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Jedburgh
10-09-2007, 06:20 PM
Arab Insight, Fall 2007 (http://www.arabinsight.org/pdf/Arabinsight24.pdf) (The entire issue in one 140 page pdf file)

Individual articles:

Confusing Hearts and Minds: Public Opinion in the Arab World (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/169.pdf)

Media Matters: The Arab Portrayal of the United States (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/171.pdf)

From Alexandria to New York: Uncle Sam in Egyptian Cinema (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/172.pdf)

Y do U H8 us :( ? Arab Online Forums Examined (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/173.pdf)

“It’s Israel, Stupid!” A Source of Anti-Americanism (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/174.pdf)

Money Can’t Buy Love: USAID Assistance to Egypt (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/176.pdf)

Lessons from Libya: How to Make Friends with Arabs (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/177.pdf)

ali_ababa
10-23-2007, 10:45 PM
I'm an Arab however i do not hate America. However, I have disagreed with their past decisions which i believe ultimately lead Iraq into the current mess.

I would love Iraq to develop on the American model rather than the ultra-conservative Saudi Arabia model where funding terrorism is occuring as we speak.

goesh
10-24-2007, 11:49 AM
After the 9/11 attacks, and given the ignorance that does exist amongst some of our people and given our numbers ( approx. 290 million at the time), the very few assualts on Muslims and muslim property clearly shows that the vast majority of people simply want to get along, provide for their families and have a bit of peace and justice in their lives. We are not nearly as Islamophobic as portrayed nor do the vast majority of Muslims hate us for being who we are.

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 11:57 AM
After the 9/11 attacks, and given the ignorance that does exist amongst some of our people and given our numbers ( approx. 290 million at the time), the very few assualts on Muslims and muslim property clearly shows that the vast majority of people simply want to get along, provide for their families and have a bit of peace and justice in their lives. We are not nearly as Islamophobic as portrayed nor do the vast majority of Muslims hate us for being who we are.

The problem is that many in the Arab world hear Pat Robertson and LTG Boykin and think they speak for Americans.

I will say this--I sometimes participate in a politics discussion board that is predominantly South Carolinians. Hence we get a lot of people who are from the Christian right. I've been aghast at how many of those truly do hate Muslims and are convinced that the conflict with Islamic militants is the beginning of armageddon. We can scoff at this attitude, but these people vote. When during the Republican debate this week, Mike Huckabee said, "The conflict with Islamofascism is the biggest threat our nation has ever faced" I fell off my chair. If that is not THE stupidest thing I've heard come out of a politician's mouth, it makes the top 10. For starters, I think the word "Islamofascism" is ridiculously ignorant. But then to contend that Islamic militants are a threat on the level with the Soviets, Nazi Germany, or the Confederacy is, in a word, asinine.

But my point is, this reinforces negative ideas in the Islamic world. As T.X. Hammes says, we provide all the psychological warfare themes that AQ could ever need.

Mark O'Neill
10-24-2007, 12:05 PM
For starters, I think the word "Islamofascism" is ridiculously ignorant. But then to contend that Islamic militants are a threat on the level with the Soviets, Nazi Germany, or the Confederacy is, in a word, asinine.

But my point is, this reinforces negative ideas in the Islamic world. As T.X. Hammes says, we provide all the psychological warfare themes that AQ could ever need.

Steve,

You have nailed it, but, as you have pointed out, I fear the problem is that a large percentage of your countrymen do feverently believe in the hogwash that the religious right puts out about Islam (and other belief systems in general).

I know that we don't 'do IO' on our own folks, but if there was ever a case for a public education campaign in some quarters, this is it.

Cheers

Mark

tequila
10-24-2007, 12:16 PM
I'll come out and agree with Goesh about this in a broad way.

There's a lot of ignorance about Islam and Muslims out there in the US, no doubt about it. However, I think the broad majority of Americans are tolerant and openminded. We tend to get distracted by cable TV and radio ranters, who we must remember cater to a very small audience relative to the total American public.

