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SWJED
09-18-2007, 08:14 AM
Moderator's Note

Being an outsider to the protracted debate in the USA over COIN I am familiar with some of the names and prompted by a new book review of Colonel Gian Gentile's latest book, I have merged six threads today. On a quick review some were single posts and others longer discussions here. This thread was called 'Eating Soup with a Spoon' and is now 'The Col. Gentile collection and debate'. Somehow I suspect there are other threads as 'Gentile' appears in 162 threads, but for now this is enough.(ends).


Eating Soup with a Spoon (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780) - Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile, Armed Forces Journal


The Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations (COIN), in many respects, is a superb piece of doctrinal writing. The manual, FM 3-24 "Counterinsurgency," is comparable in breadth, clarity and importance to the 1986 FM 100-5 version of "Operations" which came to be known as "AirLand Battle.

The new manual's middle chapters that pertain to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations are especially helpful and relevant to senior commanders in Iraq. But a set of nine paradoxes in the first chapter of the manual removes a piece of reality of counterinsurgency warfare that is crucial for those trying to understand how to operate within it...

SteveMetz
09-18-2007, 09:45 AM
Eating Soup with a Spoon (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780) - Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile, Armed Forces Journal

I, of course, take issue with the basic premise of the article. I believe we treat counterinsurgency as a variant of war not because that is the most strategically effective approach, but because we have been unable to transcend Cold War thinking. We know how to fight wars. We're good at it. So we pretend that things not amenable to warfighting are, in fact, war. It's a classic example of the old adage "when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In fact, I think there is an inverse correlation between the extent to which we approach a counterinsurgency campaign as warfighting and the success we meet (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, El Salvador).

I'll be interested to see how the debate unfolds on the AFJ discussion board (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/forums/showthread.php?p=38378929#post38378929).

goesh
09-18-2007, 12:08 PM
Mom and Pop back home don't want Sonny boy and Sissy schmoozing with the enemy, they want dead enemies first and foremost. The hard sell of COIN goes way beyond a cold war mindset. Financiers and carpetbaggers aren't about to educate the Public to the efficacy and need for COIN, that's for sure and the Military isn't capable at this juncture in our history to take on the task of educating the Public nor is it necessarily their role. For one thing, to enter the Public realm with its informal give and take and free-flow of information and critique with all its ignorance and insight requires latitude and flexibility the Military doesn't fully possess. There is a disconnect in the Public mind between killing and disabling enemies and probably always will be - if you ain't gonna' kill 'em, send in the Peace Corps type of thinking. The COIN learning curve and proving grounds Iraq is providing is being wasted IMO because of an ignorant Public, power hungry politicians and carpetbaggers, in that order. Ultimately, We The People are responsible for our woes and worries, not our Military and not our politicians.

Rob Thornton
09-18-2007, 01:23 PM
I do not take issue with the fact that War is violent and that COIN is war – in my reading of 3-24, I don’t think it does either. Part of this is my preference to always view doctrine as descriptive and not prescriptive (Unit SOPs are generally prescriptive). I’d also say that I never saw guys on the ground contemplating if it was a good idea or a bad one to shoot a clearly identified AIF setting an IED, carrying an RPG, or PKC, or even setting up a mortar – nobody was confused about the best way of immediately securing the populace was to kill those AIF actively engaged in violent activity. If there was information on a cache or meeting of AIF conducting plans or related activity – a mission was generated as quickly as possible to capture or kill them. The Iraqis and CF I worked with understood that until physical security was established, the other LLOOs would be compromised – they also understood that you had to prepared to quickly transition from conducting a Community Engagement type activity to pouncing on the enemy if he showed the will to contest our control of an area.

At the level where dyed in the wool insurgents seek to impose their will on the population it is a duel & no amount of LLOOs is probably going to convince them to give up - this minority is going to have to be captured or killed by either HN or CF.

I don't think 3-24 advocates sacrificing Tactical success - it just acknowledges that you can't pursue purely lethal Tactical operations and expect that success at that level will translate to Operational and Strategic success in COIN, or for that matter any type of war. Do we want it - you bet - every time we meet that enemy we should relentlessly pursue him until he is captured, killed, denied any freedom of movement, expelled, etc. Tactical success is credibility, and it permits our (friendly forces) own freedom of movement to pursue the LLOOs that can be translated to Operational and Strategic success in a COIN environment.

Clausewitz’s duel where there are winners and losers is appropriate. Within a province or city where insurgents have the initiative and unrestricted freedom of movement then COIN forces (HN or CF) will not – it’s a zero sum game – you either have the initiative or you don’t at what ever level you are considering. The priority for COIN forces at that point goes to seizing and retaining the initiative. This begins with lethal operations at the Tactical & Operational levels, but does not end there. 3-24 recommends transitioning to a mix of security operations and other LLOOs to develop the PMSEII so that while those who will not re-enter society are captured or killed, the conditions which lend credibility to the insurgent message and attract people to the insurgent cause are changed.

Within the COIN environment there are ongoing operations that are going to feel more like the “Other then War” we once doctrinally used to describe those missions. The problem with that doctrinal description was that increasingly those environments proved that they could go to “War” on one side of a city, while on the other side of the city it remained a “Other then” environment. However, you can’t sacrifice the gains you’ve made that permitted a transition on one side of the river to a mix of lethal and LLOOs; and you can’t sacrifice the gains that permitted a larger transition at the provincial level – these are the operations that provide the long term gains because they address the conditions that made the insurgency possible.

At the lower tactical echelons the focus is going to be sharper by comparison with larger echelons. If a BCT has the bulk of a province, it may have two TFs focusing primarily on LLOOs because the conditions permit it. However, the other TF may be clearing insurgents for months – the enemy gets a vote, and may have decided that he is willing to fight and die within the battlespace assigned to that TF. However within the Battlespace assigned to that TF – the part of the city assigned to a specific Company or CO TM may have a local leader that has galvanized the community against the goals of the insurgents – the violence within that community might be limited to assassinations and car bombs targeting the community leadership from insurgents infiltrating that company AOR– but its still lethal. The higher the echelon in COIN, the greater the chance that it contains different types of threats, must pursue different types of LOOs and LLOOs.

I don’t think LTC Nagl or any other contributor to the 3-24 would take issue with that. On the Daily show – he made the remark – I have to paraphrase – “be prepared to kill”. Operrations on the ground would seem to reflect this – the number of AIF killed or captured, the number of caches seized and the limitations of AIF freedom of movement started with, or were generated from our ability to impose our will on the enemy through the use of violence. However, that tactical success was built upon with other LLOOs that engaged the communities and secured additional benefits that could not be attained otherwise. The NGO community and passive IOs can’t conduct COIN because they don’t have the capability to employ violence or contest the armed resistance employed by insurgents – we do. However, because COIN occurs in a Social setting, and is a contest for the will and support of the citizen – we must be able to follow up security by generating the foundations for stability.

No doctrine IMHO should be a prescription for a problem – this is Clausewitz’s recognition that there is a subjective nature to War. Every War is going to be unique in the subjective due to the political context which surrounds it. There are all kinds of political goals by the various enemies we find in Iraq – the subjective nature of War may be different in Baghdad, then Anbar – that’s just the way it is. If we conduct a COIN campaign in another part of the world, those conditions will change along with the subjective nature unique to that War. The Objective nature, that War is violent, it has winners and losers, it is rife with fog, friction and chance, and the more protracted it is- the more chance plays a role, it is a social activity, it makes no sense when divorced from its political context is valid in any War.

The problem with any doctrine that addresses the complexity of War is going to be its interpretation – I’m not sure you can have a doctrine that is going to change that while remaining broad enough in scope to acknowledge both the Objective and Subjective nature of War. Take what works and apply it to the War you (your element) are in, and save the rest when conditions change – that is the value in descriptive doctrine.
Best regards, Rob

marct
09-18-2007, 01:27 PM
Hi Steve,


I, of course, take issue with the basic premise of the article. I believe we treat counterinsurgency as a variant of war not because that is the most strategically effective approach, but because we have been unable to transcend Cold War thinking. We know how to fight wars. We're good at it. So we pretend that things not amenable to warfighting are, in fact, war. It's a classic example of the old adage "when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."

I'm not sure if I agree with your sketch of the causal logic, but I certainly agree with your "act as if" conclusion; at least for the institution qua institution. Still and all, I find Gentile's logic flawed. In particular, the following paragraph really bothers me.


Yet the paradoxes actually deceive by making overly simple the reality of counterinsurgency warfare and why it is so hard to conduct it at the ground level for the combat soldier. The eminent scholar and strategic thinker Eliot Cohen noted that counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting. In trying to teach its readers to eat soup with a knife, the COIN manual discards the essence and reality of counterinsurgency warfare fighting, thereby manifesting its tragic flaw.

Let me pull this apart.


Yet the paradoxes actually deceive by making overly simple the reality of counterinsurgency warfare and why it is so hard to conduct it at the ground level for the combat soldier.

I would suggest that the use of paradoxes is a) quite normal in getting anyone to perceive a new viewpoint, b) inherently "simple" in presentation but complex in "unfolding", and c) only deceitful when they contradict already internalized paradoxes (e.g. "Peace through superior firepower", etc.). Anyone who has read any of the major works one Rites of Passage (or symbolism for that matter) knows that paradoxes are crucial in shifting a person from one role to another (the "why's" take much longer to explain, but are partly covered in a previous post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=24781#post24781) of mine). That being said, this sentence is a strawman.


The eminent scholar and strategic thinker Eliot Cohen noted that counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting.

A truly fascinating example of mixing a resort to "traditional authority (in the Weberian sense) with really poor logic. First, the appeal to "traditional authority" - imply that you are quoting, without quoting (or referencing), a scholar. The second point about poor logic is a touch trickier.

Gentile relies on an appeal to traditional authority to define "counterinsurgency war" as "war". The fact that they are perceived as somehow different, shown by the use of "counterinsurgency" as a modifier, appears to be irrelevant to Gentile who proceeds to assert an essence, in the philosophical sense, to "war" and, by a backwards chain of logic, assert the primacy of the same essence to "counterinsurgency war". This neatly avoids the annoying little point that "counterinsurgency war" is perceptually (and linguistically and doctrinally) defined as an intersection set of two classes: counterinsurgency and war. Where is the second "essence"? This brings us to


In trying to teach its readers to eat soup with a knife, the COIN manual discards the essence and reality of counterinsurgency warfare fighting, thereby manifesting its tragic flaw.

Given the strawman and illogical "logic" already used, this conclusion is both unavoidable and, at the same time, tragically flawed. What he has missed is that FM 3-24 is, in fact, attempting to define the "essence" if you will of "counterinsurgency", not "war" (i.e. his missed class), and to show the intersection with "war".

Jedburgh
09-18-2007, 02:10 PM
In his attempt to tear down the "paradox" of tactical success guarantees nothing, he completely misses the meaning of tactical success itself.

In the article, he completely focuses his perception of tactical success on what it means to his soldiers: their morale and fighting spirit. He discounts the importance of non-kinetic operations and pushes the importance the fight. He doesn't bother to clarify how aggressive engagement is going to help stabilize Iraq or defeat the bad guys - he just states it will keep up the morale and fighting spirit of his troops. This is almost the absolute stereotype of the conventional Armor officer who can't stand anything other than HIC.

Don't misunderstand - I'm certainly not dismissing the importance of troop morale. The "cognitive dissonance" issue he mentions certainly does exist - but the essential concept of the three-block war and troops having to rapidly adapt and shift focus between killing and building has been around far longer than the term itself. Its just been ignored by many in the Big Army.

However, I feel that the major error he makes is of separating the two aspects - killing and rolling up bad guys in this fight is inextricably linked with the essential non-kinetic ops required to stabilize and secure the country. They have to be linked and coordinated, with solid intel driving both into a fused effort. He makes it sound like you have to focus on one or the other; it ain't so, Joe. You have to do both, and that's what makes COIN (especially the impure messy COIN, SASO, CT, LE blend we have in Iraq) so difficult.

...I don't think they play at all fairly, and they all quarrel so dreadfully one can't hear oneself speak--and they don't seem to have any rules in particular; at least, if there are, nobody attends to them--and you've no idea how confusing it is....

Alice

wm
09-18-2007, 02:22 PM
I like MarcT's discussion of the illogic of the Gentile piece. Another way of understanding the problem is that Gentile has made a category mistake, sort of as follows:

'Counterinsurgency' (or 'COIN') names a category of things , or a set if you prefer. 'War' likewise names a category of things, or another set. In the passage quoted by MarcT, Gentile asserts, without any argument, that 'COIN' is a subcategory or subset of 'War.' (I suspect he also wants 'COIN' to be a proper subset of 'War,' but that point is not really relevant to this discussion, IMO.) He seems to presume that the set 'COIN' is wholely contained in the set 'War.' He has left out the possibility that the two sets may be completely disjoint (have no members in common) or only partially overlap/intersect (have some members in common). Either of these latter two options could put 'War' and 'COIN' at the same categorical level while Gentile's option makes 'War' a superset, a higher (or more fundamental and, therefore, more inclusive) category than 'COIN.'

Regarding the use of paradox, I submit that when one finds paradoxes in one's explanation that means that one's explanation is not as reflective of the truth (defined here as corresponding to reality) as one would like to believe. Additionally, paradoxes indicate that the truth of one's explanation (truth now defined as coherence, or the "hanging together" of the explanatory story one tells with other beliefs one holds) is not quite as likely as it could be.

Pointing out paradoxes in an explanation, in my experience, is most useful for rejecting that explanation's logical and practical efficacy. In other words, finding paradoxes in one's theory of how to counter an insurgency successfully would indicate that the theory might not be as good as one expects in achieving the desired results on a more universal scale.This is because as one expands the cases to be explained, more things come up that cause "disconnects" (or paradoxes) within one's explnatory schema.



I would suggest that the use of paradoxes is a) quite normal in getting anyone to perceive a new viewpoint, b) inherently "simple" in presentation but complex in "unfolding", and c) only deceitful when they contradict already internalized paradoxes (e.g. "Peace through superior firepower", etc.).
. . .
Gentile relies on an appeal to traditional authority to define "counterinsurgency war" as "war". The fact that they are perceived as somehow different, shown by the use of "counterinsurgency" as a modifier, appears to be irrelevant to Gentile who proceeds to assert an essence, in the philosophical sense, to "war" and, by a backwards chain of logic, assert the primacy of the same essence to "counterinsurgency war". This neatly avoids the annoying little point that "counterinsurgency war" is perceptually (and linguistically and doctrinally) defined as an intersection set of two classes: counterinsurgency and war. Where is the second "essence"?
. . .
Given the strawman and illogical "logic" already used, this conclusion is both unavoidable and, at the same time, tragically flawed. What he has missed is that FM 3-24 is, in fact, attempting to define the "essence" if you will of "counterinsurgency", not "war" (i.e. his missed class), and to show the intersection with "war".

marct
09-18-2007, 02:48 PM
Hi WM,


Another way of understanding the problem is that Gentile has made a category mistake

Agreed. Personally, I prefer the use of fuzzy sets rather than crisp sets since they appear to be more reflective of human thought and characterization - "reality" if you will - but I believe that his argument is flawed in both.


Regarding the use of paradox, I submit that when one finds paradoxes in one's explanation that means that one's explanation is not as reflective of the truth (defined here as corresponding to reality) as one would like to believe. Additionally, paradoxes indicate that the truth of one's explanation (truth now defined as coherence, or the "hanging together" of the explanatory story one tells with other beliefs one holds) is not quite as likely as it could be.

I'm not sure I agree with you on this - it may be reflective of linguistic limitations pertaining to mapping reality. Still and all, that's a subject that probably needs a long discussion with lots of potables ;). On the other hand, I would note that there is a difference between using a paradox as an explanatory mechanism vs. using a paradox as an operational mechanism designed to shift perceptions so that a different mapping structure can be perceived (a point Gentile also misses IMO). The paradoxes in FM 3-24 are, to my mind, koans designed to induce a cognitive dissonance with "regular warfighting" perceptions. As such, I don't see them as explanatory paradoxes but, rather, as operational ones. I do agree with you that the use of paradoxes for internal explanation (coherence - your second definition of truth) is a danger sign.


Pointing out paradoxes in an explanation, in my experience, is most useful for rejecting that explanation's logical and practical efficacy. In other words, finding paradoxes in one's theory of how to counter an insurgency successfully would indicate that the theory might not be as good as one expects in achieving the desired results on a more universal scale.This is because as one expands the cases to be explained, more things come up that cause "disconnects" (or paradoxes) within one's explnatory schema.

Agreed. In fairness, though, all nomenological deductive theories are prone to this problem - it's an inherent attribute of mapping limitations. What is important, at the operational level or application level is whether or not the theory can "satisfice" in much the same manner as Newtonian physics works quite nicely below .3c. I think Ted's example of the "meaning" of tactical success is a good example of that.

wm
09-18-2007, 03:12 PM
Hi WM,
I would note that there is a difference between using a paradox as an explanatory mechanism vs. using a paradox as an operational mechanism designed to shift perceptions so that a different mapping structure can be perceived (a point Gentile also misses IMO). The paradoxes in FM 3-24 are, to my mind, koans designed to induce a cognitive dissonance with "regular warfighting" perceptions. As such, I don't see them as explanatory paradoxes but, rather, as operational ones.
R. G. Collingwood described an interesting phenomenon in explanations that he called the Fallacy of Swapping Horses (as in "you can't swap horses in the middle of a stream.") I have no qualms about your distinction as long as we remember to keep astride of the same "horse of paradox" as that mounted by the author. The koan comparison is extremely apt IMO. I think we might also call out your use of paradox as a sub-category of cognitive dissonance. Your thoughts?

Steve Blair
09-18-2007, 03:16 PM
I'd be curious to see what he has to say regarding what's been posted to date.

That said, I'm also curious as to why there is such a rush to both ignore the heritage of 3-24 and to attempt to have the Army repeat its past mistakes when it comes to COIN. 3-24 is in many ways a direct descendant of the USCM Small Wars Manual, and that clearly didn't damage the Marines' ability to conduct conventional operations. One the reasons 3-24 was needed was the rush to discard lessons learned in Vietnam (and elsewhere)...so in a certain sense the wheel needed to be invented again. I honestly don't think this is a "one or the other" proposition, and attempts to make it so (by either side) really damage the value of what's in 3-24.

marct
09-18-2007, 03:36 PM
Hi WM,


R. G. Collingwood described an interesting phenomenon in explanations that he called the Fallacy of Swapping Horses (as in "you can't swap horses in the middle of a stream.") I have no qualms about your distinction as long as we remember to keep astride of the same "horse of paradox" as that mounted by the author. The koan comparison is extremely apt IMO. I think we might also call out your use of paradox as a sub-category of cognitive dissonance. Your thoughts?

Good point. I'm not sure I would call it a sub-category of CD; more of a technology designed to produce CD. Then again, I tend to view symbolic manipulation as a technology, at least in the sense used by Ellul.

One of the more interesting observations about the way paradox operates in religion, and I'm appalled to admit the reference has dropped out of my mind :o, is that paradoxes are crucial for religions but that the resolution of any paradox will shift the further that you work your way into the religion. I think that the same might apply in a COIN situation. Sorry, I'm looping back to the crisp vs. fuzzy distinction here. "War" has, at least on and off for the past 300 years or so, been a relatively crisp set - well defined rules, protocols, etc. Insurgency and Counter-insurgency, on the other hand, comprise a much more fuzzy set - sometimes "war", sometimes not. I would suspect that the "paradoxes" of "war" in the formal, crisp sense, are both well understood, mapped out and routinized within military institutions, while those of insurgency - counterinsurgency are not. This might explain the hysteresis effect on military institutions during peacetime.

Anyway, that's for another discussion sometime...


I'd be curious to see what he has to say regarding what's been posted to date.

I am too.

Jedburgh
09-18-2007, 03:41 PM
I'd be curious to see what he has to say regarding what's been posted to date.....
Here's another view (http://a517dogg.blogspot.com/2007/08/counterinsurgency-metrics.html) of Gentile's perspective on COIN:

....I went to this event at the Heritage Foundation this morning, titled "When Do You Know You're Winning? Combating Insurgencies - Past, Present, and Future." You can watch video (http://multimedia.heritage.org/content/wm/Lehrman-080207b.wvx) or listen to the mp3 (http://multimedia.heritage.org/mp3/Lehrman-080207b.mp3) of it yourself if you want to - everything was on the record....

...the truly alarming thing was LTC Gian Gentile's presentation. LTC Gentile commanded a battalion in Baghdad up until a few weeks ago and is now a professor at West Point. He gave a rundown of the metrics he used. I'll list them in the order he presented them, which according to him is the order of importance:

Security:
- Body count (which he acknowledged as "backwards" but justified by referencing some Eliot Cohen article in 2006 that argued "counterinsurgency is still war, and war's essential element is fighting")
- Number of times he is attacked (he wants it to be as low as possible)
- Number of dead bodies found on the street
- Sectarian makeup of Iraqi units he's partnered with
- Number of local tips he gets
- Number of enemy captured

Governance:
- Opening shops on the main street
- Keeping useful local leaders alive
- "Normal" activity of people
- Willingness of Sunnis to travel across Baghdad
- Essential services, employment levels

These seem to be great metrics if your first priority is leaving Iraq with as many soldiers as possible, with little regard to the situation you are leaving to the guys relieving you. It is conducive to holing up in your Forward Operating Base and leaving only to react to events. There is no mention of the local political situation that the security situation is supposed to be oriented around. Furthermore he has as "metrics" things which aren't even nominally under his control, such as the makeup of Iraqi units and the willingness of Sunnis to travel in other commanders' Areas of Responsibility. His emphasis on body count as his primary metric was especially depressing - supposedly we had learned that was a poor metric back in Vietnam (and probably earlier).

LTC Gentile did say some useful things however - he pointed out that the situation can't be measured by quantifiable variables, and that gut feeling and judgment are the overriding variables, and that progress should be presented in a narrative form rather than through graphs, etc. However I was left with a fair amount of questions...
Bolded phrase reflects an aspect of the reported brief that is identical to the article currently under discussion.

Gian P Gentile
09-18-2007, 06:55 PM
Clearly I have struck a nerve in many of the readers of this blog. I will say up front that at least I reply to criticisms made of what I have to say when others of more fame and fortune than I and of rock star status clearly see themselves above the fray of this blog.

Admittedly this piece was written in evocative and impressionistic form. That is to say I wrote this piece from the premise of how the coin’s paradoxes appeared to me when I read it at the end of my combat tour in command of a combat battalion in west-baghdad in 2006.

I must have missed the class as Dr Tyrell states and I never really did get Foucault or Derrida because for the life of me I don’t get what he is telling me. I guess I just must be slow. No matter, I will restate my impression of the coin manual’s paradoxes when I was in combat in Iraq and based on reflection upon my return: my impression was that the paradoxes removed the essence of war which is fighting. You might disagree with what I have to say but I think the logic is pretty clear.

Reference Dr Metz’s implication that I am stuck in the old “cold war mindset” I suggest that he along with so many other experts are the ones stuck in a box. He like so many others are a part of the great narrative that has been constructed on US involvement in iraq. It goes something like the army didn’t’ take coin seriously before the war and because of that the army has screwed up iraq. But happily with the help of experts and some enlightened thinkers within the active army we have now finally figured out how to do it; aka the surge. I argue that this entire construct is flawed. That by and large the American army has done pretty well in Iraq—even prior to the surge--with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. My article in fact threatens the intellectual base of the new coin doctrine because it calls its basic theoretical premises into question. Counterinsurgency war is not “armed social science” as Kilkullen has called it. Instead at its basic level is violence and death; this was my impression after a year in Baghdad.

As for Jedburg’s mean statement that I was hunkered down in a fob I point him to a recent oped piece that I had published in Army Times on that subject. He could also ask any number of 4 star generals on down to the lowest private in my squadron if I “got it” and new how to do coin. And finally, he might try asking other commanders who lost soldiers what their priorities were. I know what I said at that Heritage panel did not fit in with what the coin experts believe actual coin ops should be like, but again my impression of counterinsurgency warfare is that fighting is its basic element and so killing and not being killed were my top priorities. So go ahead Jedburg and ask people who knew of me and I trust you will not get the profile back that you have created on me.

I will pose a counterfactual again that I posted last week on this blog: If the army had read books like Nagl’s before the war and trained and taken seriously coin operations would things be any different in iraq than they are now? If the army had focused predominantly on coin prior to 2003 would the march to Baghdad gone the same way?

In my mind FM3-24 has become the army’s primary operational doctrine, and to its detriment. It has pushed us into doing things that make no sense to me: like arming the enemy of the government that we support; like dogmatically using the tactics of combat outposts in areas where other methods might be better but we do this because a French officer had success with them in the mountains of Algeria in 1958.

I think the coin doctrine has merit and can work under certain conditions; like French Algeria in the late 50s or El Salvador in the 1980s. But Civil War iraq in 2007? What we need is fresh thinking on how to operate there but the seduction of FM 3-24 in our army has pushed us into dogmatism.

One last point. A good friend of mine who was closely involved with the rebuilding of the army and its intellectual base after Vietnam told me recently that prior to its 1986 publication FM 100-5 had at least 110 articles written about it in the years leading up to its publication that fundamentally questioned its theoretical premises. How many articles written in Military Review, Parameters, etc have fundamentally questioned our new coin doctrine? Only a few.

If you want to read a quality piece written by another combat battalion commander read LTC Ross Brown’s recent article in Military Review on his experience in Iraq in 2005. Or ask some of our infantry leaders currently serving in Anbar if they are using FM 3-24 as their operational guide or the older FM 90-8 on counter guerilla operations.

To repeat, war is not “armed social science,” though many of you may want it to be.

SteveMetz
09-18-2007, 07:17 PM
Reference Dr Metz’s implication that I am stuck in the old “cold war mindset” I suggest that he along with so many other experts are the ones stuck in a box. He like so many others are a part of the great narrative that has been constructed on US involvement in iraq. It goes something like the army didn’t’ take coin seriously before the war and because of that the army has screwed up iraq. But happily with the help of experts and some enlightened thinkers within the active army we have now finally figured out how to do it; aka the surge. I argue that this entire construct is flawed. That by and large the American army has done pretty well in Iraq—even prior to the surge--with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. My article in fact threatens the intellectual base of the new coin doctrine because it calls its basic theoretical premises into question. Counterinsurgency war is not “armed social science” as Kilkullen has called it. Instead at its basic level is violence and death; this was my impression after a year in Baghdad.

You misstate my point. Agree that the Army has done well in Iraq. The fact that the Army has done well and the chances of ultimate strategic success are still slim illustrates my point exactly: counterinsurgency is not a form of war to be won by the military. Treating it more like war will not alter this.

If we ultimately fail, it will not be because we did not kill enough insurgents. It is, in your phrase, "the strategic and political cards" I have a problem with, not with Army doctrine or performance. War may not be "armed social science" (a phrase, by the way, Dave did not invent--I heard Larry Cable use it at an SF branch conference in the mid 90s). But, by the same token, counterinsurgency is not war. But because we have this great military hammer, we treat all security problems as nails amenable to warfighting.

Steve Blair
09-18-2007, 07:18 PM
To repeat, war is not “armed social science,” though many of you may want it to be.

Nor is war always the total "all or nothing" construct that many want it to be. And where exactly did Jedhburg accuse you of hunkering down in a fob?

In any case, I still think the main point of 3-24 is to get people to think about what they're doing. And the Army's track record in preserving any doctrine other than that of massive state-versus-state warfare is abysmal, going all the way back to before the Civil War. The Army as an institution has always enjoyed a certain level of dogmatism in its operational theory.

To pose an answer to your counterfactual, I would say that the situation in Iraq could certainly been different had more senior planners understood the implications of regime change and societal reconstruction...which is part of COIN. Would the march to Baghdad gone the same way? Quite possibly. Again, I present the example of the Marine Corps, which has managed to preserve both a focus on large-scale conflict and a fair stockpile of COIN lessons prior to 3-24's publication.

Merv Benson
09-18-2007, 07:40 PM
I will not try to bridge the differences between LtC. Gentile an others. I think most of his metrics make sense despite a different emphasis in the COIN manual. In fact, I think the current operations are doing a better job of destroying the enemy than we were doing with fewer troops. By being in the neighborhoods we are accomplishing two important things. We are denying access to the enemy and we are getting more intelligence on enemy locations through tips. It also means we do not have to buy the same real estate over and over. It is difficult to say that the kinetic operations in the Diyala valley were not aimed at destroying the enemy and his infrastructure in his remaining sanctuary in Iraq.

I think the reports coming out of Anbar provide at least anecdotal evidence that our new allies are not enemies of the central government and are in fact being paid by that government. In other areas we are organizing citizen watches made up of former adversaries who provide their own arms. I suspect this is a transition phase meant to gage their dependability and loyalty.

The Sheiks seem to be the key political component in Iraq to controlling the country. Saddam learned this during his war with Iran and it appears to be holding true as we see groups rallying to our side in both the Sunni and Shia area when the Sheik says to do it.

In short the result of current operations demonstrate less violence against the population by sectarian factions and more effective kinetic operations against both al Qaeda and the Shia militia.

Jedburgh
09-18-2007, 07:45 PM
.....As for Jedburg’s mean statement that I was hunkered down in a fob I point him to a recent oped piece that I had published in Army Times on that subject. He could also ask any number of 4 star generals on down to the lowest private in my squadron if I “got it” and new how to do coin. And finally, he might try asking other commanders who lost soldiers what their priorities were. I know what I said at that Heritage panel did not fit in with what the coin experts believe actual coin ops should be like, but again my impression of counterinsurgency warfare is that fighting is its basic element and so killing and not being killed were my top priorities. So go ahead Jedburg and ask people who knew of me and I trust you will not get the profile back that you have created on me....
I never stated that you "were hunkered down on a FOB". My "mean statement", as you put it, was that your comments were reflective of a stereotypical conventional Armor officer that can't stand anything other than HIC. Thus far, you have not posted anything to counter that perception, other than suggest I go around conducting character interviews. Sir, I do not question your character - I question your grasp of unconventional warfare.

....In my mind FM 3-24 has become the army’s primary operational doctrine, and to its detriment. It has pushed us into doing things that make no sense to me: like arming the enemy of the government that we support; like dogmatically using the tactics of combat outposts in areas where other methods might be better but we do this because a French officer had success with them in the mountains of Algeria in 1958.
I think you greatly overstate the influence of FM 3-24. It is an important doctrinal publication, but our Army has seen tremendous change and evolution in doctrinal pubs across the spectrum since 9-11, many of which are completely new and not doctrinal rewrites. However, I refer you back to RTK's post ( http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=25935&postcount=15) on the interrelationship of operational doctrine. Your constant diatribes against the manual are beginning to sound strident; if you could bring up substantive issues of precisely how it impacts training and other doctrine, that would go a long way towards making your case.

Offhand, I'd also like to say that arming the enemy of the government isn't something that was pushed by anything between the covers of FM 3-24. My view on the matter is stated here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=22282&postcount=4).

...If you want to read a quality piece written by another combat battalion commander read LTC Ross Brown’s recent article in Military Review on his experience in Iraq in 2005....
If you are referring to his Jan-Feb 07 piece, Commander's Assessment: South Baghdad (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb07/Brown.pdf), you are right, that is a good read. However, he specifically addresses the importance of the core subject which I have said that you either avoid, ignore or dismiss: linking killing with building, the kinetic with the non-kinetic. Other than a summary dismissal of armed social science, I would like to hear you elaborate on the fusion of those two aspects of unconventional warfare, as well as on conventional maneuver units' experience with interagency collaboration (or the lack thereof - as LTC Brown states at the end of his article) at the tactical level.

marct
09-18-2007, 07:47 PM
Hi Folks,


I must have missed the class as Dr Tyrell states and I never really did get Foucault or Derrida because for the life of me I don’t get what he is telling me. I guess I just must be slow. No matter, I will restate my impression of the coin manual’s paradoxes when I was in combat in Iraq and based on reflection upon my return: my impression was that the paradoxes removed the essence of war which is fighting. You might disagree with what I have to say but I think the logic is pretty clear.
....
Counterinsurgency war is not “armed social science” as Kilkullen has called it. Instead at its basic level is violence and death; this was my impression after a year in Baghdad.

Well, not being a proponent of either Foucault or Derrida, I'm not sure what they have to do with this. However, yes, your logic was clear. Let me use exactly the same logical form that you used.

According to Clausewitz, war is an extension of politics
Politics is a social science,
Therefore war is an armed social science


Reference Dr Metz’s implication that I am stuck in the old “cold war mindset” I suggest that he along with so many other experts are the ones stuck in a box. He like so many others are a part of the great narrative that has been constructed on US involvement in iraq. It goes something like the army didn’t’ take coin seriously before the war and because of that the army has screwed up iraq. But happily with the help of experts and some enlightened thinkers within the active army we have now finally figured out how to do it; aka the surge.

That is certainly the extreme form of that particular narrative and I believe that it is a narrative that has gained strength, at least in pop culture, over the past 3-4 years.


I argue that this entire construct is flawed. That by and large the American army has done pretty well in Iraq—even prior to the surge--with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. My article in fact threatens the intellectual base of the new coin doctrine because it calls its basic theoretical premises into question.

Why do you think it "threatens the intellectual base of the new coin doctrine"? I certainly don't see any attacks on the underlying premises of the doctrine. Also, I would suggest, that FM 3-24 is not meant as a stand alone but, rather, a complement for other types (classes or categories) of warfare.


I will pose a counterfactual again that I posted last week on this blog: If the army had read books like Nagl’s before the war and trained and taken seriously coin operations would things be any different in iraq than they are now? If the army had focused predominantly on coin prior to 2003 would the march to Baghdad gone the same way?

To answer: possibly. However, let me toss out my own counterfactual: If the Army or, more specifically the planners of the war, had read anything about the Marshall Plan in Germany after WW II, or had bothered to read The Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth Benedict, then the current COIN fight might have been unnecessary. The goal of a strike such as the march to Baghdad should not be to create more situations for killing, but that is the effect it has had since there was only a limited understanding of either previous Army doctrine (e.g. the occupation strategies of Japan and Germany) or a solid institutionalization of COIN principles.

Marc

Van
09-18-2007, 08:04 PM
In an ongoing discussion on this subject with an Air Force officer currently attending U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, I find myself coming to the conclusion that the Cold War model of a smooth continuum from low intensity to high intensity conflict is broken. The break occurs between Low and Mid intensity. The spectrum of conventional conflict, from the smallest fight to superpowers with nukes is a smooth continuum, but Small Wars operations fall in a discrete spectrum.

