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Tom Odom
12-02-2005, 04:39 PM
Folks,

You can download the report at http://www.nsa.gov/vietnam/releases/relea00012.pdf

Good read

Best
Tom

Maximus
04-16-2007, 03:12 AM
Looking for some feedback on former CIA Director William Colby's Lost Victory. I finished the book about 3 weeks ago and found it to be among the most informative and optimistic books on the Vietnam War with respect to understanding the U.S. role in the war, our many mistakes, and probably most important, how we eventually learned from these mistakes in developing a joint-pacification effort that some say led to the war being all but won by 1971-1972.

I'm not a Vietnam expert by any stretch, but did find this book, as well as Lewis Sorley's A Better War convincing in describing what could have been had we not completely pulled out militarily and cut off funding. Both books paint a very different picture of the war than others that generally focus on all things during and before the Tet Offensive.

Colby made an interesting point about how the Easter Offensive validated our success (and that of the South Vietnamese Government) because the North Vietnamese were left with little choice but to attack conventionally because the communist infrastracture in South Vietnam had been mostly destroyed by 1972. He argues this was even more the case after all three NVA conventional thrusts were defeated or fought to a stalemate during the Easter Offensive. He goes on to say that things in South Vietnam would have turned out very differently had the U.S., in 1972-1973, guaranteed the country's security from conventional external threats, much like we did when signing security alliances with South Korea and Japan.


Anybody out there with experience on the ground in Vietnam or Vietnam history experts in general that can shed some light on Colby's book?

I'm particularly interested because I see many parallels between how he describes Vietnam in 1968-1969 and where we're at in Iraq today (i.e., just now seriously embracing a pacification effort, making progress on inter-agency cooperation, really trying counterinsurgency, etc. all with decreasing political support on the homefront).

Mike in Hilo
04-16-2007, 04:39 AM
I would also recommend what seems to be the closest thing to a definitive after action report on CORDS, Pacification by Richard A. Hunt, Westview Press, 1995. The jacket, incidentally, has Colby's endorsement of this work. The author was a CORDS captain, apparently assigned to MACV HQ. As for Lost Victory, definitely a worthwhile read, and I concur in the conclusion, basically as you have put it. Concur as well in Sorely, which puts the Colby/CORDS story in context. I worked in a number of MR III provinces as a civilian in CORDS and its successor outfit, the Embassy's SAA/FO (Special Asst. to the Amb. for Field Operations) Program 1971 to April 1975. All my former colleagues who were there when I was and, to whom I have spoken since, consider, as do I, that by mid-1970 the turning point had been reached in our favor. To all of us, every stage of the pulling of the plug was an outrage. My quick and (very) dirty take on CORDS is that our advisory effort was laudably successful in ensuring the needed US and GVN focus on recruiting, training and equiping the Territorial Forces (RF/PF) and recognizing their key role in pacification--(falls under the rubric of organizing the population in its own self defense). I'll not dwell on recurring problems such as enemy penetration, but overall, to me the vindication of the program came in the 1972 PAVN offensive when US observers were able to comment in a number of situations that RF units had performed measurably better than ARVN. To me, progress with RF/PF alone more than justified the CORDS enterprise.

On another important initiative, Colby is overly sanguin, however, viz., Phoenix. After all, this was his baby. And this is why to me the CORDS advisory effort was the house half finished. Sorely quotes Abrams putting it better: there was "still a lot of work to do." Most VCI were killed not through Phoenix but by RF during the course of their normal operations. This is because many VCI (including the senior ones) resided and travelled with the enemy combatant units in the bush, not within the population. And PRU, an effective anti-VCI strike force, diminished very significantly in effectiveness once it was Vietnamized. Despite undeniably serious attrition in their ranks, the VCI were still around when CORDS ended in Feb 1973, and despite smaller numbers, able to keep their fellow villagers in a state of terror in certain areas. Communist enforcers continued to assasinate, the guides were still there to lead PAVN conbatants, and in the waning year of 1974, political agitators were unabashedly vocal. (The GVN in MR III did not demonstrate seriousness of intent in neutralizing the legal cadre--the ones living within the population. Keep in mind that CORDS was strictly advisory--if the GVN didn't do it, it wasn't done.) Conspicuously absent from Colby's account was any discussion of the thriving Shadow Supply System of local procurement for the enemy forces--an important VCI undertaking. The whole question of accommodation with the enemy was a perennial problem with which the advisers struggled, but unfortunately, as our force drawdown accellerated, the Vietnamese, no longer convinced of US commitment (the key!) were driven to increasing collaboration with the enemy.

In conclusion, I'd assess CORDS as a real success in regard to the RF/PF. But recent accounts of the successes of Phoenix (at best spotty, but overall, wanting) leave me incredulous. Some months ago, Council Member Slapout (if memory serves) suggested that I do an evaluation of CORDS, which I refrained from attempting since I am not qualified. The foregoing will confirm that judgement.

Cheers,
Mike.

tequila
04-16-2007, 09:22 AM
Let's not forget that the Easter Offensive in 1972, while an utter failure and disaster for the North Vietnamese in their attempt to take urban centers and destroy South Vietnam, did manage to successfully overrun and keep the Central Highlands. While not a major population center, it provided an excellent safe zone within the South for resupply and rebuilding. Note as well that without American advisors, FACs, and pilots, ARVN would have utterly collapsed in 1972.

Also focusing exclusively on successes in the counterinsurgency battle ignores a critical aspect of Maoist revolutionary warfare, which prescribes transitioning to conventional forces as soon as possible. The Communists in China didn't win due to guerrilla uprisings in Nanking --- they crushed the Nationalists in the major force-on-force battles, where guerrillas acted primarily as guides, supply, and political mobilization rather than playing a significant military role. The same thing happened in Vietnam, except when the major conventional campaign occurred South Vietnam fell far faster than the KMT in China.

slapout9
04-16-2007, 12:21 PM
Hi Mike, thanks for the post on CORDS, yes that was me with a request for an evaluation of CORDS. I disagree with you on your qualifications, seems like you are exactly the right person as your post proves. I am at my day job but will post more later.

Merv Benson
04-16-2007, 02:24 PM
After the war the communist said that the Phoenix program was very successful.

The communist insurgency in Vietnam was beaten many times. In Mark Moyars' Triumph Forsaken he notes that in 1959 the Diem regime had reduced the communist forces down to just 6,000 men.

After the north started sending more troops down, they were defeated again in the early '60's. What helped them in 1963 was their infiltration of the Buddhist movement creating what appeared to be a sectarian strife.

The US fell for the ruse and started putting pressure on Diem to make concessions to the Buddhist leaders who kept moving the goal post. State Department people began back a coup against Diem and were assisted in that effort by Ambassador Lodge and some reporters in Vietnam who later received Pulitzer Prizes for their efforts. The coup caused the South Vietnamese to lose momentum in their war against the communist, and President Johnson's weak response to provocations encouraged them to send more troops south.

If you are interested in counterinsurgency warfare, you will want to read Moyar's book. It only goes through 1965, so you will probably have to wait for the next volume to read about the CORDS program from his perspective.

PhilR
04-16-2007, 03:08 PM
For a dissenting opinion on CORDs and pacification, I'd strongly recommend reading Eric Bergerud's The Dynamics of Defeat; the Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Westview Press, 1991). Bergerud looks clsely at once province in Vietnam and assess that the pacification efforts could only, at best, achieve a mediocre tie with the VC and that the population, was never in a position to accept the GVN, even when the VC fighters were swept from the battlefield in the "better war" of the Abrams era.
For me Bergerud's book proves the point made by David Galula that the counterinsurgent must be armed with a better idea than the insurgent, and be able to sell that idea.

Maximus
04-16-2007, 07:55 PM
Thanks for all the feedback thus far. Will be sure to pick up the recommended books.

A few questions and observations that came to mind as I was reading the responses:

Colby described how he sent John Paul Vann down to the Delta region to lead the pacification efforts because the VC had a dominant presence in the region, at least initially. He talked about visiting this region multiple times throughout the book and for a long time it definitely wasn't a nice place. But about a year or so after Vann moved down that way (1970-1971 timeframe), Abrams in charge, pacification/CORDS really the main effort, local elections took place, fairly legitimate central government in place, etc. the Delta had significantly changed, to the point where Colby and Vann would ride around on a motorcycle, stopping in villages for days at a time, while not once being attacked or threatened. He mentioned that they would have certainly been killed had they done this in the mid-to late 1960s.

Did anyone spend time in the Delta region? If yes, please share thoughts on why things changed so dramatically.

This brings to mind all the talk of late over Senator McCain's recent trip to Baghdad. While I haven't been in Baghdad for a few years now, and don't think there are any places where an American would be wise to walk around alone in the city, I do know of significant changes on the ground in this direction in other areas.

For example, a few weeks back I spoke to a Lt that had recently returned from the once "Wild, Wild West" in Anbar. Tomorrow marks the 3-year anniversary of a battlion-sized fight in Husaybah that has proven to be one of the most intense the Marines have had in Anbar since 2004. I'm very close with many of the Marines that fought in Husaybah. One of the guys led a heavy machine gun platoon in the AO in Spring/Fall 2004 and commented that he rarely went anywhere unless he had 6 vehicles and at least 30 Marines with him. Friends from the two battalions that replaced this battalion had similar experiences.

Back to the Lt that I recently spoke to... following the clear/secure, hold, build strategy employed in this AO in late 2005/early 2006, platoons were married up with Iraqi Army and police units (many of the Iraqis were from the area) and moved in with the people. The Lt assumed control of one of these positions for 5 months. Unlike the 30-Marine/lots of machine guns patrols from years past, he routinely sent out fire team (+) to squad (-) dismounted patrols that operated alongside Iraqi security forces. While there was still an occassional threat, ultimately the people were very happy to work with the Marines/ISF, the insurgency lost most of its appeal, the economy took many steps in a positive direction, and politics at the local level began having a significant influence in the AO.

Two major things struck me about his comments:

1) He said the AO was so peaceful that the deployment was boring in many ways, and if sent back to Iraq, part of him wants to go somewhere where he can participate in a "clearing" operation (he understands that it's not a good thing if we continue to have to do "clearing" ops, but part of him feels like this is what infantry Marines are trained/supposed to do).

2) Many of his Marines had previously served in this AO. Initially they didn't believe "higher" when told how much things had changed on the ground. In fact, many thought he was insane when saying that they'd be conducting indepenent squad-sized patrols on their first day in the AO. His squad leaders warned him about how dangerous certain areas were and recommended bringing a larger force. Much to their surprise, the environment had fundamentally changed after clear/secure, hold, build was executed and committed to, now going on almost 16 months.

Thanks in advance for any more thoughts on the subject or feedback on Colby's book.

Mike in Hilo
04-17-2007, 01:32 AM
1) For Tequila: Absolutely--not quite "the highlands" but a slice of territory along the border from the DMZ all the way to the Dellta essentially fell to the enemy in 1972. Stretching it though, to say this (or 1975) was Maoist third stage--After all, the enemy conventional forces were PAVN--a foreign army. This force didn't evolve out of the village guerillas because we had killed those off. Yes, there were still VCI around to provide that army with local support--and we could, based on historical experience, predict pretty well which areas that linkage would resurface--i.e., the surprisingly precise location of the "leopard spots" was no secret. Concur 100 percent that to meet a conventional threat US advisers and tactical air support remained essential. (GVN could have duked it out with local forces forever.) When Song Be was besieged Christmas 1974, I was instructed to tell my counterparts that "the Ambassador says he is very hopeful that Congress will provide the expected assistance funds." Replied the VN Lt. Col. Deputy Sector Commander, "We don't need the aid--we need tactical air support." The ultimate outrage was not congress cutting off funds in 1975--It was the mid-1973 Congressional prohibition on any US military activity anywhere in (or over) Indochina, thus giving the enemy a green light to grossly violate the cease fire.

2) For Merv: Concur completely in Moyar's thesis. Former advisers to the ARVN 7th Division who were in the Delta in 62-63 told me they were convinced Strategic Hamlets had turned the tide in the Delta--unfortunately it all fell apart when Diem was killed. But a far better write up is provided by Dennis Duncanson in Government and Revolution in Viet Nam, Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. This history of VN ends in '67 but if you had to read just one book about VN, this would unquestionably be the one. (Then you might use Sorely to fill in 1968-75.) Duncanson was Bob Thompson's No.2 in BRIAM (UK Adv Mission to VN) throughout the Diem years and knew Diem and Nhu very well--as did then COS Colby. Re Phoenix--The Communist statements I have seen about Phoenix, in their full context, plainly use the term generically to refer to all penetration ops. According to Sorely, the friendlies had even penetrated COSVN. But that had nothing to do with Phoenix, which was a very specific intel coordination effort centered at province and district level.

3) For Phil: I also highly recommend Bergerud. Considering the base line, though, progress in Hau Nghia was impressive. To me the lesson here is that US military withdrawals (in this case 25th ID) were pemature. Two problems with Hau Nghia Province, which I covered intermitently. First, this is a place where the insurgency was entrenched because it was indivisible from family. Membership had been inherited for a couple of generations. This was unusual in the proper South Vietnam--but common in the Central Coast (eg: Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai). Trang Bang District was rubber plantation land since the French days. Among the earliest "cannonfodder" recruits to the Viet Minh in the South (c.1946) were the rubber workers--the true underclass--an impoverished rural proletariate the French had brought down from the North where there was a labor surplus. I'd like to see a study (but haven't found one) looking at whether the hard core VC of Hau Nghia came from those families, as this would explain a lot. Second problem with Hau Nghia was its location on the border and on an infiltration route (Plain of Reeds) pointed toward Saigon. So, close proximity to a PAVN base area was a problem. (Problem with oil spots is that the enemy worked their own.)

4) For Maximus: No question, throughout populated MRIII (but not the jungle areas) I could drive alone and unarmed where it would have been suicide to do so mid 60's. (To be honest, if I wanted to drive over a landmine or get myself captured, I also knew where I could still do that--but lots fewer places than in the 60's.) Laying on security for the Colby trip must have been a hell of an effort. The highlight was a stretch they drove at night! But security had improved greatly. Three points. First, the enemy initiated offensives of 1968-69 caused them great casualties. The locally recruited (i.e., insurgent) forces were decimated and never recovered. And filling the vacuum rapidly with recruitment and deployment of RF/PF (i.e., pacification) allowed the cleared areas to be held. Second, MR IV (the Delta) was not exposed to pressure from long standing enemy base areas (an exception: U Minh Forest) where PAVN resided in division strength. Third, the Delta people (true South Vietnamese as opposed to the Central Vietnamese of MR I and II) did not have the cultural baggage that made their compatriates from farther north such intractable foes. The Deltaic feudal society was essentially pre-nationalist. Anti-colonial chauvinism (likewise anti-Chinese chauvinism) were largely absent. (Personal experience--you're not likely to read this anywhere.) Places like Kien Hoa (Ben Tre) were very exceptional in having a generationally entrenched insurgency. Interestingly, among the more secure provinces in the Delta were those in which a history of land tenure inequity happened to have been the greatest (huge landholdings owned by the oligarchy and farmed by sharecroppers.) Land reform made a difference, but that was after the Colby Vann trip....But such cultural minutiae escaped many Americans...Recognizing that the resonating VC message was not nationalism after all, we might well have charted our course differently.
Finally, Your description of Anbar is reminiscent of the USMC CAP ops in MR I--the most direct US COIN effort in VN (as opposed to advisory activities).

5) For Slapout: Thanks

Cheers,
Mike.

Maximus
04-17-2007, 02:02 AM
Mike,

Thanks so much for the quick and detailed response. You've helped tremendously in my understanding of events on the ground in Vietnam.

I instruct USMC infantry Lts headed to Iraq, most within 3-6 months after graduation. They're required to read The Village, focusing on answering the questions provided in the attached document. We then have a discussion group based on the questions. If you have a few minutes, I'd greatly appreciate it if you would look over the questions and responses that I use to steer the discussion group. Please provide comments/suggestions.

Thanks again.

Semper Fi,
Scott

slapout9
04-17-2007, 02:26 AM
Maximus, you may want to check out the unit history of the 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne. It was 68 or 69 that they worked on heavy clearing operations in the Delta area. I have been to the KIA monument at the division museum at Bragg many times. For only being over there a year it was a pretty tough operation.

Mike inHilo I also asked if you new a friend of mine who was part of Phoenix and I don't think I ever told you but his opinions were very close to yours. The first time I met him and we talked about Vietnam I was just shocked when he flaty said "We could have won if we had wanted to, we just gave up." Thats why I like first hand accounts of situations usually much more accurate.

bismark17
04-17-2007, 05:07 AM
I would check out the book, Slowburn, concerning the author's viewpoint on Phoenix and the Pacification efforts. Not sure if it's in print anymore but the author is a stud and the intro is written by Stuart Herrington. I believe his first name is Stuart. Last year I ran into one of his guys who is now retired while I was at Quantico. The guy was waiting to take a job as an Intel Analyst for some FAST teams in Afghanistan. He had great things to say about Herrington which in turn reflects well on the author.

davidbfpo
04-17-2007, 08:11 AM
Very interesting thread and the current discussion paper. Being a Brit my knowledge of Vietnam is limited to reading, however there are other places where working with and FOR the locals led to victory.

I refer not to Malaya, but the campaingn in Borneo and the Oman. The two books readily to hand are:

'SAS The Jungle Frontier' (SAS Regmt in Borneo 1963-1966) by Peter Dickens (pub. 1983).

'SAS Operation Oman' (1971-1974) by Col. Tony Jeapes (pub. 1980) - which should be read alongside 'We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975' by John Akehurst (pub.1983).

I am sure there are accounts by non-special forces in both campaigns, just they are not on my bookshelves.

Davidbfpo

Mike in Hilo
04-17-2007, 08:17 AM
De Forrest's Slow Burn is definitely worth reading. I note that the author is also quite critical of Phoenix (but not of the Phoenix advisers, for whom he has well deserved high regard); laudatory of the RF; and dismissive of the "useless" RD Cadre. As I've pointed out elswhere on this site, De Forrest was able to be as successful as he was because his job with CIA enabled him to conduct a unilteral op. Phoenix/Phuong-Huang was a US-advised indig op, and therein lay the problem. (CIA, by the way, was not within CORDS). Stu Herrington was the Phoenix Adviser on the Hau Nghia Province CORDS team--same province which is the subject of Bergerud's Dynamics of Defeat.

Cheers,
Mike

Old Eagle
04-17-2007, 01:02 PM
I been here before -- and last time it really hurt.

I haven't read Colby's book, and don't know how he handles the issue of GVN competence. In my fading recollection is concern expressed by U.S. advisors that the Thieu government "didn't get it." Success in the field could not make up for lack of legitimacy in the central government. The same is true in every COIN fight. Ouch.

As I recall, the military had advisors in GVN civilian departments because more civilian experts were not available. Ouch.

Baghdad. Ouch.

Maximus
04-18-2007, 01:25 AM
Old Eagle: Colby generally had good things to say about the Thieu government. I recall him crediting Thieu for understanding the importance of pacification, dedicating the appropriate assets to the CORDS effort (as best he could), coordinating the actions of military and regional and local forces, and continuously supervising regional and local leaders to make sure they were performing. I probably wrote "supervision works... inspect what you expect" 15-20 times throughout the book when Colby discussed Thieu's leadership style.

All things being equal, I think Colby would gladly take the Thieu government over Maliki's in Iraq today.

And as you suggest, this is definitely not a good thing 4 years into this war.

Mike in Hilo
04-18-2007, 01:58 AM
Just how badly we didn't want to win is the subject of Col. McMasters's (3rd Armored Cav at Tal Afar) book, Dereliction of Duty, which shows how an a priori aversion toward winning informed the Cmdr in Chief"s decisonmaking as early as 1964. The book is unfortunately tedious, but the documented info Col. McMasters makes available is seriously shocking.

Cheers,
Mike.

Mike in Hilo
04-18-2007, 02:57 AM
My two cents. This was, after all, the third world--and as far as third world governments and armies are concerned, Thieu's was almost certainly above average--just not good enough to beat the odds without some ongoing US help. Both army and gov't had been around for decades, unlike the Iraqi army. The ministries and their provincial branches were competent (well educated engineers, agronomists, public health officials, etc., etc...). And Thieu could not have made territorial forces and land reform the priorities that he did without "getting it." The problem was far less one of incompetence than lack of political will (as it relates to acommodation with the enemy) and the related issue of corruption. And this last failing was CORDS's greatest fault, as most of the "old timers" will agree--That is, we never tackled corruption to the extent we could have (yes, we did get some province chiefs tranferred). But no doubt US relief at finding militarily competent officers to deal with constrained us from using our leverage to the fullest extent to combat this systemic problem.

Legitimacy was in VN a function of the people's confidence in the ability of the government to prevail. In 1970 VN, the government that had legitimacy in the eyes of the people was the USG! Not the NLF or Communist Party for sure...And they believed, correctly in the event, that the GVN would fold under PAVN pressure after we left. (As the Vietnamese peasants were wont to tell me in their GI English, "[When] GI go home, VC come in."

Unquestionably, the pre-WW II French regime had legitimacy. When the communists started subversion in the North Vietnamese countryside in the1930's, they knew that no villager would dare take up arms against a Frenchman. So they began by getting villagers to sully their hands first, by having them participate in "peoples' executions" of Vietnamese village elders.

Re US civilians in VN--They were in fact all over the place. And why not? Other than Tet, Saigon was quite safe. I'm reminded of the USAID woman assigned to Saigon who did a TDY in Jamaica--She was so relieved to get back to Saigon because she found crime-ridden Kingston so dangerous. US military advisers in civilan GVN ministries?--Not during my tenure, and, I believe, not ever.

Cheers,
Mike.

tequila
04-18-2007, 08:54 AM
My two cents. This was, after all, the third world--and as far as third world governments and armies are concerned, Thieu's was almost certainly above average--just not good enough to beat the odds without some ongoing US help. Both army and gov't had been around for decades, unlike the Iraqi army. The ministries and their provincial branches were competent (well educated engineers, agronomists, public health officials, etc., etc...). And Thieu could not have made territorial forces and land reform the priorities that he did without "getting it." The problem was far less one of incompetence than lack of political will (as it relates to acommodation with the enemy) and the related issue of corruption.

But how truly competent was it really compared to the NLF and DRV? An example would be Thieu's land-reform program. While better executed than the travesty that occurred under Diem, which ended up disenfranchising farmers, how was it anything but a pale imitation of what the Front had already done in its "liberated" zones?


Legitimacy was in VN a function of the people's confidence in the ability of the government to prevail. In 1970 VN, the government that had legitimacy in the eyes of the people was the USG! Not the NLF or Communist Party for sure...And they believed, correctly in the event, that the GVN would fold under PAVN pressure after we left. (As the Vietnamese peasants were wont to tell me in their GI English, "[When] GI go home, VC come in."

So would you assess GVN as never having real legitimacy in the eyes of the South Vietnamese population?


Unquestionably, the pre-WW II French regime had legitimacy. When the communists started subversion in the North Vietnamese countryside in the1930's, they knew that no villager would dare take up arms against a Frenchman. So they began by getting villagers to sully their hands first, by having them participate in "peoples' executions" of Vietnamese village elders.

How true is this? The De Tham resistance went on for almost 30 years before being finally suppressed in 1913. French "legitimacy" must have been rather thin on the ground given their utter failure to defeat the Viet Minh or regain control of the countryside after 1950.

Also, how successful were Diem's programs once the NLF was formed and started hitting back rather than accomodating, that is by 1962, when VC main forces had acheived the ability to mass for battalion-sized attacks on ARVN bases? How truly successful were the Strategic Hamlets, given the incompetence of the Diem administration in the countryside and the inability of the Civil Guard to face down the rural guerrillas, as well as the fact that the man running them and the previously disastrous "agroville" program was a VC agent?

Mike in Hilo
04-19-2007, 03:40 AM
Good questions.

1) French: Even after the 30's insurrection, pre-war French strength in all of Indochina was only 70K, acording to Fall, Street without Joy. As you know, the deux-ex-machina of Japanese occupation knocked the hell out of French rule in VN. At war's end, the Japanese commander disobeyed orders and, instead of awaiting the coming allied forces, surrendered men--and all their weapons--to the Viet Minh. Three months later the temporary Nationalist Chinese occupation force for the North arrived and liberally sold weponry to the VM. The Party had been organizing in the populated areas with discreet assistance from the Kempeitai even as Ho's forces were guiding downed US air crews to safety through the northern mountains. Meanwhile, France was on the ropes. The "real" France had just lost the war, 685K military and civilian KIA, including 66K civilian victims of allied bombing! (Fall again). Communists were the largest political party in France, with almost daily rioting, and because of Red political pressure instead of relying on French conscripts, the expeditionary force to VN was heavily North and West African. (But lots of Vietnamese did step up.) True, a multi-province chunk of Central VN coast (where most US casualties would later be incurred) was never reoccupied by the French....But these weaknesses considered, it may be remarkable that the French did, after all, manage to fight the VM to a sustainable (for France) stalemate....until 1950 when the Chinese Communist victory resulted in French loss of the border forts and ensured Viet Minh access to a friendly neighbor.

2) GVN land reform a pale imitation: No. In fact, this was a robust land reform that blanketed the rice lands and was well received. Exception: those few villages where residual VCI influence was such that cadre were able to organize sharecroppers to refuse the land titles. The program was competently and fairly administered. Importantly, most sharecropper rice land was in the Delta and, pre-land reform, the Delta was already the most secure region in the country. Absent security, the necessary surveys could not have been undertaken. The problem with land reform was not that it was too little. Rather, it was too late. By 1971, the nature of the war and of the VC message had changed. The message was now peace at any cost to end the suffering., no longer land. The reform may have been largely irrelevant.

3) Strategic Hamlets: Captured Communist docs. were clear in complaining that the program kept them from their population base, seemingly contradicting US sources saying that ill treatment of participating villagers generated many new insurgents. Large swaths of Delta were in fact cordoned off, thereby draining the swamp....The problems with the program were (a) excessive rate at which new hamlets were added, and (b) decidedly non-strategic-based decisions on where to locate the hamlets.

4) Legitimacy: In 1968, shortly after hard core Ben Tre, in Kien Hoa Province, was cleared, interviewed villagers said that "the government" (=chanh-phu in Viet.) had suffered a great defeat. They referred to the VC as the government! From my arrival in VN in 1971 to the end, no way could you have found Vietnamese who would have referred to VC/NLF as the government. But most Vietnamese plainly believed that we ran the country. Given a colonial history, an abundance of white faces in GVN offices, and VC propaganda as well, ths was an easy thought pattern to fall into. CORDS was supposed to foster a transferrence of such confidence--however misplaced--from the US to the GVN. We never succeeded! Now, once our forces left (Feb73), it became clear to all and sundry that we were not their government. And the GVN did control (to varying degrees) over 90% of the people. (The liberated zone from near Muc Hoa (Delta) to Khe Sanh near the DMZ was largely unpopulated.) And they did govern, and people were reasonably obedient. So, can you have legitimacy by default? Or else my definition of legitimacy was too high a bar and I should have settled for a more modest "a government that is seen to govern." The people knew this was just a hiatus before communism, but most clearly feared and loathed the "night riders" and the conscripts did fight--not for Thieu but to stave off the feared, violent hordes (backlash effect of terrorism).