This recent verdict (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/us/22cnd-holyland.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print)provides an indication that American juries, for instance, are in no rush to judgment just because the defendants are Muslim and accused of terrorism.

The term "Islamofascism" is blindingly ignorant. Christopher Hitchens tries to argue otherwise here (http://www.slate.com/id/2176389/nav/tap2/)and just looks foolish.

Tom Odom
10-24-2007, 12:18 PM
Steve,

You have nailed it, but, as you have pointed out, I fear the problem is that a large percentage of your countrymen do feverently believe in the hogwash that the religious right puts out about Islam (and other belief systems in general).

I know that we don't 'do IO' on our own folks, but if there was ever a case ofr a public education campaign in some quarters, this is it.

Cheers

Mark

Mark and Steve,

Agree 100%. Unfortunately this has the aspect of control through fear based on ignorance common to this element. Last week I caught the leader of the Christians for Zionism movement on early morning CNN; same type of demonizing going on there.

Best,
Tom

goesh
10-24-2007, 12:37 PM
Science can be manipulated as easily as religion - objectivity backed with education (indoctrination?) is no gurantee of immunity from manipulating the masses for economic and political gain and reasons of ego. The big dump the pharmaceutical industry does on the gullible Public is proof of the pudding. There is money to be made from hatred and war and look not to the pulpit for the biggest villain in these matters. Ooooom!

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 12:47 PM
I know that we don't 'do IO' on our own folks, but if there was ever a case for a public education campaign in some quarters, this is it.

Cheers

Mark

But that's the crux of the matter both domestically and internationally: even if folks are hearing one narrative through "official" channels, if they're hearing another one at the church/mosque, it's pretty clear which will win out. To me, that's the reason I think our "information campaign" is doomed to failure--we offer the right to vote and a fast Internet connection; the other side offers an eternity in paradise.

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 12:49 PM
I'll come out and agree with Goesh about this in a broad way.

There's a lot of ignorance about Islam and Muslims out there in the US, no doubt about it. However, I think the broad majority of Americans are tolerant and openminded. We tend to get distracted by cable TV and radio ranters, who we must remember cater to a very small audience relative to the total American public.

This recent verdict (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/us/22cnd-holyland.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print)provides an indication that American juries, for instance, are in no rush to judgment just because the defendants are Muslim and accused of terrorism.

The term "Islamofascism" is blindingly ignorant. Christopher Hitchens tries to argue otherwise here (http://www.slate.com/id/2176389/nav/tap2/)and just looks foolish.

My feeling is that American tolerance for Muslims is pretty shallow. I think we're one WMD attack in New York away from a pogrom.

Wow--I'm sure a spreader of sunshine this morning, aren't I! 409 pages in this danged manuscript and growing. I think it's going to kill me. I need to end this sabbatical and get back to the office so I can get some rest.

Steve Blair
10-24-2007, 12:51 PM
Personally I think the percentage of Americans who "ferverently believe" the stuff the religious right puts out is relatively small. Do they answer the phone when pollsters call? Most likely; making them appear to be more of a factor than they really are. But I also tend to suspect that for some people the fear/hatred of Islam might come from a slightly different source than some have considered. Anyone remember the Nation of Islam? There were a fair number of black hate groups in the late 1960s going through to today that wrapped themselves in Islamic trappings. I think for some the "threat of Islam" resonates on a different level than the Middle East.

In any case, the press loves sticking a microphone in the face of someone who's going to say something to ramp people up...so long as it's the 'right' people being ramped up. And I mean 'right' in terms of target audience or ability to make a splash as opposed to political leanings.

skiguy
10-24-2007, 12:52 PM
However, I think the broad majority of Americans are tolerant and openminded.
I'd like to agree with you on this, but I can't. You give more credit than I do. Just working with the average Joe (who isn't a news junkie and doesn't watch FOX all the time) I still see a lot of racism and complete lack of understanding to see the difference between a terrorist and a Muslim.