COIN falls in the Small Wars spectrum. It may be contemporaneous with a conventional fight, as Churchill tried to arrange for the Germans with the SOE and OSS units, and as the Germans arranged for themselves by invading the Balkans. It may be sequel to a conventional war, as for the Allied forces in Germany after WWII, and in Iraq today. It may be a prelude to a conventional war as in Indochina/Viet Nam and as envisioned in classical Latin American guerrilla theory. COIN may also occur in isolation from a conventional fight.

The bottom line is that COIN requires a different skill set than conventional war, and the U.S. military has to be ready for both. The British model as used Ireland and Bosnia is to train for the conventional war, retrain for COIN, and re-retrain after returning from COIN duty. The Canadians dual equip mechanized units with LAVs (wheeled) and tracked vehicles. I hope someone with better knowledge of Canadian doctrine can confirm or deny that they dual train also.

I don't know what would work best for the U.S. We seem to train for the current fight and continue until we've been burned by the other type of fight and throw everything the other direction until the wheel turns and we get burned again. U.S. officers (the ones I talk with at least) seem to like conventional conflict training better, and want to stay in their comfort zone, but they understand that you have to adapt, like it or not. The danger here is that we'll repeat the Air Force's mistake from the fifties and early sixties of thinking that one size of doctrine fits all (the early nuclear Air Force doctrine). (Actually, the Army wasn't much better with the Pentomic Divisions of that era.)

Utter heresy, but perhaps we should indulge the young firebrand Army, AF, and Marine Captains and Navy LTs. Find the smartest and most contrarian, and allow them a shot a writing the new model. It won't happen because of senior egos and rice bowls, but the younglings have some brilliant ideas and radical methods, and giving them looser reins could pay huge dividends.

Ken White
09-18-2007, 10:51 PM
and I'm carnivorous. Not to mention you can eat it with a knife or a spoon, whichever's easier and works best (METT-T for MRE's?)... :D

Van has it right, I think.

Seems to me that LTCs Gentile and Kilcullen are having a techniques disagreement. That's good for everyone. I think FM 3-24 is basically okay, if a tad touchy-feely and I also agree with much of what LTC Gentile says. Thus there's some merit to both sides, IMO -- I suspect, as usual , the average commander will fall in between, most will do it right and ol' METT-T will be the determinant as it always is...

While LTC Gentile alludes to the paradoxes as potentially introducing a mindset it seems to me that he accords it more power than any other document I''ve seen the Army or the Marine Corps publish. I'm afraid our mindset is too deep for one pub to change.

I do disagree with him on one point -- in his comment above he says that the Army has done pretty well in Iraq with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. I agree broadly but would submit the errors in the first eighteen months due to the lack of doctrinal effort and training emphasis on occupation, nation building and counterinsurgency throughout the Army from 1975 until I retired in 1977 and continuing until I retired as a DAC in 1995 were responsible for many those errors. There were a number of people pointing out the likely future and they were diligently ignored. Sort of understandable in the 1975-1990 period; bad ju-ju post 1990, the proverbial handwriting was on the wall... :(

Which gets to my point (and Van's) -- we have got to be a full spectrum Army.

Along that line, there's another article in the AFJ, Culture Battle by Colonel Henry Foresman Jr. That I think speaks to both 3-24 proponents and believers in LTC Gentile's approach. The culture is the problem. He says several things that I think are pertinent:


"This is not to say we should have an Army or military that is not prepared to fight grand wars; rather, we need an Army and a military capable of fighting grand wars and conducting peacekeeping operations, providing military support to civil authority and executing stability and support operations."

He agrees with me; smart guy... :wry:

However, he also makes a very valid point that it seems to me that both 3-24 and LTC Gentile barely touch upon:


"As Iraq has shown, they can defeat us through information dominance — shaping the message the world sees, whether that message is true or not. They can defeat us by eroding the will of the nation to stay the course."

I believe that is a critical point and the last phrase is the reason. I don't care how good we are. Goesh pointed out that Mr. & Mrs. America are basically cool with body bags but they want results. My sensing is he's absolutely correct and if the perception of Mr. & Mrs America is that we aren't doing well; they'll pull th plug. Techniques then become irrelevant.


"The current Army leaders have matured in a culture where they were taught what to think, not how to think..."

My perception also. Good article and bears reading.

Like Steve, I take issue with some of LTC Gian's premises and essentially for the same reason. However, I do not agree that we haven't transcended the Cold war mindset -- I suggest, as does COL Foresman, we haven't transcended the WW II mindset. We are still structured essentially as we are in 1946. For those who say "Brigade Combat Teams," my response is RCT -- with which we fought most of WW II outside the North African Desert. Not to mention Korea then back to Brigades for Viet Nam. Lest I be misunderstood, Brigades are good, Divisions are bad (even if we did err in the structure ot the light infantry Battalions). Notice that we did not do away with the Division...

I think we did not to avoid the two star spaces loss; we may need them to mobilize -- just as we will need the 3K plus Colonels and 3K plus SGM/CSM even though those are the same numbers we had in 1960 with an Army almost twice the size of todays. Mobilization backup is what that's all about but 'mobilization' is (unfortunately and stupidly) a nasty word in Congress. Thus we dissemble to keep the ability to expand tremendously. Prudent; we should. I just think there are better ways to do that.

Creighton Abrams structured the Total Army to force the government to call up the RC to go to war. The tear down of that started in DS/DS because the then CofSA and then DCSOPS hated the idea and fought Congress demands to send ArNG Brigades to Kuwait. Post DS/DS, they continued to do that in various little ways, some effective and some not. What they did not do was prepare for the present (then or now...).

It's mostly about protecting the institution. To fight WW II.

We need to be able to do that but we could be a whole lot smarter in how we go about it and still be prepared to cope with the more likely threats in the next decade or so..

Adrian
09-19-2007, 02:49 AM
As for Jedburg’s mean statement that I was hunkered down in a fob I point him to a recent oped piece that I had published in Army Times on that subject. He could also ask any number of 4 star generals on down to the lowest private in my squadron if I “got it” and new how to do coin. And finally, he might try asking other commanders who lost soldiers what their priorities were. I know what I said at that Heritage panel did not fit in with what the coin experts believe actual coin ops should be like, but again my impression of counterinsurgency warfare is that fighting is its basic element and so killing and not being killed were my top priorities. So go ahead Jedburg and ask people who knew of me and I trust you will not get the profile back that you have created on me.


Jedburgh was not accusing of you of being hunkered down in a fob (I assume you're talking about this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=26233&postcount=12)) - he was quoting from my blog post (http://a517dogg.blogspot.com/2007/08/counterinsurgency-metrics.html) after that Heritage event. For the record I was not accusing you either, merely observing that the mentality of "kill the enemy" first and foremost could conceivably push a commander to only expend his resources when he has the best chance of killing the enemy. That view would make sense if there was a defined amount of enemies, but in a COIN environment where you can create new enemies even when you kill people who deserve to be killed, it doesn't make sense to me - probably because I don't conceive of COIN as a war-fighting mission as much as you do.

That said, anyone who takes on conventional wisdom gets kudos. Also I hadn't made the connection between the frustration factor and the torture issue - good point. Although apparently everyone here disagrees with you, obviously someone needs to write articles like this to force us to reexamine our starting points.

Gian P Gentile
09-19-2007, 10:32 AM
Dear Adrian:

thanks for clarifying that point. I, like most of the participants on this blog, have lots of things going on during the day and i came to it in the afternoon and tried to answer as many points as i could rather quickly.

thanks again for the clarification and for your comments.

wm
09-19-2007, 12:02 PM
I must have missed the class as Dr Tyrell states and I never really did get Foucault or Derrida because for the life of me I don’t get what he is telling me. I guess I just must be slow. No matter, I will restate my impression of the coin manual’s paradoxes when I was in combat in Iraq and based on reflection upon my return: my impression was that the paradoxes removed the essence of war which is fighting. You might disagree with what I have to say but I think the logic is pretty clear. Conspicuous by its absence is any real logic (in the sense of reasoned argumentation) in this response. (Yearling USMA PY201 students would probably fail for an effort like this.) Also conspicuous by its absence is any attempt at rebuttal of my allegation of a category mistake in the article's subsumption of COIN under war. Category mistakes, btw, have been central issues in mainstream Western analytic Philosophy ever since Gilbert Ryle (a good old Oxford Don at Christ Church) coined the term in his 1949 Concept of Mind. Therefore, being confused by Foucault and Derrida (Continental philosophers of the "touchy-feely" sort) is not a good excuse, IMO. Actually the absence of any meaningful reclama or rebuttal discussion on this issue is fully understandable. It seems to indicate a blind spot in the author's conceptual schematism. For more on this topic, one might read the essay by Donald Davidson (another mainstream Anglo-American analytic philosopher of language so the Derrida dodge again won't work) "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," a response to WVO Quine's (Harvard logician) seminal essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Since LTC Gentile is at USMA, perhaps a trip to the second or third floors of Lincoln Hall for some remedial training in logic and critical thinking might be in order. As a minimum, I would suggest a close reading of Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought by David Hackett Fischer.


I argue that this entire construct is flawed. That by and large the American army has done pretty well in Iraq—even prior to the surge--with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. Metrics are always tied to presumptions. If we accept the presumption that the Army's mission in Iraq has been to amass a body count, then I cannot disagree with the quoted claim. However, I tend to think that just accurately placing rounds on target is too narrow a view of the mission. Back in the days of SASO as an Army mission, racking up corpes was not a good metric for the success of that mission. And it still is not a good metric for SASO's replacement.
My article in fact threatens the intellectual base of the new coin doctrine because it calls its basic theoretical premises into question. Counterinsurgency war is not “armed social science” as Kilkullen has called it. Instead at its basic level is violence and death; this was my impression after a year in Baghdad. This is a very telling statement about the author's preconceptions. What was witnessed was violence and death and the witness has choosen to describe this as "counterinsurgency war." However, what Kilcullen addresses is probably more like what Immanuel Kant calls a regulative ideal--not the state of thiings as they are but instead the future state of things that one is trying to attain. The article is a threat because it is reactionary, not because it is visionary. It seeks to turn back the hands of time, not move forward into a brave new world. I suspect that had people in the 18th Century taken the approach described in this rebuttal, then the world would still condone slavery and have many nations ruled under the pretense of the divine right of kings.


I will pose a counterfactual again that I posted last week on this blog: If the army had read books like Nagl’s before the war and trained and taken seriously coin operations would things be any different in iraq than they are now? If the army had focused predominantly on coin prior to 2003 would the march to Baghdad gone the same way? This is a question that is misframed. It really does not matter how much training in COIN had been given prior to the start of OIF. What does matter is that the mission was assigned based on a misreading of the reality on the ground in Iraq. Apparently, senior leadership above the Service departments (and perhaps within them as well) did not forese the need for a COIN force after the regime change was effected. Instead, they seemed to believe that the swap out would be more like what happens between November and January after a Presidential election in the US.


To repeat, war is not “armed social science,” though many of you may want it to be.
War may not be "armed social science," but COIN is not necessarily war simpliciter. I submit that COIN is sui generis.

Ski
09-19-2007, 05:34 PM
Great stuff here as always Ken.



and I'm carnivorous. Not to mention you can eat it with a knife or a spoon, whichever's easier and works best (METT-T for MRE's?)... :D

Van has it right, I think.

Seems to me that LTCs Gentile and Kilcullen are having a techniques disagreement. That's good for everyone. I think FM 3-24 is basically okay, if a tad touchy-feely and I also agree with much of what LTC Gentile says. Thus there's some merit to both sides, IMO -- I suspect, as usual , the average commander will fall in between, most will do it right and ol' METT-T will be the determinant as it always is...

While LTC Gentile alludes to the paradoxes as potentially introducing a mindset it seems to me that he accords it more power than any other document I''ve seen the Army or the Marine Corps publish. I'm afraid our mindset is too deep for one pub to change.

I do disagree with him on one point -- in his comment above he says that the Army has done pretty well in Iraq with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. I agree broadly but would submit the errors in the first eighteen months due to the lack of doctrinal effort and training emphasis on occupation, nation building and counterinsurgency throughout the Army from 1975 until I retired in 1977 and continuing until I retired as a DAC in 1995 were responsible for many those errors. There were a number of people pointing out the likely future and they were diligently ignored. Sort of understandable in the 1975-1990 period; bad ju-ju post 1990, the proverbial handwriting was on the wall... :(

Which gets to my point (and Van's) -- we have got to be a full spectrum Army.

Along that line, there's another article in the AFJ, Culture Battle by Colonel Henry Foresman Jr. That I think speaks to both 3-24 proponents and believers in LTC Gentile's approach. The culture is the problem. He says several things that I think are pertinent:



He agrees with me; smart guy... :wry:

However, he also makes a very valid point that it seems to me that both 3-24 and LTC Gentile barely touch upon:



I believe that is a critical point and the last phrase is the reason. I don't care how good we are. Goesh pointed out that Mr. & Mrs. America are basically cool with body bags but they want results. My sensing is he's absolutely correct and if the perception of Mr. & Mrs America is that we aren't doing well; they'll pull th plug. Techniques then become irrelevant.



My perception also. Good article and bears reading.

Like Steve, I take issue with some of LTC Gian's premises and essentially for the same reason. However, I do not agree that we haven't transcended the Cold war mindset -- I suggest, as does COL Foresman, we haven't transcended the WW II mindset. We are still structured essentially as we are in 1946. For those who say "Brigade Combat Teams," my response is RCT -- with which we fought most of WW II outside the North African Desert. Not to mention Korea then back to Brigades for Viet Nam. Lest I be misunderstood, Brigades are good, Divisions are bad (even if we did err in the structure ot the light infantry Battalions). Notice that we did not do away with the Division...

I think we did not to avoid the two star spaces loss; we may need them to mobilize -- just as we will need the 3K plus Colonels and 3K plus SGM/CSM even though those are the same numbers we had in 1960 with an Army almost twice the size of todays. Mobilization backup is what that's all about but 'mobilization' is (unfortunately and stupidly) a nasty word in Congress. Thus we dissemble to keep the ability to expand tremendously. Prudent; we should. I just think there are better ways to do that.

Creighton Abrams structured the Total Army to force the government to call up the RC to go to war. The tear down of that started in DS/DS because the then CofSA and then DCSOPS hated the idea and fought Congress demands to send ArNG Brigades to Kuwait. Post DS/DS, they continued to do that in various little ways, some effective and some not. What they did not do was prepare for the present (then or now...).

It's mostly about protecting the institution. To fight WW II.

We need to be able to do that but we could be a whole lot smarter in how we go about it and still be prepared to cope with the more likely threats in the next decade or so..

Rank amateur
09-20-2007, 02:01 AM
A number of things LTC Gentile says are undoubtedly right and he has identified the problem.


by and large the American army has done pretty well in Iraq—even prior to the surge--with the strategic and political cards it was dealt.


It has pushed us into doing things that make no sense to me: like arming the enemy of the government that we support.


It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.

I’m going to suggest that you guys are such experts on trees, and so wedded to your particular tree related theories, that you can’t see the forest. Only the amateurs, and detached professionals, can see the forest. There are no military solutions to Iraq’s political problems.

The people haven’t abandoned you. (Strangers still show up at funerals for KIA. People still donate to charities for the wounded. Everyone is appalled by the conditions at Walter Reed.) They haven't lost faith. They just know that asking you to sacrifice your life in pursuit of an impossible objective is stupid.

COIN - in Iraq - is a knife. LTC Gentile’s approach is a bigger knife; it feels better, but is no more effective.

We know the resources we can apply. We know the tactics we can use. What we need is an achievable objective.

The country is hungry for a politician who will identify a reasonable objective, and without bull####, tells us how long it will take to achieve, what price we need to pay and why it’s worth paying.

We’re not optimistic.

Ken White
09-20-2007, 03:52 AM
I don't know anyone here or anyone in any of the services or retired therefrom -- and that's a large crowd of tree experts -- who ever thought there were any military solutions to Iraq's problems.

I think you're missing the point. I don't know anyone who believes the Nation has abandoned them -- I do know many who disagree with this statement:


"They just know that asking you to sacrifice your life in pursuit of an impossible objective is stupid."

simply because they know that the objective isn't stupid. They also know that many who have not been there think it is stupid and mostly, they're cool with that.

They don't see it as an impossible objective; the objective was to open a window and let the Iraqis make their own decisions. That window was opened and is being held open. It likely will continue to be held open regardless of who's elected next year and mostly, the largest regret is that too many here do not understand all that. Regardless, the tree experts will confound the amatuers and "detached professionals" (whatever they are...) and continue to do their job in spite of that lack of understanding. Like they always have.

The country may be hungry for a politician who will identify that objective and without BS tell them how long it will take, what price they need to pay and why it's worth paying. I suspect they will be disappointed in all those desires, particularly the 'without BS' part.

I could point out that the country has in one form or another been told everything I said two paragraphs above; the problem is that, for some, those things are inadequate or insufficient cause to be there. Nothing any politicians says or does will change that; those minds were mostly made up and they aren't going to be changed. You may or may not be aware there some in the Armed Forces who fall in that category as well. They'll mostly still go and do their thing because they believe that how well one does something that one does not want to do is a mark of value.

Pessimists are never optimistic, it's contrary to their nature.

skiguy
09-20-2007, 09:35 AM
A number of things LTC Gentile says
The country is hungry for a politician who will identify a reasonable objective, and without bull####, tells us how long it will take to achieve, what price we need to pay and why it’s worth paying.
Well,only speaking for myself here, but there are some who will NEVER listen to or believe what any politician says and only listens to, believes, and learns from what the likes of Petreaus, Nagl, Gentile, et al have to say.They've made it clear what the cost is, and they've made it clear that it requires patience. And they've made it clear that there is undeniable progress.


We’re not optimistic.
Some of us are. If I had to just rely on what the president or the media says, I'd have lost hope by now. But after listening to Petreaus and Crocker, researching what has been done by others, and reading what the folks here have to say, I'm very optimistic. I understand progress isn't the number of Muslims killed or the number of major cities blown up, it's the number of would-be terrorists who aren't that way anymore and who don't want me killed. It's watching before my very eyes Islam turning into the religion of peace they claim to be.
To say I'm impressed with what I'm hearing and reading about what our guys (military and civilian) have done and are doing, is an understatement. Awe-inspriring would be a better word. I can't begin to tell you how much I want to be a part of this and how much motivation it's giving me to get through the required (and boring) math and science classes until I start taking the more interesting courses.

Don't underestimate us. There are many of us (not as many as I'd like, but enought to have a voice) inexperienced, commom, everyday, civilian shmucks who know perfectly well what's going on and what it all means and who go FAR beyond just putting yellow "support the troops" bumper stickers on our SUV's.

Ken

Gian P Gentile
09-20-2007, 12:16 PM
I am not in a rush to ignore FM3-24; in fact in my “Eating Soup…” piece I say up front that its middle chapters are relevant and useful to senior commanders in Iraq. My critique of the manual was directed at its paradoxes in the first chapter. I based my critique on my impression of the paradoxes after a year of combat as a tactical battalion in Iraq. My impression expressed in the form of a critique argued that the paradoxes removed the reality of war—which at its most basic level is fighting—from the manual.

Understandably with this critique I questioned the theoretical and underlying premises of the Coin doctrine. I also argued at the end of the piece that the influence of the new Coin doctrine has pushed the Army into dogmatism in its current operational approach in Iraq.

I believe that FM3-24 has become the defacto operational doctrine of the United States Army and it has not been questioned or seriously debated as such. I do believe that what we are seeing is unique with the American Army. This Coin doctrine has become so overriding that it now prescribes action. In short, it has moved beyond the accepted definition that doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in action to the point where it determines future action. As I have already argued in a previous posting I believe that the Surge and many of its tactics and methods are an example of our dogmatism run wild. Ironically during the Cold War Soviet Officers used to quip that they didn’t need to understand American Army doctrine because the American Army never followed it anyway. Now, ironically, one can argue the opposite. Want to know what the Americans are going to do? Just read FM3-24.

As far as your comment of not wanting to have the army repeat “its past mistakes from Vietnam” I couldn’t agree with you more which is why I have been thinking and writing about this topic. But brace yourself here: it is not me who is repeating these past mistakes but you. The mistakes from Vietnam as you imply were that the American Army became so consumed with conventional warfighting that they ditched and refused to consider problems of unorthodox war. Well, inversely, as I see it that is what we are doing now with Coin and to our detriment. I know this idea does not go over well with many because so called Coin experts and practitioners after being pushed to the sidelines during the Cold War now are enjoying their place in the sun and anything that challenges and questions their dominance is attacked.

Onward social science warriors….

slapout9
09-20-2007, 12:39 PM
Sir,(LTC. Gentile) What would you recomned as a COA for Iraq?

Steve Blair
09-20-2007, 12:51 PM
As far as your comment of not wanting to have the army repeat “its past mistakes from Vietnam” I couldn’t agree with you more which is why I have been thinking and writing about this topic. But brace yourself here: it is not me who is repeating these past mistakes but you. The mistakes from Vietnam as you imply were that the American Army became so consumed with conventional warfighting that they ditched and refused to consider problems of unorthodox war. Well, inversely, as I see it that is what we are doing now with Coin and to our detriment. I know this idea does not go over well with many because so called Coin experts and practitioners after being pushed to the sidelines during the Cold War now are enjoying their place in the sun and anything that challenges and questions their dominance is attacked.

Onward social science warriors….

I still fail to see where you can find a precedent for COIN replacing the sort of warfare that the Army has always preferred to prepare for. Training was reoriented during Vietnam, as was a certain level of doctrine (the level depended on the branch in question), but all that was quickly phased out as soon as the conflict ended. If memory serves the real peak for such training came in 1968-69, and most lessons had faded by 1975 or so. I have seen little to convince me that the same thing will not happen again. After all, we were "surprised" by Somalis using RPGs against helicopters...

If the political objectives of the United States call for the Army to be involved in COIN frequently (which is very possible given the number of failed states and the looming creation of AFRICOM), then at least some percentage of war preparation should be directed to that end...and not just a token 10% or so. That's just responsible planning.

Van
09-20-2007, 06:28 PM
Rank Amateur et al;


There are no military solutions to Iraq’s political problems.

Better to say "There are no military solutions to political problems". I'm certain that most members of the Council understand this at least intellectually, and a majority have really internalized the concept. At the end of the day, militaries only buy time for politicians to sort out the solution*. This having been said, synchronization and deconfliction of combat and non-combat measures in Small Wars (including COIN) is essential to success (per the U.S.M.C. 1940 manual and other sources). The problem is often one of persuading the civilian leadership that the military is not the correct wrench with which to pound screws.

Re: optimism- In Iraq, we should be guardedly optimistic. It won't sort itself out in a fashion that will be to our liking, but if we can sever the outside support for the insurgents, not make any more gaffs on the scale of Abu Ghraib, and stick with it for the full decade it takes to succeed in COIN, we've got a great chance of success. Sadly, the media and the self-serving defeatists are doing every thing in their power to make this impossible, no matter the strategic damage they cause us. Note the long lasting geopolitical damage we suffered from the precipitous pullout from Somalia. Now increase that by an order of magnitude...
- In the GWOT, if we can avoid validating the allegations that the West is waging war on Islam, there is plenty of reason to be optimistic, especially as Muslims are coming out against violence and the irhabi. If the popular meme reverts back to a "Christian vs Muslim" perception of the conflict, it could rapidly degenerate into calls for genocide from both sides. Again, guarded optimism is in order, but we must remain cognizant of the risks and possible consequences.


*In a republic with civilian control of the military, won't comment on other arrangements.

goesh
09-21-2007, 03:37 PM
Gentile states that when the Tal Alfar lessons were applied to Baghdad, our troops were subjected to "supreme tactical vulnerability". That's pretty serious stuff to taxpayers like me and ol' Mom & Pop back home. How much of that statement is a reflection of reality on the street and how much of it is a reflection of the inherent friction that is becoming readily apparent between COIN proponents and for lack of better word, old school (geezers?), traditional military thinking? More importanty, how much is this in-house war detracting from success of the mission in Iraq?

Ken White
09-21-2007, 07:57 PM
unit in the US Army is going to forget that the reality of war and fighting is no longer apporopriate because it is not it an FM... :rolleyes:

LTC Gentile says:


"I believe that FM3-24 has become the defacto operational doctrine of the United States Army and it has not been questioned or seriously debated as such."

Sweeping statement. It certainly seems to be the case that it is for operations in Iraq at this time -- as it probably should be. Does that necessarily mean it is the de facto operational doctrine for the entire Army. I doubt it. I'd also suggest that the nominal Soviet quip is probably apocryphal and it was earlier alleged to the Brits -- though it is essentially correct -- and the American Army hasn't changed, that'll always be correct.

We're too independent and egotistical for that. Most Commanders take the mantra and adapt it to their needs and do their own thing. And that's good. :cool:

He may be correct in that we will go overboard on the COIN side; we as an Army have a tenedency to do that to the detriment of training. We must be a full spectrum Army, no question -- and that is a heavy training task and it is expensive; there are a lot of pressures to focus more narrowly. Having been in and around the beast for 45 years, I've watched that oscillation too many times. I think there are enough people coinvinced that we need to do the whole deal to avoid the trap this time. We'll see.

I spent a lot of time training to fight a land war in Europe. Never stationed or fought there -- but I ate a heck of a lot of rice. Pity, I dearly love Bratwurst... :D

Shek
09-23-2007, 02:19 AM
I found LTC Gentile's piece to be less than compelling. For example, the paradoxes are seemingly presented as limiting thought and providing a straightjacket, in direct contrast to the manual's introduction to the paradoxes that:


These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the admonition “Sometimes, the More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” does not apply when the enemy is “coming over the barricades”; however, that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced to a
checklist; rather, they should be used with considerable thought.

If a senior officer is unable to use these paradoxes to stimulate thinking and instead reduces them for "chic" quotes in a media interview, I find it less an indictment of the paradoxes and more an indictment of an officer education system and promotion system that has allowed officers to advance in the ranks that haven't learned how to think.

Another passage that troubled me was:


The logic of the contradiction that "tactical success guarantees nothing," though, tells the reader he should not be enamored with tactical success because if he achieves it without success in other areas of COIN operations, such as essential services and governance, then it accomplishes nothing.

In this case, the paradox doesn't state that tactical successes accomplish nothing, simply that they guarantee nothing. Yet, the implied reading of the paradox doesn't stop here, and a slippery slope then follows to where lieutenants (and lieutenant colonels) reading this paradox shouldn't be that concerned about tactics since they are not important in and of themselves.

However, the paradox never states that tactical successes are unimportant; instead, it simply highlights that tactical actions don't exist in a vacuum and must be connected to operational and strategic objectives as well as host nation political objectives. Fighting isn't removed from the equation; it just isn't the only thing, and as the introduction to the paradoxes states, the application of the paradoxes, and in this case, the mix of tactical (kinetic)/non-kinetic depends on "a sense of the local situation."

Finally, I found the following passage to be highly ironic since Eliot Cohen was the co-author of Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr06/Cohen.pdf).


Yet the paradoxes actually deceive by making overly simple the reality of counterinsurgency warfare and why it is so hard to conduct it at the ground level for the combat soldier. The eminent scholar and strategic thinker Eliot Cohen noted that counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting. In trying to teach its readers to eat soup with a knife, the COIN manual discards the essence and reality of counterinsurgency warfare fighting, thereby manifesting its tragic flaw.

Patriot
09-23-2007, 07:20 AM
The paradoxes in FM 3-24 are nothing more than Sun Tsuisms for the 21st Century. They require much deeper thought and internalizing then any field manual can provide. As with the original writing of old uncle Sun, the intent of paradoxes is to stimulate thought, develop adaptiveness, adeptness, and rigor in the "art" of warfare. Often, we as Americans are fixated on finding "the" answer to a problem, whether it's a technology, a checklist, a specific tactic, or method. But the success of the US way of war is not finding "the" answer but finding "a" answer which is the whole point of the paradox.

Gian P Gentile
09-23-2007, 12:36 PM
In response to a number of recent posts namely Shek and Patriot I repeat my point in the article which was an impression I had of the paradoxes, especially the two that I concentrate on in the article, after a year in combat in Iraq: my impression was that the paradoxes removed a fundamental of war—fighting--which I experienced in a way specific to the Iraq War. The most important point that I believed I made in the article was how fighting insurgencies within a civil war like in Iraq are very hard on the combat soldier—in essence a discussion on the moral domain of war—and has not been commented on at all in this blog. Most of the postings in this blog that critique my article focus on my questioning of the paradoxes; why? Because it challenged the theoretical premises of a doctrine that so many have turned into an Orwellian nightmare that clouds creative thought and sadly produces dogmatic action. For me though, the more important aspect of my article was why these types of war are so hard to fight from the perspective of the combat soldier. And in this sense I believe that my critique of the paradoxes is still valid.

marct
09-23-2007, 02:18 PM
Sir,


my impression was that the paradoxes removed a fundamental of war—fighting--which I experienced in a way specific to the Iraq War.

As I noted in an earlier post, I think that you have fundamentally misunderstood the function of the paradoxes themselves while, at the same time, making a categorical logic error. Even leaving that aside, however, nowhere does FM 3-24 state that "fighting" should not be a part of counter-insurgency. Reduced to its simplest form, FM 3-24 argues that one should use the appropriate tool to achieve desired operational results. Given that the CoG of a COIN operation is the general populace where the desired strategic outcome is political legitimacy, "fighting" may well not be the most appropriate tool in all (or even most) situations.


The most important point that I believed I made in the article was how fighting insurgencies within a civil war like in Iraq are very hard on the combat soldier—in essence a discussion on the moral domain of war—and has not been commented on at all in this blog.

Did you mean "morale" in this? That would certainly be consistent with your statement in the article:


But most importantly, I was angry and bewildered because the paradoxes, through their clever contradictions, removed a fundamental aspect of counterinsurgency warfare that I had experienced throughout my year as a tactical battalion commander in Iraq: fighting. And by removing the fundamental reality of fighting from counterinsurgency warfare, the manual removes the problem of maintaining initiative, morale and offensive spirit among combat soldiers who will operate in a place such as Iraq.

I must admit, after reading that particular statement, I could only shake my head and think about Curtis LeMay. This has to be one of the best examples of reductio ad absurdam that I have ever seen, and one of the reasons why I am requiring my students to read your article. If you truly believed this, then I am surprised that you are not arguing Iraq delenda est.

If, on the other hand, it was not a mistyping and you actually meant "moral", I would ask you how fighting is more moral than winning?


Most of the postings in this blog that critique my article focus on my questioning of the paradoxes; why? Because it challenged the theoretical premises of a doctrine that so many have turned into an Orwellian nightmare that clouds creative thought and sadly produces dogmatic action.

Again, you miss the point. In your article you state that


However, the paradoxes are intended to frame the thinking of the reader for the entire manual. They are the theoretical framework that informs the entire manual. In this sense, they are crucial to the manual and for how our Army approaches and understands counterinsurgency operations.

First of all, the paradoxes are, as Patriot notes, "Sun Tzuisms" or koans. They are not intended to "frame the thinking of the reader" but, rather, to re-frame the perceptions of the reader allowing them to think outside of a conventional warfare set of perceptions.

Neither are the paradoxes "the theoretical framework that informs the entire manual". Less still are they an evil miasma that produces "an Orwellian nightmare that clouds creative thought and sadly produces dogmatic action". Rather, they are as Shek notes in his quotation "offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it".

Obviously, they do not have that effect on everyone. This should not be a surprise to anyone who has taken an introduction to Psychology course or read history in any depth. How people react to thoughts that go against their existing preconceptions has been quite well documented, and that includes feelings of anger, revulsion and unthinking rejection.


For me though, the more important aspect of my article was why these types of war are so hard to fight from the perspective of the combat soldier. And in this sense I believe that my critique of the paradoxes is still valid.

Certainly your article has served to highlight the difficulty some officers appear to have with this type of conflict. While I still think that your critic is logically invalid, it may well be psychologically valid for a certain portion of US forces.

Patriot
09-23-2007, 04:08 PM
LTC Gentile's article and the subsequent discussions demonstrate that whether we use a paradox or dictum as a spring borad toward explorations of complex warfare the desired outcome is intellectual rigor to critically view our warfighting doctrine with our theoretical concepts of war and our historical interpertations. There is no solution to the dynamic problems of warfare, whether ancient or modern. Why do we continue to read Sun Tsu, Uncle Carl (Clausewitz), et. al? Because there is has consistently never been a solution (doctrine - how we fight) for war. The Soldier, as the instrument of applied force, whether in conventional or unconventional war, remains the essential element to success. His understanding of his role and fuction is critical for that force application. If his leaders do not understand the complexity of unconventional war then he will suffer that lack of understanding.

Adrian
09-23-2007, 05:41 PM
The most important point that I believed I made in the article was how fighting insurgencies within a civil war like in Iraq are very hard on the combat soldier—in essence a discussion on the moral domain of war—and has not been commented on at all in this blog...
...For me though, the more important aspect of my article was why these types of war are so hard to fight from the perspective of the combat soldier.

I don't find the observation that "war is hard" to be particularly novel. Some old fogey mentioned two hundred years ago that in war everything is simple and the simplest thing is very hard. Was there an expectation that in the absence of a strong uniformed conventional army, war would be easy ("I doubt six months (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1900)...")? If so that (hypothetical, of course) expectation is inexcusable and would show a stunning ignorance of history. A focus on kinetics because the rest of it is just too hard would be similarly inexcusable.

That said, I do understand the need to remind people that "remember this is still really hard." Since the COIN manual came out, talking heads on TV seem to think "Oh, well now we've got the right plan, success will be easy!" But I don't think the specific audience that reads AFJ needs to be told that "this stuff is difficult."

skiguy
09-23-2007, 06:05 PM
For me though, the more important aspect of my article was why these types of war are so hard to fight from the perspective of the combat soldier.

But, sir, isn't that your job as their leader to tell them? I can't even imagine what it must be like for someone who served in Anbar in 2004 and saw his buddies killed by a Sunni insurgent, and then comes back this year and is now told the Sunnis are his friends. IMHO, you need to explain to him what's going on and why.

Shek
09-23-2007, 06:07 PM
And in this sense I believe that my critique of the paradoxes is still valid.

LTC Gentile:

Sir,

Thanks for the reply. I don’t disagree that one cannot neglect the moral/spiritual domain; however, the path that your argument uses to link the paradoxes and their potential impact on the moral/spiritual domain requires the use of a strawman – the claim that “tactical success guarantees nothing” should be read “accomplishes nothing.” If tactical success are not needed, then why would the manual not state that? However, this is not enough, and you then proceed to flail tactical failure by the counterinsurgent, which in no way, shape, or form is advised by the FM. So, your causal link between the tactical success paradox and a negative impact upon the morale of the fighting soldier requires a particular interpretation that removes the paradoxes from the reality of chapter in which you can find them.

