,

I didn't mean to move the conversation away from sanctuary, but rather to point out what I see as a better route to get to denial of the sanctuary we are missioned to deal with. The Taliban hold the keys to AQ's sanctuary, not any state actor. It takes a non-state, outlaw to deal with a non-state outlaw, I guess. The key to Taliban leadership is in giving them legal venue to participate in governance. the key to that is to provide safeguards for all involved to be able to work together and move forward. Once that is addressed, pay, motivation and foreign presence all decrease and thereby resolve the resistance insurgency being dealt with in the rural areas. We must clear this problem from the top down; as all we can do at the bottom is suppression of the symptoms.

Dayuhan
01-07-2011, 11:13 PM
This is less "western" than one might think. Besides, it is the content that makes something western or Asian, or whatever, not the package. Governance exists everywhere in some form, it varies in nature and extent. A Constitution is a guide to governance that creates structures that protect rights and build trust.

The notion that governance is built around a document is Western, not Afghan.

A Constitution codifies elements of consensus within a society. It cannot be stronger than the consensus that it codifies. No consensus, no Constitution; at least no Constitution that means anything.


It highlights the lack of trust the people have in government and the fact that too much power is already in Karzai. That alone is enough to flunk a constitution as failed in doing what it most needs to do.

Do Afghans believe that the problem can be solved with a new document, or do they want a new leader?


As I say, the Afghans did as Americans did with our articles of Confederation: They created a document to prevent what they hated/feared about the previous government, not what they needed to move forward as a nation.

To what extent, really, was that process initiated and managed by "The Afghans"? If a society runs through a sequence of Constitutions in short order, it may mean that the documents are flawed... or at may simply mean that there's not enough consensus within that society to be meaningfully codified.



Besides, what else do we have to offer the Taliban in exchange for them withdrawing their sanctuary to AQ?

If that's all we have, we have nothing... that's the whole problem with the idea of trying to persuade the Taliban to withdraw sanctuary.


Insurgency is no more and no less than the Illegal challenge for leadership.

Here we are again with "illegal". Do the Taliban see their insurgency as "illegal"? I doubt it... their law is shariah and pashtunwali, not some piece of paper in Kabul. In much of the world "legal" is what the guy with the gun wants. When you have power you make law. You get power by throwing out whoever has it, and you keep it by killing whoever wants to throw you out. I don't see a Constitution changing that.


Our presence only artificially tips that scale toward GIROA. Let's just go, and come back once the dust settles to work with whoever the "most powerful" turns out to be.

Let it be, and see who wins... didn't we do that once before? The Taliban won. They might again. If they do, they won't work with us; why should they?



Better to impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people. This is not impossible, it's just hard. And again, the military's role is a supporting one.

Are you suggesting that the US needs to "impose just constraints of law within which to balance the distribution of power more equitably among the people" in Afghanistan? If that's not impossible, what is? And what business do we have trying to "impose just constraints of law" or even decide what "just constraints of law" are in Afghanistan? How is the Afghan distribution of power our business? Seems to be our business is to make sure they don't attack us or our allies, or harbor those who do. If we let the mission creep up to an attempt to restructure Afghan law and governance we're biting off more than we can chew, and we're likely to choke on it.

Bob's World
01-07-2011, 11:18 PM
Dayuhan,

I see little merit in any of your arguments to counter my proposal, but I'm open, what do you suggest?

Bob

Dayuhan
01-08-2011, 01:14 AM
I see little merit in any of your arguments to counter my proposal

Well, I see little merit and great danger in the belief that the US can impose "just constraints of law" on people whose idea of law and justice is utterly different from ours and who are notoriously ill disposed toward imposition. I see little merit and grave danger in the idea that we can balance another country's disposition of power in a way that suits us. I see little merit and grave danger in the assumption that social consensus is created by a Constitution, rather than the other way round.


what do you suggest

Two things to start"

1. Reverse mission creep. Get back to the core reason why we are there, and focus on what we can do to accomplish that.

2. Accept our limitations. We cannot govern Afghanistan, nor can we dictate how it is to be governed. We shouldn't try.

Unfortunately, we've taken the opposite route for too many years and it will be difficult to reverse that. At this point we've painted ourselves deep into a most unpleasant corner and we face a difficult exercise in damage control. I don't see any magic formula here, we strive for the least bad outcome and hopefully learn some lessons.

If we negotiate with the Taliban, we should have nothing to say about law, justice, and governance. That's not our business. I could see making a simple offer: they turn over OBL, Omar, and their entire inner circle, and we pack up and go home. That's something we can offer. We can't offer to build them into the Afghan government, because we can't build the Afghan government. It's not ours to build.

Fuchs
01-08-2011, 02:29 AM
I could see making a simple offer: they turn over OBL, Omar, and their entire inner circle, and we pack up and go home. That's something we can offer. We can't offer to build them into the Afghan government, because we can't build the Afghan government. It's not ours to build.

So to whom would you make that offer if not to those who would need to sacrifice themselves?

Wouldn't it make more sense to simply demand twenty top AQ guys, to be handed over in a fashion that allows them (TB) to save their face (= officially unrelated to the agreement, handing them over to a third party or after some discrediting move against AQ)?

Dayuhan
01-08-2011, 04:08 AM
So to whom would you make that offer if not to those who would need to sacrifice themselves?

To the various factions of the Taliban, and to the Afghan populace in general. Could be a quite simple equation: you don't want us here, we don't want to be here; turn over the people who attacked us and we're gone. Make sure they don't come back, and we stay gone.


Wouldn't it make more sense to simply demand twenty top AQ guys, to be handed over in a fashion that allows them (TB) to save their face (= officially unrelated to the agreement, handing them over to a third party or after some discrediting move against AQ)?

Officially unrelated to what agreement? What agreement are we able to make, other than to leave Afghanistan in exchange for the destruction of AQ in the Taliban areas of operation. We control whether we stay or go, so we can offer to go or threaten to stay. We don't control Afghan governance and we shouldn't try; how can we offer to rearrange what isn't ours to rearrange?

Why should we be concerned with their face? The causative relationships have to be clear: harbor our enemies and you don't get what you want. Keep our enemies out and you do get what you want. No more of this nonsense about transforming Afghan governance and society: they don't want it and we can't do it.

It would have been much more effective if we'd taken this position right after the Taliban were driven out of power, but that's water under the bridge.

Steve the Planner
01-08-2011, 04:42 AM
Dayuhan:

It's not often I find anything you say in need of substantial questions.

Bob, perhaps, does not fully appreciate that in some Pakistani circles, it is justice to stone female blasphemers to death, and martyrdom to kill a person who does not agree. This is a very tough culture for US folks to absorb.

But this idea of us actually coming to possess OBL troubles me. Better to leave him in his spider hole, IMO. If we have him, and we administer our "justice" to him, we will be in the same troublesome spot to many other audiences as the progressive Pakistani governor arguing to drop the blesphemer sentence. Jesus may have advised putting the stones down, but more than one was thrown in his name.

I'm all for leaving OBL in his spider hole. If something unofficial (virtual natural causes) occurred to him, that is one thing. I personally don't want him in US custody subject to US prosecution, just because, at some point, we could do without a next wave of Jihadis chasing a revived martyr.

