Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread)

[Mike Innes]

You might want to check out Brian Glyn Williams' post at the Complex Terrain Lab (http://www.terraplexic.org/journal/author/brianglynwilliams). He's been directly involved with the HTT program. As an historian AND one who's subject matter expertise is actually relevant to the work, he offers some interesting observations.

[marct]

You might want to check out Brian Glyn Williams' post at the Complex Terrain Lab (http://www.terraplexic.org/journal/author/brianglynwilliams). He's been directly involved with the HTT program. As an historian AND one who's subject matter expertise is actually relevant to the work, he offers some interesting observations.

I'll second that :D. Interesting page all told, although I can hardly read the publications age because the type is so small in my browser (Firefox, 2.0.0.14).

[Mike Innes]

Roger that - thanks for the input. Still ironing out wrinkles and smoothing rough patches on the site.

[marct]

Roger that - thanks for the input. Still ironing out wrinkles and smoothing rough patches on the site.

No worries :D. I suspect it's a glitch in you css - probably an em set a <.71 (that's a common problem with Firefox).

[Mike Innes]

Fixed

[Stan]

Hey Mike,


You might want to check out Brian Glyn Williams' post at the Complex Terrain Lab (http://www.terraplexic.org/journal/author/brianglynwilliams). He's been directly involved with the HTT program. As an historian AND one who's subject matter expertise is actually relevant to the work, he offers some interesting observations.

Great stuff and in layman's terms to boot :) Please pass on my thanks to Brian for a Job Well Done !


Anthropologists who feel that their noble profession is being used for nefarious purposes should see their job as one that can allow 19 year olds from Kansas understand their frightening environment. At the end of the day, anthropologists in Afghanistan are not working on the Manhattan project, they are helping to interpret other worlds to those whose lives literally depends upon such things as knowing a simple Muslim greeting, understanding which hand is unclean, knowing the real distinction between a mosque and a madrassa, and knowing how to deal witih namuz (pride in protecting one’s womenfolk, home place and faith).

Regards, Stan

[Ron Humphrey]

You might want to check out Brian Glyn Williams' post at the Complex Terrain Lab (http://www.terraplexic.org/journal/author/brianglynwilliams). He's been directly involved with the HTT program. As an historian AND one who's subject matter expertise is actually relevant to the work, he offers some interesting observations.

would like to know if he has written in more detail some of his experiences and the way he approaches the relationship between the HTT and their military teammates?

[Mike Innes]

Brian's one of those rare creatures. He's a scholar, tenured, etc. - and also spends extensive time on the ground, so he knows whereof he speaks. He's also got an online portfolio site, at http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/, where you can reference his writings for yourself.

His writing is also genius in that he doesn't just write for the three other scholars in the field who might understand him in those terms. He writes with great great style, and communicates his findings in such an engaging way, that it's always a pleasure to read. The best part is that a lot of is contemporary and experiential - he writes from the ground, and places you in the scene.

[Mike Innes]

Hey Mike,



Great stuff and in layman's terms to boot :) Please pass on my thanks to Brian for a Job Well Done !



Regards, Stan

Cheers :)

[Stan]

There's also an update at Wired on this.

Marc, thanks for the post and link !
I fully enjoy Sharon's articles and her overall style. She draws intriguing and valid questions regarding the HTT program.

However, I didn't get the warm fuzzies with this article's comments by Derek Gregory. It's fairly easy to pick an individual's journal apart and comment on those areas that seem controversial or contradictory, leaving out all the other significant findings. I'd have taken Derek's comments far more seriously if his site wasn't like a gigantic Newsweek and CNN advertisement and his statement about General Petraeus being little more than an iconic figure :wry:

What I wouldn't give to know his language skills :D

Regards, Stan

[marct]

From Savage Minds (http://savageminds.org/2008/04/19/hts-in-newsweek/).

A response to the Newsweek (http://www.newsweek.com/id/131752/page/1) story by Montgomery McFate published, in full at Wired (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/04/gates-human-ter.html).


Having long been an admirer of Newsweek, I found your failure to fact check the story by Dan Ephron & Silvia Springs entitled "A gun in one hand, a pen in the other" (21 April issue) completely shocking. One naturally expects more from Newsweek than such sloppy journalism.The latest version of her responses can be found in the attachment.

[edit] See later post
Marc

[marct]

As always, Savage Minds comes up with some of the most interesting (:rolleyes:) questions...


Montgomery’s Minerva?

Pure speculation. Does Montgomery McFate have the ear of Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense? I was jumping around some sites related to the HTS discussion when I noticed the following quotes from a summary of a presentation that McFate gave {in May 2007} on ‘The Cultural Knowledge Gap and Its Consequences for National Security.

More... (http://savageminds.org/2008/04/21/montgomerys-minerva/)

Given the comments, I suspect that Mongomery is getting heartily sick and tired of all the fooforah. As Oneman noted in his comment (), "anthropology has managed a lot of amazing things in the last 40 years, without military help" and this is quite true, it has. Of course, getting rid of the four square model that used to dominate the field, making the discipline increasingly irrelevant to lived reality, and driving away potential students are not things I would want to brag about ;).

[marct]

From Philip Carl Salzman on the Middle East Strategy at Harvard blog


Uncle Sam Wants You
From Philip Carl Salzman

“He must be a spy,” said the visiting Baluch, bearded, turbaned, and baggy in long shirt and trousers. My fellow camp mates of the Dadolzai shrugged. They had accepted me and were past wondering exactly how I got there. “Sure,” I replied; “the government”—whether Iranian or American was left unspecified, “they are paying me big bucks to tell them how many rocks”—I point at rocks on the ground—”there are in Baluchistan. And they are very interested in how many of these”—goat turds—”there are in Baluchistan.” Camp mates shrug; visitor is now bored with the subject.

New locale: Rajasthan. The Brahman veterinarian from the Sheep and Wool Service who served as my guide, local expert, and traveling companion, assured me that everyone knew that so-called tourists who went to Jaisalmer, up near the Pakistan border, to ride the camel safaris in the sand dunes were really spies. “Why,” he said, “they went missing for days at a time, and we know what they are spying.” His trump argument: “No well-to-do, educated people would ever do anything so dumb as to want to ride camels in the desert, for fun.”

It is very common for anthropologists, and foreigners in general, to be regarded as spies, agents, dubious, and perhaps dangerous. So the oft-heard plea of researchers—”We can’t ever work for government or people will think all of us all the time are spies and agents”—seems at the very least naive, and, one cannot help thinking, disingenuous.

More... (http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/04/uncle_sam_wants_you/)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Williams' remark "anthropologists in Afghanistan are not working on the Manhattan project" might also have included "nor the Phoenix Program." :D

[marct]

Williams' remark "anthropologists in Afghanistan are not working on the Manhattan project" might also have included "nor the Phoenix Program." :D

LOLOL. I mean, seriously (quoth he with tongue planted firmly in cheek), all reall Anthropologists are already involved with the Post-Colonial version of the Phoenix Program - figuring out who is sympathetic to the military and conducting targeted character assassinations on them :cool:.

I think my favorite line in the entire piece was

It is not that anthropologists believe any more in neutrality, objectivity, or truth. These ideas are largely deceased among social and cultural anthropologists (excepting behavioral/evolutionary ecologists). On the contrary, subjectivity is now explicitly paired with political commitment as the twin pillars of anthropology. As there is no point seeking “truth,” the only purpose of the field is advancing the interests of the subaltern: people of color, women, gays, workers, the third world, and so on. Thus the call from the most famous of contemporary anthropologists, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, for “revolutionary anthropology.” This is a “postcolonial” extension of the Marxism that was so popular in anthropology for the decades prior to the fall of the Soviet Union.

What really gets me about this is that they haven't followed their own logic: since the military is obviously being oppressed by incompetent (and incoherent) politicians, attacked by almost every academic discipline, and the subject of extensive media spin, obviously they need Anthropologists to speak for them :eek::D!

[Rex Brynen]

...one of the advance/ground team for the July 2002 assassination in Gaza of Hamas military commander Salah Shehadeh was allegedly posing as a Canadian sociologist, and Palestinian counterintelligence services had suspicions that one of the advance/ground team for the 1988 Tunis assassination of Fateh military commander Khalil al-Wazir was posing as a Western graduate student. Whether either claim is true I don't know, although the former was substantive enough for Ottawa to pursue the issue with the Israeli government.

As for myself, while doing my own PhD research I was once accused of being an spy while in a safe house full of armed men belonging to one of the designated foreign terrorist organizations. My unfeigned outrage won me laughter, several cups of Turkish coffee, and a very good interview. (My interview subject was later assassinated in 2001.)

As to Phil Salzman's broader point on MESH, he's correct that scholars (and especially anthropologists) are very wary of excessively close connection with the government/military for both ideological and scholarly reasons.

Regarding the latter, I'm struck by the extent to which--despite all the hot debate on HTTs, Project Minerva, and so forth--there has been very little substantive analysis of the pluses and minuses of the relationship, how to address the ethical issues involved, and other practical issues. (SWJ and Savage Minds (http://savageminds.org/) being, in general, relatively rare exceptions to this pattern.)

Instead, much of the commentary and discussion remains far too polemical to be useful.

[Ron Humphrey]

As always, Savage Minds comes up with some of the most interesting (:rolleyes:) questions...



Given the comments, I suspect that Mongomery is getting heartily sick and tired of all the fooforah. As Oneman noted in his comment (), "anthropology has managed a lot of amazing things in the last 40 years, without military help" and this is quite true, it has. Of course, getting rid of the four square model that used to dominate the field, making the discipline increasingly irrelevant to lived reality, and driving away potential students are not things I would want to brag about ;).

I suspect that MR Gates ears have been trained on a lot more than people may realize. From everything I've seen and heard he really believes that listening is the best way to learn whats really going on and I'd bet he probably does exactly that a lot more than most think.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"It is not that anthropologists believe any more in neutrality, objectivity, or truth."

Sounds like they're just like journalists! :eek:

[Ken White]

Williams' remark "anthropologists in Afghanistan are not working on the Manhattan project" might also have included "nor the Phoenix Program." :DPhoenix worked. It wasn't very nice but then war isn't nice.

The 'principles' of 'fighting cleanly' and minimal force have always intrigued me. Both those efforts can only prolong a war and thus produce more widespread suffering. Beautiful example of cutting off one's nose...

[Mike Innes]

Regarding the latter, I'm struck by the extent to which--despite all the hot debate on HTTs, Project Minerva, and so forth--there has been very little substantive analysis of the pluses and minuses of the relationship, how to address the ethical issues involved, and other practical issues. (SWJ and Savage Minds (http://savageminds.org/) being, in general, relatively rare exceptions to this pattern.)

Instead, much of the commentary and discussion remains far too polemical to be useful.

Hear hear!

[marct]

Hi Rex,


As to Phil Salzman's broader point on MESH, he's correct that scholars (and especially anthropologists) are very wary of excessively close connection with the government/military for both ideological and scholarly reasons.

I would add in "historical" as well and, possibly, metaphysical (I really don't want to get into that one here...).


Regarding the latter, I'm struck by the extent to which--despite all the hot debate on HTTs, Project Minerva, and so forth--there has been very little substantive analysis of the pluses and minuses of the relationship, how to address the ethical issues involved, and other practical issues. (SWJ and Savage Minds (http://savageminds.org/) being, in general, relatively rare exceptions to this pattern.)

Instead, much of the commentary and discussion remains far too polemical to be useful.

On the whole, I agree with you on that. I could point out a few more, Marcus Griffin (http://savageminds.org/2007/08/13/professor-griffin-goes-to-baghdad/) comes to mind but, on the whole, it tends to be here and SM (and a few private lists like MilAnthNet).

I've often suspected that part of the problem is some pretty basic different philosophical assumptions about "reality". In many ways, the position taken by a lot of the extreme anti-military crowd are on the extreme end of social constructivism - "reality is a social construct". This, at least in many of the forms it shows up in, is an extreme version of "nurture" (vs. Nature) or free-will vs. predestination and one that disregards many of the scientific discoveries of the past 20 years in the area of neuro-cognition, etc.

In this paradigm, conflict cannot be "natural" since "nature" is an illusion that is used as a rhetorical device to explain the complexities of social manipulation. Since conflict arises from the social, then we must look to the social for its causes and this can only be because of the US (okay, I skipped out about 10 intermediate levels in the causal chain, but, hey, this isn't a dissertation!).

I noted that Phil specifically excepted the behavioural and evolutionary crowd in Anthropology which, on the whole, doesn't surprise me at all since these are some of the few people who still look at "nature" (read biology and neuro-biology).

As an observation, it gets really hard to argue ethics when you are coming from totally contradictory metaphysical positions about the nature of reality!

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Phoenix worked. It wasn't very nice but then war isn't nice.

It not only worked it is probably one of the more effective tactics in prosecuting COIN, when used judiciously. The anthro's shudder to think their research will be used in such a way without realizing that in actuality their help might actually allow us to win without going that far.

Unfortunately there are many who believe that you can fight a war by being nice. Reminds me of Orwell's observation: "People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf."

[marct]

It not only worked it is probably one of the more effective tactics in prosecuting COIN, when used judiciously.

I'm not so sure about that, at least as an absolute statement. First off, it "worked" in a particular time and place and, most important, media environment. Second, while it was a tactical success, the war was still lost and I've never really liked "the operation was a success but the patient died" type of argument.

I think the key to using a tactic like Phoenix is inherent in the word "judicial", especially with all of the current concerns over rule of law.


The anthro's shudder to think their research will be used in such a way without realizing that in actuality their help might actually allow us to win without going that far.

Now you're buying into Anthro propaganda :D. It's always nice to know that people think we could win the wars without having to resort to a Phoenix type program if only(!!) we had the help of Anthropologists :D. Reality? Pretty unlikely. I think that Anthropological insights can help make such a program limited in nature but you're still going to have to "neutralize" some people either via imprisonmen or assassination.

Besides anything else, a lot of the anger was over being lied to and feeling "betrayed" by the "misuse" of our research. As an analogue, how would you feel over an SF op to destroy Venezuala's oil production facilities only to discover afterwards that the op was a "favour" to Haliburton executives so they could maximize their profits?


Unfortunately there are many who believe that you can fight a war by being nice. Reminds me of Orwell's observation: "People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf."

Agreed with that; it's not an illusion I've ever had. And, let me just also note for the record, I have nothing against targeted assassinations either if they can be 99% guaranteed to have a "positive" effect (something I said when I was being interviewed for the AAA ethics committee on working with the military). I have very little time for people who bitch and complain about how everything is the fault of the West while they take advantage of the freedom to actually say that and not get arrested and interned. Bunch of soi disant, self-proclaimed "elites" who have no concept that each right is balanced by a responsibility! These are the same people who will call for blood when their own interests are attacked.

[/rant...]

At the same time, I refuse to do covert research with people that may, later, be used to "neutralize" them (obviously within foreseeable limits :wry:), and I will not betray my informants. That's my personal line in the sand; it doesn't mean that I won't do secondary research that has a direct impact on a war (hey, Ruth Benedict did that!). Nor does it mean that I won't try and do my best to make sure that people going in theatre have the best advice I can give them if they ask for it.

[Ken White]

using half measures in an attempt to reduce the suffering caused almost invariably ends up in prolonging that war (usually immeasurably) and thus inducing even more suffering it seems a short sighted, illogical and even inhumane approach to me.

But I'm just a uneddicated grunt... :D

[Hacksaw]

Marc you hurt my brain, but judging from my picture its a minor achievement :D

[SteveMetz]

I must add that anthropologists may today's masters of 1960s intellectual leftist silliness, but they don't have a monopoly. I was at an AFRICOM conference at the Pentagon Doubletree yesterday listening to a historian basically make the argument that training African militaries is a bad idea since it simply made them more effective at repressing "the people." Give you one guess as to where said historian took his bachelor's degree.

[marct]

I must add that anthropologists may today's masters of 1960s intellectual leftist silliness, but they don't have a monopoly. I was at an AFRICOM conference at the Pentagon Doubletree yesterday listening to a historian basically make the argument that training African militaries is a bad idea since it simply made them more effective at repressing "the people."

Yeah, I've heard that argument as well :rolleyes:. Recently, I've been thinking that if Africom wanted to start off on the right foot, they should do some live fire training in Zimbabwe ;).

[marct]

Marc you hurt my brain, but judging from my picture its a minor achievement :D

Hacksaw, let me introduce you to my old Anthro ethics tutor...

http://arnaud.rousset3.free.fr/images/beer-smiley.gif

[Ken White]

I'm not so sure about that, at least as an absolute statement. First off, it "worked" in a particular time and place and, most important, media environment. Second, while it was a tactical success, the war was still lost and I've never really liked "the operation was a success but the patient died" type of argument.The war was lost because the Army screwed it up for seven years and lost support of the politicians. The fact that the effort got turned around (and Phoenix played a part in that) too late to und the early errors does not negate the value of the program -- sort of the operation was a success but the patient died due to a cancer...
I think the key to using a tactic like Phoenix is inherent in the word "judicial", especially with all of the current concerns over rule of law.True. Though I would submit that current concerns may modify upwards or downwards dependent upon many things.
Agreed with that; it's not an illusion I've ever had. And, let me just also note for the record, I have nothing against targeted assassinations either if they can be 99% guaranteed to have a "positive" effect (something I said when I was being interviewed for the AAA ethics committee on working with the military). I have very little time for people who bitch and complain about how everything is the fault of the West while they take advantage of the freedom to actually say that and not get arrested and interned. Bunch of soi disant, self-proclaimed "elites" who have no concept that each right is balanced by a responsibility! These are the same people who will call for blood when their own interests are attacked.Heh. Yep...
At the same time, I refuse to do covert research with people that may, later, be used to "neutralize" them (obviously within foreseeable limits :wry:), and I will not betray my informants. That's my personal line in the sand; it doesn't mean that I won't do secondary research that has a direct impact on a war (hey, Ruth Benedict did that!). Nor does it mean that I won't try and do my best to make sure that people going in theatre have the best advice I can give them if they ask for it.Sounds totally ethical, moral and logical to me. Good for you!

[Rex Brynen]

I must add that anthropologists may today's masters of 1960s intellectual leftist silliness, but they don't have a monopoly. I was at an AFRICOM conference at the Pentagon Doubletree yesterday listening to a historian basically make the argument that training African militaries is a bad idea since it simply made them more effective at repressing "the people." Give you one guess as to where said historian took his bachelor's degree.

It is not, however, an irrelevant point--I think inadequate attention has been given to how military training, assistance to civilian police institutions, and indeed role-of-law sectoral assistance more broadly can have a range of undesired effects, including reinforcing patron-client structures in the security sector, and strengthening the repressive apparatus of authoritarian regimes.

Obviously, this certainly isn't to say that it shouldn't ever be done. It is to say that it is worth thinking about how it is best done, and how to maximize the positive while minimizing the negatives...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

how would you feel over an SF op to destroy Venezuala's oil production facilities only to discover afterwards that the op was a "favour" to Haliburton executives so they could maximize their profits?


have you been sneaking down here and looking into our playbook? Who told you about this op? :D

Phoenix was way too late. South Vietnam had pretty much lost the war in '62 thanks to Diem's ruthless policies, capped by Decree 10/59. Then the '63 coup left the country leaderless for too many years, in which time the NLF consolidated its hold. '68 was a heavy blow to the NLF but it had the same affect as the Red River Delta Offensive had on the Viet Minh in '51, it only made them stronger. Had we initiated CORD/Phoenix in '65 we might have come out on top.

But by eliminating leadership judiciously (and permanently) faster than they can be replaced makes many an insurgent take a closer look at the benefits of capitalism. :)

[Mike Innes]

It is not, however, an irrelevant point--I think inadequate attention has been given to how military training, assistance to civilian police institutions, and indeed role-of-law sectoral assistance more broadly can have a range of undesired effects, including reinforcing patron-client structures in the security sector, and strengthening the repressive apparatus of authoritarian regimes.

Obviously, this certainly isn't to say that it shouldn't ever be done. It is to say that it is worth thinking about how it is best done, and how to maximize the positive while minimizing the negatives...

Right. I think one of the most important consequences of some kinds of interventions is precisely the lack of follow-on mentoring needed to ensure new equipment and new skills aren't put to ill use. And that's where things can fall short. State-building is all fine and well, but if said capacity - which for our interests centers on the capacity to justify political borders and a corresponding entitlement to sovereign powers - isn't coupled with some form of longer term external oversight (can it be done non-paternalistically?) that understands local level issues and implementation, then the risk is that the abuses can happen.

[marct]

The war was lost because the Army screwed it up for seven years and lost support of the politicians. The fact that the effort got turned around (and Phoenix played a part in that) too late to und the early errors does not negate the value of the program -- sort of the operation was a success but the patient died due to a cancer

Well, in extreme cases radical surgery works - I've just always been in favour of preventative medicine or early surgery ;).




I think the key to using a tactic like Phoenix is inherent in the word "judicial", especially with all of the current concerns over rule of law....True. Though I would submit that current concerns may modify upwards or downwards dependent upon many things.

Yeah, that is definitely true. The worst part about itis the effect it can have on the people executing it (pun not intended). There's an all too easy slippery slope that can destroy people all too easily. In some ways, I'm a great believer in the potential for "salvation" (yeah, Stan, I know... I'm a romantic). Still and all, some people just need to be involuntarily discarnated and told "get it right next time"!


have you been sneaking down here and looking into our playbook? Who told you about this op? :D

Nah, I just popped over to a friends blog and read it there :eek:.


But by eliminating leadership judiciously (and permanently) faster than they can be replaced makes many an insurgent take a closer look at the benefits of capitalism.

Very true! After all, given the current fad for foreign outsourceing amongst the US government, they could easily find high paying employment in the near future :p. Personally, I have nothing against capitalism, even though we have never seen it in action. I prefer KYFHO (http://crankyinsomniac.blogspot.com/2006/03/kyfho.html)as a guiding philosophy...

[SteveMetz]

It is not, however, an irrelevant point--I think inadequate attention has been given to how military training, assistance to civilian police institutions, and indeed role-of-law sectoral assistance more broadly can have a range of undesired effects, including reinforcing patron-client structures in the security sector, and strengthening the repressive apparatus of authoritarian regimes.

