Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread) [Archive] - Page 4

Shek

10-25-2010, 02:52 PM

Thanks. Been a while since I did any research that required me to work with R-sqd.

One small thing - the term "irrationality" is something of a pet peeve of mine. It implies an objective viewpoint of "what is good for me." However, people act according to a subjective perception of rationality. Emotion and culture also influence decision making.

When other people act differently than we think they should, we (Americans and American military types especially) tend to dismiss the behavior as irrationality, or worse, stupidity.

The truth is that everyone has good reasons for acting the way they do according to their individual perceptions. Its our job to figure out why they do what they do.

M.L.,

I was not referring to an ethnocentric view of rationalism, but instead was talking to how we use heuristics that are fraught with systemic biases that result in irrational choices (e.g., framing choices as lives saved vs. deaths will usually result in different choices that are mathematically (objectively) inconsistent).

You point about ethnocentric viewpoints is on the mark, and I love the example of the Iraqi Perspectives Project (http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf) to point out that Saddam, who was seemingly irrational, was actually acting in a highly rational manner.

Sparapet

10-25-2010, 02:58 PM

A lot of this discussion seems to boil down to education and intelligence of the officer corps and our OGA brethren. What I find odd in the whole discussion is the same thing that grates in the whole COIN discussion; we seem to believe that we are the first human power and generation to attempt occupation and reorganization of political systems, thus we are discovering something new and amazing. The initiative in Ninewa with TF Spartan.....something to be admired in 2010? Why not in 2003? Did we discover something new about how human populations and governance work?
I think the core issue here is education of the intelligent. In this lecture from the early 1930's on education in America ( http://mises.org/daily/2765 ) the lecturer explores the question of education vs training in a way that is awfully modern and hits on the difference.
Considering our culture's technologist bent and admiration of the mechanically efficient we have created procurement and preparation system for our (especially junior) officers that meets some basic technical knowledge requirements. Beyond that no knowledge and skills are encouraged, demanded, or reinforced through pre-commissioning and through careers until mid-field grade schooling. We don't have an educational standard of any sort. So those of us who are successful, who can in fact asses accurately and think critically, become a matter of chance. IMHO there is nothing to admire here. The HTTs are not a "weapon system that fits the target" but instead a plug to fix a deficit of intellectual capital within the corps. Same with PRTs and other do-dads. Think of occupation for what it is: governance. In governance you have to govern, which means bringing with you the leadership that has some working knowledge of what it takes to govern. They don't need to be agricultural experts but they need the education and intelligence to recognize when they need those experts and how to use them. Since we (military officers) are always the first, longest tenured, most empowered presidents/governors/mayors in an occupation we need to be the educated class within the government that values big words and difficult ideas. SFC Hooah will always be the expert door-breaker and food distributor. CPT Schmedlab needs to know when/why to break the door or set up a distribution point.

Steve the Planner

10-26-2010, 01:39 AM

ML:

Herbert Simon: Bounded rationality---limited by what we know, what we can understand, etc...

I think it gets overly complicated, though, when we start mixing concepts of human settlements and governance--two different things.

Folks have been voting with their feet since the dawn of time, or scrambling to survive. That, and causations, are the basic drivers for population re-settlement. If everything was grand, we would all just procreate to scarcity.

But conflict zones are, by definition, never grand places to be, highly unstable, and treacherous to safe and prosperous existence..

I share the same insight from Iraq that dozens of soldiers noted before me---people are just trying to get by, and the challenges, to an extent, are complicated by US, and whatever "inspiration" was passing for wisdom inside the Beltway at a given time.

The difference between 120 and myself is that, hopefully, by being outside the command structure, you can influence it by, first, seeing things outside the internal lense, and, second, bringing forward the properly framed questions to drive more productive alternatives.

It never ceased to amaze me that, by catching up to folks ate ends of tours, they had folders of good ideas they would have liked to have implemented, but that weren't in their lanes.

Like any big bureaucracy, the challenge is to move the bureaucracy whether from above, below or within. It just ain't easy---don;t care whether it is Ford Motor Company or the Pentagon. Scale, organization, staffing, logistics create and define much of what will happen based on decisions made six or nine months in advance.

Not really a problem of sending folks out into the field to better their fishing if the bait and tackle are wrong, or there are no fish in the assigned river.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

10-26-2010, 11:34 PM

Sociocultural Human Intelligence Teams.

They could work with the French military's Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre and Commandos de Recherche et d'Action en Profondeur. :D

M.L.

10-27-2010, 01:21 AM

Sociocultural Human Intelligence Teams.

They could work with the French military's Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre and Commandos de Recherche et d'Action en Profondeur. :D

Creative with the acronyms. You'd be a great addition to the Pentagon...

M.L.

11-08-2010, 03:32 AM

There is an article in the November-December 2010 edition of Military Review entitled Controlling the Human High Ground: Identifying Cultural Opportunities for Insurgency (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20101231_art006.pdf). Needless to say, I’m disappointed we continue to dwell on this idea of “Human Terrain.” As I said when I started this thread, humans are not terrain. Humans aren’t even like terrain. Why we use the metaphor of “terrain” to describe human beings is beyond me.

Some might wonder why I am so intent to writing about this subject. How we model things is important. Here is an excerpt from a paper entitled On the Mismatch Between Systems and Their Models (http://www.acasa.upenn.edu/System_MismatchesA.pdf)by Russell L. Ackoff and Jamshid Gharajedaghi:

There is a very serious mismatch between most social systems and the models of them that are in use. Barry M. Richmond, creator of the Systems Dynamics model and I-think language makes it clear that systems and the models of them in use are not the same. According to him “the way we think
is outdated.” He goes on to define thinking as:

consisting of two activities: constructing mental models, and then simulating them in order to draw conclusions and make decisions. The mental model is a “selective abstraction” of reality that we create and carry around in our head. As big as some of our heads get, we still can’t fit reality in there. Therefore all mental model are simplifications. They necessarily omit many aspects of the realities they represent.

To think about anything requires an image or a concept of it, a model. To think about something as complex as a social system we use models of similar, simpler, and/or more familiar systems. Unfortunately, as social systems become increasingly more complex, simpler mental models of them do not reflect their emerging properties.

