Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Granite_State]

Study co-written by Princeton and West Point scholars:


Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U.S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime- and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.

http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/Rage2.3.pdf

[Steve Blair]

Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

Mechanized units can (and do) play a valuable role as reaction forces, but one of the major lessons not learned from Vietnam was that most of them needed more dismounted elements. The units in-country learned this, but the lesson faded quickly after the war was over. The paper does make passing reference to the 3rd ACR, but not in the depth the subject may have required.

[Cavguy]

I agree with Steve, I'm not sold. how do you explain that the two biggest COIN successes thus far in Iraq were accomplished by heavily Armored units - i.e. 3 ACR and 1/1 AD? Under this logic, the light units should have much better success records, but they don't, and in the case of some of them, much worse.

I think the personalities and leadership styles/philosophies of the CO's had much more to do with it than the tools employed. It also picks two easy examples - why not try 1AD in Baghdad, 3rd ID OIF 3, or 1st Cav OIF 2 and contrast....

The historical argument that lighter forces are more successful at coin over the long run is much stronger, IMO, but the Iraq argument doesn't seem to be nearly as strong.

[Ken White]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:


" 'Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail.' - General George C. Marshall."

[J Wolfsberger]

There's also a large difference between an Abrams and a Stryker/LAV. On top of that, and this can be the source of a lot of confusion, there is a dramatic difference between MOUT and COIN. I won't get a chance to read the paper till this weekend - maybe some who have can shed light on whether the authors captured these distinctions.

[Merv Benson]

Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.

We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.

It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.

I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.

[Ski]

I'm not sure if mechanization leads to stalemate or defeat more often. I have to read the paper with more attention to detail when I have more free time.

I do understand that mechanized forces are far more expensive to operate and maintain, and that we are spending vast amounts of cash in order to achieve results that are mediocre on average.

A lot to chew on here - my gut feeling is that this is a piece to a much larger puzzle - that includes leadership, adaptability by individual and unit, tactics, cultural/religious/ethnic differences, and maybe a few other major criteria.

Until I get into the weeds, I'm certainly not sold on mechanization = defeat in COIN, but I;m not dismissing it completely.

[Tom Odom]

I will read it also. I have long thought there is a significant internal cultural difference between heavy and light forces when it comes to dealing with people and dealing with systems. Many heavy leaders are by their training and inclinations "systems" as in combat systems oriented. They think by nature of their training in map sheets not kilometers aand almost never in meters. Light leaders are prople oriented and all planning and think is human-centric and done one foot at a time. That makes many light leaders more adaptive (or accepting) of human-centric adaptations.

Now before RTK and CAVGuy shoot me, I used the term many and not most. It is always a question of leadership and some leaders are adaptive and some are not. But in a macro sense, I see this as a trend that has continued for some time. How it plays out in COIN is certainly debatable.

But I would also say that we do have to be careful in talking COIN in an urban environment versus a full-blown MOUT fight. No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Tom,


No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

If I can amplify a bit on combined arms: I'll concede to the Air Force the potential utility of a 2000 lb. bomb in MOUT. In COIN, I not only can't see any utility, I think ANY use would be seriously counterproductive.

By the same token, an Abrams in COIN has a terrific psychological effect, one I'm sure is more profound than a Stryker/LAV. But I also believe, and I'll defer to RTK and CavGuy, that the Stryker/LAV has much greater COIN utility as transport and occasional base of fire for the dismounts. And it's the dismounts who will ultimately decide the outcome.

[Dennis]

I also haven't read this in depth yet, but my first response is is there really a difference between getting out of a brad/striker to getting out of an uparmored vehicle?

[Rob Thornton]

I don't know if we've just mitigated it through leadership and training, or its a question of adaptation over time, but I do know this. While there I saw three different BCTs rotate through Mosul. The 172nd SBCT out of AK was on the ground when I first got there - and after their RIP TOA with 3/2 SBCT from FLW they went South. 3/2 was on the ground just long enough to get things laid out (however this was much of that units 2nd time in Mosul) before they too were sent South. 3/2 was replaced with 4/1 CAV out of FT Hood. They were all good units, had quality leaders and good soldiers.

The two SBCTs had lots of soldiers in vehicles tailor made to move lots of Infantry quickly, with good protection for the conditions and enough firepower to overcome any enemy you'll find in most COIN conditions I think - there are about 170 soldiers in a SBCT Rifle Co, you get three of those in an SBCT BN, and a good size HHC as well - lots of snipers in the BN MTO&E and within the BDE you get lots of extras to provide lots of organic Combined Arms. You also get a lot of C4ISR and in addition to the three IN BNs you get a RSTA Sqdn, an EN CO, and a AT CO - so as Ken points out - the number of folks you can put on the ground is substantial. I promise even though Shek and I are products of the SBCTs - we're not biased:D (much) This provides lots of options for the CDR. Both of those SBCTs were well led and well employed both in Mosul, Baghdad and Baquba.

However, the unit that seemed to adjust the quickest to its surroundings and be able to move from lethal to non-lethal-to lethal, etc. (I could use kinetic/non-kinetic - but it just seems anti-septic to do so) was 4/1 CAV. I really wondered about that - so I started just asking the EMs, NCOs, LTs and CPTs about their experiences. For many, this was their 2nd and 3rd tours - many had been to different places and gone with different types of units. Many also discussed their MRE (Mission Readiness Exercise) at the CTC - all agreed the training had gotten to where within reason (talking resources) it reflected what they knew about the COIN environment, many had gone through the COIN Academy in Taji - and said that the training there was valuable, many had been involved with LPDs/OPDs/NCOPDs focused to COIN at Home Station, undergone special training with EMS, LE and other Civil organizations. They were well read. They were smart. These soldiers and leaders could run in Bradleys and Tanks on one day and work out of 1114s the next with no issues.

This is not to sell the two previous units short - just to point out that over time (not very long at all if we are looking at individuals, leaders and specific units) we have gotten much better at COIN regardless of the type of unit. Also that conditions change in an area - 1/25th SBCT had been in Mosul prior to the 172nd and had a different set of challenges, and I believe the situation got progressively better to where when 4/1 came in they had 1 x IN TF conducting CF ops (but partnered with a variety of folks to include ISF) and 1 x AR TF that had been given the mission to stand up an ISF cell and partner with what was then the IAG TTs at various levels (DIV through BN) to provide greater training capability with the ISF - so you have to consider the requirement to be flexible and take advantage of opportunities as they emerge.

As others have pointed out, its really about providing leadership at every level, and being able to employ the right tool or adapt it to the task at hand. I found few (if any) stereo-types in those three units, just leaders trying to the best they could (and their best was very, very good) as they understood the mission - as time has continued, our soldiers and leaders understand the mission and supporting tasks better and better -

I think at this point the light/heavy comparison is OBE except in the raw sense of MTO&E. If we're talking about the formations that provide the most flexibility in those terms - then I'd advocate more soldiers and more capabilities as it applies to good mobility (keep in mind while more and more people live in urbanized areas - some still live in remote, hard to get to places), adequate protection given the conditions of METT-TC, enhanced C4ISR - (everything from low level comms, to access to raw information and feeds), reasonable firepower that means in a COIN environment we are never the ones who show up to a gunfight with a knife, and the host of low density MOS that seem to be ever more critical and ever growing since DOD is the 800lb gorilla and the Inter-Agency just can't fill out fast enough. These types of units are going to be expensive because there are allot of people, and allot of capabilities and you have to provide them with the type of training that sets them up for success. This is not meant to translate directly into a SBCT - but you could come up with a hybrid given the amount of MRAP we are trying to acquire - the actual vehicle is just a platform that we have wired up with good computers and comms - the important piece is the soldier and leader.

Best Regards, Rob

[Shek]

Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

[Granite_State]

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.


That was my suspicion, that a heavily mechanized Army (probably unavoidable up to the present) reinforces some of the worst aspects of the "American Way of War." Especially given the current situation.

[Ken White]

Mech, to include Strykers doesn't do that. Mech has to protect their vehicles and Rob misunderstood my earlier comment; yes, Mech can put out a substantial force (particularly the SBCTS) but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles. There is also a comfort factor, the Mech guys I've know were reluctant to get too far from their vehicles. That may not be the case with SBCTs but I suspect it is with the Bradley guys... :confused:

Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot... ;)

That's not to take anything away from the re-roled guys who are doing better than expected or anyone who's over there busting their hump.

I agree that the mounted mentality adversely impacted our efforts in Iraq early on; that and I'll also restate my earlier point that the right Commander will do his METT-T thing and do well regardless of background or type of unit involved and the wrong one will err regardless of what type units available.

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,
good point:

but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles.

There is certainly a trade - if you give anybody the mobility of organic vehicles of any flavor - they now have to be protected and crewed. If you organic crews to the MTO&E it does not take away from your squads and platoons, but if you don't you have to get them from somewhere. If you have vehicles you have to either be willing to cut them loose - i.e put somebody in charge and tell them to return to a place out of contact (like getting dropped off), place them somewhere where organic TTP and vehicle weapon systems can handle the force pro, or limit your movement to where you can always cooperate - i.e. you can't just abandon them without compromising their force pro in an environment where an enemy on foot who blends in well with the population has a natural advantage. Any crew of any combat vehicle is going to have their attention split between seeing to the vehicle, and their other duties. Leadership has pretty much found the balance.

However, there are things you get by having the vehicle. Some I mentioned already - but you also get the powerful communications system - having a VRC with a power amp to get you through the interference found in a city is a good thing, a satellite based BFT or EPLRS FBCB2 with a crew to relay new information, or reach back to request combat multipliers - and bring them into range of dismounted comms allow CDRs to extend their AOR - and more flexibility in planning operations.

I've seen guys operating in sections - but always with at least three vehicles - that is pretty much the rule. The problem with using 1114s or other HMMWV variants for any organization is that it limits the number of people who can dismount. It means that to conduct dismounted operations in normal organic formations, teams, squads and platoons must first assemble at the dismount point. The folks that can retain their mobility in combat vehicles that allow for teams and squads to be dismounted as a unit have an advantage here - hopefully the type of MRAP vehicles which best account for this will find their way into the units which are tasked with doing patrols.

Hey Shek,


However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

Another good point. The effects of technology can be so subtle that once you and everyone else are surrounded by it, it becomes normal. The same can be said with the doctrine and training we followed to put that technology to best effect and fulfill task and purpose. Tom had referred to the days when the MOUT site at Shugart-Gordon was different then it is now. We considered our MOUT sites as independent blocks or villages where when all was said and done, we just could not see visualize the impacts of the tactics we were using to seize or clear it - those were generally the tasks.

Now its hard not to consider those training sites without seeing them plugged into a much larger social system, full of people who have made their homes their for generations, who have no where else to go, families of families who have 6 or more kids all living in small rooms - where we were lucky to get a few folks to a building before (JRTC has come a long way since then).

There is also the problems with heavier vehicles operating on infrastructure that in some cases was built when trade traffic was light, and technology was limited - there have been more then one case where a M1 or M2/M3 crushed some subterranean sewage or water piece that led to further problems. However, those same Brads caught the AIF way off guard when they first appeared and using thermals and coaxial MGs dirupted quite a number of AIF IED complex ambushes to good effect.

Its a tough call, as COL Foresman pointed out in AFJ we have to be capable of full spectrum operations in the complete range of conditions. We want the best tech, but ideally we don't want to be constrained by it. We appreciate leaders who can negotiate and know when to use restraint and let the situation develop and get solved from the inside out, but we also recognize the need for those who can recognize when to kill without hesitation.

So overall I guess our doctrine, mindsets, national and service cultures, TTP, and technology did hinder us in conducting COIN at the outset. However it was the same set of predispositions which was needed to send a large force to the other side of the world, pursue multiple LOOs of division sized elements and sustain them through the fight with minimal casualties. Also worth remembering is the fight in Falluja - now some will say if we'd had the appropriate sized force at the outset, the conditions that gave rise to making that city an insurgent stronghold might never have occurred, but I believe its beside the point. Fog/Friction/Chance will always conspire to throw you a curve ball, and the enemy will always seek to disadvantage you - he gets a vote - the units that cleared Falluja fought a hard combined arms fight and did so to a determined enemy's disadvantage. Also worth considering are some of the other fights that have required a large scale jump up the lethal line - Mosul 11/11/2004, Ramadi in 2006, Baquba was just recently a serious fight, and there are certainly others. It brings me back to the "there are no easy answers, only compromises for the tough questions".

While we must get better at COIN - because I also believe that is probably the majority of the types of conditions we will find ourselves in over the next decade or two - we cannot afford to not be able to fight force on force and have the advantage in doing so (how much of an advantage is needed is debatable). If we divorce ourselves too much from our former selves, somebody else will fill that vacuum - and then one of our tools in bad neighbor behavior modification will be less a couple of teeth. If we want true specialization so we can be good at everything its going to require a much larger force (and allot more $$$) so we can have enough Schlitz to pass around for every occasion - otherwise we have to live with some kind of balance. My cautionary note comes as I more often hear "if all you have is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail" becoming a panacea cliche' to describe all doctrine & force structure solutions. In our business, some (not all) problems will remain nails - and if you have ever tried to drive a nail with a Gerber multi-tool I don't recommend it. We flat out have to be good (better then the other guy) at the full range of military operations.

Best to all, Rob

[slapout9]

In the back of the article he talks about the imaginative commanders of the 3RD ACR at Talafar and how they fought as Dragoons "corralled their horses" motor pooled their tanks and fought as dismounted infantry. He also mentions in the back a question about why were some mechanized units able to fight so well why others could not. It short it is the Cavalry Dragoon doctirne (mounted Infantry) is what he is talking about. I will comment more on this later at my day job.

[Rob Thornton]

This thread made me think about an Armor officer buddy of mine who remarked as he was reading "The Sling and the Stone", that he thought COIN was much harder then HIC - if you guys remember prior to that some of the high level thinking was that if you could do HIC well, the rest would follow.

Imagine though, if you were under the other premise, and your organization and doctrine, your training and acquisition priorities were similarly associated. How different would we have looked? Take it one step further and consider if threat was a Joint outlook?

We often take for granted why we are what we are because our concern for the present and immediate future alters the context of the decisions made in the past - this is the curse of the fortune teller I guess.

It was pointed out to me that the Army is often asked why it requires so much of a LOG tail when other services and allies do not. We (the Army) campaign - we come and we stay, and although we desire certain expeditionary capabilities, our ability to sustain a difficult and enduring land campaign is something that nobody else does like us. The Joint Force (and this is not to deny they have their own sustainment/LOG capabilities, or provide the means to bring it in and take it out) and allied forces heavily rely on US Army Logistics when campaigning on land - much of their (our Joint and allied) capability truly is expeditionary, and as such is built to get there quickly, but not necessarily to support an enduring campaign. I am still not entirely comfortable with including "campaign quality" and "expeditionary capabilities" in the same sentence -but it reflects the realities of today's requirements to remain "ready and relevant"

I'm not sure where the mean of pendulum should be. I know that if you have always had something, you tend to take it for granted, and its hard to conceive of the work that was required to build it to that point, or how seemingly minor changes can have secondary and tertiary consequences, or the work that would be required to fix it. Fortunately we are evolutionary, so I think we will find the right balance over time. We must be able to do it all, because within a major COIN campaign today there is likely to be times when the enemy will use very lethal, portable and available firepower to challenge us on his terms, and there is the also the very real possibility that we will be asked to destroy another's conventional means of making War.

Best Regards, Rob

[Jimbo]

I see from the post, that there are some "vintage" or "retro" perspectives out here. The biggest change I have seen during my time in Iraq, is that the light guys have come to see that the mech guys aren't really all that different. Whoever posted about the what is the difference between dismounting soldiers from an M1114 HumVee or a Bradley hit the nail on the head. Personally it is easier to dismount from a Bradley/Stryker because of the ramp, and you do not have to bleed off squad members to man the vehicles. A mech IN company has 9 rifle squads in it. So a mech company commander/platoon leader you are fighting squads and vehicles I never had a problem with sending squads out on patrols independent from the Bradley. During my time in Iraq, I have seen many armored vehicles patrolling/overwatching without Infantry squads on the ground. The advantage that he mech forces have is that the Bradley makes a very effective platform at supporting the Infantry.

As far as mindset, there are some differences. Before the war in Iraq, the biggest difference that I noticed was the concept of areas of operation. I remember light company commanders an PL's only needing a small section of the map based on their mobility while mech guys were operating across greater differences. The joke was that a light guy could get into trouble pretty fast, but that mech guys got into trouble at 40 miles an hour. Stryker units a something of hybrid between the two. They have a lot of benefits of both communities.

Comparing mech and light unit effectiveness in COIN. If you want to draw those conclusions, then one would have to look for an example where a mech unit and a light unit had operated in the same area of operation. As many have stated, Iraq is a mosaic. Each area has it own challeneges. You have to look at the security situation as far as the people who live there, the physical terrain (especially how much you own), and how many troops you have available. When those factors are similar, then you can draw a fairly accurate comparison.

[Steve Blair]

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

My take is more that mechanization plays into how segments of the military prefer to fight their wars. It's more of an extension of the Word War II mindset. Helicopters increased mobility, but one of the biggest destructive factors in Vietnam aside from airpower was artillery; good old WW2 era-guns. The helicopter also had its downside in the amount of logistic support it required, creating a need to open and secure roads and tie down assets keeping those roads open (many of which were mechanized...a number of division cavalry squadrons spent the bulk of their time securing roads).

Doctrine is also tailored to fight the preferred conflict, not the one that may be close at hand. Thus mechanization is, in my view, tailored to fight "the big one," not to deal with smaller conflicts.

We agree on the impact of doctrine, I think, but I also feel that divorcing mechanization from doctrine (which the study authors seem to do) really undermines their main point. Mechanized units can and have played very important roles in COIN efforts. They make outstanding reaction forces for outlying posts and garrisons; they have the ability to escort relief supplies and protect local improvement projects; and they can respond quickly to any emergency (be it combat or humanitarian)...much quicker than a leg unit in many cases.

With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.

[Shek]

With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

Steve,

I agree that the commander is an omitted variable, but one that I think would be hard to quantify and thus should be addressed qualitatively in the paper. The question is what bias this creates, and the section that I highlighted from your post is what I'd argue is what happens on average, and thus, the bias would be very low.

Commanders are selected based on their performance within the chosen doctrine of the force, and the current incentives reinforce this - grad school is poo poo'd as time spent away from the force while muddy boots assignments are the "tickets" to success. While there is lip service that grad school is good now (although the incentives haven't been changed to match this, e.g., telling boards that civilian graduate school is the equivalent as a second command in Ranger Regiment), I don't think that it is much more than that. Thus, a GEN Petraeus or LTG Chiarelli that can adapt on the first go around in a non-doctrinal scenario is the exception and not the rule. The necessities of the scenario will cause others to adapt and become more effective as time goes on, but I'd still argue that mechanization does have a causal impact (through the effects of doctrine and mindset) on the probability of winning a counterinsurgency.

Essentially, what we would consider a good full spectrum commander may not be the commander that is promoted because the doctrine/mindset doesn't have the same definition of good.


Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.

Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?

[Steve Blair]

I think another issue with mechanization in COIN is the basing and logistics requirements it brings. Basing equals a larger "foreign" presence, which in turn creates an issue that an insurgent force can exploit. Since mechanized forces consume and need more in the way of supplies, they require a more extensive support network than light units, in turn creating insurgent-exploitable issues and targets.

You make a good point regarding the possible causal impact of mechanization; one that I think the original paper missed. As for the million-dollar question...it may come down to having units/forces that are trained/optimized for COIN and others that deal with larger conflict issues (which as I recall was one of the original arguments for the light divisions). Mechanized units have a clear place and utility in COIN, but their role is different than what you would see in a more conventional conflict. That might require different training and equipment (a good role for the traditional-style dragoon force slapout mentioned...or the traditional function of US cavalry prior to the world wars). Usually it's a question of force scale, and sadly our institutional "either/or" mindset hinders our ability to find that balance.

[goesh]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

[Steve Blair]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

Sure....but I think the points of interest (at least in terms of this study) are
a) What unit do they come from (mech or leg)?
b) How many of those grunts does the unit have to put on patrol?
c) Does that tie into success in COIN?

The questions raised are important for this conflict...and the one after it...and the one after that...

[Cavguy]

As indicated by my handle, I'm not impartial in this discussion. :D

I think most of the good points have been well said already, but will clarify some points:

1) 3ACR did not stable its horses. It did dismount a lot and patrol, but rarely out of sight from its vehicles for a number of security and C-IED reasons. It used them smarter. But absolutely the focus was population-centric. (source: 2 weeks in RIP/TOA with 3ACR with a company commander observing ops) It is partially true that the Dragoon concept largely won the Indian wars in the west from a tactical standpoint.

2) There are two issues here - the platform and the leader.

a) The ideal platform for COIN depends on the situation. Ramadi in mid-06 was ideal for tank/bradley ops due to its heavily kinetic nature, and you needed that armor and firepower to survive. Tal Afar in the same period was M1114/Stryker terrain where you wanted to avoid annoying the locals with a heavy footprint. In general, I'll agree that lighter vehicles able to protect a fair number of dismounts is ideal - as long as you have a few big guns to back you up.

Case study: April 2004 in Sadr City. A 1st CAV BN did not bring its tanks/bradleys because of the assumptions above - light was better. On April 4th a HMMWV patrol was attacked in central Sadr city, and cut off in a "Black Hawk Down" scenario. The 1st CAV unit was unable to get to the patrol due to a lack of Armor. In fact, a QRF launched in trucks suffered severe casualties. 2-37 AR (my BN) had to launch a tank company attack through Sadr city to rescue the patrol. The M1A1 was the only platform able to run the RPG gauntlet. They loaded the infantry on the backs of the tanks and shot their way out. I bet the Rangers/Delta in Mogadishu wished they had the same support inherent rather than begging from the Pakis and Bangledishis.

I'm certainly not saying Armor is the best platform for COIN, but you have to have it to get your nuts out of the fire.:eek:

Decision: Slight win for lighter forces. Every platform has its place and use though, the key is HOW you use it.

b) Leader mindset is a separate and highly subjective discussion in a "branchist" tone. Each branch has mentally agile and adaptive leaders.

That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers. ;) A salient point was made by an SF LTC to me at the Carr Center conference. He pointed out that the majority of successes and best conventional COIN commanders from Iraq seemed to be Armor guys. He was asking me (an Armor guy in a COIN schoolhouse assignment) why that was. My best answer (I'm really not sure) was that most of the people he was citing (Chiarelli, MacMaster, Hickey, MacFarland, Mansoor, May, White, Tien) had Cavalry backgrounds. Cav is to Armor what Airborne is to Infantry (no flames from the airborne guys, thanks). Cav trains a decentralized, high initiative mindset that encourages innovative solutions with little higher guidance. Armor is more controlling and top down. That's my best explanation.

That said, I would say that all the branches have an equal number of leaders who get it and those who don't, and I've certainly seen more than one bonehead in Armor. I think generalizations about which branch and which profile (light/heavy) has a better mindset is nothing but speculation. You can make the argument that Tom has that the light guy is unencumbered by a maintenance tail and vehicle to attach himself to, but the Armor/Cav guy can argue that the light guy thinks in terms of short range objectives, and not an adaptable and rapid maneuverist approach. That's why the Army (until recently) sought to rotate infantry officers between light and mech and armor officers between armor and cav.... to balance the perspective.

Decision: Draw, based on individual leader personalities.

Now that I've stirred the pot ....

[Steve Blair]

I'm not exactly impartial either. I firmly believe you need a strong armor/cav force in place to serve as the sort of reaction/striking force you mention, CavGuy. Going back to Vietnam, there are too many examples of armor being able to shoot its way though just about any ambush to be ignored. The size of that force, of course, varies depending on the nature of the local threat, but you still need it.

At the end of the day, it really does come down to the leaders.

[Jedburgh]

...Case study: April 2004 in Sadr City. A 1st CAV BN did not bring its tanks/bradleys because of the assumptions above - light was better. On April 4th a HMMWV patrol was attacked in central Sadr city, and cut off in a "Black Hawk Down" scenario. The 1st CAV unit was unable to get to the patrol due to a lack of Armor. In fact, a QRF launched in trucks suffered severe casualties. 2-37 AR (my BN) had to launch a tank company attack through Sadr city to rescue the patrol. The M1A1 was the only platform able to run the RPG gauntlet. They loaded the infantry on the backs of the tanks and shot their way out. I bet the Rangers/Delta in Mogadishu wished they had the same support inherent rather than begging from the Pakis and Bangladeshis....
Just to add some more depth to your excellent choice of a "case study", here's an article from the Nov-Dec '04 issue of Armor Magazine describing that fight:

Sadr City: The Pure Armor Assault in Urban Terrain (https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/currentissues/2004/Nd04/6moore04c.pdf)

Baghdad, Kut, and An Najaf were scenes of concerted attacks by the Mahdi army throughout Iraq on 4 April 2004. On that afternoon, elements of the Mahdi army engaged multiple elements of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (2-5 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division, nearly simultaneously throughout Sadr City in northern Baghdad. Twenty soldiers from Comanche Red Platoon, 2-5 CAV, had become isolated in the northern central portion of Sadr City, and available vehicle assets prohibited the unit’s exfiltration. Soldiers from C Troop, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor (Crusaders), attached to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), conducted a hasty attack into Sadr City to relieve the isolated infantry platoon....

[Cavguy]

Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot... ;)



Ken,

I don't necessairly disagree with you, but will make two observations from Iraq experience:

1) Your dismounted, vehicle unsupported squad is attacked by 5-10 AIF. Your soldiers return fire and the enemy begins to displace. Your soldiers give chase, but are unable to move quickly enough to catch them because he is weighted down with 25 lbs of armor plus his weapons, ammo, etc. Being able to rapidly mount, maneuver, and disembark a team in urban warfare is key to getting the insurgents. Secondairly, if you get pinned down, joint patrolling near your vehicle provides cover, firepower, and rapid CASEVAC.

2) In my Sa'ad neighborhood efforts in Tal Afar, my infantry platoon patrolled exclusively dismounted. We began to discover more and more small IED's hidden that were only effective against dismounted troops. While reacting to a mortar attack against the patrol base, one of these IED's killed one and wounded two more of my soldiers in what I believe was a baited ambush. The IED was a remote controlled IED, which a HMMWV with countermeasures following the squad would have interdicted.

I completely agree that COIN must be done dismounted and interacting with the people, but in urban warfare getting too far away from your supporting vehicles can be dangerous, in my experience.

(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

But I think we agree in principle.

[Cavguy]

Just to add some more depth to your excellent choice of a "case study", here's an article from the Nov-Dec '04 issue of Armor Magazine describing that fight:

Sadr City: The Pure Armor Assault in Urban Terrain (https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/currentissues/2004/Nd04/6moore04c.pdf)

John Moore, the author, is a friend of mine. He is currently a Russian FAO stationed at the hardship post of the Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany. I was the BN S4 at the time.

He received the Silver Star for his action, along with one of his Platoon Leaders. A mechanic from his company filling in as a tank loader was killed in the early stages. Most everyone on the assault got (deserved) valor awards. My OIF 05-07 XO was one of his PL's and has two BSM/V's.

That issue of ARMOR also has the story of how 2-37 re-took Najaf from the Mehidi army during the Sadr Rebellion.

Great Plug!

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Shek,


Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?

That is the one that concerns me.

We can't allow ourselves to believe we can make a rule (in a biological or physics sense) that our opponents will follow - or put another way, - that our enemies will abstain from casting a vote in the action, reaction, counter-action cycle. Even now our enemies (that would be them that are opposed to us due to their own interests or feel threatened by ours) are considering our trends, acquisitions, thoughts and actions and how to best prepare to defeat us with the means available to them. Unfortunately, the battlefield only seems to get more lethal because the technologies associated with it are prolific by being both increasingly cheaper and available. They will apply the full range of options available to them and they are keenly aware of our requirements to be better then them at everything we do in what is often their own neighborhood.

We face a myriad of counter-punchers in that regard. The best hope, and I believe our strength, is that we grow counter punchers at the unit and leader levels and provide them with the technologies in sufficient depth and quantities to adapt, innovate & prevail. However, as many have agreed, without the continued (and I'd argue increased) investment in the people (the leader and the led), the tech cannot be applied on the battlefield to good end (either the intended or adapted).

Best regards, Rob

[goesh]

Steve, your points are well taken and having only humped in my life, I am biased but it is not a stretch of imagination to assert that the COIN impact is one-on-one, small unit to neighborhood and the mechanized component is irrelevant from a purist perspective. Iraqis distinguish between man and machine, why wouldn't they? They certainly distinguish between man and beasts as tools. In other words, a tank might scare the hell out of some but not the men and visa-versa. The mechanized component gives a clear tactical and logistics edge so why slap the numbers to it and quantify and assess the impact from that perspective when truly non-tradional uses of the mechanized component are what should be exploited, or at least explored?

Has a Bradley or Stryker ever been parked beside a house so the man of the house could stand on it and make repairs to the upper wall/roof? How many older boys in very secure areas have gotten a ride in a tank and been allowed to drive it a little bit? Have any kids been given crayons and allowed to draw pictures on the side of a Hummer while the crew sits and sips tea and has a good laugh with the Iraqi parents and neighbors? If you want to get the locals to like the iron beast, get a few of them old WW2 Harleys with sidecar and start giving kids rides. Fun for the troops, fun for the locals and upsetting to AQ/insurgents. That's the ticket, ain't it?

[slapout9]

Cavguy, No flames but for accuracy the horse quote was mine and I said it kind of tonge in cheek. Because the writer did not realize the concept of Dragoons fighting dismounted but using mounted mobility has been around for some time. The exact quote is on page 23 of the study 3rd ACR "innovation" it placed its heavy armor in storage(a practice known as"motor-pooling") and proceeded to patrol with dismounted infantry.

Next you beat me to it but there is something about the Cavalry organization that seems to make leaders different. Like you pointed out Macmaster could fight the HIC Gulf War1 and then was able to switch to COIN. In WW2 the the Constabulary force was based on a Cavalry unit not an LE unit. So Cavalry is able to HIC' em, LIC' em and CIC' em a full spectrum unit. And if you go Airborne you will be able to do this all around the world.:wry:

[wm]

Cavguy,So Cavalry is able to HIC' em, LIC' em and CIC' em a full spectrum unit. And if you go Airborne you will be able to do this all around the world.:wry:

When you opt for your airborne Cav mode, just don't expect to do much IED stopping with one of these:

http://www.carolinasaviation.org/images/Vehicles/SheridanTank.jpg

[Shek]

That said, I can't resist plugging for Armor officers. ;) A salient point was made by an SF LTC to me at the Carr Center conference. He pointed out that the majority of successes and best conventional COIN commanders from Iraq seemed to be Armor guys. He was asking me (an Armor guy in a COIN schoolhouse assignment) why that was. My best answer (I'm really not sure) was that most of the people he was citing (Chiarelli, MacMaster, Hickey, MacFarland, Mansoor, May, White, Tien) had Cavalry backgrounds. Cav is to Armor what Airborne is to Infantry (no flames from the airborne guys, thanks). Cav trains a decentralized, high initiative mindset that encourages innovative solutions with little higher guidance. Armor is more controlling and top down. That's my best explanation.

Cavguy,

Maybe because it's easier to read riding around versus humping a ruck ;)

Seriously though, I think this is a great example of where the mechanization variable doesn't serve as a solid proxy for doctrinal approach/mindset. While having big toys, the goal on average for the cav is not to use them if possible, which is certainly a different mindset than an armored division designed and trained to take it to the enemy directly.

However, I'd suggest that this might not be the full story. Of the five names I recognize from your list, I see two masters degrees and two PhDs, all of them in the social sciences/humanities realm. The exception is COL McFarland, who did RIP/TOA directly from 3 ACR and thus, transitioned with a unit already successfully performing COIN. I'm not trying to detract from their successes, but I think you can attribute some of it to the learning curve that has occured across the Army as we've adapted to the war we need to fight. I'd be curious to find out what experiences (Bosnia? Kosovo? grad school? just general Cav experience) you'd attribute as being the foundation of success for Colonels May, White, and Tien. Thanks.

Shek

[slapout9]

When you opt for your airborne Cav mode, just don't expect to do much IED stopping with one of these:

http://www.carolinasaviation.org/images/Vehicles/SheridanTank.jpg



I thought these were supposed to be relaced by the M-8 Buford or something like that?

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
I'd be curious to find out what experiences (Bosnia? Kosovo? grad school? just general Cav experience) you'd attribute as being the foundation of success for Colonels May, White, and Tien. Thanks.

Shek

I think the Cav mindset is one component. Part is education, both military and civilian. For example, COL MacFarland is not a PhD, but was a SAMS grad. LTC Tien was a Rhodes Scholar, White House Fellow, and now a Harvard Fellow. Mainly it's being open minded enough to assess each situation for what it is, and adjust the plan accordingly. Adaptive leadership styles and being placed in situations where authority was decentralized is a common theme. None of those mentioned was a micromanager, but each provided an extremely strong commander's intent. Each placed their subordinates in the positions where they could best use their talents and personality to influence success. Each was willing to adjust the plan when it wasn't working, but recognized the necessity of perseverence through rough times.

I would also say each is a scholar and a reader, and learns from studying.

I am beginning to think that there is a connection between humanities education and success in challenging, unscripted situations, if for no other reason than history provides a framework of principles applicable to those situations. I have no backup for that.

I am sure I missed a host of great leaders from downrange, those listed (except Chiarelli) I have personally met or served for and can discuss why I listed them as such.

It's a topic worth studying, I'm not sure you can point to a single answer. I would also say that the officers listed above are generally less "narrow minded" than many other commanders I have observed, tolerate (to a reasonable extent) both pushback and discussion, and don't have a need to be right all the time.

[wm]

I thought these were supposed to be relaced by the M-8 Buford or something like that? Actually I think it was replaced by something called a Stryker, to which folks have had to add a bunch of funny cages and slat armor upgrades to make it survivable against WWII-vintage technology weapons like panzerfausts (oh excuse me, I mean RPGs) and such.

Seriously, I suspect that there is much to be said for keeping a balanced force. I concur that having a few M1A1's would have been very helpful in Mogadishu in 1993. The Germans found out the hard way about the mistake of not developing a mechanized force to complement their superb infantry back in WWI.

[Cavguy]

I thought these were supposed to be relaced by the M-8 Buford or something like that?

The Army cancelled the M8 AGS in the late 90's to fund the Crusader and Comanche. We saw how well those worked out. There was a movement in both 2000 and again in 2003-2004 to fund it instead of the Stryker 105mm variant and as a COIN/LIC tank.

My one experience on a M551 was as a cadet during CTLT at Irwin, it finalized Armor as my branch choice.



Maybe because it's easier to read riding around versus humping a ruck

Absolutely. During ROTC Advanced Camp at Ft. Bragg I remember being on mile five of a road march in 100 degree heat and 100 percent humidity. "F*ck this, I wanna ride for a living" was my final conclusion on any infantry delusions I may have harbored.

As a result, I got Armor, but then was assigned to 25th ID (Light), where I proceeded to hump for three years as one of the five Armor LT's authorized to the Div Cav Squadron. Fate has a cruel sense of humor. When we did our HMMWV recon, I would look out the window at the poor SOB humping the mortar baseplate or the Dragon missile and thank God I went Armor. :D

Then I got to Iraq the second time and had to hump again to do COIN ops. <sigh>

Love the infantry, but not my passion.

[wm]

I am beginning to think that there is a connection between humanities education and success in challenging, unscripted situations, if for no other reason than history provides a framework of principles applicable to those situations. I have no backup for that.

I think you are proposing one side of an interesting variant on the old nature vs. nurture chicken and egg question--Did these guys have a previous mindset/character/ disposition (nature) that made them choose a humanities education or did the humanities education develop (nurture) that predilection for open-minded flexibility? I know that I've just set up a false dichotomy, but it makes a nice LD (Does the Army still have, or need for that matter, Lines of Departure as an control measure in a non-linear war?) for further discussion of this topic.

[Steve Blair]

I think you are proposing one side of an interesting variant on the old nature vs. nurture chicken and egg question--Did these guys have a previous mindset/character/ disposition (nature) that made them choose a humanities education or did the humanities education develop (nurture) that predilection for open-minded flexibility? I know that I've just set up a false dichotomy, but it makes a nice LD (Does the Army still have, or need for that matter, Lines of Departure as an control measure in a non-linear war?) for further discussion of this topic.

For what it's worth, I think it's a combination, but with the mindset pointing the person toward the humanities path (not in all cases, obviously, but I do believe it's mindset then development). I also tend to think that the reputation and history (both real and perceived) of cav can draw people in that direction early on. There's been something of a historical trend of our more innovative, flexible officers coming from (or going into) the cav community. All branches produce innovative thinkers, but cav has that certain intangible that may attract them. All IMO, anyhow.

[Schmedlap]

This reminds me of a study that concluded that homes with more books in them tend to have children who are better readers. One should not conclude from that study that if you drop your entire paycheck at Barnes & Noble that your 6-year-old will be reading at the 12th grade level. It was not the presence of the books that made the kids better readers. The parents thought that reading was worthwhile and that good reading skills were important, so they owned lots of books. The children inherited the values of their parents. They thought that reading was enjoyable and important and put forth more effort to become better readers.

Likewise, there is a root cause to mechanization that correlates with a reluctance to do necessary dismounted work, but this does not imply a causal relationship. I would assert that militaries become more mechanized only after their country has modernized. An increase in modernization correlates with less tolerance for casualties in the so-called “middle wars” that include COIN. Less tolerance for casualties leads a military to reduce exposure to enemy actions by placing more armor between the Soldier and the enemy, as in Iraq, or to neglect the armor protection and then retreat in short order after fatalities hit double-digits, as in Mogadishu.

It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

[Ken White]

Ken,
. . .
. . .
. . .
(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

But I think we agree in principle.

agree in principle. Sorta boils down to METT-T ;)

With the all three 'Ts' being a big factor in how who does what and where...