Obviously, this certainly isn't to say that it shouldn't ever be done. It is to say that it is worth thinking about how it is best done, and how to maximize the positive while minimizing the negatives...


The training by the U.S. does as much as possible to reinforce respect for human rights, civilian control of the military etc. No doubt people trained by the U.S. commit abuses. What I was taking issue with was this guy's assumption that ANY military is by definition going to be abusive so, in his warped logic, not training foreign militaries is better. I guess that's why places without a professional military like Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are such bastions of peace.

My other favorite bit of nonsense at the conference was the argument by a very charming Liberian-American woman that since small arms fuel African conflicts and the U.S. is the world's largest arms producer, the U.S. is to blame for African conflicts. I tried to make the point that only a minuscule percentage of the small arms in Africa come from the U.S. but she was determined not to let facts interfere with a perfectly good ideological point.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

of anything that starts with "KY" :eek:

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I agree. That is also a basic tenent of traditional martial arts.

[Tom Odom]

The training by the U.S. does as much as possible to reinforce respect for human rights, civilian control of the military etc. No doubt people trained by the U.S. commit abuses. What I was taking issue with was this guy's assumption that ANY military is by definition going to be abusive so, in his warped logic, not training foreign militaries is better. I guess that's why places without a professional military like Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are such bastions of peace.

My other favorite bit of nonsense at the conference was the argument by a very charming Liberian-American woman that since small arms fuel African conflicts and the U.S. is the world's largest arms producer, the U.S. is to blame for African conflicts. I tried to make the point that only a minuscule percentage of the small arms in Africa come from the U.S. but she was determined not to let facts interfere with a perfectly good ideological point.

Thank you, Steve!

Please tell State Department that as many in Foggy Bottom operate uinder those exact same assumptions

As for the "trained" military that repressess the population, that always seems to come around to Zaire/Congo as a talking point, to whit that Western training of Zairian/Congolese security forces made them more inclined to suppress the Zairians/Congolese and that absent such training the Zairian/Congolese military would not be so inclined.

The extension of this logic led a senior State department envoy to challenge me to "reform and downsize" the Zairian military so that democracy would flower in the Congo. The funny thing was and still is that the US never emphasized direct combat training or lethal arms in our assistance to the Zairians. That came from the French, the Egyptians, and the Israelis. The primary architects of units targeted toward internal security were the Egyptians and the Israelis and the latter were by far the most blatant in doing so. No doubt that the US paid a key role in setting those things up but the lead agancy in that effort was State.

As for the arms control equates to peace theory, I never saw a machete with a trigger

Tom

[Stan]

As for the arms control equates to peace theory, I never saw a machete with a trigger

Tom

And they want to approve 200K to peacefully engage in anthropology :cool:
Wait for the AAA's response on that one :D

And, as Tom's NCO put it, machetes don't 'click' on empty :wry:

[marct]

The training by the U.S. does as much as possible to reinforce respect for human rights, civilian control of the military etc. No doubt people trained by the U.S. commit abuses. What I was taking issue with was this guy's assumption that ANY military is by definition going to be abusive so, in his warped logic, not training foreign militaries is better. I guess that's why places without a professional military like Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are such bastions of peace.

You know, Steve, I'd grant you that about US training and I agree that this character's logic is so flawed, he must be a follower of Foucault, but I do want to point out a couple of problems. First, training the military to be more professional (and we'll leave of any combat training for the nonce), does nothing to train the politicians who control them.

In a way, this gets us back into the civ-mil relationship and the entire nature of many f these post-colonial "states" (using the term very loosely).



My other favorite bit of nonsense at the conference was the argument by a very charming Liberian-American woman that since small arms fuel African conflicts and the U.S. is the world's largest arms producer, the U.S. is to blame for African conflicts. I tried to make the point that only a minuscule percentage of the small arms in Africa come from the U.S. but she was determined not to let facts interfere with a perfectly good ideological point.

As for the arms control equates to peace theory, I never saw a machete with a trigger

Agreed on machetes, but here's always this....
http://www.backpackingdave.com/euro0220.JPG

[Ken White]

Well, in extreme cases radical surgery works - I've just always been in favour of preventative medicine or early surgery ;).Me too -- but my wife refuses to get a physical so we can see if there may be any incipient problems...

People are funny about that. Then, too the Medical, military and political fields (among many others) are far from error free in the determination of potential problems.
Yeah, that is definitely true. The worst part about itis the effect it can have on the people executing it (pun not intended). There's an all too easy slippery slope that can destroy people all too easily.Which is why I'm a strong believer in psychological testing and personnel selection in most things. Shouldn't be a problem if you get the right sociopaths... :wry:

As an aside, Phoenix was in operation under another name long before the onset of that name and CORDS; it dated back to the earliest days (62 IIRC) and was modeled on a British program from the Malayan Emergency. Some Australian involvement in the set up and training was beneficial. The onset of CORDS saw it ramped up considerably in effort.

[marct]

And they want to approve 200K to peacefully engage in anthropology :cool:
Wait for the AAA's response on that one :D

Drat! I guess that means I won't get that research contract to study the ideological oppression of French baguettes by camembert! Measly 200k! How much fieldwork can you do with that? Especially in Paris :eek::D!

[marct]

People are funny about that. Then, too the Medical, military and political fields (among many others) are far from error free in the determination of potential problems.Which is why I'm a strong believer in psychological testing and personnel selection in most things. Shouldn't be a problem if you get the right sociopaths... :wry:

Too bad we don't have psychological testing for politicians :D.... getting the sociopaths isn't a problem :( (on the right or the left).


As an aside, Phoenix was in operation under another name long before the onset of that name and CORDS; it dated back to the earliest days (62 IIRC) and was modeled on a British program from the Malayan Emergency. Some Australian involvement in the set up and training was beneficial. The onset of CORDS saw it ramped up considerably in effort.

Yeah, I'd read that in John Nagl's book and, also, heard about it from my great uncle (an even earlier version in Sicily in WW II). The basic idea appears workable, but my concern with any program like that is the "false positives". After WW II during the de-Nazification process in Austria, ex-party members lost all social benefits. The problem was that, in order to get them under the Nazi's, you had to be a party member...

That's an operational issue, but there is a deeper philosophical issue which relates to free speech. Any organization that has a monopoly on power has a tendency to use that power to its own benefit (think institutional de Tocqueville). I agree that it is certainly ethical to blow the snot out of someone who is trying to blow the snot out of you, but what if they are just advocating that things should be different without engaging in armed conflict? I can easily see a Phoenix type program being used by repressive regimes to stifle free discussion and freedom of thought and action (BTW, it's one of the reasons why I was opposed to turning over the HTS databases to the host governments).

[SteveMetz]

You know, Steve, I'd grant you that about US training and I agree that this character's logic is so flawed, he must be a follower of Foucault, but I do want to point out a couple of problems. First, training the military to be more professional (and we'll leave of any combat training for the nonce), does nothing to train the politicians who control them.

In a way, this gets us back into the civ-mil relationship and the entire nature of many f these post-colonial "states" (using the term very loosely).

Not exactly true--that's exactly what the regional centers like the Marshall Center and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies do. They realized that for civilian control of the military to work, you have to have civilians who understand defense issues. So they include elected officials, civil servants, and representatives of civil society in their programs.

[Tom Odom]

Not exactly true--that's exactly what the regional centers like the Marshall Center and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies do. They realized that for civilian control of the military to work, you have to have civilians who understand defense issues. So they include elected officials, civil servants, and representatives of civil society in their programs.

And to add to the point, it is very much the role of the country team regardless of composition to engage the conuntry's leadership regarding such assistance. We regrettably have a spotty record in this area; some CTs do it very well, others don't and it is NOT merely a question of DoD versus State. Some of the worst offenders in this arena that I knew were military. Most were on the pure security assistance track and the fell into the trap of "we don't do diplomacy, the ambassador does," which is absolute horse crap. Everyone on a CT is engaged in diplomacy because they have foreign counterparts. Part of the issue is the way that SAO duties have been taught in the past with a centric core of bean counter versus operational purpose.

Tom

[marct]

Here is a link (http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml) to some of the testimony before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee joint with the Subcommittee on Research and Science Education of the Science and Technology Committee. It relates to the role of the social and behavioral sciences in national security.

[Ron Humphrey]

Here is a link (http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml) to some of the testimony before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee joint with the Subcommittee on Research and Science Education of the Science and Technology Committee. It relates to the role of the social and behavioral sciences in national security.

There were some very enlightening portions:)

[Kivlonic]

Hi, I'm new to this discussion board, and for that matter the whole study of COIN strategy and tactics, however the issue of anthropologist in the war zone interest me, I'm about to finish my undergrad, could anyone suggest a graduate level program related to this, pacifically focusing on the Middle East?
Thanks.

[Abu Suleyman]

Hi, I'm new to this discussion board, and for that matter the whole study of COIN strategy and tactics, however the issue of anthropologist in the war zone interest me, I'm about to finish my undergrad, could anyone suggest a graduate level program related to this, pacifically focusing on the Middle East?
Thanks.

Kivlonic,

There are a wide variety of graduate programs available where you can study this sort of thing. I guess my question would be whether you intend to study anthropology as it relates to the war (i.e. how does human behavior affect war), or whether you intend to study the uses of anthropology in war (i.e. how should the sciences or scientists be used in war). If the former you should look at anthropology programs, which are wide, and varied. If the latter, you should look into political science, or international relations.


The bad news is this, (and you probably already know it), most of the better programs application deadlines are long past. Some may have rolling enrollment, but that usually means that you can start in winter, instead of fall.

My advice is the following: If you have at least a year left in school take a class or two in anthropology or one of the Political Sciences that would relate to something like this. If you are about to graduate, and you are interested in the actual prosecution of COIN there is no better 'graduate education' than to get down to business with the the Army or Marine Corps, and you should give serious thought to that. If you cannot serve for some reason, or consider that an unacceptable option (and my only advice on that would be to not let your pride stop you from following what you truly want to do), then you have a year to look at what really interests you.

Sadly, I don't think there is any way that you can get into a program starting in fall. That is not always a huge issue though. You may not have considered all of the commitment that graduate education entails. And what you are interested in now, may not interest you in the long run. If you have a year to burn, don't waste it. Take a class or two; get a job that relates (civilian intelligence); read up (this forum is a great place to start); take your GRE again (required at most universities for admissions to graduate school), and write.

I don't know if any of that helps, but I found myself in a similar position mwwmfr years ago. I joined the army, learned Arabic, went to Iraq, and am now returning to graduate education all these many years later. I think the pause helped me to focus in on what I really wanted to do, and it has also made me much more highly marketable. If I had done it the other way around, I don't think I could have done it.

[Rex Brynen]

I would echo the excellent advice from Abu Suleyman.

It is too late to be applying to a graduate programme now--aim for fall 2009.

I also agree that its useful getting some practical experience before graduate school. I did a short stint in the (Canadian) reserves before going on for my graduate degrees. If you don't want to make the full commitment to the Army or Marines, you could also consider internship or volunteer with a UN agency or NGO in the field--its another essential part of peace and stabilization operations, and easier to arrange for a 4-12 month period.

[Beelzebubalicious]

I graduated with a Masters in Applied Anthropology from the University of Maryland, College Park. It's a sort of self-directed program. You have to choose one of their four or five broad areas, but within that you select what your focus is going to be and then you research and prepare a capstone project. If you select a topic (for me, anthropology of violence/war) for which there is no corresponding faculty member, it's up to you to figure it out and work it out, but you can also select from a wider group of faculty (I took one from the conflict studies program) for your advisor group. I preferred this approach since nobody is going to give you a career and what everyone needs to do is figure out what' the best way to define your niche and who are the people that can help you along the way.

Of course, most of what I've learned about war and violence is from my own eyes and ears (to the extent that I've kept them open).

[Kivlonic]

Beelzebubalicious, Rex Brynen, Abu Suleyman,
-Thanks for the advice.
Yes most deadlines have past, and Brynen I agree, I wold definitely like to get some experience before jumping into more academics, I have looked into OCS etc, (still considering this) and I do believe experience is the best knowledge one could have - I'm in the process of going through UN programs, NGOs, etc. but none seem very promising. Spent last summer in Beirut taking Arabic, was looking into going back for grad school but several people have told me the more time I spend abroad (the Middle East) the longer my application process, backround checks become. Peace and conflict management interest me, though I would much rather "get my hands dirty," in field studies than studying IR. Is there any paticular program you can suggest?
You guys have been alot of help, I graduating in 3 weeks so I guess I have alot of decisions to make. Got to go hand in a paper on Phoenix for my Vietnam class, wish I would of found this board earlier in college - would of made research a hell of alot easier!
-Thanks again.

[marct]

You guys have been alot of help, I graduating in 3 weeks so I guess I have alot of decisions to make. Got to go hand in a paper on Phoenix for my Vietnam class, wish I would of found this board earlier in college - would of made research a hell of alot easier!

Phoenix :rolleyes:!?! Make sure you reference some of David Price's work :wry:!

On graduate programs, you might want to contact Jeremy Littlewood at Carleton in the Norman Patterson Schol of International Affairs (http://www.carleton.ca/npsia/); Jez runs the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security and Intelligence Studies (http://www.carleton.ca/cciss/struct_org.htm)(part of NPSIA). There's a good group of people at Carleton looking into State building, Security, etc.

Marc

[marct]

Hi Folks,

Hot off the presses....

Dear Editors,

Having long been an admirer of Newsweek, I found your failure to fact check the story by Dan Ephron & Silvia Springs entitled "A gun in one hand, a pen in the other" (21 April issue) completely shocking. One naturally expects more from Newsweek than such sloppy journalism.

Below you will find a list of factual corrections and some more general points about the article.

FACTUAL ERRORS:

1) "the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills" - Incorrect. In fact, the goal of HTS is to recruit social scientists with the appropriate research skills and methodological approaches. There are very, very few social scientists in the US who have the requisite knowledge of Iraq or Afghanistan, since these countries have been closed to research for many decades. However, if the social scientist on a team is not an Arabic speaker, other members of the team possess the requisite area expertise and language skills.

2) "only three speak Arabic" - Incorrect. Each team in Iraq and Afghanistan has members who speak the local language, although this person is not necessarily the social scientist. As of 14 April, there are 38 HTS personnel in Iraq distributed among 5 teams (slightly higher than normal, since we are in transition and executing some individual Reliefs in Place). 8 of those personnel are Social Scientists. 13 of those personnel speak Arabic,of which 2 are Social Scientists and 11 are Human Terrain Analysts or Research Managers.

3) "Johnson served in Afghanistan on a pilot Human Terrain team last year" - Incorrect. Tom Johnson was never a team member, but merely visited theater for two weeks.

4) Tom Johnson is a "Pashto speaker", and "spent much of his time there interviewing Afghans in their homes" - Incorrect. According to Tom Johnson, he has no idea where this information came from -- "surely not me."

5) "Omar Altalib was one of only two Iraqi-Americans in the program" - Incorrect. Actually the program currently has about 20 Iraqi Americans.

6) Social scientists earn "$300,000" a year - Overstated. This is true only if hazard pay, overtime, and danger pay are included. The base salary is a low six figures.

7) "Steve Fondacaro...........a retired Special Forces colonel.." - Incorrect. COL Fondacaro (ret'd) has never been in Army Special Forces. His experience as Special Operations Force (SOF) officer was exclusively with 75th Ranger Regiment and higher Headquarters.

8) "Fondacaro says overseers had to rush through the start-up phase because Pentagon planners wanted the terrain teams in Iraq quickly" - Incorrect. The requirement to put teams in country was in response to the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) that came from the units in the war zone. Pentagon planners actually slowed the process down to carefully analyze and validate the need.

9) the contract "was handed to British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) without a bidding process" - Overstated. BAE is the omnibus contractor for TRADOC and for a start-up program, this was a normal process. Once HTS becomes a program of record, the contract will be bid out.

10) "The rest are social scientists or former GIs" - Incorrect. Actually, much of the manpower is made up of US Army reserves.

11) "the anthropologists sent to Iraq..." - Incorrect. Not all of the social scientists on teams are anthropologists.

12) "the relationship between civilian academics and military or ex-military team members was sometimes strained" - Incorrect. The environment in the training program is very different than a year ago, which is the period the quoted sources were familiar with.

13) "40-year-old expert on trash" - Incorrect. Actually, Dr. Griffin is an anthropologist with an interest in food security and economics.

GENERAL ISSUES

1) The main input to the article came from two individuals who were terminated for cause, and whose knowledge is outdated.

2) The article's main premise is that the majority of HTS social scientists are not Middle East specialists with fluency in Arabic. Fair enough, but Human Terrain Teams include personnel with language, regional, and local area knowledge in addition to social scientists. The teams are not just the lone social science advisor that the media has tended to focus upon. As teams, they include a variety of individuals uniquely suited to understanding the social, political, economic and cultural aspects of the population in question -- both military and civilian.

3) In the article, the significance of research methods was downplayed in favor of language and culture area skills. Certain subfields require formal area studies training, but as whole, social scientists are trained to apply their knowledge of analytical frameworks and research methodologies across different locales, based on the premise that the dynamics of human behavior exhibit certain universal features. This does not mean that social scientists cannot be area experts: many are, given their past research. However, what social scientists bring to the table is a way of looking at the social world, studying it, and analyzing it in a way that is distinct from the way the military approaches these issues.

4) That soldiers on their second- or third- tours possess inestimable knowledge about the area in which they are operating is undeniable. Yet, as currently organized, combat brigades do not possess the organic staff capability or assets to organize this knowledge and look at the broad questions that HTTs are concerned with. While civil affairs soldiers are the closest to such an organic asset, along with information operations, these assets are mission-focused and often lack the manpower to engage in the sort of question-formulation and asking that HTTs can. Nor do these assets always include personnel trained in social scientific analysis. Therefore, it is the job of HTTs to take the knowledge these soldiers have gleaned, to examine the information already being gathered on the ground on a daily basis, engage in original research, and consider this information in terms of broader issues from a different perspective in order to add to the brigade commander's situational awareness of the social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors at work in the environment.

5) All this was explained to both Dan Ephron & Silvia Spring, but none of it is reflected in the article.

GEN Wallace, the commander of TRADOC, has written a letter to the editors of Newsweek regarding this article, which I hope you will consider publishing. You may also consider this email as a 'letter to the editor' and publish any or all of it.

I hope in the future that Newsweek will hold itself to a higher standard of journalism.

Warm regards,

Montgomery McFate, JD PhD

As a note, Newsweek won't correct their factual errors until they are provided with the names of everyone in field - a clear OPSEC breach. Since they had the opportunity to interview everyone before deployment, one has to wonder....

[Abu Suleyman]

Peace and conflict management interest me, though I would much rather "get my hands dirty," in field studies than studying IR. Is there any paticular program you can suggest?


I am assuming you are American. If you are considering OCS, there is a great page at http://www.armyocs.org/ that will answer a lot of your questions. Just be aware that if you join either the Army or, I believe, the Marines, they do not let you pick your specialty as an officer. That isn't as important as it may seem, since a lieutenant is a lieutenant, and you will get a pretty good chance to see the war regardless of specialty (although more direct with a combat arm to be sure).

If you decide the military is not the way to go, you might look at State Department, specifically foreign service. I don't have any first hand knowledge, but people I talk to tell me that they are desperate for people who are willing to go to Iraq. As an undergraduate social scientist, it will be hard to get a job in the field, unless you go with an agency of some kind. Pretty much every government agency has some kind of intelligence or outreach program that will get you either analytical or practical experience. The problem with most government positions is that it may take just as long as applying to graduate school to actually get the job.

Remember, it doesn't matter where you go, you are going to have to pay dues, and learn the ropes, and that is often going to include things that you are not as interested in. Sometimes, though, it exposes you to things that you are more interested in, and didn't even know existed. The important thing is to show that you are good at thinking and working, and then the specialties will open up. It may be tempting to try to bypass that introductory phase, but while some people make it most just get in over their head and drown. And even those who do are stuck, and eventually want to leave, but don't have strong enough fundamentals, and can't.

[SteveMetz]

I don't know if it's changed, but when I was looking at the Foreign Service, they had 20K people a year take the written test, 2K pass that, 400 pass the oral exam, and about 200 get offers. They then had extended training. The normal age of entry was upper 20s, and the vast majority had an MA or better.

[marct]

Hi Kivlonik,

One of my (ex) students applied for a government job (in Canada) and for his MA at the same time. He finally got the job offer for the position he had applied for the day before he defended his MA thesis :cool:.

Marc

[120mm]

Marct and I were discussing novels that addressed "radical Anthropologists" and I've just come upon a gem: David Weber's "Off Armageddon Reef".

It is a novel set in the future, where a mysterious ancient race has wiped out humanity "except" a single shipload of humans who come upon a habitable planet. Sometime during the journey from now-destroyed humanity, radical Anthropologists and Sociologists have seized control of the "Ark Project", and decided that humanity itself was at fault for being wiped out, because their technology drew the mysterious race to destroy them.

So, the "Social Scientists" kill everyone who oppose them, and drum up a "religion" to prevent mankind from ever using technology again.

Of course, these "Social Scientists" really don't understand history, religion or technology, so their "religion" is just a straw man, and mankind, after a short millenium is on the cusp of embracing tech again. Add to this a cybernetic organism that several engineers hid from the "Social Scientists" just in case, which is timed to activate after 1000 years, and you have a very interesting novel, which turns the "alternative history" genre on its head.

Good read, so far.

[Abu Suleyman]

I don't know if it's changed, but when I was looking at the Foreign Service, they had 20K people a year take the written test, 2K pass that, 400 pass the oral exam, and about 200 get offers. They then had extended training. The normal age of entry was upper 20s, and the vast majority had an MA or better.

I have no information on hiring processes, although the three people I have known who joined the foreign service did not have M.A.' (they all spoke a foreign language though, which may be just as good). However, what I was thinking of was this how they are having a hard time with volunteers for duty in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/15/AR2008041503145.html). Of course, that may not have resulted in a change in hiring.

This actually sort of brings us back to the original question of this thread, which is the shortage of 'non-soldier types' like anthropologists, and Foreign Service Officers in the war zone. I think that if Kivlonic wants to 'get his hands dirty' there should be plenty of opportunity, but maybe there just isn't, outside the military, or an advanced degree. Why is that? And how could we fix that? Would things be better in Iraq if we did?