5) Diem. I wasn't there then, but strongly suspect that he gradually acquired legitimacy. But perhaps in some rural areas, never. Take a look at Fall's papers about '50s VN available on line (look first in the SWJ Library). On a map, he plots a ring around Saigon of wholesale village chief asasinations beginning in 1956 and accellerating dramatically each year. The VC preparing for the upcoming war. Kitson's "subversion" stage. No dip at all during the alleged hiatus when the GVN oppressive apparatus was allegedly working and the enemy quiescent. Suspect the quiescence and "successful supression" was largely VC propaganda, echoed by Karnow et al. ("The North finally responded to distress calls from the southern cadre"--fosters the impression that the insurgency was not a preplanned northern driven enterprise.) The patient enemy campaign bore fruit when the villages were sufficiently controlled and organized to receive and support the main force units (Yes, took them till 1962.) Also see Duncanson, and Ellen Hammer, who contends that stay-at-home cadre called the shots in rural hamlets right from the end of the war in 1954. Clearly, there were some villages where Diem never attained legitimacy.

6) Counterintel issues/penetration and enemy agent recruitment/cryptocommunists in high places: When you mentioned the Agroville guy, you hit upon a grave and debilitating problem. Anecdotes are legion, from the French 40's to the end, and in instances reached strategic import. The issue is obviously linked to the accommodation/political will problems.

7) GVN vs DRV: For securing their base, controlling their people and marshalling them to fight you can't beat a totalitarian regime. And certain classical COIN population and food control/rationing measures seem openly immitative of communist TTPs. Now, economically, the South Vietnamese living standard would have been unbelievably extravagant by DRV standards, even after the bubble burst when the US military departed.

Cheers,
Mike

SWJED
04-27-2007, 09:43 PM
Council member Merv Benson reviews Triumph Forsaken, The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0521869110/104-3075668-4435162?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0521869110) by Mark Moyer on his PrairiePundit blog - How to Lose a War (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2007/04/how-to-lose-war.html).


Mark Moyar's Triumph Forsaken, The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, gives the history of the conflict up to the day Johnson ordered US ground troops to Vietnam to prevent a communist victory in 1965. This is a book that should be required reading for all those who think they know what caused the war and how it was lost. If they follow the tale told by the winners of the Pulitzer Prizes, they will be very wrong...

Mike in Hilo
04-27-2007, 11:02 PM
Merv deserves thanks for an absolutely top notch review of this important book.

Some others have supported the same thesis, but, as Merv has pointed out, notably not the well known journalist historians. Colby, for one, recorded his shock and dismay over Diem's death in his two autobiographical works. Others who come to mind are historian Ellen Hammer, and Dennis Duncanson, whose landmark history of VN by a long time COIN practitioner, Government and Revolution in Viet Nam, has unfortunately been out of print for some time, but is likewise an essential read. ("The highest ratio of talent to numbers seen in Viet Nam previously or since," from Colby's Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA, is Colby's asessment of Sir Robert Thompson and his cohorts in the British Advisory Mission to VN, Desmond Palmer and Dennis Duncanson.)

But as Merv points out, Moyar adds lots of new material. Of great interest is the fresh analysis of the much discussed Battle of Ap Bac.

By the way, I clicked on SWJED's link to Amazon and checked out the reviews of this book that Amazon has posted, and noted that one of those is by Council Member Meara.

Cheers,
Mike.

SWJED
04-28-2007, 11:27 AM
... Merv did a great job reviewing this book. I work (day job) in the same building as Dr. Moyer - plan on doing a drive-by next week to say hey and let him know about the review.

Granite_State
10-03-2007, 03:24 PM
I'm not normally a fan of The Nation, but found it tough to disagree with this take on revisionist history of the Vietnam War:

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071015/perlstein


And here's the remarkable thing: Out of his determination--or desperation--to stay on message, Owens overlooks fundamental contradictions between these two books. Moyar's hero is William Westmoreland. He is a hero because he rejected the idea of flexible, small, counterinsurgency patrols in favor of "using large conventional forces to search for and engage the Communists." Sorley despises Westmoreland. Indeed, A Better War was all but written to drive home this single idea: that using large conventional forces to search for and engage the Communists was what almost lost us the war. Sorley's heroes are heroes because they understand that a key to victory was to monitor and improve the political quality of the South Vietnamese government from top to bottom, the better to abet "their efforts to carry out--carry through--a social revolution." Moyar's Triumph Forsaken was all but written to excoriate such people, whose insistence on monitoring and improving the political quality of the South Vietnamese government almost lost us the war.

Thoughts?

Steve Blair
10-03-2007, 03:38 PM
It's a shame that the author seemed so bitter about a new wave of revisionism reacting against the "reliable" products that came out in the 1960s...:wry:

Seriously, I always find it interesting when one side of the political spectrum comes out guns-blazing against the opposite side when it comes to historical writing. One could almost smell the torches being kindled to burn two "witches" at the stake for going against conventional liberal wisdom regarding Vietnam. Not that I agree with Sorley and Moyar and their positions on Vietnam...I tend after many years of study to come closer to the view that all we were doing was postponing the inevitable...and the question was more a matter of how much time we were buying our client state in the process. Hard-core liberals have the same cut and paste function when it comes to history...witness the efforts on the part of some of them to claim that Kennedy would have pulled out of Vietnam...ignoring his own personal ties to Diem and general lack of foreign policy success. He was too afraid of "losing" Vietnam...a fear he passed on to Johnson who had even less foreign policy experience and knowledge.

Like most historical events, the "truth" of Vietnam lies somewhere in the middle. It's very much a mix of misperceptions, colored by Cold War thinking and worldviews that need to be considered when writing about the subject. We might have bought the South more breathing room had we gone with an Abrams strategy in the early 1960s as opposed to the big war/Korea theory, but at the end of the day it would have been just that...buying time.

Granite_State
10-03-2007, 03:43 PM
It's a shame that the author seemed so bitter about a new wave of revisionism reacting against the "reliable" products that came out in the 1960s...:wry:


Definitely agree, I'm on the opposite end of the spectrum politically from The Nation, but I take his larger point about a revisionist history of Vietnam being used as an important rhetorical point in the debate on Iraq. Like Malaya, which Steve Metz for one has noted as being so exceptional, how we see Vietnam has a lot of relevance to how we see the entire viability of counterinsurgency.

Steve Blair
10-03-2007, 03:53 PM
Definitely agree, I'm on the opposite end of the spectrum politically from The Nation, but I take his larger point about a revisionist history of Vietnam being used as an important rhetorical point in the debate on Iraq. Like Malaya, which Steve Metz for one has noted as being so exceptional, how we see Vietnam has a lot of relevance to how we see the entire viability of counterinsurgency.

I agree to a degree, but also consider that political types will pull out anything they can find to make their "historical" points.

Vietnam is a hard one to consider because in the pure Maoist sense there were two wars going on at the same time, IMO. You had the insurgency, which was a real threat in parts of the country and not so much in others, and the conventional force element that was being pumped into the South by the North. The Vietnamese genius here was the willingness (and ability) to shift back and forth between the two styles of war almost at will. Note that this was not without some internal problems (with Tet being the best example of this...although the VCI losses during Tet DID solve one major problem for the North: it removed any local leadership competition from the field), but at the end of the day they were willing to outlast us and the government of the South (which did more harm than good to its own cause).

For many years both the Right and Left held up Vietnam as an almost isolationist banner to keep the US from getting involved in anything beyond its borders, and for the same reason: both sides argued (from their own reasoning bases) that you couldn't defeat an insurgency. As always this ignored the complex nature of both our reasons for getting into Vietnam, the situation we encountered there, and the aftermath. So in a sense Vietnam for political individuals is more a symbol than a historical reality. I've argued before that the best comparison between Vietnam and Iraq can be found in the responses of our own military and governmental institutions to the situation...not on the battlefield.:)

Ken White
10-03-2007, 05:44 PM
I find a lot in the Perlstein article with which to disagree. Aside from his pseudo sophisticated political diatribe, he elides fact.

Sheehan, Halbertsam et.al. were emphatically not on the side of the angels. Aside from the fact they didn't understand all they knew about what they saw, they let their personal biases enter the effort. Sheehan's later apologia to excuse the way they 'covered' the war, A Bright Shining Lie, was just that -- and he, IMO, did not cover himself with glory with that fairly worthless tome. The media did not 'lose' Viet Nam, the Army did -- but the media were certainly less than helpful. Their overall ignorance was -- and remains today -- generally appalling.

Perlstein also ignores the fact that Kennedy almost certainly approved the Diem assassination. While there is no question that the Diems (plural) were a piece of work , the message that assassination sent to the Viet Namese certainly was one that we were, um, expedient. They remembered that and used it to their advantage over the next 10 years.

I'll ignore Perlstein's mention that Jimmy Carter, of all Presidents, cited the current Bush administration as the worst in history :)

I'll also ignore that he cites the CIA as authority on virtually anything... :(

In short, he penned a political hit piece that is full of misinformation and succeeds in citing a few facts but only in the context of his politics. I have to agree with Steve Blair, burning witches doesn't fill the air with a pleasant smell.

I also agree with him that we were only postponing the inevitable. However, he and I may not agree on my opinion that it didn't have to be that way. There were literally dozens of alternative strategies that could have been pursued. No matter, they weren't so we ended up the way we did.

He's also correct, I think, that a more judicious blend of conventional and COIN tactics early on might have made a difference. Unfortunately, Harkins and Westmorealnd were Euro-war graduate mediocrities who didn't adapt at all well. If anyone wants the single most adverse impactor on Viet Nam, it was really quite simple -- the one year tour.

We, incidentally suffer from that same problem in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, I think Steve is also correct on this:


"For many years both the Right and Left held up Vietnam as an almost isolationist banner to keep the US from getting involved in anything beyond its borders, and for the same reason: both sides argued (from their own reasoning bases) that you couldn't defeat an insurgency. As always this ignored the complex nature of both our reasons for getting into Vietnam, the situation we encountered there, and the aftermath. So in a sense Vietnam for political individuals is more a symbol than a historical reality. I've argued before that the best comparison between Vietnam and Iraq can be found in the responses of our own military and governmental institutions to the situation...not on the battlefield."

The failure in Viet Nam, as Steve says, is principally the fault of Kennedy and Johnson both of whom were excessively long on idealism and excessively short on smarts. I'd add poor choices by the Army were almost as significant. The coup de grace was of course a pusillanimous Congress. C'est la guerre, C'est la vie... Xin Loi...

Steve Blair
10-03-2007, 06:08 PM
I also agree with him that we were only postponing the inevitable. However, he and I may not agree on my opinion that it didn't have to be that way. There were literally dozens of alternative strategies that could have been pursued. No matter, they weren't so we ended up the way we did.

We actually do agree here, although I think many of the strategies that might have worked were beyond our political grasp at the time. Given the mindset of the times, especially on the part of Democratic advisors (and some Republicans) regarding the "loss" of China I'm not sure if they could have considered strategies that did not center around resisting that monolithic Commie conspiracy. While the loss was certainly not inevitable, the shackles we hung around ourselves at the time certainly went a long way toward making it so.

Ken White
10-03-2007, 06:41 PM
I'm afraid that most strategies have long been beyond our political grasp. I wouldn't change our system of governance for anything but it does tend to almost force shortsighted strategy in the geopolitical arena. Fascinating thing is that Hamilton and Madison both foresaw that and kept it away from Congress. Unfortunately, they did not foresee the total lack of common sense and patience that would accrue to us as a nation in the late 20th Century. :mad:

That'll probably get worse before something forces it to get better... :(

tolsen
10-03-2007, 07:47 PM
The media did not 'lose' Viet Nam, the Army did -- but the media were certainly less than helpful. Their overall ignorance was -- and remains today -- generally appalling.

For all the inaccuracies of the review, I think that he is correct on this most important point - one that does need to be driven home before a new Myth is created about Iraq.

There does still appear to be a widespread myth that the media, or the opposition more generally, is solely responsible for losing the war. I've noticed that believers in this myth tend to have little to no interest in, or knowledge of, the actual details regarding Vietnam and how the war was fought because they don't believe those things mattered. Instead, they seem to believe that as long as we had the necessary "will" we would have won using just about any approach.

I think this myth had a direct effect on mishandling of the Iraq war, specifically on the decision by the Administration to spend years playing down the insurgency as the "last throes of dead enders". I believe that decision, among others, reflected the belief that "as long as we keep the anti-war movement in check, we will win no matter how badly we screw up in Iraq itself". If our actions in Iraq don't have anything to do with winning the war, then why not take the opportunity to put 21-year old college republicans in charge of key areas of reconstruction?

In the end I believe this myth contributes to hubris and a lack of respect for our actual and potential enemies that will hurt us until we lose the myth and embrace reality.

J Wolfsberger
10-03-2007, 08:02 PM
I just started reading it. This jumped out at me, regarding Dien Bien Phu:

"Most have discerned in France's humiliating defeat a classic example of a hubristic colonial power foolishly underestimating a nonwhite enemy."

Gee. Here all along I've thought it was a classic example of what happens when you combine almost non existent intelligence with a tactically inferior position.

I also would like him to point out when French hubris has not resulted in "foolishly underestimating" any enemy.

tolsen
10-03-2007, 08:59 PM
I just started reading it. This jumped out at me, regarding Dien Bien Phu:

"Most have discerned in France's humiliating defeat a classic example of a hubristic colonial power foolishly underestimating a nonwhite enemy."

Gee. Here all along I've thought it was a classic example of what happens when you combine almost non existent intelligence with a tactically inferior position.




I don't see the contradiction. The reason they thought they could win a battle under those conditions is because they underestimated their enemy.

I'm not sure it can be chalked up to simple racism but I feel confident in saying that they never would have tried such a thing against the Germans - they would have chosen an entirely different way of losing.

Ken White
10-03-2007, 09:19 PM
For all the inaccuracies of the review, I think that he is correct on this most important point - one that does need to be driven home before a new Myth is created about Iraq.

There does still appear to be a widespread myth that the media, or the opposition more generally, is solely responsible for losing the war. I've noticed that believers in this myth tend to have little to no interest in, or knowledge of, the actual details regarding Vietnam and how the war was fought because they don't believe those things mattered. Instead, they seem to believe that as long as we had the necessary "will" we would have won using just about any approach.

I think this myth had a direct effect on mishandling of the Iraq war, specifically on the decision by the Administration to spend years playing down the insurgency as the "last throes of dead enders". I believe that decision, among others, reflected the belief that "as long as we keep the anti-war movement in check, we will win no matter how badly we screw up in Iraq itself". If our actions in Iraq don't have anything to do with winning the war, then why not take the opportunity to put 21-year old college republicans in charge of key areas of reconstruction?

In the end I believe this myth contributes to hubris and a lack of respect for our actual and potential enemies that will hurt us until we lose the myth and embrace reality.

but I think I partly agree with what it appears to be.

We can agree there are a lot of know-nothings out there on both sides of the political divide. For everyone who thinks the press did the dirty deed, there's one who believes the press is blameless. The truth, as always, is in between..

I agree there are a few inclined to blame the media for what didn't happen in Viet Nam. There are also those who blame the protestors, the politicians, the Army -- and some who go for most or all of the above and some who probably would ascribe other things. The obvious truth is that all those were factors and people will weight the factors according to their own predilection and political views. I'm an all of the above with very, very strong emphasis on the Army, personally. YMMV.

You may or may not be correct on that myth having a direct effect on the handling of the Iraq war. I think there's little doubt that some sort of myth did have that adverse impact. I also think there's little doubt that the Army leadership did not do its job as fully as we might all have hoped in apprising the Civilian leadership of the potential problems and pitfalls and that earlier Army leadership contributed to that by diligently ignoring nation building and counterinsurgency, thus the then current leadership had no doctrinal footing on which to stand or base a reclama and the political bosses took that opening...

The BCTP is a great program today. It was pretty good before 2001. However, then it lacked two things; non-traditional combat (even though it was very obvious that was a strong potential) and, even more importantly, what happened in the conventional battle after the good guys won. The practice was to 'win,' then turn off the computers and the lights and leave the room. Fortunately, they've fixed that.

In any event, the Armed Forces at least are now very much in tune with reality. Good news is it took only 18 months in this war versus the seven long years it took during Viet Nam. Pity about todays politicians and news media; but then, both crowds always have been a little slow...

Some of your other comments are perhaps more appropriate for one of the many political blogs out there.


.

Steve Blair
10-03-2007, 09:20 PM
For all the inaccuracies of the review, I think that he is correct on this most important point - one that does need to be driven home before a new Myth is created about Iraq.

There does still appear to be a widespread myth that the media, or the opposition more generally, is solely responsible for losing the war. I've noticed that believers in this myth tend to have little to no interest in, or knowledge of, the actual details regarding Vietnam and how the war was fought because they don't believe those things mattered. Instead, they seem to believe that as long as we had the necessary "will" we would have won using just about any approach.

I think this myth had a direct effect on mishandling of the Iraq war, specifically on the decision by the Administration to spend years playing down the insurgency as the "last throes of dead enders". I believe that decision, among others, reflected the belief that "as long as we keep the anti-war movement in check, we will win no matter how badly we screw up in Iraq itself". If our actions in Iraq don't have anything to do with winning the war, then why not take the opportunity to put 21-year old college republicans in charge of key areas of reconstruction?

In the end I believe this myth contributes to hubris and a lack of respect for our actual and potential enemies that will hurt us until we lose the myth and embrace reality.

You have to remember that this myth is also a two-way street. Members of the media and the anti-war movement also want people to believe that their impact was much more profound than it actually was. I believe that the MSM has grown quite accustomed to, and proud of, what it feels its "role" was in Vietnam and will defend it to the last roll of audio tape or DVD/RW in the supply locker. The myth was also aided by the fact that many Americans were accustomed to (as in World War II accustomed) to a media that echoed the government line in a conflict. The difference they saw in Vietnam shocked them, and aided in the creation of the myth.

The lack of respect for potential enemies has been around for some time (remember how the Japanese were shown as ratty little men with glasses who couldn't fly prior to World War II?), and will remain a fixture for some time. Either that, or the ten-foot tall foe. Why? It's easier to paint in sound-bite terms if you stick with simple stereotypes. Nations have done this for ages, and will most likely continue to do so.

Steve Blair
10-03-2007, 09:25 PM
In any event, the Armed Forces at least are now very much in tune with reality Good news it took only 18 months in this war versus the seven long years it took during Viet Nam. Pity about todays politicians and news media; but then, both crowds always have been a little slow....

Agreed! This is one thing I'm glad to say has not been a parallel of Vietnam in terms of institution response time (and response in general). The Army and Marines have learned MUCH faster than they did in Vietnam, and are taking steps to make sure that the lessons aren't lost in the shuffle away from this and into the next "good war."

The MSM actually feels threatened, IMO, by its reputation from Vietnam in some quarters and (perhaps more importantly) the threat it sees from the Internet in terms of being the sole provider of what Americans see and hear about world events. That will always shape its response to events, coupled with the desire in some quarters to be the next Sheehan or Halberstam. As for politicians....they have a two-year attention span (at best) and are not likely to change.

Ken White
10-03-2007, 09:29 PM
The Media hubris indicated by such comments as those of Evan Thomas that media support was worth 15 points to John Kerry. Does that mean that without their support, he'd only have gotten 34% of the vote? :D

Seriously, you're correct, they really do want to believe they have far more power than they've ever possessed. that's why there so non-plussed by this one, they absolutely cannot understand why it isn't 'over'... :rolleyes:

Granite_State
10-04-2007, 12:21 PM
For all the inaccuracies of the review, I think that he is correct on this most important point - one that does need to be driven home before a new Myth is created about Iraq.


That was exactly my take on it. Despite the transparent politics of the piece, and its innacuracies, and general tone, I think he's on to something about revisionist histories of Vietnam. And about how you can't have it both ways on Moyar and Sorley, re: Westmoreland.

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 12:52 PM
That was exactly my take on it. Despite the transparent politics of the piece, and its innacuracies, and general tone, I think he's on to something about revisionist histories of Vietnam. And about how you can't have it both ways on Moyar and Sorley, re: Westmoreland.

The most striking thing about Pearlstein's piece is that it smacks of the same political agendizing (probably invented a word there) that he accuses Moyar of. For instance he accuses Moyar of pushing a conservative agenda with his book i.e. the same ol' republican vs. democrat format (which pearlstein has all too willinginly occupied the left side of), yet he ignores the fact that one of the principles which Moyar spends a great deal of effort vilifying is Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge--a republican.

Having read the 1954-1965 volume I am mystified as to how Pearlstien draws the conclusion that Moyar considers Westmoreland a hero in this book. Westmoreland is but a minor player in this volume only coming on the scene in the last year of the period covered and his influence in the book is quite minor. I must caveat this with the fact that Westmoreland will obviously play a strong part in Moyar's follow up volume, but not having read that book, I can't and won't make assumptions as to how Westmoreland will be treated. Perhaps Pearlstien has seen an advanced copy?

Another problem I have with Pearlstein's piece is his seeming dumbfoundedness at Moyar taking communist internal communications at face value, like all communitsts lie right? A more careful reading of Moyar reveals a much more studied treatment of communist propagandizing--for instance Pearlstiens quote of how Moyar treats the communist reaction to the deposment of Diem. Yes the communists were excited about this because they felt it would help thier effort in the long run, Moyar puts this in his book because the facts bear this out when looking back at history--in other words Moyar takes the communist reaction at face value because what they predict is actually what happened! Why would a professional historian ignore such an important piece of forbearance?

tequila
10-04-2007, 02:16 PM
Another problem I have with Pearlstein's piece is his seeming dumbfoundedness at Moyar taking communist internal communications at face value, like all communitsts lie right? A more careful reading of Moyar reveals a much more studied treatment of communist propagandizing--for instance Pearlstiens quote of how Moyar treats the communist reaction to the deposment of Diem. Yes the communists were excited about this because they felt it would help thier effort in the long run, Moyar puts this in his book because the facts bear this out when looking back at history--in other words Moyar takes the communist reaction at face value because what they predict is actually what happened! Why would a professional historian ignore such an important piece of forbearance?

Or perhaps the Communists were simply putting a good face on their reaction to events --- that Diem's death would automatically be good or bad for their cause was up in the air and, I would argue, still not definitively proven to be a positive good. I was not convinced by Moyar's thesis that Diem was popular amongst the South Vietnamese peasantry, that GVN was on its way to unstoppable victory against the VCI under Diem, that ARVN would have won the battle of Ap Bac if not for the bungling Americans, nor did I buy his spin on the joys of the Strategic Hamlet program. I did, however, like his passage on how Madam Nhu, that exemplar of moral probity, brought the whorehouses of Saigon to a stop, with American servicemen reduced to playing tic-tac-toe with virtuous barmaids, and how this was a reason why the Western press turned against Diem. With this sort of clear-eyed history, how could Moyar have failed to gain tenure?

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 02:32 PM
that GVN was on its way to unstoppable victory against the VCI under Diem,
where in the world did you draw that conclusion? Moyar tells us that South Vietnam was winning , not on its way to an "unstoppable victory".

that ARVN would have won the battle of Ap Bac if not for the bungling Americans, No, moyar's take was not that the ARVN would have won if not for the americans, his take was that it was not a dehibilitating defeat that Vann and his media friends portrayed it as.

I did, however, like his passage on how Madam Nhu, that exemplar of moral probity, brought the whorehouses of Saigon to a stop, with American servicemen reduced to playing tic-tac-toe with virtuous barmaids, and how this was a reason why the Western press turned against Diem. Now you are bordering on comedy. Did you even read the book? Please provide a page number in which Moyar derives that conclusion.


With this sort of clear-eyed history, how could Moyar have failed to gain tenure?
This sort of ad-hom attack is not helpful in critiqueing Moyar's work, but it is helpful in understanding your true motivations for posting here.

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 02:40 PM
I'd say any reasonable assessment of the GVN's progress under Diem was that it was losing ground, not gaining it. The Strategic Hamlets Diem set up that were composed of Catholic refugees from the North were indeed fairly successful...but the others were not. Also, Diem continued the tradition of bungling relations with the hill tribes (Montagnards)...a group that could have really helped the GVN secure many border areas.

Diem's poor governance did the GVN few favors. What the VCI saw when he was assassinated was not the demise of a feared and effective opponent, but rather a chance to take advantage of the chaos that would certainly (and did) follow it.

And stanley, you might want to take a moment to introduce yourself (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441).

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 03:07 PM
I'd say any reasonable assessment of the GVN's progress under Diem was that it was losing ground, not gaining it. The Strategic Hamlets Diem set up that were composed of Catholic refugees from the North were indeed fairly successful...but the others were not. Also, Diem continued the tradition of bungling relations with the hill tribes (Montagnards)...a group that could have really helped the GVN secure many border areas.

Diem's poor governance did the GVN few favors. What the VCI saw when he was assassinated was not the demise of a feared and effective opponent, but rather a chance to take advantage of the chaos that would certainly (and did) follow it.

And stanley, you might want to take a moment to introduce yourself (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441).

One might make the comparison between "Strategic Hamlets" and Killcullen's "oilspot" concept. The idea, albiet imperfectly implemented in Vietnam (especially in the delta region), is a sound prinicple in COIN. One can obviously take issue with Moyar's assesment of the war's status just prior too the coup, but Moyar's assesment that whatever the status prior, the war took a decided turn for the worse after the coup and GVN became even more incapable of dealing with the insurgency, which led to the direct intervention of U.S. forces.

I certainly agree that if Diem had engaged the Montagnards it could have helped the war effort, but expecting him to do so would have required him to cross a cultural and racial divide, an indealistic naiveness that we Americans are famous for.

What is not helpful is gross mischaractizatons of Moyar like tequila above.

tequila
10-04-2007, 03:11 PM
Now you are bordering on comedy. Did you even read the book? Please provide a page number in which Moyar derives that conclusion.

The tic-tac-toe passage is from pg. 160 and relates to the truly remarkable effects of the Social Purification Law, propounded by Madam Nhu. According to Moyar, Diem's RVN was not only defeating Communism but also prostitution.


This sort of ad-hom attack is not helpful in critiqueing Moyar's work, but it is helpful in understanding your true motivations for posting here.

Yes, I want to destroy Mark Moyar. And perhaps America, as well. :p

No, I simply find many of his conclusions incredible and unhelpful. I am also slightly bitter at having spent much time reading transcripts of Diem declaiming on various subjects, presented as examples of Diem's clear-eyed leadership, as well as Moyar's justifications for the butchery in Indonesia --- when something similar happened in Rwanda in 1997, it was called genocide.

Moyar is far too credulous in taking the assessments of certain officials as genuine reality rather than as points of view, while discrediting others as inherently compromised. For instance, Pham Xuan An, the Communist military intel agent and Reuters stringer, is automatically presented as providing a distorting view and propaganda stories to the Western press. The view of Merle Pribbenow, former CIA officer and Moyar's translator of Vietnamese documents, is that Pham's main value was as conduit of intelligence to VCI given his many links to South Vietnam's CIO and the CIA, as well as analyst of South Vietnamese and American intentions and motivations. Pribbenow's view that Pham would not have been wasted by presenting VCI propaganda to Western newspaper reporters, and indeed that Pham acted "more Catholic than the Pope" to avoid suspicion, is much more plausible than Moyar's take. Yet Moyar does not even pause to consider this in his rush to assault the Western press in Saigon.

Moyar also does not convince when attempting to persuade us that the Chinese would have abandoned North Vietnam to its fate upon an American invasion, that Tri Quang was a Communist agent, or that Indonesia would have been doomed to Communism in 1965 if not for American intervention in Vietnam. Perhaps most misleading is his picture of the Vietnamese peasantry as an unpoliticized, undifferentiated lumpen mass which responded only to strength - David Elliott's Social Change in the Mekong Delta 1930-1975 illustrates just how wrong this theory is.

Ken White
10-04-2007, 03:37 PM
...

... What the VCI saw when he was assassinated was not the demise of a feared and effective opponent, but rather a chance to take advantage of the chaos that would certainly (and did) follow it.
. . .

by folks with more idealism and arrogance than good sense who approved that coup and the almost guaranteed assassination that followed.