Dayuhan
01-08-2011, 06:59 AM
But this idea of us actually coming to possess OBL troubles me. Better to leave him in his spider hole, IMO. If we have him, and we administer our "justice" to him, we will be in the same troublesome spot to many other audiences as the progressive Pakistani governor arguing to drop the blesphemer sentence. Jesus may have advised putting the stones down, but more than one was thrown in his name.

I'm all for leaving OBL in his spider hole. If something unofficial (virtual natural causes) occurred to him, that is one thing. I personally don't want him in US custody subject to US prosecution, just because, at some point, we could do without a next wave of Jihadis chasing a revived martyr.

I thought of that, and it would be a problem. It would be ideal for all concerned if they simply turned him over in a plastic bag, but that might be too much to ask.

Of course a starting position is seldom where a negotiation ends, and just because we start with "you turn over the bad boys and we leave" doesn't mean we wouldn't settle for having some lesser bad boys turned over and the key individuals placed in a position where they could be removed in a drone strike and subsequently identified, which would save face for them and trouble for us. Of course in a few weeks the whole sordid deal would come out on Wikileaks, but we'd survive and it would be better than having them on trial in the US.

Dayuhan
01-08-2011, 10:32 AM
Just to clarify... I don't for a moment think that the offer proposed above would be accepted. It is, however, in our power to make the offer. Having formally recognized the Karzai administration as the sovereign government of Afghanistan and the current Constitution as legitimate, we cannot now go to the Taliban and offer to dismiss that Government, tear up the Constitution, and replace both with new versions that assure Taliban participation... unless of course we propose to declare that we are the government of Afghanistan.

Bob's World
01-08-2011, 03:04 PM
Ok, so the plan is we just ask the Talban to give us bin Laden in a plastic bag. Well, at least you appreciate it is the Taliban we need to ask, rather than the ISI, or Pak military, or the Pakistan or Afghan governments. That alone moves your recommendation up the merit list.

But as you constantly rail, why would they comply? What is your approach to gain that compliance. "What" is the easy part, and your "what" is the same as mine for the most part. "How" is the challenge. So, how do you propose this is done?

Dayuhan
01-08-2011, 10:11 PM
But as you constantly rail, why would they comply? What is your approach to gain that compliance. "What" is the easy part, and your "what" is the same as mine for the most part. "How" is the challenge. So, how do you propose this is done?

They wouldn't comply, but at least we'd be offering something we have the power to give, and we might create the impression that we're willing to leave if a tangible and reasonable (revenge is understood in those parts) demand is met. Might be a bit of PR value there.

Offering to restructure the Afghan government is a bit of a problem, because at the end of the day all we can offer is yet another Loya Jirga. We can't promise the Taliban that their interests will be protected, and we can't promise the non-Pashtun population that their interests will be protected, because we can't deliver on those promises unless we control the process and if we control the process it's pointless. Are we going to tell the non-Pashtuns that they'll be protected from the Taliban by... a Constitution? I suspect they'll be less than reassured.

I can actually see the Taliban being willing to "negotiate", if they could freeze military operations and bring various withdrawal deadlines closer by doing so. Can't really see it as much more than a ploy to advance their own plans.

carl
01-10-2011, 06:55 PM
I didn't say they were innocents,...

...This would be very hard, and it could easily fall apart. But it could work as well, and it offers a much more enduring solution than continuing our current course seems to offer.

I have several questions.

Where would something like this be held?

How would you determine standing, or rather who would determine standing? For example, would the IMU be included?

You mentioned the US focusing on protection of rights, does that include women's rights? There is a large difference in what women can do in now and what they could do when the Taliban ran the place, close to a matter of life and death for some women.

You also mentioned referees, how would the referees be chosen and what power would they have to back them up?

The new coalition you mentioned gives a prominent place to the Pak Army/ISI (don't tell me why I shouldn't use that phrase because I'll not stop) and Iran but less so for India and China. What if the Indians decided they didn't want to go along with that, or what if a significant portion of the Afghans decided they wanted the Indians in on the deal in a big way? I don't think we could stop them.

Would it be a good idea to give the Pak Army/ISI a formal role at the table at all? In my view they are the demon that is primarily responsible for keeping the blood flowing. Ahmed Rashid says part of the Taliban really wants to break away from the Pak Army/ISI. It seems to me it would be in our interests too to help them do so. To further that aim I think it would be good to keep the Pak Army/ISI as far away as possible.

I am skeptical this will work but it might be worth a try especially if it might help cut the Pak Army/ISI out of the picture. That is why I asked where this would be held. If it was held in Afghanistan and we gave strong guarantees of safety and said MO, Hik and Haq couldn't play unless they were in Afghanistan, that would help. It would be like giving them sanctuary from the Pak Army/ISI.

I still think the most direct and effective thing would be to put serious pressure on the Pak Army/ISI, which we have never found the nerve to do. I have never been able to figure out why we don't pressure those guys.

Last thing...which part of the Taliban do you think is covering for AQ? If it is the Pakistani Taliban, how would doing a deal with the Afghan Taliban & company get us anywhere? Unless we know for sure the Afghan Taliban has them firmly in grasp, why should we deal? Do we know for sure?

As you know, I think the ISI is covering for AQ too and everybody involved will never give them up for ideological reasons so the question is to me a hypothetical. But I still want to know.

carl
01-10-2011, 07:00 PM
There is a requirement to develop a national ID card and associated database (and if the individual has been detained before, any relevant biometrics data).


Bill:

I thought this kind of program was a fundamental. You mean we still haven't done this after going on 10 years?:confused:

Fuchs
01-10-2011, 07:02 PM
Bill:

I thought this kind of program was a fundamental. You mean we still haven't done this after going on 10 years?:confused:

Isn't it ironic how much obligatory ID cards are opposed in the U.S. itself as oppression by the state?

Bill Moore
01-10-2011, 07:44 PM
I thought this kind of program was a fundamental. You mean we still haven't done this after going on 10 years?

Partly for the concern Fuchs expressed, and partly due to the huge logistical undertaking this really is, I'm not surprised. We could have the military use their equipment to make ID cards, but they would be easily counterfeited and probably not worth the effort.

It all depends on how we're going to solve the problem. If we're going to "defeat" the insurgent we have to control the population to separate the insurgent from the populace. Depending on the procedures used and the degree of control implemented it can be a rather nasty process, and is much more accepted if it is implemented by their own country men instead of foreigners. Fuchs must think I am constantly in disagreement with him. I'm not, I'm only saying if we're going to use a counterinsurgency strategy, then there are certain things that go with that strategy in order for it to be successful. We're not limited to historical examples, but I'm not aware of any historical example where an insurgency was defeated or co-opted with economic development or civil military operations. Again show me the examples, and help bring me in from the dark.

As for making a deal with Taliban, I think we're well past that point if we want to be recognized as reliable partners to other foreign partners for the next two decades. What exactly happens to all the Afghans who have been working with us for the past 10 years? Does a secure base for the Taliban in Pakistan further threaten Pakistan's security? Once the Taliban no longer need the ISI will they turn on them? When you claim this "may" work, how will it work? What do we expect the outcome to be?

