An Asymmetric War of Ideas

[SteveMetz]

This is a passage that just spewed forth from my fingers as I sit here working on my Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy book. I'm not sure where I'm going with this, but I thought it was sort of an interesting brain fart and would welcome comments.

As what was to become known as the "global war on terror" took shape in the late summer and early autumn, President Bush adopted a decidedly ideological perspective. As small number of analysts such as Michael Scheuer, who had been an Osama bin Laden analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, advocated a policy perspective. But given President Bush's person inclinations and the angry and impassioned mood of the country after September 11, the ideological approach was almost inevitable. The explanation for the conflict was remarkably similar to those developed in the early years of the Cold War. Al Qaeda did not attack the United States because of anything it did, according the President Bush, but because of what it is. "They hate...democratically elected government. Their leaders are self appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."

While casting the conflict with Islamic militants as a reprise of the Cold War helped Americans, most of whom had never heard of al Qaeda before September 11, understand what was taking place, it also gave hint of a major problem which later emerged. While the Cold War was, to a large extent, an ideological "war of ideas," it was a symmetric one. Both sides offered different methods of political and economic organization, but they were, at least, talking about the same thing—day to day, physical life. The question for the peoples of the world was whether they wanted to live their daily lives in a political/economic system structured by free enterprise democracy or by communism. The ideological conflict with Islamic militants, though, was asymmetric. The United States was talking about the structures of political and economic daily life; al Qaeda was talking about spiritualism and fealty to God. While not yet evident as American strategy for the global war on terror took shape in 2001, countering spiritual and religious arguments with political and economic systems was difficult, perhaps in even fatally flawed. Americans knew how to conduct a symmetric war of ideas but they were novices at asymmetric ideological warfare, particularly one involving spirituality and religious belief.

[Gian P Gentile]

Dr. Metz:

I liked the first paragraph and it seems to me to be spot-on in terms of nailing mistakes made early on in how to approach the war with al-queda.

In the second paragraph you seem to portray the Cold War as some how a simpler or easier problem since it was symetric. I have found military officers tend to do this same thing when talking about how difficult coin is compared to what they think war with the soviet union would have been like had we fought it on the north german plains; that conventional war is somehow simpler than coin. I believe both are difficult in their own ways and conditions. So again you may want to look at the subtlety of your second paragraph and how it makes the Cold War appear to have been an easier problem for policy makers than the war on terror. If that is what you think of it then so be it, but I think it was a set of challenges that were different in degree and not quality.

[SteveMetz]

Dr. Metz:

I liked the first paragraph and it seems to me to be spot-on in terms of nailing mistakes made early on in how to approach the war with al-queda.

In the second paragraph you seem to portray the Cold War as some how a simpler or easier problem since it was symetric. I have found military officers tend to do this same thing when talking about how difficult coin is compared to what they think war with the soviet union would have been like had we fought it on the north german plains; that conventional war is somehow simpler than coin. I believe both are difficult in their own ways and conditions. So again you may want to look at the subtlety of your second paragraph and how it makes the Cold War appear to have been an easier problem for policy makers than the war on terror. If that is what you think of it then so be it, but I think it was a set of challenges that were different in degree and not quality.

What I was trying to get at is the point that strictly in terms of the "war of ideas," the Cold War was easier. It was complicated by the fact that there was an audience in the West that was at least partially receptive to the ideas of the other side (the political left). Today, there is less of that. But--and this is kind of uber theme I'm working on within the book--the Cold War was essentially a civil war within Western culture (albeit one that eventually played out in non-Western cultures). This conflict is quintessentially cross cultural. That's why drawing strategic concepts from the Cold War can be ineffective.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

On the whole, I agree with Gian's comments, although I think the two are different in both "degree and quality". I think you may be falling into a linguistic trap, vis "symmetric vs, asymmetric". They are useful heuristics, especially for communicating with what I assume your audience to be, but I would suggest that you really need to flush them out in a lot greater detail and precision. I think your best bet would be to use a form of set theoretic topology and look at the differences as a "mapping" problem.