Next, while recognizing that you have some great insights to offer about the moral/spiritual domain of soldiers at the unit level based on your squadron’s experience in Iraq, I don’t see how this experience provides you with any special insight on how to read and/or interpret the meaning the paradoxes (it can provide some special insights on how other officers serving in Iraq interpreted the paradoxes, but this is not the same as having a special line to the best reading of the paradoxes). As you look at your discussion of the paradoxes, you remove them from the reality of their purpose, which is to “stimulate thinking” and not to “limit it.” Additionally, you can read the ten pages prior to the paradoxes and find the following excerpts (emphasis mine):


1-105. The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Throughout history, however, the Army and Marine Corps have been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready both to fight and to build—depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The full spectrum operations doctrine (described in FM 3-0) captures this reality.

1-106. All full spectrum operations executed overseas—including COIN operations—include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state. The exact mix varies depending on the situation and the mission. Commanders weight each operation based on their assessment of the campaign’s phase and the situation in their AO. They shift the weight among these operations as necessary to address situations in different parts of the AO while continuing to pursue their overall objectives. (See figure 1-1.)

1-107. Offensive and defensive operations are integral to COIN. COIN differs from peacekeeping operations in this regard; indeed, this is a key point. In peacekeeping operations, combat is not expected and the goal is an absence of violence. In COIN, such an absence may actually mask insurgent preparations for combat. This was the case, for example, in the Sadr City area of Baghdad in 2003.

***

1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

***

1-141. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times when an overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

If one believes that the introductory chapter, of which the paradoxes are a part of, removes the reality that counterinsurgency doesn’t involve offensive operations or killing, then there is certainly an issue, but not one with the paradoxes.

Lastly, the senior officer example that you use involves a fundamental misinterpretation of the manual. As I indicated earlier, this is not an indictment of the manual, but rather, an indictment of the OES and OPMS that has allowed someone to advance through the ranks and to positions of responsibility that cannot holistically digest newly written doctrine or even worse, only reads a small segment of the manual. Paragraph 1-107 above clearly demonstrates that the statement by the senior officer to the reporter that "if we are shooting, we are not having a good day" is not categorically true.

wm
09-23-2007, 07:29 PM
The most important point that I believed I made in the article was how fighting insurgencies within a civil war like in Iraq are very hard on the combat soldier—in essence a discussion on the moral domain of war—and has not been commented on at all in this blog. Most of the postings in this blog that critique my article focus on my questioning of the paradoxes; why? Because it challenged the theoretical premises of a doctrine that so many have turned into an Orwellian nightmare that clouds creative thought and sadly produces dogmatic action. For me though, the more important aspect of my article was why these types of war are so hard to fight from the perspective of the combat soldier. And in this sense I believe that my critique of the paradoxes is still valid.
I find the appeal to Orwell to be a good place to suggest that you read the essay, "Shooting an Elephant" by Orwell, found on-line here (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/) The essay opens :

In Moulmein, in lower Burma, I was hated by large numbers of people – the only time in my life that I have been important enough for this to happen to me. I was sub-divisional police officer of the town, and in an aimless, petty kind of way anti-European feeling was very bitter. No one had the guts to raise a riot, but if a European woman went through the bazaars alone somebody would probably spit betel juice over her dress. As a police officer I was an obvious target and was baited whenever it seemed safe to do so. When a nimble Burman tripped me up on the football field and the referee (another Burman) looked the other way, the crowd yelled with hideous laughter. This happened more than once. In the end the sneering yellow faces of young men that met me everywhere, the insults hooted after me when I was at a safe distance, got badly on my nerves. The young Buddhist priests were the worst of all. There were several thousands of them in the town and none of them seemed to have anything to do except stand on street corners and jeer at Europeans.

Perhaps this essay, as well his "A Hanging" might provide some insight into the moral dilemma or quandry that LTC Gentile says is the main point of his article.

BTW I previously suggested this essay on another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=9422#post9422) at post #7

SWJED
09-29-2007, 12:45 PM
Small Wars, No Small Debate (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/09/small-wars-no-small-debate-1/) via SWJ Blog.

Rank amateur
09-29-2007, 08:25 PM
It won't sort itself out in a fashion that will be to our liking,

I agree: regardless of how many kinetic vs. COIN ops we run.


The paradoxes in FM 3-24 are nothing more than Sun Tsuisms for the 21st Century.

I didn't find any paradoxes in Sun Tsu. I'd say it was more of a philosophy that the right thing to do depends on a number of factors. Whose correct in this dispute about tactics? Both and neither. It depends. But if neither tactic will achieve the objective, then it's neither.

Eagle
10-26-2007, 08:47 PM
Unfortunately, a COIN doctrine published by the US military, whilst great, is no good unless its commanders have actually been taught exactly how to implement its doctrine.

There are many books similar to Nagls. I broadly agree with all of his assessments but remain sceptical that these lessons have been learnt, they have only been identified.

There are also wider issues. The evangelical christian movement within the US does not assist with the way in which its political objectives are pursued. A religiously motivated military, much like a politically motivated military is to be avoided. They should be apolitical through and through. Only then can the military commanders ensure that their objectives are realistic and that their political masters understand (as they frequently don't) what the military can and cannot be realistically be expected to achieve. Being 'yes' men is not good enough. Polticians need it spelt out to them.

Rob Thornton
10-26-2007, 09:22 PM
there are Lessons Available - most of the time we default to the latter -no matter where in the spectrum of operations we find ourselves. That might be good in some ways since few situations are the same, bad in others since it means we might sometimes still be looking around for the right tool or applicable experience.

From what I've seen, the learning curve has flattened out some and the war we find on the ground in Iraq is closer to the one we envision as the unit conducts its train up and deploys - this is not always true, but in the aggregate I think it is. This is important because it means units gain their footing faster and take the initiative away from AIF (from AQIZ, to JAM, to Organized Crime, to corrupt officials, to the significance of propane shortages or unemployment). I think units have learned that no matter where or when they were last time, somethings are going to be different and that means they are going to have to recognize those changes and be prepared to accept and where possible exploit them toward task and purpose - be it along a lethal line of operation or non-lethal line of effort. They have learned how to deal with people and how to solve a host of problems.

Having doctrine (of any flavor) and implementing it is not the same - however we've gotten pretty good at building in mechanisms to prepare soldiers and leaders (and I include all the services) to operate along the lethal line and transition as needed. You could be talking about changing doctrine (BTW new FM 3-0 Full Spectrum Ops is out in final DRAG), you could be talking about the way the CTCs have shifted, you could be talking about the COIN Academy in Taji, you could be talking about the individual learning that has occurred through deployments. All effect performance and like I said - we're getting pretty good at being "full spectrum" at the tactical level.

While I'm glad we have addressed some doctrinal shortfalls - be it 3-24 or 3-0 (and I hear there are some doctrinal reviews going on at JFCOM as well?), I give the credit to the soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen on the ground who are applying what works, modifying to suit the problem, and where required disregarding what is not applicable for an appropriate solution. Good doctrine enables soldiers and leaders to make good choices - and reflects the value of thinking individuals.

Best, Rob

Norfolk
10-26-2007, 10:37 PM
From what I've seen, the learning curve has flattened out some and the war we find on the ground in Iraq is closer to the one we envision as the unit conducts its train up and deploys - this is not always true, but in the aggregate I think it is.

While I'm glad we have addressed some doctrinal shortfalls - be it 3-24 or 3-0 (and I hear there are some doctrinal reviews going on at JFCOM as well?), I give the credit to the soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen on the ground who are applying what works, modifying to suit the problem, and where required disregarding what is not applicable for an appropriate solution. Good doctrine enables soldiers and leaders to make good choices - and reflects the value of thinking individuals.

Best, Rob

Rob,

Would you be inclined to say that that, having undergone a sometimes difficult apprenticeship so to speak, the Army on the ground has now hit its stride and is at least a full journeyman, if not quite a master, of the COIN trade in Iraq? That, generally speaking, from top to bottom, from private to Petraeus, the Army knows what it wants to do, how to do it, and is slowly but surely defeating the insurgency? Is it accurate to say that the Army (and Marines) are succeeding in laying, from the bottom-up, a basis for something like an orderly and organized civil society (subject of course to matter beyond the Army's control)? Or is the situation in Iraq still too tenuous or unclear to comfortably make such observations?

Rex Brynen
10-26-2007, 11:12 PM
That, generally speaking, from top to bottom, from private to Petraeus, the Army knows what it wants to do, how to do it, and is slowly but surely defeating the insurgency? Is it accurate to say that the Army (and Marines) are succeeding in laying, from the bottom-up, a basis for something like an orderly and organized civil society (subject of course to matter beyond the Army's control)? Or is the situation in Iraq still too tenuous or unclear to comfortably make such observations?

It is far too tenuous, in my view.

My sense would be that there has been (1) major progress, possibly permanent, in dealing with AQI; (2) contingent success (based on temporary alliances of convenience) in dealing with non-jihadist Sunni elements, but this is subject to future change; (3) no real success in dealing with Shi'ite militias.. indeed, if reports of JAM shifting greater weight to civic action are correct, they may become more strongly entrenched than a year or two ago, even if the problem of Shiite revenge killings/sectarian cleansing has declined (partly due to the surge, partly due to so much successful sectarian cleansing).

(4) Iranian influence--not a COIN issue, but certainly a key US strategic concern--has probably increased slightly.

(5) Civil society and institution-building--minor successes at best.

(6) Regional impact--still extremely negative, and a significant source of militant recruitment/mobilization elsewhere inside and outside the region.

To get back to your original point, parts of (1) and (2) are due to improved COIN doctrine and implementation. However, they are also due to AQI missteps, coupled with a sudden Sunni ability to count (that is, a realization post-Samarra by Sunni tribal and militia leaders that they needed protection against an angry, well armed, and larger Shiite community/militias).

(That being said, success is, in part, capitalizing on opponent errors.)

Rob Thornton
10-26-2007, 11:30 PM
Would you be inclined to say that that, having undergone a sometimes difficult apprenticeship so to speak, the Army on the ground has now hit its stride and is at least a full journeyman, if not quite a master, of the COIN trade in Iraq?

I'd rather say we've gotten better at recognizing what needs to be done faster, and have figured out how to do it with less friction - and perhaps without undoing other things that we did not want to in the process. Sorry if that sounds like I'm qualifying it, but I think it deserves more then a yes or no.


That, generally speaking, from top to bottom, from private to Petraeus, the Army knows what it wants to do, how to do it, and is slowly but surely defeating the insurgency?

I think in the aggregate of units in Iraq the answer is yes (there is no way to account for evry guy or even every squad or platoon). This is due to MNFI-s leadership in terms of articulating CDR's intent, considering the reports from the lower echelons and making the best decisions it can with regards to campaign goals. I think we've got a much better loop going between units on the ground and those readying for deployment with what is going on in Iraq then we've ever had before. I think if you consider it in terms of AIF, I'd say yes, but if you extend it to the conditions which breed insurgency, make it a viable political recourse for Iraqis - we only have so much say, so much influence and limited resources - so if you extend it along those lines - the only folks who can finally defeat the insurgency are the Iraqis - I think they are starting to want security and stability at more then just one level. This would be a good thing.

I'm not willing to put forward an opinion on the rest of the Army - for various reasons there is still a considerable portion of the Army (in terms of those in Institutional and support positions) that have not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan yet - until we can afford them that opportunity I don't think we will be at our best. Thee are in many cases valid reasons why these folks have not deployed yet - you can't take for granted all the things that built the Army, prepare it and sustain it - it takes a very large support system.


Is it accurate to say that the Army (and Marines) are succeeding in laying, from the bottom-up, a basis for something like an orderly and organized civil society (subject of course to matter beyond the Army's control)?

From what I see and saw, I think we are helping to provide the increased security for that process to take place (along with ISF and tribal allegiances) - but the basis has to be political in some sense - again, Iraqis have to buy into that at various levels. Iraqis have to take it and sustain it.


Or is the situation in Iraq still too tenuous or unclear to comfortably make such observations?

I think what has to be noted and accepted is that things change all the time - MNFI saw a success in Al-Anbar and was able to use that as something of a model to engage political buy in in other provinces - there are all kinds of internal and external things that can probably effect that. It could be from Turkey or Iran, it could be internal - If it were an assured thing we would not say we're going to be there for some time to come in some capacity or another.

These are my thoughts on it - but I'd say folks have to make up their own minds on what they see and hear. Overall, I think the folks on the ground have made significant strides forward in Iraq over the last 6 months - I noticed it in early 2007 - some things just take time to work out, and I think by then we were starting to understand things on larger scale.

Best Regards, Rob

Rob Thornton
10-26-2007, 11:34 PM
To get back to your original point, parts of (1) and (2) are due to improved COIN doctrine and implementation. However, they are also due to AQI missteps, coupled with a sudden Sunni ability to count (that is, a realization post-Samarra by Sunni tribal and militia leaders that they needed protection against an angry, well armed, and larger Shiite community/militias).

(That being said, success is, in part, capitalizing on opponent errors.)

I like it when the enemy screws up - it makes for less work, but don't sell short the ability to understand a mistep/screw up and capitalize on it. Too often an enemy gives us an opportunity and we ignore it, miss it, or screw it up.

I like your second part Rex - there is some art in being a good counter-puncher.

Best, Rob

Norfolk
10-27-2007, 12:59 AM
I will take it from the both of you then, Rex and Rob, that the US Army (and Marines) in Iraq are now and increasingly so, waging a Counterinsurgency campaign with sustantial, if still limited, success, and that the future, while unpredicatable, is more hopeful than a year ago or more - at least as things stand right now.

Starting with the fact that some of the insurgents (mainly Sunni), and especially those from AQI, have overstepped themselves, and are paying the price. AQI seems to be in quite the hurt locker lately, and I am inclined to believe that with its deliberate targetting of the civilian population in its last major terror "offensive", it succeeded in turning even the Sunni population more or less against it. Combined with a more or less successful Coalition adaptation to the requirements of COIN, the Sunni backlash against the excesses of many of their own extremists have led to Sunni tribal leaders' re-evaluation of which side the butter on their bread truly lies (at least for the moment). In the Sunni areas at least, Coalition (and especially US) forces are more and more being seen as allies, at least for the time being.

The Shi'a situation will have to be dealt with in time, particularly the Sadr'ists. I did notice a few years ago (around later 2004, maybe early 2005 - I am taking this purely from reported news and articles at the time - the Marines were clearing Fallujah and ordered to call it off just before finishing, whilst the Sadrists were rebelling in Najaf - and US troops dispatched to face them down) an increasing US awareness of the dynamics of the Sunni-Shi'a divide, and a developing ability to play them other off against one another. A strategy of divide and conquer, even if by necessity rather than design.

However, gathering from Rex's post, even if the Sunni tribes and the US reach a practical accomodation, the Shi'a extremists will pose the greatest challenge of all to bring to heel, and their strength may even be increasing.

Okay, I gather from what Rex has said that the situation is still too fragile to make evena tentative call on whether the US/Coalition forces are indeed slowly succeeding in defeating the insurgency; whereas Rob thinks that the situation is a little firmer and clearer than that, with the US/Coalition forces in Iraq having largely caught-on to the demands of the campaign, and succeeding in making things happen, so far. I think that it goes without saying that the Governmental side (above local tribal sheiks), which is formally outside the direct control of the US anyway, is a clear disappointment, but essential to the successs of the counterinsurgency.

Be that as it may. But I gather that it could be argued, with qualifications especially as to its tentativeness, that US/Coalition troops in Iraq have more or less caught-on to what needs to be done, within the limits of what is possible for them to do (necessarily excluding such matters as Iraqi governmental politics at all levels of government); and furthermore that both General Petraeus' Iraq strategy and the COIN Doctrine from which it derives are genuine, if qualified and still reversible, successes so far.

SWJED
03-04-2008, 07:36 PM
Of Cocktail Napkins and Doctrine (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/of-cocktail-napkins-and-doctri/)
Posted by SWJ Editors on March 4, 2008 3:59 AM


Charlie at Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/03/thats-right-cocktail-napkin.html) has the scoop (and an op-ed link) to the story behind authoring FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

Petraeus' Big Tent (http://www.nj.com/opinion/ledger/perspective/index.ssf?/base/news-1/1204583701184740.xml&coll=1) - Cullen Nutt, New Jersey Star-Ledger

The Front Page, a popular Washington, D.C., bistro, was an unlikely place for the genesis of a radical new war strategy for Iraq. But on Nov. 7, 2005, over gourmet burgers and beer, an equally unlikely group of military men and Ivy League eggheads sketched out a plan for a new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual -- on a cocktail napkin...

Not So Big of a Tent (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/not-so-big-of-a-tent/)
Posted by SWJ Editors on March 4, 2008 9:01 AM

By Lieutenant Colonel Gian P Gentile


The notion as presented in the article by Cullen Nutt “Patraeus’s Big Tent” that the construction and writing of the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 was based on wide-ranging debate within the American Army is fallacious.

The outcome of the manual was predetermined by a few key individuals like General Petraeus, General Mattis, retired Army Colonel Conrad Crane, active Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, and neo-conservative analyst Fred Kagan, to name a few. The fact that a conference was held at Fort Leavenworth in February 2006 to “discuss” this pre-determined doctrine and even acknowledging that at this conference there was wide inclusiveness with civilian academics and analysts does not change the fact that the doctrinal outcome of the manual with its narrow use of historical lessons learned, theories, and principles of counterinsurgency warfare was predetermined.

This is not to say that there was not good reason for the outcome of the manual to be pre-determined. The American Army and Marine Corps was at war and needed a revised counterinsurgency doctrine immediately. It did not have the luxury to debate the doctrine extensively over the course of many years...

SWJED
03-07-2008, 11:31 AM
The Colonels and 'The Matrix' (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/the-colonels-and-the-matrix/) (SWJ link).

In what is billed as the First in a Series: The Rise of the Counterinsurgents, Spencer Ackerman of Washington Independent profiles the current debate concerning COIN in The Colonels and 'The Matrix'. (http://www.washingtonindependent.com/view/the-colonels-and-the) The 'colonels' are LTC's Gian Gentile and Paul Yingling...


... Ultimately, the answer to that question will probably be endlessly debated. But the counterinsurgency community—they call it "COIN"—has perhaps the most organized answer. Counterinsurgency is a much-disputed concept, but it refers to methods of warfare used to divide a civilian population’s political and sentimental allegiance away from a guerrilla force. From the start of the Iraq war, a cadre of warrior-thinkers in the military has questioned the use of tactics that focus more on killing enemies than giving the Iraqi population reasons not to support terrorists, insurgents and militias. "We don’t just talk about the enemy, we talk about the environment," explained Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, until two weeks ago the corps commander in Iraq, in a lecture Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation. Not all of them assert that the early use of a counterinsurgency strategy could have won the war. But most contend, after the decline in violence in Iraq during the last half of 2007, that a counterinsurgency strategy would have allowed the war to have been less deadly than it is.

This small but dedicated group includes, most prominently, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Marine Gen. James "Mad Dog" Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command. Other luminaries are Petraeus COIN braintrusters like David Kilcullen, a gregarious former Australian Army officer and State Department adviser; Army Col. Peter Mansoor, who will soon teach military history at the Ohio State University; and Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, who helped craft Petraeus and Mattis’ much-praised Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, a seminal text for the COIN community known as FM 3-24.

Less visible but highly influential members—many are lieutenants, captains and enlisted soldiers and Marines who came of age in Iraq and Afghanistan—include Janine Davidson, who works in the Pentagon’s directorate of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; cultural anthropologist Montgomery McFate; Harvard human-rights expert Sarah Sewall (an adviser to Sen. Barack Obama’s presidential campaign); and Marine Corps University Professor Erin M. Simpson. The Democratic-aligned Center for a New American Security think tank plays host to many emerging counterinsurgency figures, like Colin Kahl, Nate Fick, Roger Carstens, Shawn Brimley, and, starting in the fall, Nagl. During moments of downtime, the community obsessively reads and comments on the Small Wars Journal and Abu Muqawama blogs...

...the next major debate over U.S. defense policy can be gleaned. Yingling speaks for an ascending cadre of young defense intellectuals, most of whom are Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, who assert that the U.S. military must embrace principles of counterinsurgency if it is to triumph in the multifaceted fight against global terrorism. Gentile, formerly one of those theorist-practitioners, believes the military has already moved too far in the direction of counterinsurgency, which he contends allows analysts to ignore the limits of U.S. military power. Both arguments represent an attempt to answer a searing question: What are the lessons of Iraq?

Charlie at Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/03/colonels-and-matrix.html) has more commentary on The Colonels and 'The Matrix'.

Also see Gian's latest op-ed, Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1715), at World Politics Review.

SWJED
06-26-2008, 12:09 AM
A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects (http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Gentile.html) - LTC Gian Gentile, World Affairs.


The U.S. Army’s new strategy in Iraq—launched in February 2007, along with a surge of 25,000 additional American troops—qualifies neither as particularly new nor even as a strategy. Better to call it, instead, an enhanced reliance on tactics and operational concepts previously in use. Or, put less charitably, an over-hyped shift in emphasis that, on the one hand, will not necessarily yield an American victory in Iraq but, on the other, might well leave the United States Army crippled in future wars.

Properly understood, the surge narrative is really not about Iraq at all. It is about the past and future of the U.S. Army. It resurrects dubious battlefield lessons from the past—Vietnam, principally—applies them to Iraq, and extrapolates from there into an unknown future. On all three counts—past, present, and future—the narrative suffers from numerous and irreparable defects. Its reading of the past, grounded in the cliché that General Creighton Abrams’s “hearts and minds” program “won” the war in Vietnam, is a self-serving fiction. Its version of the more recent past and even the present is contrived and largely fanciful, relying on a distorted version of both to tell a tale in which U.S. forces triumphed in Iraq in 2007 and did so despite the misguided efforts of their predecessors even a year before. More than anything else, the surge narrative stakes a claim on the future, instructing us that its methods of counterinsurgency will be uniquely suited to the next war and to the one after that.

From the surge, its most fervent advocates have extracted a single maxim: that they and only they have uncovered the secret to defeating insurgencies. Prior to the surge, in this telling, only a few exceptional units were engaged in proper counterinsurgent operations...

Much more at the link.

Ken White
06-26-2008, 01:25 AM
trick pony people go on about.

Having agreed with him that the force is out of balance -- but disagreed on how far and how dangerous that is at this time; having agreed with him that good units in Iraq were doing the right things prior to the surge -- but disagreed on how many were doing it well; having agreed with him that conventional warfare and major combat operations are really the graduate level of war -- but disagreed that COIN is totally unimportant; having agreed, I thought, that we must have a balanced force with some elements able to excel at each of the spectrums of warfare, I've said about all I have to say on the topic (as I hear Gian breathe a sigh of relief... :D ).

I did note his final words in that well written article:
More than that, Iraq bids to transform the entire force into a “dead army walking.” We who believe this to be the case may be in error on some counts. Preparing to fight the last war will not be one of them.Those words cause me to note what I believe is an astounding lack of faith in the Army and to ask; then those who believe that to be the case are preparing for precisely what?

patmc
06-26-2008, 02:26 AM
As a former Artilleryman (switched to MI this month), I agree that FA is in trouble as a branch. Officers, NCO's, and Soldiers are not universally pleased with non-standard ILO missions, but do them because that is their duty. We've lost a lot of the FA technical skills that are highly perishable. But does that mean all the branches are in trouble?

Our infantrymen and tanks are fighting as squads, platoons, and companies/troops, not as battalions/squadrons, brigades, and divisions; but in reality, squads and teams actually fight the war, so is this an overly bad thing? It may make higher level commanders rusty, but for the trigger puller who only sees the men to his left and right, the experience he is gaining in OIF/OEF is immense. Can anyone better attest to this?

This article points out that some units were fighting COIN before it became sexy and official. I drove around Iraq throughout 2006, and I never saw any Combat Outposts. A couple patrol bases, but not the forward presence we have now. We went many a convoy without seeing any US troops (other than the other convoys). If not original, "The Surge" changed the Army-wide mindset, and made it the new stategy. The data I read about IEDs on convoys shows that something new is working, as attacks are WAY down from my time there. That is a great thing, regardless of who gets credit for it.

From the article:
"Critics of this decision ought to ask themselves: If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would the ground phase of the 1991 Gulf War have been completed in four days? Would the 2003 drive to Baghdad have been accomplished in three weeks?"

Just some Monday morning quarterbacking, and in no way an insult to any of those Soldiers who fought in the invasion, but would we now trade a longer invasion for a shorter occupation? If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would there have been a plan B for after capturing Baghdad?

Gian P Gentile
06-26-2008, 02:48 AM
Ken:

Even when we have disagreed on things (probably most of the time) I have learned much from our discussions.

Patmc: At least in Baghdad, i think the notion that the cops have been a key factor in the lowering of violence has been way overstated. For the size of the city there have just not been that many put out there and many of the points that have been called cops are actually Joint Security Stations which had been in place as ISF fobs.

However, I do think that in Talafar in 2005 with 3ACR and in Ramadi in 06/07 with 1/1 AD cops may have played a significant role. Neil Smith's recent article in Military Review on 1/1 AD in Ramadi makes a pretty convincing case (albeit without viewing things from the Iraqi side) that there were enough cops in Ramadi to have made a significant difference; combined of course with the other efforts of the brigade, like co-opting the tribes to ally with them to fight alqueda.

gian

Ken White
06-26-2008, 02:58 AM
...
From the article:
"Critics of this decision ought to ask themselves: If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would the ground phase of the 1991 Gulf War have been completed in four days? Would the 2003 drive to Baghdad have been accomplished in three weeks?"

Just some Monday morning quarterbacking, and in no way an insult to any of those Soldiers who fought in the invasion, but would we now trade a longer invasion for a shorter occupation? If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would there have been a plan B for after capturing Baghdad?Abrams made the logical decision to put the main effort into ability to deter a peer competitor as he should have done. He did not take COIN or FID off the table; that was done later by Donn Starry at TRADOC and affirmed by Bernie Rogers as CofSA. The Army kept some semblance of effort at LIC until John Wickham left the job. Then it got almost totally wiped out by a series of Artillerymen and Tankers with a lot of European experience.

To put the principal effort into Europe post Viet Nam made all the sense in the world. To downplay COIN and FID made sense. That was true in 1972 and it remained true until the late 80s. However, to later eliminate anything to do with LIC, particularly after 1991 was simply wrong. Still, even that and the foolish Weinberger and Powell doctrines -- abrogation of which by both Clinton and Bush 43 prove that DoD cannot influence US Foreign policy to the extent they'd like to believe -- were not the real problem.

The problem that created the lack of planning for the post attack phase was poor training; specifically BCTP. In that training regimen, the war was played by the Generals and Colonels, active on one side and retired on the other and it was good solid and very effective training. However, it had a flaw. After the last big US attack, the victory was won -- then they turned off the computers and the lights and left the room...

The problem in Iraq was no one had trained on what to do so they effectively did nothing for a year and a half. That's been fixed. The even better news is that BCTP has also been fixed in current iterations.

What is worrying is that Eurocentricity still seems to be with us... :rolleyes:

That's not the last war, it was three wars ago... :D

Rob Thornton
06-26-2008, 03:18 AM
The U.S. Army’s new strategy in Iraq—launched in February 2007, along with a surge of 25,000 additional American troops—qualifies neither as particularly new nor even as a strategy.

Interesting statement, and one worth discussing-

One way of expressing strategy is in ends, ways and means. Did any of these change? When did they change and why did they change? Did they change all at once, or over time? Were they explicit changes or implicit changes that became explicit over time. Was it a combination of bottom up changes that were codified into something else at the right time? Was it sausage? Does it matter?

I think over time we've gotten much more pragmatic about our ends, probably an acceptance of realism over idealism - meaning we'll settle for a more acceptable outcome vs. the ideal outcome. Again I emphasize that happened over time and that realization allowed us to adjust our expectations some.

With regards to "ways" I think those have also shifted over time. It was not an overnight shift, but it was codified in the MNF-I CDR's guidance I saw early in 2007, and that did have an effect. I believe it changed the way units approached their mission before they arrived vs. the 3-4 month adaptation curve I saw in previous units. It changed the subordinate commander's intent, and that changed the operational and tactical focus, and the allocation of resources - at least that is what I attribute s the cause - I say that after having asked several BCT and TF CDRs if it made a difference in the way they saw their key tasks - nothing new there - its doctrine. However, the codification of a change in guidance into the CDR's intent combined with other environmental factors - the increase in means (U.S. and Iraqi) and some misteps by the enemy facilitated a shift in "ways" on a scale that registered. Its not mono causal, but a CDR's understanding and intuition of when to shift operational focus is his responsibility - had it failed, had he erred in his judgment the CDR would certainly be held accountable.

An increase in troop end strength and an increase in funding is certainly a strategic increase in means. The decision to focus that increase primarily in MND-B is an operational increase in means - and it is also a change in ways. Baghdad was regarded as decisive for a number of reasons from credibility of the Iraqi government and our continued efforts (our domestic will) there, to countering the focus of enemy efforts, to providing the center of Iraqi government an air of increased security where political issues could be brought up and addressed in an environment that showed the potential for progress.

So if an expression of strategy is ends, ways and means, and one of those changed significantly, then did the strategy change? It may have been sausage over time, but we did not realize and codify it until about 2007. We hang the mark there for some good reasons.

WRT risk in Army capabilities and capacities - there is always risk. We cannot and should not count on policy to produce objectives that conform to the expectations for which we have spent the most $$ preparing. Its the other way around. Yes, we must be full spectrum, but in order to secure the policy objective with available resources we may be required to accept risk in other parts of the spectrum at various times. It is our job to point out those risks, but it is also our job to accept them (and mitigate where possible) once the policy objective has been decided.

Post policy objective I believe we will balance out - it will not be as before where we were absent a portion of the spectrum - we will and should move to account for those missing capabilities. As such we will not look as we did in 2000. We will and should be a bit different. We are working toward what we've always said we must do - provide ready and relevant land power, the operational environment has caused us to redefine some what is relevant to those types of conflicts we anticipate, and as such we are changing some to ensure our readiness to meet the challenges we may be called on in pursuit of policy.

Best, Rob

Mark O'Neill
06-26-2008, 04:43 AM
been Attack of the strawman. I think that even a casual review of posting history on this site reveals that Gian has several deeply entrenched positions on this issue. Nothing wrong with that. There are plenty of us who have similarly strongly held views on a wide range of issues.

The problem I perceive with some of the argument presented is that a false dilemma is being postulated . No one - from Secretary Gates through to Nagl is on record as advocating abandonment of US conventional abilities and the US' obvious superiority in this field. You only have to look at where the rubber hits the road in terms of planned expenditure on capital equipment and systems over the next decades to find further proof of this point. And yet, it only takes one or two (or a dozen...) folks to speculate openly and in an logical fashion about the last five years of 'unconventionality' 'might mean' and the cry goes up that the conventional sky is falling in.

Of course, there is no doubt that that some skills, conventional or otherwise, may have perished through lack of use whilst the US Defense force has been preoccupied with its tasks in Iraq and Afgahnistan. Realistically, that is to be expected. It has happened in every war before these ones and will no doubt happen during the next one as well. This is why we have the Services and Service Chiefs and charge them with 'raise, train and sustain (and reconstitute)' functions. This 'loss' of skills is really only an issue if you do not trust in either the Services or the Service Chief's abilities in this regard - but that is a different argument to the 'be aware of the COIN Bogeyman' one.

Regarding Gian's recycled point (from other posts) that folks prior to the surge were doing COIN as well - I do not detect any real disagreement from anyone who actually is in the 'know' about this point. The point (that has been stated previously) is that it (the COIN practice) was just not necessarily as coherent or effective as what has developed since. Such an observation is neither a personal attack nor a slight on the hard fought and valiant efforts of any serviceman or servicewoman (or unit) pre- surge, it is simply a statement of fact.

The point I will conclude with is that the 'dilemma' that Gian presents is not a zero sum game. National Security planning never has been - it is about the art of balancing finite resources against a world of possibilities and trying to strike an appropriate balance. Picking winners in such a game is never easy - but picking turkeys is - they stand out by a mile. And for my money, either an 'all conventional force' or an 'all COIN force' approach (or variations on similar themes) are both turkeys. Picking a 'winning approach' is not served by creating false dilemmas.

Gian P Gentile
06-26-2008, 10:49 AM
been Attack of the strawman...
The problem I perceive with some of the argument presented is that a false dilemma is being postulated . No one - from Secretary Gates through to Nagl is on record as advocating abandonment of US conventional abilities and the US' obvious superiority in this field...Picking a 'winning approach' is not served by creating false dilemmas.

Mark: Well said (Rob, Ken, et al too):

I do not think I have set up a strawman or created a false dilemma. Of course folks like SecDef and John Nagl have not called for abandoning conventional capabilities, just like I have never said we need to ditch irregular/coin/stability capabilities. But it is fair to say that our conventional capabilities have atrophied over the past 5 years. Most reasonable folks would agree with that statement. The seriousness of that atrophying is what is in question and how long it will take to recover. Clearly our Army and sister services have gained much in the way of combat experience; but as I have agrued before that combat experience in Iraq and Astan is not directly transferable especially in terms of combat functions to other forms of conflict. Those who think that it will be should consult history; specifically the British 7th Armored Division who learned and eventually ended up fighting well in north Africa, gained much combat experience from that theater, but when in June/July 1944 they had a very rough go making just the 20 some-odd miles up to Caen in the face of a superior German tactical fighting ability. The logic of combat experience being universal and transferable from one form to another should have meant that the British 7th marched right up to Caen on Day 2.

I am also not sanguine at all that somehow, by process, luck, hope, whatever, that we will end up with an appropriate balance. This especially worries me when I read what John Nagl writes in his RUSI book review of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. Nagl writes that in future wars and conflicts American soldiers who


...will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies...

The last clause in the above sentence takes my breath away in its implication for policy and American action in the world. As one, like many other SWC members, who has been on the business end of American foreign policy in foreign lands I am deeply suspect of the notion that deployed American military power can "change entire societies."

And LTG Caldwell's recent article in Military Review where he proclaims with troubling certainty that:


The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.

This sweeping statment about the nature of future war is equally arresting. It is underpinned by a vision of the future security environment as one of a global-counterinsurgency that applies a counter-maoist, protracted people's war approach. Such an approach at least implies a force structure that is heavily weighted toward stability operations and irregular war. So how will our army look in 10 years? If the new Army doctrine has anything to do with things the logic of it calls for an light infantry heavy force that can work "among the people" protecting them and convincing them of ours and the host nations righteousness. this is why i am worried and not at all sanguine that "balance" will some how just come about because we say it will.

gian

Fuchs
06-26-2008, 11:13 AM
It is underpinned by a vision of the future security environment as one of a global-counterinsurgency that applies a counter-maoist, protracted people's war approach. Such an approach at least implies a force structure that is heavily weighted toward stability operations and irregular war.

Or towards saving defense expenditures (couple hundred billion USD) for a really stabilizing policy.