Another approach is to disengage from the politics period, and simply fight those we designate as a threat to our nation and let the Afghans determine their own future. How many years and how many billions of dollars have we thrown at the Afghanistan security forces? If they can't hold their hold against an irregular threat by now, then clearly we're missing something very basic.

carl
01-10-2011, 08:18 PM
We could have the military use their equipment to make ID cards, but they would be easily counterfeited and probably not worth the effort.

The UN made ID cards in the Congo as part of the de-mob program. I don't know how well they worked but well enough to make the effort anyway. In any event I always read that a local census was a basic part of fighting a small war. IDs would be part of that. I am very disappointed if we haven't been at least trying to do that. They didn't throw all the retina scanners they used in Iraq away I hope.


As for making a deal with Taliban, I think we're well past that point if we want to be recognized as reliable partners to other foreign partners for the next two decades. What exactly happens to all the Afghans who have been working with us for the past 10 years? Does a secure base for the Taliban in Pakistan further threaten Pakistan's security? Once the Taliban no longer need the ISI will they turn on them? When you claim this "may" work, how will it work? What do we expect the outcome to be?

I am skeptical that the type of negotiation proposed by Bob's World would work but it might be worth a try, Especially if it would give us some kind of wedge to pry Taliban & company away from the Pak Army/ISI.

I also think, and stated, that an AQ trade for our leaving isn't possible. Ideologically, Taliban & company and the Pak Army/ISI won't go for it.

The key is that incubus, the Pak Army/ISI. Like I said in my post #98 we have to deal with that or leave. Please read that post because I also stated what we should do if we don't confront the incubus.

slapout9
01-10-2011, 08:38 PM
The UN made ID cards in the Congo as part of the de-mob program. I don't know how well they worked but well enough to make the effort anyway. In any event I always read that a local census was a basic part of fighting a small war. IDs would be part of that.



I read somewhere that in Vietnam in order to prevent that you not only had an ID of your self, but a family ID photo that you had to carry with you(it had a name and somebody here may remember) but it was hard to fake a family photo because a Master copy was kept and could be compared back to at the local level.

davidbfpo
01-10-2011, 11:18 PM
Catching up and noted the issue of a national, Afghan ID card. The irony is that Pakistani has a very advanced national ID card system, which IIRC was provided by a local IT company and now sold onwards - even to European country. In a recent UK TV documentary there was a glimpse of the system in operation, to prevent flood relief famine with card readers in the field offices.

Official Pakistani ID website:http://www.nadra.gov.pk/

Dayuhan
01-11-2011, 01:38 AM
I am skeptical that the type of negotiation proposed by Bob's World would work but it might be worth a try, Especially if it would give us some kind of wedge to pry Taliban & company away from the Pak Army/ISI.

I also think, and stated, that an AQ trade for our leaving isn't possible. Ideologically, Taliban & company and the Pak Army/ISI won't go for it.

Agreed... but why not make the offer and let them refuse it? We'd make it clear that we're willing to leave if a reasonable condition is met, which would be an advantage from the PR perspective, and they'd get to look intransigent. Then when they say they are fighting to get rid of the foreigners, we could point out that we'd be happy to leave if only they'd get rid of that other bunch of foreigners, the ones who brought us there in the first place. Ok, so they were guests... but what obligation does a host have to a guest whose intemperate and stupid behaviour brings destruction on his house?

It's not about making a deal, it's about undermining the narrative.


The key is that incubus, the Pak Army/ISI. Like I said in my post #98 we have to deal with that or leave. Please read that post because I also stated what we should do if we don't confront the incubus.

Again agreed, but our leverage is questionable. Certainly they want and depend on our aid, but as long as we have substantial forces in Afghanistan we want and depend on their ports and land supply routes to support our forces. That kind of cancels out. How can we skew that equation in our favor? We might actually have more leverage if we didn't have a major military presence in Afghanistan requiring Pakistani cooperation for its support.

All very well to say we must confront the incubus, but we have to do it in a way that has some reasonable chance of getting us what we want.


As for making a deal with Taliban, I think we're well past that point if we want to be recognized as reliable partners to other foreign partners for the next two decades. What exactly happens to all the Afghans who have been working with us for the past 10 years?

We would have to be honest, at least with ourselves... cutting a deal with the Taliban would mean selling out our erstwhile allies and the non-Pashtun minorities to buy ourselves a face-saving exit strategy. Nothing more, nothing less.


Another approach is to disengage from the politics period, and simply fight those we designate as a threat to our nation and let the Afghans determine their own future.

Wouldn't it have been easier if we'd done that from the start? Not like some of us weren't recommending exactly that...

Infanteer
01-11-2011, 02:21 AM
This one's on a bit of a spin cycle, but I had a question/point.

How would one deny sanctuary by taking the FATA? So we slice off another slab of Pashtunistan that where we have to put a village guard in every corner. Is that going to solve anything?

When one looks over a map of the insurgency in Kandahar province it is amazing how small the area is; I have a map of one of our training areas that is larger. Each house is a literal fort. We cannot control these little forts as is, so I don't know how increasing the AO would be conducive to pacifying the Pashtun.

Ken White
01-11-2011, 03:16 AM
We would have to be honest, at least with ourselves... cutting a deal with the Taliban would mean selling out our erstwhile allies and the non-Pashtun minorities to buy ourselves a face-saving exit strategy. Nothing more, nothing less.Politicians want to avoid warfare but also want to shape others as they see fit. Thus they send troops off to do good works (in their view) while telling them not to hurt anyone...:rolleyes:

That's rather simplistic -- but it is a truth. Other than WWII, the US has always very foolishly tried to place limits on its warfare. The Gods alone know how many people that errant stupidity has needlessly killed.

They also alone know how many we've abandoned. We left Korea -- and we owe a lot of Koreans who did what we asked. We left Viet Nam -- and we owe a lot of Viet Namese (and Laotians) who did more than we asked. We left The Kurds in '96, we left the Iraqi Shia in 91 (and wonder why they do not love us... :rolleyes:). One could say we also abandoned the Afghans in '88. In fact, we've abandoned a lot of folks a lot of places over the years.

We need to stop doing that, it breeds hate and discontent. The Gods may be the only ones with an accurate count of abandonees -- but most of the World has a broad idea. :wry:
Wouldn't it have been easier if we'd done that from the start? Not like some of us weren't recommending exactly that...Yes. Even much maligned Donald Rumsfeld wanted to do that... :cool:

Dayuhan
01-11-2011, 03:21 AM
How would one deny sanctuary by taking the FATA? So we slice off another slab of Pashtunistan that where we have to put a village guard in every corner. Is that going to solve anything?

It would probably not solve anything, and would probably create a whole lot more mess. That's why the question of denying sanctuary usually comes back to either pressuring Pakistan to deny sanctuary or trying to cut a deal with the Taliban to deny sanctuary. Both options present their own share of problems and obstacles, and it's not clear that any of them would be effective. Not an easy nut to crack.