For example, you note that


While the Cold War was, to a large extent, an ideological "war of ideas," it was a symmetric one. Both sides offered different methods of political and economic organization, but they were, at least, talking about the same thing—day to day, physical life. The question for the peoples of the world was whether they wanted to live their daily lives in a political/economic system structured by free enterprise democracy or by communism.

This was certainly how it was rhetorically constructed by both sides. More importantly, however, is what was assumed in those rhetorical constructions, i.e. the assumed answers to basic questions of meaning ("Why am I here?", "What is reality?", etc.). I would suggest that what we are seeing now is that the assumptions are different and, in the case of AQ, the differences in these assumptions are what is coming out. In that sense, it is "asymmetric", but not in the more commonly understood sense of a power differential.

Possibly more important is the lack of a clear, philosophical strategy on our part. Rhetoric of "freedom" and "democracy" just doesn't cut it against the sophistication of Islamic thought. If we look at it in this sense, ten thee is a clear asymmetry in the sense of power differential - they are more powerful than we are, especially with the target audience which, BTW, includes large segments of the American public.

Where I disagree with Gian is that I do see this as a fundamentally different type of conflict - I believe that this is a global war of basic philosophies (not ideologies or religions) which has kinetic components, rather than a global war which has ideological components. To make it even nastier, and it is a corollary of my perception of this as a philosophical war, is that I can see elements of the philosophy that underpins AQ operating in current Coalition policies and practices (an example being the current Blackwater issue).

Another difference that I see is that it is much harder to construct an "Us" in opposition to "Them"; something that was a crucial rhetorical strategy in the Cold War and in all previous conflicts. To my mind, this difficulty stems from a number of sources, but I would argue that the strongest two are the actualization of the 19th century Liberal ideal of "strength through diversity" and the increased (and constantly increasing) globalized density of communications networks.

One of the things that we "know" from history is that periods of rapidly shifting communications and economics create large social movements that Pete Hallowell called "Revitalization Movements" - basically attempts to reconstruct "Golden Ages" that may or may not have ever existed. Most of the key movements in this form for the past 40 or so years have been "religious" (loosely defined). While this has often been constructed as in response to the secularization of society, I would actually argue that it is the result of not having developed and deployed "non-religious" (again loosely construed) TTPs for achieving the same ends (they do exist, but not in the mainstream culture complex of the West).

Anyway, that's my 0.1998 cents (almost par :eek:)

Marc

[goesh]

" While not yet evident as American strategy for the global war on terror took shape in 2001, countering spiritual and religious arguments with political and economic systems was difficult, perhaps in even fatally flawed. Americans knew how to conduct a symmetric war of ideas but they were novices at asymmetric ideological warfare, particularly one involving spirituality and religious belief." (S.Metz)

Very, very well said and the dynamic of suicide bombers has made it all that much more thorny and complicated in coming to grips with said dilemma, IMO. There is at some very fundamental, archtype sort-of-levels (genetic?) issues of deity potency and efficacy in the ranks of the belivers, on both sides for that matter, when it comes to the willingness of believers to repeatedly blow themselves up in order to get at the enemy. Below the surface of generalizations and assertions of the other side having but a false God, lies some unanswered, even disturbing questions. The fear and terror of suicide bombing resonates at the subliminal level more than we may be willing to concede. In some ways we are more sophisticated than the WW2 generation that could simply chalk off kamikazes as mere "crazy Japs" out to kill our troops, but then too some Chaplains in those days were praying for death of the enemy. We don't bring the God of our understanding to the fight, nor does said God call for the death of sworn enemies - the Constitution essentially won't allow it, nor will the swollen ranks of agnostics and atheists. The tactical edge in all this goes to Allah.

[JJackson]

Again, with regard to the argument in the second paragraph, I am not sure I see the difference.
They are both ideological disagreements, I would argue the asymmetry is military. While in the Cold War the two power blocks were both comprised of Westphalian Nation States with comparable military components the fighting was principally done by ‘buying’ influence within other Nations States with economic cooperation and military support. This ideological conflict is with a confederation which largely ignores the Westphalian model opting for a pan-national coalition in opposition to the export, into traditionally Islamic areas, of a system they – like the communists – would view as decadent, and corrosive to a way of life based on Koranic values. In the longer term they may hope for a Caliphate which was Westphalian in nature but probably only because this has become the established post colonial norm for dividing up the world’s landmass not because it is inherently necessary for their world view (here I am referring to the Westphalian nature of the caliphate rather than the caliphate itself). The aim, is at heart, irredentist.