[Tom Odom]

One place to look into is the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (http://bush.tamu.edu/) where they are schooling PRT memberrs.

Tom

[SteveMetz]

I have no information on hiring processes, although the three people I have known who joined the foreign service did not have M.A.' (they all spoke a foreign language though, which may be just as good). However, what I was thinking of was this how they are having a hard time with volunteers for duty in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/15/AR2008041503145.html). Of course, that may not have resulted in a change in hiring.

This actually sort of brings us back to the original question of this thread, which is the shortage of 'non-soldier types' like anthropologists, and Foreign Service Officers in the war zone. I think that if Kivlonic wants to 'get his hands dirty' there should be plenty of opportunity, but maybe there just isn't, outside the military, or an advanced degree. Why is that? And how could we fix that? Would things be better in Iraq if we did?


I'll admit that when *I* was a candidate for the foreign service, John Quincy Adams was Secretary of State.

Just for the record, I passed the written and oral exams but failed my physical because of damage to my knee from an old high school football injury. At the time I was running 8 miles a day and had just finished the season in a grad school basketball league, so go figger.

[marct]

Hi 120,


Marct and I were discussing novels that addressed "radical Anthropologists" and I've just come upon a gem: David Weber's "Off Armageddon Reef".

I picked it up when it first came out; now I want the next one :D.


So, the "Social Scientists" kill everyone who oppose them, and drum up a "religion" to prevent mankind from ever using technology again.

Of course, these "Social Scientists" really don't understand history, religion or technology, so their "religion" is just a straw man, and mankind, after a short millenium is on the cusp of embracing tech again. Add to this a cybernetic organism that several engineers hid from the "Social Scientists" just in case, which is timed to activate after 1000 years, and you have a very interesting novel, which turns the "alternative history" genre on its head.

He used a similar form of social engineering in the third book of the Empire from the Ashes trilogy (Heirs of Empire) (http://www.baen.com/blurbs/0671877070.htm), and he and Steve White used it in a much earlier novel Crusade (http://www.webscription.net/10.1125/Baen/0671721119/0671721119.htm?blurb). I get the feeling that he doesn't really like organized religions ;). Then again, it's a moderately common motif in a fair bit of military SF - look at John Ringo's Legacy of the Alldentata (http://www.baen.com/series_list.asp#GF) series as an example.

On a related note, I have a feeling that a lot of it comes from a totally different viewpoint, mainly about time. I'm still playing with this, but I suspect that the perceptual time differences between cultures (including occupational sub-cultures) accounts for a large amount of tension between groups.

[120mm]

Hi 120,
I picked it up when it first came out; now I want the next one :D.
You're kidding me. He doesn't have a sequel out? He needs to get off his butt and write one. I'm pumped for the next book, as well.

He used a similar form of social engineering in the third book of the Empire from the Ashes trilogy (Heirs of Empire) (http://www.baen.com/blurbs/0671877070.htm), and he and Steve White used it in a much earlier novel Crusade (http://www.webscription.net/10.1125/Baen/0671721119/0671721119.htm?blurb). I get the feeling that he doesn't really like organized religions ;). Then again, it's a moderately common motif in a fair bit of military SF - look at John Ringo's Legacy of the Alldentata (http://www.baen.com/series_list.asp#GF) series as an example.

You know, I see his writing as being very "religion-friendly" despite his obvious negative views of the bureaucratic religious organization. His heroes/heroines tend to have strongly held fundamental religious beliefs, though they are nearly always at odds with "establishment" beliefs.

[marct]

You're kidding me. He doesn't have a sequel out? He needs to get off his butt and write one. I'm pumped for the next book, as well.

Nah, he's been "wasting" his time writing a new series with Linda Evans :cool:.


You know, I see his writing as being very "religion-friendly" despite his obvious negative views of the bureaucratic religious organization. His heroes/heroines tend to have strongly held fundamental religious beliefs, though they are nearly always at odds with "establishment" beliefs.

I think he's drawing on a fundamental distinction that really started emerging in the 60's between "spirituality" and "religion". Actually, it's another one of those cases where it's just an update of a perennial debate, in this case between immanentalsm and trascendentalism - is the locus of morality/ethics/what have you inside the individual or outside of them?

Obviously, in most cases, it's a combination if for no other reason than most people need symbol systems to interpret their experiences and these are, by definition, inter-subjective (if they aren't, we call them "psychotic delusional" ;)). What I think he does do is make a heavy distinction between a hypertrophied system (the bureaucratic "religion" and the fanatics produced within it) and individuals who use the system but interiorize it (i.e. make it their own).

[marct]

From MEMRI.


Saudi Anthropologist Sa'd Al-Sowayan Advocates Modern Interpretation of Religious Texts, Suggests Swords Be Removed from Saudi Flag

Video here (http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1757.htm) (may require plugin)
Excerpts here (http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD192008)

I have to wonder how long it will be before someone issues a fatwa on him :wry:.

[Ron Humphrey]

From MEMRI.



Video here (http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1757.htm) (may require plugin)
Excerpts here (http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD192008)

I have to wonder how long it will be before someone issues a fatwa on him :wry:.

This has become a more and more common thing in the middle east recently and I think those who might be tempted have started to realize if they try that it will very likely backfire and they sure can't afford that.

[marct]

Hi Ron,


This has become a more and more common thing in the middle east recently and I think those who might be tempted have started to realize if they try that it will very likely backfire and they sure can't afford that.

Definitely agree that it is becoming moire common - or at least I am seeing more coverage of it, which is not the same thing :wry:. Still and all, some of the extremist groups also seem to be issuing fatwas more often - probably all part of the offshoot of increased communications.

[marct]

The long-awaited HTS website is available at http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/index.htm. I will refrain from commenting on any aspects of the design :cool:, but let me just say that it is reflective of "institutional design" at it's w.... errr, "best" :rolleyes:.

[Ron Humphrey]

Hi Ron,



Definitely agree that it is becoming moire common - or at least I am seeing more coverage of it, which is not the same thing :wry:. Still and all, some of the extremist groups also seem to be issuing fatwas more often - probably all part of the offshoot of increased communications.

There is definately more visibility then I've seen before , but on the Fatwa thing I think that they might find out why printing more money when you run out doesn't fix the problem, Darned inflation sucks.

Not to mention the old adage about not making promises you can't keep:wry:

[marct]

There is definately more visibility then I've seen before , but on the Fatwa thing I think that they might find out why printing more money when you run out doesn't fix the problem, Darned inflation sucks.

Not to mention the old adage about not making promises you can't keep:wry:

LOLOL - too true! A point strangely brought home by CBC today. It turns out that Salman Rushdie is in town (Ottawa) and I doubt there is much extra security. Any potential irhabis are just referred to one of our local cabs which will just guarantee that they don't reach their target :D.

[slapout9]

The long-awaited HTS website is available at http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/index.htm. I will refrain from commenting on any aspects of the design :cool:, but let me just say that it is reflective of "institutional design" at it's w.... errr, "best" :rolleyes:.


marct, It sure looks like they eat good overthere:wry:

[marct]

marct, It sure looks like they eat good overthere:wry:

To true, Slap! I gotta get me some of that.

http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/Image9.jpg

And to think that I just had to spend an hour defrosting a pork roast when that was available. 'nuf to make me cry ;).

[Rex Brynen]

Rule one, for neophyte HTTs. If that is mansaf--and it looks like it is--for goodness sake, don't eat it with a spoon. It makes you look such a wuss.

(The proper technique is ball it in your hand, squeeze gently, and pop in your mouth with your thumb. The amount of rice stuck to your hand after is a good indicator of whether you know what you are doing...)

Bonus advice: if they serve it with mukh (sheep's brains), as they sometimes do in Iraq... it is far more palatable when followed by large chasers of araq. In fact, large amounts of araq work with just about anything :D

[marct]

Bonus advice: if they serve it with mukh (sheep's brains), as they sometimes do in Iraq... it is far more palatable when followed by large chasers of araq. In fact, large amounts of araq work with just about anything :D

Too true, Rex!! Although, I must admit to a preference for the Turkish version of arak - you know, the stuff that's been sitting in a stone bottle for a century or so :D. I've often thought that a really good way to do interviews for the HTTs would be to serve a "dinner" ;).

[selil]

C4ISR Journal has a pretty good quickie story on the HTTs this month too. No online version I could find though.

[Ken White]

country I've been to where I never had a bad meal, not one. Even enjoyed the eyeballs...

[120mm]

Mmmmm... Grabagoat. My favorite!

[Tom Odom]

From MarcT who is on the road


passed by the USMC IA

For those of you who have not heard, Michael Bhatia has been killed in
Afghanistan. I do not know if the details provided in the Chronicle story (see here (http://chronicle.com/news/article/4460/social-scientist-in-armys)) are true, but have heard nothing to the
contrary. He is a great loss.

It sounds like his colleagues at Brown and in the UK are setting up
scholarship funds. When I get detail about that, I will pass it along.

Blessings and best wishes to Dr. Bhatia's family in this time of loss,

Tom

[SWJED]

Human Terrain Team Member Killed in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/human-terrain-team-member-kill/)

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/michaelbhatia.jpg

From the Human Terrain System,

It is with deep sorrow that we must inform you of the tragic death of Michael Bhatia, our social scientist team member assigned to the Afghanistan Human Terrain Team #1, in support of Task Force Currahee based at FOB SALERNO, Khowst Province.

Michael was killed on May 7 when the Humvee he was riding in was struck by an IED. Michael was traveling in a convoy of four vehicles, which were en route to a remote sector of Khowst province. For many years, this part of Khowst had been plagued by a violent inter-tribal conflict concerning land rights. Michael had identified this tribal dispute as a research priority, and was excited to finally be able to visit this area. This trip was the brigade's initial mission into the area, and it was their intention to initiate a negotiation process between the tribes.

Michael was in the lead vehicle with four other soldiers. Initial forensics indicate that the IED was triggered by a command detonated wire. Michael died immediately in the explosion. Two Army soldiers from Task Force Currahee were also killed in the attack, and two were critically injured.

During the course of his seven-month tour, Michael's work saved the lives of both US soldiers and Afghan civilians. His former brigade commander, COL Marty Schweitzer testified before Congress on 24 April that the Human Terrain Team of which Michael was a member helped the brigade reduce its lethal operations by 60 to 70%, increase the number of districts supporting the Afghan government from 15 to 83, and reduce Afghan civilian deaths from over 70 during the previous brigade's tour to 11 during the 4-82's tour.

A copy of Colonel Schweitzer's comments can be found at the Human Terrain System web page.

We will remember Michael for his personal courage, his willingness to endure danger and hardship, his incisive intelligence, his playful sense of humor, his confidence, his devoted character, and his powerful inner light. While his life has ended, he has not disappeared without a trace. He left a powerful effect behind, which will be felt by his friends and colleagues and by the people of Afghanistan for many years to come.

Steve Fondacaro
Program Manager

Montgomery McFate
Senior Social Science Advisor

[marct]

Thanks again for posting this, Tom. I find that posting here using a Blackberry just isn't really that feasible :wry:.

On a related note, I was at the 2008 Canadian Anthropology Society (http://www.casca2008.anthropologica.ca/) (CASCA) meetings yesterday which are being held at Carleton here in Ottawa. Last night the keynote address was given by Catherine Lutz (http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Anthropology/faculty/lutz.shtml) on Ethnography in an Era of Permanent War. Michael's death wasn't mentioned at all, although she probably didn't know about it. The talk, to my mind at least, was rather disjointed.

[Beelzebubalicious]

There's a little more info on Bhatia in a Danger Room article at http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/05/human-terrain-s.html#more, including an essay he wrote for the Globalist titled, "Shooting Afghanistan: Beyond the Conflict (III)" (http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=6418). It's a 3-part series you can access from this link.

Here's a guy who walked it the way he talked it. It's clear he thought he could make a positive difference by working through the HTS and I think that says a lot.

[SWJED]

“The program has a real chance of reducing both the Afghan and American lives lost, as well as ensuring that the US/NATO/ISAF strategy becomes better attuned to the population’s concerns, views, criticisms, and interests and better supports the Government of Afghanistan.”


--Michael Vinay Bhatia, November 2007

I've placed what links I could find on the SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/human-terrain-team-member-kill-1/).

From the Human Terrain System,

It is with deep sorrow that we must inform you of the tragic death of Michael Bhatia, our social scientist team member assigned to the Afghanistan Human Terrain Team #1, in support of Task Force Currahee based at FOB SALERNO, Khowst Province.

Michael was killed on May 7 when the Humvee he was riding in was struck by an IED. Michael was traveling in a convoy of four vehicles, which were en route to a remote sector of Khowst province. For many years, this part of Khowst had been plagued by a violent inter-tribal conflict concerning land rights. Michael had identified this tribal dispute as a research priority, and was excited to finally be able to visit this area. This trip was the brigade's initial mission into the area, and it was their intention to initiate a negotiation process between the tribes.

Michael was in the lead vehicle with four other soldiers. Initial forensics indicate that the IED was triggered by a command detonated wire. Michael died immediately in the explosion. Two Army soldiers from Task Force Currahee were also killed in the attack, and two were critically injured.

During the course of his seven-month tour, Michael's work saved the lives of both US soldiers and Afghan civilians. His former brigade commander, COL Marty Schweitzer testified before Congress on 24 April that the Human Terrain Team of which Michael was a member helped the brigade reduce its lethal operations by 60 to 70%, increase the number of districts supporting the Afghan government from 15 to 83, and reduce Afghan civilian deaths from over 70 during the previous brigade's tour to 11 during the 4-82's tour.

A copy of Colonel Schweitzer's comments can be found at the Human Terrain System web page.

We will remember Michael for his personal courage, his willingness to endure danger and hardship, his incisive intelligence, his playful sense of humor, his confidence, his devoted character, and his powerful inner light. While his life has ended, he has not disappeared without a trace. He left a powerful effect behind, which will be felt by his friends and colleagues and by the people of Afghanistan for many years to come.

Steve Fondacaro
Program Manager

Montgomery McFate
Senior Social Science Advisor

Human Terrain System
US Army TRADOC

[marct]

“I've placed what links I could find on the SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/human-terrain-team-member-kill-1/).

Thanks for doing this. The story hasn't seemed to be up on the Anthropology blogs yet (even if Michael was a political scientist).

[SWJED]

Here's a guy who walked it the way he talked it. It's clear he thought he could make a positive difference by working through the HTS and I think that says a lot.

Well said.

[Mike Innes]

I don't think I can add anything to the discussion on this. I stumbled across early mention of it in two blogs run by people who knew him, and then tried to disseminate the news as quickly and widely as I could. I suspect that was already being done web-wide by more than a few people. A sorry day. Thanks to SJW for posting the HTS news release and all the links to sites mentioning Michael Bhatia's death.

[negotiator6]

PH D is far too "eduational"..They are not going to find personnel with PHD's to bump around in a Humvee around the back roads of Paktia or Khwost Provnces adjacent to the Paki border. The application of cultural awareness, language skills and an outward bound mentality should to the mission well.

And, they better pay alot...

[selil]

PH D is far too "eduational"..They are not going to find personnel with PHD's to bump around in a Humvee around the back roads of Paktia or Khwost Provnces adjacent to the Paki border. The application of cultural awareness, language skills and an outward bound mentality should to the mission well.

And, they better pay alot...

Good PhD's do field work.

As Indiana Jones said, "You have to get out of the library and into the field", I think a lot Phd's realize that. Now training for a year, preparing for being shot at, and in general being in harms way, that might be a problem. That and what I am coming to find as a military culture that is extremely hostile to anybody who has even a wee bitty amount of education.. Where did I put my beer?

[sandbag]

A couple of business/infrastructure types wouldn't hurt, either. Economics drives the human terrain just as much as tribal lines.

[Rex Brynen]

They are not going to find personnel with PHD's to bump around in a Humvee around the back roads of Paktia or Khwost Provnces adjacent to the Paki border.

Actually, I'm not sure that's quite the problem you think it is. Take today, for example: I got an email this morning from one of my PhD students who is off interviewing both Islamists and secret policemen in a Middle Eastern country, had another graduate student drop by 5 minutes ago to discuss her impending fieldwork in a country on the verge of civil war (she's already been evacuated from a war zone one), and later this afternoon have a meeting with a third who was imprisoned for a year for his earlier research and activism in an authoritarian regime.

The bigger problem, actually, is career interruption. For recent PhD students and graduates who hope to eventually land academic jobs, there could a real cost long-term to losing a year or two of thesis-writing, academic publication, and job interviews because one is deployed as part of a HTS.

[marct]

Hi Rex,


The bigger problem, actually, is career interruption. For recent PhD students and graduates who hope to eventually land academic jobs, there could a real cost long-term to losing a year or two of thesis-writing, academic publication, and job interviews because one is deployed as part of a HTS.

That hits the nail on the head! Another factor in the same problem, is the people who stay at home and sit on the hiring committees who may not be able to judge the validity of the HTS fieldwork. This is, IMO, one major problem inside Anthropology.


A couple of business/infrastructure types wouldn't hurt, either. Economics drives the human terrain just as much as tribal lines.

Good point, Sandbag. Personally, I wouldn't recommend most of the business types (although the crowd at UTS in the ICAN group is top-notch as are a few others). The big problem with the "business/infrastructure" crowd is that they confuse their economic practices with economics in the broader sense. BTW, tribal lines are the bedrock of economic activity in many cultures - a point missed by many of the management types ;).

[Surferbeetle]

Good point, Sandbag. Personally, I wouldn't recommend most of the business types (although the crowd at UTS in the ICAN group is top-notch as are a few others). The big problem with the "business/infrastructure" crowd is that they confuse their economic practices with economics in the broader sense. BTW, tribal lines are the bedrock of economic activity in many cultures - a point missed by many of the management types ;).

Guten Tag Marc!

Interesting post. What are you recommending for references/examples/reading about the two crowds and their methodologies/successes/failures?

Regards,

Steve

[marct]

Hi Steve,


Interesting post. What are you recommending for references/examples/reading about the two crowds and their methodologies/successes/failures?

Well, if I had to put together a reading list, it wold probably include Fernand Braudel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernand_Braudel), Stone Age Economics (http://www.amazon.com/Stone-Age-Economics-Marshall-Sahlins/dp/0202010996) by Marshall Sahlins, Karl Polanyi's The Livelihood of Man (http://www.amazon.com/Livelihood-Man-Studies-social-discontinuity/dp/0125481500/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211828676&sr=1-1), The Fur Trade in Canada (http://www.amazon.com/Fur-Trade-Canada-Introduction-Canadian/dp/0802081967/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211828735&sr=1-1) by Harold Innis, The Rise of the Network Society (http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Network-Society-New-Information/dp/0631221409/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211828845&sr=1-1) by Manuel Castells (if you you get by his Structural Marxist bias, it's pretty good) and Frameworks of Power (http://www.amazon.com/Frameworks-Power-Stewart-Clegg/dp/0803981619/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211829072&sr=1-5) by Stewart Clegg ( a really tough read but worth it).

What all of these have in common is that they look at economics as a social process: production, consumption and distribution via social means and how all of them interlink. One of the big problems with most of the business / management crowd is that they either focus on a single component of this (production, consumption, etc.) or they are locked into a single social view of what is "right".

[Stan]

Hey Marc !


Personally, I wouldn't recommend most of the business types (although the crowd at UTS in the ICAN group is top-notch as are a few others). The big problem with the "business/infrastructure" crowd is that they confuse their economic practices with economics in the broader sense. BTW, tribal lines are the bedrock of economic activity in many cultures - a point missed by many of the management types ;).

As always, A Hopeless Romantic You are and Will always BE :)

Tom could relate story upon story of professional economics officers merely stymied by an African economy gone wild, but yet still stable enough to trade USD in front of the US Embassy in broad daylight (except on Sundays).

While a bit of street smarts is certainly beneficial, I'm not ready to knock our intellectual crowd just this second. The program is barely out of infancy and needs more time to fully appreciate and realize its full potential.

Really enjoyed Dr. McFate's response (even better than the draft). Kinda "get your Sierra bible studies in order" or "take no prisoners" approach:cool:

Regards from a balmy Estonia (16 degrees C. today), Stan

[marct]

As always, A Hopeless Romantic You are and Will always BE :)

Always :D! That, and singing Baroque - Renaissance music, keeps me sane.


Tom could relate story upon story of professional economics officers merely stymied by an African economy gone wild, but yet still stable enough to trade USD in front of the US Embassy in broad daylight (except on Sundays).

I've heard that one ;). Actually, it's a really good case in point - so many "economists" confuse the formality with the reality (the Substantivist-Formalist debate for those with a passing academic interest).


Really enjoyed Dr. McFate's response (even better than the draft). Kinda "get your Sierra bible studies in order" or "take no prisoners" approach

I hope she doesn't come down with a case of PSTSD (Post-Structuralist Traumatic Stress Disorder; similar to PTSD or Shell Shock, PSTSD frequently affects people who have to deal with theologically inclined academics). Actually, I like her style, too. I think she would be a lot of fun to get into a proper, Anthro style, argument with; aka argue about nothing important just for the fun of it with a lot of booze ;)


Regards from a balmy Estonia (16 degrees C. today), Stan

Man, it's warm there! We had a frost warning last night...

[Beelzebubalicious]

Stan, it was 16 C and raining today in Kiev. Russians trying to create an Abkhazia in Crimea. Beat that.

Marc, I did share a beer with Dr. McFate at Leavenworth a few years ago at a IO symposium. She was presenting her case for cultural anthropology in the DOD and showing parts of what later became the HTT. It was interesting and I can attest to the fact that she is a good person to chat and have a beer with.

Unfortunately, that was the extent of my involvement and I was subsequently shipped off to Ukraine and never heard from again, save for my occasional random posts on SWC!

Eric

[Shek]

Guten Tag Marc!

Interesting post. What are you recommending for references/examples/reading about the two crowds and their methodologies/successes/failures?

Regards,

Steve

Steve,

While not readings that will point out methodologies/successes/failures, these are good readings to understand the role that culture and acculturation plays in economics.

This first one looks at how different cultures play the standard "ultimatum" game: http://www.santafe.edu/~bowles/InSearchHomoEconomicus2001.pdf (a longer version that spells out the cultural linkages to outcomes can be found here: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/MacGamesBBSFinal.pdf). There's also a book edited by the same primary author that goes into much greater depth.