In short, this is what is happening with human terrain. We are using a simple model (terrain) to imagine or conceptualize a much more complex system (human social/cultural groups). As a result, we draw bad conclusions about the nature of the system. This new article from Military Review is a perfect example. The model of “terrain” has erroneously led the author to believe that humans, like terrain, can be “controlled.” Humans are independent beings capable of making choices. While humans can certainly be influenced, they can never be controlled.

Steve the Planner

11-08-2010, 11:42 AM

ML:

From inception, and throughout, the mistake that identifying human dynamic factors was the same as discovering On/Off switches and control dials was to dismiss foreign and enemy publics as something less complex and dynamic than our own electorate.

There is a very big conceptual gap between Big Government/Nations actors/organizations and those of Little Government/Local Governance that seems insurmountable under present structures.

Folks who live far away from a local consequence are more likely to support something with significant local impacts. The perceived impacts, at the local level, are area and impact-specific.

Terrain is the ground on which events occur. Terrain can shape and influence events, but only the actors and drive the events.

The silly notion that we are trying to "shape" terrain/events fails to appreciate the exigencies/realities of CT/COIN in a conflict/post-conflict environment.

In a conflict/post-conflict environment, a deployed and engaged military is not and "influencer" or shaper, except at the risk of falling to its own propaganda.

Occupy, dominate, control as long as is needed. Then build relationships, transitions.

Get over the notion that "wars" and "enemies" can be influenced, shaped, or PR-ed out of existence. Or that we can transition before we occuy, domonate, control.

Not doing so is as dangerous to mission, and soldiers as it is to the subject population.

davidbfpo

02-06-2012, 09:56 AM

Moderator at Work

Prompted by the most recent post I have merged eight threads on the subject of Human Terrain, Human Terrain teams (HTS) and Anthropology into one. Most threads were in the Social Science forum and a few outside, including one in Job Seekers. I have left two threads on Iraq & HTS. (Ends)

Curious that the linked topics have fallen out active posts.

davidbfpo

02-06-2012, 09:59 AM

A short e-article by SWC Member Marc Tyrell appeared in my in tray today and maybe of interest to SWC.

He ends with:Do the military need and will they continue to use socio-cultural knowledge in order to complete their missions? Yes. Is this only provided by the HTS? No. It is more than time for us to stop flogging a dead rhetorical horse and start looking at the reality of the various and multiple engagements between the military and socio-cultural knowledge.

Link:http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/05/the-human-terrain-system-clashing-moralities-or-rhetorical-dead-horses/

ganulv

02-07-2012, 01:41 AM

The two methods, broadly speaking, of social and cultural anthropology are ethnography (field work of the sort done by Malinowski) and ethnology (cross-cultural comparison using textual and non-textual artifacts of various kinds). The former is not the exclusive domain of anthropologists, though I think it fair to say they were central in its legitimization amongst scientists social and otherwise. The latter isn’t, either, but doing it well presumes some background that would be difficult to acquire outside of anthropology and a handful of genetically related disciplines (folklore and [human & historical] geography, for example).
Good ethnography is difficult in the most stable social contexts. Presume an ethnographic encounter between a visitor with no particular self-interest beyond intellectual curiosity and a local with absolute willingness to reveal the warts and all of his or her knowledge. Even if the visitor is a top notch student and the local a top notch teacher 1:1 transmission of knowledge is impeded by cultural differences and the reliability of data and inferences built on them is always somewhat in doubt. Now imagine the same ethnographic encounter when the visitor shows up backed by a group of rough men in full kit and the local has to answer to his or her shadow governor after they have departed. The reliability of data gathered under these circumstances and inferences built on them are in serious doubt.
I do not on principle object to the use being made of tools associated with anthropology by any parties to a conflict. I may find their aims distasteful but the fact is that anthropology made its IPO long ago. I absolutely believe that the agent handler, ODA team member, or FSO with some formal training in anthropology will benefit from it in the field. That is not to say, however, that I believe that good anthropological field work is likely during wartime (see #2 above).
The entire HTS project strikes me as an effort to use ethnography to make an unfeasible strategy somehow serviceable. A better applied use of anthropological tools for OEF–like undertakings would be, IMHO, to run the strategy by a group of ethnologists and ask the seemingly simple question, “Do you judge this to be feasible in the first place?”

This is just my 5¢ as someone who knows a lot more about anthropology than do most military professionals (and who fully acknowledges that military professionals tend to know no less about anthropology than do most other non-anthropologists) and more about the military than do most anthropologists (which is not to be understood as a claim that I have a vast or even good knowledge of the military). Some of it may be restatement of previous posts in this thread but I haven’t read many of them since joining this forum less than a year ago. It’s a topic that in my experience involves a lot of misinformation, posturing, and talking past one another so I tend to give it a wide berth for better or worse.

marct

02-07-2012, 02:55 AM

Hi Ganuly,

The two methods, broadly speaking, of social and cultural anthropology are ethnography (field work of the sort done by Malinowski) and ethnology (cross-cultural comparison using textual and non-textual artifacts of various kinds). The former is not the exclusive domain of anthropologists, though I think it fair to say they were central in its legitimization amongst scientists social and otherwise. The latter isn’t, either, but doing it well presumes some background that would be difficult to acquire outside of anthropology and a handful of genetically related disciplines (folklore and [human & historical] geography, for example).

We could go back and forth on this since a lot of it is national school dependent but, sure, let's work with these as the two base methods for gathering and comparing data. That said, we do know a fari bit after 150 years or so about kinship systems, economic systems, etc. that, IMHO, does have some direct relevance.