[Ken White]

...
. . .
It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

In all the aspects you cited.

...That from the resident dinosaur... :cool:

[Norfolk]

In all the aspects you cited.

...That from the resident dinosaur... :cool:

Schmedlap is completely, utterly correct. Just as modernization drives mechanization, modernization drives imbecilization. Excellent post.:D

And I know this to be certified true because the wise old dinosaur sayeth it is so.;)

[tequila]

Of IEDS and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations (http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20071017.Of_IEDs_and_MRAPs/R.20071017.Of_IEDs_and_MRAPs.pdf)- Andrew Krepinevich & Dakota L. Wood, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (77 pg PDF)

Interesting report that points out some of the drawbacks of the MRAP with respect to COIN operations and implicitly criticizes DoD's rush to embrace the vehicle (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4066) (currently 8,800 vehicles on order in 16 different variants, cost of $8 billion over FY 2007-2008, with eventual plans to expand to 17,000+ MRAPs by 2009).

Criticisms include:

Runs counter to COIN doctrine of establishing relationships with the population, which theoretically is tougher to do from the confines of an armored truck rather than on foot or in an less-imposing hummvee.
Increased logistical requirements will require more convoys, increasing vulnerability and casualties. Increased weight of armor lessens "lightness" and expeditionary capability of the force vs. hummvees.
Insurgents can more cheaply and easily increase their armor-piercing capabilities than the U.S. can up-armor its troops.
Opportunity cost issue.

[Rob Thornton]

more safe to do so. The amount of battlespace assigned dictates that even the smallest patrol will have to transit large areas – they may be going somewhere to link up with ISF to do dismounted patrols, they may be responding to an incident, they may be delivering aid or logistics, they may doing anyone of the myriad of things they do everyday that require vehicular movement.

This means the enemy will employ IEDs (of all flavors) against our folks while they move to do those things. IEDs are a feature of the modern battlefield, but all IED are not EFPs – the technology required to produce and employ EFPs to good effect is more technical then those of regular IEDs – this is why every IED is not an EFP, and one of the reasons why Iran’s technical assistance is such an issue. However, big IEDs – big enough to kill from the shock effect of killing and wounding those inside an 1114/1151 is more common and real – think of a marble inside a beer can. Now imagine if that marble is hollow and has soft, spongy brain matter inside it. That is where we have so many MTBI (mild traumatic brain injuries) from. However, mild is a misnomer – some things will not manifest themselves for years, some are up front and center. MRAP’s design deflects some of that blast and lessons the chance of MTBI. I’ve had several friends killed from such big IEDs while riding in 1114s/1151s and others seriously injured by big IEDs – their trucks where picked up – their bodies pushed up inside the truck and slammed against the ceiling with incredible force – their necks broken, their bodies hurled from a turret, their skulls smashed inside their ACH (advanced combat helmets). Think of torpedo detonating under a ship.

I’ve also watched EOD survive massive IEDs because their MRAP type vehicles deflected most of the blast – you can only covertly employ so much explosive. Now which one combined with good tactics will mitigate the enemies weapons while allowing us the flexibility to go after the networks? I don’t like reliance on technology – but I do like having good tech to be there when I need it. It is one of our strong points that allows us to conduct our “away games”.

[Shek]

Rob,

I think your point that technology/mechanization in and of itself is neutral is a great one - it's how you choose to employ it is where it counts. If you allow it to drive you to TTPs that are counterproductive, then it is not the fault of the technology, but rather the operator/leader who lost sight of the ways to the ends.

Another thought on the MRAP is that while its budgetary costs may be large, from a big picture standpoint, if you reduce American casualties enough, then it will slow down domestic opposition to the war, increasing the flexibility that policy makers will have over OIF decisions. Maybe it's fielding won't have that large of a battlefield effect, but I think that we should consider more than just its battlefield impact.

[Norfolk]

I really can't help but wonder if COIN wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been a little easier to wage if the bulk of the (combat) force structures in both countries were not made up mainly (not entirely) of good old-fashioned Infantry Divisions, the type that the Army got rid of several years ago favour of Light Infantry Divisions and now Stryker Brigades.

The old Infantry Divisions of course had the standard three brigades, nine battalions, da-da-da of Infantry, Div Arty, an Engineer Bn, et al, and a ready-made heavy-armour mechanized force for dealing with the more intense situations based upon a Tank Battalion and a unit of APCs sufficient to mechanize an entire Infantry Battalion. Not to mention, the regular infantry battalions had their own full scales of organic wheeled transport to get them where they needed to go (useful in areas where MBTs and APCs might provoke the locals or the terrain isn't really right for heavy stuff) and they can get around fairly fast. Moreover, the old Infantry Divisions only required about half of the logistical base of an Armoured or Mech Div.

It just seems that, looking back over the arguments on this thread, that the best Formation for most of the needs in Iraq could best be handled by regular Infantry Divisions. The old standard Infantry Divisions gave you a full complement of infantry, organic wheeled transport, and equipment, plus a modest but organic heavy armour and mech infantry capability that didn't have to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from another Brigade or Division and whose guys might not be familiar with your way of fighting (like when Armor units are attached to Airborne or Light Infantry formations), but already know how you operate.

It's probably too late now to re-organize Light Infantry Divisions and Stryker Brigades into regular Infantry Formations for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. But given that Light units as far back as Mogadishu (15 years ago now) needed what a regular Infantry Brigade (with organic tank company and mech infantry company) could provide that a Light Infantry Brigade couldn't, and that much the same sort of thing is needed right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe the Army would be rather better served in the future by regular Infantry Divisions in anything that didn't require mainly either Armoured Divisions or Airborne/Air Assault Divisions. Infantry Brigades and Divisions are a lot easier to switch back-and-forth between low-intensity and medium- or even high-intensity (purely defensive/holding ground role in the latter case) roles. Just a thought or two.

[RTK]

I really can't help but wonder if COIN wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been a little easier to wage if the bulk of the (combat) force structures in both countries were not made up mainly (not entirely) of good old-fashioned Infantry Divisions, the type that the Army got rid of several years ago favour of Light Infantry Divisions and now Stryker Brigades.

The old Infantry Divisions of course had the standard three brigades, nine battalions, da-da-da of Infantry, Div Arty, an Engineer Bn, et al, and a ready-made heavy-armour mechanized force for dealing with the more intense situations based upon a Tank Battalion and a unit of APCs sufficient to mechanize an entire Infantry Battalion. Not to mention, the regular infantry battalions had their own full scales of organic wheeled transport to get them where they needed to go (useful in areas where MBTs and APCs might provoke the locals or the terrain isn't really right for heavy stuff) and they can get around fairly fast. Moreover, the old Infantry Divisions only required about half of the logistical base of an Armoured or Mech Div.

It just seems that, looking back over the arguments on this thread, that the best Formation for most of the needs in Iraq could best be handled by regular Infantry Divisions. The old standard Infantry Divisions gave you a full complement of infantry, organic wheeled transport, and equipment, plus a modest but organic heavy armour and mech infantry capability that didn't have to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from another Brigade or Division and whose guys might not be familiar with your way of fighting (like when Armor units are attached to Airborne or Light Infantry formations), but already know how you operate.

It's probably too late now to re-organize Light Infantry Divisions and Stryker Brigades into regular Infantry Formations for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. But given that Light units as far back as Mogadishu (15 years ago now) needed what a regular Infantry Brigade (with organic tank company and mech infantry company) could provide that a Light Infantry Brigade couldn't, and that much the same sort of thing is needed right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe the Army would be rather better served in the future by regular Infantry Divisions in anything that didn't require mainly either Armoured Divisions or Airborne/Air Assault Divisions. Infantry Brigades and Divisions are a lot easier to switch back-and-forth between low-intensity and medium- or even high-intensity (purely defensive/holding ground role in the latter case) roles. Just a thought or two.

Since the Army decided a few years back that the cornerstone entity is the BCT, the title of the Division means very little. You're either and HBCT, SBCT, or IBCT. Whether you're in an Armored Division or a Mech Infantry Division, you look the same now. Strykers all look the same in terms of task org.

You could accomplish the same thing by returning all three cavalry regiments to corps control, making them all look like 3 ACR, giving the cav back their Kiowas, and bolstering their dismount capablility with either additional scouts within the scout platoons or 1x additional light infantry company in each squadron.

[Rob Thornton]

I'm not sure, but I'll put my bias up front having spent my Infantry time as a Rifle PL/AT PL/HHC XO in the 101st and staff and CMD time in a SBCT. When I was in 1-24th as a staff guy we were of the light variety and about a year from when I got there we "transformed" and became an SBCT as I was transitioning from staff to command. As a commander I had a 170 man combined arms team with far better mobility, better firepower, better communications, better protection then I would have had under the the old MTO&E. It cost quite a bit, but it in terms of capability - we had allot of flexibility. The IOT&E process was very enlightening- the test and evaluation that OTC came up with put us through the ringer - constant distributed ops over a period of a couple of months (I think it was three iterations) at FT Knox - which is every bit as much Infantry country as anything else - very restrictive, and over very complex. After that I turned over the rifle company and took the HHC for our trips to NTC and JRTC as part of 1/25th's train up for OIF - they were to relieve 3/2 (the Army's first SBCT) in Mosul. At this time the CTCs were transitioning toward a COIN look - the Lancer's did well at both - able to use the ability to move allot of Infantry with reasonable mobility, good comms for reachback, enough firepower in the Armsroom concept to outgun most enemy - and with additional comms and mobility to bring in more Infantry quickly if needed.

When later I went to Mosul as an advisor I got to see the 172nd SBCT on its first deployment and 3/2 on its second rotation in Mosul (and a large chunk of Ninewa). The 172nd after its RIP with 3/2 went to Baghdad for a few months, and 3/2 RIP/TOA'd early to go to Diyala. I was not surprised to see them able to use the same TTP to good effect - CO CDRs had no problem employing big combined arms 170 man companies in COIN to great effect. The AVN component was mostly KWs and those guys are great to work with.

I've not seen a more versatile formation for Infantry then the SBCT- the closest I've read about was the big Armored CAV platoons in Vietnam - I've met a couple of guys who fought those there.

SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.

What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.

I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch):D


Out of the 43 AC (Active Component) BCTs we are going to require balanced capabilities that allow for roughly half of that force to be deployed while the other half is being refit, or ramped up for future deployments. The question of what types of modular BCTs provide the greatest flexibility across the spectrum of operations is also tied to what types of BCTs go into the RC (Reserve Component) forces. An AC breakout of the 43 BCTs might be structured around 15 HBCTs, 12 SBCTs and 16 IBCTs, this would allow for a commitment of up to 8 HBCTs, 6 SBCTs and 8 IBCTs at one time, provided the supporting elements are available to sustain them.

The AC BCTs would be backed up by RC BCTs. However the breakout between the USAR and ARNG correlate to what their primary missions are. The USAR would provide the additional combat power of 10 HBCTs, while the ARNG could provide 34 IBCTs which would provide their dual state mission with the manpower needed to better fulfill their Title 32 requirements. This would make for a total force of 25 HBCTs, 12 SBCTs and 50 IBCTs.

The overall rational for where capabilities are located at within the total Army (AC/RC) is based on balancing flexibility and sustainability with the types of missions those components are more likely to be tasked with. The Army must achieve consistent balance because the missions it will be assigned may call for formations to operate within the full spectrum over short periods of time and in some cases simultaneously. While many have called for greater specialization, I believe the key to our Army’s success lies within well trained, well led, adaptable GPFs (general purpose forces) that can be combined where needed based on the parameters of the mission. If the Army had an unconstrained force structure – meaning it had the resources and authorization to allow it to create and sustain an infinite number of specialized formations; we might consider alternatives to GPFs. However if we over specialize within the constraints of meeting our commitment to deploy and sustain 20 BCTs at a time, we might sacrifice our flexibility to staff HQs and afford leaders new education and experience; as well as man the institutions which allow us to evolve and provide strategic depth.


A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.

The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.

Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.

Best, Rob

[Ski]

A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?




SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.

What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.

I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch):D



A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.

The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.

Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Excellent points Ski.:) I would not want to send an SBCT, let alone 2-Battalion + 1-Cav Sqn IBCT into an area where it may have to fight heavy armour formations, and that's even if such "Rapid-Deployment" formations really can be moved that quickly with all the logistics they'll need plus all the airpower and logistics that they'll need. I don't remember which Army officer wrote this in his CGSC monograph a few years ago, but his own summary of the changes over recent years was that "the current empahisis on getting lighter forces to the battlefield quickly is the Transformational equivalent of getting Custer to the Little Big Horn Faster". I think that it is supremely important to formally recognize the capabilities and limitations of each type of Formation and not try to shoe-horn Formations into a Doctrine or Concept that perhaps isn't really viable.

I worked with the original LAV-1 and loathed it, and with the LAV-25 (which was a definite improvement in terms of comfort); but despite a lot of what people in the Canadian Army were saying at the time about what new capabilities the LAV-25 (our recce versions back then had a good deal of the kit now in the LAV-III Strykers, which we also have too) gave us, it was just as clear that the LAV was in no way able to keep out even an errant 3" shell from a Sherman parked at a museum, let alone from the T-55s and T-72s that folks in the Balkans liked to use to intimidate our guys. We were forced to bring back the old Leopard I tank (and subsequently cancel the LAV-MGS) after a Platoon of 1RCR was ambushed in an village in Afghanistan, with one Section being pinned down and practically wiped out because the Strykers the Platoon had couldn't get to them for all the AT stuff the Taliban were throwing at them. Also, the wheeled suspension of the Strykers couldn't take the off-road conditions there and the hulls were cracking. Not good.

Now the Strykers are being replaced in A-Stan with rebuilt M-113A3s with the full armour kit and the old Leopard 1s have been replaced by Leopard 2s. Even an Infantry Battalion now has a Tank Squadron (Company) permanently attached for COIN in Afghanistan, and all the Rifle Companies have tracks to get them to where they need to go.

Another excellent point ski about the Army Reserve. Ever since the last handful or so of AR Separate Brigades were disbanded in the 90's, the AR has little capacity to reform said without a major effort taking several years at least. And given that Reserve recruiting isn't the hottest in recent years, and the IRR has been combed out to bring AC units up to strength, the AR is probably in little condition to attempt an expansion.

Or even the Active Army, for that matter.:(

[J Wolfsberger]

Where we got in trouble in OIF was having a SecDef who was addicted to glitzy techno fixes. (His addiction goes all the way back to the 1970s.) The structure, equipment, TTPs, etc. may have created problems for us, but nothing as severe as the insistence that the services would somehow pull a quick fix out of the hat if their advice was ignored.

What should have come first is the mission to be accomplished, in context. I don't recall any discussion of the fact that the state of Iraq was created from the remains of the Ottoman Empire, for the convenience of the British and French negotiators, and represented no underlying nation. But that has been one of the major drivers of subsequent events. Instead, we had "regime change" followed by "nation building," none of which, at the time, was defined in the context of who we would be dealing with. What we did not have was any sort of accurate picture of who would emerge as the significant power wielders, what their relationships were, who the significant groups were, how they differed, what they agreed on, etc. In fact, I don't think the decision makers even realized it was necessary.

Given that the mission is correctly defined, the second step is determining what is required to accomplish it. In OIF it was boots on the ground, which didn't accord with the SecDefs desire for a techno fix, and was ignored. (And if I recall correctly, the messenger, Shinseki, was "shot.") Part of this step is also looking at what equipment is available or can be developed, and how it contributes to accomplishing the mission.

I think the proper approach to answering the thread topic, and the larger questions behind it, is to ask the right questions. Do my missions in Iraq require the troops to have mobility, some protection and occasionally a base of fire? If the answer is yes, then at a minimum you need Stryker, Bradley, LAV, M113, Warrior, or some other APC/ICV. Does my enemy have the potential to bring in heavy ATGM on occasion? If the answer is yes, then you need Abrams, Leopard, Challenger, etc.

Mechanization, per se, neither contributes nor detracts from performing the mission. Fixing on it as a solution in and of itself leads to the same sort of problem our Air Force counterparts face - flying around with 2000 pound bombs and no one to drop them on.

[Rob Thornton]

. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.


2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.


3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.


5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.


6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7
. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

I'd agree with you for the most part.


8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.


Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.


We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Ski]

Interesting points about Canadian Strykers/LAV III's - did not know they were having stress issues on the frames due to combat operations.

The Army Reserve was also formed as a medical reserve in WWI for docs and nurses. As the country went to a total war capability in WWII, the USAR was expanded to become a fully structured component of the Army with combat, combat support and combat service support functions. In 1993, the USAR gave up all of its combat structure in order to get more CS/CSS from the ARNG and everyone has been happy-ish since.




Excellent points Ski.:) I would not want to send an SBCT, let alone 2-Battalion + 1-Cav Sqn IBCT into an area where it may have to fight heavy armour formations, and that's even if such "Rapid-Deployment" formations really can be moved that quickly with all the logistics they'll need plus all the airpower and logistics that they'll need. I don't remember which Army officer wrote this in his CGSC monograph a few years ago, but his own summary of the changes over recent years was that "the current empahisis on getting lighter forces to the battlefield quickly is the Transformational equivalent of getting Custer to the Little Big Horn Faster". I think that it is supremely important to formally recognize the capabilities and limitations of each type of Formation and not try to shoe-horn Formations into a Doctrine or Concept that perhaps isn't really viable.

I worked with the original LAV-1 and loathed it, and with the LAV-25 (which was a definite improvement in terms of comfort); but despite a lot of what people in the Canadian Army were saying at the time about what new capabilities the LAV-25 (our recce versions back then had a good deal of the kit now in the LAV-III Strykers, which we also have too) gave us, it was just as clear that the LAV was in no way able to keep out even an errant 3" shell from a Sherman parked at a museum, let alone from the T-55s and T-72s that folks in the Balkans liked to use to intimidate our guys. We were forced to bring back the old Leopard I tank (and subsequently cancel the LAV-MGS) after a Platoon of 1RCR was ambushed in an village in Afghanistan, with one Section being pinned down and practically wiped out because the Strykers the Platoon had couldn't get to them for all the AT stuff the Taliban were throwing at them. Also, the wheeled suspension of the Strykers couldn't take the off-road conditions there and the hulls were cracking. Not good.

Now the Strykers are being replaced in A-Stan with rebuilt M-113A3s with the full armour kit and the old Leopard 1s have been replaced by Leopard 2s. Even an Infantry Battalion now has a Tank Squadron (Company) permanently attached for COIN in Afghanistan, and all the Rifle Companies have tracks to get them to where they need to go.

Another excellent point ski about the Army Reserve. Ever since the last handful or so of AR Separate Brigades were disbanded in the 90's, the AR has little capacity to reform said without a major effort taking several years at least. And given that Reserve recruiting isn't the hottest in recent years, and the IRR has been combed out to bring AC units up to strength, the AR is probably in little condition to attempt an expansion.

Or even the Active Army, for that matter.:(

[Ski]

Rob

Sorry if I wrote my response in a snotty tone - didn't realize it until I posted it...