[SteveMetz]

Hi Steve,

On the whole, I agree with Gian's comments, although I think the two are different in both "degree and quality". I think you may be falling into a linguistic trap, vis "symmetric vs, asymmetric". They are useful heuristics, especially for communicating with what I assume your audience to be, but I would suggest that you really need to flush them out in a lot greater detail and precision. I think your best bet would be to use a form of set theoretic topology and look at the differences as a "mapping" problem.

For example, you note that



This was certainly how it was rhetorically constructed by both sides. More importantly, however, is what was assumed in those rhetorical constructions, i.e. the assumed answers to basic questions of meaning ("Why am I here?", "What is reality?", etc.). I would suggest that what we are seeing now is that the assumptions are different and, in the case of AQ, the differences in these assumptions are what is coming out. In that sense, it is "asymmetric", but not in the more commonly understood sense of a power differential.

Possibly more important is the lack of a clear, philosophical strategy on our part. Rhetoric of "freedom" and "democracy" just doesn't cut it against the sophistication of Islamic thought. If we look at it in this sense, ten thee is a clear asymmetry in the sense of power differential - they are more powerful than we are, especially with the target audience which, BTW, includes large segments of the American public.

Where I disagree with Gian is that I do see this as a fundamentally different type of conflict - I believe that this is a global war of basic philosophies (not ideologies or religions) which has kinetic components, rather than a global war which has ideological components. To make it even nastier, and it is a corollary of my perception of this as a philosophical war, is that I can see elements of the philosophy that underpins AQ operating in current Coalition policies and practices (an example being the current Blackwater issue).

Another difference that I see is that it is much harder to construct an "Us" in opposition to "Them"; something that was a crucial rhetorical strategy in the Cold War and in all previous conflicts. To my mind, this difficulty stems from a number of sources, but I would argue that the strongest two are the actualization of the 19th century Liberal ideal of "strength through diversity" and the increased (and constantly increasing) globalized density of communications networks.

One of the things that we "know" from history is that periods of rapidly shifting communications and economics create large social movements that Pete Hallowell called "Revitalization Movements" - basically attempts to reconstruct "Golden Ages" that may or may not have ever existed. Most of the key movements in this form for the past 40 or so years have been "religious" (loosely defined). While this has often been constructed as in response to the secularization of society, I would actually argue that it is the result of not having developed and deployed "non-religious" (again loosely construed) TTPs for achieving the same ends (they do exist, but not in the mainstream culture complex of the West).

Anyway, that's my 0.1998 cents (almost par :eek:)

Marc

In terms of the "us" versus "them" construct, I'm seeing the same thing that was evident early in the Cold War. There is a bed rock constituency for whom this is very clearly an epochal battle of good and evil. I hang around in a politics sub-board of a sport-focused discussion board associated with one of my alma maters (a large, Southern state school). This is really a useful window for me into "red state" mentality. (Despite the fact that I come from a very blue collar background, I'm mentally cloistered now).

Anyhow, I've been struck by the extent to which the evangelical community in general is convinced that we are now in the end-of-the-world conflict described in Revelations. (Of course, I point out to them that this same claim has been made dozens of times throughout the history of Christianity, but they can't quite grapple with the implications of that).

Anyhow, this group is political influential. And it worries me that their thinking influences U.S. strategy.

By the way, I just finished what I think is the single best book explaining the jihadist ideology: Mary Habeck's Knowing the Enemy. My only critique is that I don't think her policy prescriptions follow from her analysis. They were pretty much the existing strategy--this whole idea that we'll somehow "empower" Muslim "moderates" who will "delegtimize" the jihadist ideology. The reason I don't buy that is that I think the absolute root of the problem is that Islam as a political-cultural system cannot create stable and competitive states in the modern world. But yet the very elements which make it unstable and uncompetitive are central to the religious part of it and thus are non-negotiable.