[LIST=2] Good ethnography is difficult in the most stable social contexts. Presume an ethnographic encounter between a visitor with no particular self-interest beyond intellectual curiosity and a local with absolute willingness to reveal the warts and all of his or her knowledge. Even if the visitor is a top notch student and the local a top notch teacher 1:1 transmission of knowledge is impeded by cultural differences and the reliability of data and inferences built on them is always somewhat in doubt. Now imagine the same ethnographic encounter when the visitor shows up backed by a group of rough men in full kit and the local has to answer to his or her shadow governor after they have departed. The reliability of data gathered under these circumstances and inferences built on them are in serious doubt.
I do not on principle object to the use being made of tools associated with anthropology by any parties to a conflict. I may find their aims distasteful but the fact is that anthropology made its IPO long ago. I absolutely believe that the agent handler, ODA team member, or FSO with some formal training in anthropology will benefit from it in the field. That is not to say, however, that I believe that good anthropological field work is likely during wartime (see #2 above).

Absolutely agree! This means that whoever is doing "fieldwork" under such a condition must be top notch in their ability to perceive patterns and anomalies. Basically, it means that we have to throw out your point 1, except as background reference, and concentrate instead on observation skills.

[LIST=4] The entire HTS project strikes me as an effort to use ethnography to make an unfeasible strategy somehow serviceable. A better applied use of anthropological tools for OEF–like undertakings would be, IMHO, to run the strategy by a group of ethnologists and ask the seemingly simple question, “Do you judge this to be feasible in the first place?”

LOLOL - yup, which is why I am increasingly coming to the opinion that "senor social scientists" should be lodged in Red teaming cells vs. something like the HTS. Of course, that's another article ;).

This is just my 5¢ as someone who knows a lot more about anthropology than do most military professionals (and who fully acknowledges that military professionals tend to know no less about anthropology than do most other non-anthropologists) and more about the military than do most anthropologists (which is not to be understood as a claim that I have a vast or even good knowledge of the military). Some of it may be restatement of previous posts in this thread but I haven’t read many of them since joining this forum less than a year ago. It’s a topic that in my experience involves a lot of misinformation, posturing, and talking past one another so I tend to give it a wide berth for better or worse.

I would certainly agree that the "debate" is often a case of people talking past each other. Honestly, it's been kind of frustrating for me since all of the sides seem to have decided to ignore what actually happens :wry:. I think that's why I stuck the "rhetorical dead horses" in the title of my piece: I was honestly tired or hearing the "same old, same old" again, with little movement happening.

Cheers,

Marc

jmm99

02-07-2012, 05:52 AM

Really Good to see your avatar back on the screen. Not to get between two anthropologists for too long, but ...

Vive le Moulin a Vent et Vive le Canada ! :) You know the rest of our drill.

BTW: I'm no longer a lawyer, but a "Retired Gentleman" (to steal a Victor McLaughlin line as Quincannon (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0041866/quotes)). I can reliably inform you that the "proper uniform" of a "retired gentleman" is sweats :D:):D

Regards

Mike

marct

02-07-2012, 12:29 PM

Hi Jmm,

Good to be back :D. I thought that sweats were the uniform for teleworkers :eek:!

Cheers,

Marc

Stan

02-07-2012, 12:41 PM

Hello Marc,
Glad to see you about - you old pirate :D

David and I had just Skyped each other (that almost sounds like something the USG will ban soon with hints of data bits having sex :eek:) wondering about your whereabouts and I honestly thought you were on the dark continent with M-A traipsing around in the jungle.

Regards, Stan

marct

02-07-2012, 01:16 PM

Hey Stan,

Good to hear from you, too :D.

Nah, haven't been doing that much travelling, just dealing with life and a LOT of singing (we had our Carnegie Hall debut last summer, to rave reviews :cool:).

On the research / thinking front, I've been spending a lot of time thinking about how the CF can / should integrate their socio-cultural knowledge gathering and analysis, especially given our withdrawal from a combat role in Afghanistan. It's taken a while, but the picture is slowly coming together.

Cheers,

Marc

ganulv

02-07-2012, 02:11 PM

LOLOL - yup, which is why I am increasingly coming to the opinion that "senor social scientists" should be lodged in Red teaming cells vs. something like the HTS.
HRAF is online now (http://www.yale.edu/hraf/collections.htm) so there really is no excuse not to do some Phase 1 reading. Not that there was before.

On the research / thinking front, I've been spending a lot of time thinking about how the CF can / should integrate their socio-cultural knowledge gathering and analysis, especially given our withdrawal from a combat role in Afghanistan. It's taken a while, but the picture is slowly coming together.
If you happen to be walking along the roadside when a pair of the CF’s new model snowshoes (http://flic.kr/p/7B4rFR) fall off a truck I might know a potential buyer for them in western Massachusetts. :D Not that there has been much need for them down this way this winter… :(

Stan

02-07-2012, 02:29 PM

On the research / thinking front, I've been spending a lot of time thinking about how the CF can / should integrate their socio-cultural knowledge gathering and analysis, especially given our withdrawal from a combat role in Afghanistan. It's taken a while, but the picture is slowly coming together.

Cheers,

Marc

Marc, One would think that almost anyone with background from their military experiences would be a great source of knowledge, but it seems to me that sociocultural analyses continues to take a back seat (as far back as post-1991). We can't even remotely figure out what the Chinese and Russians are doing, yet alone a far more complex subject like Afghanistan.

I'm certainly not going to argue with Malinowski, but I've known people that devoted their lifetime to going local, but yet, had no idea what they were talking about.

One of the things I immediately recognized was the pathetic use of interpreters. Locals like their own spin on things and that never translated into something our Embassy folks could comprehend. It's no wonder we're in the mess we're in :D

marct

02-07-2012, 02:41 PM

HRAF is online now (http://www.yale.edu/hraf/collections.htm) so there really is no excuse not to do some Phase 1 reading. Not that there was before.

True.... then again, I know a lot of people who just don't have the mindset for using the HRAF files ;). Anyway, it looks like the HTS is into a market expansion phase not only trying to sell the system to other countries but, also, getting into the phase 0 action (http://www.idga.org/command-and-control/videos/idga-s-special-operations-summit-2011-col-sharon-h/&mac=IDGA_SMO_12_CA_LI) :wry:.

If you happen to be walking along the roadside when a pair of the CF’s new model snowshoes (http://flic.kr/p/7B4rFR) fall off a truck I might know a potential buyer for them in western Massachusetts. :D Not that there has been much need for them down this way this winter… :(

LOL - they are nice, aren't they! I'd probably keep them for myself given how much snow we have been getting up here. Not as much as some years, but a few heavy days.