Diem was not particularly popular with the hoi polloi (and particularly the Buddhists) -- but he was theirs and the US hand in the assassination was well known. It did not do us any favors and the South Viet Namese would not trust us after that. Probably smart. I talked to a number of SVN Officers who expressed some anger over elements of the Coup...

Moyars and Sorley wrote essentially decent if slightly biased (ALL historians have bias) history IMO. Pearlstein uses them in an attempt to produce a preemptive political strike. Not very well but I guess he deserves credit for trying... :rolleyes:

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 03:57 PM
The tic-tac-toe passage is from pg. 160 and relates to the truly remarkable effects of the Social Purification Law, propounded by Madam Nhu. According to Moyar, Diem's RVN was not only defeating Communism but also prostitution.
Yet your claim that this 'tic-tac-toe' phenomena is the reason Moyar believes western press decided to dislike Diem is fallicious. My reading of Moyar leads me to the conclusion that Moyar believed the western press disliked Diem because most of the prominant journalists spent entirely too much time with and placed entirly too much weight on the opinions thereof with one small portion of the Vietnam poplulation--the social and acedemic elites of Saigon, not because "the troops had to play tic tac toe". I do not have my copy of the book available but when I do I will post pages for your reference.






No, I simply find many of his conclusions incredible and unhelpful. I am also slightly bitter at having spent much time reading transcripts of Diem declaiming on various subjects, presented as examples of Diem's clear-eyed leadership, as well as Moyar's justifications for the butchery in Indonesia --- I am not familiar with this event and Moyar's analysis of it, but I shall study.


Moyar is far too credulous in taking the assessments of certain officials as genuine reality rather than as points of view, while discrediting others as inherently compromised. For instance, Pham Xuan An, the Communist military intel agent and Reuters stringer, is automatically presented as providing a distorting view and propaganda stories to the Western press. I'm confused here (that happens often ;) ) are you saying that Pham was reliable source or not?

The view of Merle Pribbenow, former CIA officer and Moyar's translator of Vietnamese documents, is that Pham's main value was as conduit of intelligence to VCI given his many links to South Vietnam's CIO and the CIA, as well as analyst of South Vietnamese and American intentions and motivations. Pribbenow's view that Pham would not have been wasted by presenting VCI propaganda to Western newspaper reporters, and indeed that Pham acted "more Catholic than the Pope" to avoid suspicion, is much more plausible than Moyar's take. Yet Moyar does not even pause to consider this in his rush to assault the Western press in Saigon. Again your line of reasoning is confusing to me. Are you saying that while Pham was a communist agent he acted "more Catholic than the Pope" to avoid suspicion, and this necessarily included not spreading communist propaganda and disinformation to the press? What was his purpose as a communist agent, to back up Diem's claims that he was winning the war?


Perhaps most misleading is his picture of the Vietnamese peasantry as an unpoliticized, undifferentiated lumpen mass which responded only to strength - David Elliott's Social Change in the Mekong Delta 1930-1975 illustrates just how wrong this theory is.

It's interesting that you choose to use an anthropolgy of the Mekong delta as evidence of the social leanings of the Vietnamese people--preciscly the place where Diem's COIN effort was least successful--even in Moyar's account.

tequila
10-04-2007, 04:19 PM
Yet your claim that this 'tic-tac-toe' phenomena is the reason Moyar believes western press decided to dislike Diem is fallicious. My reading of Moyar leads me to the conclusion that Moyar believed the western press disliked Diem because most of the prominant journalists spent entirely too much time with and placed entirly too much weight on the opinions thereof with one small portion of the Vietnam poplulation--the social and acedemic elites of Saigon, not because "the troops had to play tic tac toe". I do not have my copy of the book available but when I do I will post pages for your reference.

Stanley, pg. 160 is not my main beef with Moyar - just a laughable example of his valorization of the Diem regime and its, shall we say, unironic estimation of its effectiveness. I just pulled it out because I have Moyar's book on my desk - randomly flipped and found that hilarious passage. Moyar also hints that the Social Purification Law hurt Diem with journalists because their entertainment was curtailed, with no evidence cited - par for the course for Moyar.


I'm confused here (that happens often ;) ) are you saying that Pham was reliable source or not?

Again your line of reasoning is confusing to me. Are you saying that while Pham was a communist agent he acted "more Catholic than the Pope" to avoid suspicion, and this necessarily included not spreading communist propaganda and disinformation to the press? What was his purpose as a communist agent, to support the Diem regime?

His cover was as a journalist, but his mission was not to be a propaganda officer, it was to gain intelligence and provide analysis on Western and South Vietnamese intentions and motivation, as noted before. For instance, Pham deduced late in 1964 that the U.S. would escalate its troop presence drastically in 1965-66 essentially through analysis work, from his contacts in American and RVN intel offices (he maintained excellent contacts with CIO, which sought to use him as an agent, as well as with Lou Conein and Ed Lansdale besides Western journalists). He also provided much of the planning data for the VCI's Saigon offensive during Tet in 1968, assisting greatly in the remarkable infiltration of VCI troops into the city. Those missions would have been impossible if RVN intelligence believed he was a Communist agent provocateur. See Larry Berman's Perfect Spy (http://www.amazon.com/Perfect-Spy-Incredible-Vietnamese-Communist/dp/0060888385)for the best rundown on Pham's career, as well as a more detailed rebuttal of the idea of Pham as propagandist to the Western press.


It's interesting that you choose to use an anthropolgy of the Mekong delta as evidence of the social leanings of the Vietnamese people--preciscly the place where Diem's COIN effort was least successful--even in Moyar's account.

The Mekong was critical to RVN in terms of strategic access to Saigon, as well as forming a rather large part of the agricultural productivity and population of the country. If Diem wasn't going to win in the Mekong, it wouldn't have been much of a victory. More importantly, Elliott's account helps undercut Moyar's characterization of South Vietnamese village politics as essentially authoritarian, as responsive only to terror or propaganda, and the villagers themselves as incapable of forming political opinions or possessing social aspirations.

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 04:28 PM
Again your line of reasoning is confusing to me. Are you saying that while Pham was a communist agent he acted "more Catholic than the Pope" to avoid suspicion, and this necessarily included not spreading communist propaganda and disinformation to the press? What was his purpose as a communist agent, to back up Diem's claims that he was winning the war?

If you stop to think about it from a classic subversion standpoint, it would make perfect sense for Pham to back the claims of the Diem regime. Why? Because then fewer people would look at what was really going on in the countryside and VCI activity could continue unchecked.

It's also worth noting that the majority of the ethnic Vietnamese population of SVN was in the Mekong Delta region (generally speaking...although both III and IV CTZs were densely populated compared to the rest of the country) so an examination of Diem's popularity in that region is perfectly justified. The relevance of the central government at the village level in Vietnam during this period is still the subject of some debate, but one thing that isn't debated is that Diem was not especially popular at that level (this shows up both in recent research and contemporary studies...some of which came out before the coup). Still, as Ken points out (and I'll paraphrase) "he may have been a bastard, but he was their bastard." Diem had precious little in common with the common folk of SVN, but they at least understood his brand of corruption. Could we have "won" with him? Doubtful.

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 04:39 PM
Stanley, pg. 160 is not my main beef with Moyar - just a laughable example of his valorization of the Diem regime and its, shall we say, unironic estimation of its effectiveness. I just pulled it out because I have Moyar's book on my desk - randomly flipped and found that hilarious passage. Moyar also hints that the Social Purification Law hurt Diem with journalists because their entertainment was curtailed, with no evidence cited - par for the course for Moyar. My main beef is that you initally played this passage as Moyar's main belief about why western media did not like Diem. He clearly states in other places (which I will reference when I get my book back,if you desire) the reasons he thinks they disliked Diem (which I explained above), which have nothing to do with the Social Purification Law.




His cover was as a journalist, but his mission was not to be a propaganda officer, it was to gain intelligence and provide analysis on Western and South Vietnamese intentions and motivation, as noted before...Those missions would have been impossible if RVN intelligence believed he was a Communist agent provocateur.
Because his main mission was not as a propoganda officer, you think Moyar should take his communications at face value? Where does Moyar say that Pham behaved stupidly enough that SVN intelligence should have suspected him?

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 04:42 PM
Could we have "won" with him? Doubtful.

But we clearly did not "win" without him, which is one of Moyar's main themes, and one of the main reasons for history, to ponder such questions.

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 04:50 PM
But we clearly did not "win" without him, which is one of Moyar's main themes, and one of the main reasons for history, to ponder such questions.

Sure, but I don't think there's as much to ponder as Moyar seems to think. Diem was a part of the equation, but the GVN was also sinking quickly with him. There is no reason to suspect, based on both his performance and that of the people around him, that he could have "pulled the rabbit out of the hat" and salvaged SVN.

stanleywinthrop
10-04-2007, 04:58 PM
Sure, but I don't think there's as much to ponder as Moyar seems to think. Diem was a part of the equation, but the GVN was also sinking quickly with him. There is no reason to suspect, based on both his performance and that of the people around him, that he could have "pulled the rabbit out of the hat" and salvaged SVN.

I don't think Moyar is claiming that Diem could have "pulled the rabbit out of the hat" and won the war quicly and easily. He is arguing that Diem represented the best chance of pacifiying south vietnam without direct U.S. intervention, and the natural U.S. focus on true democracy absolute human rights got in the way of our stated overall goal--to win the war.

tequila
10-04-2007, 05:00 PM
My main beef is that you initally played this passage as Moyar's main belief about why western media did not like Diem. He clearly states in other places (which I will reference when I get my book back,if you desire) the reasons he thinks they disliked Diem (which I explained above), which have nothing to do with the Social Purification Law.


Apologies if my snarky tone led you to interpret it in that fashion. My main intent was to mock Moyar's unironic belief in the effectiveness of Madam Nhu's Social Purification Law, of a piece with his generally unskeptical attitude toward many of Diem's policies.


Because his main mission was not as a propoganda officer, you think Moyar should take his communications at face value? Where does Moyar say that Pham behaved stupidly enough that SVN intelligence should have suspected him?

Moyar says that Pham influenced journalists like Karnow, Halberstam, and Sheehan, whom he largely blames for Diem's downfall, in an anti-Diem direction without providing any evidence except that Pham was a Communist agent. That Pham might have acted in the opposite direction to preserve his more important mission as intel operative and analyst is not credited or discussed. See pg. 215 of Moyar.

Skimming over a bit more of pg. 215, I also see that Moyar apparently believes that Confucianism is a religion, that being a member of the Confucian "religion" means one cannot be a Buddhist or harbor Buddhist beliefs, and that Vietnamese peasants approved of governments that crushed public demonstrations with force.

Steve Blair
10-04-2007, 05:01 PM
I don't think Moyar is claiming that Diem could have "pulled the rabbit out of the hat" and won the war quicly and easily. He is arguing that Diem represented the best chance of pacifiying south vietnam without direct U.S. intervention, and the natural U.S. focus on true democracy absolute human rights got in the way of our stated overall goal--to win the war.

Well...we will certainly have to agree to disagree here.

Cannoneer No. 4
12-16-2007, 10:25 PM
Found this (https://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/Who-Owns-the-Vietnam-War--11006?page=all) at The Belmont Club (http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/12/sunday-reading.html). Arthur Herman at Commentarymagazine.com (https://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/Who-Owns-the-Vietnam-War--11006?page=all)
. . . the press had presented the Tet offensive as a stunning Communist success and a signal that there was no light at the end of the tunnel. The suddenness of the attack had caught not only the American military by surprise, but also the American media. After the war, one of their own, the Washington Post’s Saigon bureau chief Peter Braestrup, documented exactly how the major media proceeded to turn the reality of American victory into an image of American and South Vietnamese defeat.1 Basing themselves on that image, Walter Cronkite and others clearly felt they now had definitive grounds for mistrusting their government’s word and for concluding that, just as the antiwar movement had declared, victory in Vietnam was not and never had been a possibility.


Others went beyond this conclusion. In March 1969, the executive producer of ABC News told his Saigon bureau: “I think the time has come to shift our focus from the battlefield . . . to themes and stories under the general heading, ‘We are on our way out of Vietnam.’” One of those “stories” would be the massacre at My Lai, which took place in the aftermath of Tet but became a news event only a year later. The steady coverage of isolated but sensational episodes like My Lai, deaths by “friendly fire,” and the like had the effect of convincing many Americans that such extraordinary occurrences reflected the ordinary situation on the ground and were destroying their country’s moral standing. Seizing the opportunity, a weakened Hanoi tried to turn it to its advantage. As Mark Woodruff writes in Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army (1999), Hanoi “increasingly shifted its [own] efforts toward the American media and the antiwar movement and soon sought American casualties as [its] main objective.” Indirectly, then, the press’s willful misreading of the meaning of Tet and its harping on the idea that “we are on our way out” would increase the cost of the war in American blood.<snip by SWCAdmin>


It generally seems to take about a generation and half for the truth to come out. Associated Press, Reuters, CNN et al tried to Tet (http://cannoneerno4.wordpress.com/2007/07/25/tet-comes-early-this-year/) us in Iraq. Didn't work so well this time.

Shek
12-17-2007, 01:17 AM
Cannoneer,

I recommend that you find William Hammond's "The Press in Vietnam as Agent of Defeat: A Critical Examination." It provides a look at the argument that the media was responsible for a major portion of our defeat in Vietnam and decouples causation.

A more recent look at war and the media can be found in a not too old article in Parameters, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/darley.pdf. I've excerpted a portion of the article that addresses a small portion of Hammond's argument.


William Hammond, regarded by many as the premier authority on military and media relations during the VietnamWar, also concluded that there was little evidence to support a causal relationship between the tone of editorial reporting and the general public opinion. However, he does suggest that there was evidence to support a causal relationship between the factual content of information communicated through the media and shifts in public opinion, often in ways critics of the media might not expect. For example, he notes the following with regard to public opinion polls taken during and immediately following the Tet Offensive in January 1968, widely and wrongly asserted by many to have been a decisive turning point marking the final irrevocable downturn in public support for continuation of the war:


Whatever the pessimism of the press, however, the majority of Americans went their own way. Queried by the Gallup Poll on whether they considered the war a mistake, 45 percent responded “yes,” the same percentage as in December 1965; 43 percent said “no,” a drop of 3 points; and 12 percent had no opinion. Even more telling, the number of those who considered themselves “hawks” on the war rose 4 percentage points between December and February, while those who saw themselves as “doves” fell by the same percentage. The number of those expressing confidence in the government’s military policies in South Vietnam rose from 61 to 74 percent. Queried by Louis Harris on whether a bombing halt would hasten the chances for peace, 71 percent of respondents favored continuing the bombing, a rise of 8 points over the previous October, while the number of those favoring a halt fell from 26 to 18 percent.3

Thus, if Hammond’s interpretation of polling is a correct analysis of US domestic public opinion through the first part of 1968, the factual content
of media reports, in most cases accompanied by editorial content opposing
the war, evoked in a significant segment of the US public a desire for
more—not less—aggressive and decisive action to finish the war on terms favorable to the United States. Hammond goes on to note the following:


If Americans were unwilling to repudiate the war, they nonetheless appearedincreasingly dissatisfied with their President. Willing to back any decision he made, they saw little forward motion on his part. . . . The air of indecision that hung about his policies as a result took a toll on his standing in the polls, where disapproval of his handling of the war rose from 47 to 63 percent by the end of February. . . . If the gloomy reporting of the press had little effect on American public opinion, it nonetheless reinforced doubts already circulating within the Johnson Administration.

Norfolk
12-17-2007, 01:42 AM
Hammond: If Americans were unwilling to repudiate the war, they nonetheless appearedincreasingly dissatisfied with their President. Willing to back any decision he made, they saw little forward motion on his part. . . . The air of indecision that hung about his policies as a result took a toll on his standing in the polls, where disapproval of his handling of the war rose from 47 to 63 percent by the end of February. . . . If the gloomy reporting of the press had little effect on American public opinion, it nonetheless reinforced doubts already circulating within the Johnson Administration.

I think therein lies something like the truth about the effect that the media had upon the political conduct of the Vietnam War. The political leadership is, needless to say, somewhat isolated from the views of most ordinary people; and into this gap steps the media. The media are able to create perceptions, perhaps not entirely accurate ones, of how things are in reality, and these perceptions have their effects upon the thinking of political leaders and their active supporters. The potential for the media to manipulate the communication divide between ordinary people and their political leaders afforded by said divide, in turn allows the media to exert an undue influence upon political leaders and decision-makers, somewhat isolated as they are from "reality".

Ken White
12-17-2007, 02:13 AM
I think therein lies something like the truth about the effect that the media had upon the political conduct of the Vietnam War. The political leadership is, needless to say, somewhat isolated from the views of most ordinary people; and into this gap steps the media. The media are able to create perceptions, perhaps not entirely accurate ones, of how things are in reality, and these perceptions have their effects upon the thinking of political leaders and their active supporters. The potential for the media to manipulate the communication divide between ordinary people and their political leaders afforded by said divide, in turn allows the media to exert an undue influence upon political leaders and decision-makers, somewhat isolated as they are from "reality".

however, I think the great unwashed turned around on Viet Nam due to perceived lack of progress -- that and Nixon's campaign promise to get out.

The bad thing is that the media myth (and IMO, it is a myth) led them to believe they have far more influence than they really do. They honestly think the sway the public when all they actually do is sway the more gullible politicians and those political junkies among the public that believe the same things the media does.

That is highly likely to have little or no connection with reality.

Cannoneer No. 4
12-17-2007, 02:56 AM
Cannoneer,
A more recent look at war and the media can be found in a not too old article in Parameters, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/darley.pdf. I've excerpted a portion of the article that addresses a small portion of Hammond's argument.


This discussion is not intended to ignore or discount the influence of
detractors in the media—especially in the global media age—who willfully
misreport with the intent of undermining war policy and sowing doubt in the
domestic populace. Intuitively one recognizes in such media reports a corrosive
effect on national morale and public support for a war that is difficult to
measure or counter.

Having spent 12 of 14 pages not discussing tthe influence of detractors in the media, Darley finally got to the point I want made.

What hostile media gets out in print hours or days after the event becomes the narrative that stands for decades until disinterested, objective historians analyze declassified information and publish what really happened for the benefit of the small audience who still cares after such a long time.

Shek
12-17-2007, 03:10 AM
I think therein lies something like the truth about the effect that the media had upon the political conduct of the Vietnam War. The political leadership is, needless to say, somewhat isolated from the views of most ordinary people; and into this gap steps the media. The media are able to create perceptions, perhaps not entirely accurate ones, of how things are in reality, and these perceptions have their effects upon the thinking of political leaders and their active supporters. The potential for the media to manipulate the communication divide between ordinary people and their political leaders afforded by said divide, in turn allows the media to exert an undue influence upon political leaders and decision-makers, somewhat isolated as they are from "reality".

Norfolk,

Hammond's piece is up on JSTOR if you have access to it. In his piece, he specifically refers to this re:Vietnam, and cites Daniel Hallin's The Uncensored War, which states that post-Tet, coverage between for and against the war nearly balanced, with for the war maintaining a slim lead (prior to Tet, pro coverage dominated over coverage against the war 6:1). Of the coverage against the war, half of it came from government officials, while only 16% came from reporters or commentators themselves. Between this and some other evidence that he explores, his conclusion was not that the press was leading, but that it was following.

Norfolk
12-17-2007, 03:19 AM
Thanks Shek!:)

Shek
12-17-2007, 03:20 AM
This discussion is not intended to ignore or discount the influence of
detractors in the media—especially in the global media age—who willfully
misreport with the intent of undermining war policy and sowing doubt in the
domestic populace. Intuitively one recognizes in such media reports a corrosive
effect on national morale and public support for a war that is difficult to
measure or counter.

Having spent 12 of 14 pages not discussing tthe influence of detractors in the media, Darley finally got to the point I want made.

What hostile media gets out in print hours or days after the event becomes the narrative that stands for decades until disinterested, objective historians analyze declassified information and publish what really happened for the benefit of the small audience who still cares after such a long time.

The problem is that your Vietnam reference is off the mark - research by a "disinterested, objective historian" employed by the Center of Military History has shown that the popular myth that the media was a major cause of our losing Vietnam doesn't hold much weight. Sure, there was negative press out there, but it wasn't leading opinion, just following it.

However, I don't dispute that information has a much greater impact in the current conflicts, but you are drawing from a false reference and seeing only what you want to see. You saw 12 pages as wasted space because it didn't make the point you want made, despite the fact that it provides evidence that your historical reference is questionable and/or invalid.

EDIT: One of the big points that Hammonds makes is that most people in Vietnam weren't influenced by the media anyways - they saw what they wanted to see for the most part. I think the same holds true today for the domestic audience by and large.

Norfolk
12-17-2007, 04:47 AM
Norfolk,

Hammond's piece is up on JSTOR if you have access to it. In his piece, he specifically refers to this re:Vietnam, and cites Daniel Hallin's The Uncensored War, which states that post-Tet, coverage between for and against the war nearly balanced, with for the war maintaining a slim lead (prior to Tet, pro coverage dominated over coverage against the war 6:1). Of the coverage against the war, half of it came from government officials, while only 16% came from reporters or commentators themselves. Between this and some other evidence that he explores, his conclusion was not that the press was leading, but that it was following.

Shek,

I've just finished reading the Hammond piece from JSTOR, and I must say that I am rather surprised, but convincingly so, by what he had to report. I must admit quite a measure of ignorance on my part hitherto, but Hammond stripped away many layers of prejudice and obfuscation to lay bare how things really worked. Most interesting (and only now do I even clue into it) was that the shift in how the media reported upon the war resulted more from the changing views of the government officials that served as the media's sources than from any other factor. When the government officials began to have doubts or to change their mind about policy or strategy, that not surprisingly affected the reporters they were talking to. Well, talk about finally seeing something that's been staring you straight in the face. Superb piece.

Ken White
12-17-2007, 05:19 AM
(and wasn't) nearly as important as they think they are -- though they do influence political junkies and politicians to a slight extent.

It also illustrates that the faint of heart or the opposed in an Administration can have a moderately significant adverse impact...

Also note that the articles confirm my contention that the American public is not overly concerned with casualties; they (and apparently the Brits) want success, dilly dallying is rejected ... :D

Gian P Gentile
12-17-2007, 11:44 AM
[INDENT][I]....What hostile media gets out in print hours or days after the event becomes the narrative that stands for decades until disinterested, objective historians analyze declassified information and publish what really happened for the benefit of the small audience who still cares after such a long time.

Agree with the responses to your post that Shek, Norfolk, Ken White, et al have made about the myth of the media loosing the Vietnam War. I think the Parmaters article already mentioned provides a pretty compelling case by a professional and relatively unbiased historian that the Media was not to blame.

Moreover with regards to your point about today and the influence the media has on establishing the narrative i think you are correct in this statement. The media, especially print media when it comes to the later writing of history, are one of the first ones to "document" events which become the stuff of history and help build an early narrative of an issue.

However, in the case of Iraq today, and this goes contrary to what the legions of neo-cons write, I think the print media has done a pretty good job at reporting the war in Iraq. Especially over the past few months major papers like the NY Times, WaPost, and others have really tried not to overly report the violence in place of good things happening there.

What has been most interesting to me about reporting on the Iraq War is how pundits--like those happy travelers from AEI--have become almost like actual newspaper reporters. Other pundits like Trudy Rubin from the Philly Enquirer have also had their opeds started to be treated like traditional newspaper reporting. And in this regard the cumulative effect of traditional and pundit reporting has been a largely positive reporting of the war. In fact one can make the argument that the media has been glossing over some important factors that tend to look less positively on the lowered violence in Iraq and what brought it about.

So if you are trying to build an early case for a blame-the-media argument for Iraq I do not think that you have history or contemporary reporting by the media on your side.

gian

Gian P Gentile
06-03-2008, 02:57 PM
This is the title for a new article on Westmoreland and Vietnam by Army Historian Dale Andrade in the just released issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies. (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a793320485~db=all~jumptype=rss) Pasted below is the abstract to the article along with an additional paragraph. Andrade's bigger point is that if we as the United States Army aspire to be a learning organization, a good place to start is by understanding the past; specifically Vietnam and then move to a better understanding of the flawed lessons that we have dervived from that war along with myths in order to get at the truth.

More than thirty years after the fall of Saigon, historians still argue about the lessons of the Vietnam War. Most fall into two schools of thought: those who believe that the United States failed to apply enough pressure - military and political - to the Communist government in Hanoi, and those who argue that the Americans failed to use an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. Both arguments have merit, but both ignore the Communist strategy, and the result is a skewed picture of what sort of enemy the United States actually faced in Vietnam. The reality is that the United States rarely held the initiative in Vietnam. Hanoi began a conventional troop build up in South Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s, and by the time of the US ground force intervention in 1965 the allies already faced a large and potent conventional Communist army in the South. Simply employing a 'classic' counterinsurgency strategy would have been fatal from the beginning. Despite this fact, the US military has tended to embrace flawed historical analysis to explain our failure, often concluding that there was a 'strategic choice' in Vietnam - a right way to fight and a wrong way. Most blame General William C. Westmoreland as choosing the wrong way and argue that if he had eschewed a big unit 'search and destroy' strategy, the war might have turned out differently. However, this article argues that this is untrue. Westmoreland could not have done much differently than he actually did given the realities on the ground. The flawed interpretations of the Vietnam War are not only bad history, but they also lead military and political policymakers to bad decisions in current counterinsurgency strategy. As the US military finds itself embroiled in unconventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs clear lessons from America's longest counterinsurgency campaign - the Vietnam War.

Cavguy
06-03-2008, 03:08 PM
Tried to access it but got hit with a password request asking for my name and SSN to view.

Not too hot giving out my SSN, even to USMA.

AGBrina
06-03-2008, 03:59 PM
If...If...If...If !!!

If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....

If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....

If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....

But most of all...

If the Marxist-sympathizing and Democratically-controlled Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....

South Vietnam would have become as great a testament to American resolve as South Korea. The military which fought in Vietnam was better-prepared, better-supported, and better-led than the one which fought in Korea.

The Vietnamese War was not a "small war" either, although the typical battle was fought with company-sized units. At the Tet Offensive of 1968, General Weyand had 9 maneuver Divisions at his disposal. Colonel Rheault had almost 100,000 indigenous and Special Forces under his command. And the ARVN had over a million men.

The mistakes which affected the outcome of the war were not made at Khe Sanh or at MAAC-V. They were not made at the War College and certainly not at the Infantry School! They were made in the Oval Office, on Capital Hill and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Steve Blair
06-03-2008, 04:11 PM
Already read the article. Once again it's a case of "either/or" thinking with no real attempt to find a good middle ground. Westmoreland was "right" in a sense, but he was also "wrong" in a sense. He was correct in that larger units were needed to break up the main force VC units and to keep them away from populated areas (although the only real way to do that would have been to physically cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail...an option that was never really on the table), but he was wrong in his lack of attention to population security (leaving that mostly for ARVN after the force had been configured by its advisors to fight a regular enemy...even though as I recall their own leadership had hoped for training oriented more toward dealing with insurgent forces). Westmoreland paid lip service to finding a balance, but in practice he failed to do so. Most people were looking at a Korea scenario and past what they were actually facing on the ground. That is the truth of that situation. Korea and the Chinese intervention colored the majority of policy thinking in the Johnson administration, and a lack of attention to anything other than conventional war colored the evaluation of many military thinkers, to include Westmoreland. Vietnam required a blended solution, and that's something that I'm not sure we could come up with even today.