[SteveMetz]

Again, with regard to the argument in the second paragraph, I am not sure I see the difference.
They are both ideological disagreements, I would argue the asymmetry is military. While in the Cold War the two power blocks were both comprised of Westphalian Nation States with comparable military components the fighting was principally done by ‘buying’ influence within other Nations States with economic cooperation and military support. This ideological conflict is with a confederation which largely ignores the Westphalian model opting for a pan-national coalition in opposition to the export, into traditionally Islamic areas, of a system they – like the communists – would view as decadent, and corrosive to a way of life based on Koranic values. In the longer term they may hope for a Caliphate which was Westphalian in nature but probably only because this has become the established post colonial norm for dividing up the world’s landmass not because it is inherently necessary for their world view (here I am referring to the Westphalian nature of the caliphate rather than the caliphate itself). The aim, is at heart, irredentist.

The point I was trying to make is that communism promised a better life in the here and now. When the West could show that it didn't provide that, it's validity crumbled. Islamic militancy is promising reward in the afterlife. There's no way we can disprove that. We cannot demonstrate that AQ is wrong. We're promising people a more comfortable life; AQ is promising them eternal bliss. That's the asymmetry.

[marct]

Hi Steve,


Anyhow, I've been struck by the extent to which the evangelical community in general is convinced that we are now in the end-of-the-world conflict described in Revelations. (Of course, I point out to them that this same claim has been made dozens of times throughout the history of Christianity, but they can't quite grapple with the implications of that).

That's because most of them probably know diddly-squat about Christianity (BTW, one dead give-away is if someone who calls themselves an evangelical or fundamentalist uses the term "Revelations", then they are ignorant of their own supposed tradition: it is "Revelation" (singular)). This has certainly been a view pushed in some of the evangelical world and popularized by the Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins Left Behind (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left_Behind_%28series%29) novels.


Anyhow, this group is political influential. And it worries me that their thinking influences U.S. strategy.

Me too. For me, the most disturbing examples are he evangelical crowd that "support" the state of Israel because they believe that the Battle of Armageddon must take place before the Messiah can return. And, so goes their logic, sice this is the case and all Christians want the Messiah to return, it is their duty to make sure that that battle takes place.


By the way, I just finished what I think is the single best book explaining the jihadist ideology: Mary Habeck's Knowing the Enemy. My only critique is that I don't think her policy prescriptions follow from her analysis. They were pretty much the existing strategy--this whole idea that we'll somehow "empower" Muslim "moderates" who will "delegtimize" the jihadist ideology. The reason I don't buy that is that I think the absolute root of the problem is that Islam as a political-cultural system cannot create stable and competitive states in the modern world. But yet the very elements which make it unstable and uncompetitive are central to the religious part of it and thus are non-negotiable.

You know, I would probably agree with you if I didn't know how mutable religious interpretation is :wry:. While I would question the probability of such a thing happening, I certainly do not question the possibility of it happening.


The point I was trying to make is that communism promised a better life in the here and now. When the West could show that it didn't provide that, it's validity crumbled. Islamic militancy is promising reward in the afterlife. There's no way we can disprove that. We cannot demonstrate that AQ is wrong. We're promising people a more comfortable life; AQ is promising them eternal bliss. That's the asymmetry.

Actually, I think you are wrong, here, and I'll point to the Anbar Awakening as an example. I believe that we can, and have, demonstrated that AQ is wrong in terms of their vision for this life, and this very point has been picked up by some Salafi imams. Where I think we have had problems is in showing that "our" vision is what "they" should buy. This strikes me as a totally artificial either-or dichotomy.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

This strikes me as a totally artificial either-or dichotomy.
Marc

It's amazing how much the implied "either-or" shows up in many discussions, be it this or the issue of Small Wars and larger conflict.:wry:

[tequila]

Actually the genuinely barren, hazy nature of most radical irhabi literature makes clear that few of them have any real idea of what a true Islamic state would actually look like. Even comparatively sophisticated Muslim Brotherhood ideologues tend to get very unspecific when they have to detail exactly what they are fighting for as to opposed to what they are against, which they are very good at. Radical irhabism/jihadism is a bit different from Soviet or Chinese Communism in that it is principally a revolutionary doctrine, proclaiming that so-and-so is against Islam, against Muslims, out to destroy Islam, steal oil, oppress, etc. but getting quite sketchy even when dreaming their ideal state, much less the nuts-and-bolts details. Even the Maoists had land reform. A better analogue for irhabism/jihadism is radical anarchism, IMO.