Cheers,

Marc

jmm99

02-07-2012, 02:41 PM

are the wave of the present and future - the ultimate general purpose uniform even for those doing ethnography and ethnology.

That field work involving socio-cultural knowledge gathering, esp. where a common language is lacking and commmunication can be effected only by acting out the physical practices of the culture, sounds like it could get pretty sweaty - maybe no clothes is the best norm there.

All in all, cross-cultural comparison using textual and non-textual artifacts of various kinds sounds like a less stressful pursuit for aged gummers.

Regards

Mike

Stan

02-07-2012, 04:08 PM

... where a common language is lacking and communication can be effected only by acting out the physical practices of the culture, sounds like it could get pretty sweaty - maybe no clothes is the best norm there.

Regards

Mike

Hey Mike,
Most of the FAOs I worked with had far less language capabilities but yet their knowledge of the local culture and interaction in fact spoke tons. I would think having language abilities is paramount (or certainly makes things easier), but its only a slight part of the equation that some individuals simply don't possess.

Remind me to tell you the story about a CAR lieutenant who took nearly all his clothes off for a hair cut in South Carolina after being on base for 20 hours. His barber... was none other than the Provost Marshall's 18 year old daughter :eek:

Ken White

02-07-2012, 04:10 PM

It's taken a while, but the picture is slowly coming togetherGood to see you here again -- and I sure hope you'll share that as it comes together...

Sing well. ;)

Ken

ganulv

02-07-2012, 04:30 PM

I'm certainly not going to argue with Malinowski, but I've known people that devoted their lifetime to going local, but yet, had no idea what they were talking about.

One of the things I immediately recognized was the pathetic use of interpreters. Locals like their own spin on things and that never translated into something our Embassy folks could comprehend.
You know, Malinowski had the Slavic soul so he was working at an advantage. It’s true, though, just being there doesn’t mean you get it. And every field linguist I’ve known has a clue about local life in the places they have worked even if they hadn’t had the bit of formal training in socio-cultural theory per se. (On a tangent, I took a couple of courses from a linguist who is a Kinyarwanda speaker (https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/3414). He seems to think I’m pretty much a moron, not without reason. :p)

[Sweats] are the wave of the present and future - the ultimate general purpose uniform even for those doing ethnography and ethnology.
Personally, I think Supplex (http://www.shopfest.com/runners_sportswear/supplex_facts.htm) is gold for the hot and muggy stuff. But I won’t argue with my elders. :)

All in all, cross-cultural comparison using textual and non-textual artifacts of various kinds sounds like a less stressful pursuit for aged gummers.Ça dépend. I’d take a day in Bali over a day with a crusty old archivist 99 times out of a 100. And that’s being generous! :p

True.... then again, I know a lot of people who just don't have the mindset for using the HRAF files.
It’s true, I sometimes forget that I’m a gentleman of the old school.

Anyway, it looks like the HTS is into a market expansion phase not only trying to sell the system to other countries but, also, getting into the phase 0 action (http://www.idga.org/command-and-control/videos/idga-s-special-operations-summit-2011-col-sharon-h/&mac=IDGA_SMO_12_CA_LI) :wry:.That’s… surprising. My admittedly limited understanding of HTS is that it hasn’t borne much fruit. Or maybe it’s not surprising given the tendency of bureaucracy to spawn zombie programs (braindead but relentlessly expanding and hard to put in the ground).

LOL - they are nice, aren't they! I'd probably keep them for myself given how much snow we have been getting up here. Not as much as some years, but a few heavy days.It’s a neat idea to use metal to construct a more traditional frame form and to use lacing rather than Hypalon for the flotation. But that’s a separate paper, as you put it earlier.

It’s so brown and bland down this way it might as well be the Midwest. I had to make a day trip all the way to central Vermont last weekend to get into any of the white stuff. I did get to pass some of the time by listening to the Canadiens/Caps game in the vernacular, at least!

marct

02-07-2012, 04:40 PM

That’s… surprising. My admittedly limited understanding of HTS is that it hasn’t borne much fruit. Or maybe it’s not surprising given the tendency of bureaucracy to spawn zombie programs (braindead but relentlessly expanding and hard to put in the ground).

What's really frustrating for me is that we really just don't have much decent, publicly available data on it :mad:. Anecdotal evidence abounds and, from some of the stuff I've seen, the quality and usability range is huge. My suspicion, though, is that the "export version" is being pushed as a way to generate legitimacy (and revenue). The phase 0 move is probably to try and avoid coming cuts since I suspect that a lot of what they will be doing is already done. Guess we'll just have to see....

It’s so brown and bland down this way it might as well be the Midwest. I had to make a day trip all the way to central Vermont last weekend to get into any of the white stuff. I did get to pass some of the time by listening to the Canadiens/Caps game in the vernacular, at least!

We've been having rain for the past couple of days. After all, "Waterlude" (real name Winterlude) is a tradition up here. Looks like we'll get snow again on Friday, though.

Cheers,

Marc

Stan

02-07-2012, 04:50 PM

Hey Matt,

You know, Malinowski had the Slavic soul so he was working at an advantage. It’s true, though, just being there doesn’t mean you get it. And every field linguist I’ve known has a clue about local life in the places they have worked even if they hadn’t had the bit of formal training in socio-cultural theory per se. (On a tangent, I took a couple of courses from a linguist who is a Kinyarwanda speaker (https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/3414). He seems to think I’m pretty much a moron, not without reason. :p)

I guess my original point would be that we can't just take an ordinary soldier and hope to have an anthropologist. As bleak as some conclude the HTS program is, there are just as many of us that fully applaud their contributions. That "edge" may in fact work out to saving lives on both sides of the fence.