Ken White
01-11-2011, 03:23 AM
This one's on a bit of a spin cycle, but I had a question/point... Each house is a literal fort. We cannot control these little forts as is, so I don't know how increasing the AO would be conducive to pacifying the Pashtun.The answer is, of course, that we aren't going to do that regardless of the dreamers. The West does not have the numbers of people, the multi generational patience or the funds to change South Asia. Nor is it really necessary -- probably not even desirable...

Reminds me of the Kipling line about a fool trying to hustle the East... :wry:

carl
01-11-2011, 03:34 AM
They also alone know how many we've abandoned. We left Korea -- and we owe a lot of Koreans who did what we asked. We left Viet Nam -- and we owe a lot of Viet Namese (and Laotians) who did more than we asked. We left The Kurds in '96, we left the Iraqi Shia in 91 (and wonder why they do not love us... :rolleyes:). One could say we also abandoned the Afghans in '88. In fact, we've abandoned a lot of folks a lot of places over the years.

We need to stop doing that, it breeds hate and discontent. The Gods may be the only ones with an accurate count of abandonees -- but most of the World has a broad idea. :wry:

Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes! Ken, I'm glad you're around.

Bob's World
01-11-2011, 07:07 PM
Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes! Ken, I'm glad you're around.

This is why I advocate for a retirement of Containment as the core of our foreign policy for an approach better designed for the post Cold War world we live in today.

Showing up in troubled places with a more neutral agenda that is more about empowering the locals to work out their issues short of warfare, and not seeking to control the outcome will lead to much fewer incidences of coming in with an agenda, recruiting local groups to support our agenda, and then bailing on them to deal with the consequences when our agenda either doesn't work out, or we simply change our mind.

There is no need to throw the populaces supporting the Northern Alliance under the bus in order to re-open negotiations with the Taliban. To bring the parties together in a truce that we set up and secure to work through these issues. The Karzai/Northern Alliance is an unsustainable model, and their constitution guarantees oppression and conflict. It is time to stop supporting tyranny that supports our interests, and begin embracing more neutral, less controlling approaches.

This is a no-trust environment. We need to provide the neutral presence to allow them to sort out how to work together in such an environment until such time as they develop "new guards for their future security" together.

Or we can keep surging in more troops and ramp up for the next fighting season, Clear more terrain, Develop more progjects, kill more Taliban squad leaders (the bulk of what the Ranger's bag), and fire more drone-borne rockets into FATA bedroom windows. Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.

Ken White
01-11-2011, 09:09 PM
This is why I advocate for a retirement of Containment ... Showing up in troubled places with a more neutral agenda that is more about empowering the locals to work out their issues short of warfare, and not seeking to control the outcome... As you know, I'm in agreement on that...
Or we can keep surging in more troops and ramp up for the next fighting season, Clear more terrain, Develop more progjects, kill more Taliban squad leaders (the bulk of what the Ranger's bag), and fire more drone-borne rockets into FATA bedroom windows. Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.However, on that opinion of yours -- and that's what it is, an opinion, not a statement of fact -- we can continue to disagree.

Don't try to change the Elephant, you'll fail. Simply better use its strength...:cool:

Bob's World
01-11-2011, 09:49 PM
More and more facts support my opinion. Currently and historically.

Gen. P is a smart operator, and I think he is indeed on track to create a window of suppressed insurgency that meets the President's timeline. That is as much as a military solution can offer, and he is accomplishing his mission in that regard. I have no doubt he appreciates that very well.

Problem is, of course that such an effect will not likely last long unless coupled with true changes in Afghan governance, and I don't see them leaning forward on their own to make any such changes. Increased security capacity alone is not likely to work; as we take our boot off the problem and they place theirs on it in our place. But this governance issue is not really a military problem to solve, so it goes largely unaddressed, and inappropriately prioritized below the afore mentioned military efforts. This is the principal problem with punting insurgencies to the military to resolve, and classifying them as "wars" to be won or lost.

For the West, COIN means "Colonial Intervention," and it's time to move forward from that inherited approach that we put a new coat of paint on with FM 3-24. Sustaining friendly despots is no longer good enough.

Dayuhan
01-11-2011, 11:05 PM
Showing up in troubled places with a more neutral agenda that is more about empowering the locals to work out their issues short of warfare, and not seeking to control the outcome will lead to much fewer incidences of coming in with an agenda, recruiting local groups to support our agenda, and then bailing on them to deal with the consequences when our agenda either doesn't work out, or we simply change our mind.

When we impose the constraint "short of warfare" we are coming in with an agenda and seeking to control the outcome.

It's all very well and noble to say we should not try and control the outcome, but if we have no specific interest in the outcome - at least in preventing certain outcomes - we wouldn't be involved in the first place, would we? If we're there, there's an agenda.


There is no need to throw the populaces supporting the Northern Alliance under the bus in order to re-open negotiations with the Taliban. To bring the parties together in a truce that we set up and secure to work through these issues. The Karzai/Northern Alliance is an unsustainable model, and their constitution guarantees oppression and conflict. It is time to stop supporting tyranny that supports our interests, and begin embracing more neutral, less controlling approaches.


Does anybody think the Karzai regime suits our interests? As far as I can see they suit their own interests, rather predictably.

Do you really believe that the Taliban and the Karzai crowd, the Pashtun and the non-Pashtun minorities, the drug lords and the religious leaders are all going to stop fighting, participate in governance together, share power, hold hands and sing "kumbayah" if only they get the right Constitution? I wish I could believe that, but I don't. A Constitution codifies consensus, it doesn't create it. If there's no consensus to codify, a Constitution means nothing. If they pursue a Constitution because we want it, it means nothing.

I would expect that as soon as we leave, there will be a fight. The fight will go on until somebody wins, the winners will stomp the losers, and the losers will become insurgents. The winners won't control all of Afghanistan, but given that Afghanistan is a pretty abstract construct to begin with, that hardly matters. This will happen no matter what deals are made and what documents are signed. If the Taliban make a deal to throw out AQ they will break the deal as soon as they think they can get away with it... probably they will never comply with the deal in the first place. How would we verify compliance anyway? This is the nature of the place: we will not change it, we might as well accept it. Jungle Rules apply, as Stan would say, though Desert Wasteland Rules might be more accurate.

The Afghan Constitution doesn't guarantee conflict and oppression, the prevailing political culture does. A new Constitution will not change that culture. Time and evolution might, but the process is likely to be violent, and we cannot simply circumvent that process by imposing a deal that happens to suit our interests, our our idea of what their interests ought to be. We talk about empowering them to make peace... but what if they want power more than they want peace, or if they think peace can only come when they have their boot on the other guy's throat and their hand in the other guy's wallet?


This is a no-trust environment. We need to provide the neutral presence to allow them to sort out how to work together in such an environment until such time as they develop "new guards for their future security" together.

Agree on the no-trust environment, but how do you think we're going to change that? The only "guard for future security" that means anything in that environment is having lots of men with guns and doing unto others before they have a chance to do unto you... can we change that?


Or we can keep surging in more troops and ramp up for the next fighting season, Clear more terrain, Develop more progjects, kill more Taliban squad leaders (the bulk of what the Ranger's bag), and fire more drone-borne rockets into FATA bedroom windows. Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.