This second one is written by James Surowiecki and shows how it took many, many moons for Western society to develop the trust outside of their traditional contacts (family and their immediate community) to make a broad market economy possible.

Lastly, this book, http://www.amazon.com/Worldly-Philosophers-Lives-Economic-Thinkers/dp/068486214X, spells out how economics as a discipline is relatively a newcomer to the field - Adam Smith's "The Wealth of Nations", published in 1776, is often used as the beginning of modern economics (which really was the study of political economy until just over a century ago when it began to focus much more on the positive science and ignoring/de-emphasizing much of the normative). It's first two chapters talks about how broad market economics is a relatively new phenomenom, with command and family/tribe/community economics being the two existing options prior to the development of the broad market economy.

[Rex Brynen]

This first one looks at how different cultures play the standard "ultimatum" game:

One of my favourite findings from the ultimatum game (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game) is that only economists act as economists predict--that is, that economics students are much more self-interested, rational, utility-mazimizers than are non-economics students, and hence make stingier offers in the game.

J.R. CARTER and M. IRONS (1991), Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5/2 (1991), pp. 171 – 177.

Article here (http://www.jstor.org/pss/1942691) if you have JSTOR access.

I have never seen the study done with military personnel (although I haven't really looked)--it would be interesting, actually, to see whether they to deviate in significant ways from the general population in their perceptions of profit, loss, altruism, etc--and if so, in which directions..

[Shek]

One of my favourite findings from the ultimatum game (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game) is that only economists act as economists predict--that is, that economics students are much more self-interested, rational, utility-mazimizers than are non-economics students, and hence make stingier offers in the game.

J.R. CARTER and M. IRONS (1991), Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5/2 (1991), pp. 171 – 177.

Article here (http://www.jstor.org/pss/1942691) if you have JSTOR access.

Rex,

Chimpanzees behave rationally as well. Guess that doesn't say much about me :eek:

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071005104104.htm


I have never seen the study done with military personnel (although I haven't really looked)--it would be interesting, actually, to see whether they to deviate in significant ways from the general population in their perceptions of profit, loss, altruism, etc--and if so, in which directions..

I'm going to play the ultimatum game on the first day of my comparative economic systems class in the fall to illustrate how culture plays a role in your economic system and will let you know. I suspect that the "cooperate and graduate" mantra will amplify the general result that you see equitable offers in capitalistic societies.

[Rex Brynen]

I'm going to play the ultimatum game on the first day of my comparative economic systems class in the fall to illustrate how culture plays a role in your economic system and will let you know. I suspect that the "cooperate and graduate" mantra will amplify the general result that you see equitable offers in capitalistic societies.

I use it in class every year, in my peacebuilding/post conflict course, to highlight how the behaviour of parties in negotiation is shaped not only by relative power differentials and utility-maximization, but also by perceptions of "fairness" (justice, etc).

[Beelzebubalicious]

Not sure where to post this, but Wired Danger Room came out with a funny blog entry today and the subject is Montgomery McFate...Check it out at
Do Pentagon Studs Make You Want to Bite Your Fist? (http://blog.wired.com/defense/human_terrain/index.html)

[marct]

Not sure where to post this, but Wired Danger Room came out with a funny blog entry today and the subject is Montgomery McFate...Check it out at
Do Pentagon Studs Make You Want to Bite Your Fist? (http://blog.wired.com/defense/human_terrain/index.html)

I started to write a response to the piece, but ended up blogging about it (http://marctyrrell.com/2008/06/21/of-joking-relationships/) instead.

[Ron Humphrey]

I started to write a response to the piece, but ended up blogging about it (http://marctyrrell.com/2008/06/21/of-joking-relationships/) instead.

I can tell you from my limited experiences if it weren't for those Joke relationships a lot of times somebody would end up getting hurt. It really is a large part of how many soldiers deal with the various issues which confront them.

It's also kinda fun too:wry:

[marct]

Hi Ron,


I can tell you from my limited experiences if it weren't for those Joke relationships a lot of times somebody would end up getting hurt. It really is a large part of how many soldiers deal with the various issues which confront them.

It does seem to be a good, and fairly universal, way of staying if not sane, then at east not depressed :D.


It's also kinda fun too:wry:

Oh, definitely!!! :cool::D

[Darksaga]

Michael was awarded the Defense of Freedom Medal posthumously.

[Kivlonic]

Not sure if this is the proper place to post or if the piece has already been up loaded to the forum, http://http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7496375.stm
I understand fighting an ideology with an reverse ideology, but it seems the main point is that only the State (SA) can authorize jihad...
The ping pong made me laugh though.

sorry hopefully this link works...http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7496375.stm

[Entropy]

Ran across this today. (http://www.terraplexic.org/ethnographic-intelligence/)

[BayonetBrant]

I forwarded that list to a retired COL I know who's headed to Iraq with an HTT and he was very appreciative of it. Great find!

[Entropy]

That's great! - I'm glad it's proved useful.

[Darksaga]

Great link.

Thank you.

[davidbfpo]

Found on the Cryptome website: http://cryptome.org/hts-farce.htm

I make no comment and note it is part two of a series.

davidbfpo

[marct]

From what I have heard, the program does have some serious problems but I haven't been able to find out where they stem from. The entire HTS issue is too mired in political infighting for my taste :(. Personally, I really wish they would bring in an independent audit team to analyze the program.

[selil]

From what I have heard, the program does have some serious problems but I haven't been able to find out where they stem from. The entire HTS issue is too mired in political infighting for my taste :(. Personally, I really wish they would bring in an independent audit team to analyze the program.

Audit requires standards and practices. Where would those come from? I think the best we could expect is a cursory examination of hiring practices. Nobody on the anthro side is providing options, just yelling "we don't like you".

[marct]

Audit requires standards and practices. Where would those come from? I think the best we could expect is a cursory examination of hiring practices. Nobody on the anthro side is providing options, just yelling "we don't like you".

Some of the standards of practice are available, at least for the field side. On the management, recruiting and training side, there are a LOT of standards (often competing ;)). You're definitely right about the "We don't like you" whine coming from some people, though :(.

[Featherock]

that's a horrible piece of 'journalism' over at cryptome. Talk about not having any standards. Don't you just love this disclaimer at the end, about TRADOC not answering the writer's questions fast enough to meet his tight deadline? Deadline? Writing un-sourced blogs for the Web has a deadline?

Speaking

[Featherock]

Hey all you HTT news junkies, my feature story about the first HTT in Afghanistan is now out in the current (Sept.) issue of Harper's Magazine. Most of it will be old hat to those of you who know the subject well; it's written for people for whom COIN is something they carry in their pockets, not an acronym.

[davidbfpo]

Alas the story is on a subscription only basis and my IT skills could not expand the screen pages found via the search option. However this is the link for the "junkies": http://harpers.org/archive/2008/09/0082170

Perhaps Steve can persaude Harpers to allow SWC access, after all he is the author?

davidbfpo

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

the article has a link to a Mother Jones piece which the author seems to include to cast aspersions upon the reputation of Mitzie McFate. But the article pertains to a Mary McFate/Sapone who lives in FL and there is no mention in the piece of this particular woman's activities with HTS. WTFO!

[Ken White]

Mary McFate Sapone is the mother-in-law of Montgomery McFate.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

so since Mongomery McFate's mother-in-law Mary is some sort of double agent/mole for the NRA this is a primary cause for the HTS program to be a waste of resources and totally off track.

That tie in makes absolutely perfect sense to me... :eek:

I'm so glad I gave up drinking Burma Shave!

[Ken White]

otherwise it makes your breath smell sort of er, sweet... ;)

OTOH, if we don't drink it at all any more, we'll miss out on the really cool journalism out there... :rolleyes:

Come to think of it, if we do miss out on that, we'll probably get smarter. :wry:

P.S.

To the squirrels, there need no tie-in other than their absolute knowledge that evil sticks together. Nor does anything have to make sense....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Now that is probably one of the greatest reasons for an edit! :D

Personally, I ascribe to Cliff Clavin's theory on the intellectual stimulation provided through the consumption of adult carbonated beverages. I found the theory works just as well with distilled spirits as well. :)

[Norfolk]

Now that is probably one of the greatest reasons for an edit! :D

Personally, I ascribe to Cliff Clavin's theory on the intellectual stimulation provided through the consumption of adult carbonated beverages. I found the theory works just as well with distilled spirits as well. :)

Alcohol is banned by the Olympics as a performance-enhancing substance.

Which explains why in the old days troops used to get an issue of booze just before battle - strong, unwatered wine for the Greek hoplites, thick rum for WWI infantrymen...:D

[Featherock]

the article has a link to a Mother Jones piece which the author seems to include to cast aspersions upon the reputation of Mitzie McFate. But the article pertains to a Mary McFate/Sapone who lives in FL and there is no mention in the piece of this particular woman's activities with HTS. WTFO!

Hmm... a link to a Mother Jones article in a blurb about my article? Wasn't aware of that. By "author" do you mean me? Cuz it ain't me. I can't seem to find this link. In any case, I don't mention McFate in the entire article.

[CR6]

Hmm... a link to a Mother Jones article in a blurb about my article? Wasn't aware of that. By "author" do you mean me? Cuz it ain't me. I can't seem to find this link. In any case, I don't mention McFate in the entire article.

Umar Al-Mokhtār is referring to the cryptome piece.

[Featherock]

oh right, the cryptome piece. 'piece' is precisely what it is. a piece of what I leave to your good opinion.

[Beelzebubalicious]

Here's another HTT related research project. Goes in to some detail on the HTT in Afghanistan.


Erik B. Eldridge & Andrew J. Neboshynsky, Quantifying Human Terrain (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/Eldridge_Nebo_Thesis.pdf), Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008.

ABSTRACT: Operational commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan have identified a socio-cultural capabilities gap. Historically, when faced with a non-Western adversary, knowledge of the adversary’s asymmetric socio-cultural values has been a key component in achieving conflict resolution. As such, a number of organizations within the U.S. government and civilian sector have undertaken initiatives to quantify what has been termed human terrain. Multiple theories, concepts, and models reside within the confines of social sciences that describe human activities, interactions, and behavior. One organization in particular has developed methods to quantify human terrain. The organization has been able to responsively fuse a wide array of different sciences, technology, and information systems to provide cohesive products to operational commanders. Utilizing a systems approach, the organization was examined to identify methods and techniques that describe and enumerate geo-spatial, socio-cultural relationships and interactions. The identification of unique system variables is the key element in replicating the organization’s capabilities. By reproducing these critical variables other U.S. Government and non-government organizations can leverage the examined organization’s methodology and produce similar results for analyzing and quantifying complex, human-centric problems regardless of the actual geographical location of interest.

[120mm]

But frankly, the lack of logic exhibited in the AAA main points makes the head fairly spin:

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/08/anthropologists.html#more


"HTS prompted a whole re-evaluation of our ethics," Dr. Setha Low, AAA president, said during a teleconference yesterday. She said there are big issues:

1. There are too few anthropologists involved in HTS's eight five-person teams (six teams in Iraq, two in Afghanistan) to accurately represent the full range of theories and perspectives within academia.
2. Researchers participating in combat operations perhaps cannot be intellectually honest. Their research "might be slanted by the needs of the Department of Defense," Low said.
3. Research should be distributed as widely as possible in order to invite peer review, but some HTS findings might be classified.

As Low spoke, I thought: Hold the phone. Doesn't point one contradict points two and three? On one hand, Low is concerned that any anthropologists are working with the military; on the other hand, there are too few anthropologists involved. What gives?



The author does a better job than I of pointing out that you can't bar anthropologists from participating, and then whine and bitch that there aren't enough anthropologists participating.

[marct]

Hi 120,


But frankly, the lack of logic exhibited in the AAA main points makes the head fairly spin:

I suspect that part of it comes from the logic being taken out of context in some ways. The AAA has posted their revised ethics code and space for commentary at http://aaanewsinfo.blogspot.com/2008/09/proposed-changes-to-aaa-code-of-ethics.html and it is worth looking at since it abandons some of the extremely isolationist language of last meetings resolutions.


The author does a better job than I of pointing out that you can't bar anthropologists from participating, and then whine and bitch that there aren't enough anthropologists participating.

:D Makes life interesting, doesn't it? Actually, it is an almost nsanely complex intersection of competing factors. Most of today's Anthropologists have been conditioned against the "military" (as a general category), and you also have the remnants of a form of scientific idealism from Boas showing up, at least in North America. On the other hand, some Anthropologists have, in my opinion, lost the scientific ideal and replaced it with a political ideal which, while also being anti-"military", is also anti-scientific.

In all honesty, I was quite pleased with the new wording on the code. But that is the wording and not how it will be interpreted and played out in various departments.

[120mm]

From the Featherstone piece:


As a vision of the future it was pragmatic and, I feared, too optimistic. The military will always be a blunt instrument, whether it is crashing through walls or entering through a door held open by an HTT. But as long as we use our military as the primary tool of our foreign policy, one could hardly improve upon this vision.

Kudos to Steven for asking the right question, ala "I, Robot".

How about we develop non-military foreign policies that address fighting radical islam, while simultaneously addressing some of the causes that radicalists use to gain support against us through a civilian-led and academically vetted set of programs designed to solve problems without using military force?

I believe Galula said in his seminal counterinsurgency book that the counterinsurgency needs to be led by a civilian agency. But then, he also said that the legal issues surrounding how to deal with insurgents need to be worked out first, but at least we are consistent.

[Ron Humphrey]

I told grandpa I was going to get out on my own because I didn't need my parent's telling me what to do any more. I was growed up:wry:

He told me that parents and the army are like the jewlers tools and a sledge hammer.

Both can be used to refine a diamond the difference
is in how fine the final result is.:eek:

The military can and will do whatever it has to but it is important to understand that the end result will never be quite as pretty as it would be where the diplomats and other gov agencies actually where able to handle the entirety of their own missions.

[Jedburgh]

For those with AKO access, you can now also access some of the unclass products for both Afghanistan and Iraq from the Reachback Research Center (RRC) for the Human Terrain Systems (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp).

It may require registration for the KC, but if you already have AKO access, then the approval should be automatic.

[wm]

Here's (http://chronicle.com/news/article/5455/civilian-in-armys-human-terrain-system-is-set-afire-in-afghan-attack) a recent posting in the Chronicle of Higher Education on the latest HTS casualty in A-Stan.


An American woman working with the U.S. Army’s controversial unit of civilian social scientists embedded with troops in Afghanistan was seriously wounded when she was set afire in an apparent Taliban attack, Wired’s Danger Room blog reports.

On Tuesday, Paula Loyd, a member of the Army’s Human Terrain Team, was interviewing villagers in Maywand, in Kandahar Province, when she reportedly approached a man carrying a jug of gasoline. They started discussing the price of gas when he suddenly doused her with the fuel and set her alight.

[120mm]

My prayers go out to Paula, and hope she has a rapid and complete recovery.

[marct]

I was chatting with several of the HTS people over the weekend, and this highlights one of the oft-unspoken problems with the program - teaching academics to duck. Apparently, in Paula's case, her guard took his eyes off her for 5 seconds and the attack came totally out of the blue. I hope she recovers, we need more people like her.

BTW, nice comment over at the Chronicle 120.

[120mm]

I was chatting with several of the HTS people over the weekend, and this highlights one of the oft-unspoken problems with the program - teaching academics to duck. Apparently, in Paula's case, her guard took his eyes off her for 5 seconds and the attack came totally out of the blue. I hope she recovers, we need more people like her.

BTW, nice comment over at the Chronicle 120.

I've been busily following up on negative, uninformed comments on various blogs; I've been researching the program, and the more I learn, the more I like it.

Unfortunately, it has had birthing pains from its relatively fast growth as well as some early on mistakes, and there are all sorts of critters who are jumping on each and every problem to bang their drum opposing it.

[marct]

I've been busily following up on negative, uninformed comments on various blogs; I've been researching the program, and the more I learn, the more I like it.

Unfortunately, it has had birthing pains from its relatively fast growth as well as some early on mistakes, and there are all sorts of critters who are jumping on each and every problem to bang their drum opposing it.

Yeah, I know what you mean. I did a fair amount of blogging on it during the summer.

[120mm]

Yeah, I know what you mean. I did a fair amount of blogging on it during the summer.

I'm finally catching up on your blog. New job means more time to read blogs:):D

Good job outta ya, btw....

[sgmgrumpy]

Afghanistan; Units help military better understand local communities

Tom Blackwell, National Post Published: Saturday, November 15, 2008

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN - It was an unusual incident, even by the lawless standards of tribal Afghanistan: An American woman working in Kandahar province was doused in fuel last week and set on fire.

Almost as unusual is Paula Lloyd's background. The victim is a civilian, a social scientist and part of a "human terrain" team assigned to the U. S. Army unit working under Canadian command.

Such teams, now deployed throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, are designed to give the U. S. military a better understanding of local communities.

And now the controversial concept has been adopted by Canada, which recently launched a version of its own called "white situational awareness" teams.

The name derives from the military penchant for categorizing things and assigning them colours. Red refers to the enemy, blue to friendly forces and white to civilians.

Made up of two army intelligence officers and three civilian Foreign Affairs Department employees, it has been tasked with deciphering the sometimes impenetrable Pashtun culture of the region.

Drawing on information from Canadian civilians and troops operating in Kandahar, local cultural advisors and NATO allies, the team is trying to map out the power brokers of the province and how they relate to each other.



READ ENTIRE ARTICLE AT: http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=961884

[William F. Owen]

Made up of two army intelligence officers and three civilian Foreign Affairs Department employees, it has been tasked with deciphering the sometimes impenetrable Pashtun culture of the region.

Really? It's impenetrable?

So if the US wants to apply it's COIN operations in Columbia, it's going to Human Terrain Teams?

[120mm]

WILF, you make me laugh, and remind me of something I've always believed.

There is this myth that somehow, "Eastern minds" are mysterious and not understandable by westerners. I guess that might work for the dense and imperceptive among us, but I've NEVER seen or heard of an "Eastern mind" making a decision that wasn't either obvious, or decipherable by noodling it for a little bit.

Amazingly, even the "inscrutable oriental" makes decisions based upon self-interest, either short-, long-term, or of the enlightened variety. All it takes is to discover what that self-interest IS.

[William F. Owen]

WILF, you make me laugh, and remind me of something I've always believed.
Laughing is good.

There is this myth that somehow, "Eastern minds" are mysterious and not understandable by westerners. I guess that might work for the dense and imperceptive among us, but I've NEVER seen or heard of an "Eastern mind" making a decision that wasn't either obvious, or decipherable by noodling it for a little bit.
Concur.

Amazingly, even the "inscrutable oriental" makes decisions based upon self-interest, either short-, long-term, or of the enlightened variety. All it takes is to discover what that self-interest IS.
So what is it that the Human Terrain Teams are telling us, that we don't know or can't get ourselves? I really am keen to know this.

[Rex Brynen]

Drawing on information from Canadian civilians and troops operating in Kandahar, local cultural advisors and NATO allies, the team is trying to map out the power brokers of the province and how they relate to each other.

For me, the really scary thing is that it implies that we (and I mean here specifically the Canadians) haven't been doing this yet, although its clearly part of INTEL 101 for COIN operations (or, for that matter, aid and reconstruction operations).

On the other hand, I'm not that surprised (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=38098&postcount=94)....

[Hacksaw]

Wilf... I think its a little off target to cast aspersions at a program based on a reporter characterization of the topic as "deciphering the sometimes impeneterable..." I don't think either HTT members or program managers would make that claim...

Neither do I think the provision of additional resources to support the critical function of understanding the operational environment as an admission that forces aren't doing the task... it only signals the significance that leadership places on the task and the subsequent allocation of resources...

The only "worry" I have with regard to this program would actualize if commanders and staff delegated the task of understanding/describing their environment to "pros from Dover", I don't see this as likely, but certainly possible if you get a critical mass of the unimaginative/criminally inept.

Not sure why this creates some much consternation on this panel... the hystrionics of the anthropology community aside... what is the issue with bringing SME to bear on a military problem??

Live well and row

[Ken White]

The teams fulfill a valid need and are quite likely to be effective. It's easy for Wilf and 120mm who have spent some time among Arabs and Asians to say :
:There is this myth that somehow, "Eastern minds" are mysterious and not understandable by westerners. I guess that might work for the dense and imperceptive among us, but I've NEVER seen or heard of an "Eastern mind" making a decision that wasn't either obvious, or decipherable by noodling it for a little bit.In addition to the dense, there those who are not one bit dense but who just arrived in the area and have to make rapid combat decisions and do not have the time to sort through nuance -- they don't have time to noodle...
Amazingly, even the "inscrutable oriental" makes decisions based upon self-interest, either short-, long-term, or of the enlightened variety. All it takes is to discover what that self-interest IS.I partly agree -- I'll also point out that none of us knew that before we spent some time among them and I'll further bet big money that none of the three of us is nearly as adept at discovering what that self-interest is to the extent we would like or would like to think we are... :D

You left out the Asian concepts of family, face and honor which all have a significant impact and are not at all like western concepts. Politeness and the resultant tendency to tell you what they think you want to hear -- and that is not a lie to them -- also impact.

Regardless, the teams will provide insights and, importantly, will institutionalize the knowledge (well, hopefully, anyway...) so that even folks going into the area for the first time are as smart as the three of us are...

Far, far more importantly, that knowledge may cut through the terrible ego and arrogance of the westerner who thinks he's got the east figured out. ;)

[William F. Owen]

Wilf... I think its a little off target to cast aspersions at a program based on a reporter characterization of the topic as "deciphering the sometimes impeneterable..." I don't think either HTT members or program managers would make that claim...


Certainly not my intent to cast aspersions. I am genuinely trying to get to the bottom of all this "culture" and HTT thing.

I see it nowhere else in any COIN publications or any historical reference to it. It's a new invention, and nothing I've read gives it adequate colour or depth.

I want to understand it, and then I might cast an aspersion or two! :D

[Bob's World]

Anything that allows DoD to evolve from a blinders on focus on the threat as being described to them by the intel officer is a good thing. My recent experience is largely with our efforts in the Philippines, and while we didn't have special teams, we didn't need them because for SOF, assessing the environment and the populace prior to designing COIN engagement is as fundamental as breathing. Like security, it is the thing that you do first and the thing you keep doing throughout your engagement. The conventional force is going thru the school of hard knocks on this, but is continuing to evolve.