Steve, that sounds like a board I used to participate (AI-Jane). I have "problems" with civility there, so I found it best to just leave. (posting links to the KKK application was probably going a little overboard. :D)

I'm in complete agreement with you guys about the Religious Right. Just please don't bash Christians too much. Not all of us are obsessed with the end times, support the Zionists, or think Islam is the religion of the antichrist. :rolleyes:

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 12:58 PM
Personally I think the percentage of Americans who "ferverently believe" the stuff the religious right puts out is relatively small. Do they answer the phone when pollsters call? Most likely; making them appear to be more of a factor than they really are. But I also tend to suspect that for some people the fear/hatred of Islam might come from a slightly different source than some have considered. Anyone remember the Nation of Islam? There were a fair number of black hate groups in the late 1960s going through to today that wrapped themselves in Islamic trappings. I think for some the "threat of Islam" resonates on a different level than the Middle East.

In any case, the press loves sticking a microphone in the face of someone who's going to say something to ramp people up...so long as it's the 'right' people being ramped up. And I mean 'right' in terms of target audience or ability to make a splash as opposed to political leanings.

I agree with you but would add three points:

1) the number of Americans extremely hostile to Muslims is growing
2) those who are hostile have an influence over politicians greater than their numbers simply because there is no "pro Islam" lobby to counterbalance them. It's the same dynamic as the anti-Castro lobby. For many Americans, it's really hard to distinguish a "good" Muslim from a "bad" one, so they figure they'll just be safe and dislike them all.
3) even though the group may be a small minority, many in the Arab world think they are typical of Americans.

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 01:00 PM
I'd like to agree with you on this, but I can't. You give more credit than I do. Just working with the average Joe (who isn't a news junkie and doesn't watch FOX all the time) I still see a lot of racism and complete lack of understanding to see the difference between a terrorist and a Muslim.

Steve, that sounds like a board I used to participate (AI-Jane). I have "problems" with civility there, so I found it best to just leave. (posting links to the KKK application was probably going a little overboard. :D)

I'm in complete agreement with you guys about the Religious Right. Just please don't bash Christians too much. Not all of us are obsessed with the end times, support the Zionists, or think Islam is the religion of the antichrist. :rolleyes:

I've had to withdraw from that board a number of times because the sheer stupidity of some folks kicks me into my pit bull mode. After a while, I recoil at how aggressive I've become in my quest to stomp idiots.

Steve Blair
10-24-2007, 01:13 PM
I agree with you but would add three points:

1) the number of Americans extremely hostile to Muslims is growing
2) those who are hostile have an influence over politicians greater than their numbers simply because there is no "pro Islam" lobby to counterbalance them. It's the same dynamic as the anti-Castro lobby
3) even though the group may be a small minority, many in the Arab world think they are typical of Americans.

I agree with your point 3, but can we really change that? And I'd be inclined to guess that if that group didn't exist, it would be made up and people would believe it existed anyhow. I'd also argue that the Arab reaction to that small minority is what is driving your point 1. So now we have the cycle going. Can it be fixed? I'm honestly not sure. With so few moderate Moslem leaders speaking out (or, more importantly, being reported as speaking out), it's easy for the religious right to launch their spin. And their spin feeds the radical Islam spin. There's always a great deal of talk about how moderate thinkers fear the radical elements within Islam, and it's not that far of a leap for the normal person to decide that if their own co-religionists are afraid of them, maybe they should be, too.

It doesn't help the "average" American, who's accustomed to a fixed church leadership heirarchy, that Islam appears to lack the sort of leadership structure they're accustomed to. For someone who's conditioned by their upbringing to see a pastor as the 'leader' of their church, a pronouncement by an Islamic cleric who most likely doesn't have the same standing is going to be given weight that it might not deserve.

I'm to a degree thinking out loud here, but to my way of thinking the problem is more complex than pressure groups (and I tend to believe that those do more harm than good in the long run, at least from the perspective of the "average" American). Americans have been conditioned by their consumer and quota society to expect neat labels for things and groups. Things like sports play into it, too (scorecard, teams, etc.). How do you help them understand that this stuff can't be cleanly labeled? You also have decades of pro-Israel images to overcome in the process (now there's a pressure group for you...:)), as well as all the talking head babble about the "Arab street"...which I expect conjures up images of mob rule and the like for many people.