Schmedlap
06-26-2008, 11:42 AM
D'oh. I went and commented at the blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/gentile-on-war-strategy-and-th/#c001838). Oh well.

patmc raised some good issues...

We've lost a lot of the FA technical skills that are highly perishable. But does that mean all the branches are in trouble?

I felt exactly the same way about the Infantry before we were sent to Iraq to improve our skills. Whereas today the Artillery is suffering due to a fundamental shift in training and operations, the Infantry is stronger than ever. Before 9/11, the Infantry endured the same crisis that the Artillery faces today. The system was designed to prevent us from worthwhile training. Now we have Iraq and Afghanistan - both are gigantic ranges with a 360 degree range fan, unlimited ammunition, no safety tower or range control personnel, a wide-open scenario, and just about every curveball you can throw into the mix.


Our infantrymen and tanks are fighting as squads, platoons, and companies/troops, not as battalions/squadrons, brigades, and divisions; but in reality, squads and teams actually fight the war, so is this an overly bad thing? It may make higher level commanders rusty, but for the trigger puller who only sees the men to his left and right, the experience he is gaining in OIF/OEF is immense. Can anyone better attest to this?

Agree 100%.

Fuchs
06-26-2008, 11:57 AM
The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

Mark O'Neill
06-26-2008, 12:08 PM
from John Nagl that Gian cited (about the ability to change societies). I will have to go back and check the context, but I cannot conceive of this as either a practical, desirable (or for that matter realistic) task for the US military or State to aspire to - now or in the future. If nothing else the result of the neo-conservative 'project' of 02/03 should suggest the utility of such ambition.

wm
06-26-2008, 12:29 PM
A couple of points on this discussion:

1. Were we in a world that allowed the US military to have whatever it wanted, I can see the argument for ensuring that it was a full spectrum capable force. However, we are not. We are resourced constrained. And, being resource constrained means we need to prioritize how best to dispose of our resources. Folks usually seem to devote the greatest amount of resources to the problem that is most near to hand. Based on that hypothesis, it only stands to reason that the current fight gets more attention than future possibilities. Whether this phenomenon is as generalized as I propose, at least it seems to be a motivating factor for the current SECDEF. Perhaps that is a lesson that now former SECAF Wynne did not learn too well.

2. A psychologist named Gerald J.S. Wilde has written on an interesting phenomenon called risk homeostasis. In a nutshell, his theory is that we are each “hard-wired” to expect a certain level of risk in our lives. If things change so that our perceived level of risk goes down, then we will restructure what we do to bring the risk level back up. This (http://psyc.queensu.ca/target/index.html.) is a link to the first edition of his book.
If Wilde is right about risk homeostasis, then Gian’s lament is as fruitless as is that of another who claims we are sacrificing too many resources needed for the current fight in order to prepare for a future conflict. Either course of action has significant risks, and each may be viewed as one way out of many for actualizing our obligatory risk seeking behavior. Instead of disagreeing about how risky the two alternatives are, perhaps we ought to be seeking a solution that maximizes our preparations for both ends of the spectrum while maintaining the current level of perceived risk through such a solution. Is this possible and if so, what would it look like?

Randy Brown
06-26-2008, 02:14 PM
The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

My compliments on distilling large concepts into punchy insights that look good on our team's 'lessons-learned' wall. They're a good reminder for us to put any OIF/OEF lesson--from the smallest TTP to the biggest strategic shift--into historical context. Again, thanks!

Ron Humphrey
06-26-2008, 03:43 PM
from John Nagl that Gian cited (about the ability to change societies). I will have to go back and check the context, but I cannot conceive of this as either a practical, desirable (or for that matter realistic) task for the US military or State to aspire to - now or in the future. If nothing else the result of the neo-conservative 'project' of 02/03 should suggest the utility of such ambition.

It seems he is simply trying to emphasize the fact that DOD isn't going to be the only ones fighting but others as well. Specifically mentioning Info Agency.

Lends support to his recommendations for a return of said org and not necessarily unrealistic if you think about it. Armies don't make societies nor should they try, Those who have are many against which we have battled.

That said Wouldn't you consider changes in markets, infrastructure, societal norms, available employment, availability of press to public discussion, Education, etc all major societal changes. Long and short Empowerment does exactly that, it changes societies so in that context I get where hes coming from.

Cavguy
06-26-2008, 04:31 PM
The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

Real dangers, assuming that our soldiers are unthinking enough to not adapt to a different environment. That has not been shown. There are intangibles from our seven years in combat that provide benefit regardless of the battlefield.

The side effect is that we have experienced combat leaders who deal with unstructured problems very well, and are used to operating more independently than was true in the 90's. While certain HIC infantry fieldcraft has certainly been lost, that is easy to retrain/fix. We've got tons of FM's and ARTEPs that tell us how. Harder is to create junior leaders experienced in operating and thinking under combat stress and with immense responsibility in peacetime.

Entropy
06-26-2008, 04:49 PM
Gian makes some excellent points in his last comment. It frankly astounds me how predictions about the future of US military conflict are so casually made with little analysis or justification. The idea that the future of warfare will "reside among the people" needs some serious critical examination, in my opinion. As it stands now, it seems so often repeated that it's become a kind of "fact" that proponents do not feel compelled to justify even though it forms the central foundation for their successive arguments.

Personally, I'm quite skeptical that US policymakers and the US public will willingly engage in a major "war among the people" for a generation or more - a war that would require the large infantry/COIN centric force that some envision. Proponents of this particular future of warfare do not seem to address this political aspect and they remind me, actually , of the early airpower advocates who believed strategic nuclear bombing would be the truly decisive form of future warfare. Those early airpower advocates failed to consider the political aspect as well and that politicians (for good reason) would place limits on their vision of the future of warfare.

Ron Humphrey
06-26-2008, 05:28 PM
Gian makes some excellent points in his last comment. It frankly astounds me how predictions about the future of US military conflict are so casually made with little analysis or justification. The idea that the future of warfare will "reside among the people" needs some serious critical examination, in my opinion. As it stands now, it seems so often repeated that it's become a kind of "fact" that proponents do not feel compelled to justify even though it forms the central foundation for their successive arguments.

Personally, I'm quite skeptical that US policymakers and the US public will willingly engage in a major "war among the people" for a generation or more - a war that would require the large infantry/COIN centric force that some envision. Proponents of this particular future of warfare do not seem to address this political aspect and they remind me, actually , of the early airpower advocates who believed strategic nuclear bombing would be the truly decisive form of future warfare. Those early airpower advocates failed to consider the political aspect as well and that politicians (for good reason) would place limits on their vision of the future of warfare.

The most about this is how anyone talks about wars without people being all throughout it. Weapons don't kill people, People kill people, Wars don't fight themselves people fight them, and so on so forth. Point being big, small, short, long all wars revolve around, inbetween, and amongst the people because without them there is no war. That's a baseline I've never seen anyone get around.

Ken White
06-26-2008, 05:35 PM
I agree with all and would submit that the second paragraph in particular is the reason I'm not as concerned as is Gian about the future. That may seem counterintuitive as, if you're correct, that would indicate a large degree of uncertainty for the future. It does but the political aspects have always outweighed the purely military aspects. I don't see that changing.

Much of the current gnashing of teeth over the issue of Iraq; the future of warfare and ways to do thing are ideologically derived, naturally experience colored and contain a strong element of parochial interest. None of those things are going away but in the end, political need and goals will drive the effort and produce the result. No one should lose sight of that. As I've probably too often said, attempts by the Armed Forces to steer that political aim are mostly ineffectual. That means the responsibility for reacting to the Politicians brilliance or stupidity -- seems to be a 50:50 proposition -- is inherent to those forces. Period.

Thus, my contention is that we need to provide a full spectrum force; land, sea and air. Unlike others here I believe that is economically possible, human factors achievable and likely. It does unquestionably entail a revision in the way we operate and train and I think that will occur. It had better...

Ken White
06-27-2008, 03:41 AM
The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.Not on the macro level but as pointed out by others, the little things are the killers, the basics -- and those things, Afghanistan and Iraq do aid.
Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.Or without Armor if they're smart...
Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.Depends. Can be generally true in most of rural western Europe that is developed and mostly unwooded; quite true also in the desert, on the plains or steppes -- but not at all true in jungles, mountains, heavily wooded terrain like boreal forest or taiga and absolutely not in an urban environment. Again, if they're smart, not totally true anywhere but in the latter types of terrain, they only have to be half smart... :D

UrsaMaior
07-06-2008, 05:55 PM
You are probably all aware of a quote from Mao (in Protracted war) where he states that ALL his soldiers MUST be able to switch to mobile warfare and then back to guerilla-style. If so I aplogize for bringing it up.

William F. Owen
07-07-2008, 06:36 AM
There’s a couple of points here I think worth making. With regard to the issue of “balance.”


How does it serve a useful purpose to supposed of even suggest that the future of war is X or Y? The Insurgent is no more the future face of war than the T-90 tank. The fact most of the “COIN-experts” want to avoid is that Vietnam saw insurgents and NVA formations working in the same Corps area, on the same day.
Nor does studying Hezbollah hold any key to the future either. Most analysis has failed to fine-tune the distinction of Hezbollah’s very limited tactical performance, and the IDFs High Commands woeful confusion over their Strategic and operational concept of operation, leading to tactically senseless or unachievable missions. Ludicrous extrapolations have been made from a very small number of outcomes, dubious sources and popular media.
Add to all this the human dimension of agendas and personal promotion, and we have a very sticky and wholly unnecessary mess.


So assuming my comments above are not too “off base,” I respectfully suggest that we might view the problem in these ways.


Good Armies will need to be able to operate against both combined arms armour formations and Insurgents in the same town at the same time. This is mostly a training and leadership challenge. At the very worst it requires the fairly simple encompassing of a few simple contradictions and dualities. ( and as Ursamajor correctly points out.)
I think their may be merit in considering the idea that a lot of the complexity we have ascribed to the current operating environment is not complexity at all, but a need to view something as complex to excuse our own lack of understanding.
I would venture that the first step in this process may be recovering the solid, proven and effective doctrines of military force and learning to apply them I the context of avoiding civilian casualties. Take away the civilians and you take away the need for most of the complexity.

Mark O'Neill
07-07-2008, 09:28 AM
Good Armies will need to be able to operate against both combined arms armour formations and Insurgents in the same town at the same time. This is mostly a training and leadership challenge. At the very worst it requires the fairly simple encompassing of a few simple contradictions and dualities. ( and as Ursamajor correctly points out.)
I think their may be merit in considering the idea that a lot of the complexity we have ascribed to the current operating environment is not complexity at all, but a need to view something as complex to excuse our own lack of understanding.
I would venture that the first step in this process may be recovering the solid, proven and effective doctrines of military force and learning to apply them I the context of avoiding civilian casualties. Take away the civilians and you take away the need for most of the complexity.
[/LIST]

William, I am trying to ascertain what you are offering.

Isn't (1) 'Three Block War' stated differently?

Regarding (2) - by definition, complexity is relative, so I am not sure what we gain by the 'realisation' that lack of understanding makes something complex to the beholder; and

Regarding (3) - are you implying that we have a choice as to where the enemy will choose to fight us? (ie - we can choose 'no civilians'). As Gray said in '40 Maxims' , The enemy too has a vote..

That said, I agree with the point that you make up front, which essentially seems to suggest that the future does not confront us with an 'either / or' proposition by the likely requirement to be prepared to do both, proficiently.

regards,

Mark

PS apologies for stuffing up the quotation - something I edited obviously affected the list you had formatted.

William F. Owen
07-07-2008, 10:02 AM
William, I am trying to ascertain what you are offering.

Isn't (1) 'Three Block War' stated differently?

Very probably, except without blocks, and a no prescribed number of blocks. I guess I am taking out the words "Three" and "Block". We might call it just "War". I am not professing to be original.


Regarding (2) - by definition, complexity is relative, so I am not sure what we gain by the 'realisation' that lack of understanding makes something complex to the beholder; and

It's a matter of perspective. I think there is a lack of "so what" in some of the popular aphorisms people throw about. Things are often defined by the name we give them, and the amount of attention we seek to focus on them, because we perceive them to be important. I think there are various aspects of modern conflict that there may be no actual need to address or rather the cost of doing so is disproportionate, to the measurable effect.


Regarding (3) - are you implying that we have a choice as to where the enemy will choose to fight us? (ie - we can choose 'no civilians'). As Gray said in '40 Maxims' , The enemy too has a vote..

This is not what I wish to imply. The military gets no say. The Politicians do though. What I am saying is (as have many others) that if there are no civilians, then there is little complexity. The issues that create the complexity are all to do with the proximity civilian populations, and their restrictions on force.


That said, I agree with the point that you make up front, which essentially seems to suggest that the future does not confront us with an 'either / or' proposition by the likely requirement to be prepared to do both, proficiently.

Yep. That's pretty much it.

UrsaMaior
07-07-2008, 10:25 AM
To add another point: some/most Mao's fighters were illiterate. If they could grasp the TTPs of both mobile AND guerilla warfare I dont think it should be too difficult for the modern days armies' soldiers. Even if (which I doubt) their other skills get lowered, being a multitask asset offsets much more than it sacrifices.

Ken White
07-07-2008, 04:10 PM
I think I agree with Mark as well but I'm not sure I understand all I know about what I think he said... :D

I think I agree with this:
"...which essentially seems to suggest that the future does not confront us with an 'either / or' proposition by the likely requirement to be prepared to do both, proficiently."All this froth about either / or is prompted by a lack of confidence in the capability of prediction (justified) and Soldiers or Marines (not justified).

MikeF
12-04-2008, 05:11 PM
Found this article by COL Gentile in the International Herald Tribune this morning. Haven't seen it posted yet on SWJ, so here it is...


The U.S. Army and other parts of America's defense establishment have become transfixed by the promise of counterinsurgency. Since the surge in Iraq began in February 2007, the panacea of successful counterinsurgencies has become like an all-powerful Svengali, holding hypnotic sway over the minds of many of the nation's military strategists.

The promise of counterinsurgency is to turn war into a program of social-scientific functions that will achieve victory - if performed correctly by adhering to the guidance of counterinsurgency experts. The program is simple: increase and maintain long-term American combat presence on the ground; use those combat troops to protect the local population and win their hearts and minds; and build a new nation. The program's appeal lies in its purported simplicity, perceived relative bloodlessness, and seductive ability to remove the friction from war.

The current U.S. counterinsurgency program rests on the dubious assumption that the surge in Iraq was a successful feat of arms that was the primary cause for the lowering of violence. Yet there were other reasons why violence ebbed, including the buying off of America's former Sunni insurgent enemies and a decision by the Shiite leader Moktada al-Sadr to cease attacks. Without those conditions in place, levels of violence would have remained high even in the face of a few more American combat brigades on the ground.



http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/04/opinion/edgentile.php

v/r

Mike

Bob's World
12-04-2008, 06:05 PM
COL Gentile is clearly a well intentioned officer, who is obviously bright, and presumably accomplished in his own service and field of expertise; and I mean no disrespect whatsoever to make the observation that while he may be able to spell "COIN," his knowledge of the nature of insurgency and elements of an effective counterinsurgency campaign probably end there.

I will agree that many of the "born again" COIN experts in the conventional force that cut there teeth in Iraq tend to confuse what has been taking place there as COIN as well. Much of it is, much of it is not.

But COL G needs to understand that "The Surge" was neither a strategy, nor even a campaign plan, it was a resourcing requirement to enable the execution of a comprehensive campaign plan that was rooted in sound tenants of COIN. In fact, it is more accurately "Combat FID" than COIN, as COIN is what the Iraqi security forces are conducting. He also needs to understand that COIN is about neutralizing the insurgency, not defeating the insurgent. Convincing parties to representing various segments of the populace to at a minimum remain neutral, or at best to join in the solution is all critical to effective COIN.

He also implies that an Army that just a few years ago thought it could solve any military problem with a "shock and awe" assault now believes with equal fervor that it can solve any military problem with a COIN or FID campaign. I refuse to believe that we are that polarized in our actions or simplistic in our thinking.

The Army still has a great deal to learn about FID, but I suspect the Army will continue to get a great deal of practice. Hopefully they will also be able to keep an edge on their more conventional warfighting skills as well; and have leadership that recognize when to apply which to achieve the desired endstate of any given operation. The SF community continues to be the real keepers of the flame on this topic though, and though they don't have proponency and lead for the Army's positoins, if one listens carefully, these "quiet professionals," are out there.

And yes, we will still need the airforce to support us. To get us to the fight, to provide us with fires when needed, to provide aerial ISR, etc. But while COL G may raise some valid points, the effect is lost in his larger ignorance of the context in which he is trying to make them.

Entropy
12-04-2008, 06:56 PM
This is a drum Col. Gentile beats often, and it's one I agree completely with. From the article:


Many army officers and Department of Defense thinkers seem to be able to think only about how to apply the perceived counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq to Afghanistan. A recent group of colonels asked the question "how should the army execute a surge in Afghanistan," instead of the more important questions of whether the army should use the surge counterinsurgency program there. A professor from a major Department of Defense university has gone so far as to call for the surge and its counterinsurgency techniques as the model for American strategy and policy throughout the entire Middle East.

He's right to be skeptical of what sounds like the simplistic importation of the Iraqi "surge" into Afghanistan. One of many problems is there seems to be no accepted definition (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5785) of what exactly the surge in Iraq consisted of. Another serious problem are clarity issues at the policy level with respect to Afghanistan. Until those get worked out, it seems premature to declare that a surge in Afghanistan is either useful or necessary. And even if he's wrong, Col. Gentile is performing a valuable service by questioning and challenging the conventional wisdom.

datroy
12-04-2008, 08:08 PM
Bob, I would disagree with you ever so slightly. The increase in troops sure enough was a resourcing requirement. "Surge," however, was a terrible name to apply to what we did. It was not just increasing troops. It was taking a COIN approach that had worked in various locations and applying it to the entire country. So the new COIN tactics, assisted by more troops, created the security that allowed the Awakenings (which had started before the "surge," but again only because of COIN operations at the local level that led to improved ability to protect the population) to spread. But then we went and called it the "surge" so it will probably forever be reported and explained as the "surge" or the "surge in troops" that turned Iraq around.

Eden
12-04-2008, 08:23 PM
The Gentile article is not his best - I can't help but notice that when our best thinkers begin writing op-ed pieces for the mainstream press their IQ seems to drop a few notches.

Anyway, I think the problem is that we are fixated on our operational approach to Afghanistan before we have clearly articulated what our strategic goals are. Will more troops in Afghanistan help us do more of what we are doing now, only better? Yes. Is what we are doing now the right thing? How can we tell without a clearly defined objective?

I would argue that Afghanistan has been a continuous sad example of mission creep since 2001. There has never been a clear end state besides the standard (and useless) boilerplate of "strong and stable democracy capable of providing for its own defense yadayadayada..." that we foisted onto NATO and Europe some years ago while we fought our own unilateral counter-terrorist campaign.

I just got back from a talk where a two-star admiringly said of Petraeus that he never wanted to hear the words "success" or "victory", only "progress". Yikes!

As the philosopher said, "Any road is fine if you don't know where you're going." If we don't know what constitutes success, how do we know we are progressing in the right direction?

Entropy
12-04-2008, 09:02 PM
Great comment Eden.

Ken White
12-04-2008, 09:04 PM
...........

Ron Humphrey
12-04-2008, 10:21 PM
In regards to this:



I just got back from a talk where a two-star admiringly said of Petraeus that he never wanted to hear the words "success" or "victory", only "progress". Yikes!

As the philosopher said, "Any road is fine if you don't know where you're going." If we don't know what constitutes success, how do we know we are progressing in the right direction?

As you seem to have pointed out, its kinda important to know where your going, and the fact that in order to adequately plan from there ,one really needs to know where they are at not to mention what avenues are available would definately lead one to looking for a map:)

That said also realizing that your trips success is likely to be affected by those whom you may encounter it is also good to know who they are, where they are (NOTE: also requires a map:cool:) and what exactly they might be doing:eek:

Until somebody finds the "marauders map" it looks like getting all that together fast enough to please everyone might just be a little difficult.

So until then perhaps the only option open besides sitting waiting for it is to get a basic direction and keep heading towards it.

Mark O'Neill
12-04-2008, 11:40 PM
I am increasingly sceptical of the increasingly shrill drum banging about this issue. I think it is time to move onto other issues and writing Gian.

Cheers,

Mark

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-05-2008, 12:48 AM
Since this forum is small wars/LIC/COIN centric it seems that Gian Gentile’s pontifications take a greater share of potshots from this audience for his position.

However, in many ways I feel he is right in his concerns. Why? (Allow me to take few moments to position and climb atop my soapbox).

Soldiers and Marines are trained to obey orders. (no disrespect to the Navy and Air Force but this diatribe is aimed at the footslogger). At the very basic level Soldiers and Marines are trained to mete out death and destruction with a variety of small arms. However, they typically only do so in response to orders from higher authority. Soldiers and Marines are also trained to shoot, move, and communicate at the lowest levels of tactical warfare.

In “conventional” battle there are times when Soldiers and Marines must seek assistance in the meting out death and destruction, thus they call for even more destructive weapons to assist them. These weapons are typically operated by others and are employed at the request of the Soldier or Marine. If several of these weapons are called upon (tanks/arty/CAS) to act in unison there must be discipline, synergy, and orchestration to ensure these disparate weapons systems are brought to bear upon the enemy and not on the Soldier or Marine. “Conventional” battles are usually fought in areas free of innocent bystanders, thus allowing full application of weapons with little chance of “collateral damage.” This is not an easy task to accomplish and takes precise training and exacting practice on the part of the Soldier or Marine to achieve the proper coordination and orchestration to both destroy the target and not harm our own troops.

COIN is not “conventional” war; it is small war, typically absent large enemy military formations armed with “heavy” weapons (tanks, aircraft, heavy artillery). COIN is predominantly social, political, ideological warfare where the battlefields are ambiguous at best, and typically cluttered with a variety of non-combatants. In COIN the basic skill set of the Soldier and Marine isstill applicable: shoot, move, and communicate with a greater emphasis on communicate and move rather than shoot. In COIN the Soldier and Marine act more in the role of very heavily armed police officers. Police officers try to maintain the peace without resorting to firepower. In COIN the Soldier and Marine must do the same, although unlike the police officer they typically have a much greater arsenal at their disposal should they need it. The key is that, while they need the same skills to employ these weapons of greater destruction, they must be much more judicious in their employment. Collateral damage is highly counter-productive in COIN.

So where is this all leading?

After Vietnam the Army seemed to toss aside over a decade’s worth of COIN/LIC/IW lessons in favor of concentrating totally on conventional warfare with a peer competitor (the “Fulda Gap” syndrome). Despite the fact that from 1975 to 1991 all our military engagements were of the COIN/LIC/IW variety the Army was well skilled for Desert Storm. Again in 2003, despite the lessons of Somalia and Bosnia, the Army and Marine Corps conducted a conventional blitz into Iraq and defeated Saddam Hussein (again). But the Iraq campaign then changed into something very different, it became a COIN/LIC/IW campaign. The Army and Marines adopted ever so slowly but soon enough had rediscovered those lessons ignored from Vietnam and before.

I believe Gian sees this new emphasis on COIN doctrine as rapidly becoming dogma and the Army is now seemingly forsaking conventional warfare training and skills for those of COIN.

COIN is warfare as the small unit level using small arms. Every infantry Soldier and Marine knows how to use these weapons. But COIN is not a weapons system; it is a capability, one which requires a variety of often disparate tactics, dissimilar methods, and many systems to employ.

A tank is always a tank, whether an American, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or Sudanese operates it. We know what tanks are typically used for, what they are capable of, and how to defeat them. Yet an insurgent, while always a man (or woman), is not always the same. Insurgents come in different shapes, sizes, capabilities, ideologies, religious beliefs, and moral standards. Insurgencies are at once the same and different.

I feel that Gian sees the ever-increasing emphasis on a COIN centric Army as being very detrimental to the Army’s capability to wage conventional warfare with a peer competitor. He feels the pendulum is in danger of being allowed to swing too far away from center (although it certainly wasn't there pre-Iraq). A prime example is NTC. NTC was the place where Soldiers learned the various skills required of the subtle ballet that is synchronizing and orchestrating the vast array of weaponry possessed by the Army and bringing it to bear on a like enemy. Currently, however, NTC is becoming more of a COIN-training center. This is a bad precedent for the army. It will gradually lead to the deterioration of Soldiers with the requisite skills to conduct effective conventional warfare.

In many respects I agree with Gentile’s concerns and do not believe he is anti-COIN. The Army needs to have a robust capability to fight in both types of warfare. IMHO it is much easier for a Soldier who is highly trained in the complexities of employing the variety of weapons systems in conventional warfare to quickly adapt to a COIN/LIC/IW situation than it is for a Soldier who is trained predominantly in COIN to function at his optimum when thrust into the chaos of conventional war.

Soldiers, after all, are trained to obey orders, but to follow orders they need the skills. Conventional warfare requires solid skill sets, many of which that are also useful in COIN. COIN is more of an intellectual exercise requiring a common sense approach, an understanding of human behavior, and empathy with the local population, skills not necessarily taught or quantified in an FM.

Ken White
12-05-2008, 01:41 AM
and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

Mark O'Neill
12-05-2008, 11:09 AM
and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.
Nailed it in one.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-05-2008, 01:23 PM
I agree he can come off as overzealous (was unaware of the personal attacks) but unfortunately in the big machine that is the Army, and DoD for that matter, it is the squeaky wheel that gets the attention. Just ask Charlie Dunlap. ;)

Shivan
12-05-2008, 01:32 PM
Eden raised the point re strategy, which is a drum I beat, but on the political dimension of COIN. Military strategy is all to the good, but what of the political? Are we fighting for a credible political vision in Afghanistan? The analogy is to Vietnam, as Jeffrey Race describes, where the conceptual model was wrong; and the political roots of defeat were established in 1956-60, before the US presence expanded. Fall emphasizes the political for COIN as well as insurgents, one example being the Huk, where Magsaysay implemented social and military reforms which drew support to the government.

selil
12-05-2008, 04:16 PM
and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.

Steve Blair
12-05-2008, 04:24 PM
To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.

This has always been my concern with the debate. Warfare is not a binary proposition. I've had issues with historical cherry-picking by BOTH sides in the debate as well.

Ron Humphrey
12-05-2008, 04:33 PM
To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.(emphasis Ron)

From my limited perch it almost seems like the requirement for integrating COIN/IW practices firmly into bureaucratic circles has happened at the cost of that continuum understanding.

Sort of like there exists blank number of blocks for a certain type of warfare and the only way the other gets brought into the fold is through a 1 to 1 swap.

In some ways this may make sense (resource allocations, training limitations,etc) but although I can't put my finger on it something doesn't seem quite right. Lets just hope that those who represent each are able to balance their way through to reasonable exchanges in order to keep some sort of equilibrium otherwise in the end Gentile's consistant concerns might not have been as unnecessary as they sometimes may seem:confused:

Old Eagle
12-05-2008, 04:38 PM
Gian is running from something that ain't chasing him. His overstatements tend to polarize the issue, something I find unhelpful. IMHO there is no "surge dogma", and Gian does not succeed in making the case that there is.

Nor is doctrine a zero-sum game. The addition of FMs 3-24 and 3-07 to fill gaping holes in existing doctrine does not mean that we're not going to "fight" anymore.

I thought that SECDEF's Foreign Affairs article struck a very balanced, well-reasoned, and articulate chord.

wm
12-05-2008, 04:59 PM
Gian is running from something that ain't chasing him. His overstatements tend to polarize the issue . . .
I thought that SECDEF's Foreign Affairs article struck a very balanced, well-reasoned, and articulate chord.

As a matter of rhetorical strategy, one technique that often gains success is to overpolarize the situation and then present a "middle ground" solution." While this may not have been the overt plan, it is what has happpened (Gentile V. Nagl, with the SECDEF getting to be the "good guy" with the compromise solution). In fact the debate has managed to get folks to swallow a "dual track" force that will actually be a more expensive propostion than either of the other alternatives--all conventional or all irregular warfighting capability. I'd say it is a pretty slick bit of persuasion.

William F. Owen
12-05-2008, 05:28 PM
COIN is predominantly social, political, ideological warfare where the battlefields are ambiguous at best, and typically cluttered with a variety of non-combatants.

All warfare is "social, political, ideological warfare." That is what War is, is it not?. It's warfare if it uses violence, for those purposes.

My point being I still fail to see the useful reason to differentiate COIN as something distinct from "War fighting", when history proves it is merely a modifying condition - or a condition requiring modification.

.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-05-2008, 11:01 PM
All warfare is "social, political, ideological warfare." That is what War is, is it not?. It's warfare if it uses violence, for those purposes.

that warfare writ large entails all those things and much more.

The point that I was ineloquently trying to make was that down at a 'tactical' COIN environment me, the snuffy, and the grunt have to be sensitive to social, political, and ideological issues as we prosecute the campaign. These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect. ;)

My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat Soldiers and Marines obey the orders given, almost without question. If the orders are to lay waste to every living thing in your path, we certainly can do that; but if the orders are to be nice to all the people because we're here to protect them (even though we may suspect some are assisting the bad guys), we can do that too. The former requires the synchronization and orchestration of a very deadly war machine, the latter a more attuned sense of social, political, and ideological issues. While in both instances Soldiers and Marines will follow orders and utilize basic combat skills, in the first instance, that of 'conventional battle,' there are additional very specific skills needed to ensure the that the plethora of weapons systems are properly employed.

I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too. :D

CR6
12-05-2008, 11:10 PM
Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too. :D

Which is precisely why we're seeing these new digital camouflage patterns.

Ken White
12-06-2008, 01:35 AM
The point that I was ineloquently trying to make was that down at a 'tactical' COIN environment me, the snuffy, and the grunt have to be sensitive to social, political, and ideological issues as we prosecute the campaign.Been my observation that's also entailed in conventional war -- different levels to be sure but the issues are still there.
These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect. ;)At the risk of inviting a fire storm, I suggest the level of training and capability of the opposition has a strong bearing on whether those things need to be considered and how much rolling and blasting one is going to do. A fairly low level opponent allows unthinking violence -- you try that with one that thinks and is equipped as well or better than you and you're going to get a shock. In Korea, as my ever wise Company Gunny pointed out, "Them Chinese ain't got a lot of stuff we got but they're smart, shifty and there sure is a bunch of 'em and they won't quit."
My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat Soldiers and Marines obey the orders given, almost without question.I strongly disagree with that-- while conceding that you are right . What you say is true because in most units, that's the way it's done because it's easier on the NCOs and Officers.

That's also in large measure because we have not done in any war time training since 1945 -- the mothers of America don't want the training loss that realistic training would force so we soft pedal and half train people. We train better now than we ever have -- far better, in many respects -- than when I went through P.I. but we're still only half training the kids.

There are some units that encourage Snuffy to think and while that puts a bunch more work on the chain, those units function better. In fairly low level combat such as that of the last 30 years, that's okay that just some units function really well instead of adequately -- but in a major war, that will not be adequate. EVERYBODY has to think. In COIN and low tempo Ops, the NCOs can direct Joe -- given a major war of movement, they can't-- Joe has to know what to do. So do the NCOs -- and the LTs; the Bn Cdr won't be micromanaging...
If the orders are to lay waste to every living thing in your path, we certainly can do that; but if the orders are to be nice to all the people because we're here to protect them (even though we may suspect some are assisting the bad guys), we can do that too. The former requires the synchronization and orchestration of a very deadly war machine, the latter a more attuned sense of social, political, and ideological issues. While in both instances Soldiers and Marines will follow orders and utilize basic combat skills, in the first instance, that of 'conventional battle,' there are additional very specific skills needed to ensure the that the plethora of weapons systems are properly employed.True -- and I submit that to really do that well takes more training, smarts and effort that does the COIN bit. COIN operations are a pain in the tail, are tedious, frustrating and challenge your social skills. But they are not complex, they're just common sense and decent behavior.
I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too. :DNot a bad simile but I strongly suggest you consider the quality of the opposing Aussie Rules team -- that makes a very significant difference in the way your teamwork and synergies work out -- and you find that it takes a whole bunch more than brute strength to eke out a draw, much less a crush against a team that's as smart and strong as you are. One that will pay no attention whatsoever to attempts to impress...

Those folks that say COIN is the graduate level of war are, I believe, wrong. Major conventional operations against a peer opponent as well or better equipped than you are the graduate level, fail the test and you're out-- COIN against even skillful opponents but basically low tech equipped is all the anxiety, tedium, squabbles and pain of the 8th grade all over again. Neat thing is you can get a few Ds and Fs and still move on...

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-06-2008, 04:04 AM
I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions. :D

Alas I do not benefit from the infinite array and vast range of experience you possess; probably because I was not issued leggings and an M1 in boot camp. :D

However, by "obey orders" I did not mean in an automaton way. I meant in the way that if we are in a full up battle with a peer opponent and I order the platoon to take a position, they apply all the violence necessary to take the position. In COIN if I order the squad to go into a village and help the people and do no harm, that's what they do. If we were barbarians it would be easier in COIN just to wipe out the village. No one shoots at you if they are all dead or cowering in a hole. Counterproductive in COIN...certainly; is it "easier"... yes.

When we rolled into Kuwait we were supposedly facing an enemy that was battle hardened, well trained, and would inflict huge casualties on us. Hindsight proved otherwise. But I wouldn't call it "unthinking violence." If I'm in a battle zone where there are only combatants I know that anyone I lay my sights upon is either a good guy or bad guy, thus I am fully authorized without seeking prior approval to waste the bad guy. COIN has more subtlty in whom you can kill. If that makes any sense.

I totally agree that ‘conventional’ warfare is the graduate level, and that is why we still need to train up to that level. I think that is the crux of what Gian worries about, that the Army will sacrifice the graduate level training it needs in order to mass produce too many community college grads.

Ken White
12-06-2008, 04:30 AM
...Alas I do not benefit from the infinite array and vast range of experience you possess; probably because I was not issued leggings and an M1 in boot camp. :DBecause the leggings permanently remove all the hair off your legs from ankle to below the knee which means you look funny to your kids in swimming trunks. Plus having the seven digit serial number of that first M1 running around in your head almost 60 years later can be mildly annoying when you're trying to recall a newer phone number... :D
I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions. :DMe neither -- so we can both sleep good...
However, by "obey orders" I did not mean in an automaton way. I ...certainly; is it "easier"... yes.I figured that but the fact that we force these kids (well, most of 'em, anyway...) to under achieve has always irritated me. They'll do what you train 'em to do and they can do more than most people are willing to let them do, unfortunately. That and our very poor initial entry training are my pet rocks.
... COIN has more subtlty in whom you can kill. If that makes any sense.True dat. One of the reasons why it's so frustrating -- sometimes the one you can't zap tries to get you the next day. Enough to hack off the Pope.
I totally agree that ‘conventional’ warfare is the graduate level, and that is why we still need to train up to that level. I think that is the crux of what Gian worries about, that the Army will sacrifice the graduate level training it needs in order to mass produce too many community college grads.Also true. Worries me as well...