Or we can forget about pursuing goals we cannot accomplish - and installing an inclusive, cooperative democracy in Afghanistan is certainly in that category - and accept that Afghanistan is what it is, Afghan political culture is what it is, and our agenda is what it is. Then we get down to the specific question of how to achieve our agenda (it is, after all, why we're there) within that culture and that environment, instead of trying to change that environment to suit ourselves.

A "peace agreement" would have one great virtue: it would give us a face-saving exit point. It would not create peace, nor would it keep AQ out. We'd probably end up back in, though at least maybe if we go back we might be able to do it sensibly from the start. There's something to that, I suppose...

Ken White
01-11-2011, 11:34 PM
More and more facts support my opinion. Currently and historically.My post lacked clarity. My apologies. My comment on opinion was based on one aspect only:
Just because we are good at doing the wrong thing is no reason not to attempt to do the right thing.It was that statement and it alone to which I referred when I wrote:

"However, on that opinion of yours -- and that's what it is, an opinion, not a statement of fact -- we can continue to disagree."

Specifically, I meant that what we are good at doing is not necessarily the wrong thing -- it may be inappropriate for a specific campaign or mission but it is not "wrong" and if you or anyone views it as universally wrong, you and they will err -- badly. The real opinion issue is raised by your last clause; "...no reason not to attempt to do the right thing." What is "right" in your opinion is not necessarily either de facto or de jure right.

I added: "Don't try to change the Elephant, you'll fail. Simply better use its strength..." to once more with no snark and with good intent suggest you have good ideas but tend to gloss over things that seem minor impediments to be ignored by you but that others view as significant details that must be addressed. IOW, you have a great product but a really bad sales pitch... :wry:

Dayuhan
01-12-2011, 12:34 AM
I went back to edit out the "hold hands and sing "kumbayah" comment in the post above, but the edit window had closed. That was inappropriate, and I apologize.

I do get a certain frustration in this debate that tempts to intemperance, because it's an issue I encounter all the time in my own milieu. In the Philippines we have a largely toxic pattern of governance despite a quite adequate legal framework. When the laws are incompatible with the prevailing political culture, the laws are simply ignored. Of course we have the ritual parade of well-meaning Americans coming through, looking around, and pronouncing that the problem is governance... to which the only possible reply is somewhere between "duh" and "thank you, Captain Obvious".

Of course the problem is governance. The problem in that problem is that patterns of governance do not spring from structures or documents, but from a political culture, which is in turn a product of fundamental perceptions of power and privilege, loyalty and identity. They don't govern that way because of the Constitution or the laws, they govern that way because that's the way they govern. That's what they believe governance is.

These things do change. Europeans no longer believe in the divine right of kings, Americans no longer believe that power is the exclusive prerogative of white males. These changes happen over time, through an evolutionary process that often involves violence. They do not happen because some external deus ex machina dictates that they must.

Afghan political culture will change, in time. We don't know where those changes will lead, and we cannot dictate what they will be or how and when they will occur. If we declare that we are going to impose a truce and they are going to sit down and work out a power-sharing framework and execute it peacefully, we are dictating the outcome, even if we don't try to dictate the content of the agreement. We are trying to unilaterally direct another country's evolutionary process, and we are doing it to suit our own interests.

I don't believe that we can change other people's political cultures. I don't believe that we should try. We may be able to very subtly assist the evolutionary process, though if we're not very careful indeed we can easily end up derailing it. We may be able to mitigate the worst side effects and we may be able to prevent those processes from spilling over onto us. Trying to impose change in another political culture by fiat is an errand worthy of Quixote, and I can't see it ending well.

Bob's World
01-12-2011, 05:14 PM
A pretty good collection of "hard data" recently complied by interviewing 1000 men in Kandahar and Helmand.

http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan_transition_missing_variables.pdf

(I have mentioned on here previously that many rural Afghans assume the Coalition forces are Russians. A continuation of that previous invasion. This may be aided in part by the fact that we work with many of the same Afgan officials. In this report it discloses that 90% of those interviewed had never heard of 9/11 and that most assume we were just there to control their country.)

Ken White
01-12-2011, 05:39 PM
are Jews based on the rationale that only Muslims and Jews wear beards and the SF weenies aren't Muslim...:D

What your survey and my comment may well mean is that the Info War is not going well. :rolleyes:

May also mean that SF is being misused. :wry:

Bill Moore
01-16-2011, 12:49 AM
Posted by Infanteer,


How would one deny sanctuary by taking the FATA? So we slice off another slab of Pashtunistan that where we have to put a village guard in every corner. Is that going to solve anything?

When one looks over a map of the insurgency in Kandahar province it is amazing how small the area is; I have a map of one of our training areas that is larger. Each house is a literal fort. We cannot control these little forts as is, so I don't know how increasing the AO would be conducive to pacifying the Pashtun.

First I think it is doubtful that we're actually trying to control these areas, and still are very in the patrol by COIN mode, with the exception of SF's recent change in tactics which requires them to live the villages, which does facilitate greater control (perfect control may be possible, but only at great cost and only for a short period of time). However, there are varying degrees of control, and in areas of Pakistan (perhaps relatively small) some insurgent groups have considerable freedom of movement and enjoy relative safehaven with the exception of a few drone strikes (effective against the leadership, but their foot soldiers or their logistics). You take away the perception of safe haven by putting boots on the ground, which will limit their freedom of movement, and enable coalition forces (Pakistan can and should participate if they're really our ally, but I think the jury is still out on that one) to disrupt their ability to sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan by pushing them further away from the border, destroying their caches, and most importantly destroying their perception that they have a safe haven, which over time changes their views on their ability to win. As stated originally it is part of a much larger strategy, but it is critical to deny it as a safehaven. That doesn't mean we will deny operations from there entirely, we simply amp up the risk for them doing so. Ultimate success will require several small successes over time, and it a way it is very much a war of attrition. They must be convinced they can't win, and our current strategy is far from convincing. We're not going to win the war of the narrative, we already lost that fight. We can win the fight, and in so doing convince the Afghan populace that the Afghans can win, instead of simply believing they should remain neutral until the U.S. leaves and then surrender to the Taliban when they return. David made a bold statement that we couldn't do it based on assumptions that many, to include some Pakistanis, consider to be incorrect. The reality is we can do it, and there is a moral arguement to do it or leave Afghanistan. Winning the villages over in Afghanistan will accomplish nothing, but as Bob stated elsewhere, create a gap for us to exit. We're currently practicing the strategy of appeasement, and ISAF appears cowardly, which further feeds the global jihad. If the risks of a such a proposal are not worth it, then how much more blood and treasure is Afghanistan worth? One thing you don't do is stand up and tell the enemy, yes you have a safehaven and there is nothing we can do about it. That may be very European, but it isn't effective.

Posted by Bob's World,
(I have mentioned on here previously that many rural Afghans assume the Coalition forces are Russians. A continuation of that previous invasion. This may be aided in part by the fact that we work with many of the same Afgan officials. In this report it discloses that 90% of those interviewed had never heard of 9/11 and that most assume we were just there to control their country.)