I guess it all boils down to "Yeah...there's that problem. Now how the hell do we fix it? And can we fix it without help from outside?"

goesh
10-24-2007, 01:46 PM
alot of this rabble-rousing from the pulpit is like a tent revival - everyone gets on the wagon agaisnt sin but the cycle of sin repeats itself rather quickly afterwards. It makes people feel good but their shotguns gather dust in the closet as Muslims are not running amok on the streets. Steve is right about 1 WMD in New York causing a pogrom

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 01:47 PM
I agree with your point 3, but can we really change that? And I'd be inclined to guess that if that group didn't exist, it would be made up and people would believe it existed anyhow. I'd also argue that the Arab reaction to that small minority is what is driving your point 1. So now we have the cycle going. Can it be fixed? I'm honestly not sure. With so few moderate Moslem leaders speaking out (or, more importantly, being reported as speaking out), it's easy for the religious right to launch their spin. And their spin feeds the radical Islam spin. There's always a great deal of talk about how moderate thinkers fear the radical elements within Islam, and it's not that far of a leap for the normal person to decide that if their own co-religionists are afraid of them, maybe they should be, too.

It doesn't help the "average" American, who's accustomed to a fixed church leadership heirarchy, that Islam appears to lack the sort of leadership structure they're accustomed to. For someone who's conditioned by their upbringing to see a pastor as the 'leader' of their church, a pronouncement by an Islamic cleric who most likely doesn't have the same standing is going to be given weight that it might not deserve.

I'm to a degree thinking out loud here, but to my way of thinking the problem is more complex than pressure groups (and I tend to believe that those do more harm than good in the long run, at least from the perspective of the "average" American). Americans have been conditioned by their consumer and quota society to expect neat labels for things and groups. Things like sports play into it, too (scorecard, teams, etc.). How do you help them understand that this stuff can't be cleanly labeled? You also have decades of pro-Israel images to overcome in the process (now there's a pressure group for you...:)), as well as all the talking head babble about the "Arab street"...which I expect conjures up images of mob rule and the like for many people.

I guess it all boils down to "Yeah...there's that problem. Now how the hell do we fix it? And can we fix it without help from outside?"

I agree with you and, no, I don't think it can be fixed because its foundation is the "dream palace" of the Arabs. I'm the first to admit I've never lived in an Arab culture for an extended period but I have been strongly influenced over the past couple of years by a personal relationsip with an Arab. I've been amazed at the extent to which once this person arrives at a "narrative," no amount of event empirical evidence can shake them from this. I don't by any stretch intend this to be a racist position but I also don't think that because of political correctness, we can deny the fact that different cultures understand the world differently.

This is a theme I've been building in my book: the United States tends to be successful operating intra-culture (e.g. Atlanticism). We encounter problems when we operate cross-culturally (Vietnam, Iraq). And the rub is that the current global security system puts us in a position of frequently operating cross culturally. And I don't think increased "cultural sensitivity" is going to fix that.

That's why I take issue with the well meaning Americans who argue that if we just had a better organization for "strategic communications," the problem would be solved. While our organization is sub-optimal, I don't think it's the root of the problem.

tequila
10-24-2007, 02:10 PM
I agree with you and, no, I don't think it can be fixed because its foundation is the "dream palace" of the Arabs. I'm the first to admit I've never lived in an Arab culture for an extended period but I have been strongly influenced over the past couple of years by a personal relationsip with an Arab. I've been amazed at the extent to which once this person arrives at a "narrative," no amount of event empirical evidence can shake them from this. I don't by any stretch intend this to be a racist position but I also don't think that because of political correctness, we can deny the fact that different cultures understand the world differently.

I think we all have our own "narratives" which we tend to sink into comfortably, and often overestimate just how often we question ourselves on them. I've run into amazingly similar issues in my own relationships alternately with (1) a white Southerner completely unable to comprehend that slavery had anything to do with the Civil War (2) a Maronite Lebanese who insists that she has absolutely no Arab blood, and is indeed a pureblooded descendant of the Phoenician builders of Tyre (3) an African-American woman utterly convinced that black sub-Saharan Africans built the Pyramids of Giza, inspired the Greek alphabet, and invented basic principles of mathematics.