My point about how units are deploying is exactly the problem. The force structure we've built is not what is being used in theater, and since we've had to buy Billions worth of HWMMV's (and possibly MRAP's), and we've been forced to change how we fight and train for the current wars, I think we've created a force for an enemy we aren't fighting now (and who knows if the structure we've created will be used any time in the future). We've borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars to sustain military operations that is going to have to be paid back - at some time. We may not have the fiscal flexibility in the future...

Yeah - 21 IBCT's now...lots of good reasons why the force changed...

It'll cost more to move the Heavies into the USAR than its worth, and all the issues that surround the HBCT's in the ARNG will migrate over there...but you'll have all the individual augmentees you want from the USAR.

All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...

FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

As I said, we live in interesting times.

"Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"



Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.



I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.



What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.



My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.



Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

I'd agree with you for the most part.



Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.



And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.



Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Ski - no worries - I believe a little passion in a discussion is a good thing - keeps us from getting too comfortable in our ideas.:D

Good point about the MRAPs - I've heard the Marines are considering shrink wrapping a portion - while the MRAPs has degrees of utility in OIF (based on where and which MRAPs get fielded and what units use them for (Joe will probably find a good use for any piece of equipment) - In Afghanistan conditions create different requirements - I don't suspect you'll see to many heavy MRAP in the high altitudes. So maybe our answer is like the Marines - and coincides with Ken's point about Multi-Purpose forces vs. GPF on the "Retooling the Artilleryman" thread - if a BCT was going to be tagged with working a COIN mission set in supportive terrain - maybe they get fielded a supporting package to include among other things a suite of MRAP vehicles as opposed to going with what is on there books. I don't know - but that might work.

Agree with you about the fiscal flexibility - particularly when t applies to supplementals - we need to make some decisions about where we're turning this super tanker pretty soon - I did read something today ref. justification for a larger % of the GDP toward Defense and other security related stuff.


All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...


This is something we're going to be struggling with for awhile I think - at least until we can regain some flexibility that allows for better planning - hard to do with a limited strategic reserve - maybe that will change over the next year.


FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

Largely agree with you here as well - I think the big value that will come out of this to us is contingent on how we view its utility. If its viewed as a program to test and field useful tech to enable the soldier then we're probably in good shape - the moment we view it as a panacea or as a replacement for people - we've lost sight of how war is different then anything else. Allot of what is under the FCS umbrella of tech makes it to the Force in other ways - I think in the end - no matter if we call it FCS or not - it will be a gradual evolution of stuff that better equips the Force - in some cases it will just come across as some new LINs with a NET program, or maybe it'll be even more transparent. I worried allot about the FCS MGVs when I sat in a mock up - however I know the EBCT CDR down at Bliss and have enough faith in him a leader to believe he will not mortgage our future - personalities matter and he is the right 06 - one that understands well how to tell more senior leaders why something does not work, and how Industry might be trying to hide it. Honestly, among the best leaders I've ever known.


As I said, we live in interesting times. "Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"

Agreed - ultimately its comes down to our ability to play a better game with the cards we've been dealt then the other guy - and to hope his hand sucks more then ours;)
Best, Rob

[Coy R. Greer]

Sirs and Senior NCO's
Normally in a forum such as this, I would just read and learn. However, for a long time and in a quite a few articles that have been published surrounding the units that responded to and fought in Sadr City on April 4, 2004, one unit who attacked straight through the middle of the city has either been overlooked completely or Identified as something it was not. That unit was C Troop, 1st Squadron 2D ACR. We went right through the middle of the city, leapfrogging intersection to intersection, 2 platoons at a time. After a couple of unsucessful assaults by Militia while halted and defending in the intersections, the troop made linkup with a tank company from 2/37 at the Sadr Bureau. A platoon from this company took the lead, and the 4 Commanche Troop 1/2 ACR Scout platoons along with the Mortar platoon continued to run and gun right up the middle of Sadr city. We then went over towards Al Rasheed and Hit a few enemy combatants there as well. This Assault through Sadr City was conducted from Unarmored Humvee's with no doors! In the case of the Mortar Platoon, they piled in the back of 1SG Semerena's 6 pack and one of their own 6 packs, ripped off the covers, and took a knee back to back facing and engaging with M203, Saws, and M16s. Our troop was awarded 8 Arcoms w/V, numerous more Arcoms, and I believe 2 Bronze Stars. In spite of this, the Article listed here https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/currentissues/2004/Nd04/6moore04c.pdf
claims that the force that attacked into Sadr City was pure Armor with NO Infantry or Scouts. It was NOT pure Armor and there were Scouts and Infantry Assaulting forward, mounted and dismounted, capturing terrain, and sucessfully holding it. On top of that, accounts of the units involved in the counter attack into the city to reach the cut off troops and recapture key infrastructure claim ONLY Task Force 2/37 tank companies were sent into the fight, and this is simply not true! Coincidentally that was the SECOND time that half of C Troop 1/2 ACR went into the City during the fight. The first time was at 1800 with COL Mark Calvert,( at that time LTC Calvert). Two platoons of Scouts from C Troop, in 8 unarmored Humvees, and a Squadron Commander went in, maneuvered, engaged enemy combatants,captured one of Sadr's Leaders, and came back out, all alive, all vehicles operational. However, everyone, every account, every article written, acts like none of those things ever happened. Can anybody tell me why? I mentioned the awards received by the unit earlier because the orders for the awards received through out the Scout and Mortar Platoons are verifiable and undeniable proof of the involvement of the Troop with date, times, and actions. What I cant understand is why Commanche Troop 1/2 ACR participation on April 4 2004 is either omitted or complete denied all together? How can 120 Scouts and Mortars in unarmored humvees, shooting their way up the middle of the city, linking up with Armor, and continuing the attack, be "forgotten or denied"? And my biggest question is, why? Is it because we did something that we shouldn't have been able to? Is it because it would raise some questions it shouldnt? Is it perhaps because a unit that light doing what it did would steal the thunder from someone's "Pure Armor COIN Fight" concept? Or does the admission of C Troop 1/2 ACR in that fight open some kind of Pandora's box I don't know about?

[Cavguy]

Sirs and Senior NCO's
Normally in a forum such as this, I would just read and learn. However, for a long time and in a quite a few articles that have been published surrounding the units that responded to and fought in Sadr City on April 4, 2004, one unit who attacked straight through the middle of the city has either been overlooked completely or Identified as something it was not. That unit was C Troop, 1st Squadron 2D ACR. In spite of this, the Article listed here https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/currentissues/2004/Nd04/6moore04c.pdf
claims that the force that attacked into Sadr City was pure Armor with NO Infantry or Scouts. Is it perhaps because a unit that light doing what it did would steal the thunder from someone's "Pure Armor COIN Fight" concept? Or does the admission of C Troop 1/2 ACR in that fight open some kind of Pandora's box I don't know about?

Whoa whoa whoa - you're misinterpreting the event discussed and what CPT Moore meant, and talking about a separate action. There were multiple fights occuring in different areas, CPT Moore's article discusses one. Also I don't think CPT Moore thought it was the bright to attack without scout/infantry backup, he simply had no choice. Trust me, everyone in 2-37 loved 2ACR's scouts. If that's what you got out of it, you read it wrong.

You're talking about 1/2 ACR, and their attack out of WarEagle to the East side of Sadr City. CPT Geoff Wright with B/2-37 supported you guys with tanks attacking in the raid you describe, which was combined. I know because I commanded his company after we got back, and heard the stories. We had A/1/2 in our task org. BLUF, love the 19D's in the regiment. GREAT fighters.

The article expressly talks about the rescue of one platoon of C/2-5 CAV by CPT Moore and C/2-37 AR. It's about his action, not the WHOLE action. I know his account is true, I battle-tracked the fight and also ran the log support and had to account for the wounded and dead from TF 2-37. He also received the Silver Star for his action at the recommendation of COL (P) Abrams and BG May, the regimental commander.

But like all articles, it is a soda straw view. 1/2 ACR and LTC (now COL) Calvert raided east side targets, and established blocking positions. 2/5 CAV attempted to rescue their guys in the back of LMTV's. TF 1-37 and TF 1-36were in action on the west side of Sadr City that night. Hell of a fight that night, lots of stories to tell. Various elements secured the Sadr City DAC. Of course, later we all went south, you guys to Al Kut, us to Najaf, and 3/2 to Diawaynah and Najaf.

(I was with 2-37 - in your task org) Thanks for posting. Please post your intro in the thread. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=27) so we can tap into your experience.

I would say no one knows about it because no one has written it, and no embedded reporters were around at the time. You never know about the stories you never tell. I suggest writing your experiences down for ARMOR. Would be an interesting read!

As a side note, I just wrote the first article about Ramadi (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/how-the-west-was-won/)from mid-2006 to early 2007 in Military Review. When writing abbreviated accounts it's tough to mention everyone and everything, which is hard, because you want to do them all justice. But sometimes you just have to focus on the absolute key actions to get a coherent narrative togther. There's about six more articles needed to flesh out that account, and I'm sure CPT Moore faced the same writing his. It also can be that he only saw the action through his POV, and like all stories, there are multiple ones needed to create the full picture.

BTW, you ever read "The Long Road Home" (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Road-Home-Story-Family/dp/0425219348/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1206298707&sr=8-1)? It mainly focuses on 2/5 CAV's losses that day.

Toujours Pret!

[Coy R. Greer]

Cavguy,
Sir, Im sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intend on ever making more than just this post. Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it. I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
Sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intending on ever making more than just this post. Im just a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I even attempt it. I have just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

Don't let rank intimidate you out on this site. As long as you stay respectful, chime in! The ROE here is loose. You can disagree with a superior officer/nco here as long as it's making a point, and stays on the professional level. That's the beauty of this forum. Everyone here abides by that concept - I've disagreed vehemently on this forum with superior officers on certain subjects.

Your experiences provide a tremendous insight as well. Believe it or not, we don't have all the answers. I still encourage you to write an article. Even if you don't think you write well, an editor will clean it up if you give them the meat. Certainly the case in my articles! :D

[Cavguy]

I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

Really, no one's written a comprehensive history of that night. Some small stories discussed above, but an enterprising writer/historian could make quite a book of April 2004 - the month that defined the next 2 years in Iraq (Sadr Rebellion and 1st Fallujah). Alternately titled "When the wheels came off the Bus". :wry: Actually, I believe the tipping point was the UN Bombing in August 2003, when the NGO's all left immediately afterwards and the terror campaign began full swing.

Were you there that day at the UN Bombing? I watched LTC Calvert get his ass chewed by LTG Sanchez in a supreme display of bad leadership and character given the miracles worked by 2ACR that day. LTG Sanchez's conduct that day still gets me mad. Alternately, I got my first media appearance on CNN. Reporters were running amok just after it happened, and we couldn't control them from running into the rubble with cameras. My BN S3 asked me to get them under control. I shouted "WHO WANTS A BRIEFING!" as loud as I could. It was like throwing those fish food pebbles in a koi pond. Immediately I had 20 cameras shoved in my face, and I gave a ten minute session where I told them essentially that yes, the building was bombed, and no, we didn't know what it was yet. The funniest question was a female reporter who shouted "Was it an RPG?" when behind me was a hotel blown in half. :o

Did get them out of the rubble while the perimeter was set. :D

[marct]

Hi Coy,


Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it.


Don't let rank intimidate you out on this site. As long as you stay respectful, chime in! The ROE here is loose. You can disagree with a superior officer/nco here as long as it's making a point, and stays on the professional level. That's the beauty of this forum.

Let me second Cavguy's comments - "Chime in" :D. Anyway, not everyone here is a serving officer or NCO. Some of us have no military experience at all :eek:. Outside of the general "professionally loose" culture here, we really do both want and need input from every rank and POV.


Your experiences provide a tremendous insight as well. Believe it or not, we don't have all the answers. I still encourage you to write an article. Even if you don't think you write well, an editor will clean it up if you give them the meat. Certainly the case in my articles! :D

Also agree with all of this, even if I'm the one who has to do the editing :D!

Marc

[Ken White]

jump in. Your perspective will be helpful.

Cav Guy can handle the Ossifers and if any NCOs try to jump your case, I can handle them -- I know I've got time in grade on all of 'em (Which means nothing except I'm old... :D ).

Seriously, welcome and I'm sure no one will hassle you.

Scouts out... :cool:

[selil]

Cavguy,
Sir, Im sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intend on ever making more than just this post. Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it. I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!


You'll learn a lot more if you participate. Academic credentials aside the highest grade I ever made was corporal.

[Steve Blair]

You'll learn a lot more if you participate. Academic credentials aside the highest grade I ever made was corporal.

First and foremost, we're a discussion board aimed at understanding and exploring the concepts involved with small wars. One of our key concepts is respecting your fellow posters, regardless of rank and status. We're not a military board, so the content of your head is more important than what's on your shoulders.:)

The mods here will whack someone who's disrespectful of a fellow poster (which isn't the same thing as disagreeing with someone...we have lots of energetic discussions here...the key is to go after the IDEA, not the PERSON).

I'm a big fan of combined arms cav in small wars situations, so I'm especially happy to see more cav guys taking part in the discussion. Welcome aboard!

[RTK]

... and if any NCOs try to jump your case, I can handle them -- I know I've got time in grade on all of 'em (Which means nothing except I'm old... :D ).

Seriously, Ken had Moses beat on time in grade by almost a full year. He was on con leave during the Red Sea operation...

[William F. Owen]

Seriously, Ken had Moses beat on time in grade by almost a full year. He was on con leave during the Red Sea operation...

Wasn't Ken the chief instructor on the River Crossing Course Moses attended?

[Ken White]

student. He later mistranslated the 10th Commandment, putting an unnecessary 'not' in there.

Crossing prep for the Red Sea was way too slow, it could've been a tactical disaster had he not been lucky... :D

And I wasn't on leave, just had a bad hangover. Caused me to have to walk across atop the water a little later, evading all the way. Thank Mars for amateurs... :cool:

[Cavguy]

I was asked a few months ago to contribute to the Air Land Sea Bulletin a 1500 word essay on the relevance of armored forces in urban terrain. I used the ideas in this thread to write the short piece. While it could use some additional detail, hopefully it adds to the discussion. I also only had a 24h suspense, so it was more of an op-ed than a research case.

It's here (http://www.alsa.mil/documents/alsb/ALSB%202008-1.pdf)on Page 6. The editor didn't change it at all, (my bad), so there's a few embarassing grammar mistakes. They also got my location/assignment wrong, but that's ok.

[Ron Humphrey]

I was asked a few months ago to contribute to the Air Land Sea Bulletin a 1500 word essay on the relevance of armored forces in urban terrain. I used the ideas in this thread to write the short piece. While it could use some additional detail, hopefully it adds to the discussion. I also only had a 24h suspense, so it was more of an op-ed than a research case.

It's here (http://www.alsa.mil/documents/alsb/ALSB%202008-1.pdf)on Page 6. The editor didn't change it at all, (my bad), so there's a few embarassing grammar mistakes. They also got my location/assignment wrong, but that's ok.

Thought it very clear and easy to understand.:D

[Surferbeetle]

Thought it very clear and easy to understand.:D


Cavguy,

I am with Ron on his assessment, you write well and your point is clear. I just caught up with your description of your work in Ramadi in a previous thread (dated first part of 2007) here at SWJ. Words can't really capture my thoughts on this...I am glad that you posted it.

Regards,

Steve

[Entropy]

I was asked a few months ago to contribute to the Air Land Sea Bulletin a 1500 word essay on the relevance of armored forces in urban terrain. I used the ideas in this thread to write the short piece. While it could use some additional detail, hopefully it adds to the discussion. I also only had a 24h suspense, so it was more of an op-ed than a research case.

It's here (http://www.alsa.mil/documents/alsb/ALSB%202008-1.pdf)on Page 6. The editor didn't change it at all, (my bad), so there's a few embarassing grammar mistakes. They also got my location/assignment wrong, but that's ok.

Nice article! I didn't know the Russians got so thrashed in Grozny. Why did they fail so completely while we were so successful?

[Cavguy]

Nice article! I didn't know the Russians got so thrashed in Grozny. Why did they fail so completely while we were so successful?
In order - poor planning, inadequate training, poor leadership, and ill-maintained equipment.

Basically, by 1994 the Russian army had degenerated into a mostly unmotivated conscript force brutally treated by its officers. The officership was also uneven. The motorized brigade actually had more light armor (BRDM and BTR) than anything, and fewer tanks. The Russians arrogantly charged into the center of the city, where the Chechens cut the supply line and proceeded to destroy the Russians in close urban combat. The ill-trained and poorly led Russian soldiers were beaten by motivated urban guerrillas.

The Chechens were highly motivated, reasonably led, and schooled in the vulerabilities of Russian Armor. They led the Brigade into a trap, cut off logistics, and decimated them.

The Russians in turn leveled Grozny. Putin reorganized the army and in 1999 avenged the defeat and mostly crushed the Chechen rebellion. They did it through the "Roman" version of COIN - mass slaughter and intimidation. Also some well targeted campaigns to assassinate Chechen leaders. However, it still festers.

I read a great article awhile back that was a good overview, I think in ARMOR circa 1999. When I attended OBC it was the subject of great study by the Armor Center - and led to many of the conclusions in the paper.

UPDATE: ARMOR article "The Battle of Grozny" by CPT Chad Rupe HERE (https://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/armormag/backissues/1990s/1999/mj99/3groz99.pdf)- should be public access for this one.


"When the Russian columns advanced into the center of Grozny, the men expected to disband poorly trained civilian mobs through a show of force by the Russian Army. Ordered not to fire unless fired upon, the
vehicle commanders did not bother to load their machine guns. Infantrymen slept in the back of their personnel carriers. Vehicle commanders had the audacity and confidence to navigate through the city without large scale maps or guides. But as they ended up on dead end streets and in gardens, the columns quickly lost their confidence and their lives."

"Hunter-killer teams of Chechens brought the columns to an explosive halt. They operated in groups of 15 to 20 personnel, broken down into five or six teams consisting of three to four men each. Each team had an antitank gunner, equipped with an RPG-7 or RPG-18, a machine gunner, an ammunition carrier, and a sniper. As the Russians advanced, the rebels moved in behind and parallel to the columns. Using hand-held radios, rebel scouts, “hunters,” coordinated with infantry, “killers,” to establish ambushes. A group of 15 to 20 personnel moved to overlook each armored column from multi-story buildings.20 Initiating ambushes with RPG fire on the lead and trail vehicles, the rebels quickly destroyed all personnel and vehicles. Lacking air cover and all support, the main effort was annihilated short of its final objective."

"During the first 10 months of the conflict, the Russians lost over 300 armored vehicles, 2,000 men KIA, 600 men MIA, and 6,000 men WIA. In the Battle of Grozny, it is estimated that 25,000 residents, rebels, and Russian solders died"Bad Day for the Russian Army.

[Entropy]

Fascinating stuff - thanks!