William F. Owen
12-06-2008, 06:56 AM
The point that I was ineloquently trying to make was that down at a 'tactical' COIN environment me, the snuffy, and the grunt have to be sensitive to social, political, and ideological issues as we prosecute the campaign. These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect. ;)

...and I was being pedantic at your expense. ...but you raise an excellent point, and that is training, and doctrine. At the risk of being boring, the US is or was failing to differentiate War from Warfare. A certain vision of War, creates a certain type of warfare.


My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat

Nothing feeble and good on you. That's the critical bit.


I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too. :D

Interesting analogy. I actually know far more about ballroom dancing that I do Aussie Rules!! :rolleyes:

Bob's World
12-06-2008, 01:38 PM
William, you raise an excellent point, and share a position that is fairly common. My short answer for why it is important to differentiate between types of war is so that one can put together a proper solution that will achieve their desired ends.

Goes to Old Carl's point of "the first thing is to know what kind of war you are in."

The conventional force in the US is new to this business, and learning most of its lessons in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, and using that experience to provide context to the study of Insurgency to draft the current COIN doctrine and TTPs that are coming out. This stuff is pretty good. Where it is off is usually by a few degrees of azimuth; but for those who have experience with indirect fire or long distance land nav, you know how far off you can be from the intended target if you are off by a small azimuth error at the start.

I tend to be a purist on definitions, and tend to wince when varioius sources start mixing terms. Its all part of staying on azimuth.

Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved. The populace wages insurgency to change the politics, and there are three broad categories of insurgency: Resistence against a foreign invader, revolution to change the government of the entire state, and separatist to break a segment away (note, all three of these have been going on in Iraq, and all require unique solution sets). COIN is the efforts of the state to resolve these family disputes.

FID are the efforts of an outside third party to influence this state dynamic on the behalf of the current government. FID runs a tremendous scale, from routine exchanges with allies that have very stable governments, to full scale combat like we have been experiencing in places like Vietnam and Iraq.

A new twist with globalization is the rise of non-state powers, and also the greater connectivity of populaces with like populaces from other states. This does not change the nature of insurgency, but it certainly changes the environment in which it occurs, and requires new tactics from those employed successfully in the past when populaces could be isolated. It also means that non-state entities can now act in state-like ways by using networked operations, and also without the achilles heel of a state that can be targeted, or that must be defended. Think AQ

That brings us to UW. UW is the efforts of an outside party to incite or exploit an insurgency on the part of the insurgent. This is what the US did in the initial phase of Afghanistan (then we transitioned to the FID we are doing there now). This is also what AQ is doing through out the Middle East. Note, that this is the MISSION of UW. We in the SOF community use UW skills and tasks in FID and COIN as well.

Mao described three phases of insurgency, essentially starting with organized low-level violence. As I have studied the problem, I find it helpful to in effect add a phase zero to Mao's time proven model. If one considers that every populace is waging insurgency, and every government is waging COIN at all times it helps in two major ways. First, it recognizes that what most think of as insurgency is caused by the failure of government to meet the expectations of its populace. That this effort is continuous, and that it is largely civil in nature and requires civil lead. Second it helps the military responder to remember that he is last in and should be first out in helping to resolve a situation that has grown beyond the civil governemnt's ability to handle. It also helps the military to remember that the insurgent is part of the populace, and that their mission is not to defeat the insurgent, but instead to help resolve the problem. Most governments and populaces are happily down in phase 0, but by monitoring phase 0 closely, one can implement efforts early, far short of conflict, to keep everything stable. Every Cop, every garbageman, every politician, etc is waging COIN everyday. I believe that if they recognized and embraced that noble role, there would be far fewer "classic insurgencies" that we all think of with G's and the military going at it.

The last real American Insurgency and COIN was the Civil Rights movement. This was a shining moment for COIN, as the civil government recognized that it was wrong, and conceded powers to the insurgent that it did not have too, causing the insurgency to move back down into a more peaceful norm short of bringing in the military to suppress or defeat the insurgent. This raises the common issue of "appeasement." A government can not appease its own populace. To meet the needs of ones populace is the duty of government. Appeasement is when government act counter to the needs of its own populace to make concessions to the government or populace of another.

Purpose for action and status of parties, and a true understanding of the environment in which such a conflict is happening are all critical pieces of information for the FID or COIN elements if they want to design and implement an effective campaign.

Just 2 cents from an SF guy.

slapout9
12-06-2008, 02:59 PM
We talked about this in detail a good while back. My position was that according to our form of government there are only two types of War. Declared and Undeclared! By it's very nature declared war is conventional...by declaring it we define it. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined....hence the other side will break all the rules, because their aren't any.

Schmedlap
12-06-2008, 03:49 PM
The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position...
... the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

I think that both the content and method are suspect.

Regarding method, the author argued in an earlier piece (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4782) on the assumption that our successes since 2007 somehow detract from the sacrifices of his Soldiers in 2006 and earlier. But he cannot seem to argue his case without indirectly belittling the sacrifices made since early 2007. He mischaracterizes those sacrifices as simply "buying off" our adversaries or ignores them completely by assuming that Sadr simply had a change of heart. Those arguments form the core of the issue that he seeks to address. Those arguments are bogus.

If it were as simple as "buying off" former insurgents then this conflict would already be over. See an earlier response from Cavguy (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=38712&postcount=10). And I am still amazed that in December 2008 the author still thinks that Sadr's decision to scale back the tomfoolery of his militia was unrelated to our seen and unseen efforts. I understand that the author left Iraq in 2006 and may not have visibility over what we did in the meantime to specifically, deliberately, and relentlessly force Sadr's hand, but I would think that even without that knowledge, one would still find the notion that Sadr just had a change of heart to be absurd on its face.

He may have the right conclusion regarding Afghanistan, but how he gets there and how he backs it up detracts from his argument. I think it should be reason for pause when the editors at IHT eat this stuff up, but the crowd at SWJ chew it up and spit it out.

Bob's World
12-06-2008, 03:51 PM
Slap, I hope you aren't serious.

slapout9
12-06-2008, 04:37 PM
Slap, I hope you aren't serious.

Yes, I am. I take it you have a few issues with this?:)

Tom Odom
12-06-2008, 04:47 PM
Yes, I am. I take it you have a few issues with this?:)

Just don't call him, Shirley :D:D

Bob's World
12-06-2008, 05:01 PM
Well, it would certainly make things easier.
"Congress, how do you want to play this one"? The military would ask.

"We believe we'll issue a declaration of war." Congress would say.

"Excellent, then this is a conventional war and we will execute such a strategy immediately."

"Good job men, we'll see you all back here for Christmas, parades, and awards ceremonies!"

slapout9
12-06-2008, 05:37 PM
Bob, not exactly. I will have to kind of bring you up to date so this will wander a bit.

Our for fathers being incredibly wise figured out that there are two types of war. Declared usually conventionally state on state but not necessarily. They also realized that there would be situations where military intervention would be needed because of an emergency situation that would require them to act without the formal consent of congress but the authority of the president. And at that time they would generally fall to the Navy and the Marine corps.

If they could not be resolved quickly then a declaration of war would be required at which time the ARMY would submit a plan to cover men,material and costs of such a war.

In short the USMC would be the first to FIGHT but the ARMY would be the first to FINNISH, and would require a more diverse nature and capability set.


Part two guerrilla warfare,terrorism,subversion are more a discussion of what TTP's will be allowed(by law) by our side than it is a type of war or warfare.

Make any sense?

Bob's World
12-06-2008, 07:18 PM
Slap,

I will say that your position makes sense in that I understand what your position is.

As to it making sense in that I agree with your logic, I can't go there.

It would take volumes to address every component of your position, so I won't even try, but I've read enough of your posts to know that you are able to consider new arguments to help you refine your viewpoints.

1. When America was founded, the world was made up of Kingdoms, and war between kingdoms (I.e., funded by the sovererign's purse for his goals) is a far simpler affair than wars between nations (the full resources of the populace behind the effort, and not controlled by one man).

2. Similarly, the environment that popular uprisings occur within has changed dramatically as well with the communications tools that fuel globalization.

3. "small wars" back in the day were also typically purely an assertion of will by the strong over the weak for economic purposes. Empire building. Now, while there remains plenty of economic motivations for warfare, we also have a lot of conflicts today that are the backlash of suppressed populaces, either against the colonial master directly, or more often, against a "puppet" government that has been sustained in power over them by some outside power that is extracting resources from their country.

So, much has changed in terms of the environment that warfare occurs within.

The only other comment I would offer is that I believe that the full spectrum of warfare could fall under either of your two umbrellas, so I don't think it is very helpful. At the end of the day, you have to take each conflict as a unique problem set, make sure you understand exactly what it is you are trying to accomplish for your nation, and then make sure you fully understand the environment that you are going into, the threat you are facing, and tailor a campaign plan accordingly.

One new development to help staffs be more effective at this are two competing processes for developing this broader understanding. One is the "Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design," that is favored by the Army and is being codified currently by TRADOC. The other is "Systemic Operational Design," which is a more eclectic process developed by Brig Gen Naveh, a brilliant retired Israeli officer.

I'm all about seeking simplicity, but recognize that lot of complex thinking has to occur first to achieve the simple.

Bob

slapout9
12-06-2008, 08:50 PM
Hi Bob, yes much has changed. It was actually being dealt with in the original posts ahwile back. Yes you could have both types of operations under each umbrella. Which is what Tom Odom brought up with his friends paper "Compound Warfare" or my newer SBW (Slapout Based Warfare):eek:

The reason to declare or not declare war is still valid today and hasn't changed. In fact it is more important than ever because it will establish our moral, legal authority and it will also define or should at least our enemy..nation,group or person. We have a big problem with this.

As for your last point about SOD and OP Design we have been talking about that since I came here...I believe in the original Systems theory as taught by Col. Warden (5 Rings analysis) and was involved with it in LE in Counter drug and some other things not the EBO crazy stuff that it turned into.

But SBW beats em all. "Use people as soldiers that don't look like soldiers,use things as weapons that don't look like weapons, and use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields."

Will pop in and out to discuss if you want but have to get ready for the Alabama vs. Florida game. Rollllll Tide:)


PS Tom Odom....Shirley:):)

Bob's World
12-06-2008, 09:16 PM
Football time here too. Since OSU let the Ducks crush them last week, I have to hang my Rose Bowl hopes on UCLA taking down USC today and opening up the back door.

Best of luck to your Alabama boys, because down here in Florida I'm hearing a lot of smack from the Gator gang... I don't buy into Florida schools having a right to win any more than I do California schools (yet today I have to root for one. Go Bruins!)

Rank amateur
12-06-2008, 09:30 PM
I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions. :D


you say that like it's a bad thing.:D

I'm really glad Gian has used the word dogma. I'm an ad guy and the one thing I'm qualified to comment on is people's perceptions, beliefs and actions. I really believe we got into a mess in Iraq because a bunch of people said things that sounded true "democracy is a good" and treated it like dogma, when they should have been on the lookout for evidence that we just might need to offer a little bit more than democracy.

Things that disturb me: the belief that since counter insurgencies take a decade or two, everything will work out all right if we hang around for a decade or two. No. If we're wrong about something, we need to adjust now; if we wait a decade or two before adjusting, you won't see any results for 20 to 40 years.

I also believe there is huge confusion between "protecting the population" and "population control." You stop insurgencies by physically preventing the population from supporting insurgencies. The most effective way to do that is by building fences. ("Pre surge" Iraqi insurgents used to go back to the areas we left. Now, we build a fricken fence so they can't go back. The biggest problem in Afghanistan: no fences. (You have a bunch of people who dogmatically believe the things you do after the fences have been built to try to build support for the legitimate government - i.e. build better roads - will fix the problem. They won't. The population can use the roads to support insurgents.))

All dogma is bad. Semper gumby.

Rank amateur
12-06-2008, 09:42 PM
Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved.

Sorry if this sounds like a rude question. It's not meant to be. Where does "spreading democracy," "draining the swamp" and "denying safe haven" fit into your definitions?

Old Eagle
12-06-2008, 10:01 PM
Insurgencies are seldom "internal". In fact, some factors we need to deal with are external sanctuary and external support. There are several great threads relating to those issues.

Getting back to the mainstream thread -- I disagree with Gian and more recent posters that my Army has adopted COIN as a "dogma". Big green Army is hunkered down in the fetal position, hoping that this inconvenient COIN thing (and other IW unpleasantries) blow by it, so it can get back to business as usual. Hence, my original post -- from where I sit, there are still not enough folks even trying to understand COIN challenges, much less adopting COIN as a dogma.

Bob's World
12-06-2008, 11:01 PM
To Rank Amatuer and Old Eagle.

First, totally agree that rare is the insurgency that is not influenced by outsiders waging either UW or FID, depending on which side they wish to prevail. That does not change the need to understand what insurgency itself is. Also, rare is the insurgent who will not take advantage of a convenient border, or any other legal ploy, to gain some advantage in such a conflict.

As to "spreading democracy," in my opinion this is the most arrogant and flawed aspect of our current strategy, and completely at odds with our own ideology captured in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. Better that we back off from trying to make everyone like us (we know how we felt when the Soviets were trying to make everyone like them...) and instead take a more pure position. I recommend we support "Popular Sovereignty." While we lose some control (last I checked, these weren't our countries or our populaces) we are less hypocritical if when we intervene we simply level the field so that the populace and the government can sort out their differences. Any form of government they choose for themselves, is better than any form of government we impose upon them.

As to "draining the swamp," that is what 95% of FID is that we are doing around the world everyday. Preventing insurgency is far wiser than allowing it to fester to a degree where the military is required to help counter it. But even in combat FID the main effort when applying the Indirect Approach remains in effect, draining the swamp. As we build capacity in the HN government that we are assisting, we also guide them to similarly making this their main effort for COIN.

Last you ask about "denying safe haven." Excellent question. This is one of the greatest areas of misconception in COIN theory. Many seem to believe that sanctuary lies within ungoverned spaces. If this were true, AQ corporate HQ would be in Antartica. Insurgency is a people business. Sanctuary lies within a populace, not any given terrain feature. Granted, some terrain is more favorable than others, but at the end of the day, if you have popular support (to include the kind that comes from fear and coercion) you can hide in plain sight. AQ is in the FATA because of a favorable populace first, terrain second, border to hide behind third.

These are the types of subtle nuances of insurgency that were missed in big Army and big Marine Corps rush to publish a COIN manual. There are older SF COIN manual's out there that are better resources. Also if I was only going to read one book I'd read Galula. He discusses all levels Strategic to Tactical, and gives great examples.

slapout9
12-07-2008, 01:12 AM
Bob,First all crimes and wars are committed by people, so it makes sense that any major counter strategy must include a population based solution, hence my interest in your PCE theory. However control of the terrain is critical in fact land ownership and usage is often at the base of some insurgencies. There was actually a paper that was published about how fencing should be our main strategy, I think it is in the SWJ library somewhere.

Second Rank Am raises a very important point in that many infrastructure projects can actually enable the insurgency and we should be careful about building them.

Which goes back to my original point about defining our enemy. Part of SBW is the OPS theory. Other Peoples Stuff. Criminal organizations/Drug Dealers do this all the time and so do Terrorist Organizations and they can be very difficult to track and to attack because the cure can be worse than the disease. They use other peoples terrain but don't own it,they use other peoples money but not their own. We do not fight these organizations very well because of this. There is no COIN solution for them and Gian is right in that respect in that we should not go hog wild on COIN everything as opposed to creative use of more conventional forces.

IMO how we should fight AQ and UBL in Astan has nothing to do with COIN or at least it shouldn't have. We got into a lot of trouble when we attacked the Tali-ban instead of staying focused on AQ.

Gian, is also right in that we haven't Won anything yet.....we have certainly improved the situation through COIN TTP's but it ain't over by no means.

Bill Moore
12-07-2008, 08:00 AM
Some interesting dialouge, not sure where it is going. Bob is once again trying to redefine everything, Slapout has presented an unorthodox theory, and Rank Amateur has redefined populace control.

Bob wrote,
Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved. The populace wages insurgency to change the politics, and there are three broad categories of insurgency: Resistence against a foreign invader, revolution to change the government of the entire state, and separatist to break a segment away (note, all three of these have been going on in Iraq, and all require unique solution sets). COIN is the efforts of the state to resolve these family disputes.

FID are the efforts of an outside third party to influence this state dynamic on the behalf of the current government. FID runs a tremendous scale, from routine exchanges with allies that have very stable governments, to full scale combat like we have been experiencing in places like Vietnam and Iraq.

I think your trying to over simplify for clarity, and as I argued elsewhere when you oversimplify a problem you fail to adequately address the scope of the problem. Old Eagle already addressed part of the issue by pointing out the foreign intervention in support of insurgents, which you hand waved off as UW, but it is not that simple. In many cases there wouldn't even be an insurgency without outside intervention to mobilize a select target audience, then train and equip and advise them. I disagree with your argument that all insurgencies are internal (most may be, but not all). Second you state that one of the forms of insurgency is resistance against an invader. Following that logic, if the foreign invader has become the defacto government like we did in Iraq during the transition period, then we were conducting COIN against the insurgents.

Rank wrote,
I also believe there is huge confusion between "protecting the population" and "population control." You stop insurgencies by physically preventing the population from supporting insurgencies. The most effective way to do that is by building fences.

Rank, protecting the populace is a subset of populace and resource control (PRC), which is a wide range of activities designed to control the populace and designated resources to isolate the insurgents. PRC facilitates 3 objectives:

1. Isolate the insurgents from human and resource support.
2. Isolate the insurgent from the populace.
3. Identify and neutralize insurgent infrastructure.

Since many insurgents (if not most) use coercion to garner support from the populace, at least during the initial phases, then protecting the populace is key to severing the insurgent influence on the populace. I don't disagree with the requirement for fences, but is it feasible for the U.S. to advocate and support locking large groups of people up behind fences like the Brits did in Malaysia in 2008? How long do you think world opinion would allow us to continue now that path?

Slapout wrote,
We talked about this in detail a good while back. My position was that according to our form of government there are only two types of War. Declared and Undeclared! By it's very nature declared war is conventional...by declaring it we define it. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined....hence the other side will break all the rules, because their aren't any.

I don't get it? We declared war on Japan and Germany, and while the conventional war was the main effort we supported substantial unconventional operations, terrorist tactics, assassinations, fire bombings, and even the A-Bomb. In our war against insurgents we have actually been forced to follow more restrictions than we would in a declared war.

Now this I like a lot:


Criminal organizations/Drug Dealers do this all the time and so do Terrorist Organizations and they can be very difficult to track and to attack because the cure can be worse than the disease. They use other peoples terrain but don't own it,they use other peoples money but not their own. We do not fight these organizations very well because of this. There is no COIN solution for them and Gian is right in that respect in that we should not go hog wild on COIN everything as opposed to creative use of more conventional forces.

Slapout can you send me the link to Tom's paper you referenced?

Bob's World
12-07-2008, 11:16 AM
Good discussion all, though to be fair, it is the neo-COIN community that is revising definitions, and I can post open source quotes from Admiral Olson, CDR of USSOCOM that essentially take the same position on definitions that I laid out above.

I also agree that dealing with non-state entitiies that use other peoples terrain and populaces for their own means is, while often intertwined with insurgent movements, a very different problem set requiring different solutions. We produced an unclassified strategic appreciation of the dynamics going on in the world today, and one of the major overarching themes is that of "a competition for sovereignty." BLUF is that people have greater choices than just the state these days for the various things they need. Charitable NGOs, profit oriented corporations, states, and transnational criminal organizations, and politicallly motivated state and non-state actors.

Though all of this is indeed very complex, and deriving effective solution sets even more complex, it is possible and extremely helpful to bin these players out into the simple, enduring categories that I laid out so that you can begin figuring out how to deal with each. Today's environment is much more complex than the old Red vs Blue world that our intel community still tries to bin everything into; or even "your either with us or against us."

One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace. It would include the full DIME, CT, etc. I beleive this is more helpful than just labeling a state as "rogue" or an organization as "terrorist" At the end of the day do we need to "defeat" AQ, or do we simply need to neutralize them? In fact there are many that think that AQ is fading due to its overreliance on violent ways, and failure to adapt more political wings like the IRA and Hezbollah. If this is true, I think instead of cheering the demise, we need to be very concerned about what replaces them. The conditions that gave rise to AQ still exist in spades. Here I agree with Gentile, there is no victory. By changing our campaign to a more holistic counterUW campaign aimed at neutralizing AQ by rendering them irrelevant to the populaces they seek to influence we have a better chance of not giving rise to a second, more sophisticated generation of non-state actor that comes in behind them to continue the mission. Counter UW works for states also. Clearly we do not want to "defeat" Iran to prevent them from waging UW in Iraq, or Lebannon, but we do need to devise a sophisticated, holistic scheme of engagement to counter this UW effort and it destabilizing effects that are counter to our national interests.

So, yes it is complicated, I fully appreciate the complexity. Any simplifications I offer, however, are based upon refining that complexity down to its essence, which is far different than just scraping a simple observation off of the top.

Bob

Tom Odom
12-07-2008, 02:17 PM
Slapout can you send me the link to Tom's paper you referenced?

Bill not my paper but an anthology gathered by a friend at CSI

Compound Warfare: An Anthology (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/compound_warfare.pdf)

slapout9
12-07-2008, 02:46 PM
Bill Moore, under declared war we did the one thing we have not done and should have done. We mobilized our entire country to fight the war. Which gave us the resources to do anything necessary to win. In short we had a plan for victory...it was all Strategic and Stuff. Now we have a very good and professional Army that is being worn out. That sucks and it ain't right to keep doing that. If this GWOT,Iraq,Astan,Mexico, is truley a war for our national survival than we need to fight it as a nation, not just the Army (Army/USMC all military don't mean to leave anyone out).

I read Tom's paper while eating chicken wings at work, best way to do it:eek: I know it's not Tom's paper but Tom posted it so I just call it that for short. Important paper and worth the read.

Bob's World, there is actually a book online about the history of UW,Guerrilla warfare that talks about renaming missions just like you propose, In fact it was done that way for awhile. It talks about creating counter organizations for specific enemies. Anyway I will find the link and post it for all to read.

OPS is a critical part of understanding how to fight these RICO organizations because that is what they are IMHO more than anything else.

Alabama lost:(:(: but it was a good game. Roll Tide!

slapout9
12-07-2008, 04:22 PM
BobW, and everyone else here is the link to the book I was talking about. Since it's inception the US COIN, special warfare community has been trying to define what it is and does according to this book. It is well researched and provides extensive references. Also seems to favor the USMC small wars approach above all the Sneaky Pete type stuff.
You can read by chapters online or print by chapters. Excellent research and historical source. I found this a couple of years ago and should have posted it then but stuff happens.

http://www.statecraft.org/

Bill Moore
12-07-2008, 05:15 PM
Tom, thanks for the link. Slapout, this document is over 300 pages, that is a lot of chicken wings brother!

Responses to Bob,


one of the major overarching themes is that of "a competition for sovereignty." BLUF is that people have greater choices than just the state these days for the various things they need. Charitable NGOs, profit oriented corporations, states, and transnational criminal organizations, and politicallly motivated state and non-state actors.

First, understand that ADM Olsen proposed this hypothesis about FID and COIN, I just don't think it will hold water when it is put into practice. I'm going off memory, but I believe COIN (probably an outdated book) was mission set under FID? I'll look it up someday, it is a worthwhile discussion that will help focus policy, doctrine, and training. Back to your quote above, Ken and I debate this frequently when I challenge the legacy definition of COIN. After reading your post, I'm not sure sovereignty is the right word (I guess I should look it up :)), but many of these organizations are interested in overthrowing the State government, but rather controlling some terrain (physical, human, cyber, etc.) within that State and others, so they can defy the State's laws and implement their own law of the land. It is an immature idea that I need to further develop, but by all means please tell me where you think I might be off track.


One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace.

I like this, and it might be useful to refresh DoD's and the USG's knowledge base on how to wage this type of war. I think we did a decent job countering unconventional warfare against the Soviets during the Cold War. There is much, much more to it than chasing HVIs, which we still tend to confuse with decisive operations (there usually isn't a decisive operations in this environment). One area I think that is sorely lacking is the counterintelligence field, we seem to have diverted (at least in the military) CI focus from rooting out subversives to locating HVIs, which is a misue of a critical asset in counter UW. More to follow on this whole discussion of counter UW.

Posted by Slapout,
under declared war we did the one thing we have not done and should have done. We mobilized our entire country to fight the war. Which gave us the resources to do anything necessary to win.

When we expanded GWOT into Iraq, I was frustrated about the lack of mobilization also. However, for mobilization to be most effective, it needs to be implemented during patriotic phase of the conflict. I think attempting to mobilize the populace now to reinforce our tired ranks would be counter productive, due to the potential second order effect of giving the anti-war movement more propaganda material. Also, now that we're attempting to shift our main effort to more of an indirect approach, there may not be a need for mass mobilization. Good points.

Ken White
12-07-2008, 05:54 PM
that it was / is necessary for this effort? Or, more importantly that it could have been done with over 30% of the voters opposed to invading Iraq before the fact? Or would / could have been sustained with over 60% opposed to it at one point?

Slap, one thing you might want to consider about 'declared war' is that we've been in several since the last that had an actual Congressional Declaration of War and that during that war and its concomitant full mobilization a number of laws were passed that gave the Federal Government some truly awesome and draconian powers during a 'state of war' i.e., a declared war IAW the Constitution. Avoidance of triggering those laws is one significant thing has driven Congress to deliberately avoid declaring war since 1945...

I'd further suggest that your theory of declared versus undeclared wars has merit with respect to the intent of the founders but have to question whether a literal interpretation along your lines affords the flexibility needed today. While there is no question that the Armed forces could be restructured to operate within your parameters, I suggest you'd be confronted with an Army that sat stateside and trained along with an Air force that was minimally employed and a Navy an Marine Corps that were overworked.

Obviously, the Navy and Marines could be enlarged and better funded but this would have to be at the expense of the CONUS based Army and AF which would impact their size, equipping and training. Those services would wither. Not a big deal to me but some would get ferociously upset at that -- the more important issue is not the politics, it's the practicality of such an eventuality.

An item to note is that the current system has produced the most combat experienced armed forces in the world today and most other nations Ministers of Defense are well aware of that and don't want to consider a couple of million combat experienced Americans anywhere near their nation. I doubt they'd be that concerned if we were talking about just a few hundred thou Marines and an Army that had been sitting at home training marginally -- and peacetime training is ALL marginal, CTCs or no.

You also have USSOCOM to deal with. Whatcha going to do with them? :D

Ken White
12-07-2008, 06:01 PM
BobW, and everyone else here is the link to the book I was talking about.
http://www.statecraft.org/However he also has some flawed ideas -- and an agenda:

Michael Mcclintock (http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about_us/staff/mcclintock_m.aspx).

Schmedlap
12-08-2008, 10:35 AM
I second Selil's earlier comment regarding COIN/conventional as being a continuum, rather than an "either/or". I would also add that I think Rupert Smith has it right in The Utility of Force (http://www.amazon.com/Utility-Force-Art-Modern-World/dp/0307265625)*: "if a decisive strategic victory was the hallmark of interstate industrial war, establishing a condition may be deemed the hallmark of the new paradigm of war amongst the people... as the political aims have changed, so has the use of force: the conflicts are fought for sub-strategic objectives."

I think he's generally correct regarding the changing nature of our objectives - and thus - the changing nature of how we must fight. I don't know anyone who thinks that COIN is the end-all-be-all of the future of warfare, nor do I know anyone who thinks the same of conventional, but there certainly are too many who think one is significantly more important than the other. Selil is right in that the two are part of a continuum over which we may frequently shift back and forth from day to day. After all, that is how we are currently fighting. Even in 2005, my battalion was kicking in doors one day, providing medical screening to kids at a school the next day, and then doing a joint Army-Marine WWII-style hammer-and-anvil sweep through the desert 3 days after that. It's a continuum that we shift back and forth across.

* - By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.

Devil's Advocate
12-08-2008, 08:11 PM
By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.

Schmedlap, here are a few I found. I keep bumping the book down my to read list, but now I think I will crack it open.

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni_reviews/the_utility_of_force.htm

http://johntreed.com/utilityofforce.html

I offer these two not as a endorsement, but rather because they offered some good fodder.

slapout9
12-09-2008, 01:01 AM
Bill Moore, 300 pages that is what I said. I took Tom's advice read a little, chew a little.:wry:


Ken White, I understand your point but you wouldn't have to do it like that. One, the criticisms of Draconian measures you mentioned are valid and I hoped we have learned from that. Two, we would not have to mobilize the entire country like WW2 but certain arrangements should have been made to insure we had immediately available back up production of needed machines and materials and even a modified national service program to support and relieve combat units and perform support services that are being contracted out at a huge cost to the country and a war tax to avoid borrowing the money.

No modification of Navy/USMC needed. In fact that is the point of the declaration to state what we need in terms Army,Air,Space Navy,USMC,Special Warfare. All which was done in WW2, we should have done it on an appropriate scale based upon the....drum roll....METT-TC!

Forgot, I agree it is to late to do it now, but there will be another one...sooner or later.

Ken White
12-09-2008, 01:57 AM
I understand your point but you wouldn't have to do it like that.Wouldn't have to what like what???
One, the criticisms of Draconian measures you mentioned are valid and I hoped we have learned from that.The point with those measures is that they are still on the books as laws and become automatically active IF a war is declared, that's why Congress is not going to declare a war unless it becomes a truly and obvious existential requirement.
Two, we would not have to mobilize the entire country like WW2 but certain arrangements should have been made to insure we had immediately available back up production of needed machines and materials and even a modified national service program to support and relieve combat units and perform support services that are being contracted out at a huge cost to the country and a war tax to avoid borrowing the money.We can disagree on most of that; is partial mobilization like being partially pregnant? The only problems with materiel were due to laws Congress passed about the DoD acquisition system that put that huge inefficient bureaucracy in place; every thing that was NEEDED -- not everything that was wanted or the ignorant media got on about -- was provided as soon as the system could get it there. Both the body armor and the MRAP things were way overblown by the dumb press and partisan stupidity in Congress. You want something to get upset about; the M855 5.56 round and that stupid M9 pistol the army insists on hanging onto...

I do not support or agree with a national service program; a lot of folks agree with me and I believe more do than would support it. Nor do I agree with more taxes -- better distribution of what's there, yes -- not more.
No modification of Navy/USMC needed.If they're going to pick up the slack in todays world for the Army which you want to retain statside to train for a big war, they'll need modification.
In fact that is the point of the declaration to state what we need in terms Army,Air,Space Navy,USMC,Special Warfare. All which was done in WW2,You're mixing apples and kiwi fruit. Here's the declaration of War for WW II LINK (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/declare.htm). Note what it says. Actually, the WW II armed forces were effectively decided upon and designed in 1939-40 and early 41 BEFORE the war was declared.
we should have done it on an appropriate scale based upon the....drum roll....METT-TC!Actually, it WAS done to that criteria -- you just don't agree with the way it was done (I don't either). A 'declaration' was not going to happen and wouldn't have changed much; as you can see from the WW II job, it effectively gave FDR a free hand.
Forgot, I agree it is to late to do it now, but there will be another one...sooner or later.Of course there will -- and unless it is a war of national survival, it won't be declared either... ;)

slapout9
12-09-2008, 04:10 AM
Ken, read this WW2 Mobilization plan.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm

Ken White
12-09-2008, 04:16 AM
Ken, read this WW2 Mobilization plan.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htmand mobilization was one of my core tasks. What does that have to do with declared versus undeclared war or to do with the forays into Afghanistan or Iraq?

Not trying to be difficult, I just don't understand the connection... :confused:

Er, you did note that it confirmed what I said -- most of the mobilization planning took place before the Declaration of War (and that Pamphlet Gordy Sullivan put out before his Louisiana Maneuvers refreshed my memory on that score back in '92.

jmm99
12-09-2008, 05:59 AM
The difference in language between these two acts by Congress evidences a difference in national strategic policy.


WWII Declaration of War (link by Ken)

.... the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

The language is very specific in ratifying an armed conflict with a single nation, to bring that conflict to a successful termination, and all the nation's resources were pledged.

On the other hand, we have the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which is here (http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/H.J._RES_1145).


Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

The language is specific in ratifying armed force; but does not focus on a single nation; does not focus on a specific armed conflict, or in bringing that conflict to a successful termination; and certainly does not pledge all of the nation's resources.

What was going on here ? The resolution is area-focused - on SE Asia and maintenance of peace and security in that area - read that as limitation of communism in that region, and as a rejection of an agressive roll-back policy. The termination condition was when "the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions".

That portion of the resolution does not mention Indochina (or its then four component parts), except indirectly (Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were "protocol states" under SEATO). That evidences the continued primary focus on SE Asia as a whole - of which, South Vietnam was but a component part - and, individually, not a very important part.

-------------------------------------------
Now, my point is not to debate the relative merits of these two acts of Congress - or what speculative alternatives any of us might draft as being "better". My point is that the two different national strategy approaches resulted in different approaches by the "National Command Authorities" in military strategy, operations and tactics in each conflict.

The result of our military action in Vietnam (no matter how flawed or unflawed you want to make it) was consistent with the termination condition set in the national strategy evidenced by Tonkin Gulf (and other NSC statements, as well). Ran into the following by GEN Westmorland in Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge, which is available here (http://www.amazon.com/Distant-Challenge-U-s-Infantryman-Vietnam/dp/0898390710):


A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)
Foreward

Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.

Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.

William C. Westmorland
April 1983

The salient point is that, regardless of the technical form of the Congressional act, the national strategic policy and the resultant military plans must mesh. Otherwise, we do get mired in dogma - and disputes about what should or should have been done in the past (e.g., Summers vs. Krepinevich).

Since we don't have a single nation to declare war against, what is our area national strategic policy for South Asia in 2009 ? I haven't the foggiest idea beyond killing Bin Ladin, Zawahiri and AQ there.

slapout9
12-09-2008, 06:33 AM
JMM, can you declare war against an Organization? I know of no precedent or standing to quote. It would take care of the problem with just declaring war on a single country as you pointed was done in Vietnam...ah SE Asia.

jmm99
12-09-2008, 07:44 AM
only nations and some international organizations are recognized.