Due to my own narrative, I find myself chronically unable to believe that the Marine Corps did not win the Pacific War or storm Fallujah by themselves.


This is a theme I've been building in my book: the United States tends to be successful operating intra-culture (e.g. Atlanticism). We encounter problems when we operate cross-culturally (Vietnam, Iraq). And the rub is that the current global security system puts us in a position of frequently operating cross culturally. And I don't think increased "cultural sensitivity" is going to fix that.

That's why I take issue with the well meaning Americans who argue that if we just had a better organization for "strategic communications," the problem would be solved. While our organization is sub-optimal, I don't think it's the root of the problem.

Agree with much of this argument. Unfortunately, I think even our "Atlanticist" operations are much overrated, at least anytime we penetrate east of the English Channel. As far as the vapidity of "strategic communications" go, I agree that this is accorded far too much importance. However, I think that often the issue is not necessarily so much a clash of cultures being unable to understand one another as a genuine divergence of interests. We Americans have our own cultural blinders --- one of them is a failure to recognize that what is best for the United States and our own interests is often not what is best for those in other places with other interests.

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 02:13 PM
Due to my own narrative, I find myself chronically unable to believe that the Marine Corps did not win the Pacific War or storm Fallujah by themselves.

I hear that they MIGHT have had they not run out of jars.

goesh
10-24-2007, 03:12 PM
I guess I don't have to worry quite as much about globalizing myself any more.

Van
10-24-2007, 03:56 PM
I think we're ignoring a key point; althought this is a problem for the U.S., one of the big sources is Arab nations using anti-U.S. sentiments to distract attention away from their own corruption. It gives frustrated young men an outlet that is not perceived as a threat to the internal status quo, and helps the governments avoid detaining/killing/torturing these young men en masse (as they scream for the death of Zionism, crusaders etc, rather than for the death of their own prime minister, president, etc), which would only make internal tensions worse.

The countermove is fairly obvious, but wouldn't fly well in the media; diplomatic sanctions and loss of economic support to nations that spout anti-U.S./West venom from state-run media, and distribute free radios pretuned to the regional VOA and BBC freqs. And the carrot; diplomatic and economic considerations for nations that have free media or even-handed state run media. The real key to the carrot and the stick is making them rapidly adaptable, so changes in a nations actions (good or bad) don't go unrecognized.

Of course, the mainstream media would scream that this is interfering in freedom of press, a propaganda program, yada yada.

tequila
10-24-2007, 04:15 PM
I think we're ignoring a key point; althought this is a problem for the U.S., one of the big sources is Arab nations using anti-U.S. sentiments to distract attention away from their own corruption. It gives frustrated young men an outlet that is not perceived as a threat to the internal status quo, and helps the governments avoid detaining/killing/torturing these young men en masse (as they scream for the death of Zionism, crusaders etc, rather than for the death of their own prime minister, president, etc), which would only make internal tensions worse.

The countermove is fairly obvious, but wouldn't fly well in the media; diplomatic sanctions and loss of economic support to nations that spout anti-U.S./West venom from state-run media, and distribute free radios pretuned to the regional VOA and BBC freqs. And the carrot; diplomatic and economic considerations for nations that have free media or even-handed state run media. The real key to the carrot and the stick is making them rapidly adaptable, so changes in a nations actions (good or bad) don't go unrecognized.

Of course, the mainstream media would scream that this is interfering in freedom of press, a propaganda program, yada yada.

I think you're falling into a number of traps here that fail to address some of the genuine differences that need to be addressed honestly.

1) I think you are overestimating the impact of state-run media on Arab perceptions of both Arab regimes and the West, especially given the rise of semi-independent and privately run media in the past 15 years, al-Jazeera leading the way.