I have seen this previously and it is telling that the locals are adhering to a completely different narrative than we are, and yet we expect them to clearly see that our goals are legitimate and just. It is amazing we're doing as well as we are. Thank goodness incompetence is a disease that affects all of us, friend and foe alike.

davidbfpo
01-16-2011, 12:48 PM
Bill,

OK then, action is taken against the safe haven across the Durand Line, say on an identified logistic facility or even a series of actions. What is the effect on the campaign in Afghanistan? Yes, our opponents know we can strike them there and have to reconsider their actions.

Locally the tribes are hardly neutral and are pushed / pulled more towards the insurgency. The Pakistani impact, well that has been covered already and the logistic access is closed TFN (say a couple of months).

Do we ignore the impact of the narrative in Pakistan and beyond?

The safe haven will be hurt, it will still exist and how far do we strike beyond the Durand Line?

That is why I argue the political policy is not to cross the Durand Line and the military has to adjust accordingly. I remain unconvinced that the scarce resources we have in Afghanistan should be expended in cross border safe haven actions.

Covert action and other methods - is a separate issue and best not debated here.

slapout9
01-16-2011, 02:40 PM
Although a little off the safe havens topic this interview of Jonathan S. Landay has some interesting comments that bear on the discussion of what to do and who to support in order to win in A'stan. Don't know how credible this guy is, but he argues for a more classic COIN approach (nation building) as the real solution.
Link to the interview is below.


http://www.therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=5923#

Bill Moore
01-16-2011, 06:55 PM
Posted by Davidfpo,


That is why I argue the political policy is not to cross the Durand Line and the military has to adjust accordingly. I remain unconvinced that the scarce resources we have in Afghanistan should be expended in cross border safe haven actions.

Covert action and other methods - is a separate issue and best not debated here.

Reference covert action we're in agreement and as you stated nuff said.

I also agree that the political policy, which we are of course abiding by is not to cross the Durand Line, and I am challenging the logic behind that policy (as weak as it may be, because I do recognize the risks associated with crossing the line). While not fully convinced myself that crossing the line is the right answer, I think the assumptions for not crossing it need to be re-examined in the light of day and see if they stand up against the counter arguments. If they do then fine, I'll retract my position.

As for expending scant resources to cross the line, I'll propose a simple military counterargument. Are our resources best used in a defensive mode or an offensive mode? Normally offensive actions win wars.

Slap I'll check your link out tonight.

Bill Moore
01-17-2011, 03:27 AM
Slap,

I listend to the video and did a quick background check on the speaker, he is well educated and an experienced reporter. However, while he mentioned troops in Afghanistan in the 2006 period realized it was a COIN fight and started their own disjointed economic development efforts, I didn't hear him champion it as the means to victory.

Below the video is a transcript of his presentation and if you read his last paragraph it is pretty alarmist (and probably accurate). I don't think our current COIN efforts alone will prevent this from happening, it will only delay it. We are still confusing the means with the strategy. We can stay forever and do what we're doing now and hold things in place, but our efforts at nation building are undermined by the very clowns we're trying to prop up to run the country.

Read the transcript, or listen to the video again, and let me know what I'm missing. Does he specify anywhere that nation building will prevent what he is predicting in the last paragraph?

slapout9
01-17-2011, 03:42 AM
Slap,

I listend to the video and did a quick background check on the speaker, he is well educated and an experienced reporter. However, while he mentioned troops in Afghanistan in the 2006 period realized it was a COIN fight and started their own disjointed economic development efforts, I didn't hear him champion it as the means to victory.

Below the video is a transcript of his presentation and if you read his last paragraph it is pretty alarmist (and probably accurate). I don't think our current COIN efforts alone will prevent this from happening, it will only delay it. We are still confusing the means with the strategy. We can stay forever and do what we're doing now and hold things in place, but our efforts at nation building are undermined by the very clowns we're trying to prop up to run the country.

Read the transcript, or listen to the video again, and let me know what I'm missing. Does he specify anywhere that nation building will prevent what he is predicting in the last paragraph?



BillM, this is the part of the interview that gave me that impression.

Copied fromt the Real News Network interview of Johnathan S. Landay by Paul Jay.


JAY: President Bush, in a speech in--just days following the beginning of the bombing of Kabul and which led to the overthrow of the Taliban, he made a speech where he said there'd be something like a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan and we won't abandon you again.


LANDAY: Well, they weren't abandoned, but there certainly was absolutely no Marshall Plan under the Bush administration. And, in fact, it wasn't until the last year when they really sort of came up with the basics of a strategy, of a counterinsurgency strategy. Indeed, I was there in 2006 when US troops in the east who had come--many of whom had come from Iraq, understood that what needed to be done was a counterinsurgency, a full-scale counterinsurgency strategy, in which reconstruction played a very large role. And they began doing sort of small-scale reconstruction projects on their own using funds that they had available to them. There was no direction from Washington.

Bill Moore
01-17-2011, 04:01 AM
Slap,

That is what I thought you were referring to, but when you read the rest of the article, it doesn't add up. Nation building won't fix the problems he identified, problems that must be fixed if they're going to avoid another round of ethnic warfare. It will take years to bring Afghanistan to that level, and we're trying to do it with a largely incompetent State Department, underfunded, lack of consensus within ISAF, an incompetent Afghan Government, and Pakistan conducting UW to undermine our efforts. None of that doesn't mean it can't be accomplished of course, but it will be challenging and more of the same won't move us further down the road IMO.

slapout9
01-17-2011, 04:16 AM
Bill, I probably should have made it clear that because the title of the interview is a "missed opportunity" I think he is responding to what might have worked in the past (traditional COIN campaign), hence missed opportunity. I don't think he has a "current" solution at least I didn't take it that way.

Bill Moore
01-17-2011, 04:53 AM
Bill, I probably should have made it clear that because the title of the interview is a "missed opportunity" I think he is responding to what might have worked in the past (traditional COIN campaign), hence missed opportunity. I don't think he has a "current" solution at least I didn't take it that way.

I never read the titles :o

Entropy
01-17-2011, 05:58 AM
Bill,


I also agree that the political policy, which we are of course abiding by is not to cross the Durand Line, and I am challenging the logic behind that policy (as weak as it may be, because I do recognize the risks associated with crossing the line).

We don't know the exact risks. We don't know what the Pakistanis have said they would do if we go freelancing the FATA or NWFP. Our government surely knows the risks as I have no doubt the Pakistanis have made it clear where the red lines are. If we ignore that and go ahead and intervene without Pakistan's consent, the government could not stand by and do nothing. The question is, what would they do? They have a lot of options and none of them are good for us. Closing down the supply routes through Pakistan would probably be a first step. That is bad enough that an incursion wouldn't be worth it IMO except perhaps for a one-time raid to get UBL or Zawahiri.

Bob's World
01-17-2011, 11:08 AM
Like anything, there are dozens of ways to go at AQ in the FATA. There are several things I would guard against in the effort:

1. Rationalizing that firing a missile from an unmanned drone is somehow less abusive of Pakistan sovereignty than boots on the ground are.