[goesh]

There can be nothing but chaos, violence, disruption and 0 stability as the precepts of Shariah spread and manifest. The expansion is predicated on instability. Our own extreme Right wing says kill them all and let God sort them out - Pax Americana, baby. The inequity of wealth distribution Western technocracy yields is every bit as upsetting to the fundamentalist jihadist as is the Libertarian life-style and freedoms it affords, i.e. moral corruption. Tending to beached whales while children close by go neglected infuriates them every bit as much as does gay rights parades and women in short skirts with uncovered heads. They do address the material as well as the spiritual and we are being fully symetrical with emphasis weighted on the spiritual. Some of the COIN 'heavy hitters' are saying this is a 100 yr. effort. With superior technology, proven political systems and economic applications , many should be wondering why it is going to take so long. Our symetrical analysis clearly shows their system can't provide competetive and stable states as the author well points out, but they measure time in generations, not linear years and the spread of Shariah is based on the death of the vanguard and those they are able to take down with them. It cannot spread otherwise - Divine Obedience will enable stability and an equal share of the wealth for all.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,


A better analogue for irhabism/jihadism is radical anarchism, IMO.

In the modern or 1930's variant from, say the Spanish Civil War?

Anyway, I do agree with your general point about them being fuzzy on what they are fighting for. When I pointed to the Anbar Awakening as an example, I think the crucial point I was trying to make was that the irhabi rhetoric was being converted into a lived reality that the inhabitants could see and experience (often with fatal results). That "lived reality" contextualized the rhetoric in a day to day setting and, IMO, served as a counter to the rhetoric itself.

[marct]

It cannot spread otherwise - Divine Obedience will enable stability and an equal share of the wealth for all.

I'm reminded of a 1930's folk ballad (http://musicanet.org/robokopp/usa/longhair.htm)


Long haired preachers come out every night
Try to tell you what's wrong and what's right
But when asked about something to eat,
They will answer in voices so sweet.

You will eat, bye and bye,
In that glorious land above the sky
Work and pray
Live on hay
You'll get pie in the sky when you die!

[SteveMetz]

Actually the genuinely barren, hazy nature of most radical irhabi literature makes clear that few of them have any real idea of what a true Islamic state would actually look like. Even comparatively sophisticated Muslim Brotherhood ideologues tend to get very unspecific when they have to detail exactly what they are fighting for as to opposed to what they are against, which they are very good at. Radical irhabism/jihadism is a bit different from Soviet or Chinese Communism in that it is principally a revolutionary doctrine, proclaiming that so-and-so is against Islam, against Muslims, out to destroy Islam, steal oil, oppress, etc. but getting quite sketchy even when dreaming their ideal state, much less the nuts-and-bolts details. Even the Maoists had land reform. A better analogue for irhabism/jihadism is radical anarchism, IMO.

I'd again commend Habeck's Knowing the Enemy. It is true that the jihadists are not Leninists in terms of having a concrete alternative blueprint. But that's because they believe that the alternative has already been spelled out. For them to offer a blueprint for a better society would be arrogance since, from their perspective, God has already provided such a blueprint.

In a way, that makes them a more difficult opponent in the war of ideas. With communists, we could eventually say, "See what life under communism is like. Is that what you want?" But since the jihadists say that their model was the first few decades after Mohammed and to deprecate that era is to "insult" Islam, we are not able to legitimize it.

Ironically, I think in the long term it would have served our cause better if we had landed in Afghanistan and crushed the existing AQ infrastructure, but left the Taliban in control. Then we would have actually had an instance of an "Islamic" state to show to any Muslims attracted by the idea.