As far as your DIE verbs go, ask that Kinyarwanda speaker to battle with Lingala with but 800 words and phrases. Tons of vocabulary doesn't always translate into difficult :D

As an aside, I'm glad you finally met Marc. We have battled with wit and brawn with no equal. It's now on you :cool:

jmm99

02-07-2012, 06:11 PM

ethnography (interviewing people, establishing rapport, communicating "stuff") - in my (former) world, that may or may not have involved shaping (manipulation) of the "stuff" to meet the requirements of my client's end goals determined by the client's policy. "What is Truth ?" asked Pilate - and received no answer. Shaping (manipulation) may be used to support good, indifferent or bad policies. Anthropology also may be used to support good, indifferent or bad policies.

ethnology (cross-cultural comparison using textual and non-textual artifacts of various kinds) - been there, done that and do it here; and admit to the shaping (manipulation) of the resultant product. Again, the issue becomes whether the methodology is used in support of good, indifferent or bad policies. That opens up a new endeavor - as to which, one might pursue further adventures in ethnography and ethnology, or engage in adventures in babysitting.

Stan: The interpreter thing is interesting - and sometimes one gains a personal insight. Flashback: I'm with a gal and her parents (the dad having been a partisan in the Winter War after the Russians burnt the family farm; and then a regular in the Continuation War) to talk about legal options. The gal (very well educated) offered to translate - which was wise, considering my lack of any fluency in the spoken language (esp. real Finnish). I was surprised on how often "mutta" (but) occured - translating something like: on one hand ..., but on the other hand ... (yksilla kadella ..., mutta toisaalta ...). I sounded like some legal academic. :o

ganulv: While Supplex rings my bell as a chemist (and I've a little Dupont stock), I buy my wardrobe at the Family Dollar Store - no fancy Yuppie stuff. Besides, the only hot and muggy places up here are saunas - no clothes worn there. :D

I'd never argue anthropology with Marc; he's the one who keeps bringing up things like Hittite Law (as to which, he clearly needs guidance ;)). No point in fighting - our ancestors did enough of that in 1755-1760 (Lake George and the Plains of Abraham, wins for Marc's; Fort William Henry and Le Moulin a Vent, wins for mine). They then went on to join in building a nation, Canada - although admittedly, a few others did help in that process. :)

Regards

Mike

Stan

02-07-2012, 06:39 PM

Hei Mikka !

Stan: The interpreter thing is interesting - and sometimes one gains a personal insight. Flashback: I'm with a gal and her parents (the dad having been a partisan in the Winter War after the Russians burnt the family farm; and then a regular in the Continuation War) to talk about legal options. The gal (very well educated) offered to translate - which was wise, considering my lack of any fluency in the spoken language (esp. real Finnish). I was surprised on how often "mutta" (but) occured - translating something like: on one hand ..., but on the other hand ... (yksilla kadella ..., mutta toisaalta ...). I sounded like some legal academic. :o
Regards

Mike

Interpreters are locals and they are prone to what all locals say and do. Who wants to look like a prime idiot in front of a bunch of Yankees :D
But, if you want to ever walk away with even a clue as to what was discussed and the context of the conversation - you better up your game.

My first real Finnish sauna was with a great bunch of Finnish bikers. Being beaten with soaking birch branches is definitely an acquired taste thing. I got more out of that 2-hour session than I would have in 10 years talking to Finns. My Finnish, BTW, sucks :o

I just completed interviews with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) to see if we had some candidates for tours in Africa with the UN. Out of 77 candidates, I came up with 6 I felt met the grade. During the interviews two of them decided to use the "N" word to describe Africans. Having just been read the riot act (death by powerpoint) on conduct inside the MSB. What the HR folks from Sweden didn't know, was that the N word is merely part of the Estonian language and means very little - certainly not racist. What the Estonians didn't know was that their tiny country and secret language was taken completely out of context.

While I was able to defuse the situation I made it a point to slam home the often conceived version of a simple mistake with languages and cultures.

I could have done nearly anything at the Finn's house and sauna and little would have happened. Finns are a tolerant and friendly bunch. I doubt that such acts and slights in the Sub-Sahara would be so easily forgotten.

Regards, Stan

jmm99

02-07-2012, 08:17 PM

from Stan
Finns are a tolerant and friendly bunch

but not always accurate.

I could point you to commentary by an African-American who lives in Helsinki - racial slurs of him vary (use and non-use thereof) from person to person.

On the other hand, Finns are used to their Black or Dark Finns (my mother was one - she'd tan very dark even in what summer we have - despite the blue eyes), which is said to be because of the 25-30% "Eastern" genetic component that runs in most Finns.

Then, there is the Swedish-speaking Finn vs Finnish-speaking Finn thing, which goes beyond all reason. It supposedly is gone - along with other 19th and early 20th century things. But, it is far from gone if enough beer goes down the throat of a still dyed in the wool "Fennoman" - attestation by fairly recent personal experience.

Now, is the Stan-JMM conversation ethnography or ethnology (JMM being something of an artifact) ? :)

Regards

Mike

ganulv

02-07-2012, 10:22 PM

Hey Matt,

I guess my original point would be that we can't just take an ordinary soldier and hope to have an anthropologist. As bleak as some conclude the HTS program is, there are just as many of us that fully applaud their contributions. That "edge" may in fact work out to saving lives on both sides of the fence.
I guess my reservation is that some seem to conceive of socio–cultural knowledge as a panacea. If the expectations are reasonable I could see how having an anthropologist around on the ground could help in this way: anthropologists are aware that there is always more than one way to do things as well as of the fact that variation in social life isn’t infinite. An anthropologist could conceivably 1) help steer troops on the ground away from understanding the locals’ motivations too much from their own (the troops’) point of view as well as 2) help save some time making assessments of communities because they can immediately eliminate a lot of options that someone cutting things from whole cloth might consider in their initial assessments.

I remain skeptical that anthropologists working with troops in an area where there’s an insurgency underway can elicit consistently reliable opinions and detailed pieces of information from the locals. One of the things an ethnographer usually needs to get at those is trust, and that takes time even when everyone isn’t paranoid (and with good reason!) about everyone else’s real intentions. I hope no one is under the impression that ethnographers can get what an interrogator can in those contexts, just without the consequences of running interrogations.