[reed11b]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?
In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone? Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC. Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support. There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers. Cavguy can probably give some strong examples. Rob's example of the Strykers calling them "trucks" is a good start on how to avoid what you describe. The one thing I don't like about strykers is that they appear to be complicated to operate, i.e. need additional training. The IMV's that I like look and operate like a "truck". Now I have never served in an SBCT so my belief in there complexity may have no basis in reality, but there expense is certainly more then is required for a good IMV.
Reed

[Ken White]

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?The assigned drivers for the 2 1/2s in the Airborne units. Now ask me who drove the Tracks from the APC Battalion in the 7th Inf Div (ROCID) in the late 50s. Or ask me who drove the tracks in the Mech Bde I was in in during my 75-76 tour in Korea. Answer's the same, the drivers -- what's your point? Mine is that vehicles need drivers (a person), usually some security (another person or two) or to leave the area. The real point was in a discussion of Mech or mounted units (i.e. assigned vehicles) units, not transported infantry.
In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone?Because in addition to the driver (who as you point out, was not in your examples a member of the Platoon but of a support or another element...) with most modern vehicles you have to leave someone to man the gun. In the Bradley because of the capacity, you also have to leave a third guy behind to pass up additional 25mm to the gunner. So you're confronted with the fact that your seven dismounts (IF you have all of them) are reduced to five or six. You're also stuck with the fact that mounted troops are absolutely not going to get too far away from their vehicles under most circumstances. Recall again, the discussion is on units with assigned vehicles.
Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC.There's that word again. if, indeed...
Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support.No question about that. I however, have no clue how we ever won a fight without all that sruff... :D
There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers.Sorry, don't understand that???

[William F. Owen]

Here are my conclusions on Infantry Mechanisation.

A.) The platoon ORBAT is/should be optimised to fight/operate dismounted. Mechanisation means picking up and transporting folks who are "Light Infantry."

B.) Driving and fighting almost any modern armoured military vehicle is a specialist skill requiring a good dedicated course of instruction. The vehicle crew (always 2 or 2+) does not have to be infantrymen.

C.) The vehicle crew should not be considered part of the section/squad or platoon. Personally, I can see great merit in having a Mech Platoon (14-16 vehicles , so 28-32 men) at the Company level. BN would have "Mech" companies.

D.) There is a world of difference between operating with an MRAP vehicle and a MICV. They are two entirely different doctrines.

MRAPS/JLTV and APCs are protected mobility for "Light Infantry". IMO, It is the minimum standard for all infantry!

MICVs are another thing entirely. Yes, I confess there is now a lot of cross-over between an MICV and some APCs, but my basic contention is that it is almost entirely to do with what you expect of the vehicle.

[reed11b]

you beat me too it. I agree w/ you Ken that Mechanization ; as in Bradlys or other IFVs, does reduce boots on the ground. At the same time it increases area reachable and range of operations. One way to reduce the loss of infantry skill would be to have the IFVs and there operators in a sepperate platoon. A Bradley requires a complex skill set that is very differnt from being an infantryman. There would still be less total troops in a Bradley company, but just as many available for dismount and they could focus on training on there dismount skill sets while bradley operators retained skills at fireing and driving a bradley.
As far as IMV's go, if they can be operated by anyone in the Bat. and you are using vehicles in "light" infantry ops anyway (becouse we and everyone else is too) how does making that mobility protected cost troops on the ground or infantry skills and abilities?
Reed
Sorry I know this could be clearer but it's late and I'm up past my nap time.

[Ken White]

I have some experience in the fighting on foot / picking up transporting "light infantry with non-dedicated vehicles. The US Army did that from the late 50s until the mid 60s. Problems: Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking (Yes, they need to be trained -- and plain old riflemen training is a good base from which to start), the track commanders were similarly poorly trained and the crew just wanted to transport and not get involved in the fight. Doesn't work that way. So, yes, the training of the crew is very important -- and they should at least have a basic understanding of Infantry tactics. They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.

A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided...

MRAPS are dangerous; vehicle hugging becomes a driving force (pun intended); the troops don't want to leave the armored (and today, air conditioned) cocoon. The vehicles are unwieldy, cannot ever offer 100% protection and thus provide a false sense of security (as does ALL armor). They need to be left in Iraq and not replicated. I'm not going to waste a lot of time discussing those expensive monstrosities with such limited use. I have no problem with buying special equipment for special purposes or units but the driving force should be military requirements and not a PR problem exacerbated by commentary from ill informed people (or equally ill informed partisan hacks in Congress).

Add to that that Armor can lull you into a false sense of security -- NOTHING is bullet proof, the heavier the vehicle, the less agility it possesses (and, generally, the less the using unit has tactically speaking); the fact that the vehicles must be protected; may or may not (and should or should not) be able to lend to the fight or mission with mounted weapons or even limited maneuver and I suggest that to say, categorically, that vehicles are good and the drivers / crews need not be infantry or a part of the unit is likely to be incorrect.

JLTV and APCs and protected mobility are not a panacea and their use should be totally METT-TC based; there's a time and a place for them, no question -- there's also the fact that they are inimical to some missions and do not suit all terrain and environments. I think the old dictum, 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.

Use of any vehicles by Infantry reduce the number of dismounts. In the old Airborne Battle Group and Battalion Recon Platoons with the M 151, a third of the strength was driving. My Sons Rifle Platoon in OIF II had a slew of unarmored HMMWVs with no turrets and ad hoc weapons mounts; they carried more people so he only lost a fifth of his strength to the vehicles. Later, in OEF IV (or V, can't recall) he had an Antitank Platoon, armored HMMWVs with turrets -- back to a third or fourth of the strength left with the vehicles. I do not see how anyone can argue that vehicles in a given situation do not impact the number of troops on the ground. That's true in any circumstance but certainly true if the vehicles are organic.

Mounted troops do not like to leave their vehicles and if forced to, they won't get too far away from them. That's logical and necessary but can be tactically limiting.

There is no question that Mech Infantry and 'Armored' Cavalry are necessary and that the application of force by such units differs from that of infantry. The issue is that in trying to blur the three, you end up with a hybrid that won't do any of the three very different jobs well. I'd submit our Cavalry already suffers from too much Armor / Mech blending and thus is really just a high speed mech outfit that doesn't do Recon at all well, though it's great at economy of force missions. Further, the 'mounting' of all infantry entails a loss of patrolling skill, perhaps the most important and critical infantry effort -- that, BTW, is documented IIRC from a Kilcullen Briefing; it got so bad in Iraq, they had to call in AWG to retrain infantry units in dismounted patrolling. That is pathetic, could have been quite dangerous and we're just lucky Iraq was a relatively benign environment that could tolerate such foolishness.

Cavalry is necessary and valuable, even if we don't do it right due to our impatience.

Mech Infantry is necessary and valuable. Walking infantry is equally necessary and valuable. 'Mounted' infantry is an idea looking for a home, is a hybrid -- and it will not do either job satisfactorily.

Long way of saying I disagree with both of you on this -- and that ought to be okay ;). I'd just posit that the METT-TC factors drive the train; there is no one size fits all and any use of vehicles entails a loss of foot troopies. Whether that loss is smart or not is totally situation dependent.

[reed11b]

Long way of saying I disagree with both of you on this -- and that ought to be okay . I'd just posit that the METT-TC factors drive the train; there is no one size fits all and any use of vehicles entails a loss of foot troopies. Whether that loss is smart or not is totally situation dependent.

But if I convert just one more to my point of view, I get a free toaster!;)
On the serious side, One of my disagreements with the SBCT concept is that the Styker is so fundamental to it, that even if the METT-TC demanded it, you will never hear "OK boys, were having additional aviation assets attached and were leaving the trucks behind." The current MRAPs are in fact better left behind, being poorly designed to do anything other then survive mine blasts, and the RG-31 and similar designs are not what I am referring to when I talk about an IMV. Ideally an IMV should affordable, simple, and provide some degree of protection and operational (not tactical) mobility. Even support vehicles need some degree of protection as we re-learned the hard-way..again.
Reed

[Ken White]

But if I convert just one more to my point of view, I get a free toaster!;)doesn't count even in horseshoes... :D

On the serious side, One of my disagreements with the SBCT concept is that the Styker is so fundamental to it, that even if the METT-TC demanded it, you will never hear "OK boys, were having additional aviation assets attached and were leaving the trucks behind."also true of Mech inf and Bradleys or whatever -- thank you for making my point. ;)
The current MRAPs are in fact better left behind, being poorly designed to do anything other then survive mine blasts, and the RG-31 and similar designs are not what I am referring to when I talk about an IMV. Ideally an IMV should affordable, simple, and provide some degree of protection and operational (not tactical) mobility.If it's an 'infantry' vehicle, it needs tactical mobility, period. That generally means 'lighter' thus little or no Armor -- which works for me, Armor is vastly over rated as a protective device; it offers some, no question but it also has a number of down sides. Better operational mobility is generally provided by aircraft for infantry in most circumstances though Armor and Mach do need operational AND tactical mobility in their vehicles. That's achievable.
Even support vehicles need some degree of protection as we re-learned the hard-way..again.METT-TC. Cannot understand why that concept is so hard to accept; one size fits all never works well for warfare. Leslie J. McNair and his stupid 'everything should be GP...' mantra screwed up the thinking of the US Army.

Support vehicles need some form of protection if -- and only if -- you're going to operate in an environment where it's required. In other -- most -- situations, you're just wasting money on an unneeded capability. Every penny spent on junk not needed is money not spent on training which is needed and which we do not do well -- due to financial constraints. Best solution is not to go with pure protected as some seem poised to do but to have vehicles which can be easily up armored, threat dependent -- which some others are also trying to do.

[reed11b]

Ken?
How “tactically” mobile were the HMMWV and FMTV trucks the infantry relied on before? Sure they “some” off-road capacity, but believe me, I have gotten many a HMMWV stuck. Any of the IMV’s that Wilf or I advocate have the same “tactical” mobility range as these vehicles and are simple enough to be left behind if specialty tracks (like the Australians and Brits have done in East Timor and Afghanistan) or helicopters or plan old forced marches are better suited. Also,

In the old Airborne Battle Group and Battalion Recon Platoons with the M 151, a third of the strength was driving. My Sons Rifle Platoon in OIF II had a slew of unarmored HMMWVs with no turrets and ad hoc weapons mounts; they carried more people so he only lost a fifth of his strength to the vehicles. Later, in OEF IV (or V, can't recall) he had an Antitank Platoon, armored HMMWVs with turrets -- back to a third or fourth of the strength left with the vehicles.
as you point out, a signifigent amount of the force gets tied up in vehicles regardless. If an IMV holds as many troops or more then the PC HMMWVs, doesn't that increase the troops available?

Helicopters do provide potentially better mobility, however, unless you are advocating for decentralized helicopter distribution (which does not work very well either), they have problems as well. They are very expensive to operate, take a great deal of advance planning the way they are currently set up, and have vulnerabilities to MANPADS and planned ambushes. Like you say, METT-TC dictates. The core concept to the IMV is that it is NOT a “system of systems” and simply an affordable force multiplier if METT-TC dictates. Historically, since they have been shown to be the most likely to be utilized, the easiest and most affordable to operate, since they do not require a unique skill set as helicopters and IFVs do, why not make them organic? This means the operators will in-fact have infantry skills. Don’t need them, don’t use them. Need them, and if they are not available, that’s were situations like Somalia and the 2-5 CAV QRF rescue attempt in Sadr City occur.

One more question.. you state

Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking (Yes, they need to be trained -- and plain old riflemen training is a good base from which to start), the track commanders were similarly poorly trained and the crew just wanted to transport and not get involved in the fight. Doesn't work that way. So, yes, the training of the crew is very important -- and they should at least have a basic understanding of Infantry tactics. They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.
But then you state

A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided...
IFVs are aggressive fighting vehicles, so why is the first quote be relevant to them? They are designed to get in and mix it up with the enemy. If you do not want to lose the cohesion and training for infantry platoons, then you have to separate the IFVs (and the unique skill sets required to operate them well) and the Infantry squads. Even if they stay in the platoon, the manning can’t come out of the individual squads, or else you are never capable of dismounting an effective infantry squad/platoon, period. So the question is, what is your suggestion to reduce the infantry manpower and skill drain in the Mech units? Having the troops rotate between light and heavy outfits is a good start but it only addresses part of the issue. What else is there? You have been around for a variety of concepts, what works best in your eyes?


Walking infantry is equally necessary and valuable
ALL infantry is walking infantry since they require essentially the same skill set and there job starts once they "dismount". All Infantry needs to be able to utilize IFVs, IMVs and aircraft if the TA-DA! METT-TC determines them to be valuable. The ability to dismount and fight effectivly are determined more by..TA-DA again! training, training and training.
Reed
P.S. Do I get my toaster yet?:wry:

[Ken White]

That doesn't bother me...
Ken?
How “tactically” mobile were the HMMWV and FMTV trucks the infantry relied on before?Before what? The HMMWV is a poor vehicle IMO, yet another example of the compromises the Army must make to achieve the 'GP' functionality it is unduly enamored of. The FMTV is more mobile than its predecessors and that's good; the HMMWV just has a little better ground clearnce and more power. It is a poor military vehicle. Neither is really a tactical vehicle, they are trucks, no more and no less.
Sure they “some” off-road capacity, but believe me, I have gotten many a HMMWV stuck.Proving that tactical driver training, including things not to try, is very, very important. :D

I've been stuck, too. learned how to avoid that and, more importantly, teach others how to avoid it. Tracks and wheels. A thrown track by hitting a dip in a a side slope traverse is as much a mobility kill as one blown off. You cannot just put anyone behind the wheel of a tactical vehicle and ever expect good results.
Any of the IMV’s that Wilf or I advocate have the same “tactical” mobility range as these vehiclesThat's not saying much, better solutions are available.
and are simple enough to be left behind if specialty tracks (like the Australians and Brits have done in East Timor and Afghanistan) or helicopters or plan old forced marches are better suited.Left behind where? In a tactical situation? In theater if you leave? ???
...as you point out, a signifigent amount of the force gets tied up in vehicles regardless. If an IMV holds as many troops or more then the PC HMMWVs, doesn't that increase the troops available?Obviously -- but you still have the security of the vehicles and the don't get too far away from them syndromes to worry about. I'm not saying never, merely that it's situation dependent and one is probably advised not to try to create an either / or rule.
Helicopters do provide potentially better mobility, however, unless you are advocating for decentralized helicopter distribution (which does not work very well either)Didn't say helicopters, said aircraft; MV22, C27, others. Oh it works very well, it just isn't terribly efficient -- the question is which is important, efficiency or effectiveness?
they have problems as well. They are very expensive to operate, take a great deal of advance planning the way they are currently set up, and have vulnerabilities to MANPADS and planned ambushes. Like you say, METT-TC dictates.Yep -- and anyone who contemplates their use should consider your negatives in their planning.
The core concept to the IMV is that it is NOT a “system of systems” and simply an affordable force multiplier if METT-TC dictates. I agree; IF. Big word, that...
Historically, since they have been shown to be the most likely to be utilized, the easiest and most affordable to operate, since they do not require a unique skill set as helicopters and IFVs do, why not make them organic? This means the operators will in-fact have infantry skills. Don’t need them, don’t use them. Need them, and if they are not available, that’s were situations like Somalia and the 2-5 CAV QRF rescue attempt in Sadr City occur.First, I'd say the 'historical' resord is brief and unclear. Second, depends on how much you want to pay for something you may not need. Or may not do all you think it will do. Can't comment on either Somalia or Sadr City, wasn't there. Found out a long time ago that expounding on actions one was not in was foolish -- commenting on actions one was in can even bring conflicting views from others who saw different things.
One more question.. you state""Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking ... They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.""
But then you state""A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided.""
IFVs are aggressive fighting vehicles, so why is the first quote be relevant to them?It isn't, the first quote was relevant only to the "put the infantry in carriers of some sort and operated by dedicated crews that are not a part of the transported unit" method. The second applied to Mech units with organic vehicles.
They are designed to get in and mix it up with the enemy. If you do not want to lose the cohesion and training for infantry platoons, then you have to separate the IFVs (and the unique skill sets required to operate them well) and the Infantry squads.Strongly disagree, the carrier of whatever type (and, if any, its weapons) and from where ever becomes part of the tactical operation; they and the dismounts have to train and, when possible, rehearse, together.
Even if they stay in the platoon, the manning can’t come out of the individual squads, or else you are never capable of dismounting an effective infantry squad/platoon, period.Yep.
So the question is, what is your suggestion to reduce the infantry manpower and skill drain in the Mech units? Having the troops rotate between light and heavy outfits is a good start but it only addresses part of the issue. What else is there? You have been around for a variety of concepts, what works best in your eyes?Dismounted and mounted infantry are two different animals and they have many interchangeable or transportable skills but different mindsets pertaining to operating techniques. Mech is mechanized and foot infantry isn't; three versus 30 clicks an hour; aggressively attacking versus letting the weapons do the work; bypass, regas and haul ass; lot of differences.
ALL infantry is walking infantry since they require essentially the same skill set and there job starts once they "dismount".Yes and no. Many skills do transfer but all do not. The mindset does not transfer. Quite simply, in my experience foot infantry is more aggressive and less risk averse than mech infantry. Mech Infantry is needed and has many advantages not least the mobility and the firepower and log support to troops supplied by the vehicles -- but those troops are tied to those vehicles. One can argue about the length of that tie but it is always and emphatically there. Size of the vehicle is usually going to limit the number of dismounts; five (the current norm, all things considered) per track gives you about 20-25 per mech platoon versus about 35-40 for a fairly full rifle platoon. That slight edge in strength give the foot guys more wiggle room and better ability to absorb casualties or other losses and still get a job done.

For a whole lot of reasons, I disagreed with the decision to do away with the 11M MOS. IMO that was done not because there was a recognition that there were not two discrete types of infantry in the US army but to make Infantry OSUT cheaper by single tracking and giving the Per Squirrels the ability to transfer square pegs to round holes at will. The mentality is, as I said, different...

As far as I'm concerned, Mech Infantry should be Armored Infantry and, while if I were King, I'd do away with Branches all together, if we have to have branches, the Heavy divisions ought to be Armor pure, including the foot combat dismounts.
All Infantry needs to be able to utilize IFVs, IMVs and aircraft if the TA-DA! METT-TC determines them to be valuable. The ability to dismount and fight effectivly are determined more by..TA-DA again! training, training and training.
P.S. Do I get my toaster yet?:wry:No -- but drop the IFVs out and that last paragraph got you closer... :D

[William F. Owen]

As far as I'm concerned, Mech Infantry should be Armored Infantry and, while if I were King, I'd do away with Branches all together, if we have to have branches, the Heavy divisions ought to be Armor pure, including the foot combat dismounts.No -- but drop the IFVs out and that last paragraph got you closer... :D

So does this mean the the medieval and ancient distinction of "heavy infantry" and "light infantry".

If so, this does have considerable merit. We'd have
"light infantry" with effective protected mobility to enable their light infantry mission - IMVs.
"heavy infantry" optimised to operate with armour formations.