(And, by the way, I'm using the word "jihadist" despite have had looong conservations with Jim Guirard about it. I personally think that most Muslims understand the difference between "jihadi"--which most of them consider themselves--and "jihadist" which is the militant mutation of the concept).

[tequila]

I'd again commend Habeck's Knowing the Enemy. It is true that the jihadists are not Leninists in terms of having a concrete alternative blueprint. But that's because they believe that the alternative has already been spelled out. For them to offer a blueprint for a better society would be arrogance since, from their perspective, God has already provided such a blueprint.

In a way, that makes them a more difficult opponent in the war of ideas. With communists, we could eventually say, "See what life under communism is like. Is that what you want?" But since the jihadists say that their model was the first few decades after Mohammed and to deprecate that era is to "insult" Islam, we are not able to legitimize it.

Note that this is pure jihadi ideology. To my mind one should not confuse jihadi political "theory" (al-Qaeda & associated radical revolutionaries), such as it is, with the more politically based model propounded by, say, the Egyptian or Jordanian Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood). Ikhwan writers speak of the pure days of Muhammad and his companions as example but focus on real-world provision of services, cleaning up corruption, and social conservatism when making the case on the stump.

This is the real battle of ideas - not Western democracy vs. the apocalyptic Caliphate. No Muslim nation is going to ever vote for or accept al-Qaeda as its leadership. Pure jihadi ideology is more in the nature of a recruiting pitch, aimed specifically at pulling in martyrs to wage jihad against foreign domination or oppressive rulers. It is not really aimed at transforming societies.

A real danger is missing the forest for the trees in the differentiation between radical jihadism and mere political Islamism.

[goesh]

Amen, Brother Marct! The quill fits your hand well

[Skipjack]

Dr. Metz et al--I would like to add some comments and, ideally, grist for the collective mill with the below.

With regard to the "policy perspective vs ideological approach," both seemed in 2001 (and before) and now to miss the complex cultural and intercultural issues that are playing themselves out in the dynamic of al-Qa'ida (and similar Islamic extremist movements--there is a debate (some have characterized it as a civil war) in Islam and the Islamic world over the fundamental questions of "what is Islam?" What is "modernity" and the "modern world?" What is the proper role of a Muslim in a/the modern world? How will the "Islamic world" interact with and/or be influenced by the western and/or modern world?

This conflict (I would maintain) is symmetric in the sense that both sides can only resolve it by figuring out how to deal constructively with the other.

The asymmetric element is that al-Qa'ida's struggle is, at its root, one of political and economic issues (especially political disenfranchisement and economic powerlessness for the mass of the population) cloaked in Qur'anic language and images and in a religious dimension. If we look at it only (or largely) as a war of religions (or even as a "war of ideas") without addressing the underlying issues that helped to create the bin Ladins and Attas, we waste our energy--and in so doing help to MAKE this conflict asymmetrical.

I look forward to your comments and to reading your book.

[J Wolfsberger]

Steve,


I'd again commend Habeck's Knowing the Enemy. It is true that the jihadists are not Leninists in terms of having a concrete alternative blueprint. But that's because they believe that the alternative has already been spelled out. For them to offer a blueprint for a better society would be arrogance since, from their perspective, God has already provided such a blueprint.

This gets close to something I've been thinking about: That what we are really dealing with under the term "Global War On Terror" is actually a schismatic war within Islam.

As with in other religion, it is neither inherently benign or malevolent. It becomes what its practitioners interpret it to be. In the situation we face today, a group of practitioners have decided Islam is a bizarre implementation of a medieval tribal culture that I'm not certain ever existed. To obtain attention/dominance they drew the US into a war. An analogy would be for the Swedes and North German nobility attacking the Ottoman Empire in 1618 to entice them to attack the Catholic countries in southern Europe.

I'd go a bit further and add that it has become conflated with two different, simultaneous wars: The Democrat's War on Bush (in fact, a war on any Republican who had won the 2000 election); and the Leftist War on Western Civilization.

I'd add more, but out of time.