2. Half-ass intel that conflates the various Afghan/Pakistan Pashtun insurgent groups with AQ. (Popping foreign fighters who come to assist AQ is probably fine, as they signed up for that in coming to the FATA and I doubt there is much popular blowback to their loss on the populaces and their own conditions of insurgency back home).

3. Unilateral operations.

I would recommend an "AQ and Foreign Fighter only" policy, coupled with the development of a combined Afghan/Pakistan Commando unit made up of Pashtuns to the degree possible. Model this on the Afghan Commandos. Use SF advisors and leverage the Coalitions enablers to develop the intel, and provide logistical and airlift support. I suspect that this is something that the government of Pakistan could grant approval to. If possible, split the basing to be in both countries. All raids would be 90% Afghans and Pakistanis and under their C2. Cancel all Predator drone strikes, other than in support to such raids.

Such a force would be able to "KLE their way across the objective," quickly sorting out who belonged, and who did not; and do so in a manner consistent with and respective of local traditions and customs.

Consider a permanent combined force to police the many areas along this border in the future as well. Not border police, but more like Texas Rangers working a vast, self-governed space under rules and authorities agreed to by both nations.

Sovereignty is evolving, we must evolve as well. Meanwhile, I am still struck by the words of a village elder in the FATA to a US operator during the first Pak mil excursion up into this region back in '02:

"We really do not like the government forces coming up into our region. You, however, we do not mind, because you are here for revenge, and revenge we understand."

Meanwhile, I would continue negotiations with the Taliban to withdraw the sanctuary that they give to AQ. Diplomacy as the main effort, smart (right size, right design, right force, right duration, right targets, etc) military operations in support.

William F. Owen
01-17-2011, 01:32 PM
are Jews based on the rationale that only Muslims and Jews wear beards and the SF weenies aren't Muslim...:D

If they are smart men, who remember to call their mothers, are polite and careful with money, then you are probably correct!

carl
01-17-2011, 02:41 PM
1. Rationalizing that firing a missile from an unmanned drone is somehow less abusive of Pakistan sovereignty than boots on the ground are.

Aren't the drones making strikes in Pakistan based in Pakistan and therefore sanctioned by the Pak Army/ISI? I don't understand how that is abusive of Pakistan's sovereignty regardless of their public pronouncements.

Bob's World
01-17-2011, 03:08 PM
Carl,

One would think, right?

This is a great example of the tremendous conflict of interest we have created for the government of Pakistan. Two of their most vital national interests are:

1. Maintaining a close relationship with the U.S. (particularly a U.S. that is working to get closer to India every day); and

2. Maintain control over an unstable Afghanistan through the employment of the Pashtun populace/Taliban.

During the Soviet invasion we shared these interests, and then after that, but prior to 9/11 we were neutral as to the second one. Following 9/11 that all changed, and that is where the conflict of interest began that I believe is the #1 contributor to instability in Pakistan.

Today a great example of that conflict and how it tears at the fabric of governance in Pakistan is a government that feels compelled to allow Predators to base on their soil on one hand; and to protest violations of their sovereignty on the other. We force a thinly veiled duality that is not sustainable, and shows growing signs of major, negative effects.

We cheer the news of successful strikes, wonder about how bad the collateral damage is, and how serious the reports of such strikes influencing the Pashtun populace to become more anti-government. Soon the mystery may be over if we keep this up. The fact that a Biden-plan rooted in such drone strikes is the top alternative on the table to pop-centric nation building is worrisome to say the least.

Ken White
01-17-2011, 04:43 PM
If they are smart men, who remember to call their mothers, are polite and careful with money, then you are probably correct!they generally fit the first three factors and failed miserably on the third... :D

Everyone needs a Gold Rolex... ;)

Even if the second hand moves in full second increments. :rolleyes:

Entropy
01-17-2011, 05:10 PM
Bob,

What about Kashmir?

Bill Moore
01-17-2011, 05:18 PM
Posted by Ken,


Even if the second hand moves in full second increments. You could get real fakes for $35.00 in Thailand, may be cheaper now with the devaluation of the Baht. Isn't that being careful with your money? :D

Bob,

I think our government has made all your proposals (or similiar ones) only to be rejected by Pakistan. While I agree there is some blow back from the drone strikes, they appear to be striking fear in AQ senior leadership, so I wouldn't so easily give them up (unless the Pakistanis agree to get them). They are still planning attacks on the homeland and we do have the right to self defense.

Assuming we go after AQ and foreigners only, where does that leave us with the Taliban threat against Afghanistan? I think your proposals would only work if we had a time machine, and could go back in time with the knowledge we have now. Maybe we can submit that requirement to SOCOM's S&T development section?

Bob's World
01-17-2011, 08:09 PM
The key to the Taliban threat is the reconciliation process. A process that ISAF throws up its hands and says "that's up to GIROA, we'll just support reintegration at the local level. Besides, we find many of those actors to be beyond the pale."

The WWII equivalent would be the U.S focusing on German activities in South America while leaving Europe to the Europeans. Sometimes you have to get your hands dirty and go after the main effort.

Besides, considering that GIROA is made up of a coalition of ethnic minorities that are fearful of any possible return of Pashtuns into the fold, they are unlikely to take this on of their own accord, and settle for the current program of leveraging ISAF to hold the Pashtuns at bay. The Tajiks appear open to reconciliation, but I doubt it gets much support among Uzbeks and Hazara.

Oh, and I reject the idea that if one takes the wrong path for too long they can never get back on azimuth again. Its never too late to kill a bad program at the pentagon, and its never too late to dump a bad plan either.

Bill Moore
01-18-2011, 05:24 AM
Posted by Bob's World,


Oh, and I reject the idea that if one takes the wrong path for too long they can never get back on azimuth again. Its never too late to kill a bad program at the pentagon, and its never too late to dump a bad plan either.

Wouldn't it be nice if it was really that simple? We just huddle around the map and come to consensus that our current plan is pretty stupid, so we agree to change it. What does changing it mean? If it means abandoning our friends, who put their trust in us, to years of ethnic warfare and bloodshed; then is changing really a viable option? If it results in another post Vietnam War foreign policy slump where we're risk adverse (gun shy) and refuse to get involved where it is wise to get involved because our memories of the Afghanistan conflict, then is changing a viable option? We pulled a lot of nations into a just conflict that we never developed a viable strategy for, and now we're saying after years of denial that maybe we didn't get right, so we're going to change our plans, are you blokes game? I think your onto something with the decent interval, but the blow back will be significant in ways we can't even imagine now.

Another option, since we did commit to solving this problem with our military is to cut the military loose to actually fight the enemy. We can't say it won't work, when we have refused to attempt that approach since 9/11. We talked a tough game, but we quickly lost momentum and now are mired down by legal bureaucrats, scary assumptions that probably have limited basis in fact, and a COIN and Nation Building dogma that is distracting us from the real issues that are in our national interests.

I hear what you're saying and agree we need to get off the track we're on now, but simply changing plans isn't that simple.

Bob's World
01-18-2011, 11:30 AM
Bill

I agree, "true change" is extremely hard. I suspect 'the World' expected a substantive change to our approach in Afghanistan following the election of President Obama, and that indeed would have been the perfect opportunity.