At a higher level, progress continues to be made incorporating this more holistic approach into our planning process as well. Be it "Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design," or "Systemic Operational Design." Both processess essentially insert into the Mission Analysis process a methodology that breaks down the problem and analyzes the systems and dynamics at work; vice simply asking "where are the bad guys." We continue to evolve.

[120mm]

The teams fulfill a valid need and are quite likely to be effective. It's easy for Wilf and 120mm who have spent some time among Arabs and Asians to say : In addition to the dense, there those who are not one bit dense but who just arrived in the area and have to make rapid combat decisions and do not have the time to sort through nuance -- they don't have time to noodle...I partly agree -- I'll also point out that none of us knew that before we spent some time among them and I'll further bet big money that none of the three of us is nearly as adept at discovering what that self-interest is to the extent we would like or would like to think we are... :D

You left out the Asian concepts of family, face and honor which all have a significant impact and are not at all like western concepts. Politeness and the resultant tendency to tell you what they think you want to hear -- and that is not a lie to them -- also impact.

Regardless, the teams will provide insights and, importantly, will institutionalize the knowledge (well, hopefully, anyway...) so that even folks going into the area for the first time are as smart as the three of us are...

Far, far more importantly, that knowledge may cut through the terrible ego and arrogance of the westerner who thinks he's got the east figured out. ;)

I don't claim an expertise, but I AM from a very small, backwards, redneck place... (with due apologies to at least one other board member who I know is from there) and I have yet to encounter a "foreign" cultural concept. And I disagree that the Asian concept of family, face and honor are foreign to Western culture; they just aren't the McCulture variety that is marketed in, to and by the US as a whole.

I STILL get a cheesecake for my birthday, which I eat with feigned enjoyment, that is given to me by a now-elderly neighbor, because I once remarked that I like cheesecake. And I do so because of family, face and honor implications....

BTW - I get to do so for the 32nd time a month from today.

[reed11b]

BTW - I get to do so for the 32nd time a month from today.
Rock! I am not the youngest member of this community! Thank you for being a "young pup"
Reed:D

[120mm]

Laughing is good.

Concur.

So what is it that the Human Terrain Teams are telling us, that we don't know or can't get ourselves? I really am keen to know this.

HTTs need to tell this to the military commander, because they are too foreign to the military CoC to engage in "can-do, hoo-ah, suck up" behaviors that everyone who wears green tends to do. But that's just my opinion.

The primary problem with The Army is that they suck at self-examination. Too many people at too high of levels focused on their own rice bowl. HTS isn't perfect, but at least they are outsiders, capable of seeing the problems.

[120mm]

Rock! I am not the youngest member of this community! Thank you for being a "young pup"
Reed:D


Wrong - The neighbor lady found out I liked cheesecake on my 13th Birthday. Been choking it down since then, or for 32 additional years. You can do that math to find out how old I will be.

[Rex Brynen]

And now the controversial concept has been adopted by Canada, which recently launched a version of its own called "white situational awareness" teams.

Am I the only one who find the name both amusing and peculiarly appropriate (as in, "some white folks in Afghanistan could so with some situational awareness...")?

To get to the broader debate that Wilf raises:

1) I agree that other cultures are rarely impenetrable, and indeed that there are certain dynamics of power and politics than run through a great many societies. By the same token, there are concepts that are different, cultural values that aren't appreciated, tolerances and intolerances that need explaining. Moreover, I absolutely agree with Ken than those of us who spend a lot of time in other parts of the world sometimes don't even realize the things that we know about societal behaviour, cross-cultural communication, etc.... and that newbies may well be in need of a crash course (lest they otherwise, well, crash).

2) On top of this, the news report (Hacksaw is right: it shouldn't really be taken as a necessarily clear and accurate description of the teams) suggests that a lot of what will be done is social mapping—where power and resources lie, and how local political dynamics work. This does require some specialist attention, either brought in from the outside, learned on the spot, or some combination of the two.

Deciphering where real power lies, how decisions emerge, the balance of cultural/ideological/material/pragmatic factors in decision-making, the influence of identity, clan, and family factors, the amorphous boundaries of social groups, and the relationships between them, (etc, etc.) is all hard work. (It also as much art as science, but that's another issue...)

[Bob's World]

Spending 7 months in the Egyptian Army (Desert Shield and Storm) was an eye opener for for me as a young ODA Commander. Yes, people at their core are the same everywhere, and concepts like Maslows heirarchy apply to every populace; but if you think that a phrase or action that means one thing in your home town will mean the same thing three states over, let alone within a completely different culture, you are sadly mistaken. Yes, we need to draw upon our commonalities, but we also need to understand our differences if we want our engagement to be effective (i.e., produce our intended effect).

People from the Middle East see things very differently than People in America do. That is a fact. But don't stop slicing there. People within the Middle East are all very different as well. As any Iranian would quickly tell you "We are not Arab!!" When one travels to Asia, the people there similarly have a very keen sense of heirachy between nations and cultures that are very important to them. Most Americans can't tell a Japanese from a Korean by sight, but trust me, the people of the region can again slice it much finer than that and attribute tremendous significance to differences that we don't even register.

You see this in the Philippines a lot. The people there speak english, they have adopted a great deal of US culture, but at their core, they are Philippino; and how they think and percieve things is based upon thousands of years of Philippino cultural development, and that is very different than the cultural development of the average American. If an American drops a dish, he says "Sorry, I dropped the dish." If a Philippino drops a dish, he says "The dish fell." This is just one example, but if a people by their culture do not accept responsibility for actions, how does that translate to a government of that same people and their approach to Insurgency?

These are complex issues, and should not be down played. This is why the persistent engagement of our forward deployed Special Forces personnel is so important. Over years of going back over and over to the same areas they devleop an understanding that cannot be conveyed in the little booklets that our conventional forces always produce and hand out to everyone as they get on the plane. Keep printing the little books, but never forget that the knowledge it contains is just the tip of the iceberg.

[Rex Brynen]

People from the Middle East see things very differently than People in America do. That is a fact. But don't stop slicing there. People within the Middle East are all very different as well. As any Iranian would quickly tell you "We are not Arab!!"

Important point, and I would go even further: it can vary by locale, age, gender, level of education, etc. etc. The political role of Palestinian clans (for example) is very different in Gaza than it is Ramallah; Sunni urban politics is different in poor Tripoli than in middle class Beirut.

I'm also tempted to add Arlington County and Foggy Bottom, or Ottawa and Gatineau. :D

[Ken White]

I don't claim an expertise, but I AM from a very small, backwards, redneck placeMe too, I bet mine is smaller than yours... :D
and I have yet to encounter a "foreign" cultural concept.Then you're really lucky, I've run into several; Boston, New york, Los angeles among others. As for overseas differences, I spent a couple of years in the ME living and traveling on the economy in peacetime and I've spent about seven in Asia proper mostly but not all in wartime.

They may not be different to you but there are differences -- not quite the same thing -- in my opinion and that of most people I've talked to. That includes the local residents overseas who are acutely aware of those differences if you really talk to them at length.
And I disagree that the Asian concept of family, face and honor are foreign to Western culture; they just aren't the McCulture variety that is marked in, to and by the US as a whole.I didn't say they were foreign, I said: "You left out the Asian concepts of family, face and honor which all have a significant impact and are not at all like western concepts." To me that simply meant you didn't mention them and they have an effect in any relationship or dealings with Asians. We have the concepts as well but theirs are not like ours, the interpretations and strengths of application differ. Thus my angels / pin comment; what you said I said is not what I said. :confused:
I STILL get a cheesecake for my birthday, which I eat with feigned enjoyment, that is given to me by a now-elderly neighbor, because I once remarked that I like cheesecake. And I do so because of family, face and honor implications... Good for you for doing it for all those reasons. Good of that person to track you down around the world and get it to you -- unless you're always lucky enough to be home for your birthday; if so, good for you.

My Family was slighted by another family two centuries ago -- I do not wait for one of them to appear in my sights to be killed. Others have been known to carry a grudge that long -- and to kill over it. Nor do I consider my wife and daughter inferior creatures (I wouldn't dare :wry: ). I've got three Cousins I can't stand; wouldn't ask them for help or help them for any reason, ever, cousins or no...

There are differences.

If you really don't believe there are differences and if you bought any local products while you were in the ME, I'll bet you made the seller's day... ;)

[120mm]

Re: both the above. Once you are aware there ARE micro-cultures and internal differences in social logic, it makes it a heck of a lot easier to actually dig in and figure out the 5 Ws of cultural issues.

Of course, sensitivity and perceptivity vary between individuals, and a very perceptive individual will see the feedback and seek to adapt to the cultural difference. Others will just snowplow their way through, ignorant of even the existence of difference, or dismiss them as being "strange".

[120mm]

Ken, I didn't mean to mean that cultures aren't different, I meant that they didn't seem "foreign" to me. Even big cities, while different, had a landscape and rhythm that was understandable. I've embedded my responses for fun and profit...


Me too, I bet mine is smaller than yours...

Smaller than 3 people per square mile?



Then you're really lucky, I've run into several; Boston, New york, Los angeles among others. As for overseas differences, I spent a couple of years in the ME living and traveling on the economy in peacetime and I've spent about seven in Asia proper mostly but not all in wartime.

They may not be different to you but there are differences -- not quite the same thing -- in my opinion and that of most people I've talked to. That includes the local residents overseas who are acutely aware of those differences if you really talk to them at length.I didn't say they were foreign, I said: "You left out the Asian concepts of family, face and honor which all have a significant impact and are not at all like western concepts." To me that simply meant you didn't mention them and they have an effect in any relationship or dealings with Asians. We have the concepts as well but theirs are not like ours, the interpretations and strengths of application differ. Thus my angels / pin comment; what you said I said is not what I said.


Even better is "what you said I said not being what you said" is not conceptually the same, so we're really talking past each other.


Good for you for doing it for all those reasons. Good of that person to track you down around the world and get it to you -- unless you're always lucky enough to be home for your birthday; if so, good for you.

1 month in transit, being crushed, and high heat didn't help it any; I *really* didn't eat it, I threw it out. But that can be our secret on this public internet forum....:D


My Family was slighted by another family two centuries ago -- I do not wait for one of them to appear in my sights to be killed. Others have been known to carry a grudge that long -- and to kill over it. Nor do I consider my wife and daughter inferior creatures (I wouldn't dare :wry: ). I've got three Cousins I can't stand; wouldn't ask them for help or help them for any reason, ever, cousins or no...

There are differences.

If you really don't believe there are differences and if you bought any local products while you were in the ME, I'll bet you made the seller's day... ;)

Oh, c'mon, Ken, where's your Tiddlywink spirit? Surely you wouldn't let the family down....;)

Your grudge example is a good place to work from. It isn't tough to understand a "grudge", though the variable of "time" is unusual to some. To your typical 13 year old girl, "grudge" is a natural concept. Maintaining it intergenerationally for 200 years is long, but not unheard of. Now, is that a totally "foreign" concept? Not really, at least to my way of thinking. It's well within the range of human experience. So is the concept of not claiming fault, or needing to save face. They're familiar concepts, provided you don't "foreignize" them by getting wrapped around the axle about a different variable or two.

I think this concept has an analogy in male-female relations. The great majority of males I know cannot seem to communicate with females, and find them mysterious at best, and totally erratic and illogical at worst.

Personally, I've never found it particularly difficult to communicate with females; I find their behavior predictable and (mostly) transparent and frankly, I am confused at what all the other males are complaining about.

[Ken White]

there are also those that have it all figured out. My observation over the years has been that about one or two out of 100 may actually be there -- and you may well be that batch hereabouts -- while the other 98+ range down the scale from almost as knowldgable as they believe to totally dangerous. Ain't no doubt in my mind I'm somewhere in the middle of that incomplete knowledge pack.

Asians aren't strange and I've never said or implied that -- they are different and that's not only okay but desirable IMO. They do many things better than westerners do -- basic politeness for one; and a lot of things as well but with a slightly different approach. You'll rarely see a price tag in the ME, for example. You do not want to admire any item at your host's house too lavishly or you'll end up taking it home...

You do realize you could confuse someone, particularly somebody as old and senile as I am. This:
"and I have yet to encounter a "foreign" cultural concept."and this:
Once you are aware there ARE micro-cultures and internal differences in social logic...would almost seem to be contradictions and this:
"I think a very important question we need to ask ourselves, is "What impact is our insistence on forcing a foreign concept of "law" on a society where we are trying to fight a counterinsurgency have on our strategic goals?" * seems to imply that you accept there are differences and they deserve serious consideration...

* From the "Honor, murder and law" thread.

[reed11b]

My argument is not the use of HTT's but the naming and placement of them in the structure. I just get an expanded CA vibe from the whole project, and perhaps imbedding a CA element w/i a HQ section would be more effective, combined with an on-going focus of teaching leaders HOW to think instead of WHAT to think. Then again, I am more or less on the outside looking in at this point.
Reed

[Ken White]

Ken, I didn't mean to mean that cultures aren't different, I meant that they didn't seem "foreign" to me.That's great. I can say pretty much the same thing, never had any "I don't fit in " angst even when I knew I didn't -- however, what applies to us may not apply to the whole Yankee Army, thus the HTTs may have some merit...
Smaller than 3 people per square mile?Depends on when -- when I was a kid, yep. Not today.
Even better is "what you said I said not being what you said" is not conceptually the same, so we're really talking past each other.I don't think I said what you think I said but then again you didn't say what I thought you said or something like that-- so you're probably right... :D
Your grudge example is a good place to work from. It isn't tough to understand a "grudge", though the variable of "time" is unusual to some. To your typical 13 year old girl, "grudge" is a natural concept. Maintaining it intergenerationally for 200 years is long, but not unheard of. Now, is that a totally "foreign" concept? Not really, at least to my way of thinking. It's well within the range of human experience. So is the concept of not claiming fault, or needing to save face. They're familiar concepts, provided you don't "foreignize" them by getting wrapped around the axle about a different variable or two.Now you're tap dancing -- not too well, either... ;)

There is a difference; not a 'foreign concept' but a difference in application -- which is all I said in the first place.
I think this concept has an analogy in male-female relations. The great majority of males I know cannot seem to communicate with females, and find them mysterious at best, and totally erratic and illogical at worst.

Personally, I've never found it particularly difficult to communicate with females; I find their behavior predictable and (mostly) transparent and frankly, I am confused at what all the other males are complaining about.Hmm. Okay. I'm reminded of my earlier comment about the seller of stuff in the ME...

The other males are NOT saying females are mysterious, erratic or illogical. Not at all. Most guys can figure out what females are up to as easily as you can. What they are saying is that females think and react differently than do males. Just as Asians think and react differently than do westerners.

Which is all I said in the first place...

[120mm]

I think the fundamental problem is that I'm not communicating well what I mean. I see "different" and "foreign" as two discrete categories. To me, a "different" cultural aspect is comprehensible and understandable, while "foreign" often completely blows the mind of the receiver, or is not even picked up in the first place.

Thus my analogy about male/female relationships. Whether they acknowledge it or not, the majority of males, just don't "get" females, or the females I'm talking to are fibbing about it, at least to me....:) For example, I just attended a meeting where the only female there exhibited a wide range of both receptive/exhibiting behaviors toward one meeting attendee, while simultaneously exhibiting "you creep me the heck out" behaviors toward one other attendee, and exhibiting "I'm interested in what you're saying" to another attendee. I doubt if any of the males present were particularly attuned to these message, and maybe dimly so.... I occasionally quiz males in situations like this to gauge their level of awareness, and unless they are lying (which is possible) they most often can (barely) receive the receptivity cues, and that's about it.

Our interplay in this thread is exactly what I'm talking about. We have completely dissimilar ideas of what the concept of "different" and "foreign" are, which is deliciously ironic.

And, while I HAVE done ballet, modern and jazz, I have NEVER tap-danced. :cool:

[Ken White]

I think the fundamental problem is that I'm not communicating well what I mean. I see "different" and "foreign" as two discrete categories. To me, a "different" cultural aspect is comprehensible and understandable, while "foreign" often completely blows the mind of the receiver, or is not even picked up in the first place.I don't disagree with that; can I point out that you are the one who first used and has continued to use the word 'foreign' whereas other than quoting you I have not used it? To me, it's not germane to the discussion which IMO effectively boiled down to the fact that 'foreign' is not important to soldiers; 'different' is important to them -- and there is a difference in thought processes between east and west.
Our interplay in this thread is exactly what I'm talking about. We have completely dissimilar ideas of what the concept of "different" and "foreign" are, which is deliciously ironic.Don't see any irony -- but perhaps that's because I don't agree with you that our idea of what is 'foreign' and what is 'different' are dissimilar. I think they're pretty well in sync. The ironic thing is you keep using 'foreign' -- in a sense and with a use with which I have consistently agreed -- and seem to me to be saying that since Asians and their reasoning or approach to things are not foreign to you, they are therefor not different -- yet all the while acknowledging there are differences, if generally indirectly...

IOW, I'm inclined to believe this degenerated from a discussion of terms and whether a difference in thought processes existed and if so was it important to the soldier to an argument about foreignness and females, fine esoteric concepts both but which IMO aren't germane. So yeah, I guess there's some irony in there somewhere... :wry:
And, while I HAVE done ballet, modern and jazz, I have NEVER tap-danced. :cool:That's good, given the example today on 13 year old female creatures and grudges, it is not thy forté. :D

[120mm]

IThe ironic thing is you keep using 'foreign' -- in a sense and with a use with which I have consistently agreed -- and seem to me to be saying that since Asians and their reasoning or approach to things are not foreign to you, they are therefor not different -- yet all the while acknowledging there are differences, if generally indirectly...

I'm not saying they aren't different; I'm saying the differences aren't fundamental. Rather they are variations on a theme. I see human beings as being more alike than they are different. Kind of a "glass half full" thing.

On the other hand, there appears to be no end of people who comment about how fundamentally different people are, depending on their culture/national identity. I'm saying it's more accurate to say they are cosmetically different.

[Ken White]

I'm not saying they aren't different; I'm saying the differences aren't fundamental . . . I'm saying it's more accurate to say they are cosmetically different.No argument on that; People as they say are people. My point all along has simply those differences do exist and they need to be considered in military decision making because subtle and cosmetic though they may be, they can still be problematic -- reporting of numbers is a great and simple example...

Re: your earlier clarifying post Post on HTTs:
The primary problem with The Army is that they suck at self-examination. Too many people at too high of levels focused on their own rice bowl. HTS isn't perfect, but at least they are outsiders, capable of seeing the problems.Forgot to mention earlier that I agree with that as well.

Who sez we were talking past each other... ;)

[William F. Owen]

...my sole point being that while it is all too easy to screw up or not understand folks, the getting to understand is pretty simple.

I live in a very complex multi-cultural society, and religiously diverse beliefs and practices, but it's pretty easy to work out how the whole place works, and who hates who, and why, once you know what each believes and why. History is usually the key and history can be learnt.

I'm still fascinated to know how we could have employed HTTs in Sierra Leone, for example, which has a good few competing ethnic and tribal groups.

[Ken White]

It is easy to understand other cultures -- if one wants to do so; it's the dummy who don't wish to or who are too lazy to do so that are problematic. Been my observation that generally the former far outnumber the latter and most suffer from over active egos...

I think the HTTS are like any other operational tool; there are times when they're appropriate and times when they aren't. They would, for example, have been of little use to the US in Central America some years ago (to provide a corollary to Sierra Leone).

[120mm]

But I found this to be funny, relevant and enlightening to the subject at hand:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v311/120mm/Slide1-1.jpg

[Beelzebubalicious]

Paula passed away recently. She was with her family and friends.

Paula asked her family, in the event of her demise, to establish a program for girls in her memory at an Afghanistan school. The family will be providing details and I'm sure would be happy for support.

[Tom Odom]

Paula passed away recently. She was with her family and friends.

Paula asked her family, in the event of her demise, to establish a program for girls in her memory at an Afghanistan school. The family will be providing details and I'm sure would be happy for support.

I am sorry to her that. My best to her family and friends.

Tom

[Ron Humphrey]

Paula passed away recently. She was with her family and friends.

Paula asked her family, in the event of her demise, to establish a program for girls in her memory at an Afghanistan school. The family will be providing details and I'm sure would be happy for support.

seems to represent the kind of person she was.

[Beelzebubalicious]

On another note, this report appeared recently in Wired magazine,

Help Wanted: 'Human Terrain' Teams for Africa (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2009/01/help-wanted-hum.html#more)


Now it looks like the human terrain teams -- or something very much like them -- are coming to Africa. Research and risk management firm Archimedes Global, Inc. recently sent out help-wanted ads for a new "socio-cultural cell" within U.S. Africa Command, the new regional military headquarters. Within two months of the contract start, the company will deploy a six-contractor team to eastern Africa.

[Stan]

Hey Eric,

On another note, this report appeared recently in Wired magazine,

Help Wanted: 'Human Terrain' Teams for Africa (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2009/01/help-wanted-hum.html#more)

Intriguing link and story, Thanks!

While I've been an advocate of soldiers studying host country culture, language and awareness (especially in Sub-Sahara) prior to getting into deep Sierra, I'm going to remain a tad skeptical at this current job ad. Taking a look at Archimedes' site and the folks charged with this latest shindig doesn't give me the warm fuzzies.

Not to toot my own horn, but we have (or at least had) well-trained and experienced CA, PSYOPS and countless other SF teams performing the very same. We've been pounding the sand demanding our soldiers be taught and learn something, but yet those that have, are merely replaced with yet another quick fix. Smells like status quo at least until the funding runs out and we find another acronym and task to replace it with.

Regards, Stan

[marct]

Hey Eric,
Intriguing link and story, Thanks!

Second that!


While I've been an advocate of soldiers studying host country culture, language and awareness (especially in Sub-Sahara) prior to getting into deep Sierra, I'm going to remain a tad skeptical at this current job ad. Taking a look at Archimedes' site and the folks charged with this latest shindig doesn't give me the warm fuzzies.

Yeah....:cool:.


Not to toot my own horn, but we have (or at least had) well-trained and experienced CA, PSYOPS and countless other SF teams performing the very same. We've been pounding the sand demanding our soldiers be taught and learn something, but yet those that have, are merely replaced with yet another quick fix. Smells like status quo at least until the funding runs out and we find another acronym and task to replace it with.