I also found Andrade's use of the communist histories interesting, as their current spin is to deemphasize the role of the VC in operations. This has more to do with the political and social split that existed between Northerners and Southerners at the time than actual objective history. It's easy to forget that they have an interest in presenting the history of the War of Liberation to fit their own domestic goals...not unlike the motives often attributed to Western commentators writing about the war.

If there's a flaw, it's the same one that we seem to be incapable of escaping...the "either/or" mindset. Vietnam was a blended situation. We missed that then, and we seem to be missing that again.

Cavguy...you should be able to log into the article through the library there without giving up any information. If not, PM me.

Steve Blair
06-03-2008, 04:18 PM
If...If...If...If !!!

If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....

If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....

If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....

Closing the ports that early wouldn't have made much difference, because the North wasn't engaged in a major conventional offensive (the rail routes from China were more significant during the early periods, as was the land route from Cambodian ports). Nor would bombing the transportation network, because there wasn't much of one to bomb and it wasn't being used heavily for the war effort at that time. It was different in 1972 because the North chose to launch a conventional offensive that required much more in the way of supplies than their earlier campaigns and thus exposed them to interdiction and airpower. Operations prior to the Easter Offensive used minimal supplies (an average of five truckloads per NVA DIVISION if memory serves), so there wasn't much to bomb.

The Marines would have been better used in the IV Corps CTZ where they could have focused on population security (and training ARVN in similar techniques). It just so happened that they were the first large US force deployed and once they got in I Corps CTZ they were more or less stuck there.

Cavguy
06-03-2008, 05:35 PM
Cavguy...you should be able to log into the article through the library there without giving up any information. If not, PM me.

COL Gentile and Shek both sent me copies - Share many of the same opinions of the article. There is some merit to the argument that development is impossible without baseline security, and security requires force. Therefore, the author's argument is that Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.

He gets to it in the last paragraphs when he states the main takeaway:


Counterinsurgency is not only about good planning, it is also about numbers. Without sufficient forces to dominate the operational area on a constant basis, there is simply no way to disrupt the guerrillas and at the same time foster pacification programs. This is as true today as it was then.

I disagree with his conclusion here. My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

What is the bio/background of the author?

Steve Blair
06-03-2008, 05:56 PM
COL Gentile and Shek both sent me copies - Share many of the same opinions of the article. There is some merit to the argument that development is impossible without baseline security, and security requires force. Therefore, Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.

Sure, but again I tend to think the discussion is another case of "either/or" thinking. Westmoreland was right to use 'search and destroy' to push main force units back from the population centers, but he was also remiss in not focusing some real priorities on population security or at the very least insuring that ARVN could do so (which its training effectively precluded since it was focused on main force combat).

Andrade is one of the historians at the CMH and has written on both the Phoenix program and some aspects of SOG. He also wrote a good study of the Easter Offensive. Steve (Metz, that is) might be more familiar with him.

Ken White
06-03-2008, 05:58 PM
This is the title for a new article on Westmoreland and Vietnam by Army Historian Dale Andrade ... Andrade's bigger point is that if we as the United States Army aspire to be a learning organization, a good place to start is by understanding the past; specifically Vietnam and then move to a better understanding of the flawed lessons that we have dervived from that war along with myths in order to get at the truth.Couldn't agree more with your premise. We certainly should eliminate the flawed lessons of Viet Nam -- however, we should also be very careful not to preselect the lessons we wish to learn -- or eliminate.

My sensing tends to coincide more with Steve Blair than with Andrade. Westmoreland was right -- to an extent. He was also wrong to an extent. IMO, he was more wrong than right, Andrade can differ as can you but there is little denying three salient facts:


- The primary Operational level of effort, COIN, was given only lip service from 1963 until late 1968.

- There were a number of flawed decisions by MACV during that period that ranged from placing the Marines in the wrong CTZ (as Steve pointed out) and the Army having to develop a Riverine capability to operate in 4 CTZ on the fly; the infusion program and the force protection measures that insisted on large unit operations and constant US Artillery cover (two things the VC and NVA quickly learned to exploit). Most of these and more sprang from the NW Europe mentality of Westmoreland and the MACV Staff that could not wrap itself around the flexibility required to confront an agile enemy * .

- The vast majority of contacts were initiated by the enemy, not by us and that is by any measure a significant operational and tactical failure. As that NVA Colonel told Harry Summers, not being whipped in battle was irrelevant.

It did not need to be that way and Westmoreland was in command. So, no, he wasn't right...

In any event, Afghanistan, Iraq and Viet Nam are three very different wars fought against three very different enemies in three very different sets of terrain in a different time and with different levels of troop training and capability. Few of the lessons of Viet Nam translate directly and we should be extremely careful of those we choose to adopt.

* An example of that is the statement recently made in a war game prep at Knox to an acquaintance by a senior person regarding reconnaissance; "We (Americans) don't have the patience to sneak and peek, we just mount up and go out looking for trouble and you have to have Armor to do that." I submit that worked in NW Europe at the tail end of WW II; it took the Remagen Bridge, for example, good job. It may work today in a European or even in some Iraqi settings. It did not work in Viet Nam and it does not work in Afghanistan.

Steve Blair
06-03-2008, 06:04 PM
* An example of that is the statement recently made in a war game prep at Knox to an acquaintance by a senior person regarding reconnaissance; "We (Americans) don't have the patience to sneak and peek, we just mount up and go out looking for trouble and you have to have Armor to do that." I submit that worked in NW Europe at the tail end of WW II; it took the Remagen Bridge, for example, good job. It may work today in a European or even in some Iraqi settings. It did not work in Viet Nam and it does not work in Afghanistan.

This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia. The same goes for at least parts of his staff as well. SOG had the potential to deliver incredible intelligence, but it was often wasted by people who didn't have a good understanding of what they had. Not to mention the constant denial on many levels that the North was taking an active role in the South until late 1966 or so.

I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.

Ken White
06-03-2008, 06:05 PM
...Therefore, Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.Not really; nor did Tet and the general VC (the very few left) and NVA (lots and lots of them replacing those killed) toll allow it as some postulate; Abrams simply changed the emphasis as Palmer had been urging all along. Westmoreland could have done it two years earlier; he chose not to do so.
...My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.Exactly.

Cavguy
06-03-2008, 06:16 PM
Sure, but again I tend to think the discussion is another case of "either/or" thinking. Westmoreland was right to use 'search and destroy' to push main force units back from the population centers, but he was also remiss in not focusing some real priorities on population security or at the very least insuring that ARVN could do so (which its training effectively precluded since it was focused on main force combat).

Andrade is one of the historians at the CMH and has written on both the Phoenix program and some aspects of SOG. He also wrote a good study of the Easter Offensive. Steve (Metz, that is) might be more familiar with him.

I think we're in violent agreement. I can't subscribe to his assertion that pacification and security must happen in parallel and not sequentially (though targeted and scaled).

Ken White
06-03-2008, 07:09 PM
This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia...I saw the process repeated in a number of units that got good intel from their Recon and LRRP Units and then blithefully ignored it and put more dependence on SPAR info. Dumbbbb...
I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.True; unfortunately we sort of fell into the same failure (the war we wanted...) post 1989...

BRUZ_LEE
06-03-2008, 07:52 PM
...what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe).

Who would like to see that happen ? - At least nobody in Central Europe!

Concerning the failure in South Vietnam it is quite fruitless IMO to discuss the value of "Search & Destroy" missions or reports of SOG troopers about what's happening on remote jungle trails, when you try to back an incapable dictatorship government in S-Vietnam and simultaneously drop bombs on innocent civilians in N-Vietnam.
That's the wrong strategy and doomed to fail anyway.

Rob Thornton
06-03-2008, 10:51 PM
Cavguy said:

My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

Ultimately the conditions will drive requirements, but I think Neil gets to the meat of it here, the two are dependent upon each other in ways that get beyond the number of attacks, and toward the rational for continued insurgency. It is a matter of art and decision. Figuring out what makes insurgency the most viable and attractive recourse in terms of what the real objectives are is key to sustainable security - but implementing it offers a different set of challenges.

Having said that, I think if the conditions are such that all the counter insurgent's activities are absorbed in physical security, then allocating resources to development might not be possible - even if the commander knows that is the requirement to get to long term sustainable security. It is event driven to a degree.

Each situation is likely to be different - Vietnam is not Iraq, nor are any two provinces or cities wholly alike. They are all driven by politics at a number of levels. While I do believe that History offers unique insights into the present and future, to get its full value we have to acknowledge its limitations. We can look back and recognize where there were seemingly non-linear outcomes, mistakes and vindications, but its hard to account for the number of potential outcomes that come through interaction as you look forward.

The two are different. Using History to draw useful observations about a past event to think about the future is one thing. Drawing conclusions and absolutes about the future based on historical events that are by nature frozen in time and no longer interactive is dangerous business, and offers to great an opportunity to inject bias.

Best, Rob

Sargent
06-04-2008, 01:56 AM
Andrade's analysis is on point if the threat to South Vietnam came from without. North Vietnam certainly had its own agenda regarding unification. However, those plans would have gone the way of North Korea's had South Vietnam not had its own very serious internal problems, had there not been a serious disconnect between the government and the governed. Whether American counterinsurgency efforts could have changed this is unknown. However, it does make clear that however successful the conventional war could have been, it would not have been enough to secure South Vietnam as a viable, independent entity.

From this perspective, there is an interesting connection with Iraq -- there is often a temptation to conflate the foreign fighter problem with the bulk of the security issues in Iraq. But there are serious internal issues regarding relations between the localities and the central government. Even those Iraqis who are working to support the American effort are not entirely comfortable with the emerging model of a central government that controls more of daily life than has ever been the norm -- for example, even under Hussein Fallujah was pretty much left alone to run its own affairs. I would argue that this antipathy to the center is expressed in the black market activities in oil - while some amount of the theft is tied to supporting anti-government/American military activities, some is simply about building the strength of local actors. In any case, solving the foreign fighter problem is never going to pacify Iraq. The problems are within, and they are going to require a whole different set of answers - many of which exceed the capabilities of the military or the use of military force, either conventionally or in COIN.

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north.

Jill

Ken White
06-04-2008, 03:52 AM
All good, but particularly these two:
"The problems are within, and they are going to require a whole different set of answers - many of which exceed the capabilities of the military or the use of military force, either conventionally or in COIN.

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north."That last very important point is missed by most...

William F. Owen
06-04-2008, 05:23 AM
This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia. The same goes for at least parts of his staff as well. SOG had the potential to deliver incredible intelligence, but it was often wasted by people who didn't have a good understanding of what they had.

I concur to a degree. In the early days, the product delivered by OPS-35 was pretty variable, and only covered a very small AO. By 1968, B-52 strikes were being put in based on OPS-35 product.

...however, and I say this as a man with many friends who served in the OPS-35 Recon Teams, the role of the NSA in Laos (Angry Talker, and Polaris 2) has never really been researched. As far as I can tell, most of the targets run in 1969/70 were based on Angry Talker intercepts.



....Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....


What crippled ARVN was oil prices. Giving ARVN more equipment (which was what the IDF needed to replace 1973 losses - (and US support broke the will of Jordan and Egypt to continue by military means) ARVN just lacked training and mostly combat power across the board. Giving RVN more M113s and F4E's would not have altered the military outcome.

However, it would have saved Cambodia! - a nation truly betrayed by the US Congress and a few other people. I've never wanted to talk to Jane Fonda about Hanoi, but I would love to chat about Cambodia!

Tom Odom
06-04-2008, 12:52 PM
Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north."



All good, but particularly these two:That last very important point is missed by most...

To echo Steve, Ken, and Sargent, in fact the regime in Hanoi actively purged surviving members of the VC infrastructure, military and political, after the collapse of Saigon in 1975. The rewrite of history to exclude the southern comrades began then and has never stopped.

For example see:


History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/tra/tra.asp)

In 1978 the Political General Department of the Vietnam People's Army adopted the policy of having cadres who worked and fought on the battlefields write memoirs about our nation's glorious war against the United States and recommended that I write about the B2 theater during the victorious spring of 1975: "How did the B2 theater carry out the mission assigned it by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee?" How did it contribute to that glorious spring?"

Along with the other battlefields throughout the nation the B2 theater, in order to fulfill its glorious mission, contributed considerably to our people's great victory. The B2 theater and its people are proud of being part of the heroic Vietnamese fatherland, of the heroic Vietnamese people. Recalling and recording the events that occurred there is an honor and a responsibility of all cadres, enlisted men, and people of B2. I accepted the recommendation...

But what was B2? Perhaps even now there are many people who are not very clear about that. To help the reader better understand the events about which I have written, I believe that it is necessary to mention some of the features of the B2 theater.

"B2" was the code name of the land and people in the southernmost part of the homeland during the anti-U.S. war period. Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel was divided into four theaters....

B2 consisted of the rest of South Vietnam, from the former Gia Nghia Province (part of the present Dac Lac Province), Lam Dong, Thuan Hai, and on down to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Con Son, Ha Tien, and Phu Quoc....

Our B2 theater accounted for about half of the land and about two-thirds of the population of South Vietnam...The people of B2 are honest and loyal and are independent in nature and their deeply patriotic ancestors came from north and central Vietnam. They always think of our beloved Uncle Ho and Hanoi, the capital and the ancient Thang Long, with an immortal sentiment..

and in the second chapter:


However, during Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. For that reason, although that decision was wise, ingenious, and timely, and although its implementation was well organized and bold, there was excellent coordination on all battlefields, everyone acted very bravely, sacrificed their lives, and there was created a significant strategic turning point in Vietnam and Indochina, we suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 so that the revolution could stand firm in the storm.

Jedburgh
07-16-2008, 01:52 PM
1st Infantry Division Operational Report-Lessons Learned (1 May - 31 July 1966) (http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/AD391481)

During the period covered by the previous Operational Report-Lessons Learned (1 Jan - 30 Apr 66), the 1st Infantry Division began to conduct major operations outside the assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) to extend U.S. and GVI influence into previously uncontested areas. The period covered by this report was marked by even deeper penetrations into areas considered as VC dominated territory. Operations were characterized by rapid reaction to Intelligence information and deployment of the bulk of division forces over vast areas of the ll Corps Tactical Zone. There has been a significant increase in the integration of ARVN combat forces into 1st Infantry Division operations. The division initiated its first major pacification operation and results to date have been very encouraging. Operations wore also conducted within base camp TAORs to locate and destroy remaining VC forces aad installations. Three main Force Viet Corg regiments were engaged in five major battles and in each the enemy forces wore decisively defeated. The elite 272d VC Regiment was engaged in battle on two separate occasions, one of which occurred on the 49th Anniversary of the formation of the Big Red One, 3 July 1917.....

Mike in Hilo
07-18-2008, 03:19 AM
Thanks for posting, Ted. A look at the OB reminds of the extensive network of enemy base areas (and infiltration routes) within RVN. Which illustrates the oft-discussed conundrum: Hard to see how you could succeed at sustainable pacification without first disrupting the base areas in this phase of the war.

Cheers,
Mike.

Jedburgh
10-16-2008, 10:33 AM
MACV Combat Experiences 5-69 (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD506438&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), 5 Jan 70

This particular issue deals with experiences of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). As part of its territorial security and pacification mission, the RF/PF play an important role in the preemption of enemy preparations for major attacks. In preparing for battle, the enemy customarily uses reconnaissance parties and small groups who prepare food and ammunition caches and build or dig command posts, aid stations and similar installations. During the battle he employs couriers, aid men and ammunition and food resupply porters. During withdrawals he employs other small groups to link and support his major units. His dependence on these techniques of employment of individuals and small groups makes him vulnerable to a programmed coverage of the countryside by RF and PF units. This can be done by the RF becoming heavily engaged in aggressive patrolling and night ambushes. Such actions can preempt surpris- attacks on populated areas and installations. Because of their knowledge of the people and the local area, the PF can be an invaluable asset in preventing acts of terrorism and sabotage by identifying infiltrators into populated areas and by simply being alert to and reporting unusual incidents. MACV Combat Experiences 5-69 highlights a few problems of the RF/PF, describes their great worth in the effort to curb aggression and hopefully will better prepare all recipients of this document to assist the RF/PF in performing their extremely valuable functions.

AdamG
10-31-2008, 02:54 PM
While the BBC's pre-existing bias is well-documented, this is still worth reading.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7698055.stm

The singer and soldier Hershel Gober returned to Vietnam in 1969 as a company commander, and knew even then that the war was lost.

He told his men that he did not want any John Waynes in his outfit. He was wounded and sent home.

Many years later, he became acting secretary for veterans' affairs in the Clinton administration. He changed his mind about this war and others; he opposed the war in Iraq.

He believes that in Vietnam the Americans lost not only the war but the opportunity to learn from it.

"Sometimes I think we didn't learn a damn thing from Vietnam," he says, "We didn't learn enough".

Ken White
10-31-2008, 03:48 PM
That's the myth that needs to be dispelled and that's a lesson we did not learn in Viet Nam. People will act in their perceived self interest and they will follow their heart -- but they will not let you win that heart. Nor do you need to...

The reason he thinks we didn't learn a thing or enough is 'cause we have foolishly allowed DoD simply because of the money they get and the global presence they have (both of which are necessary but not wisely employed) to assume the de facto lead in our foreign policy. That transcends Viet Nam which was simply a symptom, not the problem.

Congress is mostly to blame; they, after all, are the ones that overfund (for campaign contribution and vote reasons) and micromanage (because they're ignorant) DoD and underfund and do not adequately supervise State (or the Intel community, another story. Both again due to ignorance...).

Gobel, by the way, was slow, took him until '69 to get real. I -- and others -- were saying in '66 that we were going to spend $50B, get 100K US troops killed and give Uncle Ho ten airfields. In the event, we reversed the math, Ho died and the number of airfields rose to 15 or 16...

William F. Owen
11-01-2008, 08:08 AM
That's the myth that needs to be dispelled and that's a lesson we did not learn in Viet Nam. .

Dam straight. We need to drop this Hearts and Minds BS once and for all. Templer said that the conflict in Malaya would be won in the "hearts and minds" or the Malayan people. Eventually enough people felt in their hearts and knew in their minds, they could never eject the British by military means. Same deal in Northern Ireland.

Personally, I think anyone who bands about the the words hearts and minds, has the credibility of someone who says "Cho Cho train" when discussing public transport. We need to stop using these words. They are no longer useful.

Adam L
11-01-2008, 08:51 AM
Dam straight. We need to drop this Hearts and Minds BS once and for all. Templer said that the conflict in Malaya would be won in the "hearts and minds" or the Malayan people. Eventually enough people felt in their hearts and knew in their minds, they could never eject the British by military means. Same deal in Northern Ireland.

Personally, I think anyone who bands about the the words hearts and minds, has the credibility of someone who says "Cho Cho train" when discussing public transport. We need to stop using these words. They are no longer useful.


Very true, but what sound-bite must we replace it with now? I worry that at this time it is not feasible politically to discard them. I would agree they are not accurate or appropriate anymore, on the other hand I feel they are still very useful. That is, in a PR capacity. The public doesn't repsond well to non-fuzzified language. In many ways the term "hearts and minds" is an absolutely brilliant PR catch phrase. Nobody can say winning "hearts and minds" is a bad idea. Some may feel we should do it without weapons, but the goal is still a "good one." You're 100% correct Wilf. Unfortunately I don't think that will ever happen

Adam L

John T. Fishel
11-01-2008, 10:58 AM
as I said on another thread.:eek:

What do we call this kind of war - LIC, OOTW, COIN, SASO, MOOTW, CT, or the other hundred names? Each has its partisans and its critics and both have good reasons for their positions. Templar coined a phrase that had real utility at the time but was more simplistic than what the Brits actually did. In fact, they won the hearts and minds of the Malay majority by promising and granting independence, which allowed them to to go after the Chinese insurgents. One might argue that the Brits followed a pop centric strategy toward the non-insurgent population (including many if not most of the Chinese) with the necessary enemy centric components against the insurgents. Thus, perhaps, the term to replace "hearts and minds" when describing a Small Wars or COIN strategy might be Pop Centric. Of course, its critics will attack it on semantic grounds as well.:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

davidbfpo
11-01-2008, 12:34 PM
I'd suggest, on a quick thought, that loyalty is a suitable replacement word.

"Hearts & Minds" creeps into UK CT, sometimes in official documents and is quite inappropriate.

davidbfpo

Ken White
11-01-2008, 02:49 PM
Actually, in Malaya the British -- correctly -- first went after the CTs and removed their ability to terrorize minds; then they terrorized the Malays and the Chinese civilians not playing CT by virtually eliminating Civil Rights and moving the majority of them into 'New Villages.' There was no winning of hearts and the minds involved were coerced, not coaxed.

The 'hearts and minds' tag line was introduced but the iron fist behind that velvet glove was what 'won' the COIN war. About 40K Commonwealth Troops and over half that number of British and Malay Police plus the concentration camps that were the New Villages fighting a max of 6-8K CTs and killing well over half of them from 1951 until late 1956 swung it -- hearts and minds were little if any involved.

The Malays were the people who wanted independence. Yet they were not involved in the insurgency to almost any extent. The Chinese were making money so mostly, they weren't big on independence. Few of them followed the CT line.

Chin Peng just used 'independence' as an excuse and in an attempt to replace impending, promised and on schedule independent but majority Malay rule with a Communist government headed by Chinese. Thus to say that the British won Malay hearts and minds when the Chinese were the insurgents is an obvious misnomer

The British and Malays then offered an amnesty to the CTs -- and a pretty sweeping one at that --and by late '56, the insurgency was pretty well whipped. Independence, proposed and effectively promised in 1948 at the formation of the Federation of Malaya and to be effective in 10 years finally came on 31 Aug 57, a year early but Malaysia as it exists today wasn't really formed until 1963.

I said it before and I'll say it again:

""Winning hearts and minds anywhere is a myth...That's the myth that needs to be dispelled and that's a lesson we did not learn in Viet Nam.""

""People will act in their perceived self interest and they will follow their heart -- but they will not let you win that heart. Nor do you need to...""

That opinion by me does not of course preclude others from using whatever terminology they wish. Even if they are wrong. ;) Nor does that opinion obviate COIN techniques as espoused by most; it merely suggests that the effort be viewed realistically and not through idealistic prisms that can distort actions. That's the semantics part of it...

Words are important.

Adam L
11-01-2008, 03:12 PM
I'd suggest, on a quick thought, that loyalty is a suitable replacement word.

"Hearts & Minds" creeps into UK CT, sometimes in official documents and is quite inappropriate.

davidbfpo

Yes, at times we may be looking for "loyalty," but a more accurate word would be obedience. The problem with loyalty is that it is a bit transparent given how concrete and narrow its definition is. "Hearts and Minds" is very amorphous. "Obedience" would be a PR nightmare. I remind everyone that the material we discuss in this forum, including this thread, is very open to the public. The openness and publicity of COIN development is certainly interesting and possibly beneficial to the area. On the other hand, perhaps the language, at the cost of accuracy, has to be made more suitable to the public's, especially the media's, taste.

Adam L

William F. Owen
11-01-2008, 03:18 PM
What do we call this kind of war - LIC, OOTW, COIN, SASO, MOOTW, CT, or the other hundred names?


Security Operations? - there are Combat Operations and Security Operations. Security Operations may involve some combat and vice versa. - Would that help?

Ken White
11-01-2008, 03:27 PM
...On the other hand, perhaps the language, at the cost of accuracy, has to be made more suitable to the public's, especially the media's, taste.

Adam LYou're totally correct in my view. I don't really have any problem at all with the media and the general public using the 'hearts and minds' tag; my concern is that working professionals and those actually involved in a COIN operation do not succumb to an amorphous concept that is not a plan and that is almost certain to fail.

One cannot bribe one's way to success in such conflicts (simplistic, I know but most will understand...). :wry:

camoguy
11-01-2008, 11:54 PM
Around 1968 the US stopped trying to deter the North Vietnamese from infiltrating the south by bombing the north. Instead they implemented a plan where they dropped thousands and thousands of sensors on the Ho Chi Minh trail in order to detect when the North Vietnamese were sending supplies and personnel south along the trail. When movement was detected this information was sent to patrolling F-4s who bombed the heck out of the area where the movement was detected. Ultimately the whole plan was a failure as it didn't do a whole lot to prevent the NV from infiltrating the south. Instead of providing a specific alternative possibility wherein the US could have better interdicted the movement south along the trail, I'm curious if anyone can provide a scenario where the US could have better interdicted the movement south. Could the sensor-shooter loop have been better implemented? Could some other plan have better worked? Was McNamara just too enthusiastic about throwing something hi-tech at the problem? Any thoughts? What are the implications of this situation for today?

reed11b
11-02-2008, 12:17 AM
I think you may find the answer by looking for historical examples of conflict changing interdiction.
Reed
Hint: I have found none at this point in time, perhaps the council will provide an example I have missed

Mike in Hilo
11-02-2008, 02:56 AM
Inter alia, Ending the Vietnam War, Kissinger's effort (Simon and Schuster, 2003) to coalesce material from his other memoirs, posits that Op Lam Son 719 was originally planned as a US led op--until the realities of US domestic politics intervened...

Cheers,
Mike.

Mike in Hilo
11-02-2008, 03:26 AM
Love that last line, Ken.....Far away and long ago, lots of hamlets in various provinces where economic prosperity seemed almost incongruous (indicators include power tillers having replaced buffalo, proliferation of well-built, new stucco houses, etc. )--Yet they remained insecure to the GVN...VCI ran the hamlets, usually in tandem with the menacing effect of a nearby enemy base area. (one example, southern panhandle of my first province, Tay Ninh, with NVA base area across the border in Svay Rieng)...

Cheers,
Mike.

Ken White
11-02-2008, 03:56 AM
the housing of friendly Montagnards who promptly penned their pigs in them and built new elevated thatched huts for themselves nearby... :wry:

We gotta admit the bicycle powered paddy irrigation water pump was a good idea, though. ;)

We're getting smarter (not). Like the US standards hospital in Mosul we designed and donated with a built in O2 distribution system. Which will be great when and if someone starts producing O2 locally in a volume that will be adequate to fill the tanks... :(

slapout9
11-02-2008, 04:33 AM
Interesting piece about how the Air Force would have used PGM's on the Ho Chi Trail IF they had been invented back then.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/saunders.html

William F. Owen
11-02-2008, 08:21 AM
SOG OP-35 did some good work, in that Recon Teams can did have "sensor-shooter" loops that were reactive to target in less than 15 mins.

The most effective method of interdiction seems to have been physically dug in troops with on call CAS. I think the last big "Road Block" was conduct in November 1970.

Contrary to popular belief, the NVA were reliant on trucks routes. That is what they put 90% of their effort into building and maintaining.

Mike in Hilo
11-03-2008, 06:36 AM
Wilf-- Sorely quotes Abrams, Weyand, CG Third regional Assistance Command Hollingsworth, and Kissinger as concluding that Lam Son 719 (aka the Laotian Incursion) of Feb '71 prevented the annual enemy dry season offensive that year, delaying it until 1972, when, Kissinger is quoted as noting, the enemy's main thrust was over the DMZ rather than farther south where their supply system had been disrupted by both the 1970 Cambodian incursion and LS 719.
Journalists, incidentally, were quick and seemingly unanimous in declaring the op a dismal failure....

Cheers,
Mike.

William F. Owen
11-03-2008, 07:40 AM
Wilf-- Sorely quotes Abrams, Weyand, CG Third regional Assistance Command Hollingsworth, and Kissinger as concluding that Lam Son 719 (aka the Laotian Incursion) of Feb '71 prevented the annual enemy dry season offensive that year, delaying it until 1972, when, Kissinger is quoted as noting, the enemy's main thrust was over the DMZ rather than farther south where their supply system had been disrupted by both the 1970 Cambodian incursion and LS 719.
Journalists, incidentally, were quick and seemingly unanimous in declaring the op a dismal failure....