[Ken White]

So does this mean the the medieval and ancient distinction of "heavy infantry" and "light infantry".That would work but being a traditionalist (when it suits... ;) ) I'd go for Infantry (period) and Dragoons.
If so, this does have considerable merit. We'd have
"light infantry" with effective protected mobility to enable their light infantry mission - IMVs. "heavy infantry" optimised to operate with armour formations.Change to:

Infantry, primarily foot mobile but able to quickly adapt to air or vehicle (including IMV) operations as the mission requires. Dragoons, primarily mounted in vehicles but prepared to dismount to provide close in protection for Armored formations and to provide limited range dismounted action on infantry like missions (added: ) as a component of Armored forces. The Armored force may be mounted in wheeled or tracked vehicles; the defining factor being their training and equipment aimed at highly mobile and predominantly mounted combat.

Armor also needs mounted engineer / pioneer types, specifically trained for the mission. I'm still searching for a name. Neither Drappers nor Sagoons seems to work very well... :D

[Mark O'Neill]

Armor also needs mounted engineer / pioneer types, specifically trained for the mission. I'm still searching for a name. Neither Drappers nor Sagoons seems to work very well... :D

that you are spot on with that observation! Ken, please don't do us anymore favours with 'new' names, we are happy enough with the one we have.

[Ken White]

or with the fact that my names don't work well??? :D

ArmorSaps would not be good, huh? :(

Sigh, no one appreciates the artistry in my soul...

(Ken exits stage left to seek solace in the glass...)

[Tom Odom]

or with the fact that my names don't work well??? :D

ArmorSaps would not be good, huh? :(

Sigh, no one appreciates the artistry in my soul...

(Ken exits stage left to seek solace in the glass...)

Arsssaps?

[Mark O'Neill]

I am not sure that changing the name would help the infantry or cavalry anyway - they are quite used to yelling out 'Follow the Sapper...." when things need to get moving.:p

[Ken White]

Mate, touché... ;)

[82redleg]

In the July-August 1985 issue of Infantry, COL (then) Huba Wass de Czege wrote an article describing the necesity for 3 kinds of infantry (https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/1985/1985_4/06_pf01.pdf) - he called them armored, regular and light.

Armored infantry's "primary mission is to support the advance of the tank." He concluded that the M2 Bradley equipped mechanized infantry (as then organized in the US Army) met this requirement well.

Light infantry is "specialized for rapid air transportability, clandestine insertion, very rugged terrain, night operations, infiltrations, raids, and ambushes."

Regular infantry, the force in between these forces, supporting tanks at the operational level, but supported by tanks at the tactical level.

He identifies a trend to skip the regular infantry, and push all infantry toward either light or armored.

In the Sep-Oct 1986 issue of Infantry, in an article titled "More on Infantry (https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/1986/1986_5/07_pf02.pdf)", he expands on this idea more, describing a void in the middle. It seems to me that this void is exactly the void that has been discussed in this thread- criticizing both light and armored infantry organizations for their weaknesses at regular infantry tasks. In this article, he identifies the "motorized" infantry of the 9th ID as "a 'light' variant of the regular infantry". SBCTs- which I see as a modern type of the regular infantry- seem popular in this thread.

On another interesting note, in the 1986 article, he discusses organizing "modular" division headquarters with the capability to C2 different types of brigades that are logistically self-sufficient and tied directly into the COSCOM logistics chain. This seems very like the current BCT structure.

[sullygoarmy]

I am coming in late to this discussion but will add my $.02 worth. I started out as a light infantry officer with the 82d and eventually became an Armor officer in 1ID. Bottom line: it was all about trying to achieve a balance. In the 82d, I had a commander in the delta company (AT HMMWVS) that refused to get out of his truck and did not his 11Hs getting out their trucks...stupid but that was his take on how to conduct mounted operations. Not smart, not effective but his. Of course as soon as he was out of eyeshot, the NCOs kicked out a guy to recon up to IV lines, stash the trucks and conduct dismounted sweeps. See "Boot on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations" by John McGrath (OP 16 at CSI website) (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp#global) and so did the tankers of A/1-63 Armor. We added in dismounted road marches, patrolling, reflexive fire courses and urban (dismounted) operations to sharpen their skills. They were just as good as the infantry companies I was with in the 82d and great tankers to boot.

While the authors of this study do have some valid points in terms of the amount of available troops to conduct dismounted patrolling in mechanized forces, I do not believe their theory is valid anymore. The majority of units, NCOs and Officers understand you need to get out of your vehicles in a COIN environment. The vehicles provide advantages: mobility, firepower, communications platform, supply point, etc be it a HMMWV, MRAP, Bradley or Abrams. It comes down to balance.

Good leaders understand the need to achieve balance in both training and war. Training programs back in the states have to emphasize both sides of the mechanized world: maneuver and dismounted operations. It is the same in combat. GEN Petraeus' quote "You cannot commute to COIN" is a perfect example. You do have to commute sometimes. Even the COPs smack dab in the middle of towns and neighborhoods require some sort of vehicular support for resupply, casevac, and firepower. Once in the neighborhood, however, everyone from the Brits doing Imperial Policing, to your local law enforcement organizations realize you have to get out of the vehicle and meet the people. Leaders who understand this (and there are many...experience is a tough teacher) are the ones you see doing a better job of implenting this key tactic. In return, those units are the ones having the best success in making progress in the COIN realm.

[William F. Owen]

Armored infantry's "primary mission is to support the advance of the tank." He concluded that the M2 Bradley equipped mechanized infantry (as then organized in the US Army) met this requirement well.

That is doctrinally incorrect and illogical. Infantry are that component of the combined arms team that fights on foot. Protecting armour is not, and never should be their "primary mission."


Light infantry is "specialized for rapid air transportability, clandestine insertion, very rugged terrain, night operations, infiltrations, raids, and ambushes."

These are all things that any good infantry formation should be able to achieve. They are all issues merely associated with training, equipment and organisation. Again, fighting on foot is the key issue


Regular infantry, the force in between these forces, supporting tanks at the operational level, but supported by tanks at the tactical level.

I am fairly astounded by these pronouncements. Infantry are the most numerous, and most flexible element of the combined arms team. I am very much of the view that everyone exists to support the infantry as, only the infantry can deliver military capability in a spectrum of violence and across almost all terrain.

I agree with HDV that there may be three types, in some minds. However for that construct to be valid we have to do some pretty poor reasoning and this is not what the reality should reflect.

[Ken White]

That is doctrinally incorrect and illogical. Infantry are that component of the combined arms team that fights on foot. Protecting armour is not, and never should be their "primary mission."Dragoons to the rescue!!! :D
These are all things that any good infantry formation should be able to achieve. They are all issues merely associated with training, equipment and organisation. Again, fighting on foot is the key issue.Agreed. The 'light Infantry' (US version, which isn't really that light) is a semantic construction created in the 1970s to justify the slicing of TOEs to the bone to produce 12 (lighter) US Army Divisions from 8 (heavier). The result was nine man vs. the earlier and far better 11 man Squads and a structure unable to sustain itself.
I am fairly astounded by these pronouncements. Infantry are the most numerous, and most flexible element of the combined arms team. I am very much of the view that everyone exists to support the infantry as, only the infantry can deliver military capability in a spectrum of violence and across almost all terrain.

I agree with HDV that there may be three types, in some minds. However for that construct to be valid we have to do some pretty poor reasoning and this is not what the reality should reflect.Wass de Czege was justifying in salable form, the retention of a more robust Infantry Division without treading on the toes of either the Infantry School (who had earlier justified the 'light' foolishness) or the Armor School (Clank, clank -- but without giving them Dragoons... ;) ).

[William F. Owen]

Yes, Dragoons, but Dragoons still fought on foot, or should have done. They dismounted to shoot, but eventually became a form of Cavalry, but without real Cavalry missions. I fear the same has happened here.

[Ken White]

problem some way...

[William F. Owen]

I think MBTs and infantry should be mutually supporting. Under most conditions neither has primacy. MICVs are a sort of chimera I am still trying to wrestle with. My first thought was "they work but they shouldn't". I know have a better of idea of how well they work, and what it actually costs the infantry to get there. MRAPs are actually the object lesson in this regard. They are APCs.

Where is sit right now, is that the man getting out of a M2 should not be an infantryman, and the M2 should be an M3. Same goes for UK Warrior but that's another can of worms.

[reed11b]

Ken,
That means Wilf more or less agrees w/ you btw, as do I. However, Infantry still have a role in "mechanized warefare" so "dragoons" are still only part of the answer. Infantry is still the job that is done when dismounted, regardless of the mode of transportation, so this "light, Medium, Heavy, Pink or cyborg types" of infantry is silly and defeats good training and interoperability.
Reed

[Cavguy]

Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:

Theory:

1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?

2) What was the rationale of counting settlements as losses? If they are coded as wins, does the data result change? What was the criteria of defining a win/loss/draw?

3) Why would a foraging army, taking goods from the populace, gain cooperation from the same? If you steal my stuff, I'm certainly not giving you intel willingly, unless you suggest coercive methods are used. Why do foragers obtain better information, as you suggest? Or are you suggesting mechanization also reduces use of coercive intelligence gathering?

4) Are certain COIN tactics used in the 19th Century still usable today? The campaigns against the Native American tribes were extremely successful COIN, but certainly the methods used are taboo in the 20th century. Does this affect your argument?

5) Is a better determinant of mechanization's effect on a force the assessment of the opponent it will likely fight? If one has a largely mechanized force, he envisions fighting a similar enemy in decisive battle. Therefore doctrine and training align against the most dangerous threat, which is usually conventional. Therefore heavily mechanized armies are less likely to study/practice for COIN. This is far more plausible than foraging/logistics as an explanation for any declining COIN performance associated with vehicles.

Case Study:

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?

3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.

4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?

5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division? (Think COL Steele (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7707&highlight=col+steele))

6) What are the policy implications of your paper? How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?

7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?

8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?

Just a few of the issues raised in our response, which I can send PM to those interested but not publish yet.

[jkm_101_fso]

Case Study:

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

No. Petraeus had it pretty much right in '03. Odierno had to learn.


2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?

We all used vehicles in OIF...some units used different types. There were failures in light and heavy units. I'd attribute it to leadership and their inability/unwillingness to learn or change.


3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.

Leadership, innovation and many more reasons


4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?

Can't speak for any except 101. From my very small foxhole, Petraeus made his intent to the BDE/BN commanders very clear. As far as I know, we had no "rogue" BNs or BDEs doing their own thing. Everyone seem to be on the same page as far as security and stability ops (what we called it then)


5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division?

Lack of Div Cdr's guidance, IMO. I don't really know any other explaination. But the 101 Div HQ was in 3 BCT AO. I was in 1/101, in the AO adjacent (east) of 3rd BCT, but we seemed to be doing things far different (not that we were much more effective). They were probably too aggressive, we probably weren't enough. I could go on and on...


6) How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?

Has anyone tossed out the idea of specifically training BCTs for COIN? Officers and NCOs could "bounce back and forth" between COIN and HIC units maybe. I don't know...just a thought.

Armor should not be eliminated, nor reduced. It's a mode of transportation, like a Humvee or MRAP, but with different capabilities. The people in them are the same as any other unit.


7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?

No. Both types of units have had successes and failures. Performance in a COIN environment is about 90% leadership, as I mentioned.

[Steve Blair]

8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?

My historical $.02 on the 11th ACR's performance is that it was able to more or less set its own operational parameters (within some CTZ guidance constraints, obviously). It was very successful in some areas, especially when it came to slowing infiltration from Cambodia in 1969, but was often more involved in route security than traditional COIN activities.

The division-level cavalry squadrons are, to me, a more interesting study, because their effectiveness or lack thereof in COIN was often tied directly to division operation methods. Comparing 1/4 Cav and 3/4 Cav might be interesting because they operated in more or less the same area (3/4 was roughly west of Saigon while 1/4 was roughly north although they shared a division AO boundary line) but had very different division operational frameworks (the 25th ID was considered to be more COIN-oriented than the 1st ID from about 1966 through 1968). In an aside, both divisions discovered the utility of mechanized infantry in COIN, and both also demonstrated the usefulness of tanks in such an environment. As jkm mentioned above, leadership is a huge factor in COIN, but armored forces have a utility in it that cannot be ignored.

[Shek]

Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:

Theory:

1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?

2) What was the rationale of counting settlements as losses? If they are coded as wins, does the data result change? What was the criteria of defining a win/loss/draw?

3) Why would a foraging army, taking goods from the populace, gain cooperation from the same? If you steal my stuff, I'm certainly not giving you intel willingly, unless you suggest coercive methods are used. Why do foragers obtain better information, as you suggest? Or are you suggesting mechanization also reduces use of coercive intelligence gathering?

4) Are certain COIN tactics used in the 19th Century still usable today? The campaigns against the Native American tribes were extremely successful COIN, but certainly the methods used are taboo in the 20th century. Does this affect your argument?

5) Is a better determinant of mechanization's effect on a force the assessment of the opponent it will likely fight? If one has a largely mechanized force, he envisions fighting a similar enemy in decisive battle. Therefore doctrine and training align against the most dangerous threat, which is usually conventional. Therefore heavily mechanized armies are less likely to study/practice for COIN. This is far more plausible than foraging/logistics as an explanation for any declining COIN performance associated with vehicles.

Case Study:

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?

3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.

4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?

5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division? (Think COL Steele (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7707&highlight=col+steele))

6) What are the policy implications of your paper? How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?

7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?

8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?

Just a few of the issues raised in our response, which I can send PM to those interested but not publish yet.

Neil,

A lot of great questions, especially the line of questioning that hits at the change in international norms. One point - regression analysis is aggregated analysis, and so it can't answer to individual observations such as your Petraeus vs. Odierno OIF I thought experiment. You can always find observations that don't conform to the regression analysis.

I think your question #6 is the most important, and in terms of causality, I think that mechanization serves as a proxy for institutional identity, a sort of "if you build it, they will come" hypothesis. In other words, if you build a heavy force, it becomes easier to adopt a heavy mindset, and so it's not the mechanization that hurts, but rather, the doctrine (or more appropriately, doctrinal oversight/bias) that hurts COIN performance, which comes back to your line of questioning about education.

I think that COL Gentile gets it exactly right in his comment here, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/cultural-awareness-or-cultural/#comment-4026, where he talks about educating for COIN instead of training for COIN. As much as people (not so much on SWJ) buy off on the false dichotomy that is often portrayed in the Gentile vs. Nagl debate, I think that looking how to determine how to best educate our force will help us to have our cake (conventional) and eat it too (COIN). In this light, mechanized vehicles are put back into their place as a tool and not the master as the "mechanization hurts COIN" bumper sticker makes it out to be.

[Eden]

Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:

Theory:

1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?

I can't help but think that relative declines in COIN performance, if they exist, are almost solely a result of changing conditions and expanded expectations.

1. Since, oh, the '30s, and definitely in the post-colonial world, a rising percentage of COIN campaigns have been 'third-party' affairs. Whenever a third-party works in support of a weak indigenous government, both have to work under handicaps that make COIN much more difficult. In other words, COIN is easier when one power controls both the military and the government.

2. The range of tactics and techniques available to the COIN forces have narrowed as a result of many factors - mostly moral - while the range has expanded for insurgents.

3. Expectations - goals set by the political leadership or accepted as the definition of 'victory' - have risen. From suppression of banditry, or protection of citizens and property (see USMC Small Wars manual) we now expect nation-building and promotion of various fuzzy nostrums: democracy, security, etc.

So the mechanization debate is about as relevent as debating which rifle is best suited to COIN

[William F. Owen]

Having spent some time reviewing this thread, I just cannot see how "mechanisation" Hurts COIN Forces. I see no evidence that it does. I see ample evidence that a lack of protected mobility can lead to catastrophic loss, as it nearly did for 16 Air Assault in their first A'Stan tour.

Using vehicles are a logical development of infantry in the same way gun powder was.

The only thing I can assume about suggesting Mechanisation hurts COIN forces is another "POP_COIN" type forcing mechanism, to try and gloss over very stupid tactical behaviour, by suggesting that somehow the rules have changed since the end of the Cold War - which is nice little lie everyone surprise by irregular warfare keeps telling themselves.

[Fuchs]

Having spent some time reviewing this thread, I just cannot see how "mechanisation" Hurts COIN Forces. I see no evidence that it does. I see ample evidence that a lack of protected mobility can lead to catastrophic loss, as it nearly did for 16 Air Assault in their first A'Stan tour.

Too much hurry.
I didn't weigh in yet. :D

This is a good opportunity to use a worn, but respected phrase to soften everyone up for my later arguments:

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

The participants in this thread came (I guess so) from "Western" countries. they were accustomed to "Western" pattern of abundance and scarcity.

Let's think about the Sri Lankan army, or an African one.
Would mechanization hurt their COIN capability?
YES.

Why? Because they cannot afford it. Their shortage is not in infantry, but in hardware.

Now shift the look to Afghanistan. How many troops could we sustain there if we used much less expensive, less wearing out and less thirsty hardware?
(I heard a gallon fuel costs up to 100 SD when it arrives in Helmand!)
Mechanisation may be a good thing for us, but even in our near-abundant resources situation there's a point where excess begins.

Losses are furthermore just one ingredient of a victory/defeat decision, rarely decisive in themselves.
(The German forces were way more powerful in almost all physical regards in early '45 than in late '39, for example.)

My answer to the thread title question is therefore "It depends."
Different forces have different advantages, and they need to exploit advantages and downplay disadvantages to mater challenges - in COIN as in conventional conflict.

"Our" "Western" forces may be improved in COIN by mechanisation, but that would only be a work-around for some of our terrible weaknesses.
The Indians would probably be rather reduced in their capabilities by widespread mechanisation because they would need to sacrifice too much of their strengths to afford it.

[William F. Owen]

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."
Simplistic, but it makes a point.


The participants in this thread came (I guess so) from "Western" countries. they were accustomed to "Western" pattern of abundance and scarcity.
Well strangely I take the great weakness of western forces to be manpower, not equipment, but I don't pre-suppose abundance.

Let's think about the Sri Lankan army, or an African one.
Would mechanization hurt their COIN capability?
YES.
Well let's not forget the irrelevance of lots of infantry that are relatively immobile. The Sierra Leon Army benefited massively from some BMPs and Hind-Ds (albeit manned by South Africans). Yes dismounted manoeuvre may have great merit, but dismounted administrative moves are usually plain dumb.

My answer to the thread title question is therefore "It depends."
Different forces have different advantages, and they need to exploit advantages and downplay disadvantages to mater challenges - in COIN as in conventional conflict.
So it's about context, context and context? Wallah! OK, but I don't think there is really any evidence to actually suggest that helicopters and protected mobility harm any ones ability to successfully conduct operations in irregular warfare.

I think what evidence there is, may indicate that the stupid and poorly informed applications of equipment and training may result in less than effective operations, and thus failure at some higher level.

[Fuchs]

I'm a bit confused by your use of the word "mechanisation".
I learned it like this:

motorization = using motorized vehicles, to varying degrees (up to 100% motorized).
In Cold War context also= use of motorized and some wheeled armoured motorized vehicles ("MRD").

mechanised = (partially) using armoured motorized vehicles
In Western European context also = ... tracked ...