I think you're right about that, Stan. It strikes me that what is being tossed around at the conceptual level is an either/or scenario. It makes a lot of sense to have an academic style research reachback available, although hopefully operating at faster than academic speed ;), but on the ground? I think a mixed type of set up might work better - take the people with the training and experience, send in an anthropologist for ~3 months or so from the reachback group (cycle them all through), and let them work together.

[Beelzebubalicious]

I think there's a place for rigorous and objective research as a basis for understanding the culture, politics and other facets of a given society.
Anthropologists could be engaged in doing specific studies and briefing people in theater in a way that goes beyond the usual cross-cultural stuff that people get.

By the way, the Millenium Challenge Corporation is going to issue a RFP any day now for a civic participation project in Rwanda that calls for the participation of Anthropologists. For example, see this recruitment ad (http://www.devex.com/jobs/anthropologist) on www.devex.com:

"RTI International (www.rti.org) is accepting expressions of interest to fill a senior-level Anthropologist position for a three-year program funded by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) focusing on improving political rights, civil liberties, and accountability in Rwanda.

RTI International seeks an Anthropologist with significant background in history or culture as it applies to modes of discourse, attitudes toward authority, and in assisting in the design of meaningful public participation experiences in Rwanda or similar setting."

[jcustis]

I'd like to take this thread slightly off the anthopological tack and delve into a question that has been grinding my gears for at least a week now.

Imagine if you will, that you are serving as a PRT member, and are involved in bringing foreign businessmen into Iraq for the purpose of business development talks in an area where a foreign company was responsible for an agricultural project many years ago. Along for the ride is a certain blond DoD liaison representative who, while attractive and young, and a Harvard grad, has about zero wits about her when it comes to cultural sensitivity, and doesn't recognize the fact that her Uggs boots don't fit the freaking climate

If you are said PRT and you are participating in an engagement with the "sheik of sheiks" of Iraq, and happen to know that there is a potential for many other sheiks to be present for impromptu discussions, would you require that the DoD liaison adhered to the basic cultural sensitivity nod of covering her head before she stepped into the ornate home of the host, even if it was a relaxed Queen Noor sort of way?

[Surferbeetle]

Jcustis,

How much pull does your fictional DoD rep have?

Perhaps this person is needed to facilitate an important advance meeting with a similar demographic of the Iraqi population that they can effectively influence and perhaps observe and internalize cultural 'norms' for this demographic. Engagement planning and post engagement discussions may help to orient them to your/The Shiek's concerns.

After all this effort and coordination go for the consensus decision, if there is 'no time for this' then you make the call my friend.

Regards,

Steve

[Rex Brynen]

I'd like to take this thread slightly off the anthopological tack and delve into a question that has been grinding my gears for at least a week now.

I would take her aside and explain to her the cultural and political facts of life, and suggest that she wouldn't want to inadvertently compromise the mission by failing to adapt to local circumstances. How tactfully you do this depends, of course, on rank/influence/age issues.

Of course, I can say this having never served in a PRT ;) However, I wouldn't hesitate to straighten out a fellow consultant/team member when I'm on a field mission for a development agency.

[jcustis]

I suppose that for clarification, I need to say that this in fact did happen, and also make the correction that she was not a liaison, but rather on a fellowship, and responsible for some sort of tag-along responsibilities.

My non-kinetic effects manager told the story from several days ago, as he was part of the movement for the delegation's junket. He is kicking himself for not stopping to make the point that she was out of place, in part because he unconsciously decided that if she had come all the way from the Green Zone that someone had to have screened her and thought she was good to go. When she interrupted a meeting of some 50 sheiks and walked past them all at the head sheik's bidding (he has very Western tendencies BTW), my guy did cut her off when she started asking who the PDK was and who the particular visiting sheiks were aligned with. He made the point that she needed to excuse herself, uncovered and all, and make for a bathroom until the meeting was over.

Makes me think of Emerald City moments, and I am once again brought back to the reality that sometimes, we just don't freaking get it. :( It had nothing to do with the fact that she was a woman, but everything to do with the fact that it was just a stupid series of moments.

[Rex Brynen]

(...as in Hunter S. Thompson, that is.)


Afghanistan: The New War for Hearts and Minds (http://www.mensjournal.com/new-war-for-hearts-and-minds)
Men's Journal
Wed, Jan 21, 2009


ROBERT YOUNG PELTON goes deep inside America’s new, brainier strategy in Afghanistan and finds that, on the front line, scientists and soldiers don’t always mix. An absurdist tale of modern warfare.

[Surferbeetle]

From wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Young_Pelton)


Robert Young Pelton (b. July 25, 1955, Edmonton, Canada), is an author, journalist and documentary filmmaker. A self-styled adventurer, he considers himself a "witness" to conflict, rather than a serious journalist. He has witnessed conflicts such as the siege of Grozny in Chechnya, the battle of Qala-I-Jangi in Afghanistan, the rebel campaign to take Monrovia in Liberia. He embedded himself with the CIA during the hunt for Bin Laden, and spent time with both insurgents and Blackwater security contractors during the war in Iraq.[1]

Pelton's regularly published guide The World's Most Dangerous Places, which provides practical and survival information for people who work and travel in high risk zones, was a best seller.[2] He was also host of the Discovery Travel Channel series "Robert Young Pelton's The World's Most Dangerous Places" from 1998 to 2003. Now residing in Los Angeles, California, Pelton currently writes books and produces documentaries on conflict-related subjects. He is a popular interview subject appearing as an insightful expert with ground experience or as an often humorous raconteur of his various misfortunes and safety tips on shows as diverse as Oprah, Conan O'Brien, CNN, Fox, BBC, ABC, CBS, NBC and others. Most recently he has been in negotiations with the President of Equatorial Guinea regarding the arrested coup plotters, many of whom had worked for Executive Outcomes in the mid-1990s. The story behind the coup and his efforts to free Nick du Toit and Simon Mann are documented in the May 2008 Men's Journal "How to Stage a Coup".

[Beelzebubalicious]

I just read the Pelton piece. I feel warm and fuzzy. I'm afraid this guy is going to follow the footsteps of the recently kidnapped anti-kidnap expert.

Although I think the crusade to bring culture to the military and pastures to the unpasturized is noble and good, I really do wonder how effective it can be in environments like afghanistan and iraq. Someone in the article stated that anthropologists would have been more effective back in 2001 when people would really talk. Perhaps it is too late at this point and at the point of engagement. I know there are efforts underway to improve our understanding of our adversaries and civilian cultures and that's great. It will take time to make a difference. And there are still a lot of hard realities that will always be there.

Makes me think that the focus can and should be more on the softer side, the foreign service/diplomatic side. I think there's a lot more room for social science and anthropological analysis and tools in understanding a given society/culture. Embassies employ economic and political teams which attempt to understand societies and governments from these perspectives, but the cultural aspect is more about the exchange of culture (as in the arts). I always thought it would be interesting to have a culture team in the Embassy that does research and analyzes that society from a cultural/anthropological perspective. It would also help build up the cadre of trained, educated and informed people in every country that could be called upon to advise and assist when needed.

[Cavguy]

This should be a case study in CGSC (or for LTG Caldwell) of piss poor PAO operations.

WTF, let's send the major reporter out with a 1LT and a stressed out guard unit. Good idea.

*sigh*

[William F. Owen]

The idea behind human terrain teams, or HTTs, is to put a small army of civilian social scientists (ideally anthropologists) and intel-savvy military officers into the field to give brigade commanders a better understanding of local dynamics. The teams are charged with “mapping” social structures, linkages, and priorities, just as a recon team might map physical terrain. By talking to locals the teams might help identify which village elder the commander should deal with or which tribe might be a waste of time; which valley should get a roads project and whether a new road might create a dispute between villages.

I still don't get this. FACT: This was done, successfully, in Vietnam by SF. No civilians. Is this not the type of mission SF was created for?

I just hope this is a BS article and has totally got the HTT mission wrong.

Now, don't get me wrong. The teams are charged with “mapping” social structures, linkages, and priorities, just as a recon team might map physical terrain. By talking to locals the teams might help identify which village elder the commander should deal with or which tribe might be a waste of time - is a very sound military mission, was was routinely done by the British as a matter of course. It's good military common sense. It's called Reconnaissance - and it should be done by soldiers.

Talking to a village elder and all the other stuff is real time intelligence work. Why does this require anthropologists?

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


Talking to a village elder and all the other stuff is real time intelligence work. Why does this require anthropologists?

Shirt answer is that it doesn't require an Anthropologist. The long(er) answer is that you need an Anthropologist in the loop because of potential problems in interpreting the data and, in many cases, even figuring out what questions to ask.

Wilf, the Brits had a major advantage over the US in having their soldiers do this type of work. A lot of early style ethnography was actually pioneered by serving British military officers, especially in India during the 19th century. But about the only reason that that actually worked well was because of two factors.

First, the average Brit officer in, say, 1850 or so had a classical education, including Latin and Greek. They were used to dealing with a much longer time horizon than the average US officer, and they also had several other skills that led to an almost automatic comparative attitude (especially multiple languages).

Second, British colonial officers, or officers in the various company armies, tended to deal with sepoy troops from multiple cultures. Again, that reinforces a comparative perspective when looking at phenomena.

But both of these are absent with the vast majority of US troops. While I applaud the fact that West Point remains one of the few places where students are required to read the classics, that doesn't mean that it is the same as struggling through Caesar's Gallic Wars, in Latin, at age 10, or reading Arrian at the same age.

Put simply, British officers had the cultural capital that enabled them to take a long time horizon and have a large historical database to draw on, while most US troops don't. And that time horizon and historical / comparative database are the base requirements for Anthropologists.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, the Brits had a major advantage over the US in having their soldiers do this type of work. A lot of early style ethnography was actually pioneered by serving British military officers, especially in India during the 19th century. But about the only reason that that actually worked well was because of two factors.


Marc mate, I agree with you on one level, but..

British Officers were doing this well into the 1970's both in the Arabian Peninsular and to some extent, Ulster.

Charting tribal, social, family and even ethnic associations are all Standard practice in Small War Intelligence work. It is something that the US has done before. - Vietnam, Indian War, etc etc. - and it is not something of recent invention, or insight.

What is more, why is the US aiming to develop this skills set, with the aim of deploying no civilians?

[Van]

Wilf,
The cynical answer is that employing soldiers for this mission doesn't create lucrative, long term contracts.

A more pragmatic answer is the classic "Solutions: good, fast, cheap; pick one" (Normally pick two, but with issues of this magnitude....) We chose fast. I would argue the good solution (neither fast nor cheap) is to pick bright soldiers at the end of boot camp but before AIT and tell them that they have a unique opportunity to go to college for a full ride scholorship, and fast track to warrent rank as Athropology specialists. The cheap solution (relatively and neither fast nor as good) would be a six to nine month, intensive course in ethnographic reconnaissance and language school.

[max161]

This should be a case study in CGSC (or for LTG Caldwell) of piss poor PAO operations.

WTF, let's send the major reporter out with a 1LT and a stressed out guard unit. Good idea.

*sigh*

I would not necessarily blame the PAO in this case unless he recommended approval this embed with the LT. Where was the chain of command? Whose chain of command is this LT and his HTT in? What message was the chain of command to whom this LT belongs trying to send? I think we all read what message was received? There are a lot of issues in this article. What was that HUMINT team all about? In the hard copy edition the guy was all kitted out and wearing BDUs so either it was not a recent photo or the guy was not Army (which might explain why he did not know that the Army has THTs tactical HUMINT teams which I do not think go around snatching villagers out of bed at night). And talk about sensational journalism: Did Steve Fondacaro really give an interview for 9 hours and after 7 hours got up, walked into a door, broke his jaw, and then continued to talk for 2 more hours? Just a few thoughts.

[William F. Owen]

I would argue the good solution (neither fast nor cheap) is to pick bright soldiers at the end of boot camp but before AIT and tell them that they have a unique opportunity to go to college for a full ride scholorship, and fast track to warrent rank as Athropology specialists.

OK, but does the task require a fully trained anthropologist? Really? This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity designed to aid on the defeating of insurgents. Why have Anthropologists?

[Van]

OK, but does the task require a fully trained anthropologist? Really? This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity designed to aid on the defeating of insurgents. Why have Anthropologists?

Come on now,Wilf. In the Small War application, this is a subset of intelligence. Cultural norms, taboos, perceived interests, values, moralities, etc, all that Anthro stuff, shapes the commanders' options. But you're well aware of this already. Given the way you word your objection, maybe the ethnographic reconnaissance/language school is a better course of action. We don't need fully trained and qualified Special Forces operators to develop the commander's picture of the human terrain, nor do we need people with graduate degrees in anthropology, but it is a specialized discipline that we haven't developed a structured doctrine for yet.


This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity...
On reflection, are you sure you want to stand by this position? What is the difference between a PSYOP and a marketing campaign? Both are activities designed and executed to modify the behavior of a target audience. Developing ethnograpic intelligence or anthropology; the difference is who is using it, and for what rather than the actual functions of the personnel conducting the work.

[William F. Owen]

We don't need fully trained and qualified Special Forces operators to develop the commander's picture of the human terrain, nor do we need people with graduate degrees in anthropology, but it is a specialized discipline that we haven't developed a structured doctrine for yet.
Concur, so I see this as being a function of HUMINT. Human as in the most precise meaning of HUMAN. Its about gathering information to inform a commanders decisions, so it's intelligence.
Dare I say "Human intelligence preparation of the battlefield." Seems like common sense to me, - which is what IPB should have been, but never was!


What is the difference between a PSYOP and a marketing campaign? Both are activities designed and executed to modify the behavior of a target audience.

Well I suspect we might disagree here. I see PSYOPS as being usefully limited to being things that break to enemies will to continue, or to dissuaded folks from doing something that is against your interest.

[Rex Brynen]

OK, but does the task require a fully trained anthropologist? Really? This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity designed to aid on the defeating of insurgents. Why have Anthropologists?

Wilf, I think its fair to say in theory that anthropologists who have spent a dozen full-time years of graduate and post-graduate work on (say) kinship relations or local customary law, who have been through considerable training in research methodology, and who may have spent considerable time living and working among local populations, might know a thing or two about how local social dynamics work out on the ground that others aren't likely to pick up.

On the other hand, I agree with you that this is, in essence, an intel function. It is neither appropriate nor useful for the HTS to pretend its just a set of neutral social scientists who happened to have arms/armed escorts.

Moreover, while I can see the benefits above in theory (and, after all, the existing intel community already has people in it with social science specializations for precisely that reason), it is not at all clear to me that:


the mere fact of graduate training in the social sciences makes you an effective HTSer (indeed, I would think only a relatively small proportion of scholars would do the job well).

the current recruitment system is recruiting the right kind of people (although I'm sure there are some excellent HTSers). In fairness, people with meaningful expertise in the current geographic areas of interest aren't that common, and post 9/11 there is huge competing demand for them in the academic and (other) government agency job market.

the system benefits from all the hoopla and high profile that surrounds it, some of which seems to be self-inflicted.

the system couldn't have been better designed as an add-on to existing capacities (albeit with some effort made to assure that it offers a distinctive and valuable analytical product).

whatever the value of specialists (and I'm one), we shouldn't underestimate the overwhelming value of common sense and empathy (not necessarily sympathy, but the ability to put yourself in someone else's shoes) in undertaking analysis. Given the choice between a PhD without those, and a smart analyst or operator with them, I would take the latter in most circumstances.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I think its fair to say in theory that anthropologists who have spent a dozen full-time years of graduate and post-graduate work on (say) kinship relations or local customary law, who have been through considerable training in research methodology, and who may have spent considerable time living and working among local populations, might know a thing or two about how local social dynamics work out on the ground that others aren't likely to pick up.


...but where would that not be true? Does the LAPD gang unit use Anthropologists in LA to understand the dynamics of local gangs in relation to immigrant communities? Maybe it should, but that does not make the case for having civilian scientist acting as part of your formation ISTAR capability. On that I think we are agreed.

[marct]

Some good food for thought that has been rumbling around in my backbrain for a while now.


Marc mate, I agree with you on one level, but..

British Officers were doing this well into the 1970's both in the Arabian Peninsular and to some extent, Ulster.

Agreed, although I suspect that some of that happened as a result of regimental tradition (it's a guess, but....).


Charting tribal, social, family and even ethnic associations are all Standard practice in Small War Intelligence work. It is something that the US has done before. - Vietnam, Indian War, etc etc. - and it is not something of recent invention, or insight.

Again, I agree. I'd take it back further to the Lewis & Clark expedition and the ethnographic questionnaires they were required to complete on their journey (something not usually taught in Anthro courses, along with the minor fact that Albert Gallatin, who was one of the founding fathers of the American Ethnological Society, was involved in creating those questionnaires :wry:).

I'm still trying to think this through but, at the moment, I am inclined to make the following observations:



The British had a tradition of Officers being "Gentlemen" which carried with it certain assumptions about types of education, attitude, etc. (along with the ability to buy your commission ;)).
One of these assumption, the "classical education", actually mirrors a lot of the reading in the old Roman system of PME (I've got an excruciating paper on it if anyone wants to read it).
A lot of this reading is in the tradition of thought from Hecateus of Miletus, through Herodotus, Lucian and Tacitus; i.e. the same roots as a lot of cultural Anthropology.
In addition to being the ground for modern Anthropology (I know some will disagree with me, but I can certainly back that assertion up), the same tradition produced what we can broadly called "military ethnographies" such as Tacitus' Germania and Brittania, Arrian's work, and Chapter XI of the Strategikon of Maurice. They also gave rise to Jeffersonian "ethnography" (i.e. "ethnography" as for both scholarly inetrest and political-military intelligence).

So, when you say "it is not something of recent invention", I'm smiling :D! It goes back a lot farther than most people want to talk about.

Anyway, that last observation leads me to think about your and Rex's point


On the other hand, I agree with you [Wilf] that this is, in essence, an intel function. It is neither appropriate nor useful for the HTS to pretend its just a set of neutral social scientists who happened to have arms/armed escorts.

You know, I think I'm going to have to partially disagree, more as a matter of trying to clarify things (in my mind) than anything else. My concern is that ethnographic knowledge may and at times is an intel function, but that that is not the sum total of it.

One of the things that came clear to me when I was writing that horrid paper last year on ethnographic knowledge in the Romano-Byzantine military tradition was that there was a point at which the knowledge became dangerous to the State (e.g. it made revolts too easy amongst other things). This led me to thinking about the functional type of ethnographic knowledge that was operationally useful for the military which, in a really round about way, brings me back to a lot of the questions Rex notes about the HTS.

Do you need someone with a graduate degree in Anthropology (or the social science) to produce operationally relevant, working ethnographic knowledge (that was the term I used in the paper)? Nope. Heck, that type of material can be pretty much produced by almost anyone who has some training and the right mind set.

Where something like the HTS, at least in theory, plays an appropriate role would be in situations where you are going into the realm of politics and de facto cultural engineering. If you have military commanders doing this, which we do at the moment, then they will need that level of ethnographic knowledge.

The potential problem, at least as I am perceiving it right now, is that there seems to be a real disconnect with actually integrating ethnographic knowledge of any type (outside of the "don't eat with your left hand" level). Anyway, I'm still mulling all this over and waiting for the light bulb to go off....

PS. Steve wanted to be a masochist and read the paper, so here is the link (http://marctyrrell.com/uploads/TFCT.pdf) to it (pdf, ~250k).

[Rex Brynen]

Does the LAPD gang unit use Anthropologists in LA to understand the dynamics of local gangs in relation to immigrant communities?

I would be very surprised if the LAPD doesn't sometimes use consultant anthropologists/criminologists/sociologists, actually. The RCMP, CSIS, and the DoJ certainly does here.

The difference with domestic LE, however, is that the consultant base is on location all the time as a matter of course, doing much of the kind of research you might be interested in, and can be given short-term contracts. In war zones you would have to go about securing that resource in a different way.

Moreover, the LAPD will be dealing with LA gangs until the end of time (and then some, if all the post-apocalyptic science fiction movies that I so love are anything to go by).

Militaries, on the other hand, need to be able to develop area- or issue-specific surge analysis capacities to meet current operational needs, which may be very different a few years down the line. I can see this coming from contracted social scientists where in-house uniformed capacities are unable to meet this (in which case, you're exactly right--it wouldn't be part of your "regular" formation ISTAR capability).

This is all separate from how well the current HTS system is actually doing this at the moment, an issue on which I really don't have enough information to judge, but do have some concerns.

[Ken White]

Militaries, on the other hand, need to be able to develop area- or issue-specific surge analysis capacities to meet current operational needs, which may be very different a few years down the line. I can see this coming from contracted social scientists where in-house uniformed capacities are unable to meet this (in which case, you're exactly right--it wouldn't be part of your "regular" formation ISTAR capability).

This is all separate from how well the current HTS system is actually doing this at the moment, an issue on which I really don't have enough information to judge, but do have some concerns.You, Sir, are a master of understatement -- I have major concerns about it even though I acknowledge the need in the paragraph above. My perception is that the downsizing and shoving under the bus of the Foreign Area Officer program by the Army was a terrible mistake...

[120mm]

Very interesting discussion: There are three things that haven't been mentioned so far, that I think are germane to the issue.

First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units. I'm glad they're special, but they do nothing for me, in terms of ethnographic information.

Second, I believe one of the primary purposes of HTS, is to re-engage the academic soft sciences into the military. And while we're at it, I am sick and tired of hearing about how Anthropology is drama-queening all the attention. It's not just about them. Frankly, I'd pick a military vet with a poli sci degree over an Anthro PhD every day of the week. Whether the HTS, or whatever it morphs into is too late for this particular war is immaterial. This is prototyping for future conflict, and as such has merit.

Third, I see nowhere in the regular Army where the kind of skill-set necessary for ethnography or creative problem solving are truly encouraged. The Army would find a way to pick out those "special soldiers" after basic to put them through school to be ethnographers, and at the end of those years of development, would be considered just another warm body for SDO, and whatever #### detail they could dream up. And in the process, that sharp person would become just another acculturated and compliant soldier.

A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.

[marct]

Some really good points, 120....


First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units. I'm glad they're special, but they do nothing for me, in terms of ethnographic information.