I’m beyond skeptical about efforts at directed culture change. I’m not saying it can’t be done successfully. I’m not convinced anyone knows how to do it predictably, though. And I just don’t believe the U.S. is ever going to see a long term culture change project through to the end, and that’s a recipe for things ending up more chaotic than before when the project is left off. Reconstruction is—or at least should be, IMHO—the type specimen for such as that.

As far as your DIE verbs go, ask that Kinyarwanda speaker to battle with Lingala with but 800 words and phrases. Tons of vocabulary doesn't always translate into difficult :DNoun classes, always a party… :wry: With some vowel harmony and a little tonal morphophonology as party favors! :D

Stan

02-08-2012, 08:40 AM

Now, is the Stan-JMM conversation ethnography or ethnology (JMM being something of an artifact) ? :)

Regards

Mike

Hey Mike,
Without a doubt ethnography :D

Stan

02-08-2012, 01:04 PM

Hey Matt,

I guess my reservation is that some seem to conceive of socio–cultural knowledge as a panacea. If the expectations are reasonable I could see how having an anthropologist around on the ground could help in this way: anthropologists are aware that there is always more than one way to do things as well as of the fact that variation in social life isn’t infinite. An anthropologist could conceivably 1) help steer troops on the ground away from understanding the locals’ motivations too much from their own (the troops’) point of view as well as 2) help save some time making assessments of communities because they can immediately eliminate a lot of options that someone cutting things from whole cloth might consider in their initial assessments.

A good point and something the Army often does to their FAO and SF with extremely high (unobtainable) expectations. I saw the use of HTS as a one-person team working towards the same goals, but not hanging out with a bunch of armed men. In the end the anthropologist is yet another tool in the kit bag and not construed as the answer to everything culturally-related. The anthropologist is also a great mentor and instructor. Where better to learn and practice than in the country in question.

I remain skeptical that anthropologists working with troops in an area where there’s an insurgency underway can elicit consistently reliable opinions and detailed pieces of information from the locals. One of the things an ethnographer usually needs to get at those is trust, and that takes time even when everyone isn’t paranoid (and with good reason!) about everyone else’s real intentions. I hope no one is under the impression that ethnographers can get what an interrogator can in those contexts, just without the consequences of running interrogations.

That I think is the problem with our command (upper echelon) - when and how to employ your best assets should be left to the folks on the ground, and even then only with adequate training. For example: We have explosive detection dogs, but they are not the cure-all and certainly will not respond passively during a fire fight or under duress.

I’m beyond skeptical about efforts at directed culture change. I’m not saying it can’t be done successfully. I’m not convinced anyone knows how to do it predictably, though. And I just don’t believe the U.S. is ever going to see a long term culture change project through to the end, and that’s a recipe for things ending up more chaotic than before when the project is left off. Reconstruction is—or at least should be, IMHO—the type specimen for such as that.

Both Marc and I were subjected to a virtual cultural training video (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7970) years ago. While we both had some serious reservations and both concluded it was not ready for prime time, it is out there and ... Well, dunno :wry:
Any skepticism about the HTS would soon seem mediocre once you took the cultural challenge :D

davidbfpo

03-28-2012, 03:14 PM

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for this item:The US Army's Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin for Oct-Dec 2011 is a special issue devoted to the subject. Some of the articles relate to Iraq, but several are devoted to the HTS in Afghanistan, including case studies of Rural Human Terrain in Kandahar, engaging local religious leaders in the Central Helmand River Valley and articles on bilingual data collection and HTS support to Information Operations.

Link to the Bulletin's issue:http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2011_04.pdf

...one of the papers notes: "Difficulties integrating HTS teams into Army units arise because the HTS program brings together two professions (social science and military studies) that tend to operate within different problem-solving paradigms, speak different languages, consist of different personalities, and have misconceptions one about the other. Academia is stereotyped as theoretical, long winded, and perhaps of no practical use at the moment. Military studies are stereotyped as too practical, laconic, and operating under the slogan that a 70 percent solution is good enough right now in the battle space."

Link to Circling:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/analyzing-us-army-human-terrain-teams.html

ganulv

03-29-2012, 06:10 AM

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for this item:

Link to the Bulletin's issue:http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2011_04.pdf

Link to Circling:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/analyzing-us-army-human-terrain-teams.html
Many thanks for these links. I scanned the bulletin just now and will aim to read a couple of the articles tomorrow.

What I have seen of the bulletin so far reinforces my impression that the U.S. military and civilian contingents in Afghanistan seem to be fairly ignorant as to the basics of agriculture. (That's not a criticism. In my experience few Americans know much about where the food they eat comes from.) Am I way off base here?

marct

03-30-2012, 10:20 AM

What I have seen of the bulletin so far reinforces my impression that the U.S. military and civilian contingents in Afghanistan seem to be fairly ignorant as to the basics of agriculture. (That's not a criticism. In my experience few Americans know much about where the food they eat comes from.) Am I way off base here?

That matches my impression, and in more areas than just agriculture. Still working through the articles, though....

Cheers,

Marc

ganulv

03-30-2012, 11:54 PM

120mm

03-31-2012, 02:02 PM

but I still find the case study of the village of fig farmers in Kandahar where no one knew rotted manure is fertilizer to be absolutely bizarre. I have to wonder what you would find if you were able to scratch beneath the surface of that one.

You'd find out HTS members are drooling idiots. But that's ok; they fit in with the rest of the US contingent, there.

ganulv

03-31-2012, 04:24 PM

You'd find out HTS members are drooling idiots. But that's ok; they fit in with the rest of the US contingent, there.
:(

In all seriousness, that they happened upon a settlement full of people who farm for a living where no one knows how to manure their fields and didn't go beyond teaching them about organic fertilizer speaks volumes to me. In that kind of situation I would think that either a) they haven't been farming for a living for long and start trying to figure out if there is a recent history of population movement and/or a "development" project or b) the folks in that settlement were actually doing something else for a living. Pursuing those possibilities might really reveal a lot (whether or not ISAF and GIRoA would like the things revealed is another question).

It all could just be a problem with the text. Who knows what got edited out? And I'm not pretending I know the constraints involved with the case. But still, the article leaves me scratching my head.