However, that being said, GC III Art. 2 recognizes "Powers" to an armed conflict - they do not have to be nation-states or recognized governments of nation-states (e.g., the Taliban, and possibly AQ). If such a "Power" accepts and applies the GCs, its combatants flow into Art. 4 (PW/POW status) provided they meet its requirements. Otherwise, their status is governed by Art. 3 (the non-international armed conflict provisions),

I see nothing problematic about declaring an armed conflict to exist between a nation-state and such a "Power"; but it would not be a formal declaration of war. In fact, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was aimed at communism and a region, SE Asia. Similarly, the AUMF was aimed at terrorism and was global - as they say in other contexts, overly broad and vague.

From the standpoint of US Con Law, the use of both formal declarations of war and joint resolutions was recognized early on - with both coming under the Congressional power to declare war. However, as Ken points out, a number of statutes and executive orders are best interpreted as requiring a formal declaration of war.

That's the law as I see it. Others will disagree.

PS: we might have "lost" the Vietnam War - Let the Summers-Krepinevich disciples argue that one out. We won the Southeast Asia Armed Conflict and that's where I count the guys and gals on the Wall - that one's an emotional issue to me which I don't like to argue.

Bob's World
12-09-2008, 12:33 PM
I wrote a piece where I made a statement that our young men and women on the ground for the GWOT were giving an A+ effort to execute a C+ strategy; and that sadly the end result was a C+. That we as senior leaders owed them better than that, and that our populace expected better as well. Needless to say my Army War College professor had a cow.

Strategists and campaign planners let the force and the nation down in Vietnam, and it is happening again. Military victory that does not produce the required (not to be confused with "intended") strategic effect is sadly wasted.

With my oldest son, an E-4 11B on the ground in Iraq for his second tour, it is easy for me to stay focused on this as I wage the good fight with those who craft strategy and draft campaign plans to raise their game.

As to war and states vs non-states; this is one of the bold new areas that we enter into as the world flattens, as populaces become more connected and empowered, and as the Westphalian system morphs. Clearly now, while we still struggle (as are the Indians with their efforts to sort out how to respond to the Mumbai attacks) with how to effectively deal with an act of war committed by a non-state entity. To wage war against a non-state group? To wage war against a tactic? To attack a state who is perceived to have allowed this organization to develop the capability for the attack? There is no clear answer to this, and no precedent to rely on. We must move forward with an open mind and create new precedent. GWOT is a school of hard knocks for the U.S. in this regard.

It is, however, clear that an organization can wage war against a state, and that they can act in very state-like ways. Consider the UW campaign beign waged by Al Qaeda. They reach out to incite and facilitate popular uprisings around the Muslim world, each with it's own unique motivations, but all with a common thread, and collectively helping AQ move its own selfish agenda forward.

This is why I get a little tight when people try to make sense of what is going on by misapplying sound concepts. Everything is not COIN, and clearly all future battle will not be COIN. The U.S. military's no-fail mission is to fight and win our nation's wars, regardless of form. However, in this new and messy peace, they must create new and flexible capacity to apply tailored capabilities to conduct FID in ways they are not used to doing, and with command and control relationships they are not used to submitting to. Concepts like "global insurgency" aggragate diverse threats and facilitates the type of polarized thinking that Gentile warns against. Insurgency in a globalized world is a far different thing than global insurgency, and while we need to be able to mitigate and prevent these many uprisings from getting out of control, we must also regain and sustain our warfighting skills as a whole.

Entropy
01-20-2009, 01:32 PM
I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/01/gian-gentile-versus-abu-muqawama-round.html) Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:


Gentlemen, I am not a battlespace owner. I never will be. I am a guy who operated with his boots in the dust on a continuous basis and saw (and still sees) the spotty application of the tools that others have proven will work; not exactly in each case but adaptively to particular situations. While you discuss such lofty things as future procurement budgets, I'm telling you that we are at war now and the horses are still being machinegunned from under their riders as we write. Young company grade officers are still being blocked from doing what they know to be best in their AOR's. COIN is still something that has not reached the strategic Corporal. He can't be strategic; the strategic Captain can't even be strategic. While Colonels dicker about the new tank, the Captains are still horse-bound. The Army has still not bought the weapon of choice for the war in which primers are being dented daily. COIN is still a subject of acceptance. This was touched on in the "some units were doing good COIN while others weren't" discussions on this thread.

Would we have accepted such random achievement in a conventional conflict fought under AirLand?

Not just "no," but "hell no."

Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.

Piranha
01-20-2009, 02:41 PM
Great stuff indeed, food for thought ...
I'll add Abu Muqawama's site to my list, thanks for the hint.

SWJED
01-20-2009, 04:06 PM
Yes, Ex and crew do a great job at AM.

Ken White
01-20-2009, 06:24 PM
I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/01/gian-gentile-versus-abu-muqawama-round.html) Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:

Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.What the articulate Looking Glass says in even more words than I would use is that:

- We blew the well done fighting entry into Iraq because we had no doctrine for, had not trained for and did not plan for Phase 4 / occupation -- and the likely ensuing activity. True. Most all of that simply due to a lack of training; we wiped it out of syllabii and no one knew what to do.

- We're not really practicing COIN operations in many ways because we're still in a pre-2001 NTC mindset. True -- but hopefully he realizes that's because all the Generals and Colonels are products of that period and are reverting, as we all do, to the way they were trained *...

- We can probably produce a force that can do both MCO and LIC if simply train correctly. True.

- Our training is pathetic. True.

So, yeah, he's got it pretty well right and he's trying to educate Gian... :D

* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.

[ Count the number of times the word 'train' or its derivatives appear in this post. ;) ]

Fuchs
01-20-2009, 09:50 PM
I'm always a bit perplexed that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.
Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.

Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).
The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
It sucks.
Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).
There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.

It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)


Preparations for more small wars in the future?
Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice.
Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).

Ken White
01-21-2009, 12:02 AM
I'm always a bit perplexedNot to worry, give it some thought...
that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.Some give orders too; over here they're asked for their opinion -- sometimes they're listened to, sometimes not but here everyone has a right to state their opinion and most of us will.

Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.You're living in a dream world; most western politicians today have stayed as far away from the armed forces as they possibly could.
Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).Agree they should, shame they don't -- or when they do, don't do a better job of it...
The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
It sucks.Yep. Makes no difference. Those politicians you talked about earlier will keep sending soldiers off to do work that sucks...

Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.Greece. Philippines -- didn't we do this before? Why bother; what's past is irrelvant; politicians not only can't spell Army, few of them know much history.
It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)I'll forward your recommendation to the White House; you'll hear from them soon, I'm sure.
Preparations for more small wars in the future? Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice. Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).There you go, being logical -- you don't need to tell us all that -- tell the politicians.

Schmedlap
01-21-2009, 01:06 AM
I don't know who Looking Glass is, but I like the cut of his jib.


Just look at the MITT/ETT program... the treatment and support of these teams when they operate in another's battlespace tells most of all how much our Army "gets" COIN.

Gentlemen, while you address this matter in such scholarly fashion, men are in crude places poorly supported and repeatedly countermanded by senior officers, your brethren, who just plain don't "get it." As long as that is a consistent narrative, any discussion of, "has our Army gone too far with this COIN thing?" is pointless.EXACTLY! This never-ending debate is like the kid who checks under the bed and checks the closet every night, afraid that the bogeyman is there. He's not. But the kid keeps worrying. Gone too far with COIN? The doctrinal publications are very nice. They have neat illustrations and interesting concepts. The cover designs are swell. But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country." And back home, over half of the pre-deployment training is the same old weapons qual, reflexive fire, squad/section evaluations, and Table 8/Table 12. Procurement is still churning out big heavy vehicles, boats, and aircraft. And Officers are still learning how to draw big sweeping arrows (though now in PowerPoint format, projected on a 42" plasma screen).

Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?) responds:

Your quip about our discussions here of being "scholarly" has a whiff of condescension and implies a muddy-boots view of the ivory tower... this blog has many participants some with experience, but most with lots of knowledge and interest in these important matters.It's a damned good muddy-boots view of the ivory tower, in my opinion. The discussions are purely academic, in spite of the operational experience of the participants. The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers. Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.

Gian P Gentile
01-21-2009, 01:42 AM
Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?)


Since you ask I am an active duty Army Colonel presently posted as an associate professor of history at West Point where I run the military history program. I have done two runs in Iraq. The first was in 2003 as a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit and the second was again in 4ID in west Baghdad in command of an armored recon squadron in 2006.

For whatever it is worth I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the Air Force's World War II Strategic Bombing Survey and in it I was highly critical of the air force for using it to shape their future visions of an independent air arm.

I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

Ken White
01-21-2009, 02:12 AM
...The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers.Totally true and it will have no effect on what really happens -- but I'm retired and don't have much else to do... :D

It doesn't really mirror reality because most of those decisions have been made for the next five years and the few that haven't been will be made mostly by Congress and not be me or anyone involved in the debate including the big names or the Think Tanks -- or their graduates. Or Gian. Or Looking Glass. ;)
Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.I don't think we have and know we will not go far enough to get good at it -- we can and likely will go far enough to do okay for the most part.

I still contend however, that we should avoid it where possible; it's un-American. That, BTW, is a serious comment, we're too impatient and selfish to do it well. More importantly, we are too widely disliked in most of the world to do it because we become targets, everybody wants a shot at the big guy. On top of that, the One Third and Two Year rules apply. :eek:

Fuchs
01-21-2009, 02:15 AM
Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."

It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.

Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.

Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.

Cavguy
01-21-2009, 03:09 AM
I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

That is interesting. I need to read your dissertation on Strategic Bombing, I saw it mentioned on the loop the other day.

Ken White
01-21-2009, 05:38 AM
Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."We could do that but is seems a waste of effort to me because most military folks and civilian military analysts are fully aware that it's a truth and that the politicians don't pay much attention to it.
It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.Two ifs; big ones...

I don't recall any western democracy including the US taking that route. All have tried other options -- perhaps not the right ones but they tried. I cannot recall any instance since WW II where western nations have elected war as a first choice.
Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.That was the purpose of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines; they guided US policy in that vein from 1984 until 2001. The thrust was no COIN ops, don't go to war unless major US interests were involved. George W. Bush ran for election as President essentially saying "...no nation building, no sticking our nose in other peoples business." After we went to Afghanistan, he got roundly criticized for not doing what he said he would do. Lyndon Johnson got elected in 1964 saying his opponent would expand the Viet Nam war -- got elected and proceeded to expand it himself.

The problem is that the politicians aren't going to war so the fact that some are harder than others doesn't matter to them.
Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.I doubt it. Most of 'em aren't smart enough to figure that out. They've been known to threaten people with blunt swords. The US has gone to big wars eight times, Viet Nam was the last (Desert Storm was not a war and neither Afghanistan or Iraq is a big war by any definition) -- all eight of those saw us with an essentially blunt sword and the politicians knew and went anyway. Aside from those wars, we have since 1801 engaged in over 200 incursions, raids and what have you on the sovereign territory of others; swords were blunt most of those times.

The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again. You may be a nice guy and opposed to war -- there are a lot folks out there who aren't nice and will start a war in a second...

Bill Moore
01-21-2009, 06:11 AM
I'm not going to fool anyone, I have been involved in the COIN debate with other SWJ members for a few months. I don't know if my apparent flip flopping on whether I support or oppose Gian's views are due to some underlying medical issue, or if I'm just not sure what the debate is really about.

Posted by Ken,


* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.

I have agreed with Ken on this point several times, and I'm not sure why we feel obligated to support one position or the other? The argument seems to be dividing us unnecessarily, if you support COIN you're in the Moose Party and if you support conventional war you're in the Bear Party. Fortunately, our situation isn't that complex. We're American fighting men and women who took an oath to defend our Constitution against "all enemies" foreign and domestic. Many of our potential foes present a conventional military threat, while many of our foes present an irregular combatant threat. There is no debate, we "must" be prepared to fight and win against both. How we prepare is arguable, and in Gian's defense I don't think he ever argued that we ignore COIN or the irregular threat.

I found much to agree with Looking Glass's post, and unfortunately the truth frequently hurts. There is a big difference between really getting and doing it and paying lip service to it; it being COIN.

Once an operatonal mold is set, it is hard to break out of it. I remember one of the dumbest statments I heard from a very smart senior officer. Don't worry about it Bill, it's Iraq, so we got it, which was one way of saying we been there before and we're going to do the same thing again when we go back, don't worry about the new intelligence reports. Most leaders are not as courageous and intelligent as GEN Petreaus in my opinion, and his leadership has been courageous and decisive, and I think his surge strategy (or right sizing) was instrumental in reducing the violence in Iraq. By no means was the surge the sole factor, but I don't believe all the other contributing factors would have made much of an impact without the surge. The argument is academic at this point because we'll never really know what would have happened if we didn't surge, but still I would like to hear Gian's arguments on why he believes the surge wasn't effective in reducing the violence?

Now I'm going to flip flop (I'll see the doc tomorrow) and support one of Gian's arguments. His point about our COIN doctrine being largely focused on counter-Mao insurgency strategies is accurate, and it is a major shortfall. To be fair it does address other types of insurgencies, but it doesn't address different strategies for dealing with them. In many areas of the world there will not be a large majority of fence sitters in the affected populace just waiting to be won over by either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent. Who they support is sometimes a given, especially in identity based insurgencies/struggles. How do you wage a successful COIN campaign when the populace will not support you (and the HN you're supporting) with our current doctrine? I think the courses of action available (regardless of feasibility) are obvious, even if some of them are not politically correct. But onward to the most important post,

Schmedlap posted,


But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country."

COIN is a reality, we'll have to be proficient at it at all levels and we're not. There is much to fix; and to fix with a great sense of urgency. We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?

Ken White
01-21-2009, 06:27 AM
...We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?The debate is, at this level, whiling away time and stating opinions. Most of the big decisions for the next five years are already in concrete in any event.

Wat is not in concrete is our training. That can be changed -- and, as you point out, it needs to be...

Bullmoose Bailey
01-21-2009, 06:43 AM
excellent discussion...

thanks for pointing this exchange out here. have felt that the "adaptive" application of the numerous tools in our weaponry at the full spectrum of diplomacy through total warfare is called for. this spontaneous improvisation may be the true measure of genius in small wars.

William F. Owen
01-21-2009, 08:40 AM
To jump in behind Bill Moore

OK, I have no dog in this fight, but as an "informed" outside observer it strikes me that this debate between Col Gentile, and the post-modernist is getting off track in terms of being useful.

What I find extremely useful in Gentile's attitude is his forewarning that the loss of Combined Arms dispersed mobile warfare skills, against a peer or even near peer competitor, are extremely easy to loose and very expensive and difficult to recover. It is this level of operations which armies find difficult to do.

COIN is the basic standard for ALL armies, or should be. It's cheap to train for, relies mostly on education, and is very context specific.
(EG: for the UK, force generating units like the Ulster Defence Regiment was extremely easy compared to force generating Armoured Infantry regiments)
Sadly is not often done well, because of these things. Cheap is bad, and "education is for pussies", while "training is for warriors."

It is neither true nor useful to say that all future wars will be small wars. Does the US need to improve it's COIN training and education - YES!
Can it afford to let its High End slide - NO!

The solution all lies in the correct training and doctrine, constrained by a limited budget and finite time and resources. Unless some fundamentals are put in place, this debate serves neither side well.

Schmedlap
01-21-2009, 10:09 AM
Visit any unit in Iraq or Afghanistan and tell me that what you see is a COIN force, rather than a conventional force occasionally engaging in COIN. I think you'll be hard pressed to do so with a straight face. In terms of organizational culture, MTOE, and the basic mindset of the average Soldier, we are a conventional force engaged in LIC. This is even more apparent if you observe training, stateside. I think people on both sides of the COIN too-much vs not-enough debate overestimate how well we've adapted. The debate is academic and the views and memories of the participants have been clouded through the passage of time and overexamination, imo. I think that a lot of very smart people are wasting their time, arguing themselves into irrelevance. The new doctrine, the continuous churning out of new op-eds, and the glossy think tank studies are neat. But training is not keeping pace with the rhetoric.

Gian P Gentile
01-21-2009, 12:31 PM
Niel: The little thing was turned into a book by NYU Press a few years back but don’t buy it since the price has become somewhat prohibitive. I bet the Leavenworth library has a copy of it. Anyway, just as you quipped a few weeks ago that I would be proud of you for mentioning the need to maintain hic capabilities I think you would be pleased with my criticism of the air force and airmen in their zeal to create an independent air arm and the arguments they were making at the time for the absolute decisiveness of air power.

Bill: Agree and good question: "what is the Coin debate about?" To me it is not a maximalist set of arguments of an either or proposition on things. As I have said before, the different view always acknowledge the others positions; eg, Niel acknowledges the need to maintain conventional capabilities, or John Nagl always does the same too. And I have never said that the army should not maintain its capability to do coin because it must. I think where the debate is at, prompted rightly by discussions on the SWJ and AM and specifically by folks like Herschel Smith, is to get at a clear and detailed understanding of what we really mean by "balance." Ken has weighed in often very clearly on these matters. It seems to me that as Herschel stated we have to take out the red-pen, we have to make choices. And I imagine if you put a Coin proponent in a room with me as a "Con" proponent and said take this list of defense resources and start cutting, then produce a scheme for how to organize and train the military and specifically the army for the future, well at that point agreement would most likely go away. I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force.

Schmedlap: Well the exchange between me and LG has been interesting. I have made my points about his well articulated but in my mind still discrete views. But stepping forward a bit, if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

BayonetBrant
01-21-2009, 01:51 PM
In discussing the debate on COIN around the office here (small IT defense contractor with about 40% prior-military or current reservists), we are all of a similar mind about one thing: The Army might train for a lot of COIN missions, or undertake a lot of COIN operations - and we've done so for a large part of the existence of the US military (ie, the Indian Wars from 1800-1890 or so). But at this point in time, there are a variety of agencies involved in COIN/SASO operations - USAID, State, CIA, USDA, etc - but only one agency responsible for, and capable of, fighting a war, and that's DoD.

This is not to say that COIN/SASO needs to be sloughed off onto a variety of other agencies. What it does say is that the US military cannot lose sight of its primary purpose to fight and win the nation's wars. And any task that takes away from that basic mission should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism and analysis to truly assess the need/value of that task.

I think COL Gentile's statement about "tradeoffs" above rather well-encapsulates that idea, and I support his assertions, as do most of my co-workers here.

William F. Owen
01-21-2009, 02:00 PM
Simple Thesis.

It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

If someone wants to jump in with the antithesis, or state the thesis more usefully, then I suggest that we the grounds a useful debate.

Gian P Gentile
01-21-2009, 02:34 PM
BayonetBrant: Agree.

Wilf: Agree with your thesis. Moreover, history generally suggests this to be the case too.

Ron Humphrey
01-21-2009, 03:19 PM
Simple Thesis.

It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

If someone wants to jump in with the antithesis, or state the thesis more usefully, then I suggest that we the grounds a useful debate.


With 100, 000 men and one good commander nations can be conquered,
With 1000 men and 10 strong leaders one could set the world on fire.


Which one would you rather go against; and why:(

William F. Owen
01-21-2009, 03:27 PM
With 100, 000 men and one good commander nations can be conquered,
With 1000 men and 10 strong leaders one could set the world on fire.


Which one would you rather go against; and why:(

I'm not sure I agree with the veracity of the statement.

I guess I could reply that a Hamster with lit match is more dangerous to a bale of hay, than a snake with a flick knife.

Ron Humphrey
01-21-2009, 04:24 PM
I'm not sure I agree with the veracity of the statement.

I guess I could reply that a Hamster with lit match is more dangerous to a bale of hay, than a snake with a flick knife.

As to it's veracity me thinks if we turn to our good friend webster


1 : devotion to the truth : truthfulness
2 : power of conveying or perceiving truth
3 : conformity with truth or fact : accuracy
4 : something true <makes lies sound like veracities>

It would seem that both yours and my statements fit the bill.

That said perhaps it's applicability to the discussion might be called into question.

Then again maybe not.

Consider that the underlying premise is approach to a problem set
In each we find that a what might seem to be a less dangerous problem but in truth can be found to be much larger in its overall effect on the environments within which it exists.

Now in an effort to tie this into your initial presentation

It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"


Training is the real answer to this(I know big duh)
Honestly wars are fought by individuals the only differentiations in the long run are how many and in what context. Perhaps it is true as many seem to be concerned that working effectively in larger groups takes much more work to perfect than smaller yet potentially just as effective groups. Not to mention that in order to bring to bare resources and capabilities associated with large scale operations requires a much greater effort to collaborate and keep those involved on the same page.

One highly over simplified question is if the foundation isn't as important as the house why even build it. If one accepts that the foundation of any armed forces is the men and women of which it is comprised and then that they must be good at what they do then learn to do it together; would it not make just as much sense that the same premise follows all the way through to the highest levels. If one brigade commander has one really well trained battalion and several more not so much how well will they stand against a moderately well trained collection of battalions. Same for a Div, Corps, Army, etc.

If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable. Either extreme would seem to make it excessively difficult to transition without considerable hardship and unfortunate costs both human and otherwise.

It is true that soldiers are not police, it is however equally true that they are not natural born killers(Exceptions aside). They are at the base simply men and women who have chosen to do a job and deserve to be adequately trained to do it. When $#^ hits the fan they can and will adjust up or down as necessary the key is knowing if you've done your job getting them ready for it.

This is why the very argument itself is so unfulfilling, This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them.

Seems like we need to quit worrying about what type of war we want, need, expect and put meat and muscle behind every soldier, airmen, marine with whatever we've got to help them do whatever they have to. :(

Surferbeetle
01-21-2009, 05:16 PM
One highly over simplified question is if the foundation isn't as important as the house why even build it. If one accepts that the foundation of any armed forces is the men and women of which it is comprised and then that they must be good at what they do then learn to do it together; would it not make just as much sense that the same premise follows all the way through to the highest levels. If one brigade commander has one really well trained battalion and several more not so much how well will they stand against a moderately well trained collection of battalions. Same for a Div, Corps, Army, etc.

If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable. Either extreme would seem to make it excessively difficult to transition without considerable hardship and unfortunate costs both human and otherwise.

It is true that soldiers are not police, it is however equally true that they are not natural born killers(Exceptions aside). They are at the base simply men and women who have chosen to do a job and deserve to be adequately trained to do it. When $#^ hits the fan they can and will adjust up or down as necessary the key is knowing if you've done your job getting them ready for it.

This is why the very argument itself is so unfulfilling, This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them.

Seems like we need to quit worrying about what type of war we want, need, expect and put meat and muscle behind every soldier, airmen, marine with whatever we've got to help them do whatever they have to. :(

Ron,

Excellent points all. (And the foundation analogy especially gladdens the heart of this civil engineer :D)

Ken likes to beat this drum as well; it does indeed all come down to training the troops. Like you, my part of this particular melody is that we need to accept the realities of what we find on the ground and craft appropriate solutions to them as opposed to coming in with strong preconceptions and refusing to adjust to the facts.

Excellent military forces do indeed excel at MCO but they are not just thoroughbred one trick ponies who should only be taken out of the barn for carefully prepared for MCO events. In the real world pickup trucks, tractors, quarter horses, mustangs, and mule's are used to get many things done around the ol' farm as well. Once upon a time I learned about the importance of combined arms and I still think that it's a valid concept...

Best,

Steve

ipopescu
01-21-2009, 06:27 PM
Ken said:


The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again.

Ken,
I think this pretty much nails it, and I don't think many people really object to this. I would only add that the probability of an eventuality should determine the emphasis given to it in terms of resource allocation, training, doctrine, etc. At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them. My prof Peter Feaver, a former Bush NSC official, recently summarized what I believe may be a commonly held position inside the former administration here (http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/19/the_real_debate_about_coin) on the Foreign Policy website. One of the paragraphs for this thread is pasted below;
Ionut.


"First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgentnear-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational."

Rob Thornton
01-21-2009, 06:42 PM
For those capable of accessing AKO - the Army has hung its UNCLASS "Army Strategy 2008" document there (just run a search). This is a good document - it is not so much a strategy as we might consider the NSS or NDS, however it does reference them. It is more of a capability generation strategy and addresses the full spectrum of required capabilities. I like that it frames the discussion in terms of "strategic choices" and "strategic questions".

There is a good deal of thought devoted to IW capabilities, SFA capabilities, MCO capabilities, ARFORGEN, personnel practices, areas of relevant DOTMLPF, spin out capabilites and modernization, AC/RC practices. etc.

If you have access, I think it will inform much of this and other discussion. Its the first time I've seen such a document. I think it is the appropriate focus for the Army as a force and capability provider to the GCCs.

If you have a .mil addy, ping me and I'll send it to you.

Best, Rob

Entropy
01-21-2009, 06:52 PM
And I imagine if you put a Coin proponent in a room with me as a "Con" proponent and said take this list of defense resources and start cutting, then produce a scheme for how to organize and train the military and specifically the army for the future, well at that point agreement would most likely go away. I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force.

Schmedlap: Well the exchange between me and LG has been interesting. I have made my points about his well articulated but in my mind still discrete views. But stepping forward a bit, if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

Col. Gentile,

After some thought, I think you and LG were talking past each other a bit. Specifically it appears you each are looking at slightly different timeframes. Your writings strike me as more focused on the future while LG is focused on the present.

And time is a problem in this debate. There's a distinction, I think, between what we should be doing now and what we should be doing down the road over the long term (once Iraq and Astan wind down). As it stands now, my perspective is that current OPTEMPO in the ground forces simply do not allow enough TIME for sufficient training in both HIC and COIN. It would be nice to have a full-spectrum force, but unless the force can be increased (unlikely) or unless commitments in Iraq and Astan decrease (likely, the question is when), I don't see how the ground forces can maintain competency in both areas. And, judging from the debate between you and LG, it seems we might be at (or on our way) to what you correctly describe as the "worst of all possible worlds" which is incomplete competence in both areas.

So, what should we do over the short term? How will those short-term decisions affect what we do over the long term? It seems to me your concern (which I share) is that going full-bore COIN now will make the creation of a balanced force in the future more difficult - a problem that only complicates the "tradeoffs" you describe above. If we go "all in" for COIN now, how long will it take to recover those HIC skills once OPTEMPO allows more training time? Will the Army's future leadership, raised on COIN, develop a COIN "mindset" and eschew HIC as LG believes the current leadership is eschewing COIN? What are the alternatives? This brings us back to the problem of trying to fight a high-optempo COIN war while trying to maintain HIC proficiency. Our force ain't big enough to do both right now. Something's got to give or we'll continue to muddle through.

Schmedlap
01-21-2009, 08:21 PM
... if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

That is about 95% right, imo. Were it not for the lackluster training that occurred prior to 9/11, I think that statement would be 100% correct. The only reason that I don't think we've become deficient at the higher end is because we already were. The reality check that occurred on 9/11 (that we might actually have to fight real enemies, rather than OPFOR at NTC), has forced some degree of realism and some relaxation of safety standards in training, both of which could do nothing less than improve the quality of training.

Ken White
01-21-2009, 10:42 PM
This post addresses several comments above but not in chronological order.

ipopescu said:
"At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them."That's true -- and efforts by the Army to deter them from COIN-like commitments from 1975 until 2001 were successful only because said civilians did not see a need. Once one of those civilians saw a need, we were off to COIN city. Well, sort of...

Ipopescu also posted this quote:

""First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgent near-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational.""

I do not agree totally with that statement -- some in the Army have done that on that basis but they're fooling themselves, the real problem is that the US military will be told to go do it, ready or not. If, OTOH, even the partial intent of the statement is to say those are the only types of wars that can be seen in the near future -- I disagree on that score as well. No one can reliably predict that we will not become engaged in a major conventional combat next week, much less three years form now. That inference, COIN will rule, Attempts to make a guess into a statement of fact and it presupposes a choice that could be exceedingly dangerous.

Friend ipopescu homed in on the last part of my statement he quoted -- he should have paid more attention to the far more important first phrase: "The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible."

Gian said:
"I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force."Since you're an Armor Officer, I'm sure you wouldn't -- I suspect some Light Infantry Officers might disagree... :D

However, isn't that really an argument looking for a home? I see no move by the Army to build more Tanks at this point nor do I see any inclination to get rid of any that we possess. So why bring this up? Because the added personnel are going to infantry Bdes perhaps. Makes sense -- Armor is expensive and if you're going to add more spaces -- almost certainly temporarily -- and there is no need for added armor at this time, it seems unwise to add any. There are also discussions about moving some heavy Bde sets into the ARNG; an idea with some merit if we get to the point where we can again have a strategic reserve.If the issue is truly the defense of the US instead of branch partisanship, neither of those things should be a problem.

Entropy said -- and this is important:
"As it stands now, my perspective is that current OPTEMPO in the ground forces simply do not allow enough TIME for sufficient training in both HIC and COIN. It would be nice to have a full-spectrum force, but unless the force can be increased (unlikely) or unless commitments in Iraq and Astan decrease (likely, the question is when), I don't see how the ground forces can maintain competency in both areas. And, judging from the debate between you and LG, it seems we might be at (or on our way) to what you correctly describe as the "worst of all possible worlds" which is incomplete competence in both areas.In reverse order, "the worst of all possible worlds" is about where we are today. That is as a result of bad decisions by the Army in the 1989-2001 period, of mediocre training and of the ever ongoing generational change. Senior Commanders today received no COIN or stability ops training while they were developing and thus they did not practice those skills and embed them in muscle memory (so to speak). They're all smart guys, they can read, they go to schools, they learn new things -- but old habits die hard. Almost all adapt, some in a truly outstanding manner, the majority more than adequately but it is still an adaptation and it is not an experience and training derived skill. That's why the application is spotty and varies from person to person, why some above mention that we are not doing many things as well as one could hope.

Which leads to the fact that the current OPTEMPO does not allow time for adequate training. I'm not sure I agree with that but I will acknowledge that the way we currently train coupled with that OPTEMPO almost guarantee marginal training. We need better initial entry training so that both new Officers and new EM have the basics of soldiering firmly instilled. If the basics are acquired, branching out is simple -- without mastery of the ground floor of the profession, everything new becomes chaos. There are some good efforts taking place all over the Army to address this, Basic and AIT as well as the Officer Basic courses are being fixed and that's great. We are slowly --too slowly -- introducing Outcome Based Training. We simply need to take it a step further and double the time to allow mastery of the basics. It would help if we also had a series of courses on how to delegate and how not to micromanage. :wry:

That needed fix does not address the requirement for a full spectrum force and how it is trained. That is not a problem -- except that again the OPTEMPO now intrudes; if everyone has to rotate to a theater on a one on - one off schedule, there is no chance for specialization or multi spectrum training. Everyone has to train for the fight we're in, period. There shouldn't even be any argument about that. To train on unneeded skills is to waste training time and will put the troops at unnecessary risk. Lest I be misunderstood, a 19B or 19K needs to be able to shoot, move and communicate -- but he does not have to be a Master Gunner...

Later, post Iraq and Afghansitan (and they will become history) we simply divide training into a roughly 70:30 (or 80:20 -- the ratio will vary from unit to unti) time and effort routine with the light folks doing Stability ops : MCO and the Heavy guys doing MCO : Stability ops. Note I say stability ops and not COIN. The US should diligently avoid COIN situations. There will be those that say we cannot do that. We can -- however we may still have to do some now and then, thus we must have, as nearly everyone now agrees, the doctrine in hand and everyone trains at least a bit for that eventuality.

Entropy also said:
"This brings us back to the problem of trying to fight a high-optempo COIN war while trying to maintain HIC proficiency. Our force ain't big enough to do both right now. Something's got to give or we'll continue to muddle through."Yes. Muddle through. That's what we're doing but we have a lot of practice at that, I got to watch us muddle through -- and believe, muddle is kind -- two earlier wars and we really do that well. So, muddle through we will. Hopefully, we'll improve our training and PME and thus get as good as we were in 1945 but do it without three hard years of a really hard war to get there. it can be done.

Ron Humphrey said:
"If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable.
. . .
...This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them."Exactly.. The issue is not what we're going to buy -- those decisions are mostly locked in concrete for the next five years. The issue is how we train.

The answer is -- not very well.

As Schmedlap said:
"The only reason that I don't think we've become deficient at the higher end is because we already were. The reality check that occurred on 9/11 (that we might actually have to fight real enemies, rather than OPFOR at NTC), has forced some degree of realism and some relaxation of safety standards in training, both of which could do nothing less than improve the quality of training."Sadly true on all counts.

All this discussion isn't really about equipment buys, force structure or strategic focus -- it is simply about training. Contrary to our inability to affect major policy and budget decisions, we can affect training decisions. Well, I can't -- but most of you guys can...

Gian P Gentile
01-21-2009, 11:46 PM
Entropy: Agree with your post, and in a sense you are right in that we may have been talking past each other. LG is focussed on the now, while I am viewing the now but with a longer eye toward the future and the effects that the current wars in astan and iraq will have on it. I have stated this point in many of my published writings that--as you point out too--the Army must maintain its focus on coin now since the operational environment demands it. If a BCT is slated to deploy to Astan in 8 months then of course it should be training on counterinsurgency at the NTC instead of staring down the 11th Gaurds MRR in the VOD. My point all along has been to argue that the Army needs to accept how consumed it has become with counterinsurgency (again with good and understandable reasons) and then look honestly at itself in what that focus has done to its conventional capabilities. FM 3-24 is a different but related story. My criticisms of it have been toward its selectivity in theory and historical underpinnings at the expense of a doctrine that offers options other than nation-building. Did the Army need an updated counterinsurgency manual? yes of course it did. Was FM 3-24 a good cut at it based on the time constraints involved? Maybe. Is FM 3-24 the endstate for American counterinsurgency doctrine? In my mind it should not be.

Ken: My point about trade-offs was not an argument for building an armor-only force as your post suggests when it uses the term branch parochialism. Of course the Army needs an infantry capability. But if the Army is not careful we may wake up one day and look around and see the majority of its combat brigades as infantry with its few remaining mech and armor bcts in the national gaurd. That i do not think is a wise move. And hey Ken, what infantryman on the ground in Falujah in 04 didnt love having that Bradley in his hip pocket backing him up? Read David Belavia's book "House to House" to get a feel for the importance of firepower and protection even for dismounted infantry forces.

gian

Ken White
01-22-2009, 01:05 AM
"Ken: My point about trade-offs was not an argument for building an armor-only force as your post..."I did not think it was and did not mean to say or imply that you did.
"...suggests when it uses the term branch parochialism.Not an accusation, merely a possibly unwarranted caution. I do not believe that is your motivation.
"Of course the Army needs an infantry capability. But if the Army is not careful we may wake up one day and look around and see the majority of its combat brigades as infantry with its few remaining mech and armor bcts in the national gaurd. That i do not think is a wise move.I think that would depend on how many Bdes went where, how it was done -- but I certainly do not think under any circumstances that all the heavy stuff should go to the Guard. We need to keep at least about 9 Heavy Bdes active. I think we also need at least 2 ACRS active and three or four in the Guard.
And hey Ken, what infantryman on the ground in Falujah in 04 didnt love having that Bradley in his hip pocket backing him up?Actually, my son the Grunt was there at the time and he said Brads were great for crashing through gates. :D . He also sent me a great pic of an M1A2 resting on its Cupola in a ditch along with an 88 Crew that looked like they'd love to be anywhere else. ;)
"Read David Belavia's book "House to House" to get a feel for the importance of firepower and protection even for dismounted infantry forces.I will. Having wandered through Seoul and Uijongbu with Tanks to run antisocial types out of town I'm sort of aware of that importance. :wry: There's no doubt in my mind that tracks are good things (though I've gotta admit to never having been a Brad fan) and as a former M26 Gunner and M41 TC as one of the world's better Cav Platoon Sergeants, not to mention a Mech Bde Ops SGM who had to teach all the new guys how to drive an M577A2 -- I'm not against the heavy guys at all...