2) You are seriously overestimating the potential positive impact of saturating the Arab world with Western media outlets. Again, the "if we could only get our strategic communications right, everything would be okay!" trap. You assume that our message is selling something that the Arabs want to buy.

The United States has spent billions in the past six years spreading its Arabic-language message through outlets like al-Hurra (http://www.alhurra.com/)and Radio Sawa (http://www.radiosawa.com/). Yet negative perceptions of the United States have skyrocketed in the past six years. Has it occurred to you that no matter how well packaged, the invasion and occupation of Iraq is just not going to be popular with Arabs, and thus negatively affect how they perceive the United States?

Promoting a free media in the Arab world is a worthy U.S. goal. However, a truly "free" media will also be one that is "free" of U.S. messaging control. The best example of this is, of course, al-Jazeera, which is accused by most Western governments and militaries as being militantly anti-Western, despite the fact that it is the only Arab sat channel which routinely covers American and Israeli politics and which grants airtime to Israeli government spokesmen.

Rex Brynen
10-24-2007, 04:24 PM
I think we're ignoring a key point; althought this is a problem for the U.S., one of the big sources is Arab nations using anti-U.S. sentiments to distract attention away from their own corruption. It gives frustrated young men an outlet that is not perceived as a threat to the internal status quo, and helps the governments avoid detaining/killing/torturing these young men en masse (as they scream for the death of Zionism, crusaders etc, rather than for the death of their own prime minister, president, etc), which would only make internal tensions worse.

I'm not sure which Arab countries you're thinking of. In most of them, there is almost no officially-promoted anti-Americanism... indeed, regimes tend to play down strong, open, official criticism of Washington (even when they differ sharply on policy issues) because they are well aware of the difficulties of being allied to the US at a time when their populations are overwhelmingly critical of US policies. There are exceptions--Syria, for example--but these are regimes that are at loggerheads with the US, and over which Washington has little leverage.

There is strong criticism of the US from the opposition press--both Islamist (of all varieties) and liberal-democratic. There is also considerable criticism in the free (satellite) TV channels, notably al-Jazeera--generally reflecting, rather than leading, popular attitudes.

Some of this hostility is rooted in misperception, sterotypes, etc. US public diplomacy has often been very weak.

However, a great deal is rooted in US policies too--and there's only so much you can do to sell an unpopular toothpaste by just changing the packaging...

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 04:26 PM
y U.S. goal. However, a truly "free" media will also be one that is "free" of U.S. messaging control. The best example of this is, of course, al-Jazeera, which is accused by most Western governments and militaries as being militantly anti-Western, despite the fact that it is the only Arab sat channel which routinely covers American and Israeli politics and which grants airtime to Israeli government spokesmen.

Agree completely. I think we Americans have this deeply naively belief that the only reason people would fear and dislike us is because they misunderstand us. We have this belief in the benevolence of the free press and democracy, then are aghast when al Jazeera criticizes us or Hamas wins and election.

I believe we have two and only options in the Islamic world: 1) get used to being hated (and hence invent a different counterterrorism strategy that is NOT based on winning hearts and minds); or 2) abandon Israel and support to dictators like Mubarak, the Sauds, and Musharraf.

goesh
10-24-2007, 05:59 PM
option 2 is out - the ME would light up fast and like never before and since large swatches of our population are mostly interested in upgrading their cell phones to include 40 different ring tones and sales at Wal-Mart, we will have to just live with the hatred. Civil liberties and the wide breadth and latitude of Constitutional interpretation might convulse over inventing a new approach to counterterrorism. In short, we have probably reached our apex as a civilization.

Van
10-24-2007, 06:20 PM
Re: the anti west state media in the middle east-

The one that loomed largest in my mind is Saudi. Recently returning folks from the contractor community there go on at length about the difference between what is said in english and what is said in arabic...

Re; Strategic Comm- Yes, it won't fix everything, but yes, we absolutely must improve it now. It does not garantee success, but it is neccessary for success. Getting our voice, or at least something resembling a free media is a step in the right direction, and there is no reason not to use economic and diplomatic tools in support of information operations.