Well, I have no idea if they are doing something like this, but I would be very surprised if they weren't. That said, if it doesn't get out to the regular Army units, it's irrelevant. Just out of interest, let me toss out two hypotheticals. If SF is doing something similar, would you be in favour (hypothetically) in having their material distributed? Second, if they aren't doing something like this, do you think they would be a good place to lodge such a program IFF the material was distributed properly?


Second, I believe one of the primary purposes of HTS, is to re-engage the academic soft sciences into the military. And while we're at it, I am sick and tired of hearing about how Anthropology is drama-queening all the attention. It's not just about them. Frankly, I'd pick a military vet with a poli sci degree over an Anthro PhD every day of the week. Whether the HTS, or whatever it morphs into is too late for this particular war is immaterial. This is prototyping for future conflict, and as such has merit.

Several good observations here...

1. Yes, re-engaging with the social sciences and, especially, the qualitative side was part of the purpose.

2. But it's FUN!!!!!! :eek: (writes he in a whiny tone of voice)
http://la.indymedia.org/uploads/2005/11/authentic_drama_queen.jpg
NB: This picture is purely for illustrative purposes and is NOT meant to be a representation of any Anthropologist living, dead, or somewhere in between.

3. I can see why you would prefer a PoliSci person with a military background and how they could certainly be useful. Personally, I think it's more a combination of attitude and skill set rather than any particular degree per se.

4. You're quite correct that it is protyping, whether for future conflicts or for current ones in the future. That said, and given the often infuriating constraints on getting programs through and deployed, I would like to see a lot of thought going into the exact roles of such teams.


Third, I see nowhere in the regular Army where the kind of skill-set necessary for ethnography or creative problem solving are truly encouraged. The Army would find a way to pick out those "special soldiers" after basic to put them through school to be ethnographers, and at the end of those years of development, would be considered just another warm body for SDO, and whatever #### detail they could dream up. And in the process, that sharp person would become just another acculturated and compliant soldier.

Probably true :(. The history of the FAO program would certainly indicate some type of marginalization would happen.


A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.

Ummm, are you sure you want to do that :eek:? Much as I would love to see some politicians preaching the values of solidarity and socialism in the Swat Valley (http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD221009), I suspect that they would be even more useless that ...., sheesh, anyone I can think of!

[Ken White]

First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units...They don't keep it to themselves -- with some dumbass exceptions; most will willingly share -- an equal or greater problem is that some dumbass regular army units don't listen.
...And in the process, that sharp person would become just another acculturated and compliant soldier.Not everyone's all that compliant. I spent 45 years in it fighting compliance almost all that time. I know a lot of guys who wouldn't succumb. You've been around the system a while -- are you compliant?
A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.We did that in Viet Nam, it was called CORDS and it worked. Worked very well, in fact. DoD didn't like that, the Generals didn't like that and Congress didn't like that. DoD didn't because their money was being spent by USAID. The Generals didn't because COIN is tedious, messy, dirty, lengthy and not predominately a military effort, it messed up the tidy Army in many ways. Congress didn't like it because it was expensive and required too much clout be given the Executive branch. Practicality and effectiveness were not items of concern.

So we decided not to do that. Until we had to do that and everyone had forgotten how. That's with a State Department and and Army with some continuity in charge -- and now you want to put politicians who roll over at two, four and six year intervals in charge...:eek:

[William F. Owen]

First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units. I'm glad they're special, but they do nothing for me, in terms of ethnographic information.

So what you are saying is that SF is not fit for purpose and the Army lacks the command authority to fix the problem? This is a mission that USSF have done and have done successfully.



Second, I believe one of the primary purposes of HTS, is to re-engage the academic soft sciences into the military.

This is prototyping for future conflict, and as such has merit.


Why do you want academic soft sciences in the field? Didn't need them before. Their engagement gets them money, so I guess they're happy.

How do you know what has merit in future conflict? What you do know, is discernible from past conflict. HTTs did not figure in any of the previous COIN conflicts. From all I have read, I see HTTs being a targeting and information gathering asset. Ethnography is information and it is put to military use, which should, when required, mean the use of lethal force.
That is not something civilians should be doing.


A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.

Well all war is a political problem and politicians are in charge of it. That's pure Clausewitz. Any Army that sees COIN as a distinct and separate form of warfare is guilty of gross stupidity. COIN is warfare. Normal Warfare practices apply, and are adapted accordingly.

[120mm]

They don't keep it to themselves -- with some dumbass exceptions; most will willingly share -- an equal or greater problem is that some dumbass regular army units don't listen.

I get the dumbass regular army thing; however, I only get info from SF guys over beer, once they realize that you're "okay". That is a two-edged blade.


Not everyone's all that compliant. I spent 45 years in it fighting compliance almost all that time. I know a lot of guys who wouldn't succumb. You've been around the system a while -- are you compliant?

I'm also irrelevant. I see a trend with an inverse relationship between compliancy and relevancy. But that is just basic large group dynamics, the more I think about it.


We did that in Viet Nam, it was called CORDS and it worked. Worked very well, in fact. DoD didn't like that, the Generals didn't like that and Congress didn't like that. DoD didn't because their money was being spent by USAID. The Generals didn't because COIN is tedious, messy, dirty, lengthy and not predominately a military effort, it messed up the tidy Army in many ways. Congress didn't like it because it was expensive and required too much clout be given the Executive branch. Practicality and effectiveness were not items of concern.

So we decided not to do that. Until we had to do that and everyone had forgotten how. That's with a State Department and and Army with some continuity in charge -- and now you want to put politicians who roll over at two, four and six year intervals in charge...:eek:

That is the rub, isn't it?

[120mm]

Why do you want academic soft sciences in the field? Didn't need them before. Their engagement gets them money, so I guess they're happy.

But prior to 1969 or so, academic soft sciences WERE major contributors to military efforts. Pigeon-guided bombs, anyone?


How do you know what has merit in future conflict? What you do know, is discernible from past conflict. HTTs did not figure in any of the previous COIN conflicts. From all I have read, I see HTTs being a targeting and information gathering asset. Ethnography is information and it is put to military use, which should, when required, mean the use of lethal force.
That is not something civilians should be doing.

We embed civilian journalists in military units, don't we? And I think it is short-sighted to view HTTs as targeting assets. Where intel weenies decide which doors to kick down, HTTs should be advising commanders on why they shouldn't kick down the door in the first place.

The military commander is pre-loaded to go after that weapons cache; maybe we need someone who is politically astute to explain to the military types that one military cache will not win or lose the war. But kicking down doors MAY lose it. And, frankly, HTTs become more of a POLAD than anything else, pushed down to the lower levels.

HTTs are also useful in teaching lower level soldiers on what to look for, beyond the "don't stare at their women and don't shake with the left hand" thing.

[William F. Owen]

We embed civilian journalists in military units, don't we? And I think it is short-sighted to view HTTs as targeting assets. Where intel weenies decide which doors to kick down, HTTs should be advising commanders on why they shouldn't kick down the door in the first place.

Journalists are tourists. No one pretends they contribute anything.
To kick or not kick is not really the problem. That comes down to good behaviour, and common sense.

... but HTTs are working for the military. That means that have to have some military utility. They must be useful. The military has a defined mission and that is what the HTTs have to support. The military is not there to enable the HTTs to gather information of Ethnographic interest.
Surely their job is to furnish information in support of the mission? Isn't that an S2 function?

Is it a civil affairs function?

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


To kick or not kick is not really the problem. That comes down to good behaviour, and common sense.

Both of which are rare and, also, culturally defined ;).


... but HTTs are working for the military. That means that have to have some military utility. They must be useful. The military has a defined mission and that is what the HTTs have to support. The military is not there to enable the HTTs to gather information of Ethnographic interest.
Surely their job is to furnish information in support of the mission? Isn't that an S2 function?

Is it a civil affairs function?

I think you, and a lot of people, are caught up in a terminology (and perception) problem here. The first part deals with the concept of "mission". First off, all missions are nested under and, in theory, subservient to a policy "mission". What may be the most immediately effective way to achieve a specific mission may actually lead to an increased likeliness of a higher order mission failing. This seems to be the niche in which the HTS was originally conceived of to fill - figuring out when the "normal" actions on a mission would increase the likelihood of failure for a higher order mission. That isn't really either an S2 or CA function.

Second, the "military utility" of an HTT is, in theory, both preventative as well as supportive in nature. Again, in theory, it should cover the spectrum from really low level missions (e.g. door kicking) to the highest order they can influence (e.g. which local power structures to work with). This just doesn't fit in nicely with the standard definitions of who does what, when and how, and it has certainly led to confusion about the role of the HTTs and the HTS.

[120mm]

I think it is probably a good time to point out, that as currently configured, HTS teams' primary mission is to provide overlap of ethnographic information between rotations.

Originally, HTS was supposed to be a computer system, but it failed, miserably. The teams were conceived as an analog way to pass ethnographic information from one rotation to another.

Apparently, the system has grown bigger than that, but it's conception was a reaction to the Army's inability to properly do a battle handoff with the inhabitants of their "battle space".

[marct]

You know, it's a totally weird evolution. If you go back to the earliest discussions, the original concept, apparently, was to provide some base level cultural training to deployed troops with an ethnographic library "back-up".

I wonder what a generation is in terms of its mission?

[Ken White]

I get the dumbass regular army thing; however, I only get info from SF guys over beer, once they realize that you're "okay". That is a two-edged blade.You missed the point. Dumbasses on both sides are the problem. I've seen SF teams get wrapped up in a green blanket and mystique and get really dumb as well as RA Cdrs tell the Teams to get a haircut. It is a two edged blade; both sides are at fault and it is abysmally stupid.
I'm also irrelevant. I see a trend with an inverse relationship between compliancy and relevancy. But that is just basic large group dynamics, the more I think about it.No question but there are more non-compliant folks in the sense you meant than compliant ones, I believe...
That is the rub, isn't it?Not to me, I wouldn't put a politician in charge of anything.:D

[ODB]

a dumbass. There is a time and a place to act in the ways so many complain about. When an Army BCT is targeting an ODA based on SIGINT and said ODA sends up a picture of one of it's members to the BCT S2, then said member goes into the TOC to brief the S2, the S2 realizes it's his target, makes for a funny story. Unfortunately in reality it is not funny. Or how about the time a conventional GO decided no one would leave a FOB in civilian clothes and vehicles. Intel dried up immediately because those he was complaining about stopped doing their job to comply. Same GO within a week came back begging for them to get back to work. Or the time an ODA thought they didn't need battle space approval for missions, then get into a skirmish and have no QRF support because no one knows they were even out conducting operations. I can go on and on, as we all can about the dumbasses on both sides, but the bottom line is it comes down to individuals. There is a common ground we all should be working towards to complete, unfortunately when individual agendas get in the way we end up with things like those stated above. No one side is more guilty than the other it just depends on the individuals involved. I have said before that I believe now than any other time in history are many of these issues going away and that the relationship between SOF and CF have never been better. Finally is everyone starting to understand what it is each other does, the big problem is when others want to do the jobs of each other and not their own job. There are many who "get it", unfortunately after 7 years there are still too many who do not. Too many have the I'm "special" attitude, why are they "special", because they are "Special Forces" who work for "Special Operations Command". That's two "specials", too bad they forget about the 3rd one, the individual!

As far as information sharing, there is a bigger picture out there that we all have our piece to paint. Whether we like it or not, all of us in the Army are compartmentalized for various reasons. There are different authorities that allow each of us to do different things, not everyone needs to know everything. I have heartburn when a BCT tells me they have their list of 300locals that I cannot talk to, what? That lasted all of 1/2 a day, when did they get into my business?

Additionally ethnography (had to look it up), but when I did I found it to be one word that sums up what I do. When one looks at techniques:

Direct, first-hand observation of daily behavior. This can include participant observation.

Conversation with different levels of formality. This can involve small talk to long interviews.

The genealogical method. This is a set of procedures by which ethnographers discover and record connections of kinship, descent and marriage using diagrams and symbols.

Detailed work with key consultants about particular areas of community life.

In-depth interviewing.

Discovery of local beliefs and perceptions.

Problem-oriented research.

Longitudinal research. This is continuous long-term study of an area or site.

Team research.

Case studies.

Sounds like what SF teams do daily.....

[marct]

Hi ODB,


Additionally ethnography (had to look it up),

LOL - from the Greek (like a lot of big academic words) ethnos - "people" and "graphos" - writing. Literally writing about a "People".


but when I did I found it to be one word that sums up what I do. When one looks at techniques:

Sounds like what SF teams do daily.....

Yup. Never said you folks didn't do it, and I'd love to buy you a few rounds sometime and chat with you about how you do do it. Maybe write an ethnography of SF ethnographers :D.

[ODB]

That is the million dollar question. We all know things are being done, but where those reports end up is the question. Additionally when they are passed around it's up to individuals whether they continue to distribute or file away. IMO the information is out there, but individuals with their own agendas hold it up or decide that because of the source they don't need it and develop (recreate the wheel) their own products. This is what we need to get over! I'm just one individual but it starts with individuals and if others start to come on board then we can make things happen the way they are suppose to. The whole networking thing, who knows maybe someday I'll be in some distant land with one of the very people on here and we'll both think back to these discussions and do things they way they should be done.

I'm always up for a few good rounds and some meeting of the minds. Best way to learn IMO, next to experiences.

[marct]

I'm always up for a few good rounds and some meeting of the minds. Best way to learn IMO, next to experiences.

Works for me :D.

You're right about the information compartmentalization, and it's not only in the military - we (Anthropologists) do it as well.

[William F. Owen]

Hi Wilf,
Both of which are rare and, also, culturally defined ;).

Agreed, but that doesn't change anything! :D


First off, all missions are nested under and, in theory, subservient to a policy "mission". What may be the most immediately effective way to achieve a specific mission may actually lead to an increased likeliness of a higher order mission failing.

Well I think I am pretty well versed in the difference between, task, mission, plan, and even strategy. I see all as being different things, but we do not have a universal set of definitions here.


That isn't really either an S2 or CA function. - Then it needs to be challenged and held to greater rigour than I had previously suggested. Seems like HTTs should work for the State Department then :)


This just doesn't fit in nicely with the standard definitions of who does what, when and how, and it has certainly led to confusion about the role of the HTTs and the HTS.
Again, this would seem to indicate a lack of rigour.

The role of HTTs reminds me of that of Wellington's cavalry - who thought their job was to "add tone to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl."

[jcustis]

I would have to offer, that at least in my personal experience right at this moment, ODAs can at times have very specific agendas, like the mentoring and development of CT or "I-SWAT" teams that puts that effort at odds with the larger business of doing those things you mentioned ODB. Again, it is my current observation here in N. Iraq; results elsewhere may vary.

What I will also offer is the rant that I think it is totally presumtuous for a HTT to draft a report on the goings-on in my TF's AO, without ever setting one foot on the ground, talking with one single local national (to say nothing about taling with sheikhs, muktars, and men-on-the-stree), or perusing the conditions at any local market. So then how can that HTT presume to write a report about tribal and ethnic tensions on an electoral process, when we already know what their executive summary says? This same report smells exactly as if they simply read intentions reports and intelligence summaries and then slapped their own shade of lipstick on the baboon's ass. It remains a baboon's ass, however.

The problem lies in the fact that the folks who are tasked with employing aspects of HTT support just don't frigging know how to do it, and at time don't want to be bothered...Right as I got into country, the non-kinetic effects manager of our higher headquarters was concerned about the pending arrival of a human terrain team to his command, and he frankly did not know what to do with them, in part because he did not have the exposure, training, or both. I pointed him in the direction of this Council and the data repository of the Journal, in the hope that he would get enough read-in information to avoid getting steam-rolled by any agenda. Heck, he already had a huge wall chart of reconstruction project information that was in various states of disarray. He "got it" but he had neither the staff or time to manage the volume of the effort as effectively as he probably could have. And then a HTT gets tossed into the mix?

I was a huge fan of the PRT concept when I first read about much of it here within this very board. In pratical terms, there is anecdotal information that many battalion commanders find the PRT and embedded PRT efforts as a distraction, waste of time, and often very counter to their understanding of the commander's intent that was received from their higher headquarters. You know what they say about there not being any "I" in team, and I have already dealt with two PRT guys who have impressed me as being almost egocentric to the point that they could not possibly hear and understand what we were saying in response to their ideas and commentary. Couple that with this looming sense of zero movement on about anything that really needs to get done, and it is downright frustrating.

To cite just one example, we had a supporting PRT lead show up and try to pitch his development ideas to my boss, but he continued to harp on the red-tape he had to go through (some 17 steps with DoS) to get a project implemented via his channels. He wanted, however, to support our Task Force's efforts by assisting us with employing our funds to spin up the same sort of project. To all this, my boss told him basically thanks, but no thanks. Why should he utilize his money for something that should be a matter led by State in the first place?...and if it was hard because of the 17 steps, then maybe it just wan't meant to be performed by his TF either.

In just this past year or so, I have begun to rage against the degree with which we are outsourcing so much capability, and the PRTs and HTTs are starting to frustrate me, right along with the Law ENforcement Professional program, which at least for my TF, has turned out to be a bust and is about three years too late.

[120mm]

Agreed, but that doesn't change anything! :D

- Then it needs to be challenged and held to greater rigour than I had previously suggested. Seems like HTTs should work for the State Department then :)

I would suggest that the Army should work for DoS, at least in COIN.



IWhat I will also offer is the rant that I think it is totally presumtuous for a HTT to draft a report on the goings-on in my TF's AO, without ever setting one foot on the ground, talking with one single local national (to say nothing about taling with sheikhs, muktars, and men-on-the-stree), or perusing the conditions at any local market. So then how can that HTT presume to write a report about tribal and ethnic tensions on an electoral process, when we already know what their executive summary says? This same report smells exactly as if they simply read intentions reports and intelligence summaries and then slapped their own shade of lipstick on the baboon's ass. It remains a baboon's ass, however.

I cannot imagine how an HTT can continue to collect their prodigious salaries and never leave the wire. Did the commander not let them out of the gate, or did the HTT not leave based on their own judgement?


The problem lies in the fact that the folks who are tasked with employing aspects of HTT support just don't frigging know how to do it, and at time don't want to be bothered...Right as I got into country, the non-kinetic effects manager of our higher headquarters was concerned about the pending arrival of a human terrain team to his command, and he frankly did not know what to do with them, in part because he did not have the exposure, training, or both. I pointed him in the direction of this Council and the data repository of the Journal, in the hope that he would get enough read-in information to avoid getting steam-rolled by any agenda. Heck, he already had a huge wall chart of reconstruction project information that was in various states of disarray. He "got it" but he had neither the staff or time to manage the volume of the effort as effectively as he probably could have. And then a HTT gets tossed into the mix?

I wonder why he couldn't form a council of the various actors to cause them to coordinate and self-direct. He sounds like a micro-managing type who got what he deserved, frankly. Way too many folks in the military who manage/direct assets without knowing how to lead or to just let others do their jobs.

To me, a staff officer or commander would be well-served to look at product, first, and then share that vision with the actors, who can then be convinced/coerced/massaged into getting the commander's product.

BTW - the staff officer or commander have to expect that the actor gets his/hers, too, in the process of helping each other out.

[Stan]

I cannot imagine how an HTT can continue to collect their prodigious salaries and never leave the wire. Did the commander not let them out of the gate, or did the HTT not leave based on their own judgment?


That issue is no longer an "issue". They will be promoted to the prestigious grade of GS-12 and promptly dumped outside the wire (assuming they stay on board) :wry:


HTS Program Managers Spared, Laugh On Way to Bank (http://www.inteldaily.com/news/173/ARTICLE/9681/2009-02-11.html)

By John Stanton

Filed under > Commentary

(The Intelligence Daily) -- “I will bet that there is more to this than SOFA issue! It would be interesting to know the true reason this has happened. I can imagine that there are some unhappy campers in the program now.”

On February 9, 2009, Human Terrain System (HTS) program manager Steve Fondacaro informed HTS employees that they were being converted to Term Government Employees. The catalyst for the drastic change was, according to Fondacaro, the new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi Government. Yet, sources believe there is something fishy about the SOFA cover, particularly since their treatment by HTS program management (Steve Fondacaro, Steve Rotkoff—Deputy Program Manager, and Montgomery McFate-Sapone-Senior Social Scientist) over the past year has been anything but stellar. Further, BAE SYSTEMS was not notified by HTS program management but, according to sources, by HTS employees who had gotten word of the changes afoot through the HTS grapevine.

[marct]

That issue is no longer an "issue". They will be promoted to the prestigious grade of GS-12 and promptly dumped outside the wire (assuming they stay on board) :wry:

Too true, Stan! Take a look at John's latest report (http://cryptome.info/0001/hts-bailout.htm). This part in particular caught my eye:


"As of 8:00AM Monday morning, 9 February, the US federal government made a move to make all Human Terrain Team jobs federal positions. BAE was never notified in advance and received notification at about the same time as employees. This is a major pay cut [for us] and you would not believe how much. I was making six figures (USD) with the opportunity to make much more when I got to Iraq. Now I drop to five figures and with my cap as a government employee I will not make much more. But a social scientist with absolutely no experience will still be making the six figure amount! We will now all be labeled as Intelligence Analysts and that includes analysts, research managers, social scientists and team leaders. Many of us can't afford to quit because of financial obligations. Social Scientists in the program are torn now because they can't take a position that says Intelligence Analyst as a job description."

That last sentence, if true, will be a real problem. One other thing is that this quote seems to imply that there will be different pay grades for social scientists and other team members. If THAT is true, it is a kiss of death as far as team building is concerned :(.

[Stan]

Hey Marc !
The things one can google these days :cool: I ran across Implications of Space and Time (nice job BTW) and the US. Army's Professional Writing Collection.

You may have very well provided the first complete set of definitions for AO that, to this day, I never spent much time thinking about.

Then the Army comes (came) up with The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s) (http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume6/september_2008/9_08_2_pf.html) :rolleyes:


Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) have recently been employed in Afghanistan at the brigade level to support a focus on the information environment in planning with very positive initial success. ... The education pipeline, however, is not overflowing with trained information experts and most brigades will likely never see a social scientist assigned to their staff.

Not quite sure why I think this para means absolutely nothing, but yet, says it it all.

[Ken White]

ways to rid themselves of a program that is drawing flak while never admitting any mistakes on their part.