Yes, I talked to Lewis Sorely about that. NVA were seriously worried by main force incursions.

However IIRC, 719 as headed for Tchepone, which was the junction of several major routes. Any damage done took months to repair. The Cambodia Operations really only hit base areas, and because of the very flat terrain, did minimal damage to the trail network. ... but yes, consistent main force incursions did more damage than anything else.

Steve Blair
11-03-2008, 02:24 PM
SOG OP-35 did some good work, in that Recon Teams can did have "sensor-shooter" loops that were reactive to target in less than 15 mins.

The most effective method of interdiction seems to have been physically dug in troops with on call CAS. I think the last big "Road Block" was conduct in November 1970.

Contrary to popular belief, the NVA were reliant on trucks routes. That is what they put 90% of their effort into building and maintaining.

True. The company-size ops tended to be very effective, although they did consume a great deal of airpower and SOG resources. It did show that it took eyes on the ground to evaluate targets, roadblocks to bottle up resources further up the trail (rendering it vulnerable to strikes), and sufficient resources to exploit what the ground force turned up.

Given the technology available at the time, I think this was the only viable interdiction option short of a major US incursion in the tri-border area to physically cut the trail.

Granite_State
11-03-2008, 11:30 PM
There was a good article in Foreign Affairs, sometime in the mid-Sixties, that demonstrated (by truck, sampan, bicycle, and elephant (!) load) how little the VC needed in terms of daily supplies. Wish I could be more specific, I had a photocopy but misplaced it I think. It was in the same issue as an article by Templer of Malaysia fame.

slapout9
11-04-2008, 12:04 AM
From 1978 Air University Review about C-130 gun ships and Ho Chi Interdiction.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1978/jan-feb/gilster.html

William F. Owen
11-04-2008, 05:56 AM
There was a good article in Foreign Affairs, sometime in the mid-Sixties, that demonstrated (by truck, sampan, bicycle, and elephant (!) load) how little the VC needed in terms of daily supplies. Wish I could be more specific, I had a photocopy but misplaced it I think. It was in the same issue as an article by Templer of Malaysia fame.

I'd be extremely interested to see that. My own research pretty comes down on the side that the NVA romanticised a good deal about "the trail." Without Soviet trucks, they would have been lost. Bicycles and porters could not effectively sustain the tonnage's of supplies needed, and whole NVA units, manning the trail frequently went hungry and were forced to grow their own food. There is also some evidence (from the Chinese) that the trail was massively inefficient, with as little of 30% of resources, that entered the Mu Gai pass, actually reaching combat units in the South.

davidbfpo
11-04-2008, 08:32 AM
Just tried the Foriegn Affairs website search function and it found two possible issues: July 1965 and April 1968.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search/search?Sort=Relevance&ArticleAuthor=&ArticleType=&Full+Text=templer

Tried the July 1965 issue and nothing appears to match Granite State's recollection: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1964/4.html

April 1968 seems a better match, as there are two articles 'Must We Invade the North?' by Roger Hilsman ( http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19680401faessay46301/roger-hilsman/must-we-invade-the-north.html ) and 'Squaring the Error' by Sir Robert Thompson (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19680401faessay46302/sir-robert-thompson/squaring-the-error.html ).

Hope this helps all those interested; note the articles are a summary and paid access is then the option - unless you are near a very good library.

davidbfpo

Granite_State
11-04-2008, 04:28 PM
Just tried the Foriegn Affairs website search function and it found two possible issues: July 1965 and April 1968.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search/search?Sort=Relevance&ArticleAuthor=&ArticleType=&Full+Text=templer

Tried the July 1965 issue and nothing appears to match Granite State's recollection: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1964/4.html

April 1968 seems a better match, as there are two articles 'Must We Invade the North?' by Roger Hilsman ( http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19680401faessay46301/roger-hilsman/must-we-invade-the-north.html ) and 'Squaring the Error' by Sir Robert Thompson (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19680401faessay46302/sir-robert-thompson/squaring-the-error.html ).

Hope this helps all those interested; note the articles are a summary and paid access is then the option - unless you are near a very good library.

davidbfpo

Thank you, almost positive April 1968 was the one, confused between Templer and Thompson. I think it was Hilsman's article then, he might have made the case that since interdicting supplies from the North was hopeless, the VC would always have a sanctuary and supplier in Hanoi. Will keep an eye out for my copy, but doesn't look like it survived the trip home across the Atlantic.

sapperfitz82
11-04-2008, 05:58 PM
Moyar's book does an excellent job covering the growth, total tonnage moved but what means, and the effect of this on the insurgency and later invasion by NVA.

It seems that the bombing did work quite well, but because Pres. Johnson only pursued it in fits and starts, the long term result was an negative.

Surprisingly, a great deal of supply was brought by sea until a co-ordinated campaign by the navy finally brought a halt to this. The reason the water routes were used is because the GSVN troops had severed the trail in the Central Highlands.

Well documented read on this particular issue.

Surferbeetle
11-29-2008, 03:24 AM
Ken,

With the benefit of hind sight would more MCO or COIN or some combo thereof have made a difference on the M side of DIME?

My 2009 Economist Pocket World in Figures tells me Vietnam's GDP per head is currently running at $720 and that 58% of the workforce is in Agriculture. 21.6% of its export trade is the US while 5.6% is with China.

Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam) says:


In 1986, it instituted economic and political reforms and began a path towards international reintegration. By 2000, it had established diplomatic relations with most nations. Its economic growth had been among the highest in the world in the past decade.

Nationmaster (http://www.nationmaster.com/country/vm-vietnam/eco-economy) has some interesting Vietnam statistics.

During OIF 1 it was my impression that if we had consistently and heavily focused upon the populace across the country within the first six months after the initial MCO we could have kept/flipped enough folks to have kept the lid on. The combination of summer heat, little or no electricity, mass 'downsizing' among the workforce, and deteriorating population security snuffed out that candle however and we all know the rest...

Regards,

Steve

Ken White
11-29-2008, 03:55 AM
With the benefit of hind sight would more MCO or COIN or some combo thereof have made a difference on the M side of DIME?However, all things considered and given the goal of an independent, democratic (western version) nation, probably neither would've made much difference in the long run -- the nationalistic strain was too powerful. All out MCO could've taken us to Hanoi in less than six months -- but the Eurocentric staff at MACV / USARV would not have known how to handle the resultant COIN effort and the South was not ready for it at the time. In any event, we went in with a 'limited objective' in mind and "all out" wasn't in the cards. Shades of I-rak, 40 years later... :(
During OIF 1 it was my impression that if we had consistently and heavily focused upon the populace across the country within the first six months after the initial MCO we could have kept/flipped enough folks to have kept the lid on. The combination of summer heat, little or no electricity, mass 'downsizing' among the workforce, and deteriorating population security snuffed out that candle however and we all know the rest...Agreed. Missteps by the 2/82 in April of '03 followed by the doofus decision to disband the Army and Police allied with a total lack of knowledge (and combat arms ego-centric disinclination to use CA) of what to do doomed us to what occurred. Replacing McKiernan with Sanchez was also abysmally stupid... :rolleyes:

Both wars were hobbled by very poor pre attack intel and an overweening sense of hubris at the WH that didn't pay enough attention to the intel that was available. Add to that Army egos which refused to listen to FAOs and others who knew the area and the people; Commanders who selected campaign goals that were flawed; and an overall inadequately trained Army...

All problems that could've and should've been avoided.

Surferbeetle
11-29-2008, 04:48 AM
Both wars were hobbled by very poor pre attack intel and an overweening sense of hubris at the WH that didn't pay enough attention to the intel that was available. Add to that Army egos which refused to listen to FAOs and others who knew the area and the people; Commanders who selected campaign goals that were flawed; and an overall inadequately trained Army...

All problems that could've and should've been avoided.

Ken,

Realistic training is more important than high dollar weapons systems; getting a consensus (as evidenced by sufficient resources) on what is realistic training however is always tough.

Keeping in mind that we do not have a habit of religiously following doctrine and instead we often seem to rely on adaption to existing ground conditions, there is an Oct 06 document that may still be floating around on CALL which covers an analysis of a battalion planning process. There are some points worth considering in there, despite the obvious influence of the MBA types :rolleyes: Here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/118-kuehl.pdf) is a first hand account which might be of help in the analysis of the worth/lack of worth of portions of that planning process.

As with most things cookie cutter solutions do not work everywhere and as you know even better than I, we are playing for all of the marbles everytime we step onto a battlefield, even with the benefit of that 'sure-fire plan'.

Regards,

Steve

Ken White
11-29-2008, 05:22 AM
Realistic training is more important than high dollar weapons systems; getting a consensus on what is realistic training however is always tough.I don't think realism in training is nearly as important as complete training -- realism is nice and makes a difference but when we leave out most of the basics because they're hard to train and don't produce good looking go rates or scores, all the realism in the world in what little is trained will not help much. We spend half the time on initial entry training, officer and enlisted of most western Armies and it shows...

There is consensus on what those basics are; we just tab a lot of them from the institution out to units where many things get forgotten or not done due to the alligators wandering about. The consequence is a group of marginally trained 2LTs and Troops and a lack of willingness to trust them on the part of Commanders plus a lack of trust of all subordinates due to that known training shortfall...
Keeping in mind that we do not have a habit of religiously following doctrine and instead we often seem to rely on adaption to existing ground conditions, there is an Oct 06 document that may still be floating around on CALL which covers an analysis of a battalion planning process. There may be some points worth considering in there, despite the obvious influence of the MBA types :rolleyes:The Battalion planning process is not a problem; that can be done by the Bn Cdr on the fly -- unless one is more concerned with form than function.
As with most things cookie cutter solutions do not work everywhere and as you know even better than I, we are playing for all of the marbles everytime we step onto a battlefield, even with the benefit of that 'sure-fire plan'.I read that when it was first posted. Agree with parts, disagree with parts. Planning is vastly over rated; one does not have time to do that bureaucratic foolishness in a war of movement. Emphasis on the process merely breeds bad habits that will hurt us later, mark my words.

You're correct on the cookie cutter not being adaptable to the US Army. Yet, we continually try to force mediocrity on everyone. It's frustrating.

We have to KNOW what to do -- and it isn't that hard. Fighting wars, as they say, is not Rocket Science. Trying to make it complicated to dazzle the uninitiated only befuddles things.

Sorry if this is abrupt; you hit a sore spot. We spend entirely too much time on processes and not enough on the product. We train better than we ever have in many respects but there are still some glaring shortfalls -- that get people killed. As does the concern for form over function, that and stupid turf battles.

Bill Moore
11-29-2008, 07:21 AM
Ken, "Hearts and Minds" and "Carrots and Sticks" are overly simplistic and often misunderstood and misapplied. Unfortunately "hearts and minds" is too often interpreted as some politically correct feel good crap, and carrots and sticks while understood almost always turns out to be nothing but carrots when put into practice. However, when the phrases are correctly understood they can be useful guidelines to developing your strategy.

Frequently strategists define the center of gravity as the will to fight, while I don't think it is that simple, I do think that is critically important. How do you influence their will their fight?

If we're the counterinsurgent, then winning hearts means convincing the populace that their interests are best served if we win. This requires a considerable amount of information engagement to clearly deliniate the differences between an insurgent and government victory to the target audience. They don't have to love us, but they need to understand an insurgent victory will be a less desirable outcome. Relating back to Jone's Populace Centric Engagement argument, if we can't convince them that this is the case, then we probably can't win without employing draconian measures.

Winnng minds means convincing the populace that we're going to win both the short and long term fight. The short term fight means we can protect them from insurgent coercion, and the long term fight means they know we're going to go the distance and do what it takes to win. If they think otherwise, then it would be to their benefit to support the insurgency since they will continue to live there regardless of who wins.

Written by Mike,
Love that last line, Ken.....Far away and long ago, lots of hamlets in various provinces where economic prosperity seemed almost incongruous (indicators include power tillers having replaced buffalo, proliferation of well-built, new stucco houses, etc. )--Yet they remained insecure to the GVN...VCI ran the hamlets, usually in tandem with the menacing effect of a nearby enemy base area. (one example, southern panhandle of my first province, Tay Ninh, with NVA base area across the border in Svay Rieng)...

We failed to protect the populace, you can't win their hearts our minds unless we do. This is my biggest beef with our Civil Affairs folks, they do great work, and their projects make excellent Kodak Picture moments with smiling kids standing around the new school, etc., but it doesn't mean anything if we don't continue to exert continued presence in that area to ensure that the populace is protected and that they answer to State Law, not insurgent law.

This involves tough love, aggressive tactics, and higher risk operations (more exposure to attack).


Actually, in Malaya the British -- correctly -- first went after the CTs and removed their ability to terrorize minds; then they terrorized the Malays and the Chinese civilians not playing CT by virtually eliminating Civil Rights and moving the majority of them into 'New Villages.' There was no winning of hearts and the minds involved were coerced, not coaxed.

I don't think they terrorized the Malays, but they did control them so they could eliminate the threat. War is tough, I think the measures that were taken were effective and I think they are in line with the hearts and minds concept. That approach won't work in most countries, the tactics you use to control the populace must be based on local factors.


""People will act in their perceived self interest and they will follow their heart -- but they will not let you win that heart. Nor do you need to...""

We have to find what their self interests are and show how a government victory is better aligns with those interests than an insurgent victory. If you don't do that you may have to do a lot more killing, which in the information age is not generally a feasible course of action.

Surferbeetle
11-29-2008, 04:30 PM
We failed to protect the populace, you can't win their hearts our minds unless we do. This is my biggest beef with our Civil Affairs folks, they do great work, and their projects make excellent Kodak Picture moments with smiling kids standing around the new school, etc., but it doesn't mean anything if we don't continue to exert continued presence in that area to ensure that the populace is protected and that they answer to State Law, not insurgent law.

Bill,

What the American taxpayer is looking for is a low cost solution to his problem in country X, or even better yet no problem in country X. SOF are there to see if they can prevent or resolve problems by working with the local culture to provide an acceptable and long term solution.

Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services when provided by local people provide long term solutions. If we are taking the lead on population security or building new schools, providing government services, etc. then the solutions that we are providing are not reaching the 'hearts and minds' that we are aiming at, nor are they long term (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuart_Bowen). Nobody likes charity. What people are looking for is a partner to commiserate with, perhaps teach them a few things, and to help them out of a bind.

Admiral Olson gave an interesting talk at the CNAS (http://www.cnas.org/files/multimedia/documents/AdmOlson_CNAS_Transcript.pdf) which spoke to the importance of the ability of being able to provide both direct and indirect solutions. He is able to address this concept better than I can.

Steve

Ken White
11-29-2008, 04:31 PM
I don't think we're in much disagreement at all. My comments to which you refer were made four weeks ago but I haven't changed my mind on any of them and I don't think any -- other than a semantic quibble about 'hearts' :wry: -- dispute what you say. :confused:

Bill Moore
11-29-2008, 04:54 PM
Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services when provided by local people provide long term solutions.

This is granted, but there are two concerns here.

1. When we're in the lead, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan (armed nation building vice COIN), then we are the ones who have to initiate and execute the strategy. The first goal is to gain some semblance of stability, then transition to a HN lead. That takes time, sometimes a lot of time......

2. When we're truly conducting FID by providing assistance to the HN, and the HN is in the lead the "hearts and minds" concepts still apply (even more so), and we as advisors must push, nudge, cajole, our partners to pursue an appropriate strategy that takes these concepts into consideration.

The idea applies to whoever the counterinsurgent is (HN preferably, or in rare cases us).

Ken, I misunderstood your comments.

Ken White
11-29-2008, 05:15 PM
Ken, I misunderstood your comments.Thus my ""then they terrorized the Malays and the Chinese civilians not playing CT"" use of the word 'terrorized' with tongue in cheek [ ;^) ] should have had that tongue in cheek symbol to show it was intentional overstatement; your use of 'control' is correct, of course.

My wife keeps telling me to stop trying to be a comedian... :wry:

Bill Moore
11-29-2008, 06:30 PM
My wife tells me I have no sense of humor, so I probably missed your point, though I usually enjoy and catch on to dark humor :D

bourbon
03-16-2009, 06:22 PM
Vietnam Histories (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam.asp)

This release consists of six declassified histories volumes and describes the CIA's role in Indochina during the Vietnam War. These histories written by Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., are based on extensive research in CIA records and on oral history interviews of participants. The release totals some 1,600 pages and represents the largest amount of Vietnam-era CIA documents yet declassified.
Document List

CIA and the Generals (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/1_CIA_AND_THE_GENERALS.pdf) (13.2 MB PDF)
Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam

CIA and the House of Ngo (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/2_CIA_AND_THE_HOUSE_OF_NGO.pdf) (13.1 MB PDF)
Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954-63

CIA and Rural Pacification (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/3_CIA_AND_RURAL_PACIFICATION.pdf) (71.3 MB PDF)

Good Questions, Wrong Answers (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/4_GOOD_QUESTIONS_WRONG_ANSWERS.pdf) (2.7 MB PDF)
CIA's Estimates of Arms Traffic through Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the Vietnam War.

The Way We Do Things (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/5_THE_WAY_WE_DO_THINGS.pdf)(7.1 MB PDF)
Black Entry Operations into Northern Vietnam

Undercover Armies (http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/6_UNDERCOVER_ARMIES.pdf)(29.2 MB PDF)
CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos

jmm99
03-16-2009, 08:13 PM
for those interested in Vietnam. The only "but" is that the DL is over 130 MB - so broadband is needed. My plan is to burn a CD here and take it home where I am limited to dial-up. Will be interesting to compare these with the Pentagon Papers.

Steve Blair
03-17-2009, 04:57 PM
Looks interesting. I haven't looked through all of them yet, but there have been the usual "excisions" in sections of the text. These range from single words to entire paragraphs.

Mike in Hilo
03-19-2009, 01:56 AM
Thanks for posting. So far, I was able to peruse the piece on Pacification. To be sure, this was an interesting read for me.....although, frankly, I found it unimpressive insofaras I didn't learn any new information or see conclusions that deviated from the arguably superficial ones offered by popular journalism.
Anyway, I would be hard put to consider any CIA document on pacification that relegated the enemy's Shadow Supply System to one line anything but a disappointment. (Perhaps this topic, which was highly sensitive at the time, remains classified. In fact, this assumption has constrained me from offering more than similar, minimalist one-liners about this successful enemy enterprise that helped to convince me that Phoenix was more of a failure than a success. ...Those in present company with the necessary clearances who are interested might try key words Shadow Supply System MR-III, 1970-73. )

Edit: A bit more, although still terse, on the Shadow Supply System on page 111 of the piece on CIA and the Generals, which I have begun reading.

Cheers,
Mike.

jmm99
03-19-2009, 03:52 AM
Lots of scanned documents (unclassified) are out there.

E.g., MACV Command History 1972-1973, whose Table of Contents is here (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/107/1070703001a.pdf). Brief discussion of "shadow supply system" starts at A-41, p.18 of .pdf, in this part (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/107/1070703001e.pdf) of the MACV history.

Explanation of Texas Tech Vietnam Center and Archive is here (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/).

For a different slant on the "VC villagers" - and a couple of articles on "in country logistics" and "import-export", see an article collection by Jacques Leslie (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/articles.htm), which has a number of articles from the 1972-1973 period:


"Communist Cadres (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/communist.html) Use Nightly Persuasion: Told to Hamper Truce, Viet Villagers Say"
November 21, 1972. [JMM footnote *]

«The following stories from Vietnam won A Sigma Delta Chi Distinguished Service Award, an Overseas Press Club citation, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination for foreign correspondence.»

"'We Are Friends (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/friends.html),' Viet Cong Tell Visiting U.S. Newsman"
February 1, 1973.
An account of the first visit by an American correspondent into Viet Cong territory in South Vietnam.

"Binh Phu (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/binhphu.html): A Lesson in How Viet Cong Village Operates"
February 2, 1973.
Analysis based on my trip to Viet Cong territory.

"In Viet Cong Country (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/vietcong.html), Villagers Are the Key"
February 4, 1973.
More reflections on the Viet Cong visit.
.....
"U.S. Advisers (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/us.html) Tell of Viet Corruption"
April 23, 1973.
This story and the next two were based on documents surreptitiously taken out of the United States embassy in Saigon.

"Both Sides (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/bothsides.html) Found Committing Major Viet Truce Violations: Although White House Depicts Reds as Main Transgressor, U.S. Embassy Documents Present Far Less Clear-Cut View"
May 26, 1973

"Troop Corruption (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/troop.html) Seen Alienating S. Viet Populace"
May 27, 1973. [JMM: brief mention of "shadow supply"]

"Vietnam Generals (http://www.jacquesleslie.com/vietnam.html) Suspected in Brass Smuggling Scandal"
June 20, 1973.
I became curious when I read that the Japanese manager of Mitsubishi's Saigon branch had been imprisoned without explanation. This story was the main factor in my expulsion from South Vietnam a month after it appeared.

--------------------

from last paragraph of this article:


The informants said that when villagers asked why there was no cease-fire Oct. 31, cadres told them, “The deceitful Americans have tried to delay the agreement, but they cannot betray the peace-loving people of the United States and Vietnam. This plot of the American leaders will be crushed soon, because if there is no cease-fire, we will go on fighting, and 17 million people in South Vietnam cannot defeat 19 million in North Vietnam and 800 million in China.”

The view of this VC guy is well kept in mind in assessing the line-up in this armed conflict.

Mike in Hilo
03-19-2009, 04:22 AM
Appreciate the links--Thanks,


Regarding "the line-up in this armed conflict," one might add that the cadre did not need to point out the obvious, which was that in Oct 72, the top player, the US military, had all but departed, and total abandonment was widely anticipated.

Cheers,
Mike.

jmm99
03-19-2009, 05:49 AM
at Texas Tech (declass. 19 May 1983) - 9 pages - Shadow Supply System (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?ic3HOBLEnTTjjpzWdZEZorqmuHrPURmLs23N o30m@K6y6LwB4CaBQjHNVYMS.7TmnOWI2ftkbllkzyuOBKDsBa .rbARm0UMXQyQooAIYmM4/2301509001.pdf).

And, another piece (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?DMw.cV15X0bLbuM3BNhXMh@V13h5y0qpWXH8 FnWEri83jV8NrpuYnZN0rSmeq1r38fpmfpVezovk4brsqI1CTt KaOLfhlYVu.0pMHlFlcus/2131803123.pdf) from another journalist in 1971.

NIE 53/14.3-73 Estimate of Vietnam Short-Term Prospects (http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?HE5GrGexnuf.e0aRpcot3liABXpb@NakKSc1 J0YnfH5Lojg3h0Z08Gm9oc@Ssq3xIqPCY59QknsNvTZQ4ySHdi ieRoh9XhuGVAlRmRjs9To/2122802001.pdf), October, 1973 (20 pages) (FOIA declss.) - accurate prediction of NVA offensive in 1974-1975 (page 20).

Another dozen or so hits turn up for "shadow supply" in TTU Archives.

----------------------------------------

E.g., Lenin's "All in a Week's Work" in SE Asian terms. We will rob the capitalist's bank on Mon. He will collect from his insurance company on Tues. We will use the bank money to buy arms from the capitalist on Weds. We will have our revolution on Thurs. We will take the capitalist's money on Fri. We will execute the capitalist on Sat. We will rest on Sun.

If you search for this among Lenin's works, you won't find it - cuz I just authored it. :) He did say something similar, but where I forget.

jmm99
03-19-2009, 08:25 PM
Among the many papers at CSI, Harold Ford's "Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/vietnam.html)" is a must read - no doubt, it will generate some opinions contrary to his.

His background on things Indochinese was long. His thesis is summed as follows:


Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam
Unpopular Pessimism
Harold P. Ford (1)

(1) Editor's Note: The author of this study drafted his first National Intelligence Estimate on Indochina in 1952, and subsequently had Vietnam-related duties as staff chief of CIA's Office of National Estimates and as a CIA representative to certain interagency working bodies. Since retiring from CIA in 1986, when he was Acting Chairman of CIA's National Intelligence Council, he has prepared classified studies on Vietnam for CIA's History Staff.
.....
Areas of Doubt

These, then, were the principal areas of doubt that for years lay behind so many CIA analyses of the outlook in Vietnam. Except for those occasions where Agency officers produced flawed accounts or rosied up their judgments to meet pressures from above, the areas of doubt translated into the following fairly stark messages to successive policymakers:

1. Do not underestimate the enemy's strength, ruthlessness, nationalist appeal, and pervasive undercover assets throughout South Vietnam.

2. Do not underestimate the enemy's resilience and staying power. He is in for the long run and is confident that US morale will give way before his will. He will keep coming despite huge casualties. If we escalate, he will too.

3. Do not overestimate the degree to which airpower will disrupt North Vietnam's support of the VC or will cause Hanoi to back off from such support.

4. Do not overestimate the military and political potential of our South Vietnamese ally/creation.

5. The war is essentially a political war that cannot be won by military means alone. It will have to be won largely by the South Vietnamese in the villages of South Vietnam.

6. The war is essentially a civil war, run from Hanoi, not a Communist bloc plot to test the will of America to support its allies.

7. Winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese is a tough task. Most Vietnamese simply want to be left alone, and most do not identify with Saigon. And many are either too attracted to the VC or too afraid to volunteer much information about the VC presence in their midst.

Ford outlines one of several fundamental dichotomies in 1963-1964 between the CIA analytic view and the policy makers - the domino theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domino_theory).

As to the policy makers, he sums their view:


[NSC Action Memorandum 288, 17 March 1964]: We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. . . . Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance . . . accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective US and anti-Communist influence . . . or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so . . . . Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India on the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.(33)

(33) As quoted in The Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam/New York Times, ed., 1971), pp. 283, 285. That portion of NSC 288 repeated, verbatim, a text which Secretary of Defense McNamara had written the day before. McNamara, Memorandum to the President, 16 March 1964. FRUS, 1964-68, Vietnam, Vol. I, p. 154.

On the other hand, the CIA analysts had this to say:


[ONE Memorandum for the Director, June 1964]: We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would be followed by the rapid, successive communization of the other states of the Far East. . . . With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time--time in which the total situation might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause. . . . [Moreover] the extent to which individual countries would move away from the US towards the Communists would be significantly affected by the substance and manner of US policy in the area following the loss of Laos and South Vietnam.(34)

(34) As quoted in FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. I, p. 485.

My own perception is that the NSC view was too pessimisic - and the ONE view too optimistic - for the timeframe of 1963-1964. After a passage of four years to 1967-1968, events had modified the picture for SE Asia as a whole:

1. The Sino-Soviet split (which Ford discusses)

2. The sea change in Indonesia from 1965 caused by the abortive Com revolt and subsequent eradication of the party apparatus there (which Ford does not discuss).

3. Confirmation of stabilization (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN) in Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines (also not discussed by Ford).

So, by 1967-1968, in the view of some, South Vietnam had become expendible - measured in the larger context of SE Asia. What received the larger media and scholarly attention, however, was the "anti-war" reaction in 1968-1969 and thereafter. All of that is beyond the intended scope of Ford's brief article.

To the extent that Vietnam is suggested as a template (usually in the negative sense) for present-day efforts at counter-insurgency, one must recognize that Vietnam was very complex, not only internally, but also with respect to regional geopolitics. My perception is that it is not a very good template (positive or negative) for anything other than itself. Others differ.

jmm99
03-28-2009, 02:26 AM
An Assessment (and short history) of the RD/Pacification Program, 5 Jun 1967, is here (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/docrepository/AssessmentRev.pdf).

The GVN also published its own reports on RD/Pacification. A large collection is found here (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/) (along with some other scanned docs).