There's no reason why troops would need to be immobile if they're not mechanised.
They might actually be more mobile if they copied Taliban motorization with motorcycles (as in the anecdote about Lithuanian SF).

[Schmedlap]

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?
I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

[Cavguy]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what? I was in 1AD when it shifted from MG Sanchez to MG Dempsey, and within a month it was a different division in attitude and morale.

Or for an alternate example, how did GEN Ridgeway turn Korea around in a few short months in 1951?

Niel

[jkm_101_fso]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

I agree with the premise, but specifically for OIF (101 vs 4th), post-MCO, I disagree completely. I'm telling you that Petraeus' vision went down to BN level. It was executed and understood at the company level. He pretty much had it right from the get-go...whereas Ordierno had it wrong. His units and their leaders were arguably out-of-control in OIF I. Ordierno had to learn, which he did; thank goodness.

[jkm_101_fso]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what?

Exactly.

[Steve Blair]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what? I was in 1AD when it shifted from MG Sanchez to MG Dempsey, and within a month it was a different division in attitude and morale.

Or for an alternate example, how did GEN Ridgeway turn Korea around in a few short months in 1951?

Niel

Or the turnaround in the 1st ID in 1966 when DePuy took over. There are too many examples of a strong, dominant commander being able to in essence remake a division in his image (for good or ill) to discount the idea. DePuy fired a high percentage of his brigade and battalion commanders if memory serves, but there are other examples (the 1st Mar Div in World War II after Rupertus left command) where the organization has simply responded with a will to a change in leadership.

[Shek]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

While only a brief snapshot, having worked alongside both 101ABN and 4ID at the end of OIF I, I'd say that the descriptions forwarded by Ricks in Fiasco match up with what I experienced and reflect the portrayal offered of GEN Petraeus and GEN Odierno.

While I agree that organization culture may be difficult to overcome, I think that this is a red herring in this context, as actions in my mind did reflect their commander's approach, and so for me, the only question is how much did the terrain influence each commander towards the path they took. Given GEN Petraeus' background and GEN Odierno's background, I think the issue comes back to their educational paths to division command, and while both possessed graduate education, GEN Petraeus' lended itself to "getting" COIN from the get go.

As the counterfactual and a different angle to the thesis of mechanization/COIN, absent his particular graduate schooling/education path, would GEN Petraeus, growing up through the ranks in light/airborne formations, have developed the same campaign plan?

[Schmedlap]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what?
I didn't suggest that it is not leadership. I only pointed out that it is not just the Division Commander's leadership. I suspect that from 2003 to 2005, almost all leadership rotated, from Div down to Plt, along with NCO billets. Also, the operating environment was significantly different, making comparison even more difficult.

That said, the past few comments have poked some pretty good holes in my original comment. My only hesitation in agreeing is to imagine the role reversal of Odierno and Petreaus. If 4ID units were out of control, I don't see how that could significantly be attributed to the Div Cdr leadership (unless he actually endorsed and supported it). He might have been a minor catalyst, but there are layers of leaders between the General and the Riflemen. Those leaders are not mere relay stations for the orders of the General. A good Div Cdr will have some bad platoons. A bad Div Cdr will have some good platoons. In OIF I, I had a Company Commander who I thought should have been relieved. He was all in favor of doing anything that 4ID was doing, or worse. It was only because the PLs and PSGs did not agree that those things did not occur. Now suppose the opposite were true - good CO and bad Plt leadership. He could not have prevented everything.

In regard to org culture, not sure if this is a rebuttal or a stream of consciousness, but here goes... Back when we broke down the firewall between 11B and 11M, most NCOs would tell you that going from a light unit to a mech unit, or vice versa, was like entering a different universe. Even now, after that integration, 101 is different from 82 and 3ID is different from 4ID. I've seen Commanders at all levels come and go, but the unit's culture remains. Different cultures will be more or less prone to committing shenanigans and atrocities. Leadership can impact that, but I would argue that it needs to be leadership at all levels. One guy with two stars on his hat? I just don't see it.

I think Shek is on the right track regarding the different terrain, different task organization, and question of what kind of plan each would have come up with. Choosing a course of action is a small part of leadership.

[Ken White]

and about five in another similar Division, in both in peacetime service as well as in combat, I saw them when they were as good as anyone if not better than most -- and in the pits, literally unable to perform even marginally well and several levels in between.

Biggest single difference? The Division Commander.

There were other factors that affected things but the (1) professional competence, (2) personality [specifically a disinclination to micro manage], (3) command presence and (4) willingness to demand proper performance oh his subordinate commanders by the Division Commander made all the difference in the world.

There is in certainly a unit culture -- the 82d and 101st (and the 11th) Airborne Divisions back in the day when all were on parachute status were different; lot of similarities but also some notable differences. The two Parachute RCTs, the old 187 and the 508th were similar in size and orientation but were different cultures. SF Groups differ in culture -- considerably.

However, I'm still firmly convinced that the Commander makes a significant difference in how a unit performs on a day to day basis.

In my recollection, the ADCs and intervening Commanders also had an effect. I can recall one particularly good BG as ADC Ops who carried a mediocre Division Commander pretty well. However, generally the Divisions as a whole reacted to the Commanders -- Subordinate units within the Divisions at time transcended that Division norm but that was also in my observation very much dependent on their Commanders.

That's why command selection is extremely important and should not be the 'whose turn is it?' operation it now is. That's true at all echelons above Company; who commands a Company is only really important in the Reserve Components where leadership is required and distance makes proper selection more important than is true in a co-located and consolidated AC Battalion.

[jkm_101_fso]

I didn't suggest that it is not leadership. I only pointed out that it is not just the Division Commander's leadership. I suspect that from 2003 to 2005, almost all leadership rotated, from Div down to Plt, along with NCO billets. Also, the operating environment was significantly different, making comparison even more difficult.

That is true, mostly. Many of the OIF I leaders went again with us in 05-06, as did most of the Soldiers. For many of us, we did not forget the lessons of OIF I and were frustrated by some of the decisions of our leaders during the second tour. This mainly applied at the company level because that is where the continuity was. Most of the personnel changes were battalion level and above, where decisions are made.


My only hesitation in agreeing is to imagine the role reversal of Odierno and Petreaus. If 4ID units were out of control, I don't see how that could significantly be attributed to the Div Cdr leadership (unless he actually endorsed and supported it). He might have been a minor catalyst, but there are layers of leaders between the General and the Riflemen.

Again, I disagree. There are only 3 layers (BDE/BN/CO). What Petraeus did was make his intent very clear to Bn leadership. I saw him on more than one occasion at our BN TOC. Our leaders at the BN level did an outstanding job briefing us at the Platoon level about what it was that the DIV doing, and in turn our CO made sure that the Rifleman understood the mission and plan.


Those leaders are not mere relay stations for the orders of the General.

True, but it is an important aspect of leadership to explain "why" to the Soldiers. It's only one aspect of their job, but it's an important one.


A good Div Cdr will have some bad platoons. A bad Div Cdr will have some good platoons.

No doubt.


In OIF I, I had a Company Commander who I thought should have been relieved. He was all in favor of doing anything that 4ID was doing, or worse. It was only because the PLs and PSGs did not agree that those things did not occur. Now suppose the opposite were true - good CO and bad Plt leadership. He could not have prevented everything.

I had the exact same situation. Bottom line was the the BN CDR recognized this CO was "less capable" and kept in very good contact with the 1sg, PLs and PSGs of our Company, to make sure we stayed on task until he changed command half-way through the deployment. My second CO was awesome.


Different cultures will be more or less prone to committing shenanigans and atrocities. Leadership can impact that, but I would argue that it needs to be leadership at all levels.

Disagree with the first half. I'd argue culture has far less impact on a unit "committing shenanigans and atrocities" than leadership. Take 101st for example. OIF I, there were no major issues. OIF IV...different story. Steele's Rakkasans had their issues and 2nd BDE of course had Steven Greene & Co raping teenagers and murdering families. Culture didn't have much impact there, but leaders sure did; leaders at all levels...so you are right on that one.


One guy with two stars on his hat? I just don't see it.

I can and have. BDE commanders will obey, as will all commanders and leaders all the way down, for the most part. Sure, there will be rogues along the way, but in most cases, people get "on board" with the CG's vision, intent and expectations (if he relays them). At platoon level, we understood that in OIF I. I can't say the same in OIF IV. Which is sad because even my lowly BN MiTT had "face time" with the CG, DCSM, ADCO and ADCS on almost a dozen occasions. I still came away confused on what the plan/intent was. Of course it's entirely possible that I'm a dummy :)

[Schmedlap]

Many of the OIF I leaders went again with us in 05-06, as did most of the Soldiers. For many of us, we did not forget the lessons of OIF I and were frustrated by some of the decisions of our leaders during the second tour.
In the same duty positions? I deployed the second time with a lot of the same leaders as the first, but the guys who commanded moved to staff and vice versa.

Again, I disagree. There are only 3 layers (BDE/BN/CO). What Petraeus did was make his intent very clear to Bn leadership. I saw him on more than one occasion at our BN TOC. Our leaders at the BN level did an outstanding job briefing us at the Platoon level about what it was that the DIV doing, and in turn our CO made sure that the Rifleman understood the mission and plan.
That sounds like the primary virtue of the Division Commander was in formulating a plan and articulating it.

I'd argue culture has far less impact on a unit "committing shenanigans and atrocities" than leadership. Take 101st for example. OIF I, there were no major issues. OIF IV...different story. Steele's Rakkasans had their issues and 2nd BDE of course had Steven Greene & Co raping teenagers and murdering families. Culture didn't have much impact there, but leaders sure did; leaders at all levels...so you are right on that one.
That seems like apples and oranges to me - kind of what I was getting at earlier when I pointed out the two vastly different operational environments. I would add to that expectations. Just a few differences between OIF I and later deployments, off the top of my head...
- Greater reluctance to report incidents in OIF I; there was a much more adversarial relationship between media and military and the instinct of the military was deny first, investigate, and then damage control, from what I observed
- Similar to the point above, some of us just had a warped mindset in OIF I and wouldn't have known to report most misdeeds. After a unit spends three weeks slaughtering adversaries, suddenly pushing people around, pointing weapons at people, and being belligerent don't seem like a big deal. I cringe when I think about how we behaved in OIF I. At the time, we truly didn't realize how counterproductive our behavior was. It wasn't until we'd been patrolling for about two months that my interpreters were able to reign us in (one tremendous benefit of having older, educated, indigenous terps). On later deployments, when we had a better idea of what was expected of us, we were more likely to report incidents.
- There were better reporting procedures in place in later deployments. In OIF I, we would get into a firefight, kill the assailants, and leave their bodies in the street. Sometimes we'd forget to even report it. In OIF III and later, we must have done at least one 15-6 per week to document engagements where there might be even a hint of something not being kosher.
- More stable operating climate in later deployments; Soldiers got to know their AOs better and developed more comfort working in them. While most leaders have a better idea of what behavior is proper, a more stable and predictable environment is conducive to rogues within a unit being able to come up with dingbat ideas, like raping/killing or other nonsense
- Significantly greater resistance and dissatisfaction with the war back at home in later deployments, which influences Soldiers' attitudes and, imo, makes them more likely to rationalize doing dumb things out of frustration
- Soldiers behave differently when they are waiting on word for when they will redeploy (next week? next month? three months?) and when they know that they are in country for the next 10 months

Just to be clear - the above points are not rebuttals to the original assertion regarding the impact of a Division Commander. Just a few variables to point out why OIF I vs later deployments is, imo, not a good basis for comparison.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

In reading the above only; I fear they may have a rather narrow view of COIN opns, as I found myself relating their rhetoric to urban efforts to dismount police from their cruisers.

I would also very much like to read the 238 "insurgencies" to see how neatly fit that monicker is. I suspect their may be some false-flag, anarchies, shill-surgencies and faux-surgencies skewing the data.

Pardon my ignorrance the link wasn't responding to me just now but I'll relish the read.

If fire and maneuver are an integral part of war waging facilities then "Mechanization", as the West consensually uses the term, is an essential advancement that must be utilized. Or do I much mistake?

[jwater]

This seems to be somewhat of a hot topic recently, which is good for me since I'm working on a thesis on military policy and I want to focus on the use of armor (and probably also airpower) in asymmetric warfare, but more specifically COIN operations.

SWJ Blog recently posted this http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/more-on-armor/ and Tom Ricks' recent post on Armor is generating some good discussion as well http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/19/is_the_army_s_armor_branch_defunct#commentspace.

So first let me make a couple things clear: I am not interested in whether US armor is becoming defunct or outdated, and I do not believe that armor should be sacrificed in the face of asymmetric warfare. Ricks' note that X number of Staff Sergeants are not qualified on the M1, or commenters' discussion of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon are really aside from what I'm interested in.

My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?

I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.

Thank you for any feedback you can give me on this!

[OfTheTroops]

Do you lose the population once the tanks move in? Probably. At least you are set back to square one (Order maintenance) The scenario may be like I encountered when command threatened to bring tanks into the small town and level every sympathizers home. Good threat but if he had done it:eek: How long would it take to recover?

If you have the big gun you may not have to use it. Better to have than want. Show of force, power, and awe. Nothing says power like the earth rumblin beneath your feet but if that power is foreign the circle of love continues.

[Hacksaw]

Short answer -- No!!!
If used improperly, yes but...
a clankety clank and whop whop are real useful tools in the COIN tool kit...
FM 3-24 doesn't do a good enough job of saying this, but COIN does not mean you don't kill bad guys, and insurgent forces sometimes gather to conduct direct action against govt forces (especially if you don't have adequate firepower)....
From a strictly COIN perspective... I might not need an armor division in Northern Iraq, but an AR BN sure is handy...

[Cavguy]

Note JWater, a new SWC posed his question as a new RFI and the moderators moved it here.

As you may infer from my handle - the notion that armor is counterproductive in COIN is ahistorical and lacks anything other than academic speculation which conflicts with historical fact. Leadership and organizational mentality, not the platform, matters.

[Ken White]

My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?The quick answer to that is that all wars differ and that ANY attempt to establish an all encompassing parameter is likely to do more harm than good. Any other 'answer' to that question is liable to allow formation of a supposition that the current wars and their specifics are transferable to other places, people and times. That is not at all true.

Each war and set of ethnicities involved will have differing attitudes toward other nations, toward technologies and those and other variances including the terrain are inimical to an academic or scientific hypothesis.
I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.In order:

- The morale boost is not at all significant, the killing power is the significance. As you allude, it can cut both ways. That's why an individual assessment not only of the war in question but even of various regions and populations affected or in contest is imperative.

- If you say the weapons systems should be available, they will be used if at all appropriate -- and perhaps if not. That is dependent mostly on the quality of your commander and not really on weapon or system procurements and inventories. If you elect to not procure them and procure other systems designed specifically for low intensity operations, I believe history suggests that you have guaranteed that your next war will involve major combat operations...:wry:

- The correct question really is; Are or were our current COIN operations necessary.

The Tanks and attack helicopters are used for their combat power. That power is sometimes needed and sometimes not. The root issue in your query is weapons employment, not location, procurement or possession. That employment varies widely and should be based solely on assessment of the METT-TC factors. Those factors will not only vary from war to war but from time to time within a given war. One 'T' in that mnemonic indicates terrain and that, urban or rural, jungle or desert also impacts not only tactics but weapons usability and survival. There is no one size fits all...

We are involved in COIN operations not because we had no choice but since elected to be so involved. That will almost certainly be the case if we are foolish enough to decide to be involved in another -- and it may be a totally different war than either current theater. Better diplomacy and thinking along with full spectrum capability can preclude our involvement in COIN-like situations which are far too costly for the benefit derived.

[jwater]

Hacksaw, Cavguy & Ken:

Thank you for the responses, I had a gut feeling that this research question would not pan out, it seems I may have been caught up in the wave of 'academic speculation' (and it is purely that) on this topic which has suddenly become popular. That said,

Hacksaw:

FM 3-24 doesn't do a good enough job of saying this, but COIN does not mean you don't kill bad guys, and insurgent forces sometimes gather to conduct direct action against govt forces (especially if you don't have adequate firepower)....
From a strictly COIN perspective... I might not need an armor division in Northern Iraq, but an AR BN sure is handy...

This I understand, certainly I'm not arguing that we shouldn't be killing 'bad guys', there will always be a cadre of hardcore insurgents in conflicts like Iraq and A'stan, if there weren't this category of undesirables, we could turn it over to mediators and be on our way!

Ken:

The quick answer to that is that all wars differ and that ANY attempt to establish an all encompassing parameter is likely to do more harm than good. Any other 'answer' to that question is liable to allow formation of a supposition that the current wars and their specifics are transferable to other places, people and times. That is not at all true.

Each war and set of ethnicities involved will have differing attitudes toward other nations, toward technologies and those and other variances including the terrain are inimical to an academic or scientific hypothesis.

Fair enough, again I'd say in my enthusiasm to nail down a thesis topic I probably went too far in such a generalization.


If you say the weapons systems should be available, they will be used if at all appropriate -- and perhaps if not. That is dependent mostly on the quality of your commander and not really on weapon or system procurements and inventories. If you elect to not procure them and procure other systems designed specifically for low intensity operations, I believe history suggests that you have guaranteed that your next war will involve major combat operations.

I'm with you and Cavguy regarding the quality of the commander, I just wanted to clear up that I was not suggesting phasing out systems designed for conventional combat, I understand the merits of the M1 and so forth, my concern remains in the practicality of their deployment in a zone like Iraq or A'stan. Like you said, conflict is not one size fits all, and I'm curious if it's really necessary to have M1s deployed at all. Obviously I'm not on the ground, so if I'm mistaken, please educate me!


The correct question really is; Are or were our current COIN operations necessary.

Great question, but probably beyond the scope of my thesis! ;)


We are involved in COIN operations not because we had no choice but since elected to be so involved. That will almost certainly be the case if we are foolish enough to decide to be involved in another -- and it may be a totally different war than either current theater. Better diplomacy and thinking along with full spectrum capability can preclude our involvement in COIN-like situations which are far too costly for the benefit derived.

Trust me, I'm right with you here! My last paper was actually on the subject of our allies in COIN operations and how we needed to get a lot better at picking our friends before we pick new enemies - our track record is pretty atrocious!

[Sylvan]

This seems to be somewhat of a hot topic recently, which is good for me since I'm working on a thesis on military policy and I want to focus on the use of armor (and probably also airpower) in asymmetric warfare, but more specifically COIN operations.

SWJ Blog recently posted this http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/more-on-armor/ and Tom Ricks' recent post on Armor is generating some good discussion as well http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/19/is_the_army_s_armor_branch_defunct#commentspace.

So first let me make a couple things clear: I am not interested in whether US armor is becoming defunct or outdated, and I do not believe that armor should be sacrificed in the face of asymmetric warfare. Ricks' note that X number of Staff Sergeants are not qualified on the M1, or commenters' discussion of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon are really aside from what I'm interested in.

My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?

I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.

Thank you for any feedback you can give me on this!

Cost benefit.
There is a huge psychological advantage ini having the biggest stick, and if you use it wisely, the negatives are minimal.