The Armed forces of the US are masters of the various techniques... ;)

[marct]

The things one can google these days :cool: I ran across Implications of Space and Time (nice job BTW) and the US. Army's Professional Writing Collection.

You may have very well provided the first complete set of definitions for AO that, to this day, I never spent much time thinking about.

Hey Stan,

Thanks - I enjoyed writing it ;) (if any masochists want to read it, it's here (http://marctyrrell.com/2009/01/10/some-implications-of-space-and-time/)). I've got to admit that the assumptions they operate on are really bad blinders :cool:.


The education pipeline, however, is not overflowing with trained information experts and most brigades will likely never see a social scientist assigned to their staff.

You know, that might not be a bad thing :D. Seriously, though, I would rather see social scientists interacting with planners, trainers and simulators (oh yeah, and the policy folks too!), than foisting us off on an unsuspecting BCT. Okay, I'll admit, I'd love to do fieldwork with one, but that gets us back to the question about foisting social scientists off on military personnel in a war zone...

[Ron Humphrey]

Hey Stan,

Thanks - I enjoyed writing it ;) (if any masochists want to read it, it's here (http://marctyrrell.com/2009/01/10/some-implications-of-space-and-time/)). I've got to admit that the assumptions they operate on are really bad blinders :cool:.

Read earlier after Stan posted about it and it didn't hurt as much as I thought it might:wry:

Think your on to something though with exactly how and or where integration takes place. If someone specializes in things which happen over long periods of time then aside from the fact they might recognize something not exactly sure how well they'll ever not be somewhat of a difficulty for those who have deal with the "here and now, right now" day to day action.:confused:

[marct]

Hi Ron,


Read earlier after Stan posted about it and it didn't hurt as much as I thought it might:wry:

Drat, I'm going to have to maqke those posts more academic or my rep will be RUINED!!!!!! :p


Think your on to something though with exactly how and or where integration takes place. If someone specializes in things which happen over long periods of time then aside from the fact they might recognize something not exactly sure how well they'll ever not be somewhat of a difficulty for those who have deal with the "here and now, right now" day to day action.:confused:

It is tricky. I tend to think in centuries / millenia, and that gets really tricky for my students to understand. On the whole, I know it is possible - I've been able to do it - but it is tricky.

[120mm]

I am looking more and more like a freaking genius for taking my current gig.

BTW, things are just rockin' in Kabul, so far...

[Stan]

I am looking more and more like a freaking genius for taking my current gig.

BTW, things are just rockin' in Kabul, so far...

Hey Drew !
Say, you're not hangin' out with Anthropologists at the local bars, are you ? :eek:

Stay safe and keep your powder dry !

Regards, Stan

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, Mar-Apr 09: All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090430_art010.pdf)

Field-experienced warfighters and other experts in operational art have identified a range of weaknesses in military cultural training, education, and intelligence. Each “culture gap” has been painstakingly codified in military journals and official publications, most notably in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (COIN). Finding an effective and lasting solution to these shortcomings has framed the latest phase of an ongoing debate over how to meet operational cultural requirements.

One approach argues for comprehensive change. This method would take all the criticism of military cultural training and intelligence analysis to heart, applying recent doctrine to long-term knowledge and cultural terrain analysis programs. Forcing the services to view the cultural terrain as a co-equal element of military terrain—without abandoning core warfighting capabilities—would ensure the kind of all-inclusive focus on culture that the Army and Marine Corps applied to maneuver warfare theory in the 1990s.

The other side of the debate, represented by the advocates of the Human
Terrain System (HTS), calls for an immediate solution in the form of nonorganic personnel, new equipment, and the direct application of external academic support. HTS essentially adds a quick-fix layer of social science expertise and contracted reachback capability to combatant staffs. This “build a new empire” proposal is based on the assumption that staffs are generally incapable of solving complex cultural problems on their own.....

[120mm]

The thesis of this paper offers a false choice: Having HTS does not negatively impact the Army's ability to fix it's cultural awareness problem one iota. In fact, smart Army leaders should be able to integrate HTS into their cultural awareness improvement plans.

[marct]

I suspect that there is a confusion going on as to the levels (and types) of cultural knowledge used by the various programs - HTS included.

[jcustis]

I came across this on a totally unrelated site dedicated to the process of becoming a Marine Corps officer. Good reading that shows the knuckle-draggers are thinking. It also shows, I would argue, that we are seeing a new breed of hero to some degree. Bhatia died and that makes it somewhat more poignant, but still heroic:

Found this excellent story at MarineCorpsTimes.com about another academic who was killed while serving with the HTT.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/03/ap_dangerousman2_031509w/
--------------

After seven nights sleeping on the ground, and seven days without a hot shower, Master Sgt. Rachael Ridenour was beat.

But when the Black Hawk helicopter touched down at Forward Operating Base Salerno, Afghanistan, Ridenour and teammate Tom Garcia shouldered their packs and headed straight for the plywood hut with plywood furniture that served as the Human Terrain team's office. It was time to meet their new colleague.

They expected a jetlagged and lost-looking newbie. But the man in the button-down Oxford shirt who rose from behind a computer to shake their hands talked in overdrive. He used vocabulary that made clear he was no soldier. In the two days he’d spent waiting for them to return from their mission, Michael Bhatia told them, he’d already begun two research projects.

PART ONE
• 1 man’s odyssey from campus to combat

Heading back to the barracks, Ridenour and Garcia assessed the new guy.

“He needs to hurry up and get tired or it’s going to be a long year keeping up with him,” she said.

[William F. Owen]

Purely for information, am I to understand that the following are indicative of the normall HTT mission, and can anyone tell me why they do not fall under the normal G2 staff and Provost Marshall responsibilities?

Garcia — was working to make himself an expert on the theft of goods from military convoys, interviewing drivers and others to figure out what was stolen, why and where.

Ridenour — was working to become the team’s expert on the local economy, tracking the price Afghan locals paid for cooking oil, flour and other staples.
...and...

Meanwhile, Bhatia was zeroing in on his own line of research — gauging the insurgency by tracking attacks not on the military, but on local leaders who were combatants’ rivals for power.

Additionally, from whom did these people receive their tasking? Someone other than G2?

[Ken White]

but since I haven't been there and am woefully out of date, I could be wrong so I'll let someone who's more current answer.

[Meinertzhagen]

While I agree that answering these questions is a part of the core tasks of a G-2/S-2 section, the tactical (Div. and below) Military Intelligence corps is simply not aligned to collect and analyze the information to provide accurate answers. In Afghanistan, the CJTF-101 CJ2 and perhaps even the Brigade S-2s (depending on the Brigade) are almost entirely threat focused. Even within the focus on the enemy, they are largely oriented toward personality targeting and other of what I term distracters, such as foreign fighters and "the border". While the Division CJ-2 operates a small "Non-Lethal Analysis" section, I would be surprised if a single person in that shop ever talked to an Afghan other than at the Bagram Bazaar.

This isn't fundamentally a criticism of the CJ2, as they generally respond to the demands of their command and must work within the trained competencies of the personnel assigned as analysts and collectors and the MTOW. However, I am strongly critical of the general orientation of the MI Corps itself, looking largely away from the tactical fight at the Company level and below. The Division CJ2 section has hundreds of personnel on its Joint Manning Document, most of whom will never impact even the Battalion fight.
The most experienced HUMINT collectors are filling the CJ2X bureaucracy, managing Division and above requirements often meaningless to the actioning units and shuffling paperwork. Tens of all source analysts are dedicated to simply doubling the efforts of Battalion and Brigade analysts, only operating with less information and exposure to the fight.

All of this amounts to a large section of smart, talented and experienced personnel whom through their isolation in windowless rooms at Bagram will simply never understand the battlespace about whom they claim to be able to produce "intelligence." (sorry if I sound bitter) Thus leaving a massive void to be filled. The HTT is manned and missioned to be among the people, conducting the research on the ground where the vast majority of MI personnel will never go. Smart Battalions and Brigades have of course recognized this and have made the necessary adjustments to compensate without a HTT. Until Battalions and below are resourced with the personnel and training to answer these questions themselves or there is a realignment in the priorities of work among collectors and analysts, the void will remain for the HTT to fill.

[Ken White]

My perception was that possibly (or more likely probably) the Bn / Bde S2 crews were understaffed (as likely was the 4 while while the 1 and 3 were probably overstaffed... :rolleyes:) and that aside from that adverse impactor, two other things hit. You confirmed that one is excessively large and perhaps misemployed higher level staffs and I sense that another is an insistence by the chain of command on focusing on the 'kinetic' * slash 'real warfighting' aspects as opposed to the human factors -- which is what we're supposed to be all about...

Is that sensing correct in your view?

* I'm beginning to dislike 'kinetic' almost as much as I disliked 'target servicing' and 'H&I Fires.'

[120mm]

Purely for information, am I to understand that the following are indicative of the normall HTT mission, and can anyone tell me why they do not fall under the normal G2 staff and Provost Marshall responsibilities?


...and...


Additionally, from whom did these people receive their tasking? Someone other than G2?


These don't ordinarily sound like an HTT "core" mission, but they certainly would be peripheral to judging the Human Terrain "Map". Understand that the reporter could be completely off, but it sounds like this particular team go off into G2 territory, as you point out.

HTTs should co-exist, but not receive any "tasking" from G2. By my understanding, the HTT Leader should go directly to the commander to mutually work out his/her boundaries, and what kind of product he can/is tasked to produce.

If I were a Brigade Commander, I would have my HTT working on ways to accomplish my Brigade mission without applying military force/applying minimum military force. Kind of like a POLAD and staff. I'd also like them playing devil's advocate on my kinetic ops, having them research and lay out the consequences of those ops within the community at large.

In addition to their core mission of mapping who is related to whom, in what ways and how.

[William F. Owen]

In addition to their core mission of mapping who is related to whom, in what ways and how.

Well that's insightful in many ways because if we assume (and I am assuming because the practice does not support my assumption) that there is a Human Terrain to map, then the implication is that like a cartographic survey, specialist skills are required - BUT - that should be the limit of their employment.

Seems to me that, if the article is accurate, - and I do not assume it is, - then there are some serious question marks over what HTTs do and more critically, why experience military personnel with relevant and usable military skills (military police) and being farmed out to them.

[120mm]

Seems to me that, if the article is accurate, - and I do not assume it is, - then there are some serious question marks over what HTTs do and more critically, why experience military personnel with relevant and usable military skills (military police) and being farmed out to them.

I think the answer is because "experienced military personnel" will ignore any information that doesn't apply directly to them. Or see it only in ways that fit their own, rather narrow paradigm.

It's been my experience, in the care and feeding of American military personnel that they will a) stay in their lane and b) slap down anyone who appears to be out of their lane. This prevents anything approaching creativity and thought from happening.

This, I think, is a weakness of the military mind. Academics have roughly similar weaknesses, but in a different way. I think they'd make a good devil's advocate tool for a commander smart enough to use them as such.

And I don't think Human Terrain is a good term at all. More likely that Human Weather Map would be a better term.

[120mm]

Just thought I'd post that the last couple weeks I've been working in the vicinity of a highly effective HTT in Afghanistan. Frankly, they need to clone these guys, and send them with every Army Brigade.

They are severely depleted in strength, however, and no hiring of new HTT members in sight.

And no, they are not targeting the enemy, and yes, they work quite well with the BDE POLAD. CA and SPECOPs assets are basically doing "not much" in the Human Terrain category in the AO. At least relevant to this BDE.

Maybe the HTS is the answer to a real problem, hmmm?

[Jedburgh]

Commander's Guide: Employing a Human Terrain Team in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=762524&lang=en-US)

AKO Log-In and BCKS registration required to access the link.

[William F. Owen]

Just reading this (http://www.amazon.com/Military-Intelligence-Palestine-1914-1918-Studies/dp/0714646776) - thanks to finding a cheap-copy, and a recommendation from Jedburgh.

It contains an extract from the Middle-East 1918 Intelligence Handbook,

The Arab Bureau was really a Tribal Department where all the information about tribes was recorded, and which also compiled and issued various analyses of tribes, genealogical tables, tribal maps, personalities and who's who and so on...

...so basically given that this is provably a military G2 area, and, as I have said, always has been, so why the HTT route?

...and as one reviewed notes here (http://www.meforum.org/1270/british-military-intelligence-in-the-palestine), HUMINT can be massively over played.

[George L. Singleton]

I got an interesting letter this morning over a list I'm on from the Sheiks of the al-Tajy North Region endorsing the actions of the HTT in their area.

I just got permission to post the letter, so here it is. BTW, the names of HTT members have been blanked out and the English is somewhat poor.

Hang on...

Hah, got it! Here's the letter (http://smallwarsjournal.com/docs/user/shiekendorsement.pdf).

Isn't publishing the three shieks names and titles setting them up to be murdered by the terrorists?

[Van]

During WW II, Margaret Mead wrote a proposal for a two year training program to make soldiers into "regional ethnogeographic specialists". Does anyone know where I could locate an e-copy of it?

Thanks.
Van

[120mm]

Just reading this (http://www.amazon.com/Military-Intelligence-Palestine-1914-1918-Studies/dp/0714646776) - thanks to finding a cheap-copy, and a recommendation from Jedburgh.

It contains an extract from the Middle-East 1918 Intelligence Handbook,

The Arab Bureau was really a Tribal Department where all the information about tribes was recorded, and which also compiled and issued various analyses of tribes, genealogical tables, tribal maps, personalities and who's who and so on...

...so basically given that this is provably a military G2 area, and, as I have said, always has been, so why the HTT route?

...and as one reviewed notes here (http://www.meforum.org/1270/british-military-intelligence-in-the-palestine), HUMINT can be massively over played.

I'd respond to that by stating that the military (G2, CA, SF) are focussing on other things, and have abdicated that mission. So the HTT occupies the vacuum.

Our local HTT does a pretty good job of evaluating the things that don't normally figure into the G2 "loop". They evaluate how ops affect public opinion and work to integrate US/Afghani "soft" issues, such as engagement with not only local leaders, but also some of the rank and file citizenry.

I recently attended an "Afghan Night" where the local leaders/citizens were able to mix fairly freely with ISAF soldiers in a secure environment. This event was conceptualized, researched and executed by the local HTT. In the 8th year of US presence here, it was the first time done, and was wildly popular with both the Afghans and the ISAF personnel.

The so-called "G2 channels" in the US army are primarily concerned with finding doors to kick in and people to shoot/arrest. HTT should be concerned with advising the Commander what the consequences are IF they kick in the door and arrest those people.

[120mm]

As an addendum, one of the problems with US G2, is that it has its own branch. As a non-MI officer who has spent 10 out of 26 years in an MI billet, I have found that good MI officers are fairly rare. And by "good" I mean the kind of well-grounded, outside the box thinkers who really understand their craft.

The best intelligence officers I've ever met were generally not MI branch, or were branch transfer types. Of course, the vagaries of the evaluation system and branch loyalty has tended to be rough on the careers of detailed-branch officers, and the current policy of excluding non-MI officers from MI billets has just about guaranteed something less than mediocrity within G2.

[120mm]

Isn't publishing the three shieks names and titles setting them up to be murdered by the terrorists?

Not really. The bad guys know who they are and what they're doing.

[William F. Owen]

The so-called "G2 channels" in the US army are primarily concerned with finding doors to kick in and people to shoot/arrest. HTT should be concerned with advising the Commander what the consequences are IF they kick in the door and arrest those people.

120 mate. I do get it. My "so why the HTT route" is rhetorical.

From my perspective, the US using HTTs is addressing a problem that should not exist, IF someone had

thought through the problem, from a real staff functions perspective
understood the real history and enduring conditions of "small wars."

Clearly no one did and I think FM3-24 may not have dealt with it - long time since I bothered to look at it.

Point being, now you have HTTs there is never going to be a fix to the problem, and thus the problem will get worse. For example, making the differentiation, as you have articulated it, blows huge holes in the conceptual teaching of MI.

I am not saying HTTs are not good and brave men. They assuredly are, but that should not be seen as justifying their existence.

[Ken White]

calls for repairing or discarding things that are not broken. In the event something is slightly broken, the preferred option is to refer it to a consultant or specialist who will (a) tell you what you knew all along and (b) offer you a 'plan' to 'fix' the problem -- realizing of course that said consultant has no vested interest in your success or failure. This invariably involves throwing money at all problems and a consultant or specialist who laughs all the way to the Bank while the former minor problem exacerbates and morphsd into a larger and more complex problem.

The US Army training process is an excellent example of this...

Thus, for the topic at hand, failure to be prepared to conduct warfare in all its permutations caused us to lose focus generally, the Intel folks to get enamored of gadgets instead of their job, and our various communities to fight for more dollars by doing whatever seemed likely to attract the most money. Note that latter is NOT the same thing as doing what was obvious to a fifth Grade Student what was probably needed...

So, Yeah, you and 120mm are both correct. The HTT are needed and they do fill a vacuum caused by improper focus. :mad:

(Thank you both for allowing my morning rant!)

[120mm]

Wilf,

Unfortunately, I do not believe there is a possible fix to the G2 problem. Heck, the entire staff officer system is a band-aid for incompetent commanders, if you look at it a certain way.

Your implication that the system even considers that there IS a problem, and if so, that it is desirable or even possible to effect a solution is giving the staff development/training system too much credit.

Note how the fragmentation and super-specialization of US staffs has occured over the last 10 years alone.

We've gone from having a commander, a couple advisors, and runners/liaison officers, to discrete numbered staffs, (1-4, then 5) to a system that now has 9? staff sections.

I expect, within the next decade to encounter a Field Grade Officer who identifies him/herself as the Battalion S-1,238,976 (which has primary staff responsibility for tracking the zodiac sign of red headed left handers born during a blue moon within the battalion.) That section, of course, will have 10 people in it.

[Ken White]

Good comments.

I've watched the 'Generalist' model not do all that well in the US Army for years and could never put my finger on a fix other than to do away with DOPMA / OPM 21 and realize that everybody of broadly similar background can't do everything well. I knew the Army realized that but always figured the Congressionally imposed 'fairness' and 'objectivity' laws forced the issue. Couldn't figure a way to fix it without undoing laws and such -- always difficult.

Talking to my Son the other night and he hit me with a blindingly obvious point that I should've picked up years ago but did not. Staffs. Staffs are the problem. As you say most are far too large and not at all well trained. Son pointed out that the Germans then and now also use the Generalist as Commander approach but their systems work far better than ours.

The difference -- their General Staff system and small very competent staffs; that and the fact that they do not arbitrarily move people constantly and don't have 'up or out.'

Yeah, I know, they lost two Wars -- but not because of performance at Division and below. That's where you need real tactical and technical competence; echelons above that are politically dominated

[jcustis]

I expect, within the next decade to encounter a Field Grade Officer who identifies him/herself as the Battalion S-1,238,976 (which has primary staff responsibility for tracking the zodiac sign of red headed left handers born during a blue moon within the battalion.) That section, of course, will have 10 people in it.

For that reason alone, it is good to be able to greet someone and say, "hey, nice to meet you...I'm the XO." That way, they already know you are the proverbial one-legged man, and that your pain is real. :D

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

Unfortunately, I do not believe there is a possible fix to the G2 problem. Heck, the entire staff officer system is a band-aid for incompetent commanders, if you look at it a certain way.


120, you are so singing my song! I hear you. The staff system is porked, and your comments are spot on the money. If the timings in Battalion Logs are accurate the UK now takes 4 times longer than it did to plan and execute an attack than it did in 1944!! - when there were only 3 staff posts up to the formation level I, O and G!

[William F. Owen]

Talking to my Son the other night and he hit me with a blindingly obvious point that I should've picked up years ago but did not. Staffs. Staffs are the problem. As you say most are far too large and not at all well trained. Son pointed out that the Germans then and now also use the Generalist as Commander approach but their systems work far better than ours.

The difference -- their General Staff system and small very competent staffs; that and the fact that they do not arbitrarily move people constantly and don't have 'up or out.'


Yep, staffs are getting bigger for no good reason for sure. (net centric anyone?) The IDF copied the UK staff system, not the German, but even in 48,67,73 and 82, Bn Staffs were rarely more than 3-4 officers. Even at the Brigade level their were rarely more than 10 - based on folks I've talked to.

[jmm99]

from Wilf
If the timings in Battalion Logs are accurate the UK now takes 4 times longer than it did to plan and execute an attack than it did in 1944!! - when there were only 3 staff posts up to the formation level I, O and G!

Going back to 1944, 1/117 had the CO (LTC), XO (MAJ) and four staff officers: S1 (CPT; also HHC commander); S2 (1LT); S3 (CPT); and S4 (1LT). In a staged photo of the Siegfried Breakthrough sandtable (mid-Nov 1944 phase), pictured are the CO and the five company commanders. Apparently, that was then and now is now.

[marct]

During WW II, Margaret Mead wrote a proposal for a two year training program to make soldiers into "regional ethnogeographic specialists". Does anyone know where I could locate an e-copy of it?

Thanks.
Van

David Price talks about it in Anthropological Intelligence (google books (http://books.google.ca/books?id=gtRATdFSxuEC&pg=PA79&lpg=PA79&dq=%22margaret+mead%22+%22regional+ethnogeographic +specialists%22&source=bl&ots=wpLjmRYHl6&sig=YL0-64ielut2eUcJhyc4JDBE2R8&hl=en&ei=8IYRSvnLKZ2uMdOthbkG&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2)). The source is listed as Box M25, MM. Sorry, I don't have a paper copy to get the rest of the reference material.

[IntelTrooper]

As an addendum, one of the problems with US G2, is that it has its own branch. As a non-MI officer who has spent 10 out of 26 years in an MI billet, I have found that good MI officers are fairly rare. And by "good" I mean the kind of well-grounded, outside the box thinkers who really understand their craft.

The best intelligence officers I've ever met were generally not MI branch, or were branch transfer types. Of course, the vagaries of the evaluation system and branch loyalty has tended to be rough on the careers of detailed-branch officers, and the current policy of excluding non-MI officers from MI billets has just about guaranteed something less than mediocrity within G2.
I'm sorry I didn't see this post until just now. This pretty well sums up my experience working with MI officers. It's a tragedy because the job is so important. I must say, you are a very perceptive person. :)

[davidbfpo]

A rare example of the UK trying the HTT approach, with one reservist officer: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6349141.ece

davidbfpo