[SteveMetz]

Steve,



This gets close to something I've been thinking about: That what we are really dealing with under the term "Global War On Terror" is actually a schismatic war within Islam.

As with in other religion, it is neither inherently benign or malevolent. It becomes what its practitioners interpret it to be. In the situation we face today, a group of practitioners have decided Islam is a bizarre implementation of a medieval tribal culture that I'm not certain ever existed. To obtain attention/dominance they drew the US into a war. An analogy would be for the Swedes and North German nobility attacking the Ottoman Empire in 1618 to entice them to attack the Catholic countries in southern Europe.

I'd go a bit further and add that it has become conflated with two different, simultaneous wars: The Democrat's War on Bush (in fact, a war on any Republican who had won the 2000 election); and the Leftist War on Western Civilization.

I'd add more, but out of time.

Well, I think the bit at the end is best left for a different type of discussion board. I personally am a card-carrying, contributing member of the RNC who is also listed in the Heritage Foundation's database of conservative public policy experts and I think the Bush strategy has been a failure of tragic, historic proportion.

But your analogy of the European religious wars is interesting. I looked at it from a different perspective, though. I kept thinking of the Bush strategy which says there is a "civil war" within Islam and we are going to shape this by "empowering the moderates." That would have been like the Turkish caliph lending his support to the Protestants in Europe. How much would that have helped them?

[J Wolfsberger]

Steve,


Well, I think the bit at the end is best left for a different type of discussion board. I personally am a card-carrying, contributing member of the RNC who is also listed in the Heritage Foundation's database of conservative public policy experts and I think the Bush strategy has been a failure of tragic, historic proportion.

I'm in 100% agreement. I didn't amplify out of thinking it might be too inappopriate to this board (and being chicken:D).


But your analogy of the European religious wars is interesting. I looked at it from a different perspective, though. I kept thinking of the Bush strategy which says there is a "civil war" within Islam and we are going to shape this by "empowering the moderates." That would have been like the Turkish caliph lending his support to the Protestants in Europe. How much would that have helped them?

Again, I agree, and I think that was one among many serious flaws in the Bush admin's approach. Had we taken the approach that we were drawn into a religious war against our will, we'd be in much better shape to implement to type of IO advocated by Jim Guirard at TrueSpeak.

[Tom Odom]

Again, I agree, and I think that was one among many serious flaws in the Bush admin's approach. Had we taken the approach that we were drawn into a religious war against our will, we'd be in much better shape to implement to type of IO advocated by Jim Guirard at TrueSpeak.

But not in keeping with the evangelical mindest grafted on to the in your face behavior that was common in the 7th grade

ok gonna shut up now :D

Tom

[Rex Brynen]

I think one needs to be careful in distinguishing between the ideology of militant Islamist leaderships, and the sometimes rather different issues and ideas that motivate a great many of their followers and supporters.

In Lebanon and Palestine, very, very few of those who voted for Hizbullah or Hamas bought into the notion of establishing a global Caliphate (indeed, in my experience even many Hamas cadres don't). Rather, they are motivated by nationalist (or, in Lebanon, sectarian and even class) factors, as well as immediate political grievances—to the point that both parties play down their Islamist ideologies at election time.

In Iraq, we know that most of the people who have been shooting at coalition forces are angry Muslims, but not militant Islamists (although the conflict may push them in that direction).

In Afghanistan, the largest share of the Taliban support base very localist, even parochial Pashtun tribes who don't like lots of (non-Muslim) foreigners, and are deeply suspicious of the Karzai government.

These are all sets of grievances that have been mobilized in the past by a broad array of ideological messages, from Arab nationalism (in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq), communism (among some in Iraq and Lebanon), the nationalist new left (ditto), or tribalism (notably in Afghanistan).

Given this, even if one could "defeat" leadership ideology, it would leave many of the subgrievances intact.

What contemporary jihadist groups have done, however, is to project a message of devotion and success, with AQ having set the "gold standard" on 9/11, and Iraq having done almost equal damage in terms of sending a signal of (perceived) American weakness and Islamist success to proto-supporters.