JMA

03-31-2012, 04:33 PM

Ken White

03-31-2012, 05:56 PM

Why would the 'US military contingent' need to understand the basics of agriculture?I've been wondering the same thing while following this thread...

Bob's World

03-31-2012, 06:51 PM

I've often been curious about the fixation on Afghan agriculture as well, in regards to how improving it might somehow be a cure for insurgency.

I'm no expert on the topic, but I did grow up in rural Oregon and my undergrad was in forestry so I have some appreciation about those who live close to the land and what works and what doesn't work. I also spent a bit of time flying over Helmand, Oruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul provinces; and being fascinated with the grandeur of the place, and also very interested in the study of terrain as it shapes the fight, and the study of how man works to squeeze a living out of a harsh environment; I spent much of that time staring down at the ground and thinking in those terms.

From this I earned a tremendous respect for the Taliban fighter and his ability to defy our tremendous technology through his equally tremendous hardiness, dedication and ability to become one with his surroundings. Also for the Afghan farmers, who seemed to squeeze every drop of life out of the soil and water available with their efforts.

I also spent a couple hours standing on the roof of the Arghandab District center looking out over the Arghandab valley in conversation with a USDA SME discussing his work, his observations, recommendations, etc. So, no expert, but I have some experience on this topic.

I too don't get it.

People tell me how the Afghans don't know how to maximize the agricultural potential of their land. Bull####. With the tools and resources available to them they maximize it very well. Sure, if they had massive tractors, irrigation, computers, etc they could do ma ore to be like Americans farm in Kansas, but hey, Afghanistan isn't Kansas. Who is going to sustain and maintain those capabilities? To provide such a capacity would be as silly as building a massive Western-style Army that they cannot afford to sustain and that is inappropriate to the security concerns of the region...

Second, where in the history of conflict between those who are governed, and those who govern them (insurgency), has it been a function of said populace not knowing how to farm their land?? Not owning the land they farm? Definitely. That is a classic grievance for insurgency, one that Mao leveraged very well. Land ownership is one of the largest problems in Afghanistan today as well, but for very different reasons. In this "winner take all" patronage society, where fortunes have swung 180 degrees so often over the past 40 years there is truly no way to sort out the mess of who has best title to any of the very valuable plots of arable or city land.

But is there a role for military personnel in this? No, not really.

ganulv

03-31-2012, 10:49 PM

Why would the 'US military contingent' need to understand the basics of agriculture?
If the strategists have decided upon undertaking a population-centric counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/population-centric-coin-in-afghanistan) and 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture, how could these same strategists even pretend to formulate strategy if they know nothing about agriculture?

But is the implicit question whether or not I think military professionals need to know something about agriculture? I don't see how it would help the young man scanning the Fulda horizon with his field glasses c. 1985; I don't see how it would not help the military governor of an agriculturally rich state then, now, or ever.

And my semi-informed opinion is that with COIN 2.0 the United States Military asks far too much of itself.

Ken White

04-01-2012, 01:50 AM

JMA

04-04-2012, 11:48 AM

If the strategists have decided upon undertaking a population-centric counterinsurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/population-centric-coin-in-afghanistan) and 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture, how could these same strategists even pretend to formulate strategy if they know nothing about agriculture?

But is the implicit question whether or not I think military professionals need to know something about agriculture? I don't see how it would help the young man scanning the Fulda horizon with his field glasses c. 1985; I don't see how it would not help the military governor of an agriculturally rich state then, now, or ever.

And my semi-informed opinion is that with COIN 2.0 the United States Military asks far too much of itself.

May I offer another perspective on all this.

The assumption that COIN has to be either enemy- or population- centric is an error IMHO.

An analysis of each specific insurgency should lead to a unique course of action being adopted as COIN policy.

Not every grievance cited as contributing to the insurgency can be addressed. If for example the true motivation behind the insurgency is more ideological than economic, more religious than the pursuit of human freedoms or more ethnic than a demand for democracy then a 'political settlement' will be unlikely.

Certainly the current US approach to COIN being what can be called 'cheque-book COIN' where money is thrown around to buy off the opposition and buy support from those caught in the middle is quite ridiculous and destined to fail.

Ken's (good) point about the use of foreign troops to support the 'state' is valid. And of course the US know that the longer the troops stay in the country the more the locals see them as occupiers and want them to go (this also happened to the Cubans in Angola).

It is well worth having another look at Wilf's paper 'Killing your way to Control' (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/BAR%20151%20Killing%20your%20way%20to%20control%28 2%29.pdf)

If we accept that at the highest level 80% of the COIN policy is political the 20% comprising the military action will often prove to be critical in determining the outcome of the insurgency.

It should be obvious that the armed 'wing' of the insurgency must be confronted with armed force. The armed insurrection must be suppressed or at least contained to to allow the political process to run its course. If the armed insurrection is not suppressed then it is not possible to negotiate from a position of strength (as is the case in Afghanistan).

Wilf writes:

The population will obey whoever exercises the power of law over them. Power creates support.

IMHO I would use the word 'submission' rather than support.

The people need to submit to the rule of law. The people need to submit to peaceful negotiations (whether a minority gets what it wants or not). etc etc

Those who resort to violence must be met with kind.

...So I would not spend a cent on agriculture in Afghanistan... in fact the next trick should be to destroy their irrigation system if they use continue to use them to cultivate poppies. Just give them the Gypsy's warning on that... and if they don't listen... then let the Engineers have a little fun with demolitions.

Dayuhan

04-04-2012, 12:28 PM

An analysis of each specific insurgency should lead to a unique course of action being adopted as COIN policy.

Agree completely with that, but I'd hope that analysis would be conducted not only to determine what course of action is needed, but also to determine whether any action is called for at all. One of the problems with all our talk of COIN is the visceral assumption that insurgency by definition is something that needs to be countered, even if the specific insurgency in question is really not something we need to be concerned with.

The people need to submit to the rule of law. The people need to submit to peaceful negotiations (whether a minority gets what it wants or not). etc etc

Those who resort to violence must be met with kind.