All for 'em, in fact. As you may recall, I agree with you that MCO is and must be the driver, that we need to be proficient at that and that then, oh by the way, we can do stability ops as well as a lesser chore. I hope you now see that I agree with you on the value of Armor. Where we really differ, I believe, is on the subject of how much the Army and its units can do -- I think they are capable of much more than we currently ask of them -- but I do know that to get there, we have to invest in training and that is not a popular thing to fund.

The force structure for the next few years is locked and I'm not going to affect that -- what I wish I could affect is our training -- even though it's better now than it's ever been, we just do not do it as well as we could

Gian P Gentile
01-22-2009, 02:52 AM
Ken:

good post; and agree.

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types. My point, and this has been beat around pretty well in other threads, is that the most flexible and adaptable combat units are ones trained primarily in the higher end of the fighting spectrum because in that training they would have honed their basic combat skills (regardless if they are infantry, armor, cavalry, etc). What I just said is an ideal, an organizing principle of sorts, and not, NOT a call to stop coin training for units that are deploying so that they can train on hic. But at some point if we are able to wind down in Iraq these questions will start to arise.

The interesting thing about Belavia's book if you get the chance to read it is that he writes from an infantryman's perspective in urban combat and acutally is explicitly dismissive of armor at various points in the book, but when he describes fighting in houses at the end of the engagement there always seems to be a bradley outside either breaking the wall down or pumping rounds wherever needed.

If I had a dollar for your combat experience relative to mine I would be a rich man.

v/r

gian

Ken White
01-22-2009, 03:16 AM
In order:

I agree.

I 'll get the book -- or my son the Military historian to be may already have it.

Nah. Different times breed different events, it's all relative. With all mine and a buck, I can get a cup of coffee in a cheap restaurant (which is really bad when one remembers a Nickel a cup in a good restaurant...). What counts is that we both brought back as many as we could, we both care and we're still here to pick on each other and mayhap, some day, buy each other a drink. ;)

Gian P Gentile
01-22-2009, 04:20 AM
Ken:

what a nice thing to say!!

your eloquence moved me.

we did bring back as many as we could; and the ones we didnt, well that is the bond that we share.

very respectcully

gian

ps; if you are ever in the new york city area you have an open invite to spend a day with me at west point in the classroom with future lieutenants who you in past times taught and trained.

BayonetBrant
01-22-2009, 02:03 PM
I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types.



Sir,

I wholeheartedly agree. And I think that combat-focused training is starting to lose traction as the 'experts' offer their 'help' to the current leaders charged with executing these wars.

I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion. COIN is inherently dangerous work, and it involves exposing yourself to all manner of dangerous possibilities. But COIN can't be successfully accomplished from inside the wire, or outside the wire in brigade-size movements to contact.

Are the leadership today more afraid of appearing on C-SPAN with a well-hones "Yes, Senator. No, Senator" soundtrack than they are of failing at COIN because they were too tentative in their FOB-based approach?

I guess I'm trying to ask if the old habits that die hard aren't more the result of endless 'risk assessments' in training that have more to do with snakebites and heat cramps than with mission failure.

It's easy to justify casualties in HIC - there's a shooting war going on. But it's harder to tell some kid's parents that they were patrolling without body armor on because the local populace were more likely to open up to the soldiers and provide better info to them when they weren't wearing it.

RTK
01-22-2009, 02:10 PM
I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types. My point, and this has been beat around pretty well in other threads, is that the most flexible and adaptable combat units are ones trained primarily in the higher end of the fighting spectrum because in that training they would have honed their basic combat skills (regardless if they are infantry, armor, cavalry, etc). What I just said is an ideal, an organizing principle of sorts, and not, NOT a call to stop coin training for units that are deploying so that they can train on hic. But at some point if we are able to wind down in Iraq these questions will start to arise.



Sir,

I've always thought this was the crux of your argument. It's spot on.

Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event.

Cavguy
01-22-2009, 03:59 PM
I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types.

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

Gian P Gentile
01-22-2009, 04:56 PM
I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

Niel: right, and now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved. Now the Coin advocates response is well, really, so what, because we must win the wars we are in now so don’t worry about the future. I don’t buy that logic, and I think it to be irresponsible. This gets to your question about education. Certainly at places like the Army War College and other defense educational institutions there is an important place for coin, irregular war as subjects for education. But we should not turn these places into Coin Academies where that is all that they do there. Why? Because we must be able to think beyond the current wars in terms of policy and strategy, do otherwise would be to ignore a duty that we have to our elected leaders and the people of the United States.

finally, you and I will never agree on your other points. I think it is just flat-wrong to think counterfactually that if more soldiers had read Galula things would have turned out differently. You cannot prove that anyway. But what I can prove at least through the record as it is given to us from the most recent credible histories written is that the majority of American Army tactical units transitioned quickly to full-spectrum operations and within that were conducting many best practices in coin. Were these capabilities as wide-spread as they were under the Surge? Probably not, but they still were wide-spread and the delta so to speak was not decisive.

Such arguments of "if we had done this or that" are really a big large trope within the american army for trying to fight vietnam all over again in iraq but this time win.

gg

Cavguy
01-22-2009, 05:20 PM
Sir,

Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's? I feel they should have an understanding of the principles of all forms of conflict, supported by broad reading.

Yes, we adapted quicky, but I (along with many observers) think we missed our window in Iraq between April 10 and August 17 (UN Bombing, IIRC). Yes, we "rapidly" adapted tactically, slower operationally. In my view, we did lose whatever chance we had to gain the cooperation of the population in that period, mostly through ignorance of COIN principles. The fact that we learned later doesn't mean that it was okay to not know in the first place. If you read Kalev Sepp's taxonomy (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun05/MayJun05/sepp.pdf) of best/worst COIN practices, it largely describes everything we did in 2003-2004.

You do have a point that no amount of better tactics would have fixed the lack of strategic clarity and direction at that time.

Niel

selil
01-22-2009, 05:30 PM
I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.


Most of what I have seen the Army do is training not education. Training is task oriented while education is concept oriented. There is often a misunderstanding in expectations between the two paradigms. The result is also often the criticism heaped upon academia that what is taught isn't immediately relevant. That is because the educational model creates flexibility to changing environments and adaptability. You educate a student on operating systems not Windows XP. They can then figure out any operating system.

The way you get past limitations in training is you identify the concepts, patterns, and educate troops on those. We often refer to the Army of today as the best, brightest, smartest in history. It may be true that there are officers with doctorates, or multiple masters degrees, but we aren't talking about the outliers. We are talking about the base of the pyramid where the job gets done not talked about.


Well dropping a bunch of superlatives on the deck as evidence does not make it true. A highly trained Army will do specific tasks within that paradigm of training. As a root cause the methods and educational tools used to train soldiers require intensive instruction that is single minded in the execution. That system produces skilled soldiers with silos of training. If you expand that training model you can cross train soldiers through further intensive training and make special operations forces. At some point in time through that model falls apart as we see in the COIN/HIC argument when training resource time runs out.

The problem though is solvable. There is another way but y'all won't like it.

You have to educate soldiers and eradicate the diffidence between academic and military culture. Embrace the scholar soldier and produce thinkers. Then you can educate based on patterns of conflict versus task oriented training. I am not even suggesting you abandon all training. There are specific skills that are required for EVERY soldier and those should be learned. If you want a cross functional Army capable of taking on any mission at any time without large times spent re-training then you will have to change the educational models and expectations.

This is not a discussion of semantics. The vocational training system versus higher education debate has raged for a long time. The result is that thinking, problem solving, risk management, and other thinking strategies are becoming highly sought over. These would be exactly the same skills needed at the root of a fully flexible military branch.

There are a lot more things that could be said but in general the arguments will be around; 1) There isn't enough time in the training cycle (applying the wrong model from the onset); 2) Soldiers aren't that smart (even though they are getting older and more educated, wrong again); 3) We have to train for the fight we have today (again same wrong model as evidence against being prepared); 4) There is no way to integrate that kind of training with the current staff (presupposing the failure based on the inadequacy to develop staff will always fail, but how did we get armor?); 5) Various other similar rebuttals following the same pattern.

The fact is it would be a success, it would work, it has worked in previous conflicts, and as the national education system abandoned liberal arts and social sciences, so did the military drive towards a vocational model that now is seen as a restriction on mission capability.

Put succinctly the abject failure to reform military training to an educational model from a vocational model is a direct and substantial impact on national security capability.

max161
01-22-2009, 05:33 PM
I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel
I hate to sound cliche but when GEN Schoomaker was CDR USSOCOM (or CINCSOC back in the day!!) he always admonished that we "train for certainty and educate for uncertainty." The certainty is you have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate in any situation. We need to train and maintain proficiency in all our combat skills (both for US operations in MCO and to be able to impart those skills to friends, partners, and allies when necessary). But operations in an Irregular Warfare environment will always be uncertain and require creative problem solving. So we do not need to focus on training for IW. We need to educate for the possibilities we may face but also realize that we cannot identify every possible threat or complex situation. The "irony" is that I think if we really look critically at our military, particulalry our ground forces (Army and Marines) I think we will find many Officers and NCOs who have had sufficient education and were very adept at problem solving in complex operational environments and have done so since we began operaitons in 2001. They were able to do this because they were tactically and technically proficient, they possessed initiative and sufficient lattitude from their chain of command, and they were mentally agile and creative to solve or assist in solving complex problems. I think we find many of these Officers and NCOs at the Brigade and Regimental level and below. What is always the difficult part is developing and orchestrating an integrated and synchroniched operational campaign that supports strategic aims. Training occurs best in our units. Our PME for officers and NCOs needs to focus more on education and less on training.

Ken White
01-22-2009, 05:49 PM
Bayonet Brant said:
"...I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion."That, too. I 'd say in about equal measures across the board, varying in percent of each between individual commanders.

RTK said:
"Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event."Couldn't have said it better m'self... :D

CavGuy said:
"I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.Having run an instructional branch charged with training OBC and AOAC students at the Armor School for five years and having come up with some fairly innovative -- and effective -- training at the time only to see it go back to below humdrum in a matter of months after I left and being broadly familiar with the Infantry versions over the years, I can believe that your experience was all training and little education. Mostly poor training and not nearly enough of it at that.

That's why I continually beat the drum about the fact that our initial entry training does not prepare people for service in a professional army. We are still training people as if they were destined for a rapidly mobilizing wartime force. It's stupid. I know that both the OBC and CCC curricula are undergoing changes -- good ones -- but we haven't gone far enough. We're doing better than we used to but we can do even better.

CavGuy later added:
"Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's. I feel they should have an understanding of the principlesI strongly agree but would suggest you better do that for the NCOs as well or you'll suffer later.

I'd also suggest that education has to start for both officers and the enlisted folks at entry. Most everyone who comes in the Army will operate in jobs at least one and often two ranks higher than that actually held BEFORE they go to the level of school to 'equip' them for the higher position. Our PME has never adapted to that fact. At Knox, in the 70s, almost all Captains had commanded and been on a staff before they came to the advanced course. We had one ANCOC course where every single student had already been a Platoon Sergeant...

Gian said:
"...now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved."True and the risk has to be accepted for now but given the effort to turn the overly massive bureaucracy that is TRADOC it is time to start setting in place revised POIs for all training and education, IET through the War College that truly, at lower levels thoroughly inculcates the basics of the profession and at upper levels encourages calculated risk taking, decentralization and independent thought.

We are not going to restore our ability to trust subordinates until we do that and no armed force can operate effectively without trust.

ADDED: And what Max161 said; train the basics on entry, educate the leaders... ;)

Surferbeetle
01-22-2009, 06:11 PM
Cherry picked from the White House Web site on Defense (http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/) (got the link from SWJ - thanks!)


President Obama and Vice President Biden will invest in a 21st century military to maintain our conventional advantage while increasing our capacity to defeat the threats of tomorrow. They will ensure our troops have the training, equipment and support that they need when they are deployed.

Invest in a 21st Century Military

* Rebuild the Military for 21st Century Tasks: Obama and Biden believe that we must build up our special operations forces, civil affairs, information operations, and other units and capabilities that remain in chronic short supply; invest in foreign language training, cultural awareness, and human intelligence and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization skill sets; and create a more robust capacity to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces, so that local allies are better prepared to confront mutual threats.

Ken White
01-22-2009, 06:36 PM
that it was carried forward to the WH Web site. I have no quarrel with any of that provided it is done sensibly and as truly needed based on a thorough assessment, is not done automatically mostly as a counterpoint to the predecessor and does not get in the way of full spectrum capability. We need to and can do all those things without going overboard.

I doubt he'll pay much more attention to me than Bush did but I can hope they'll do right instead of just doing something... :wry:

marct
01-22-2009, 06:42 PM
I find it intriguing that "training" is often listed as a component of PME; it shouldn't be.

Sam is quite correct in his critique of the differences but, while he says that it isn't a discussion of semantics, it is really. "Semantics" is the science of meaning (or the study of meaning) and that is exactly what this entire training vs. education debate is about, and it is also one of the reasons why people are talking past each other.

Ken White
01-22-2009, 07:26 PM
Nor, I know, did you say I was... :D

However, to clarify...

My goal is better training -- particularly upon entry -- which will give people a thorough grounding in the basics of performance required to survive and to be successful in combat. That training must include a smattering of education because the new career includes subject matter never before acquired or even in many case encountered or considered.

Follow on PME should be mostly education -- but the application of that education in practical exercises at the educational institution constitutes some training as well. Too many years of practical effort have pretty well proven that even purely cognitive skills can be embedded with three practical repetitions of application.

Aside from institutional training and education, continued self-education is required and in the conduct of day to day business and in field exercises, all previous training and education should be put into practice in what the Armed Forces usually call 'training.' As is sometimes said "Everything is training is everything."

Thus the conmingling. ;)

Surferbeetle
01-22-2009, 07:33 PM
Most of what I have seen the Army do is training not education. Training is task oriented while education is concept oriented. There is often a misunderstanding in expectations between the two paradigms. The result is also often the criticism heaped upon academia that what is taught isn't immediately relevant. That is because the educational model creates flexibility to changing environments and adaptability. You educate a student on operating systems not Windows XP. They can then figure out any operating system.


There are a lot more things that could be said but in general the arguments will be around; 1) There isn't enough time in the training cycle (applying the wrong model from the onset); 2) Soldiers aren't that smart (even though they are getting older and more educated, wrong again); 3) We have to train for the fight we have today (again same wrong model as evidence against being prepared); 4) There is no way to integrate that kind of training with the current staff (presupposing the failure based on the inadequacy to develop staff will always fail, but how did we get armor?); 5) Various other similar rebuttals following the same pattern.

The fact is it would be a success, it would work, it has worked in previous conflicts, and as the national education system abandoned liberal arts and social sciences, so did the military drive towards a vocational model that now is seen as a restriction on mission capability.

Put succinctly the abject failure to reform military training to an educational model from a vocational model is a direct and substantial impact on national security capability.

Sam,

Do you have any case studies which discuss costs in terms of time and money for the two models that you would be willing to provide links for?

The NYT has an interesting opinion piece (http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/the-last-professor/?ref=opinion) by Dr. Stanley Fish (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Fish) who ruminates about some of your points.


In previous columns and in a recent book I have argued that higher education, properly understood, is distinguished by the absence of a direct and designed relationship between its activities and measurable effects in the world.

This is a very old idea that has received periodic re-formulations. Here is a statement by the philosopher Michael Oakeshott that may stand as a representative example: “There is an important difference between learning which is concerned with the degree of understanding necessary to practice a skill, and learning which is expressly focused upon an enterprise of understanding and explaining.”

So, how do I build a training or education system to keep my charges alive, make as many of the opposition as needed die for their system, and separate/protect/stabilize and perhaps improve the lives of the innocents caught in the middle of the conflicts that we are in? Do you have any case studies of successful systems to share?

Best,

Steve

Ken White
01-22-2009, 07:56 PM
Do you have any case studies which discuss costs in terms of time and money for the two models that you would be willing to provide links for?While I am painfully aware that your parameters have been used by the Army (the other services do so as well but not to as great an extent) for years to justify marginal training that produces a barely acceptable product -- enlisted and officer -- who is sent to a unit which, quality of unit dependent may or may not better prepare him or her for the job. The good folks will also better educate and train themselves (both are required) while the lesser people will not exert the effort to do so (but will continue to be tolerated instead of being encouraged to seek another career). I think two points are in order:

- Individuals and units should not have to do that to the extent they now do.

- Is time/money the proper arbiter or should the arbiters be competence and proficiency to better enable the future survival of self and subordinates to insure successful mission accomplishment (as opposed to a flawed job that has excessive costs in many terms).

I'm quite conversant with the time/cost aspect having managed an Army multi-million buck budget for a number of years and thus learning how the system really works (not!). I also know that our use of those two inhibitors is a smokescreen. We continue to tolerate poor training because we are unwilling -- not unable; unwilling -- to spend what is required and to take the time needed not because we can't afford either, we can -- but simply because we've never done it that way and change is difficult. Every objection Sam lists has been used by many to me over the years -- and, as Sam says, everyone is hogwash.

Surferbeetle
01-22-2009, 08:14 PM
While I am painfully aware that your parameters have been used by the Army (the other services do so as well but not to as great an extent) for years to justify marginal training that produces a barely acceptable product -- enlisted and officer -- who is sent to a unit which, quality of unit dependent may or may not better prepare him or her for the job.

Ken,

Just because I too have also been subjected to marginal training does not mean that I advocate it my friend. Like it or not however, time and money are measuring sticks, and what I am seriously seeking is a better example of how to do things which addresses these parameters.


The good folks will also better educate and train themselves (both are required) while the lesser people will not exert the effort to do so (but will continue to be tolerated instead of being encouraged to seek another career). I think two points are in order:

- Individuals and units should not have to do that to the extent they now do.

- Is time/money the proper arbiter or should the arbiters be competence and proficiency to better enable the future survival of self and subordinates to insure successful mission accomplishment (as opposed to a flawed job that has excessive costs in many terms).

I'm quite conversant with the time/cost aspect having managed an Army multi-million buck budget for a number of years and thus learning how the system really works (not!). I also know that our use of those two inhibitors is a smokescreen. We continue to tolerate poor training because we are unwilling -- not unable; unwilling -- to spend what is required and to take the time needed not because we can't afford either, we can -- but simply because we've never done it that way and change is difficult. Every objection Sam lists has been used by many to me over the years -- and, as Sam says, everyone is hogwash.

An analogous discussion would be on engineering specifications: performance based versus prescriptive. For military and engineering situations education & experience of the people one works with dictates what route I choose and/or advocate.

My personal vote is always for quality (leaning towards the performance based end of things) education & training...I have spent my money & time on three degrees; and over twenty years of my training time on military themes.

Perhaps we are not so far apart as you may think (internet nuances and all that...) I am seriously looking for a better way to do things.

Best,

Steve

Ken White
01-22-2009, 08:33 PM
Just because I too have also been subjected to marginal training does not mean that I advocate it my friend. Like it or not however, time and money are measuring sticks, and what I am seriously seeking is a better example of how to do things which includes these parameters.I'm also painfully aware they are real measuring sticks -- the issue is what priority are they accorded in determining the balance of Needed training vs. cost vs. time available.

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

So. I hear you and know those are considerations -- they just need to be placed in the proper perspective. They have gained credence at current levels not because they are correct but simply because of bureaucratic inertia and acceptance of almost good enough instead of truly good enough training and education in all too many cases.

If that were not true, this thread would not exist.
...I am seriously looking for a better way to do things.So am I, so are we all -- and I suggest we will not find such a way by approaching the problem over the same routes we have always used.

Surferbeetle
01-22-2009, 08:59 PM
My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

America and its military are tough enough to get it done, it's just gonna hurt...:eek:

It's difficult for me to articulate in this short space how rapidly informational vehicles change; from transistor radios and wall mounted telephones to ipods & cellphones in just a flash.

The upheaval apparant in newspapers & on campus with regards to the digital divide will also hit the Army soon...the requirements and failures that GWOT has made apparent to us all guarantees it. A 24/ lifestyle, the internet, video games, google earth, wiki's, SWJ-style learning & interaction are just some of the educational & training vehicles that will/do help us to improve both content and availability of education and training to all of our forces.

Those of us who have suffered and lived through the BS and nastiness that results from lack of planning/training/etc. (and there are many...) will continue to speak out and push for change for the better. We have as examples those who are even older and who have lived through even more who still continue to push for change (dont we :D).

Ken White
01-22-2009, 09:24 PM
America and its military are tough enough to get it done, it's just gonna hurt...:eek:Yep.
...We have as examples those who are even older and who have lived through even more who still continue to push for change (dont we :D).Yeth, I do hope tho... ;)

(Spake by old Dude, no teef...)

reed11b
01-22-2009, 09:40 PM
My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.



BINGO! It also explains partly why the retention rate for 4 year initial contracts is higher then 2 year initial contracts (though I imagine that those that do 2 year contracts are less devoted to begin with). I would dump those two year contracts if I could. I think it also explains why we micro-manage (believe me, one clueless private on your fire-team will test even the most laid back sergeant) and why we do not train in manner that encourages initiative and thinking. How many disillusioned soldiers quit after one or two enlistments because they tired of being treated like children. There is a low ratio of prior service E-5 and below on this board, so this may not be the best sounding board for that info, but my personal experience working with vets suggest the number is higher then it should be.
Reed

Ken White
01-22-2009, 10:00 PM
...How many disillusioned soldiers quit after one or two enlistments because they tired of being treated like children. There is a low ratio of prior service E-5 and below on this board, so this may not be the best sounding board for that info, but my personal experience working with vets suggest the number is higher then it should be.One can also ask how many disillusioned LTs and CPTs depart...

Poor education and training works its evil from the bottom to the top. You and I talked about the bottom but as you go up, it's sort of telling that the pet song of several AOAC Classes back in my day was "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights." That may have changed and I really hope it has -- but I don't think I want to bet on it just yet.

Some would be amazed at the number of Officers I've met from long ago to recently who went or are going out of their way to avoid Leavenworth or the Pebntagon -- or the number of MSGs I have known and know that have tried or are trying to figure out how to avoid the USASMA. Many will say bad things about those kinds of folks. Possibly correctly -- but I suggest that those attitudes are indicative of a problem. The system forces in one way or another all those things as stepping stones and everyone knows that. Yet, some, a few to be sure, still try to 'escape.'

Been my observation that if you do it right, people fight to be included...

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-23-2009, 01:15 AM
a trip to Leavenworth's dusty, musty archives to search for Major Gentile's thesis:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA383740&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also of interest:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/mcmullen.pdf

Although this gem: “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan” is proving a tougher nut to crack.

:D

selil
01-23-2009, 01:54 AM
Surferbeetle,

Though it looks like your original question has been OBE, I'll do my best to give some insights.

First, there is a substantial body of literature around educational techniques with many different vectors and metrics for creating understanding. For example you can read about the socratic method, and the deeper seated learning that occurs with that versus simplistic lecture. The example though shows that even with the educational system there are better ways of doing things too.

So as to creating expertise on a cost/time/output type I'm afraid it isn't their are higher or lower costs just differences. As was alluded to by ken in "wasted days, and wasted nights" the primary costs are found in the "TIME" not in the delivery. As such you change the delivery and expectations mechanisms and perhaps some of the patterns being taught. You want a LIC/HIC type soldier to see those patterns and be able to respond and function correctly as rapidly as training.

Since what we're talking about is revolutionary to us now we need a model. We can look back in time and see when older, more educated people were entering into the service and perhaps make comparisons. We can look at todays educated cadre and compare them to non-educated cadre. Looking through ERIC (educational research database) I did not find any examples. That may be due the human subjects shield that is in place for military, but I was actually a little surprised nobody has done a similar type of study.

My basis for the primary elements of my argument though are grounded in the work by Bloom (1954) and others. My favorites?

Instructional design (second edition), Smith & Ragan
Beyond constructivism, Lesh & Doerr
The nature of expertise, Chi, Glaser, & Farr
Knowing what students know: The science and design of educational assessment, NRC
How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, and school, NRC

There is a large body of punditry that points out many of the issues with higher education such as "ProfScam" by Charles Sykes. Another example of a contrary opinion (sort of) is "Excellence without a soul" by Harry Lewis. I always try and look at both sides of an equation and in this case I am fairly convinced.

The United States military education system is broken at the most basic level. I'm not talking about the academies, the universities or colleges. I am talking about where the rubber hits the road and the reason it is broken is all of what I said before.

Sorry that may be a weaker argument than you might expect but what we're talking about is not easy, is not soft, and requires a substantial amount of reading. The study of the problem with money though is simply not the mark you need to consider. It is a wash and the system could be changed bottom up (to middle where I think it flips) in a matter of a few years. The results won't happen today, we are talking generational change, just like the way we got here.

Gian P Gentile
01-23-2009, 02:21 AM
I hate to sound cliche but when GEN Schoomaker was CDR USSOCOM (or CINCSOC back in the day!!) he always admonished that we "train for certainty and educate for uncertainty." The certainty is you have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate in any situation. We need to train and maintain proficiency in all our combat skills (both for US operations in MCO and to be able to impart those skills to friends, partners, and allies when necessary). But operations in an Irregular Warfare environment will always be uncertain and require creative problem solving. So we do not need to focus on training for IW. We need to educate for the possibilities we may face but also realize that we cannot identify every possible threat or complex situation. The "irony" is that I think if we really look critically at our military, particulalry our ground forces (Army and Marines) I think we will find many Officers and NCOs who have had sufficient education and were very adept at problem solving in complex operational environments and have done so since we began operaitons in 2001. They were able to do this because they were tactically and technically proficient, they possessed initiative and sufficient lattitude from their chain of command, and they were mentally agile and creative to solve or assist in solving complex problems. I think we find many of these Officers and NCOs at the Brigade and Regimental level and below. What is always the difficult part is developing and orchestrating an integrated and synchroniched operational campaign that supports strategic aims. Training occurs best in our units. Our PME for officers and NCOs needs to focus more on education and less on training.

Dave:

Supremely stated!! Couldnt agree more.

gian

Gian P Gentile
01-23-2009, 02:33 AM
a trip to Leavenworth's dusty, musty archives to search for Major Gentile's thesis:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA383740&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also of interest:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/mcmullen.pdf

Although this gem: “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan” is proving a tougher nut to crack.

:D

UAM, thanks for the shout-out. Oh to be a major again, alas those days are long gone. The essay of mine that you provide a link to was a SAMS monograph that parts of it actually became an additional chapter to my dissertation that New York Univerisity Press published into a book in 2001 titled "How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo."

Not as big of a seller to be sure as that book about eating soup with a utensil. In fact the darn thing never even went into paperback. Oh well, I guess one book is better than none.

gian

patmc
01-23-2009, 03:01 AM
CPTs are still trying to avoid the CCC. I was trying to deploy again, but HRC found me and sent me a RFO. In my old unit, only 1 commander has attended CCC, and 2 of my buddies are on 2nd commands before CCC. The FACCC specifically, has a real bad reputation with junior officers. FA as a branch has had retention problems, and after a near 90% MiTT assignment class, FACCC was struggling to fill classes. Literature says this has been fixed, but little birds tell me otherwise. The curriculum has switched several times the last couple years, and is still having an identity problem.

Personally, I wanted to deploy instead of MICCC, but now that I am here, I am really enjoying myself. They've changed the curriculum, and yes there is still HIC IPB and MDMP, but they've added better targetting, COIN, and MiTT for those lucky few (RUMINT: we get assignments next week). There is probably still room for improvement, especially with adding Security Manager instruction (this is 90% of the actual S2 job unfortunately), but overall I'm impressed with the instruction. My buddy that just graduated MCCC (combined Armor and Infantry) had nothing but good things about the course too. Its getting better, but not fixed.


One can also ask how many disillusioned LTs and CPTs depart...

Poor education and training works its evil from the bottom to the top. You and I talked about the bottom but as you go up, it's sort of telling that the pet song of several AOAC Classes back in my day was "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights." That may have changed and I really hope it has -- but I don't think I want to bet on it just yet.

Ken White
01-23-2009, 03:43 AM
I finally got a look at most of the basic / OSUT POI and there are a lot of great things going on -- still too short but progress is there. I get mixed reviews on OBC and generally positive stuff on changes to the CA CCC. If we can keep Outcome Based Training integration going all over that Army, that'll help. It's harder for the instructors but that's okay; it does take more time but that's needed in any event -- and it costs no more.

I think most everyone realizes that we cannot go back to pre 2001, it just takes time to shift the bureaucracy and get the nay sayers (who, like the rich, are always with us...) on board. Training is better than ever IMO -- but still needs work...

Speaking as a one time Bn and Bde Intel Sgt, put that young MSG on all the security Manager stuff so you can do the S2 gig properly. He'll get it done and still have time to help with the other (while hating me for suggesting that to you :D).

Marauder Doc
01-27-2009, 06:42 AM
Since it was mentioned earlier, I was just going to jump in here with something crazy in regards to procuring equipment for HIC and COIN.

It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.

Why were we able to conduct OIF I with so many units in unarmored vehicles, or lacking SAPI plates, then all of a sudden when we settle in to the nation building effort personal and vehicle armor become a huge issue? Why does the MBT continue to have a valuable role in stabilization operations, long after conventional wisdom would suggest that its use had reached the point of diminishing returns?

In HIC, you have options, concealment and mobility play a huge role in force protection. You can blitz the enemy and get inside their OODA loop with overwhelming force. But in Phase IV, where do you move to? Where do you hide your guys when you are guarding a conference of tribal elders? In a dumpster? Your stuck, exposed, whether it's at a checkpoint or a reconstruction project, everyone knows where it is, and that they might get a chance to shoot at Americans if they show up.

For COIN I want armored everything, Abrams with TUSK upgrades, up armored HMMWV, the Strykers can come play if they've got their cages on, etc. They have to be able to shrug off a ton of hurt when they're stuck watching an intersection.

For HIC I want light and deployable. Recent HICs have been absurdly fast, measured in days. If we wanna play in those we gotta be able to get in there fast. Not maritime prepositioning fast, C-17 fast. Or else it'll be settled in the UN before we even get there.

William F. Owen
01-27-2009, 06:55 AM
It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.



True and has been since the 1916 Easter Uprising. It's not counter-intuitive at all. That's actually pretty well covered, and widely recognised.

Ken White
01-27-2009, 06:19 PM
Glad to have you. it would be nice if you'd go to this LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=65337#post65337) and add a little about yourself to that thread.
It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.Exceed is perhaps not a good word but there's no denying the benefit if not 'need.'
Why were we able to conduct OIF I with so many units in unarmored vehicles, or lacking SAPI plates, then all of a sudden when we settle in to the nation building effort personal and vehicle armor become a huge issue? Why does the MBT continue to have a valuable role in stabilization operations, long after conventional wisdom would suggest that its use had reached the point of diminishing returns?It became a huge issue because we had lost our COIN experience and knowledge and blundered about for 18 months, thus giving the opponents time to mount an intensive campaign of attacking with the tons of explosives that Saddam had deliberately scattered all over the nation for just that purpose. Those conditions may or may not ever prevail again.
For COIN I want armored everything, Abrams with TUSK upgrades, up armored HMMWV, the Strykers can come play if they've got their cages on, etc. They have to be able to shrug off a ton of hurt when they're stuck watching an intersection.You may want to consider what real value the Tanks offer in an urban setting and contemplate their vulnerability in a city before you spend $5M a pop to buy a bunch. I'd also suggest that you take, there are many better vehicles -- the up armored HMMWV exists because it was relatively cheap and rapidly available, not because it's good for much of anything. There are a great many far better vehicles available. I'd also ask why you want to watch an intersection.
For HIC I want light and deployable. Recent HICs have been absurdly fast, measured in days. If we wanna play in those we gotta be able to get in there fast. Not maritime prepositioning fast, C-17 fast. Or else it'll be settled in the UN before we even get there.You might also consider that the recent HIC involving the West (or Russia) have also been a major state attacking a comparatively fifth rate opponent instead of a near peer. Desert Storm was a total aberration; OIF 1 was close to being the same and the Russian incursion in Georgia was a political effort; a great FSB operation that just happened to use the Russian Armed Forces. Those are all very poor examples to use in determining what future HIC will be like. Lebanon in 2006 is probably closer than any of the others I cited.

Backwards Observer
05-07-2009, 08:13 AM
To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost. Persistent and clever, sometimes noisome and everywhere. That he might remain invisible to people inside-the-beltway is only a problem in that information gatekeepers like the aforementioned journo, craft narratives about the war — about future wars — without the consistent insight of the contrary view. As consumers of the news — as Americans — we should demand the whole scoop.

COL Gentile interview at Antiwar.com, by Crom!

http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2009/05/06/gian-gentile-exposing-counterfeit-coin/

William F. Owen
05-07-2009, 09:32 AM
I Concepts like "global insurgency" aggragate diverse threats and facilitates the type of polarized thinking that Gentile warns against. Insurgency in a globalized world is a far different thing than global insurgency, and while we need to be able to mitigate and prevent these many uprisings from getting out of control, we must also regain and sustain our warfighting skills as a whole.

I don't think Col Gentile could have said it better. I don't agree with all he says, but Gian Gentile, stands as a "antidote" to a lot of the verbiage and silliness the current myopic infatuations pumped to us by those who have suddenly discovered that not all enemies ride around in tanks.

George L. Singleton
05-07-2009, 09:49 AM
In what may fit into your discussion here I ran into last night some back and forth between/among the few highly educated (by inference) intellectuals among the so-called Pakhtun "movement" wherein their "core" model, revolving around religionIslam, is uniquely debated among themselves. Will try to clip some key comments/disussions and also try to cite the total discussion citation for you, but bearing in mind that as with SWJ when dealing with same type format (exactly) of Global Hujra Online in recent write ups by me I have goofed and overlooked fact that at present I am the "only" non-Muslim, non-Pakhtun member of that site and my research and so-called total access does not always equate to you guys getting direct access to full articles I read and then try to citation-paste up for you.

selil
05-07-2009, 01:24 PM
COL Gentile interview at Antiwar.com, by Crom!

http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2009/05/06/gian-gentile-exposing-counterfeit-coin/

I think it was a great article. I don't agree with several points but it seems consistent with Col. Gentiles views and like it or not he has a point. I think the tension between LIC and HIC camps is funny. The number of HIC operators is much larger and LIC/COIN is still struggling for a foothold in the Army. So, a narrative that LIC is preeminent is a bit silly. Growing perhaps but top dog I don't think so.