For example, Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, author of "The Cambodian Incursion", Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979, earlier (1977) wrote "Pacification", which can be downloaded in its entirety here (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm).


Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (1977)
1 Introduction (443 KB pdf)
2 Pacification Strategy and Objectives (761 KB pdf)
3 Operation and Support (1086 KB pdf)
4 RVN-US Cooperation and Coordination in Pacification (441 KB pdf)
5 Pacification Techniques and Operations (661 KB pdf)
6 Social Reform and Economic Development (711 KB pdf)
7 The GVN Political, Information and Chieu Hoi Efforts (849 KB pdf)
8 An Assessment of Pacification: Some Achievements, Difficulties, and Shortcomings (740 KB pdf)
9 Observations and Conclusions (427 KB pdf)
Appendices (727 KB pdf)
Decree ¡V Military Organization of the National Territory
Decree ¡V Reorganization of Village and Hamlet Administration

Download entire document (7 MB pdf right mouse click)

A sample chapter (ch 8) is here (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran8.pdf).

Sigaba
07-29-2009, 06:16 AM
With this sort of clear-eyed history, how could Moyar have failed to gain tenure?
IMO, what has failed Moyar thus far is his approach to historiography and his professionalism in general.

Above all else, he wants to be right and everyone who disagrees with him to know that they are wrong. One is not going to succeed with that type of approach in a profession dominated by academics who came of age protesting that war. (Especially when one is reliant upon another person's foreign language skills.)

PeterJensen
09-13-2009, 03:49 PM
At the home page of the U.S. Department of State is it possible to browse through the Foreign Relations of the United States series and find plenty of documents from the administration of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon concerning the war in Vietnam.

You can visit the Foreign Relations of the United States at:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/index.htm

A real gold mine for people with historical interests:)

pjmunson
09-13-2009, 10:44 PM
See the National Security Archives at GWU for a treasure trove of declassified documents on Vietnam and other issues. Some of these are original top secret memos declassified and scanned in as PDFs. Great stuff. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

Old Eagle
09-13-2009, 11:10 PM
I'll send a link on Mon

PeterJensen
09-14-2009, 03:08 PM
Well, I'm amazed! Thank you for the link. A very interesting collection of documents at the National Security Archives. Do you know other on-line collections of documents concerning counterinsurgency in American history in the 20'th century?
Thanks in advance.

Steve Blair
09-14-2009, 03:16 PM
Texas Tech's collection is certainly first-rate. You can also find after-action reports and the like scattered throughout this collection (http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/results.php?CISORESTMP=/cdm4/results.php&CISOVIEWTMP=/cdm4/item_viewer.php&CISOMODE=grid&CISOGRID=thumbnail,A,1;title,A,1;author,A,1;abstra ,A,1;none,A,0;20;title,author,date,none,none&CISOBIB=collec,A,1,N;title,A,0,N;author,200,0,N;no ne,A,0,N;none,A,0,N;20;collec,none,none,none,none&CISOTHUMB=20%20%284x5%29;collec,none,none,none,non e&CISOTITLE=20;collec,none,none,none,none&CISOHIERA=20;title,collec,none,none,none&CISOTYPE=browse&CISOROOT=/p4013coll11).

PeterJensen
09-14-2009, 05:42 PM
Thanks :-)

Old Eagle
09-14-2009, 06:46 PM
faster through Google, but here's the link I promised

http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/

PeterJensen
09-24-2009, 06:33 PM
Has anybody heard of the new book "A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq" by Mark Moyar? And does anyone know which approaches Moyar uses in his new book? And how he regards counterinsurgency through the period?

Thanks in advance.

Sigaba
09-24-2009, 10:30 PM
Has anybody heard of the new book "A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq" by Mark Moyar? And does anyone know which approaches Moyar uses in his new book? And how he regards counterinsurgency through the period?

Thanks in advance.
Peter--

FWIW, Yale University Press has a page for the book available here (http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/reviews.asp?isbn=9780300152760). From the blurbs, one may gain a sense of Moyar's trajectory of inquiry. YMMV.

PeterJensen
09-25-2009, 02:16 PM
Thanks Sigaba :)
I have read the blurbs and know from other references, that he focuses on leaderhip and character, but does anyone know more about Moyar's approaches in his new book?

MattC86
09-25-2009, 03:13 PM
My boss has an advance copy, I've been bugging him about it for days, but he despises Moyar, and hasn't really looked at it.

Will offer some insights ASAP.

Matt

PeterJensen
09-25-2009, 04:43 PM
MattC86: Thanks mate.

I have made a pre-order of the book on Amazon UK, but it is first realeased on the 27th of November. It would be very convenient to know other readers opinion of his new book.

MattC86
09-25-2009, 05:50 PM
Got it. . .will post some thoughts this weekend.

Judging from a quick skim-through, I would say save your money, but that's a very first impression. . .

Matt

John Grenier
06-14-2010, 01:57 AM
Has taken a lot of heat from the community of professional historians. It is a fine revision in that no one can rightly say that the US won the VN War (58K KIA, God only knows how many WIA, 1M+ VN dead, our economy thrown in the toilet, and our ability to contain communism--the stated aim of the war) so Moyar decided to write that we should have won the war. Well, I should have done a lot of things in life, but I didn't. Very few historians are taking this book seriously and have identified Moyar as a player in the Culture Wars. I recommend Andy Wiest's excellent book if you wanted to understanding the thinking of historians about the VN War. BTW, how do you write a book on how we should have won the VN War without reading a single Vietnamese source? We should have won the war, perhaps. But didn't the Vietnamese (NVA, ARVN, NLF, VC, etc) also get a vote?

Sigaba
07-01-2010, 07:39 PM
Very few historians are taking this book seriously and have identified Moyar as a player in the Culture Wars.FWIW, on the other side of the coin, John Prados's Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (2009) has drawn criticism for its presentism and political biases.

As the saying goes, the comprehensive, definitive history of the Vietnam War remains to be written.

TX Grayman
09-08-2010, 04:26 PM
'Victory has a thousand fathers and Defeat is an orphan.' As a Vietnam War infantry soldier I subscribe to the critiques of U.S. Army Infantry combat operations in Vietnam by LTC Anthoney Herbert and COL David Hackworth.

Dayuhan
09-09-2010, 09:51 AM
If...If...If...If !!!

If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....

If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....

If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....

But most of all...

If the Marxist-sympathizing and Democratically-controlled Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....


Here's an even bigger if... what about IF we'd actually listened to these rather prescient conclusions from 1951 (cited by jmm on another thread):


In October 1951, the student conclusions to their study of US policy in Southeast Asia were presented to the college. Although opinions were somewhat divided, a large majority opposed any major US involvement. The conclusions of the majority could be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially, Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the US forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia, the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Strait of Malacca and populous, richly endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily, the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for US forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military agression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographic conformation combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically, the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvatages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel ["-iel", not "-ial"] military aid.

"US Policy in Southeast Asia". Reports of Student Committees #13-17 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 1951), cited in Bruce Palmer Jr, The 25-Year War (1984) - with HT to Ken White for suggesting this book.


The bold portions are added by me, emphasis probably unnecessary. At least somebody was looking at the situation clearly. Pity nobody listened.

Tukhachevskii
09-09-2010, 10:48 AM
There a chapter in Cold War Hot (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Cold-War-Hot-Alternative-Decisions/dp/185367530X) which basically applies Westmoreland's "plan" and posits a US victory. There's also an alternative COIN plan based upon Thompson's recommendations that leads to a US victory.

Dayuhan
09-09-2010, 12:40 PM
There a chapter in Cold War Hot (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Cold-War-Hot-Alternative-Decisions/dp/185367530X) which basically applies Westmoreland's "plan" and posits a US victory. There's also an alternative COIN plan based upon Thompson's recommendations that leads to a US victory.

The realm of the hypothetical is a marvelously flexible place.

Ken White
09-09-2010, 02:30 PM
Alternative history leads to really dangerous fantasies... :mad:

Steve Blair
09-09-2010, 03:41 PM
As does cherry-picking historical analysis to find one opinion that you happen to agree with.... Especially these days, when every two-bit joker with a blogspot account is suddenly considered an expert...:wry:

jmm99
09-09-2010, 04:41 PM
of Vietnam (about a decade after the fact) is found in his forward to Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge (http://www.amazon.com/Distant-Challenge-U-s-Infantryman-Vietnam/dp/0898390710):


A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)

Foreward

Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.

Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.

William C. Westmoreland
April 1983

Leaving aside the rhetoric, GEN Westmoreland came to see Southeast Asia (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) as the prize, which Vietnam helped to preserve from communism.

PS: We won the Southeast Asian War Games.

Regards

Mike

tequila
09-09-2010, 05:06 PM
So Mark Moyar's argument that the war in Vietnam kept Indonesia non-Communist (incidentally causing the deaths of nearly a million people in Indonesia) was originally a Westy canard? Good to see he was still trotting out the domino theory even in the 1980s.

jmm99
09-09-2010, 06:33 PM
Canard = An unfounded or false, deliberately misleading fabrication, a false report, rumour or hoax.

What specific language in Westmoreland's 1983 piece is a canard ?

What variant of the "domino theory" do you assert that Westmoreland was following in 1983 ?

His description of SE Asian geopolitics appears to be more like such:

1252

Should we call this the "almost domino theory" ?

Ken White
09-09-2010, 07:05 PM
So Mark Moyar's argument that the war in Vietnam kept Indonesia non-Communist (incidentally causing the deaths of nearly a million people in Indonesia) was originally a Westy canard? Good to see he was still trotting out the domino theory even in the 1980s.It reads:

"It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world. Bold emphasis in original, underline added by me / kw)"

Agree with JMM -- no canard there. If you choose to think '"...events in Indochina..." refer solely to the Viet Nam war, your prerogative. Throwing out the Russians was due to the USSR attempting to muscularly support the PKI to the exclusion of Sukarno who disagreed with that idea. The PKI and the Confrontation were more significant catalysts to the 1965 coup regardless of Westmoreland's statement -- which may or may not be what he really thought. Those two items and Suharto's desire for power mean Viet Nam was really only a peripheral event.

PeterJensen
10-12-2010, 05:34 PM
There is plenty of literature about the Vietnam War.
Despite that, can any of you readers of SWJ recommend works (books, articles, etc) concerning the Vietnam War historiography with a specifically focus on COIN and how the American decision makers viewed and applied between COIN versus conventional warfare during the conflict?
I am very interested in the different positions in the historiography.
Thanks in advance.

Steve Blair
10-12-2010, 05:53 PM
This is actually something of a "bone of contention" among historians at the moment. One of the more balanced treatments, even though it is older, is Palmer's The 25 Year War (http://www.amazon.com/25-Year-War-Americas-Military-Vietnam/dp/0813190363/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286905747&sr=1-1). Nagl's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" is interesting mainly for the way it examines how the Army learned (or failed to learn) from Vietnam. It is NOT a history of the Vietnam War, but rather an examination of organizational learning. Krepinevich and "The Army in Vietnam" takes an opposing view, seeing the war as mostly a COIN-type effort that was ignored by Big Army.

My advice? Start with Palmer and then work your way around.

jmm99
10-12-2010, 07:32 PM
somewhat akin to the 1000 lawyers in chains sinking to the ocean floor. :)

Palmer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Palmer,_Jr.)'s book is, however, written from a high level, starting at an O-5 & O-6 level in the early 1950's when he was at the Army War College (with an excellent analysis then made by him and others re: the Indochina War and the relative unimportance of Indochina in the larger US-scheme of things). It mostly deals with the O-7 through O-10 levels.

Here are four SWC threads with links to a number of resources.

Resources on the French defeat in Indochina? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9297)

CIA Vietnam Histories (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6843)

CORDS / Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=695)

McCuen: a "missing" thread ? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10908)

This stuff may or may not help - it depends on what you are looking for.

Cheers

Mike

davidbfpo
10-12-2010, 08:30 PM
My Vietnam book collection is limited, but I do commend two books: 'Victory At Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's General Vo Nguyen Giap' by Cecil Currey (Pub. in the UK 1997) and a much older 'America in Vietnam' by Guenter Lewy (Pub. in the USA 1978).

Steve Blair
10-12-2010, 08:44 PM
Lewy is decent, but also relies heavily on a legalistic view of the war. He's also considered one of the "old" generation of commentators on the war, and thus thought suspect by newer authors.

If you're looking for a battlefield view, Kieth Nolan is really hard to beat. He spends almost no attention on COIN considerations, though. Bergerud (http://www.amazon.com/Dynamics-Defeat-Vietnam-Nghia-Province/dp/0813318742/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286915947&sr=1-4)does, but his analysis gets thin when he tries to extend observations from one province to all of South Vietnam. Moyar and Prados are both quite political (although on opposite ends of the spectrum), and it's worth keeping that in mind when you look at their books.

jmm99
10-12-2010, 10:54 PM
on the "village wars": Bing West, The Village (http://www.amazon.com/Village-Bing-West/dp/0743457579/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286922065&sr=1-2) and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (http://www.amazon.com/War-Comes-Long-Revolutionary-Vietnamese/dp/0520260171/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286922337&sr=1-1).

I'd echo Steve re: take all with a grain of salt - and check the foornotes and original sources.

For another (slightly lower-in-grade) Palmer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Richard_Palmer)'s view, Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective (http://www.amazon.com/Summons-Trumpet-U-S-Vietnam-Dave-Palmer/dp/0891415505/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1286922533&sr=1-1).

Tim Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/People%C3%A2%C2%80%C2%99s-War-Rule-Insurgency-Intervention/dp/0807845779/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286922993&sr=1-2), interests me because of his ideas - again, not a "bible".

Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/Phoenix-Birds-Prey-Counterinsurgency-Counterterrorism/dp/0803216025/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286923181&sr=1-3), gives a decent overview of CORDS-Phoenix and other aspects of Vietnamese Pacification.

Make sure you take a look at Tran Dihn Tho, Pacification (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm) (freebie), for the South Vietnamese viewpoint.

A wealth of RAND publications from the 1960 are freebies on line. Online and offline North Vietnames articles and books are in Ed Moise, Vietnam War Bibliography: Writings by and about Important Communist Leaders (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/commlead.html). His Vietnam War Bibliography (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/bibliography.html) is much larger - mucho original doc refs in one place.

Cheers

Mike

jmm99
10-13-2010, 03:59 AM
Large collections (many online links) in two areas that seem to fit your subject matter request:

Vietnam War Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Counterinsurgency (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/limited.html)

Vietnam War Bibliography: In the Villages: Pacification (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/villages.html)

Cheers

Mike

Dayuhan
10-13-2010, 04:29 AM
I'd recommend Why Viet Nam: Prelude to America's Albatross by Archimedes L.A. Patti. Patti headed the OSS operations in the area in the later stages of WW2 and was among the first Americans on the scene in the aftermath. Fascinating day-by-day account of a critical and largely overlooked period in the story.

Much like the Americans on the scene in China who reported that Chiang was finished and Mao was going to win, Patti - whose opinion was that the French were toast and Ho Chi Minh was ultimately going to be the ascendant factor in the country - was widely reviled as anything from a pinko commie to a naive young man who fell under the spell of Ho. While the book was certainly written with some hindsight, it doesn't really make him sound like either.

davidbfpo
10-13-2010, 06:15 AM
If we are going back to pre-US involvement, The First Vietnam War by Peter Dunn, is the best book I have read (Pub. 1985). That weird period after the Japanese surrender in and around Saigon, as the British Empire intervened before the French colonial rule returned.

Granite_State
10-16-2010, 10:22 PM
What are opinions on Lewis Sorley's book? I liked it and his conclusions made sense, but I'm not an expert on Vietnam by any means.

BillV
10-17-2010, 04:08 AM
A good start for your study would be Bernard Fall's excellent books :

Street Without Joy
Hell In A Very Small Place

Backwards Observer
10-17-2010, 06:23 AM
Our Own Worst Enemy by William J. Lederer was pretty good.

Our Own Worst Enemy - Amazon link (http://www.amazon.com/Our-Worst-Enemy-William-Lederer/dp/0393053571)

William Lederer - Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Lederer)

Sigaba
11-04-2010, 04:39 AM
There is plenty of literature about the Vietnam War.
Despite that, can any of you readers of SWJ recommend works (books, articles, etc) concerning the Vietnam War historiography with a specifically focus on COIN and how the American decision makers viewed and applied between COIN versus conventional warfare during the conflict?
I am very interested in the different positions in the historiography.
Thanks in advance.I recommend the following:

Robert A. Divine, "Revisionism in Reverse," Reviews in American History, 7:3 (September, 1979): 433-438.

Robert A. Divine, "Vietnam Reconsidered," Diplomatic History, 12:1 (January 1998): 79-93.

Gary R. Hess, "The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War," Diplomatic History, 18:2 (April 1994): 239–264.

outletclock
11-04-2010, 04:07 PM
Andrew J. Birtle. "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal." The Journal of Military History 72.4 (2008): 1213-1247.

might be of use.

It probably should be read in the context of Lewis Sorley's "A Better War," since IIRC it tends to quarrel with some its (Sorley's) claims.

OC

tequila
11-04-2010, 08:17 PM
The Birtle article was the subject of a Gian Gentile article and some SWJ posts here:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/birtle-on-provn/#c005780

Agreed that it was a thought-provoking article by an excellent scholar.

Also, Phil Ridderhof contributed this (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/iii-maf-pacification-in-vietna/)to SWJ about DoD's critical assessment of III MAF Pacification efforts (the CAP program) in the same vein.

Mike in Hilo
11-06-2010, 01:26 AM
1) For the war between ARVN and PAVN after US disengagement, you might wish to see Col William Le Gro's Cease Fire to Capitulation..Col Le Gro ran intel at the Office of the Defense Attache, Saigon, 1973-5..The entire work is available on-line.

2) Take a look at David "RAND" Elliiott's pentateuchal (in size, not sanctity) work on the war and social change in the Mekong Delta, exerpts of which appear on-line from time to time...It offers many useful insights (among which, the shocked realization of the study's veteran communist protagonist that by liberation --1975, the majority of the populace even in seminally revolutionary Dinh Tuong Province, had been successfully seduced by US-induced modernization and no longer supported the Revolution.....)

3) Bergerud is important for a feel of the situation on the ground in one province, but I concur precisely in Blair's cautionary admonition. Also several of his conclusions are non-sequiters but the narrative is probably an essential read... Don't know what prior experience you bring, Mr. Jensen, but as you can see, if you are coming to the project with tabla rasa, it can be difficult to discriminate amongst the many opinions voiced.

4) Re: Granite State on Sorely: I'd recommend this book because so few others cover the final years. The author sees near defeat of the enemy by 1970. I concur strongly, as would most of my old adviser colleagues, particularly those who experienced both the before and after phases. But ascribing the near win to a dramatic shift from enemy-centrism to territorial security overstates the case, IMO. (....since I have come to the conclusion that at least during my tenure (1971-5), the enemy center of gravity within RVN reposed in the PAVN units in the in-country base areas....Significantly, during the unilateral US withdrawal period ('71-Jan '73), remaining USARV units in MR-III were targeted against those units in those sanctuaries.)...This is not to denigrate the critical nature of territorial security--or the 100% male mobilization after Tet, which enabled effective raising of territorial forces and turned virtually every rural family into RVNAF dependents.

5) Finally, if I had only one book to recommend, it would be a work of history--Government and Revolution in Viet Nam, by Dennis Duncanson, OBE. Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. The author served with his longtime colleague Sir Robert Thompson on BRIAM (British Advisory Mission to VN) through the early '60's; the perspective is that of a COIN practitioner...Thompson recognized Duncanson as the team's preeminent historian and VN expert. The depth of scholarship is impressive, as is his uncommon grasp of the nuances of Vietnamese society. The book's fault is it ends in 1967.

Cheers,
Mike.

Pete
03-14-2011, 09:14 PM
The other day a thread touched upon the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968. On the Tom Ricks blog I stumbled upon this link (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/1683/168300010762.pdf) to MACV's unclassified report of significant events in February 1968. It's interesting reading.

Sasquatch
06-18-2011, 03:48 PM
So, is there one? And what should be on it?

Not for the SAMS students (Althougth their input is welcome), but what should the recomended reading list for the average company grade officer and NCO contain? I'm sure this issue has been covered before, but evergreens are everpresent for a reason.

Background: Twice recently I have witnessed people (OK, guys) asking about specific Vietnam Wars books at my local public library; They were both asking about widely distributed works of literary merit. Needless to say, my local public library does not own either one.... (OK, I have issues with them).

So, what ten books (Fiction/Non Fiction) are most useful to understanding Vietnam in the context of American History? Let's go for a maximum of four Fiction and the rest non fiction.

And ten books is optimistic; then you have to select five that will engage the average buck seargeant....

Brad Carr
06-18-2011, 05:41 PM
I would recommend Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press), 1966.

motorfirebox
06-18-2011, 06:04 PM
I have often wished for a literature cannon. Seems like it would have a much greater impact than simply telling someone that they need to read a book. (Sorry, couldn't resist!)

I am very interested in seeing some recommendations here.

Ken White
06-18-2011, 08:42 PM
I'll take a stab but with a two caveats. First, it's virtually impossible to find a book about Viet Nam that is not biased in one direction or another or about something -- however, a reasonably diligent reader can filter most of that out.

Second, this is A list -- there are hundreds of others that are just a valid. I make no apology for this one and believe it's fair and as balanced as most and do not plan on entertaining futile arguments about it. It is not an Academic's or General Officer's list or one of which most would approve, it is the list of a a working Grunt. It's offered, accept or disregard as you wish. :wry:

None of these are perfect or, IMO, error free, they all have omissions and biases but most are pretty good and reasonably well balanced. I start with The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Vietnam War by Phillip Jennings. It is biased -- as stated it is politically incorrect -- but does a decent job of dispelling a number of myths (some of which appear often on this Board :rolleyes: ). Some of its contentions are problematic but that's true with all books. In any event, it sets the stage for the other books, which are:

Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall

Why Vietnam by Archimides Patti

The Vietnamese War by David Elliot

How We Won the War by Vo Nguyen Giap

The Twenty-Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. by Bruce Palmer Jr.

The Killing Zone by Frederick Downs, Jr.

The Irony of Vietnam; The System Worked by Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts

Backfire by Loren Baritz

Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (Major Problems in American History) by Robert McMahon and Thomas Patterson {tedious but informative... / kw]

ganulv
06-18-2011, 11:23 PM
I don’t know enough about the topic to claim how any readings would rank in terms of a canon, but I have enjoyed everything I have read and seen by Pierre Schoendoerffer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Schoendoerffer). I found the article below to be well written; it might be of particular interest to members of the Special Forces.

Salemink, Oscar (http://anthropology.ku.dk/staff/beskrivelse/?id=403491&f=2). “Mois and Maquis: the invention and appropriation of Vietnam’s Montagnards from Sabatier to the CIA.” In Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge (http://www.worldcat.org/title/colonial-situations-essays-on-the-contextualization-of-ethnographic-knowledge/oclc/24107933&referer=brief_results), edited by George W. Stocking, 243–84. Vol. 7 in History of Anthropology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.

jmm99
06-18-2011, 11:54 PM
The Vietnam Literature Cannon - JMM limited edition:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1100&d=1274888764

:)

Usually, for me, Vietnam sources = stuff re: the US civilian-military policy interface (e.g., "Pentagon Papers"); Pacification in SVN (e.g., "Military Struggle" and "Political Struggle"); and the PAVN view of conventional and unconventional warfare from 1944 to the end in 1975 (e.g., the unity of the "Military Struggle" and the "Political Struggle").

The following references do not follow that pattern. They look much more to the personal side of that conflict - of which, each person had a unique and different vantage point.

I don't define an "average company grade officer or NCO". The latter group (including buck sergeants) could include such people as William Manchester and Gene Sledge - both very articulate in painting word pictures of their war.

Here are eight "Vietnam" books (links to Amazon pages, with reviews - check Amazon "used") written by folks who were company grade officers or NCOs in the Vietnam War:

Brennan's War: Vietnam 1965-1969 (http://www.amazon.com/Brennans-War-Vietnam-1965-1969/dp/0671705954) (Matthew Brennan, 1985)


Review by RC
Matt explains what a lot of us went through. This book should be one used in schools to teach about the War in Vietnam. I was in the Blues of A Troop 9th Cavalry in 1966. Very well done, Matt.

One Soldier (http://www.amazon.com/One-Soldier-John-H-Shook/dp/0553260510) (John H. Shook, 1986)


Review by B
What puzzled me about "One Soldier," John H. Shook's autobiographical account of his experiences in the Vietnam War, was that it wasn't as popular or widely praised as other famous war-autobiographies (such as Ron Kovic's "Born on the Fourth of July"). I found myself unable to put this book down. Shook begins telling his story from the very moment he receives a draft letter and takes us to boot camp, to Officer Candidate School, and then to the dense, hellish jungles of Vietnam, all without turning his story into one big cliche`. I felt like I was having an intriguing conversation with a veteran, hearing his story, being able to understand where he was coming from. A flawless accomplishment. It's disappointing that Shook's "One Soldier" isn't as highly praised and recognizable as other war stories.

Once a Warrior King (http://www.amazon.com/Once-Warrior-King-David-Donovan/dp/0345333160) (David Donovan, 1985)


Review by RB
I was stationed in Duc Pho, Southern I Corp, and spent over 8 months living in a remote village with my platoon during 1969 and 1970. I saw so very much and understood so little. This book brought back the conflicts that haunted me for years and helped me come to grips with the most significant year of my life. Fear, anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, and confusion blended into an environment that this book describes like none that I have read.

Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat (http://www.amazon.com/Platoon-Leader-Memoir-Command-Combat/dp/0891418008) (James R. McDonough, 1985)


Review by RJM
Lt. McDonough writes of his experiences in Viet Nam in such straight forward language with little embellishment and an honest and humble attitude. This is one of the best written depictions of combat I've ever read. His experiences commanding a platoon in the heart of VC country surpass anything that has been portrayed by Hollywood in terms of the difficulty of the mission and the horror of day to day survival in a combat situation. This is one gritty and tough account of day to day life in the Viet Nam war that should be widely read. Ranks right up there with Philp Caputo, Michael Herr, Tim O'Brien and Tobias Wolff as a contribution to the definitive written record of grunt life in the war.

Only War We Had: A Platoon Leader's Journal of Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/Only-War-We-Had-Platoon/dp/0804100055) (Michael Lee Lanning, 1987)


Review by AC
The thing that sets this book apart from others like it is the fact that it is the author's personal journal from his tour as a platoon leader in Vietnam. It lacks the "story-telling" quality that most other personal accounts of the Vietnam War have. Often it is not well-written or completely coherent, but that only serves to help the reader understand the conditions under which the entries were made. The entries are sopplemented by the author's reflections upon preparing them for publication. The events in this book were recorded as they occured - not years later - and that's what makes its special.

The 13th Valley (http://www.amazon.com/13th-Valley-John-Del-Vecchio/dp/0553235605) (John M. Del Vecchio, 1982)


Review by REW
Although "The 13th Valley" is a novel, it is based on a very real operation conducted by the 2/502nd, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, temporarily assigned to th 3rd Brigade near the end of the "Texas Star" operation. At that time, the U.S. was in gradual withdrawal from Vietnam. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 3rd Marine divisions had already left I Corp leaving the 101st to manage an area 4 times their previous area of responsibility. As a last push into the famed A Shau Valley area, the 3rd Brigade was heavily involved in a siege at Firebase Ripcord. Surrounded by an estimated 12,000 NVA regulars, this battle was longer and claimed more casualties on both sides than occurred at "Hamburger Hill". The Battle at Firebase Ripcord remained a secret for many years. Both armies not wanting to publicize the battle as we were disengaging from the war and the NVA took thousands of casualties. the 3rd Brigade defenders were lifted out without being captured. The 2/502nd "Strike Force" gained some level of revenge by attacking the 13th Valley and leaving the NVA Headquarters and camp in shambles. As a former member of the 2/502nd in Vietnam, I have reread this great book many times and can attest that, although a novel, most stories are based in fact on true events of the 2/502. I highly recommend this great book and encourage those interested to also read about "Firebase Ripcord".