What if it's the government that ignores the rule of law, refuses to negotiate, and resorts to violence? It happens, and it's a good reason to be very careful about choosing what governments we want to support and deciding what insurgents need to be countered.

ganulv

04-04-2012, 04:13 PM

Wilf writes:
The population will obey whoever exercises the power of law over them. Power creates support.IMHO I would use the word 'submission' rather than support. IMHO the use of force can almost always ensure compliance but it may or may not ensure cooperation. In a scenario in which you possess unlimited recourse to violence and they do not you can bludgeon them into compliance before they are entirely exterminated. (Probably (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masada).) You might even mistake that compliance for cooperation. But should your recourse to violence decrease and theirs increase they might give you a nasty lesson in the difference between the two (http://youtu.be/wWIbCtz_Xwk).

JMA

04-04-2012, 04:50 PM

IMHO the use of force can almost always ensure compliance but it may or may not ensure cooperation. In a scenario in which you possess unlimited recourse to violence and they do not you can bludgeon them into compliance before they are entirely exterminated. (Probably (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masada).) You might even mistake that compliance for cooperation. But should your recourse to violence decrease and theirs increase they might give you a nasty lesson in the difference between the two (http://youtu.be/wWIbCtz_Xwk).

This is exactly why I said 'submission' and not 'support'.

This is also why I stated (elsewhere) that the US needed to make greater use of proxies to fight these wars because - like in Rodesia but not in Zimbabwe - the US is not willing to indulge in the brutality required to defeat the insurgents and match their methods which force the population into the submissive compliance required.

ganulv

04-04-2012, 05:19 PM

This is exactly why I said 'submission' and not 'support'.

This is also why I stated (elsewhere) that the US needed to make greater use of proxies to fight these wars because - like in Rodesia but not in Zimbabwe - the US is not willing to indulge in the brutality required to defeat the insurgents and match their methods which force the population into the submissive compliance required.
Yeah, to me the most problematic statement in Owen’s article is that "[t]he population should not be asked to pick sides" on p. 37. No, they shouldn't be, but they will, and not nicely. The worst case I can think of is being stuck between the Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian security forces (http://icarusfilms.com/new2009/luca.html). There are probably worse, sadly.

120mm

04-05-2012, 02:20 AM

Back to the agriculture issue:

1. Those anthropologists/social scientists who do not understand agriculture tend to be idiots who are not worth their weight as landfill. By "tend", I mean "they are, without a doubt". Ivory tower idiots with multiple degrees and no useful experience.

2. In some localities, there is zero knowledge of farming, because entire generations have been wiped out, and the locals are returnees with no ag experience or interlopers with no ag experience. It is not uncommon to see these guys make really bad ag decisions, like dumping a bag of seed on the ground in a pile in their field, or spraying melons for worms after they are infected. And then selling them in the market. These "farmers" then starve and can be picked up by the insurgents fairly easy as recruits to make ends meet.

3. The presence of someone with practical ag experience plus a bit of anthropological education might keep the US from doing stupid #### like the Helmand/Argandab Valley Authority project like we did in the 1950s and 1960s, which is precisely what others in this thread warns about. In other words, local ag standards, executed correctly, are often superior to 'Murrican methods.

Finally, on the subject of HTS personnel. In short, they suck. They suck because they tend to be morons and idiots. Most are catastrophically unqualified and the few that are "qualified" are unsuited for this sort of work. I know one actual social scientist who is currently deployed who really knows how to do this sort of work. I had the honor of working with him the last year and a half.

On a related topic, this HTSer, myself and an Afghan-American in another program outproduced the entire $227 million HTS program last year, in quantity of reports alone. Now, if you consider "quality" of reports, we outdistanced that $227 million program a hundred fold. Their reports tend to be recycled data and "I like poop. Do you like poop?" kind of quality, whereas ours was real data, collected, analyzed and given to grateful ISAF/DoS personnel. Or quashed by the chain of command as being just a little bit too much of an uncomfortable truth.

The problem with inserting Anthropologists/Social Science types into this situation is that the skillset and mindset are so shockingly rare that it isn't worth the pain. There are maybe a couple of people that could really do the job and would want to do the job.

JMA

04-06-2012, 05:28 AM

Yeah, to me the most problematic statement in Owen’s article is that "[t]he population should not be asked to pick sides" on p. 37. No, they shouldn't be, but they will, and not nicely. The worst case I can think of is being stuck between the Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian security forces (http://icarusfilms.com/new2009/luca.html). There are probably worse, sadly.

Lets look at his whole paragraph shall we:

The population should not be asked to pick sides. They should merely be informed that the Army will win, and that should be demonstrated to them, as forcefully and unequivocally as possible. No one should be confused that if you fight the Army/Security Forces, you will die or be captured. Evidence should be literally laid before them. There should be no more complicated message than that.

The idea here is good but easier said than done.

Clearly this has not worked in Afghanistan despite the Taliban taking significant casualties. There seems to be a never ending supply of those ready to take the money the Taliban offer (much from poppy derivative proceeds) and take up arms.

So the message has not got through to the population that death or capture will be the end result of joining the Taliban.

So is Wilf's model achievable?

My position is that it is not with the restrictions placed on the US and Brit armies in Afghanistan. Rules of engagement and (horrifyingly) increasingly attitudes of officers (some displayed around here) which are more suited to work with the Peacecorps than with an army at war.

Then inexplicably the US have appeared to forgotten the simple lesson they learned in Vietnam - where a segment of their Viet Cong enemy were 'farmers by day, soldiers by night'. (If they have not forgotten then they have no #*!# idea how to deal with that)

This comes back to the need - IMHO - to use proxies who can fight by the same lack of rules as the Taliban. Use of such tactics or methods would not be possible for use by US or Brit forces. (Nor would - most likely - the US Congress allow such proxies to kill in the name of the US)

Edward Lattwak is always a good read to counter the namby-pamby stuff that the new breed of COIN experts churn out.

I suggest you start here: What would Byzantium do? (http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/01/what-would-byzantium-do/)

The prognosis is not good for successful US/Brit military interventions in the future.