SteveMetz said:
I believe we have two and only options in the Islamic world: 1) get used to being hated (and hence invent a different counterterrorism strategy that is NOT based on winning hearts and minds); or 2) abandon Israel and support to dictators like Mubarak, the Sauds, and Musharraf.

Get used to being hated? The media would love it, and sell many papers and much air time; this would be good for our economy :)

Abandon Israel; now there's a strategy that can't be sold in the U.S. I won't even start on the similarities between Israeli policies and Stalinist Russia, but it is disturbing that pointing out that Israeli interests are not automatically U.S. interests ensures that one will be labelled an anti-semetic.

Look at the distribution of wealth and the distribution of religous fundamentalists. Throughout Judeo-Christian-Islamic history poverty is often equated to piety. Kind of makes sense, poor folks can't store up material wealth, so invest themselves into their faith. This suggests that we need a Marshall plan for the Middle East in order to reduce poverty, and reduce the conditions that create the desparation that inspires terrorist leaders, and etch away at the religious fundamentalism that is the common thread of much of our challenges there. The choke point for increasing the wealth of the common people in the Arab world is the dictators and their governments. Corruption is so endemic that private economic development is almost impossible. Allowing a significant middle class to emerge is not on their agenda as this would be a threat to political power. At best, supporting dictators is only a stop gap measure for a strategic solution, the better answer is applying influence to allow a middle class to emerge. But that is a very long term solution.

And if you had told me in 1990 that I would be pitching equitable distribution of wealth as a means to strategic success, I would have laughed in your face...

The best strategic solution is to arrange for the Arab and Persian world to be irrelevant, placing it firmly in the same category as Tibet, an issue, but not one worth significant expenditure of resources. The path there: break our dependence one foreign oil. The ideal endstate is one where we can afford to not care if they love us or hate us.

Rex Brynen
10-24-2007, 06:35 PM
Regarding Steve's option, I think its potentially a little misleading to cast the alternatives as starkly as "abandon Israel."

To my mind, promoting a stable two-state solution the Palestinian-Israeli conflict along the lines suggested by the Clinton Parameters (http://www.fmep.org/documents/clinton_parameters12-23-00.html) (2000), Beirut Arab League summit resolution (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/5a7229b652beb9c5c1256b8a0054b62e) (2002), and Geneva Accord (http://www.geneva-accord.org/general.aspx?FolderID=250&lang=en) (2003) is hardly "abandoning Israel." Rather, it is rejecting the extremism of both the Israeli settler lobby and Palestinian hardliners to emphasize the center ground in the conflict. Indeed, I believe it to be in the interest of a great majority of Israelis and Palestinians, as well as the international community.

On supporting Arab dictators, I think there's a trade-off here between short and long terms. In the short term, authoritarian Arab regimes are useful CT allies. In the long term, the West's support for them is a major source of local grievances, and strengthens the appeal of radical and anti-Western groups, thereby aggravating the CT challenge.

In the medium term, its just plain messy. I'm inclined to believe--hopeless romantic that I am--that, when in doubt, its not a bad idea to do the (morally) right thing, which probably doesn't involve supporting repressive regimes.

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 06:42 PM
Regarding Steve's option, I think its potentially a little misleading to cast the alternatives as starkly as "abandon Israel."

To my mind, promoting a stable two-state solution the Palestinian-Israeli conflict along the lines suggested by the Clinton Parameters (http://www.fmep.org/documents/clinton_parameters12-23-00.html) (2000), Beirut Arab League summit resolution (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/5a7229b652beb9c5c1256b8a0054b62e) (2002), and Geneva Accord (http://www.geneva-accord.org/general.aspx?FolderID=250&lang=en) (2003) is hardly "abandoning Israel." Rather, it is rejecting the extremism of both the Israeli settler lobby and Palestinian hardliners to emphasize the center ground in the conflict. Indeed, I believe it to be in the interest of a great majority of Israelis and Palestinians, as well as the international community.

On supporting Arab dictators, I think there's a trade-off here between short and long terms. In the short term, authoritarian Arab regimes are useful CT allies. In the long term, the West's support for them is a major source of local grievances, and strengthens the appeal of radical and anti-Western groups, thereby aggravating the CT challenge.