There is a parallel with the Cold War here too--the successes of the USSR in the developing world had a lot to do with a combination of anti-colonialism, legacies of past Western involvement, social inequality and underdevelopment, the benefits offered, and the apparent success of the USSR (in the 1960s and 70s at least) as challenger. While there were many third world socialists, I'm not sure many outside Indochina really bought into the core ideas of the Moscow (or Beijing) communist model.


Ironically, I think in the long term it would have served our cause better if we had landed in Afghanistan and crushed the existing AQ infrastructure, but left the Taliban in control. Then we would have actually had an instance of an "Islamic" state to show to any Muslims attracted by the idea.

..although Saudi Arabia, Iran, and (at times) Sudan, could also make claims to being an "islamic state" and that hasn't made much difference. Moreover, Afghanistan is generally considered such a peripheral backwater of the Muslim world that (Pakistani Pashtuns aside), very few Muslims pay it much attention unless it has Soviet or US troops in it..

[SteveMetz]

In Lebanon and Palestine, very, very few of those who voted for Hizbullah or Hamas bought into the notion of establishing a global Caliphate (indeed, in my experience even many Hamas cadres don't).

Of course. But if you'd ask them if they'd like to see a unified Islam, I suspect most would say yes.


These are all sets of grievances that have been mobilized in the past by a broad array of ideological messages, from Arab nationalism (in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq), communism (among some in Iraq and Lebanon), the nationalist new left (ditto), or tribalism (notably in Afghanistan).

What makes the jihadist ideology powerful is that it is able to point to these motivations and say, "See--you tried all those things and where did it get you?"


..although Saudi Arabia, Iran, and (at times) Sudan, could also make claims to being an "islamic state" and that hasn't made much difference. Moreover, Afghanistan is generally considered such a peripheral backwater of the Muslim world that (Pakistani Pashtuns aside), very few Muslims pay it much attention unless it has Soviet or US troops in it..

The jihadists say most conclusively that those were not, in fact, true Islamic states. AQ in particular said that Afghanistan was the only one.

[Rex Brynen]

Of course. But if you'd ask them if they'd like to see a unified Islam, I suspect most would say yes.

Among supporters/voters? Preferring a single Muslim umma (in which they would become a small minority)? No, I don't think so at all.

Among cadres? Its harder to tell, but many of the Hamas cadres that I've spoken too are rather more nationalistic than pan-Islamic.


What makes the jihadist ideology powerful is that it is able to point to these motivations and say, "See--you tried all those things and where did it get you?"

Absolutely agreed. But there's an interesting parallel here with radical Arab nationalism, which at its heyday in the Middle East in the 1960s was as popular (roughly) as Islamist groups are today. Radical pan-Arabism didn't decline because it lost a war of ideas in the grand sense--on the contrary, many in the region would still regard its ideas as positive and progressive, and profoundly rooted in history and ethnic self-identity Rather, it lost its appeal because of its failure to deliver on a range of issues: the conflict with Israel, economic development, empowering the marginalized, etc., coupled with the practical realities and benefits of state citizenship (and hence pull of localized identities).

I'm not suggesting that ideas aren't important--I think they absolutely are, and indeed I think as a result that has been a very real COIN cost to the US being seen to lose moral high ground on issues ranginging from Abu Ghraib and Gitmo to ME democratization. I am suggesting (I suppose--I'm trying to sort through my ideas as I post!) that its important to think of the OPFOR here as a coalition, not a formation, linked by diverse grievances and not simply the appeal of an overarching vision of the future. The danger of the "asymetric war of ideas" formulation is it may unitentionally obscure some of this, and hence obscure potential vulnerabilities among radical Islamist groups.

(On a side note, I'm not a fan of using "jihadist" for these groups, given the positive connotations of the term in both Arabic and Islam--I think "takfiri" (accusers of apostasy) works far better, since it highlights the willingness of such groups to kill Muslims, an enormously controversial issue among their potential supporters. Otherwise "militant" or "radical Islamists," which I think is relatively neutral and accurate. It sounds like you've had this conversation before, however, so I won't bother *lol*)

[goesh]

So few are setting the stage for so many to dance on and they have every intention of keeping us proactively on the plane of the mundane and material.