Vietnam-Perkasie: A Combat Marine Memoir (http://www.amazon.com/Vietnam-Perkasie-Combat-W-D-Ehrhart/dp/0870239570) (W. D. Ehrhart, 1983)


Review by DK
Bill Ehrhart's work for too long has been neglected. VIETNAM-PERKASIE is one of the most memorable first-hand accounts of the war which America loves to forget. This memoir is gritty, real, and vastly underrated. It should be made into a film.

The Village (http://www.amazon.com/Village-Bing-West/dp/0743457579) (Bing West, 1972)


Review by DF
This is a wonderful book. It tells the story of 15 marines assigned to defend a hamlet, working with about the same number of Popular Force militiamen. Of that original band, 7 are killed in the first half of the book, most of them in a single firefight when their "fort" is over-run. (The PFs suffer losses at roughly the same rate.) But they love the work, get along fine with the villagers, and exact an even higher toll on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units sent against them.

(cont. in part 2)

jmm99
06-19-2011, 12:04 AM
Moreover, so as to immediately break the ten-book limit, here are four oral histories (two general, and two more specialized); all presenting a more generalized set of personal experiences than the eight "autobiographical" books above:

Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam War (http://www.amazon.com/Everything-We-Had-History-Vietnam/dp/0345322797) (Al Santoli, 1981)


Review by LR
There are actually two false war stories in this book, those of Thomas Bird ("Ia Drang") and Mike Beamon ("The Green-Faced Frogmen"). Mr. Bird apologized to the author after the book's publication. He did serve in Vietnam, not in combat, and the POW story is a complete fabrication. Mr. Beamon did not even serve in the US military, never mind the SEALS or Vietnam. At the time the book came out, 1981, it was difficult to get veterans to discuss the war at all, never mind insist they verify their stories. Mr. Santoli, who I knew personally, was as disappointed as any of his critics that he had been taken in by these accounts. Still "Everything We Had" is a monumental work, from the days before the Vietnam Wall. Then the popular culture wanted nothing more to dismiss the war completely and held the men who fought there in contempt as losers or criminals. The feelings of Santoli's real contributors are still a compelling read today, twenty years later.

To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Americans and Southeast Asians (http://www.amazon.com/Bear-Any-Burden-Aftermath-Americans/dp/0253213045) (Al Santoli, 1985)


Review by JMDV
I first read To Bear Any Burden when it was originally released in 1985. This has been a 'must-read' classic of American involvement in Southeast Asia since it was published. For it, Santoli interviewed, in depth, 47 individuals representative of that involvement from 1945 into the 1980s--Americans, Viet-Namese (communists and anti-communists), Cambodians and Laotians. The book is so artfully compiled as to flow like a single narration; yet the 'cast of characters' are separate in time, space, culture and social rank--an entire spectrum from ambassadors to villagers, soldiers to politicians, in one volume. No one's education about the Viet-Nam War is complete unless they've read this book.

Bloods: Black Veterans of the Vietnam War: An Oral History (http://www.amazon.com/Bloods-Black-Veterans-Vietnam-History/dp/0345311973) (Wallace Terry, 1984)


Review by RJR
This is similar to Santoli's book regarding individual experiences in the Vietnam conflict. You definitely get a feel for the Vietnam experience, and it is very readable. The narratives portray the unique challenges of this experience, along with the added dimension of the race issue. The range of assessments of the racial issue was amazing and educational for me; some of the vets had active civil-rights values and even revolutionary values before getting to Vietnam, and some had little or no opinions regarding race relations despite the turbulent times. The great range of views regarding whites and the dominant U.S. culture, including government, was intriguing. The attitudes toward the Vietnamese, both North- and South-, also held great range, and was fascinating. This leads me to feel that the strength of this memorable book is the common experience conveyed simultaneously with the diversity of experiences and attitudes.

Survivors (http://www.amazon.com/Survivors-Zalin-Grant/dp/0393087271) (Zalin Grant, 1975)


Review by AC
Zalin Grant did a masterful job weaving together oral interviews of seven of the twelve survivors of one of the worst death camps run by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. There were 11 deaths from disease and starvation, plus one killed attempting escape during the time period covered by Grant's book. After the unsuccessful Son Toy raid on an empty POW camp in North Vietnam, the Viet Cong moved their southern prisoners by walking them to Hanoi. The journey took six months, but ultimately all of Grant's survivors were released in Operation Homecoming in 1973. This book is must reading for the serious researcher on POWs, or anyone who wants to know how difficult it was to survive jungle captivity. Also recommended is a brand new book by survivor interviewee Frank Anton "Why Didn't You Get Me Out?," which includes most of his experiences covered in Grant's book, but adds Anton's observations about MIAs seen in Laos on his way to Hanoi, plus Anton's concerns about the plight of MIAs written off by the US government many years ago.

Finally, to set a chronological framework - and presenting a different picture of the Vietnam War in the eyes of the author (a Marine grunt and later an officer in the Aussie Navy):

Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, 1961-1973 (http://www.amazon.com/Unheralded-Victory-Defeat-Vietnamese-1961-1973/dp/0918339510) (Mark W. Woodruff, 1999)


Review by CS

Hello, I feel very strongly about this book. I feel quite inadequate to write a review of other peoples personal experiences in vietnam.

I served in Republic of Vietnam from 1967 through 1969 as a fresh butterbar (2nd Lt., then on as XO and revolving platoon leader (casualties for 2nd lts was always quite high) for the company I served with, then on as Platoon leader for a second tour then serving briefly as CO of company for a grand total of 3 days until I got wounded by mortar fire.

While I feel this book is a bit too right wing it clearly shows a significant amount of popular media of that era and today is frankly nonsense. A fact that no one seems inclined to reinterpret. Many people don't like this book, because if doesn't fit into their very very simplistic broad general view of a very complex civil war(take a look at vietnamese history the vietnamese have fought a handful of civil wars and wars of conquest) involving two superpowers selling their brand to the the world, Period. Vietnam just happened to manifest itself perfectly as the testing ground much to the pain of the vietnamese. It's coke or pepsi with a pistol to you head and that's that.

The entire strategic goals of the vietnam war and the way it were fought were obviously completely flawed, I highly advise everyone to read "A bright shining lie" along with "dirty little secrets of the vietnam war"; a bit of a cheesy title, and a bit simplistic but spot on with Facts about the conflict with only a very slight sense of favoritism towards the USA. The truth lies flat in the middle of these three books and is frankly much simpler than most would lead you to believe.

I served in highly populated areas my first year in country, there was definently "accidental" death of civilians from all manner of reasons (out at night after curfew triggering ambushes, random artillery fire). It was dangerous to be a civilian in vietnam and they suffered greatly regardless of their political stance. My second year was spent mainly fighting NVA in terrain with almost no civilian population.

This book should be taken with a grain of salt but there are many many facts in this book that highlight directly how much horse puckey and COMPLETE DISTORTION OF FACT was used for dramatic effect both then and now.

I feel competent to say this as I am currently typing this from my home in Vietnam. I speak vietnamese fluently, am married to a Vietnamese woman who's fathers side of the family was Viet Cong and her mothers ARVN.

Along with my unique experience as well as getting a real earful of communist propaganda, most of the references the author makes towards Hanoi's political and propaganda machine are easily found here in print by Vietnamese publications. I strongly urge people truly interested in learning some amazing and not often, if ever talked about facts to READ THIS BOOK.

You probably won't like its point of view, (I had a real tough time swallowing alot of" a bright shining lie" but the author does make a very strong and factual arguement). So does this former marine. Get this book and the others and stop kidding yourself about how much you know about Vietnam because you watched Platoon and Full Metal Jacket...

I found Woodruff's book very interesting - "winning" the warfare, but "losing" the war.

Regards

Mike

outletclock
06-19-2011, 07:21 AM
John Prados and Ray Stubbe, Valley of Decision.

Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie. (Books I-III are perhaps all that is necessary.)

Robert Mason, Chickenhawk.

Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War.

Perhaps more tangential to the intended point of the original query, but a fun read nonetheless (the early Vietnam reporters - Halberstam, Sheehan, Arnett et al - through the coup that toppled Diem): William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War.

Speaking of Halberstam, I have actually never read either, but do/does The Best and the Brightest and/or The Making of a Quagmire merit inclusion on this list?

And speaking of books not read, here is a book only partially read by me, but which (I think) is thought well of, an assessment I find to be a justified one: Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An.

Regards
OC

jcustis
06-19-2011, 08:06 AM
I can only offer one, and that is Frank Snepp's Decent Interval.

outletclock
06-19-2011, 08:32 AM
Since JCustis mentioned Snepp's Decent Interval, I'll add two other books regarding April 1975:

David Butler, The Fall of Saigon.

Larry Engerman, Tears Before the Rain.

Incidentally, Harry Summers was at the American Embassy helping to conduct the evacuation, I think, which made me think of his On Strategy.

Regards
OC

slapout9
06-19-2011, 04:05 PM
"Slow Burn" by Orrin DeForest-excellent book on Intelligence and Interrogation (the way it should be done) for Vietnam.


Buck Sergeants will definitely love Brennon's War:)

Old Eagle
06-19-2011, 07:31 PM
by Douglas Pike. Powerful thesis on the inability of the west to come to grips with the pol-mil strategy of the Peoples' Army. I thoroughly enjoyed the book when it was first published in the 80s. I understand that it has come under some academic criticism in the meantime.

My personal theory is that we are still on the road to victory in VN, and that General Electric and General Motors will prevail where General Westmoreland and General Abrams failed. (I stole this line from somewhere, but as usual, can't remember where.)

Sasquatch
06-19-2011, 09:27 PM
Response.....

And helps me clarify my thoughts on the question. And a new one... (Later).

Actually, there are two educational goals,

1. What memoirs. etc will help the strategic corporals (buck Seargeants) do their jobs better, and avoid reinventing the wheel. (The old joke, we fought in Vietnam for one year seven times, or something like that).

2. What really was the broad picture there? How did we get into that mess, and why did it end so badly?

There does not seem to be a version of the Ricks/Woodward first draft of history out there.

A good example is the US Military institutional bias against Body Counts;

The weekly casualty reports on the six PM news is unlikely to have been the subject of family reminiscenses around the dinner table.

outletclock
06-19-2011, 11:52 PM
Sasquatch:

Meant respectfully: If the goal is to
help the strategic corporals (buck Seargeants) do their jobs better, and avoid reinventing the wheel, then for said purpose, why limit the query to Vietnam? Obviously how the US entered the Vietnam War is Vietnam-specific, but helping the strategic corporal would not seem to be. Perhaps books regarding Korea, to take one example, or just as well other conflicts, might be equally (or even more?) useful for said goal?

Regards
OC

slapout9
06-20-2011, 04:52 AM
Link to the final and complete 7,000 page history of Vietnam published for the first time without any redactions.....and it is free:)


http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/

outletclock
06-20-2011, 06:19 AM
Regarding prong 2) of Sasquatch's prompt - i.e., the "big picture" and the proffered example of a fixation on body counts - I consider James Wirtz's article "Intelligence to Please" (Political Science Quarterly, 1991) to be excellent. It examines the discrepancy between MACV and CIA estimates of the enemy Order of Battle.

Regards
OC

Steve Blair
06-20-2011, 02:25 PM
Sasquatch:

Meant respectfully: If the goal is to , then for said purpose, why limit the query to Vietnam? Obviously how the US entered the Vietnam War is Vietnam-specific, but helping the strategic corporal would not seem to be. Perhaps books regarding Korea, to take one example, or just as well other conflicts, might be equally (or even more?) useful for said goal?

Regards
OC

Vietnam is worthwhile in this context because it is noted for "burning up" an entire generation of NCOs. As far as memoirs go, it's hard to find good ones that deal exclusively with NCOs (in my opinion). VN memoirs tend to focus heavily on junior officers and draftees. There are a handful that cover NCOs, but they tended to come out earlier in the memoir cycle (say the early 1980s).

There are also theme cycles you have to be aware of when looking at literature about Vietnam. There are some interesting and strong bias swings. One of the interesting things about Kieth Nolan's books is that you can almost follow that cycle in his writing (although it's not strong bias as much as it is a slight shift in focus).

If you read Lanning, be sure to read both books.

I'd second Ken's list, with the addition of "Ringed in Steel" by Michael Mahler and just about any of Kieth Nolan's books.

And just to make an observation about one of JMM's books, "The 13th Valley" isn't about Ripcord. Kieth Nolan has a good book out about that situation, but DelVecchio's book (which I consider one of the finest novels about Vietnam, if not the finest) deals with a later fight.

outletclock
06-20-2011, 05:12 PM
"Vietnam is worthwhile..."

I realized after I posted that that there is absolutely nothing wrong on any level about creating a Vietnam-specific canon, and that said post therefore really was not warranted. I guess the lesson for me is, Think before posting.

Regards
OC

Ken White
06-20-2011, 07:13 PM
... I guess the lesson for me is, Think before posting.Not just for thee, for all of us, I suspect. :eek:

However, I'm opposed. Aside from the fact that I'm congenitally unable to do so at all times, that sure would take a lot of spark out of life on the internet... :D

motorfirebox
06-21-2011, 01:21 AM
Vietnam is... noted for "burning up" an entire generation of NCOs.
Any recommendations on that topic in particular?

Old Eagle
06-21-2011, 01:53 AM
Yeah, I'd like to see some documentation on the burning NCO issue.

We also have to ensure that we don't hijack the thread. If there is specific fodder for the canon on the NCO issue, fire away!

Ken White
06-21-2011, 04:05 AM
Yeah, I'd like to see some documentation on the burning NCO issue.

We also have to ensure that we don't hijack the thread. If there is specific fodder for the canon on the NCO issue, fire away!I disagree with that place to the extent I won't even link to it -- but since it's you, I 'll tell you where documentation can be found. ;)

I'll also defer to Steve Blair who's historical documentation knowledge certainly exceeds mine. My recollection is that overall VN KIA rate was about 1% while that for NCOs was 2.5% mostly SGT / SSG. That doesn't count the 1,400 or so fragging incidents, 80 some odd Officers or NCOs killed...

However, just for grins, the fact that NCOs were being burned out is amply shown by the simple existence of the NonCommissioned Officer Candidate Course -- and the fact that their KIA rate was over 5%.

For the other NCOs, the burnout came from a year in Viet Nam doing pretty much the same job (few promotions or incountry rotations for NCOs as opposed to Officers and Troops) and about 10 months in the States before returning to the SEA Follies. That was unsustainable so by 1968, third tours coming up and still shortfalls in mid and senior grade NCOs (and Officers, many of whom resigned -- the NCOs could not) led the US Army's fine Battalion Commanders by sheer necessity to lean on new LTs and SGTs and thus reinforced and enhanced micromanagement as a life style. :wry:

I know many NCOs with five tours all in combat units but I know few officers with more than two. Of course, I also know some NCOs who served in the period with no tours -- tankers and support folks, mostly -- and I know an Officer with six tours (one in Laos and one in [theoretically]Thailand). It was simply a function of the system and times. We do it a little better today, I hope...

The evidence of that burnout lies in the immediate post Viet Nam Army which suffered from a significant dearth of NCO leadership. Most were too tired to care. :(

Steve Blair
06-21-2011, 01:28 PM
NCO burnout in Vietnam was focused heavily in the senior NCO ranks ("in the rear with the Sergeant Major, the beer, and the gear"). Remember that during this period most (if not all) of the Army's SNCOs had combat time in Korea and even World War II. It wasn't a problem initially, but by mid-1968 the Army was relying more and more on "shake and bake" NCOs (guys who were a handful of months or maybe a year older than the men they were supposed to train and lead). Older NCOs were either getting out or using their connections to get rear jobs.

Again, this trend accelerated as the war went on. It wasn't so much a factor of KIAs as it was repeat tours and (likely underestimated) a major "generation gap" between the Regular Army NCOs and a mostly draftee force fresh from the impact of the counter culture.

Within the canon, most of Kieth Nolan's books touch on the NCO issue in at least some way, since his writing focuses for the most part on the period after 1968. It's touched on to a degree in some of the SOG memoirs, but like I mentioned before the memoirs tend to come from either the junior enlisted or officer ranks. Shelby Stanton talks about it in "The Rise and Fall of an American Army" as well. "Self Destruction" also gets into it.

Mike in Hilo
06-23-2011, 03:04 AM
I'd like to second Old Eagle's addition of Pike's PAVN to the list. I think it's worth mentioning that among other useful insights, the book presents a succinct and lucid explanation of what occurred in RVN during the period--1969 onward--about which less has been written.

PAVN employed a methodology to convince the populace of its implacability, and attempted to raise the level of violence (now perceived to be unending) toward an unacceptable threshold. A steady rhythm of assassination, indirect fire and sapper attacks, punctuated by "high points" of greater violence proceeded, despite great cost, even during the period of greatest US/GVN success (1970-71). The calculation was that the Vietnamese majority, who were not in the enemy camp, including those alienated by PAVN/VC overreach; the many ethnic Southerners in whom disgust at all Northerners, whether Communist or Catholic was an ingrained trait; and even the Northern Catholic denizens of the urban slums who had come South as refugees from Communism, would find submission to new, unsavory overlords preferable to endless bleeding. And in 1971 it had become clear that the Vietnamese would be bleeding alone--that the US was indeed withdrawing. Other grievances were eschewed, PAVN psyops concentrated on exploiting the war weariness.

The lesson to be drawn, Pike points out, is that in any society that is not totalitarian, there is no effective counter to the prospect of "the fifty year war."

Cheers,
Mike.

JMA
06-23-2011, 04:10 PM
That doesn't count the 1,400 or so fragging incidents, 80 some odd Officers or NCOs killed...

These are horrifying stats. Do you have an idea of the breakdown of motivations behind these actions?

Steve Blair
06-23-2011, 06:18 PM
These are horrifying stats. Do you have an idea of the breakdown of motivations behind these actions?

Obviously it depended on the time frame and who you asked, but a reasonable number were either race- or drug-related. Fragging became a recognized issue after mid-1968 or so, and accelerated after 1969. It's also worth nothing that fragging was quite often a rear area phenomenon...and that wasn't helped by the practice of combat units "dumping" their problem children on the rear areas (be it battalion, brigade, or some other echelon). In some cases a fragging could be traced to a reaction to a "hard-line" career NCO or officer, but there were other cases where it was drug dealer retaliation or a more random event when some stoned trooper tossed a grenade in the general direction of someone who pissed him off.

Vietnam is also complex in that such things weren't necessarily tracked in previous wars, and that combined with the fallout from social changes in the US created an interesting situation. Fragging wasn't common in front line units, though, leading to speculation that lack of mission focus and clear purpose in the rear areas accelerated the incidence of fragging.

jmm99
06-23-2011, 06:29 PM
Going beyond Fragging - Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fragging), one might look at:

The Hard Truth About Fragging (http://www.historynet.com/the-hard-truth-about-fragging.htm/1), by Peter Brush (Vietnam Point of View, July 28, 2010):


Since most fragging incidents did not end up in the court system, it is more difficult to establish a profile of the perpetrators themselves. However, a 1976 study conducted at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Fort Leavenworth gleaned some general characteristics of likely individuals who committed fragging. Of 850 inmates in the USDB population at the time, 28 were identified whose actions, based on their courts-martial transcripts, matched the fragging incident profile. On average, they were 20 years old and had 28 months on active duty. About 20 percent were African American, and about 7 percent were draftees. Most had enlisted in the service and supported the war. They had attained only a low level of education and were considered "loners." Most were in support units, given jobs for which they had not been trained, and reported little job satisfaction. They felt "scapegoated" and showed little or no remorse for their crimes. Almost 90 percent of these men were intoxicated on a wide assortment of substances at the time of the fragging, which mostly occurred at night. They admitted to little planning beyond talking to others, and most did nothing to avoid capture. Consistent with the command structure at the company and battery level, captains and first sergeants were their most common targets, and 75 percent of the perpetrators had been at some time involved in a verbal or physical altercation with their victims.

In terms of motive, the victims were viewed as having somehow denied the offenders of something they desired, such as promotions or transfers. The victims were perceived as a threat to the offenders. Only two of the 28 offenders studied claimed race was a factor. According to the authors of the study, the easy access and use of drugs was an essential factor in the assaults. That conclusion was further buttressed in a 1976 article in the American Journal of Psychiatry by Thomas Bond, which claimed that illicit drug use, so much more common in Vietnam than in other wars, tended to reduce any inhibitions the offenders may have had about assaulting superiors.

More recently (January 1, 2011), Fragging: Why U.S. Soldiers Assaulted Their Officers in Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0896727157?ie=UTF8&tag=fopo-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0896727157) (by George Lepre); as reviewed at FP by Tom Ricks, Best Defense bookshelf: 'Fragging,' the Vietnam War's characteristic crime (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/08/best_defense_bookshelf_fragging_the_vietnam_wars_c haracteristic_crime) (8 Mar 2011):


What did surprise me in this illuminating book was the basic profile of soldiers who fragged NCOs and officers (that is, tried to kill them with hand grenades). In this carefully researched study, Lepre reports that:

--Most fragging occurred in the noncombat support units in the rear, not in front-line combat units. (p. 31)

--The attacks often killed the wrong person: "of all the army officers who are known to have died in fragging incidents during the Vietnam War, only one was the intended target of the assault." (p. 44)

--Four would-be fraggers were killed in their own attempts to assault others. (p. 47)

--The last Vietnam fragger to get out of jail was William Sutton, who was released in 1999, his time extended by a parole violation. (p. 200)

--Not all fraggers left the military. Staff Sgt. Alan G. Cornett Jr. [author of Gone Native: An NCO's Story (http://www.amazon.com/Gone-Native-Story-Alan-Cornett/dp/0804116377/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1299502115&sr=8-5)], who was in Special Forces, fragged his unit's executive officer, Lt. Col. Donald F. Bongers, who was wounded but not killed by the grenade blast. Cornett was convicted, did a year's confinement, some of it at Fort Leavenworth's disciplinary barracks -- and then served another 17 years in the Army, retiring in 1989 as a master sergeant. (p. 82)

--Most fraggers already had had a brush with the military justice system before committing their fragging offenses (pp. 76-77). More typical of fraggers than Cornett was PFC Richard Buckingham, a cook in the 538th Transportation Company. Lepre goes on:


The government eventually withdrew its charge against Buckingham, which who would have faced his second court-martial in the space of a year: in June 1970 he had been tried in West Germany on charges of rape and sodomy, and was acquitted. Buckingham left the Army in 1972 but couldn't stay out of trouble: only weeks after his discharge, he strangled a seven-year-old girl to death and was sentenced to life imprisonment. A judge released him in 1999 in the belief that he "would not pose an unacceptable risk to society" but Buckingham was quick to prove him wrong: in 2002, he was sentenced to serve several more years in his native Ohio for assaulting yet another female. (p. 118)

Regards

Mike

CR6
06-24-2011, 04:59 PM
in no particular order and without reference to previous posters. * indicates my recommendation of what will appeal most to the average Sergeant. YMMV:

*Street Without Joy Bernard Fall (Narrative of French involvement in Indochina)

Dereliction of Duty H.R. McMaster (Analysis of the role of the JCS at strategic level)

The Best and the Brightest David Halberstram (journalist’s account of American efforts in SVN)

A Bright Shining Lie Cornelius Mahoney Neil Sheehan (similar to TB&TB, but with through the lens of the career of John Paul Vann. Good stuff on the battle of Ap Bac)

*Dispatches Michael Herr (compilation of articles by a war correspondent)

Honorable Warrior Lewis Sorely (bio of CSA during Vietnam by an historian of the revisionist school)

*War comes to Long An Jeffery Rice (a micro view of insurgency and COIN in one SVN province)

*We Were Soldiers Once and Young Hal Moore and Joseph Galloway (no explanation needed, right?)

The Nightingale’s Song Robert Timberg (a neat discussion of the impact of Vietnam on American society up to and including Iran Contra told through the lives of 5 USNA grads who were active in security affairs and politics)

The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966 Rick Atkinson (follows West Points Class of ’66 through USMA to combat in Vietnam and beyond. Similar to TNS, but broader scope. Atkinson and Timberg are both journalists, but Timberg was also a Marine combat veteran of Vietnam. This informed his writing, which I preferred)

*Fields of Fire James Webb (fiction) (Follows a Marine rifle platoon leader through his tour. Written by Senator Jim Webb while attending Georgetown Law School, as a way of dealing with PTSD after a rough year in combat and separation from the USMC. Webb’s story is told in Timberg’s book)

*The Thirteenth Valley John Del Vecchio (fiction) (Written by a 101st veteran combat correspondent who also holds a degree from Lafayette College. This cat can write. Covers an infantry company operating in the A Shau Valley in latter part of the war. Excellent back story on characters and how their backgrounds both mesh and conflict under the strains of combat in the jungle.)

outletclock
06-24-2011, 06:23 PM
First, Ken, thanks for your post of the other day. :)

Second, CR6 et al:

Sheehan's narrative of the Battle of Ap Bac was excellent. Yet I do think that one ought to, if possible, counterpoise it against the description of the battle in Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken. While not developed as in depth, Moyar is actually more convincing in the testimony that he deploys, IIRC.

While perhaps not meriting inclusion in the Canon being compiled, I nevertheless just think that if Sorley and Fall are mentioned, then A Better War and Hell in a Very Small Place ought to be mentioned as well.

Further, I agree that The Long Gray Line (Atkinson) and The Nightingale's Song are both great books.

Regards
OC

Ken White
06-24-2011, 08:46 PM
Agree with you on the Moyar - Sheehan comparison but acknowledge I'm prejudiced, I believe Sheehan's book was penned as an apologia for the sloppy way they reported the war (not to say the debacle was their fault, just that most of them did not do their job very well). Sheehan's detour into Vann's childhood is bizarre at best. In any event, my take on his book was one of skepticism on several levels... :rolleyes:

I restricted myself to the ten requested by Sasquatch but your suggestions were on my initial long list and all are great. :cool:

Mike in Hilo
06-25-2011, 02:36 AM
Afterthought: As a former CORDS guy, I think I ought to mention the one book that is thoroughly dedicated to providing a balanced account of CORDS, Pacification, by Richard A. Hunt. Reads like a decent after action report, is detailed, and IMO objective.

By contrast, Sheehan's biography about Vann strangely doesn't devote much time to CORDS at all (I concur in Ken's assessment), and CORDS boss Bill Colby's two autobiographies present a sadly rose colored view of "pacification." (I mean, for one example, how can you be seized--as was Colby-- with the idea that PSDF, village militia composed of males too old or too young to be drafted, organized by top-down gov't decree, in which membership was compulsory, rpt. compulsory, would evolve into a grass-roots, mass political movement--[think "The Awakening"]?)

Cheers,
Mike

Sasquatch
06-25-2011, 08:12 PM
Still looking for a brief (Less than 300 pages?) general overview for the person who is more familiar with the NFL draft rules....

(Sorry, but I'm not qualified to teach High School history, my first name is not "Coach")

Remember reading Bernard Fall way back in the day; probably should include one of his books on the final list, the idea is, the really interested soldier will seek out his other books on their own.

Sasquatch
06-25-2011, 08:20 PM
Interesting direction of the thread, because I have a query related to the NCO issue, and don't know where to start a thread.