Problem was that he had been mislead by the "experts" as to both the nature of the threat, the risk to our nation, and the viability of various cures. He also had been roundly abused by the Republicans as weak on foreign policy, so he had little choice but to jump into Afghanistan with both feet. Thus "Obama's War." We changed the tone of our approach a bit, increased the resources, but essentially left the framework unchanged, opting for "harder, faster," over "smarter."

The "experts" are just as loud today, though the metrics coming back from the surge efforts are making them nervous. The "Biden Plan" is beginning to take on new life. If I was gambling man, and asked what the most likely friendly COA currently is, my money would be on "Create a 'decent interval' with the surge, then shift to the Biden Plan and withdraw."

If I were asked if I thought that was a viable plan, I would have to say "No." It may well save our bacon, but it only delays a likely replay that could look a lot like the final days of South Vietnam, or more accurately, the final days of Afghan communists following the Soviet withdrawal.

There is no need to run out on our friends to make true change, in fact, we actually put our friends in a much better spot by making true change now, rather than by forcing them to stay on the current ride to its inevitable finale.

The Northern Alliance and the minority populaces they represent will be far better served by a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and the Pashtuns that leads to a new constitution and more balanced and equitable governance than the current model, than they are by leaving them to their own devices and years of violence. The violence will likely increase and potentially end in the Northern Alliance fleeing for their lives. The US and our influence and reputation is far better served by designing and overseeing the former rather than the latter as well.

BL, is we have options.

Dayuhan
01-20-2011, 02:43 AM
There is no need to run out on our friends to make true change, in fact, we actually put our friends in a much better spot by making true change now, rather than by forcing them to stay on the current ride to its inevitable finale.

The Northern Alliance and the minority populaces they represent will be far better served by a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and the Pashtuns that leads to a new constitution and more balanced and equitable governance than the current model, than they are by leaving them to their own devices and years of violence. The violence will likely increase and potentially end in the Northern Alliance fleeing for their lives. The US and our influence and reputation is far better served by designing and overseeing the former rather than the latter as well.

This works very well if the Taliban and the Pashtuns will settle for "a new constitution and more balanced and equitable governance". If they will not, and if they see a deal simply as a way to get the US out of the picture so they can toss our Constitution in the bin and resume governing the way they govern, it doesn't work at all. What reason have we to believe that the former scenario is what would happen? The ethnic minorities clearly believe that the latter scenario is what will happen, which is why they don't want a deal.

What can we offer the non-Pashtuns as protection against a Pashtun majority and a Pakistani-backed Taliban? A Constitution? A Constitution that is not backed by genuine internal consensus, or one that is imposed by an outside force, is a meaningless piece of paper. It will protect nobody.

Should we be trying to design and oversee a political "solution" to Afghanistan's internal conflicts, or should we be focused on achieving our own objectives despite a political culture that we cannot change?

Bob's World
01-20-2011, 08:25 AM
No, we support and defend the constitution, not the man.

We stop creating a functional "sanctuary" for Karzai's poor governance to function from within and go after the root causes of the insurgency.

Dayuhan
01-20-2011, 11:34 AM
No, we support and defend the constitution, not the man.

The current Constitution? I thought that was the source of all the problems...

Defending the Constitution makes perfect sense to an American; I wonder how much sense it makes to Afghans. This is a feature of our political culture, and I'm not sure we can superimpose it on theirs, or that we should try.


We stop creating a functional "sanctuary" for Karzai's poor governance to function from within and go after the root causes of the insurgency.

Is this really "bad governance" or is it simply Afghan governance?

Root cause of insurgency may simply be that the Taliban want to take the country back and neither we nor the non-Pashtun populace consider that an acceptable outcome. Deciding that everybody should just share power under a balanced Constitutional system might be ideal for us... but is that ambition consistent with Afghan political culture, and do we have the right or the capacity to impose such an outcome?

Bob's World
01-20-2011, 12:13 PM
You may be right, but I highly doubt it. Of course the "Taliban want to take the country back." The question is why, and how are their reasonable goals balanced with those who are currently in power. The Republicans can't simply run the Democrats off to Canada and write a new constitution that excludes them for further participation in government; and neither can Karzai. At least, not without being met by a growing insurgency since he pulled that stunt with our support and blessing.

"poor governance" as I employ it in my work is rooted in human nature. The facts, cultures, beliefs, etc of every community are unique and shape what triggers such human nature responses; but in the end, people are people. So no, poor governance is not just Afghan governance. The Afghans are fully capable of being just and equitable. They are fully capable of designing and employing methods of selecting government officials that are perceived as legitimate by the populace; and they are fully capable of drafting a constitution that guards against abuses of governmental power and that protects individual rights deemed essential to these people.

But you dodge the main point. We have built a bubble around the Karzai government and protect it, while at the same time refusing to engage directly the aspects of it that fuel this insurgency. We agonize over why the Pakistan government protects that Taliban, yet never seem to wonder why we similarly protect the Karzai government. But this is the nature of COIN doctrine so closely related to TTPs developed over generations of colonial interventions.

Until we remove the self-imposed sanctuary we have created around the Karzai government, we are merely working our tails off to manage the symptoms of the problems that are caused by the nature and policies of that very government.

And obviously I mean defend the "new constitution" that is step 2 of the reconciliation and constitutional loya jirga that I see as vital to making true headway on bringing stability to these people and this region.

omarali50
01-20-2011, 10:24 PM
Robert,

The Republicans and Democrats have co-existed and cooperated under a democratic constitution for over a century. The taliban are not the democrats (or the Republicans). You need to stop seeing at Afghanistan as some kind of 51st state.
The US can:
1. With enough determination and finesse (NOT an infinite amount of money or manpower, but definitely more determination and FINESSE than they may be capable of) stabilize this current ruling coalition, including deals with reconcilable Taliban and pressing Pakistan to cooperate with such deals. While it is not clear if that is a job the US should have taken on in the first place, it is a job they promised to do. Still, realpolitik (no oil in Afghanistan, not worth it, etc) and determined opposition from GHQ may dictate that this aim be dropped.
2. Stabilize and help to defend a new regime with less ambitious aims, but one that guarantees protections for those parties that stuck their neck out and worked with the US against the Taliban. This would mean a rupture with Pakistan and renewed civil war, but with the anti-taliban regime having an upper hand in large chunks of the country. It would get very ugly though. I personally think Pakistan would suffer most in this scenario, but the Pakistani army has to do what the army has to do. But from an American point of view, its very much doable and the cost is relatively low.
3. Pull out with Pakistani help and let Pakistan negotiate some deal between the parties in Afghanistan. This is the least expensive option. It will be followed by a renewed civil war and a bigger regional mess (because the deal will not stick), but that will be China's heacache (and India's and Iran's and so on). I assume this is what you might pick as the least bad of the three scenarios I listed? (i obviously did not list your 51st state scenario, but that one does not look plausible to me).
I should add that I dont expect any of these scenarios to come to pass soon. I expect more of the current picture for several years and then some unexpected disaster in Pakistan may change the situation. It doesnt look like there is any way out of the current impasse with current assumptions.