If you don't think watching apache's hover around hampers TB recruiting, you are crazy.
As for the cost/benefit, you need these pieces of equipment for the overall mission of support and defend against all enemies, so you need to have them anyway. The question becomes how much do you need.
The Canadian Leos ( I think they were Leos, not an armor guy) were really counter productive in Kandahar. Apaches, when handled correctly, were huge force multipliers.

One of many keys in COIN is manueverability. Nothing beats a helocopter in that regard. Now, if only we had a proximity fused 30mm round...

[Cavguy]

Cost benefit.
There is a huge psychological advantage ini having the biggest stick, and if you use it wisely, the negatives are minimal.

If you don't think watching apache's hover around hampers TB recruiting, you are crazy.
As for the cost/benefit, you need these pieces of equipment for the overall mission of support and defend against all enemies, so you need to have them anyway. The question becomes how much do you need.
The Canadian Leos ( I think they were Leos, not an armor guy) were really counter productive in Kandahar. Apaches, when handled correctly, were huge force multipliers.


Interested in your source on the Leos in Kandahar. Every Canadian soldier I know and their professional journal articles speak otherwise, as well as the two officers I shared a panel with once.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4046010


Because of the increased use of roadside bombs in Afghanistan, tanks have become critical in protecting the lives of Canadian troops, said Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie, the Army's commander.

"The tanks overseas are good," Leslie said during a recent appearance before the Senate defense committee here. "We had one that was hit by an improvised explosive device this morning. The crew is fine. That tank has done its job."

Leslie said the tanks have also proven their worth in mobility on the battlefield, as they are capable of going over obstacles that limit the Army's wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs).

The Leopards have also proved their worth in destroying insurgent fortifications. Mud walls found in Afghanistan can be more than a meter thick and as hard as concrete.

"Prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25mm fire from the LAVs achieved limited results against these structures, often requiring the [battle group] to resort to the use of aerial bombardment or risk the deployment of dismounted soldiers forward to affect a breach with anti-tank weapons or demolitions," Army Maj. Trevor Cadieu wrote in the Winter 2008 edition of the Canadian Army Journal.

and:
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogscript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A9c4d329f-b07d-4628-9bf2-1481efef8964




Maj. Cadieu quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, commanding officer of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group as saying, “If you’d asked me five months ago, ‘do you need tanks to fight insurgents?’ I would have said, ‘No, you’re nuts.’” But “Because [the Taliban] are acting conventionally, then conventional assets like tanks, armoured engineering vehicles, and armoured bridge-laying vehicles certainly have their place here.”

One of the big knocks against using tanks and heavy artillery in a COIN fight is that both weapons systems have the very real potential of killing innocent civilians and causing collateral damage. In Maj. Cadieu’s estimation, this isn’t the issue that many make it out to be. Since commencing combat operations nine months ago, he writes, “Canadian tanks have killed dozens of insurgents in battles throughout Kandahar Province, yet there has been no suggestion of civilian deaths attributed to tank fire during this entire period.”

Maj. Cadieu admits that tanks are difficult—and expensive—to maintain and service in the harsh conditions of Afghanistan, and cautions against splitting tank units up into sub-squadron teams, since doing so detaches them from the logistical support that the whole squadron comes equipped with. But other than those difficulties, his article is a full frontal assault against those who don’t think big guns and heavy weapons platforms have much of a place on the asymmetric battlefield.

He has a point where Afghanistan is concerned, since the Taliban still emerges from time to time to try and fight conventional-type battles, but in other places—like Iraq—his love of the tank might prove less useful.

And from the Army Journal

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_03_e.pdf


Many of the force developers and critics of armour that informed recent Army
Transformation initiatives argued that tanks had become increasingly irrelevant in the
COE for a multitude of reasons: they are expensive to maintain, they are not easily
deployable and they can be vulnerable in complex and urban terrain. These
observations are true, but they are self-evident and apply to most other elements of the
combined arms team, all of which have their own weaknesses and deficiencies when
operating independent of the other enablers. Providing increased firepower, protection,
tactical battlefield mobility, and a definitive psychological impact, the tank will remain an
invaluable tool in the arsenal of the Canadian Army for the foreseeable future.

[Cavguy]

I'm with you and Cavguy regarding the quality of the commander, I just wanted to clear up that I was not suggesting phasing out systems designed for conventional combat, I understand the merits of the M1 and so forth, my concern remains in the practicality of their deployment in a zone like Iraq or A'stan. Like you said, conflict is not one size fits all, and I'm curious if it's really necessary to have M1s deployed at all. Obviously I'm not on the ground, so if I'm mistaken, please educate me!



Try this issue of ARMOR (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Armor_COIN_Selected_Works.pdf) mag for starters, and let me know what you think. Armor has been hugely successful in Iraq. The most famous successes in Tal Afar and Ramadi were done by Armored Regiments/Brigades, and the heavy city fighting in Sadr City, Karbala, Najaf, and Fallujah reinforced the usefulness of tanks in urban combat.

This unit (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Road-Home-Story-Family/dp/0399153829) in particular is probably alive because of the actions of CPT John Moore and C/2-37 Armor (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Sadr_City-Armor-Moore(Nov-Dec04).pdf).
and on and on and on....

[William F. Owen]

My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?

No, if they are employed skilfully and sensibly. I might suggest that the question should be, "How are platforms like M1 and the AH-64 best employed against Irregular Forces."

Maj. Cadieu quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, commanding officer of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group as saying, “If you’d asked me five months ago, ‘do you need tanks to fight insurgents?’ I would have said, ‘No, you’re nuts.’”
That quote shows just how badly educated some armies are about modern combat operations. On what planet was the use of armour against insurgents ever deemed a bad thing?

[Infanteer]

I've operated beside tanks for the last 7 months in a low-intensity conflict. Are they cumbersome at times - absolutely, and they require judicious use, especially in and around fragile local infrastructure. Would I say they weren't suited for COIN or low-intensity fighting? Never. Nothing deters insurgents like 70 tons of steel.


That quote shows just how badly educated some armies are about modern combat operations. On what planet was the use of armour against insurgents ever deemed a bad thing?

The quote is pretty inaccurate to boot - now Col Lavoie was never in the PPCLI nor a CO of one of its Battlegroups. I guess its just another example of poor extrapolation of soundbites....

[jwater]

Try this issue of ARMOR (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Armor_COIN_Selected_Works.pdf) mag for starters, and let me know what you think. Armor has been hugely successful in Iraq. The most famous successes in Tal Afar and Ramadi were done by Armored Regiments/Brigades, and the heavy city fighting in Sadr City, Karbala, Najaf, and Fallujah reinforced the usefulness of tanks in urban combat.

This unit (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Road-Home-Story-Family/dp/0399153829) in particular is probably alive because of the actions of CPT John Moore and C/2-37 Armor (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Sadr_City-Armor-Moore(Nov-Dec04).pdf).
and on and on and on....

Read over most of ARMOR, it's reassuring to know COIN is featured so predominantly. Tal Afar is a textbook case of great COIN, very impressive. I was also seriously impressed with DeRosa's article and the ingenuity used to cover all their bases. Seems like the Army really needs to be combining infantry and armor brigades to take advantage of the strengths of each. It's great that M1A1s could act as a deterrent on the main highways, but it seems like the mechanized guys were stretched to the limit to get all the dismounted action done.

[JMA]

Is war not about applying the correct resources to a theater based on a thorough understanding of the terrain and the enemy? If operations are tailored to fit based on the forces allocated, (mech, para/airborne) then we are wasting our time. The military appreciation if correctly done will lead us in the correct direction. Maybe night bombing based on thermal imaging followed by a coroners team to pick up the pieces (literally) is good for one area while a Fallujah (Op Al-Fajir) type operation is good for another. Enemy and terrain, enemy and terrain.

[Ken White]

Is war not about applying the correct resources to a theater based on a thorough understanding of the terrain and the enemy? If operations are tailored to fit based on the forces allocated, (mech, para/airborne) then we are wasting our time. The military appreciation if correctly done will lead us in the correct direction. Maybe night bombing based on thermal imaging followed by a coroners team to pick up the pieces (literally) is good for one area while a Fallujah (Op Al-Fajir) type operation is good for another. Enemy and terrain, enemy and terrain.You left out the rest of the mnemonic -- Mission, Troops available, Time, and Civilian considerations.

Maybe some can afford a multitude of units of all types in order to have the correct mix for every situation. Most nations cannot and even those with a good mix may have commitments (or civilian legislative tinkering) that affect the availability of the best type of unit in the requisite quantity(ies) for a mission or operation.

[JMA]

You left out the rest of the mnemonic -- Mission, Troops available, Time, and Civilian considerations.

Maybe some can afford a multitude of units of all types in order to have the correct mix for every situation. Most nations cannot and even those with a good mix may have commitments (or civilian legislative tinkering) that affect the availability of the best type of unit in the requisite quantity(ies) for a mission or operation.

Its all about round pegs in round holes.

[Ken White]

Its all about round pegs in round holes.However, the number of pegs versus the number of holes has an effect.

I can place a square peg in a round hole, it will have to be smaller than the required round peg but I can get it in there. Can do the same with a triangular peg -- or an Octagonal (which can be almost as good as a round one...). All depends on how many pegs I can afford and have. That and how many and what type holes on the board but I can adapt.

It also depends on how many holes the board maker places on the board. Unfortunately, I can't predict that, so I have to get as many pegs as I can afford of the types that I guess I'll need. And that will always be a guess and fiscal and political constraints on the number and type of pegs will always exist on my end...

[flagg]

My background includes only one brief trip in a fairly permissive peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment in a light infantry role with a balance of foot and light vehicle mobility patrols.

One thing I noticed was the often negative attitudes by locals towards a coalition partner's forces which might have been strongly correlated with their quite infrequent debus-ing and lack of direct interaction with the locals...their vehicles seemed to create a significant barrier at times.

In my mind, I wonder if mechanized versus light infantry in COIN might be VERY ROUGHLY analagous to the squad car based versus beat cops on foot argument in crime ridden urban environments that comes up now and again?

While I understand the threat environment can be, and often is, quite high in the AOs in question...far higher than I've personally experienced.....and can warrant the real need for mechanization and the benefits it provides......but I wonder if the mechanization(when not actually necessary or warranted) creates some significant barriers along the same lines as I perceive things in this linked photo:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3167/3055255880_462a20f862.jpg

Sorry if my post might come across as too remedial/intro 101 COIN...just trying to learn!

[Shek]

My background includes only one brief trip in a fairly permissive peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment in a light infantry role with a balance of foot and light vehicle mobility patrols.

One thing I noticed was the often negative attitudes by locals towards a coalition partner's forces which might have been strongly correlated with their quite infrequent debus-ing and lack of direct interaction with the locals...their vehicles seemed to create a significant barrier at times.

In my mind, I wonder if mechanized versus light infantry in COIN might be VERY ROUGHLY analagous to the squad car based versus beat cops on foot argument in crime ridden urban environments that comes up now and again?

While I understand the threat environment can be, and often is, quite high in the AOs in question...far higher than I've personally experienced.....and can warrant the real need for mechanization and the benefits it provides......but I wonder if the mechanization(when not actually necessary or warranted) creates some significant barriers along the same lines as I perceive things in this linked photo:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3167/3055255880_462a20f862.jpg

Sorry if my post might come across as too remedial/intro 101 COIN...just trying to learn!

Flagg,

The beat cop vs. squad car is a great analogy. Perception is reality, and this classic piece by James Q Wilson about broken windows I think cuts to the heart of what you're after.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/

Additionally, another name for COIN that was used by the Brits back in the day was Imperial Policing (http://www.amazon.com/Imperial-policing-Charles-William-Gwynn/dp/B000858KY0).

[jwater]

My background includes only one brief trip in a fairly permissive peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment in a light infantry role with a balance of foot and light vehicle mobility patrols.

One thing I noticed was the often negative attitudes by locals towards a coalition partner's forces which might have been strongly correlated with their quite infrequent debus-ing and lack of direct interaction with the locals...their vehicles seemed to create a significant barrier at times.

In my mind, I wonder if mechanized versus light infantry in COIN might be VERY ROUGHLY analagous to the squad car based versus beat cops on foot argument in crime ridden urban environments that comes up now and again?

While I understand the threat environment can be, and often is, quite high in the AOs in question...far higher than I've personally experienced.....and can warrant the real need for mechanization and the benefits it provides......but I wonder if the mechanization(when not actually necessary or warranted) creates some significant barriers along the same lines as I perceive things in this linked photo:

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3167/3055255880_462a20f862.jpg

Sorry if my post might come across as too remedial/intro 101 COIN...just trying to learn!

Don't worry about being "too remedial", certainly people like me appreciate the context - I'm constantly looking up acronyms when I read posts on SWJ. ;)

The analogy you propose makes a lot of sense to me, and my gut feeling originally would have been to agree, but the point that a lot of guys are making in this thread (one I'm starting to see as the reality), is that the cop car is not a barrier in and of itself - nothing is stopping the cops from parking their cars and doing a little community outreach on foot. In fact, they should, and good leadership would encourage that kind of behavior.

[GI Zhou]

In the Caucasus the Russians found the lighter T-62 with its manual gearbox, lighter weight, non-turbocharged diesel engine and larger ammunition supply of various types with four crewmen was better that the T-72 or T-80. The Centurion tank used by the Australian Army in Vietnam with its 20pdr/84mm gun was just as successful as the Leopard C1 with the 105mm gun in Afghanistan. A powerful medium calibre gun, with varied ammuniton types is ideal in a COIN environment.

[William F. Owen]

In the Caucasus the Russians found the lighter T-62 with its manual gearbox, lighter weight, non-turbocharged diesel engine and larger ammunition supply of various types with four crewmen was better that the T-72 or T-80. The Centurion tank used by the Australian Army in Vietnam with its 20pdr/84mm gun was just as successful as the Leopard C1 with the 105mm gun in Afghanistan. A powerful medium calibre gun, with varied ammuniton types is ideal in a COIN environment.

Sorry, but as someone currently writing a Masters Thesis on Tank Design, I don't understand any of this.
How can you compare the effectiveness of Centurion Mk5/1 with the Leopard C1 40 years apart in completely different terrain?
Why is 105mm "ideal"?
What is the difference between 120mm and 105mm when it comes to using armour in irregular warfare?
BTW you can put a 120mm gun on a CV-90 chassis.

[Fuchs]

Wilf; 75mm HE was adequate in most WW2 combat (there was a desire for bigger bang and specialist assault vehicles with ~150mm guns, though).

90mm He proved to be adequate in several conflicts and 105mm HE proved to be adequate or good in several conflicts (a specialist assault vehicle for bigger bang than 75mm offered was the WW2 StuH 42 - with a light 105mm howitzer!).

The current standard of 120-125mm MBT guns was reached due to APFSDS-T energy requirements (~11 MJ), not because of requirements for soft target munitions. The majority of targets are either soft or thin-skinned hard targets. The Cold War fixation on frontal armour penetration is about to fade away, so we can look again at medium calibres (see Stryker MGS).

Btw you can put a 120mm gun on a M8 AGS chassis ("Thunderbolt") and have a 125mm gun in a 18 t AFV ("2S25 Sprut-SD").


I think a medium calibre rapid fire gun with additional kinetic energy missiles for frontal anti-MBT shots is a promising concept. You've probably read about that concept in another place, of course.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf; 75mm HE was adequate in most WW2 combat (there was a desire for bigger bang and specialist assault vehicles with ~150mm guns, though).

Yep. Concur. 75mm CN-75 stayed viable well into the 1960's and if you could take a CN-75 (copy of Kwk-42) you could probably take a 105mm. The balance is always for HE and AP performance. L7 105mm is and was an outstanding tank gun, but it does require a good chassis.

Something like the 76mm low-pressure L-23 is probably all you need for fighting the Taliban.

[tankersteve]

JWater,

In Tal Afar, I started out with a completely mechanized heavy unit - 8 tanks and 8 Bradleys. Later, we got some HMMWVs and some additional M113s. This gave us a great deal of flexibility. We would execute patrols with different vehicle sets for different missions.

For instance, tanks (and Bradleys) could conduct 2-vehicle patrols and longer-range night observation missions. We often had to commit a tank section to overwatch a key highway. The tanks could use their long-range thermal sights to see quite a ways. It was critical for the crew to position themselves to take advantage of this, as well as pull good security.

Also, we conducted lots of 2-tank patrols to keep the enemy off-balance and deny them freedom to 'maneuver' (plant very large IEDs). Some of these were the dreaded 'presence' patrol, but their presence kept the enemy at home and ensured OUR freedom of maneuver. Often, a tank section would patrol while an infantry squad conducted a dismounted patrol. The tank created noise that allowed the infantry squad to get into its observation or ambush position while also providing some very responsive heavy QRF capability.

For joint patrols with the Iraqi Army, we did things differently. Obviously the infantry platoons were well set up for this - ride to the Iraqi Army outpost, dismount, linkup, and conduct a joint patrol. They had the manpower to provide overwatch from bounding fire teams. For a tank platoon, what worked best was a single M113 and 2 tanks. Two crews would ride the M113 to the IA outpost, dismount, and conduct a patrol, with the M113 following the patrol. This put six or seven Soldiers on the ground with the IA. The M113 provided ECM coverage, a single heavy machine gun, long-range radio, and CASEVAC. The tanks would provide some overwatch or patrol an adjacent street. The IA liked this more than what 3ACR had done, with tankers on tanks and the IA on the ground (of course the fight had evolved - 3ACR had been in big fights and the tankers were used to shooting from their vehicle). You share some risk, you gain some respect. And they didn't mind the firepower at all...

As we fielded uparmored HMMWVs, we used them more and more. However, for executing larger dismounted missions, they were not very effective as you don't get a lot of dismounts per vehicle. Instead, we would revert back to our M113s again. 3 M113s (manned by mechanics) with tankers inside was a valid package to execute a small raid.

When we got to Ramadi, though, I had a platoon that went right back to tanks and fired a large amount of rounds in direct support of a Marine infantry battalion. Another platoon used a section of tanks regularly for night overwatch. The third platoon used a section of tanks once in five months. My HQ, run by myself or my XO, would conduct a night overwatch mission every few days on the highway, watching for IED emplacers, using the tank thermal sights. In our last few days in Tal Afar, we had rarely used tanks, yet as soon as we hit a new AO, they became very popular again.

Flexibility in being comfortable/competent in multiple vehicle platforms was a key characteristic of mech forces. There was just too much ground to cover to walk everywhere. However, you do have to balance this against increased logistical requirements and fewer dismounts available. But then, these problems have existed since we had horses in the Army.

Steve

[Cavguy]

Dr. Nathan Toronto and I published a response to Lyall and Wilson in Routledge's "Small Wars and Insurgencies (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a927059877~frm=titlelink)". Unfotunately it isn't publically available and costs a lot, but nearly all our points/arguments are listed above as to why their thesis is fundamentally flawed.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a927059877~frm=titlelink

And a motivational picture:
(Ok, not COIN, but appeals to my tanker side ...)