On Fragging, 80 odd casualties and 1400 attempts?

It shows how shallow institutional memory is; even in the 1980's, young soliders had not heard (learned?) that the first step was to roll the grenade into the LT's hooch without pulling the pin, in hopes he would modify his behavior.

Or something like that, but you can figure it out.

davidbfpo
06-25-2011, 08:23 PM
Sasquatch,

You asked:
don't know where to start a thread.

If you and others think "fragging" is worthy of a discussion a new thread can be started, perhaps best in the history arena. I can copy or move the posts here to that.

outletclock
06-25-2011, 10:47 PM
I suppose Ron Milam's Not a Gentleman's War is arguably germane to Sasquatch's original query, although it supposedly is dedicated toward exploring the officer experience in VN. (I use "supposedly" because IMO, the book is somewhat deceptive in its title and somewhat so in its thesis as well. That is to say, does it seek to debunk the "Calley myth," describe the officer experience, both, more - e.g., to some extent, describe the Vietnam experience for all soldiers, rather than just officers - one or the other and only one or the other?, etc.) And additionally, I'm not sure whether it meets some of Sasquatch's other criteria, i.e., a book that people would actually really want to get up and read, snarky as that may sound to a piece of scholarship almost certainly composed with toil and tears. Yet it may fit into the original thread, as well as the fragging thread which may be evolving. All that said, let me proceed to the punchline: IIRC (and alas, here my recall could alas be wrong), the book does have some material on fragging, and even if the text itself may be spare on the topic, then some information may perhaps be gleaned from the footnotes.

Regards
OC

CR6
06-26-2011, 12:17 PM
Still looking for a brief (Less than 300 pages?) general overview for the person who is more familiar with the NFL draft rules....



The Summons of the Trumpet by Dave R. Palmer comes in at 277 pages. Sub-titled "US-Vietnam in Perspective", the book provides a good overview of US involvement in SE Asia, but with the limitations inherent in covering a long and tumultuous period in a concise manner.

matty groves
06-26-2011, 02:33 PM
Many novels provide excellent accounts of this war. You can't beat Webb's Fields of Fire or Roth's Sand in the Wind. The 13th Valley has already been mentioned. For the Montangards, try Jonathan Raban's The Barking Deer.

David Elliot's massive (and expensive) 2 volume treatment of the war in the Mekong is definitive. Ward Just's To What End is often overlooked. I think it is every bit as good as Dispatches. The air war is not often dealt with. I like Thud Ridge, but I'm not really familiar with the literature on this aspect of the war, so others may have better suggestions.

Finally, there were two sides in this war. The material on the US side is enormous; on the NVA side, virtually non existent. Of course, there are many reasons for this--lack of access to archives, regime control of everything,etc. but there is a huge gap to any attempt to understand this conflict.

davidbfpo
02-14-2013, 06:11 PM
An email landed today announcing this panel discussion sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and by the Reserve Officers Association:http://www.fpri.org/events/2013/02/why-we-lost-vietnam-revisited

Thursday, February 21, 2013
1:45 p.m. Registration; 2:00 – 4:00 p.m. Program
ROA, One Constitution Avenue, NE, Washington, DC

Free and open to the public, reservations required:events@fpri.org (http://events@fpri.org)
Also available via w webcast/teleconference, after registration:https://cc.readytalk.com/r/jm9ayjemevi4


Nearly four decades after the last American soldier left Vietnam, a debate still rages concerning the cause of the American defeat in that war. An influential narrative holds that the United States could never have won in Vietnam given the nature of the war and the commitment on the part of the Vietnamese communists. But over the past 20 years, a number of observers have called this narrative into question. Some military writers have argued that the US defeat in Vietnam can be traced to a flawed national strategy, which they blame mostly on civilian policy makers. But more recently, influential analysts, both military and civilian, have indicted the military itself for the failure, blaming military leadership for adopting a defective operational strategy.

This FPRI/ROA workshop addresses the latter argument by assessing the issue of Army generalship in Vietnam. The four panelists are well equipped to undertake this assessment. Three are soldier-scholars, combat veterans with PhDs who have grappled with this topic for many years: Lewis Sorley, Gian Gentile, and Gregory Daddis. One is a seasoned national security journalist who has spent decades observing the US military during war and peace, Tom Ricks. While the discussion will not resolve the debate, it will certainly enable reasonable observers to refine their own views.

Bill Moore
03-11-2013, 02:24 AM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5GL3cJTyUM

Special Forces - LRRPs Vietnam

Excellent history on the LRRPs in Vietnam and the MACV-Recondo School ran by Special Forces. Only U.S. military school where students conducted live patrols in enemy territory. Students interviewed spoke very highly of the course.

Unfortunately, there were a couple of examples of piss poor leadership by the conventional army directed tactical operations from the rear, so some things never change.

Interesting discussion on their transition into the 75th Rangers (pro's and con's). It increased their risk due the Rangers operating in larger size patrols (8 men versus 4), but on the other hand gave them more firepower. Then the program discussed the incurred risk during Vietnamization when Vietnamese Rangers were integrated into U.S. Ranger patrols without being able to train together and learn each others SOPs prior to fighting together.

Overall a very well done documentary.

davidbfpo
07-09-2013, 10:03 AM
The actual title of this BBC article is 'Viewpoint: Could one man have shortened the Vietnam War?', but I fear having Vietnam in the title may put (American) readers off:
Konrad Kellen was an unknown defence analyst who might have changed the course of the Vietnam War if only people had listened to him....in the early 1960s, he joined the Rand Corporation, .... And there he faced the greatest challenge of his career - the Vietnam Motivation and Morale Project.How often do we read and learn this happens?
..the Pentagon didn't know anything about the North Vietnamese. They knew nothing about Vietnamese culture, Vietnamese history, Vietnamese language. It was just this little speck in the world, in their view.
Listening is hard because the more you listen, the more unsettling the world becomes. It's a lot easier just to place your hands over your ears and not listen at all......Kellen said that the Vietcong were not giving up and were not demoralised. It was not, he said, a battle the US could win - not today, not tomorrow and not the day after tomorrow.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-23037957

davidbfpo
09-02-2013, 08:18 PM
I have just merged nine threads on the history of Vietnam's wars, that specifically cover books, not aspects or incidents in the conflicts. Plus a new title.

davidbfpo
09-02-2013, 08:26 PM
A short review of a 2012 book, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam by Fredrik Logevall, that:
...traces the history of America's involvement in Vietnam. The book provides a sweeping narrative that starts with World War I and French colonialism and ends with direct U.S. intervention starting in the late 1950s.

Link:http://www.pri.org/stories/arts-entertainment/books/tt-the-french-connection-new-book-provides-sweeping-history-of-vietnam-war-11194.html

Amazon has dozens of v.good reviews, order via SWJ link! See:http://smallwarsjournal.com/content/support

Reviews:http://www.amazon.com/Embers-War-Empire-Americas-Vietnam/dp/0375504427

davidbfpo
11-27-2014, 02:56 PM
Not a counter-factual, rather a short introduction to a French offensive in northern Vietnam against the Viet Minh, from the newly discovered Defence in Depth, a Kings Defence Studies blogsite:http://defenceindepth.co/2014/11/27/operation-lea-oct-nov-1947-a-wild-gamble-at-finishing-the-indochina-war/

http://defenceindepth.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/map_tonkin_autumn_1947.jpg?w=620

The author cites Bernard Fall on Operation Lea:
a wild gamble at finishing the war in one single master stroke.It is worth reading Fall's commentary on an operation at the same time. minus aircraft, tanks etc that actually had an effect and was led by two local infantry battalions - in the T'ai Highlands (see pg.30):http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GkHH8OoCTtAC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA28#v=onepage&q&f=false

There is an old thread dedicated to Bernard Fall, after his wife published her own book:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=269

The author, Michael Finch, has a book on French COIN 1885-1900:http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674572.001.0001/acprof-9780199674572?rskey=hilqH5&result=1

Defence in Depth has irregular postings on such battles / operations:
Forgotten Battles is a feature on Defence-in-Depth designed to bring long-lost battles back from the depths of history. Our authors have chosen these engagements because they believe that their significance has been overlooked or overshadowed by better-remembered battles in history. The significance of the chosen battles may have been strategic and influenced greatly a particular war or campaign or may be based on other factors, such as social or cultural impact or the way in which a battle shaped the thinking of future leaders.

davidbfpo
12-08-2014, 12:15 PM
Another Defence in Depth piece: 'Nation building a forgotten aspect of the Vietnam War' and asks why study this now?

Simple:
..both historians and theorists of nation-building have neglected one of the most comprehensive attempts at strengthening a foreign government ever undertaken by the United States.....a new generation of Vietnam War scholars is beginning to challenge this endless search for blame and to look at the conflict in a wider historical and theoretical perspective.

Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2014/12/08/nation-building-a-forgotten-aspect-of-the-vietnam-war/

Alas the first link, a book review is beind a paywall; the second pair of links only take you to author bios, well at least there are starting points for reading identified.:wry:

Bob's World
12-09-2014, 09:36 AM
Another Defence in Depth piece: 'Nation building a forgotten aspect of the Vietnam War' and asks why study this now?

Simple:

Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2014/12/08/nation-building-a-forgotten-aspect-of-the-vietnam-war/

Alas the first link, a book review is beind a paywall; the second pair of links only take you to author bios, well at least there are starting points for reading identified.:wry:

Of course there were good tactical programs and operations in Vietnam. Likewise in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there is no value in celebrating these meaningless successes unless one does so in the context of the larger issue of the fundamentally flawed strategic context in which we viewed and framed these conflicts, and the infeasible policies we shaped our goals within.

Bottom line, when one creates an impossible problem and defines it in inaccurate terms - no amount of good tactical action, military or otherwise, is going to meet the basic measures of acceptable, suitable, feasible and complete.

At some point the US must step back and be objectively honest about how we have exaggerated our need to intervene in the governance of others in the name of our own security; and have equally assumed that the goodness of the nature of the governance we offered to others would somehow overcome the fundamentally illegitimate character of how that governance was imposed.

SWJ Blog
03-03-2015, 12:51 PM
Stories of Grief, Love and Penance Live Among What’s Left at the Vietnam Wall (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/stories-of-grief-love-and-penance-live-among-what%E2%80%99s-left-at-the-vietnam-wall)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/stories-of-grief-love-and-penance-live-among-what%E2%80%99s-left-at-the-vietnam-wall) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
04-21-2015, 07:06 PM
Forty years ago this month the Vietnam War ended and the History News Network has a short article by a Vietnamese author (based in the USA) and in particular commends one book Huy Duc's The Winning Side (which does not appear to be in English):http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/159046

So he argues the South won and refers to:
prominent Vietnamese from diverse backgrounds now feel that it was a costly mistake.[/URL][URL="http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1590"] (http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/159046#sthash.NKlgN9HK.dpuf)

davidbfpo
05-01-2015, 12:01 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this pointer by Mark Stout (JHU):
Forty years ago yesterday, the North Vietnamese Army captured Saigon and the Vietnam War was over. This week we look at the memoirs (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2861016001)of a key North Vietnamese participant in those events, Lieutenant General Trần Văn Tr (https://books.google.com/books?id=WLcG5Cdw-NIC&pg=PA460&dq=tran+van+tra&hl=en&sa=X&ei=I4RCVa_GKcuWgwTsv4GIAg&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=tran%20van%20tra&f=false), the aggressive deputy commander of the forces that launched that final offensive. These memoirs (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2861016001), originally published in 1982, were translated from Vietnamese by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and are available to us now in four parts (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2861016001) thanks to the remarkable Vietnam Center and Archive (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu) at Texas Tech University.

(Nice passage at the end) ... in 1982 with the publication of his memoirs. General Tr spent three years under house arrest. His sin? Describing the Tet Offensive as a defeat that weakened the communist cause and set it back a matter of years. In short, the general forgot the primacy of politics in war.
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/warchives-vietnam-and-the-meaning-of-defeat/

AdamG
06-08-2015, 04:35 PM
Many novels provide excellent accounts of this war. You can't beat Webb's Fields of Fire or Roth's Sand in the Wind. The 13th Valley has already been mentioned. For the Montangards, try Jonathan Raban's The Barking Deer.

David Elliot's massive (and expensive) 2 volume treatment of the war in the Mekong is definitive. Ward Just's To What End is often overlooked. I think it is every bit as good as Dispatches. The air war is not often dealt with. I like Thud Ridge, but I'm not really familiar with the literature on this aspect of the war, so others may have better suggestions.

Finally, there were two sides in this war. The material on the US side is enormous; on the NVA side, virtually non existent. Of course, there are many reasons for this--lack of access to archives, regime control of everything,etc. but there is a huge gap to any attempt to understand this conflict.



The Captain, a Communist sympathizer who's risen through the ranks of the South Vietnamese Army, has a confession:

I am a spy, a sleeper, a spook, a man of two faces. Perhaps not surprisingly, I am also a man of two minds. I am not some misunderstood mutant from a comic book or a horror movie, although some have treated me as such. I am simply able to see any issue from both sides.

So begins Viet Thanh Nguyen's new novel, The Sympathizer.

http://www.npr.org/2015/04/11/398728517/a-dark-funny-and-vietnamese-look-at-the-vietnam-war

Tangentially, see also http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/youth-vietnam-war-fall-saigon/391769/

AdamG
06-08-2015, 04:41 PM
In Vietnam almost two decades after Saigon's fall, the author, in a private talk with a former enemy general officer, came to understand an aspect of the war he never before had. In that talk, they shared personal insights about the war-discovering a common bond. It unlocked a door through which the author passed to start his own healing process. It began a journey where he would meet hundreds of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong veterans-listening to their personal stories of loss, sacrifice and hardship. It opened the author's eyes to how a technically inferior enemy, beaten down by superior US firepower, was able to get back up-driven by an "iron will" to emerge triumphant. "Bare Feet, Iron Will" takes the reader on a fascinating journey, providing stories-many never before told-as to how enemy ingenuity played a major role in the conflict, causing us not to see things that were there or to see things there that were not! It shares unique insights into the sacrifice and commitment that took place on the other side of Vietnam's battlefields.


Bare Feet, Iron Will ~ Stories from the Other Side of Vietnam's Battlefields James Zumwalt
http://www.amazon.com/Bare-Stories-Other-Vietnams-Battlefields-ebook/dp/B0044XV95Y


Lieutenant Colonel James Zumwalt is a retired Marine infantry officer who served in the Vietnam war, the 1989 intervention into Panama and Desert Storm. An author, speaker and business executive, he also currently heads a security consulting firm named after his father--Admiral Zumwalt & Consultants, Inc.

He writes extensively on foreign policy and defense issues, having written hundreds of articles for various newspapers, magazines and professional journals, including:

USA Today The Washington Post The New York Times The Washington Times The LA Times The Chicago Tribune The San Diego Union Parade magazine & others

His articles have covered issues of major importance, oftentimes providing readers with unique perspectives that have never appeared elsewhere. This has resulted, on several occasions, in his work being cited by members of Congress and entered into the US Congressional Record.

His thoughtful perspectives earned him an invitation to join the prestigious Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), of which the honorary co-chairmen are Senator Joe Lieberman, Senator Jon Kyl, former Secretary of State George P. Schultz and former CIA Director R. James Woolsey. The CPD is a non-partisan organization with one goal--to stiffen American resolve to confront the challenge presented by terrorism and the ideologies that drive it.

Colonel Zumwalt is featured as one of 56 US military professionals in LEADING THE WAY, a book by best-selling author Al Santoli, which documents the most critical moments of the interviewees' combat experiences from Vietnam to Somalia.

He has also been cited in numerous other books and publications for unique insights based on his research on the Vietnam war, North Korea (a country he has visited ten times and about which he is able to share some very telling observations) and Desert Storm.

Colonel Zumwalt received a presidential appointment to be the Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in which capacity he served from 1991-1992.

Because of his expertise, he also was asked to participate in a very unique educational project conducted at a high school in Raleigh, North Carolina, where he voluntarily contributes time and resources to educating students on issues of international importance.

AdamG
06-15-2015, 01:31 AM
Soviet veterans' website
http://www.nhat-nam.ru/vietnamwar/oldfoto.html

davidbfpo
08-17-2015, 10:43 AM
Another short article from Defence-in-Depth, by a USMC LtCol, which I expect will be of interest;).

It opens with:
In the 50 years since US Marines first landed at Da Nang on the morning of 8 March 1965, the history of their involvement in the Vietnam War has been one of the most misunderstood and sometimes contentious topics in modern military history. In most cases historians assert that the Marines had neither a clear understanding of the conflict nor the American military strategy to contain the spread of Communism in South Vietnam. By extension, the Marines’ involvement from 1965 to 1968 is often depicted as a series of unplanned and isolated events, demonstrating a divide between the Marines’ long-term vision and operational approach and the overall American military strategy in Vietnam. This interpretation, whilst enduring, has come to obscure the centrality of the Marines’ approach to implementing American strategy.
The landings at Da Nang, exemplify this problem.Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2015/08/17/reconsidering-us-marine-corps-involvement-in-the-vietnam-war/

The author's very short bio:
LtCol Nevgloski, assigned as the operations officer of The Basic School School, Quantico, VA, is completing his doctoral thesis on the US Marine Corps planning for Vietnam in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London.

Condor
08-17-2015, 09:13 PM
Another short article from Defence-in-Depth, by a USMC LtCol, which I expect will be of interest;).

It opens with:
Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2015/08/17/reconsidering-us-marine-corps-involvement-in-the-vietnam-war/

The author's very short bio:

Good article, but I could be biased since a) I know the author (went to TBS with him) and b) I'm a Marine. ;)

SWJ Blog
10-12-2015, 03:50 PM
Living and Breathing: Just Another Day in Vietnam (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/living-and-breathing-just-another-day-in-vietnam)

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SWJ Blog
11-03-2015, 08:42 AM
Spies, Advisors, and Grunts: Film Portrayals of Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/spies-advisors-and-grunts-film-portrayals-of-counterinsurgency-in-vietnam)

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SWJ Blog
12-15-2015, 11:49 AM
Game Review: Fire in the Lake, the Vietnam War, 1964-75 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/game-review-fire-in-the-lake-the-vietnam-war-1964-75)

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SWJ Blog
01-27-2016, 12:32 AM
The Easter Offensive of 1972: A Failure to Use Intelligence (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-easter-offensive-of-1972-a-failure-to-use-intelligence)

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SWJ Blog
05-25-2016, 08:01 AM
Moving On In Vietnam, But Remembering Its Lessons (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/moving-on-in-vietnam-but-remembering-its-lessons)

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SWJ Blog
07-09-2016, 10:31 PM
Some Sounds and Senses - Vietnam (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/some-sounds-and-senses-vietnam)

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SWJ Blog
01-10-2017, 05:09 PM
1967: The Era of Big Battles in Vietnam (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/1967-the-era-of-big-battles-in-vietnam)

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Bob's World
01-18-2017, 02:26 PM
Moderator Adds

This post was copied from another thread: Strategy begins with empathy: Netflix series "Colony" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=24879) and lightly edited to sit here.(Ends).

The attached link is to an perspective on Vietnam that closely mirrors my own assessment of the nature of that conflict. For those who buy into the uniquely American perspective that "we defeated the insurgency in South Vietnam, and it was only after we left that the state of South Vietnam was defeated in traditional combat by the state of North Vietnam," this will require taking a more empathetic perspective.

I have heard General Keane state in person, but many other "experts" as well, and certainly the dominating theme in US written histories of the conflict is the "we won but they lost after we left" perspective. That is, IMO, not being able to see the strategic forest for the tactical trees.

A good read, regardless of personal perspective:

http://discover.wooster.edu/jgates/peoples-war-in-vietnam/

davidbfpo
01-18-2017, 05:49 PM
With the catalyst of Bob's Post and it's link I have merged eleven small threads into this main thread. Some had 9k views, but only one post.:)

When you search for Vietnam in thread titles there are just over thirty, but for the purposes of the history of the Vietnam War a small number, all closed appear very appropriate:

1) The Advisory or Advisor Challenge, with 102 posts and 90k views:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4690&highlight=vietnam
2) Vietnam collection (lessons plus), with 140 posts and 82k views:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1041&highlight=vietnam

Neither can be merged in, as the sequence of posts would be crazy.:cool:

SWJ Blog
01-24-2017, 08:50 PM
Vietnam ’67: At Quang Nam, a Raid and a Reckoning (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/vietnam-%E2%80%9967-at-quang-nam-a-raid-and-a-reckoning)

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davidbfpo
02-04-2017, 08:07 PM
A new book 'A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA' by Joshua Kurlantzick and a WoTR article reviews the arguments. It starts with:
If you work at it, you can make a case that Americans fought on the right side in Vietnam. There is an argument — not conclusive, but defensible — that with all its faults, the anti-Communist side offered South Vietnam’s people a freer and more prosperous future than they would face if the Communists won. That didn’t mean war was a wise choice or that its goal justified the death and destruction it caused. But Americans looking for some moral comfort could at least tell themselves that they were fighting for a better outcome for the Vietnamese. By contrast, it is harder to find anything morally defensible in American actions in Laos and Cambodia. U.S. operations in those countries, including among the heaviest bombing in military history (http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/607706/jfq-78-the-limits-of-airpower-or-the-limits-of-strategy-the-air-wars-in-vietnam/), were conducted to support American objectives in Vietnam rather than for any achievable benefit for its smaller, weaker neighbors. That was also the reason for U.S. air support and military aid that kept weak, ineptly led local Laotian and Cambodian ground forces in the field long after it was clear they had no chance of winning against their stronger North Vietnamese enemies.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/the-secret-war-that-transformed-the-cia/

His Amazon bio:
Joshua Kurlantzick is a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been a correspondent in Southeast Asia for The Economist, a columnist for Time, the foreign editor of the New Republic, a senior correspondent for the American Prospect, and a contributing writer for Mother Jones. He has written about Asia for publications ranging from Rolling Stone to The New York Times Magazine. He is the winner of the Luce Scholarship and was selected as a finalist for the Osborn Elliot prize, both for journalism in Asia. He is the author of four previous books on Asia. For more information on Kurlantzick, visit CFR.org.
Link to Amazon, with very mixed reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Great-Place-Have-War-Military/dp/1451667868/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485802168&sr=8-1&keywords=a+great+place+to+have+a+war

davidbfpo
02-04-2017, 08:12 PM
I have reviewed a number of the Vietnam-related threads in this area and merged eight of them into this the main thread.

Five others remain in this arena, I have added Vietnam to the title field so they can be readily identified. They remain separate as they are large and merging would destroy the posts in response. A larger number in various places refer to Vietnam.

Possibly the most significant is a "lessons learnt" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1041

SWJ Blog
02-21-2017, 12:30 PM
Vietnam '67 - Bernard Fall: The Man Who Knew the War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/vietnam-67-bernard-fall-the-man-who-knew-the-war)

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SWJ Blog
05-22-2017, 12:10 PM
Was Vietnam Winnable? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/was-vietnam-winnable)

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SWJ Blog
05-29-2017, 04:23 PM
Ken Burns Talks About the Vietnam War, the Wall and His New Documentary (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ken-burns-talks-about-the-vietnam-war-the-wall-and-his-new-documentary)

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Azor
06-22-2017, 04:49 PM
By Robert Farley at War is Boring: https://warisboring.com/could-the-united-states-have-really-won-in-vietnam/

Introduction:


Mark Moyar, the scholar of U.S. foreign and military policy, recently had the opportunity to update (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/opinion/was-vietnam-winnable.html?mcubz=0&_r=0&mtrref=undefined&gwh=21461AE4A92ADA37CE41FABB6C75E883&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion) an older argument on the viability of the Vietnam War.

Moyar argues that the historical consensus on the war is wrong on several points, and that in fact the United States could have won the war and preserved the Saigon government at acceptable cost.

While Moyar’s argument is worth consideration, he still fails to make his case against the long-standing consensus on the war.

Moyar's key points:


South Vietnam was a viable state by 1972, afflicted but not overwhelmed by insurgency
Local Communist forces in South Vietnam had been mortally wounded in 1968
With U.S. support, South Vietnam could blunt and even defeat North Vietnamese offensives
Saigon was far more democratic and less repressive than Hanoi
The war was less unpopular in the U.S. at the time than it is presently


Farley’s “realities”:


South Vietnam could not survive on its own in the way of South Korea
Hanoi was unified whereas Saigon was prone to infighting
The U.S. could not have stopped North Vietnamese aggression
The war was unpopular enough that Nixon faced no opposition in 1972 for abandoning South Vietnam, and Ford could not generate any support for re-engagement in 1975
The U.S. could have militarily won by invading and occupying North Vietnam or have merely remained engaged in the South indefinitely, but both options would have been very costly politically and materially

Bob's World
06-22-2017, 09:39 PM
Gotta disagree with Mark, as he is arguing based upon the US narrative on the war, rather than the Vietnamese reality. The "states" of North and South Vietnam were legal fictions created by the US in an effort to deny the Vietnamese people the victory they had won to remove the French and attain a self determined government. The victors came from across Vietnam and were forced to withdraw into what became North Vietnam. Meanwhile the insurgency continued in the Maoist model of ebb and flow until they finally prevailed. Sure, we could have delayed their independence even longer than the 30 years we did, but it would have happened eventually. Conflicts are what they are, caring little for how they are named or perceived by various parties. The US completely misunderstood and mis- defined that conflict. A mistake we are repeating in a few places currently as well.

davidbfpo
06-23-2017, 08:18 AM
There are a number of SWJ articles on this question and two caught my attention:

1) In 2009'A Better Understanding of the Vietnam War'byColonel Gian Gentile and there is a telling quote:
...the war could [not] have been 'won' in any meaningful sense at a moral or material cost most Americans deemed acceptable.
Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-better-understanding-of-the-vietnam-war

2) In 2011 'Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy' by David Maxwell, that is a pointer to a Parameters article by Colonel John Collins. This led to thirty-five comments. Amidst them is one by Ken White, cited in part, with my emphasis:
If we cannot discuss history and current activities then we may have to fight them again as you say -- but I do not believe it will be a like it or not problem. It will be a choice on our part. I for one submit that Vietnam was a mistake in all aspect
Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/vietnam-postmortem-a-senseless-strategy

davidbfpo
07-02-2017, 08:30 PM
Maybe timely a new PBS series is due, by Ken Burns and The Guardian has a report. The headline and sub-title:
Ken Burns returns to take on Vietnam – 'a war we have consciously ignored' Burns’s new 10-part, 18-hour epic film covers the conflict from all sides, and hopes to ‘shape more courageous conversations about what took place’
The war in south-east Asia is now the subject of an epic 10-part, 18-hour series by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick. Burns is America’s premier documentary film-maker....
The series, which premieres on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) on 17 September in the US and will be released in full on DVD in the UK, includes rarely seen archival footage, photographs, TV broadcasts, home movies and secret audio recordings from the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations, as well as music of the period....Link:https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/01/ken-burns-america-foreign-policy?

SWJ Blog
09-04-2017, 07:15 PM
7 Important Weapons Used By the United States in the Vietnam War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/7-important-weapons-used-by-the-united-states-in-the-vietnam-war)

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SWJ Blog
09-16-2017, 02:47 PM
Documentary Review - Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's ‘The Vietnam War’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/documentary-review-ken-burns-and-lynn-novicks-%E2%80%98the-vietnam-war%E2%80%99)

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SWJ Blog
09-17-2017, 02:42 PM
Ken Burns’ Vietnam War Docu-Series Premieres Today (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ken-burns%E2%80%99-vietnam-war-docu-series-premieres-today)

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SWJ Blog
09-21-2017, 08:32 PM
Navy Completes Vietnam War Book Series (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/navy-completes-vietnam-war-book-series)

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