George L. Singleton
05-07-2009, 01:31 PM
http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?p=69136#post69136

http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?p=69150#post69150


http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?p=69161#post69161

http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?p=69162#post69162


http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/showthread.php?p=69170#post69170

William F. Owen
05-07-2009, 02:01 PM
I think the tension between LIC and HIC camps is funny. The number of HIC operators is much larger and LIC/COIN is still struggling for a foothold in the Army.

...but that isn't the tension. The tension between the Nagl mob, and Gentile, my friend Doug MacGregor, me and probably a few others (Ken White?) is the perversion of the military mission, by moving towards the nation building bit. To quote:


John Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, is so cocksure of the efficacy of Army combat power that he believes it will have the ability not only to dominate land warfare in general but also to ‘change entire societies’… We are organizing ourselves around the principle of nationbuilding rather than fighting.

Fighting should be the foundation of an Army. Anything that detracts from that is dangerous and stupid.

For example, instead of having Intelligence and Recon teams, you have "Human Terrain Teams".

Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free.

Steve Blair
05-07-2009, 02:10 PM
Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free.

And the same can be said of the "anti-COIN" crowd. Point by point. Too many of them remain locked in a Cold War view of the world, obsessed with mythical peer competitors and the notion that conflicts will only occur on their terms. In many ways they're quite similar to the more radical COIN advocates: both are convinced that they've seen the shining light of future conflict truth.

MacGregor's an interesting guy, but some of his ideas are just as flawed as the COINistas' concepts. I tend to consider both groups to be historical distortionists at best.

Hacksaw
05-07-2009, 02:17 PM
Gian is an important public voice and good friend...

Unlike some, I would guess Gian is somewhat ill at ease with the elevated public profile... I do know that his position is based solely on what he views as the need for intellectual honesty (for that matter John Nagl is cut from the same cloth) and he has always been a bulldog when he feels that principle is being subjugated...

However intellectual honesty is in the eyes of the beholder and like several other folks I don't agree with Gian on some things, especially the notion that COINistas are taking over the DoD... I'd argue quite the opposite...

A healthy portion of serving officers accept the COIN doctrine for what it is... a helpful tool for adjusting their mindset/aimpoint in the missions they are currently DIRECTED to execute... I don't for a minute think the majority view COIN/LIC as end all be all... I know for a fact that senior officers charged with preparing forces have already begun to work through how to bring the training centers back to full-spectrum...

However, and this is where Nagl is correct, there is a fight to be won today... and if our training centers aimpoint is directed elsewhere it would amount to criminal negligence...

That's all I have to say about that...

Anyone else under the impression that the author had a crush on Gian... he prose was very heroic :D

William F. Owen
05-07-2009, 02:30 PM
And the same can be said of the "anti-COIN" crowd. Point by point. Too many of them remain locked in a Cold War view of the world, obsessed with mythical peer competitors and the notion that conflicts will only occur on their terms.

...but who are the anti-COIN crowd? No one I know says "we don't do COIN." What I'm against is the "nation building, armed social work," stuff. Securing a population is warfare. It is based in fighting skill.


MacGregor's an interesting guy, but some of his ideas are just as flawed as the COINistas' concepts. I tend to consider both groups to be historical distortionists at best.
Interesting and extremely smart. I strongly disagree with him on many things, but I also agree on a lot. Doug and I are like tracks versus wheels (Doug is tracks!)

About 18 months ago I had a serving senior US Army officer come up to me and say "don't mention you are friend of Doug MacGregor. It'll damage your credibility." - so I now say it whenever I can! :wry:

Bob's World
05-07-2009, 02:57 PM
Tragically, where we lack the greatest capacity currently is at the strategic senior leadership level to better understand that nature of the threats we face, how to modify our behavior as a nation to be more effective in an emerging world order, and how to best use our tremendous military capacity to enable all of the above.

Too much politics; too much shaping of perspectives of what "right" looks like by our long and successful Cold War efforts; too much confusion of what the attacks of 9/11 really signafied and therefore how to best respond; too much inertia in certain directions by multi-billion dollar procurement programs and those with vested interests in the same, etc.

If this were training, the OC probably needs to call for a pause, and circle everyone in for a little enroute AAR to talk about whats happening, actions, reactions, whats working and what isn't, etc prior to continuing on to the objective. The problem is that this is real, and there is not pause to regroup.

Our biggest areas in need of repair are at the Strategy and Policy level. Those repairs are underway, but are being accomplished in the same messy environment described above.

The military is ok. Not perfect, but powerful, flexible, adaptive, mission oriented and filled with an unprecedented quality of highly experienced personnel. We don't start wars and we don't end wars, but our lot will always be to wage wars in their midst, and deter them in between.

Between Gentile and Nagle lies the force we need; and simple economics, human nature and realm of political compromise will probably make it the force we shape. Not the best force for Irregular Warfare, nor the best force for high-end conventional warfare, but one prepared to take on either one and succeed. I don't worry much about the "war wagers" I know they'll come through.

I worry about the guys and gals in suits that are in the "war starting / war ending" business. Arming them with the best possible strategies and policies for the emerging world is what matters most toward determing where America stands 100 years from now, and how many brave young men and women were dedicated to that end.

Steve Blair
05-07-2009, 03:15 PM
...but who are the anti-COIN crowd? No one I know says "we don't do COIN." What I'm against is the "nation building, armed social work," stuff. Securing a population is warfare. It is based in fighting skill.

While no one may say "we don't do COIN" (although Dunlap has come mighty close, IMO), if you look at the historical record it is routinely allowed to drop off the face of the training and planning map. And then it comes up and bites us in the ass with surprising regularity.

My point has always been that you have to preserve the lessons and training for ALL levels and aspects of combat, not just the one you really WANT to do. The Army has historically done a poor job of that, and it's gotten worse in the aftermath of World War 2. I suppose that might be considered acceptable by some, but I wouldn't call it ideal.

And as for "armed social work," although a great deal of the writing on this is overblown and clogged with social science jargon, I think that it's overdue recognition of one of the roles that an army often HAS to assume in the aftermath of a conflict or in a situation that might fall short of full-scale war. The more the West wants to conduct humanitarian aid and other such operations, the more we're going to be drawn into "armed social work." And political realities (even if we don't agree with them) indicate that such aid operations will remain at their current levels if not rise in the next decade or two.

We may just have to agree to disagree here, which is fine. I'm not in favor of an "all COIN" Army, but I also don't want to see us continually relearning the same lessons at a higher cost each time we roll out of the gate.

William F. Owen
05-07-2009, 03:38 PM
While no one may say "we don't do COIN" (although Dunlap has come mighty close, IMO), if you look at the historical record it is routinely allowed to drop off the face of the training and planning map. And then it comes up and bites us in the ass with surprising regularity.


Concur. Why the US neglected COIN is a fascinating question. It was gross professional negligence by any standard.

Personally I have very clear ideas about what forms a military mission and what does not. This does not preclude the use of Armed Forces in humanitarian assistance, as concerns the saving of life, or the prevention of harm.

It does excluded any form of social or welfare service, and especially anything to do with religion or education.

Ken White
05-07-2009, 05:18 PM
Wilf:
"...The tension between the Nagl mob, and Gentile, my friend Doug MacGregor, me and probably a few others (Ken White?) is the perversion of the military mission, by moving towards the nation building bit."True on all counts.:
However, and this is where Nagl is correct, there is a fight to be won today... and if our training centers aimpoint is directed elsewhere it would amount to criminal negligence...Yep. The training issue is the elephant -- and it need not be, train the basics better and go for outcomes instead of looking at minutia through 'Standards' and that will satisfy both camps. Hacksaw also said:
I know for a fact that senior officers charged with preparing forces have already begun to work through how to bring the training centers back to full-spectrum...I don't think [B]back to full spectrum will do it as I don't believe we were full spectrum in any of the TCs or Schools before -- or now. We're headed that way and that's good. For, as Bob's World says:
Between Gentile and Nagle lies the force we need; and simple economics, human nature and realm of political compromise will probably make it the force we shape. Not the best force for Irregular Warfare, nor the best force for high-end conventional warfare, but one prepared to take on either one and succeed. I don't worry much about the "war wagers" I know they'll come through.True. We've had this disagreement in this country for over 200 years -- but that's always been true. We come up with a flaky compromise and make it work. Or rather, the Troops make it work...

Cavguy
05-07-2009, 05:57 PM
Haven't we had this discussion before? :rolleyes: Did we learn anything new?

Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.

Cavguy
05-07-2009, 06:05 PM
BTW, some pithy humor over at Abu M (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/) related to the thread:


P.S. It's not all sticks and stones for Gian, though. Granted, a site called "AntiWar.com" is probably not the best place to go for sober-minded discussion of military strategy. And this line was a peach:

It really shouldn’t be a surprise, that members of the elite news media — particularly the ones who don’t necessarily focus on a national security beat — fasten easily onto the conventional narrative and "move on" condescendingly, satisfied their knowledge is au courant and complete. ... To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost.

Uh, ma'am, Gian was the subject of a prominent article by elite news media journalist Yochi Dreazen (C '99) in the elite news media Wall Street Journal. I don't know a single defense policy journalist for a major U.S. news organization who doesn't know Gian either by name or personally. And for goodness sake, just do a Google News search for Gian's name. But when, I want to know, is regular Abu Muqawama commenter SNLII going to get the credit he deserves for coming up with the phrase "COINdinista"? Is there no justice, AntiWar.com?

William F. Owen
05-07-2009, 06:16 PM
Haven't we had this discussion before? :rolleyes: Did we learn anything new?

Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.

To my mind there never was a COIN v Something else debate. I can't speak for COL Gentile, but I don't think anyone has ever spoken against COIN. They spoken about biasing training and resources so heavily towards COIN (Security Operations) that Combat Operations skills and resources suffer.

Add to that the perversion of the "Security mission" into a "nation building mission" and I think you have still think there is a lot left unresolved.

Ken White
05-07-2009, 06:40 PM
However, Wilf came in with "there's a lot left unresolved." True but there always will be as long as there more than two people in the debate.

What does not need resolution is that we do have to be able to do both (which may be why so many say that we need to do that...) and that's not nearly as hard as some seem to think. We have the doctrine (not perfect but adequate), we have smart dedicated kids that are willing for the most part to do more than they are asked -- they're also able to do much more. We have the equipment. All we need is the training piece and that's better than it's ever been and is improving.

Now we just have to (a) await the QDR and see what it brings; and (b) see if Congress gets a lot smarter and more concerned about their Oaths than they seem to be...

What's the problem? :D

Cavguy
05-07-2009, 07:00 PM
To my mind there never was a COIN v Something else debate. I can't speak for COL Gentile, but I don't think anyone has ever spoken against COIN. They spoken about biasing training and resources so heavily towards COIN (Security Operations) that Combat Operations skills and resources suffer.

Add to that the perversion of the "Security mission" into a "nation building mission" and I think you have still think there is a lot left unresolved.

Wilf,

I've stated this about ten times on other similar threads but it bears repeating to your observations.

Much of what COL G is saying is true, but what I am about to say is true as well -

Our TRAINING and OPERATIONAL forces are near 100% focused on COIN/SO/SFA. That is because the Army is fully committed to OIF and OEF for at least the next 2 years. It is irresponsible not to train them for the environments they are directly heading to.

Our LEADER DEVELOPMENT and EDUCATION has not significantly changed. Tweaked, but not changed. You can find numerous observations here on SWJ and on BCKS commenting about that our schoolhouses are generally focused on HIC.

I have a paper which will be published in a few months outlining the whole case, but the bottom line is that COIN is not currently mandated or integrated as a subject of military professional education. The educational system is a greater threat because right now it leads us to a repeat of our 1973-2003 educational deficit for this spectrum of war.

So in a sense, Gian is right, but so are many of the COIN crowd in stating that the institution has not changed for the long term. As soon as we have non-deploying combat brigades, HIC skills will resurrect.

Niel

Old Eagle
05-07-2009, 08:12 PM
Anybody else find irony in the fact that "antiwar.com" is defending MCO?

Steve Blair
05-07-2009, 08:22 PM
Haven't we had this discussion before? :rolleyes: Did we learn anything new?

Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.

Maybe you should take a stab at it...;)

I look at it from the historical standpoint, and it's discouraging to note that the bi-polar orthodoxy has existed in American military history more or less from the beginning. It's also discouraging to note that many truly adaptable leaders within the army have been historically ignored or marginalized in many cases (I'm thinking mainly of the post-Civil War period, which was a great testing ground to see who could make the transition from MCO to what was effectively COIN, although there are other periods that certainly deserve study).

One good first step would involve overhauling the personnel system. Until we scrap that draft-age relic I'd say we're stuck tilting at the same windmills to at least some degree.

Ken White
05-07-2009, 09:10 PM
One good first step would involve overhauling the personnel system. Until we scrap that draft-age relic I'd say we're stuck tilting at the same windmills to at least some degree.Thank you, thank you...

goesh
05-08-2009, 02:31 AM
"Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free. "
(WF Owen)

-maybe then that's to say the COIN principle of talent being gleaned from anywhere regardless of rank is either a myth or incapable of being implemented without fracturing the chain of command. How much spontaneity can there be in a combat zone? MikeF asserts there are no human terrain teams, only people. If true, it is a two edged sword, applicable to both camps. What price is paid for spontaneity? What is the reward? The reflection of history shows a lot of dead bodies stemming from fractures in the COC. I don't have a clue as to how much at the small unit level has to 'go up' before there is movement on the part of the small unit in either theatre.

selil
05-08-2009, 03:35 AM
...but who are the anti-COIN crowd? No one I know says "we don't do COIN." What I'm against is the "nation building, armed social work," stuff. Securing a population is warfare. It is based in fighting skill.


Sorry but the United States military does much more than HIC. It is the primary operational response force within the United States during times of disaster (read the national response framework). The United States military is the primary agency for large scale pandemic/civil disturbance/etc. The United States military has a seat at every table where a disaster or incident of national significance occurs. This is including the fires raging in California right this minute. Oh, and since they are basically the same force sure you can say National Guard, but sorry that differential is eroding.

The United States military does much more than HIC we just seem to get wedded to our own opinions to quickly. A lot of that stuff looks like nation building/civil support to me.

jkm_101_fso
05-08-2009, 04:33 AM
Our LEADER DEVELOPMENT and EDUCATION has not significantly changed. Tweaked, but not changed. You can find numerous observations here on SWJ and on BCKS commenting about that our schoolhouses are generally focused on HIC.


I'm currently a student at the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course.

Last week, I was tasked to give a class on The Mobile Defense (division level operation).

This week, I called for Fire (with ICM i/e) on a BMP-1 in the Guardfist.

HIC is alive and well here at Fort Sill. I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that; but you are correct, sir.

However, tomorrow we start on chapters 1-4 in FM 3-24. Our first COIN class since we started two months ago.

William F. Owen
05-08-2009, 05:55 AM
SWJ and on BCKS commenting about that our schoolhouses are generally focused on HIC.

I have a paper which will be published in a few months outlining the whole case, but the bottom line is that COIN is not currently mandated or integrated as a subject of military professional education. The educational system is a greater threat because right now it leads us to a repeat of our 1973-2003 educational deficit for this spectrum of war.

So in a sense, Gian is right, but so are many of the COIN crowd in stating that the institution has not changed for the long term. As soon as we have non-deploying combat brigades, HIC skills will resurrect.


Cav mate, thanks and I do get this.

I have no dog in this fight, except as a critic of the abuse of history and military thought, and your concern about the education system is clear and valid.

However, what would concern me is if COIN (The Security Mission) was deemed to a separate or special area requiring some special insight or education.

I submit it is not, and I further submit that the COIN-club are pushing that it is.

Everything we know about War and Conflict flows seamlessly between the combat mission and the security mission. They are one and the same, or two sides of the same coin (pardon the pun).

William F. Owen
05-08-2009, 06:06 AM
Sorry but the United States military does much more than HIC. It is the primary operational response force within the United States during times of disaster (read the national response framework). The United States military is the primary agency for large scale pandemic/civil disturbance/etc. The United States military has a seat at every table where a disaster or incident of national significance occurs. This is including the fires raging in California right this minute. Oh, and since they are basically the same force sure you can say National Guard, but sorry that differential is eroding.

The United States military does much more than HIC we just seem to get wedded to our own opinions to quickly. A lot of that stuff looks like nation building/civil support to me.

I agree with all that. Same is true of almost all NATO armies.

Providing trained bodies of manpower to aid the civil authority requires very little training if any, so armies don't train to do it. - and sometimes it provides good training.

That is all completely different from going to a far foreign land and having an army build schools, churches/mosques and hospitals, as part of a political activity aimed at creating a government friendly to yours..

- and while war is a political act, those parts of it which are NOT demonstrably about creating exploiting or supporting the application or threatened application of violence, are not (or should not be) a military mission.

.... and yes sometimes you have to do it because your government lacks the political will to ensure that the right people do it.

Bob's World
05-08-2009, 10:22 AM
"Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free. "
(WF Owen)

-maybe then that's to say the COIN principle of talent being gleaned from anywhere regardless of rank is either a myth or incapable of being implemented without fracturing the chain of command. How much spontaneity can there be in a combat zone? MikeF asserts there are no human terrain teams, only people. If true, it is a two edged sword, applicable to both camps. What price is paid for spontaneity? What is the reward? The reflection of history shows a lot of dead bodies stemming from fractures in the COC. I don't have a clue as to how much at the small unit level has to 'go up' before there is movement on the part of the small unit in either theatre.


1. Any "COIN" lessons learned in Iraq should have a astrix next to them, just like a Barry Bonds homerun record. Good lessons, but you just don't want to confuse them with truly understanding COIN, or contributing to truly understanding COIN

2. History is indeed critical to understanding COIN, but anyone who limits that study to just the insurgencies of the past 100 years or so won't draw a full perspective. In fact, anyone who just studies conflicts over thousands of years won't have a true perspective. COIN is about governance and human dynamics, and the conflict aspect of it is just the one very blaring, but small slice that we focus on. Look deeper to understand the root causes, and through that, not the study of tactics used to "defeat" insurgents will one find the true keys to putting to rest an insurgency.

3. Some Empires die in a blaze of glory with grand conventional fights. Others, like the British Empire, die a death of a thousand cuts, through a series of lost COIN campaigns due largely to the misconception that military might and the ability to exert ones will on another means anything in COIN.

4. Do study history, but make it as comprehensive as you can, or the lessons you draw may be false ones.

Bob's World
05-08-2009, 10:43 AM
I'm currently a student at the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course.

Last week, I was tasked to give a class on The Mobile Defense (division level operation).

This week, I called for Fire (with ICM i/e) on a BMP-1 in the Guardfist.

HIC is alive and well here at Fort Sill. I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that; but you are correct, sir.

However, tomorrow we start on chapters 1-4 in FM 3-24. Our first COIN class since we started two months ago.

Become the very best artilleryman you can possibly be first, because if asked to support COIN operations someday the speed and accuracy of how well you can do that will be far more important than how well you understand the process that went into developing the target that you are shooting at.

That said, never limit your own professional development by the limits of your profession. As a former Artilleryman who spent most of his conventional career in the Infantry, I can tell you, that most artillerymen just don't understand maneuver, but more dangerously, think that they do. I suspect many will walk out of Ft Sill thinking they understand COIN. Understand your role in COIN and that you don't fully understand the nuances of it and you will do fine. Study on your own to be as capable as possible. Or, do like I did and go straight from Sill to Bragg, I walked of the stage at Sill as the honor grad, and then went straight to selection and never looked back. That knowledge has served me well over the years.

The Field Artillery is facing hard times these days, but someday we will need it again in spades, and we'll need an artillery that can once again reign as the greatest killer on the battlefield. Don't lose that. Don't let your profession lose that.

William F. Owen
05-08-2009, 10:56 AM
The Field Artillery is facing hard times these days, but someday we will need it again in spades, and we'll need an artillery that can once again reign as the greatest killer on the battlefield. Don't lose that. Don't let your profession lose that.

If you spray painted that mothers head-stone, I'd still buy you a beer. Well said Sir.

selil
05-08-2009, 01:28 PM
That is all completely different from going to a far foreign land and having an army build schools, churches/mosques and hospitals, as part of a political activity aimed at creating a government friendly to yours..

- and while war is a political act, those parts of it which are NOT demonstrably about creating exploiting or supporting the application or threatened application of violence, are not (or should not be) a military mission.


The United States Navy has been involved in substantial missions to our southern neighbors with the primary goal being medical care to communities that have none or very little. The mission "Operation Comfort" is a very soft power mission, from what the LACC communities have said it is very successful. The same ships that have medical facilities are escorted by ships that could topple regimes in seconds.

I think the idea of COIN/soft power/stability is very much a part of the American way of doing business. "Speak softly carry a big stick" whether true or not is still part of the American narrative. It is when we walk away from that idea that polarization and schizophrenia of political process starts.

I have a very controversial hypothesis (everybody tells me I'm wrong then offers me medication), I believe that the cold war was a long aberration of American politics with moments of lucidity. America doesn't do the "World Police" role very well, domestically doesn't like it, and it is fed by corporate needs more than political requirements.

If it wasn't for the cold war Israel would never have gotten the support it got, same for the Shah of Iran, Norriega, and any of dozens of other regimes. I think, though have no ability, knowledge, or capacity to prove, that what we are seeing is the break down of the cold war mindset. It just appears or seems that much of the LIC and HIC discussion isn't about COIN, but is about a fundamental Kuhn type paradigm shift in American political military presence.

American's see themselves like Canadians, act often like Germans, sympathize with the French, and mope about their mistakes like the British, while worrying about the Russians.

Meanwhile the Chinese build five more carriers and triple the size of their navy.

Steve Blair
05-08-2009, 02:27 PM
I have a very controversial hypothesis (everybody tells me I'm wrong then offers me medication), I believe that the cold war was a long aberration of American politics with moments of lucidity. America doesn't do the "World Police" role very well, domestically doesn't like it, and it is fed by corporate needs more than political requirements.

If it wasn't for the cold war Israel would never have gotten the support it got, same for the Shah of Iran, Norriega, and any of dozens of other regimes. I think, though have no ability, knowledge, or capacity to prove, that what we are seeing is the break down of the cold war mindset. It just appears or seems that much of the LIC and HIC discussion isn't about COIN, but is about a fundamental Kuhn type paradigm shift in American political military presence.

No controversy here, actually. The Cold War WAS an aberration in terms of American policy. A careful reading of just military history shows this. The US has always had an internal focus, with a few flailings outside our borders, until the end of World War II.

AmericanPride
05-08-2009, 02:37 PM
The US has always had an internal focus, with a few flailings outside our borders, until the end of World War II.

Robert Kagan made a convincing counter-argument (http://www.amazon.com/Dangerous-Nation-Americas-Earliest-Century/dp/0375411054).

jkm_101_fso
05-08-2009, 02:50 PM
Become the very best artilleryman you can possibly be first, because if asked to support COIN operations someday the speed and accuracy of how well you can do that will be far more important than how well you understand the process that went into developing the target that you are shooting at.

That said, never limit your own professional development by the limits of your profession. As a former Artilleryman who spent most of his conventional career in the Infantry, I can tell you, that most artillerymen just don't understand maneuver, but more dangerously, think that they do. I suspect many will walk out of Ft Sill thinking they understand COIN. Understand your role in COIN and that you don't fully understand the nuances of it and you will do fine. Study on your own to be as capable as possible. Or, do like I did and go straight from Sill to Bragg, I walked of the stage at Sill as the honor grad, and then went straight to selection and never looked back. That knowledge has served me well over the years.

The Field Artillery is facing hard times these days, but someday we will need it again in spades, and we'll need an artillery that can once again reign as the greatest killer on the battlefield. Don't lose that. Don't let your profession lose that.

Sir,
I appreciate the advice and Prof Dev. To say that my artillery skills were degraded when I arrived here would be an understatement. I was very glad to refresh on gunnery and FS. In fact, the schoolhouse is implementing a "reset" block dedicated to correct degraded artillery skills for junior officers in CCC. It added a month to CCC, but I think it's probably worth it. More importantly, they are concentrating on teaching us "how" to train our redlegs when we get back to the force. I also think we are slowly moving away from "cram for this, take the test and then forget it" mentality.

There are plenty of folks here that think they are COIN experts. But mainly it's students. The instructors are a bit antiquated, just because they have not been to theater lately; not their fault. As mentioned, the culture has changed in the school somewhat to: "Here is a method of doing things and here some examples; but it's up to YOU to make decisions." I am glad this change has occured.

What the CCC doesn't teach, I try to make up for by hanging out on here and reading as much as I can. It is apparent that the FA is having somewhat of an identity crisis. We've picked up IO, EW and are concentrating on precision munitions to stay relevant. But you are right, we will be needed someday again. And contrary to popular belief we ARE shooting in AFG and a little bit in Iraq.

Funny story, I tried to access SWC on the computers in the schoolhouse library and the site was blocked. I marched down to the S-6 dudes and demanded they unblock this site. I was kind of disappointed, because that means that of all the Captains and LTs (and field grades) that have come through Snow Hall at some point, no one was interested enough to access SWC during their downtime at school. But the block was lifted, thankfully. I've tried to spread the word to my classmates about SWC.

Oddly, when assignments came down last week, there were NO slots for Bragg, Campbell or Lewis. Needless to say, getting back to the light world will be pretty competitive, but I'll do my best. Thanks again,

Jake

Steve Blair
05-08-2009, 03:06 PM
I didn't consider Kagan's argument especially convincing, actually. Laden with ideological postures, certainly.

AmericanPride
05-08-2009, 03:20 PM
How then is the narrative of American isolationism reconciled with the country's history of expansionism?

selil
05-08-2009, 03:40 PM
How then is the narrative of American isolationism reconciled with the country's history of expansionism?

Fredrick Jackson Turner explains that pretty well. Manifest destiny being only part of the American experience versus the Europeans experience. As an example much of American expansionism was purchased (Louisiana Purchase, Alaska), or brought in under treaty (Texas, Samoa, USVI), or acts from responses to acts of war (Philippines). Yes I'm being very general. However, the expansion characteristics were very different than European.

Just don't ask an American Indian about this.

Talking with my wife (who schools me on FJ Turner often or I wouldn't have a clue).. Europe has a tendency to identify America by what they see on the East Coast (e.g. New York or Miami). Asia has a tendency to identify America with what they see on the West Coast (e.g. LA, San Fran, Seattle). Americans as citizens have a tendency to regionalize their politics (e.g. Texas). The result is a heterogenous mixture of politics that can create behavior that outsiders consider contradictory yet is quite consistent.

It is interesting that Europeans expand by conquering and holding. America is unique in that we gave back the Philippines, gave back Panama, Puerto Rico and Samoa are one vote from being separate national entities. Contrast that to Europe's experience in Africa and other places.

And, yes let me add I know I am far afield from my own area of study and base much of this on the few dozen books I've read on the topic. I think the idea is consistent with the historical evidence but as you said Kagan and others engage in a substantive counter narrative. I know I don't have their credentials but this idea of American isolationism and the aberration of the cold war seems to make more sense than American imperialism and world policing. I know I don't have the intellectual evidence to prove my case. Others might I don't know.

AmericanPride
05-08-2009, 03:48 PM
Selil,

I agree that the Cold War was an 'aberration' in American history, but with a slightly different take. I reject the idea was isolationist -- we regularly and vigorously pursued expansion abroad at the expense of a number of different peoples and countries. But I would agree that the Cold War represented a shift from non-participation (neutrality) in European-dominated politics to direct intervention and eventually mastery (or at least a semblance of it) of foreign politics.

Steve Blair
05-08-2009, 03:50 PM
How then is the narrative of American isolationism reconciled with the country's history of expansionism?

As Selil mentioned, it has much more to do with a geographic focus. Kagan seems inclined to confuse rhetoric with action, and in most cases the public as a whole was opposed to expansion outside what was defined in their minds as our geographic sphere. The war with Mexico was opposed by a significant segment of the population (mainly what was then called the Old Northeast) on both economic and moral grounds, as was perceived imperialism in the Philippines and other locations. We meddled in other locations from time to time, but we very seldom stayed (as opposed to the European experience). It's important when looking at this stuff to draw a clear line between the rantings in newspapers of the period and the actual opinions of the populace (when they can be determined) and actions of policy-makers. Many of our foreign "adventures" were triggered by a perception that a European power might be trying to establish a foothold close by.

mikekuhn
05-08-2009, 07:01 PM
Anybody else find irony in the fact that "antiwar.com" is defending MCO?

I also found that funny-ironic that AntiWar.com was wading into that side the pool, along with the perception that the Army is marching together under a "Somos COINdinistas" banner with COL Gentile as the lone, John the Baptist-esque voice in the wilderness.

Am I missing something or just confused about the part of the argument charging that COIN proponents want to go around the world nation-building, a la Thomas PM Barnett's expeditionary "leviathan (http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/pnm/index.htm)"? Isn't the basic argument of Drs. Nagl/Kilcullen that doing so isn't the business we should want to be in, but that since we're in a COIN fight on two fronts we should focus on getting it right? I don't think I've read anything by either of those men saying otherwise, but I'm interested to know if there is something out there along those line that I hadn't seen or heard.

Bob's World
05-08-2009, 07:41 PM
Actually the US is more accurately conducting "Post-regime change FID" on two fronts. My term, but it seems pretty accurate. (COIN is something that a Nation's government does to deal with its own internal insurgency.)

To add to our confusion, many think not only that we are doing COIN, but also that the recipe for COIN is one part "Defeat the Insurgent," one part "Defeat the Ideology," and two parts "Create Effective Democratic Governance."

Since we are not the cooks in this kitchen, but merely advising and assisting, we should at least start by making sure we have the right recipe:

One part "understand the populace and what the issues are (real or perceived) that makes them susceptible to ideological inspiration (tailored for taste across the nation),"

one part "help fix that part of the government that is failing to adequately address those particular issues, ensuring that the populace is allowed full self-determination, with the only caveat being that whatever system is adopted must provide that same populace with the absolute certainty that it has legitimate recourse to address any such failures in the future short of violent insurgency"

one part "ensure your own narrative for your involvement not only matches your principles and your actions, but also facilitates avoiding as much as possible the perception that you are now the source of legitimacy of this failed government, but are instead an ally of the populace representing them first, over whomever happens to be in office,"

and one part "help create a secure environment, with emphasis on host nation security capacity enabled as necessary."

Once we get out of the mode we are in and adopt a “smarter” application of power, we will probably find that we no longer need to convert the entire force to the conduct of such operations, or to create an equivalent civilian corps for the same. A small force can enable a large one if it is applying the right recipe and knows what its doing; and there are plenty of civilians looking for work right there at ground zero. No need to import many of ours.

mikekuhn
05-08-2009, 08:46 PM
to answer my question here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6273)

Ken White
05-08-2009, 09:22 PM
Actually the US is more accurately conducting "Post-regime change FID" on two fronts. My term, but it seems pretty accurate. (COIN is something that a Nation's government does to deal with its own internal insurgency.)
. . .
Once we get out of the mode we are in and adopt a “smarter” application of power, we will probably find that we no longer need to convert the entire force to the conduct of such operations, or to create an equivalent civilian corps for the same. A small force can enable a large one if it is applying the right recipe and knows what its doing; and there are plenty of civilians looking for work right there at ground zero. No need to import many of ours.Smack on the target... :cool:

MikeF
05-08-2009, 09:32 PM
Actually the US is more accurately conducting "Post-regime change FID" on two fronts. My term, but it seems pretty accurate. (COIN is something that a Nation's government does to deal with its own internal insurgency.)

The only COIN the USG does is internal anti-gang,terrorism, etc...

I've been banging my head against the wall trying to consider why we don't consider this fact. We can assist other governments (SFA, FID, IW); We can force regime change (UW, HIC), but what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan is occupation.

I simply don't understand why that is hard to grasp. Occupation is neither good nor bad. It is just a word. What we must determine in our grand strategy is if we want to be an empire or not. That, IMHO is the elephant in the room that no one talks about.

v/r

Mike

AmericanPride
05-08-2009, 10:06 PM
What we must determine in our grand strategy is if we want to be an empire or not.

Given the insatiable desires of any large body of people, I think it's more a matter of aligning strategy to the necessity of imperialism, in whatever modern form it might take.

Bob's World
05-08-2009, 11:18 PM
I think America has demonstrated quite well that one can develop a tremendous global economy without placing a yoke of colonialism on anyone's shoulders.

At the same time though, those very populaces are quite familar with that yoke, so when we do change our approach and begin conducting "justified" occupations, you have to expect the occupied populaces to look at that event just a teeeny bit differently than we do. Tricky business that.

But as I like to say: "While it may be right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."

Time to swallow the ego and start doing the right thing. We fear that we will be accused of cutting and running. There is a big difference between running away from a situation because you are scared, and backing out of a situation that you never belonged in in the first place. Particularly if you are committed to ensuring that you don't just let it collapse into chaos behind you. This isn't just on GWOT issues, actually it is primarily on Cold War issues. Time to balance the books and get back in synch with our national principles. We'll actually gain far more credibilty in that process than we will lose.

William F. Owen
05-09-2009, 07:13 AM
The United States Navy has been involved in substantial missions to our southern neighbors with the primary goal being medical care to communities that have none or very little. The mission "Operation Comfort" is a very soft power mission, from what the LACC communities have said it is very successful. The same ships that have medical facilities are escorted by ships that could topple regimes in seconds.
Providing medical care is not building or re-building. This activity as part of diplomacy makes sense and always has. - but it should not be part of operations or an element of your combat and security strategy. "Soft Power" is for use against those who support you or want to. Soft Power is an instrument of diplomacy.


If it wasn't for the cold war Israel would never have gotten the support it got, same for the Shah of Iran, Norriega, and any of dozens of other regimes. If you want to throw in every member of NATO, as well, I'd absolutely agree with you.

SWJ Blog
06-22-2011, 11:12 PM
Ten Whats With… Col. Gian Gentile (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/ten-whats-with-col-gian-gentil/)

Entry Excerpt:

Ten Whats With… Col. Gian Gentile (http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2011/06/22/ten-whats-with-col-gian-gentile-2/) by Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/). On COIN and IW: "I think with the current fad and fetish of counterinsurgency, irregular wars, often times caricatured as “wars amongst the people” fought to win the allegiance of local populations and to suppress so called “irregular threats,” we may be losing the bubble on the fact that states still exist, and potentially in the future we may one day have to face a hostile state again."



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/ten-whats-with-col-gian-gentil/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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