In the medium term, its just plain messy. I'm inclined to believe--hopeless romantic that I am--that, when in doubt, its not a bad idea to do the (morally) right thing, which probably doesn't involve supporting repressive regimes.

I think there are enough militants in the Islamic world who will settle for only the full destruction of Israel to sustain the conflict. I thought all along that the Bush strategy of winning "hearts and minds" through democratization was fundamentally flawed. Unlike traditional Maoists, modern terrorist networks don't really need a willing "sea" to swim in. All they need are a few sugar daddies and a few hundred psychopaths. A two state solution in Palestine isn't going to totally cut off the supply of either sugar daddies or psychopaths.

Rex Brynen
10-24-2007, 07:06 PM
I think there are enough militants in the Islamic world who will settle for only the full destruction of Israel to sustain the conflict. I thought all along that the Bush strategy of winning "hearts and minds" through democratization was fundamentally flawed. Unlike traditional Maoists, modern terrorist networks don't really need a willing "sea" to swim in. All they need are a few sugar daddies and a few hundred psychopaths. A two state solution in Palestine isn't going to totally cut off the supply of either sugar daddies or psychopaths.

It depends, of course, which militant Islamists we're talking about. Some (Hizbullah, Hamas) are indeed mass movements. Others (AQ, PIJ) are small networks of cadres.

I agree that many of the latter won't change their orientation if ME peace breaks out and Arab authoritarianism begins to succumb to third-wave democratization. However, I do think there would be significantly fewer of them, and the challenge would be much more manageable.

(For the record, I don't think either regional change--peace or democracy--is likely soon, nor did I ever think that the Bush administration had a coherent or feasible democratization strategy of any sort whatsoever.)

SteveMetz
10-24-2007, 07:28 PM
It depends, of course, which militant Islamists we're talking about. Some (Hizbullah, Hamas) are indeed mass movements. Others (AQ, PIJ) are small networks of cadres.

I agree that many of the latter won't change their orientation if ME peace breaks out and Arab authoritarianism begins to succumb to third-wave democratization. However, I do think there would be significantly fewer of them, and the challenge would be much more manageable.

(For the record, I don't think either regional change--peace or democracy--is likely soon, nor did I ever think that the Bush administration had a coherent or feasible democratization strategy of any sort whatsoever.)

I think it's pretty significant that the former category has only attacked us on their home turf, while the latter have struck us here.

On the democratization idea, the way I'm playing that in my book is that it was based on a complete misunderstanding of the Reagan administration. I y believe Bush badly wanted to be another Reagan. He saw the wave of democratization that took place in the former Soviet bloc in the 1980s and 1990s and concluded, "Gee, this is easy." In other words, he totally misunderstood the cultural and historical differences between Eastern Europe and the Arab world. I can write that off to his inexperience. But I will never for the life of me understand why brilliant people like Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Kristol, Muravchik, etc. couldn't see this.

Rex Brynen
10-24-2007, 07:46 PM
On the democratization idea, the way I'm playing that in my book is that it was based on a complete misunderstanding of the Reagan administration. I y believe Bush badly wanted to be another Reagan. He saw the wave of democratization that took place in the former Soviet bloc in the 1980s and 1990s and concluded, "Gee, this is easy." In other words, he totally misunderstood the cultural and historical differences between Eastern Europe and the Arab world. I can write that off to his inexperience. But I will never for the life of me understand why brilliant people like Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Kristol, Muravchik, etc. couldn't see this.

For most of them, I think, it hardly went beyond the notion of a "grand idea," the primary vehicle for which would be regime change in Baghdad and the ensuing domino effect. In this sense, yes, it was modeled on the sudden, rapid changes in Eastern Europe, and not on the much more contingent and difficult changes elsewhere.

The operational challenges of the agenda--how one balances off CT cooperation and pressuring authoritarian regimes, how one configures aid programs/MEPI, etc. were never thought through at all, but rather replaced with a lot of wishful thinking.

It was also relatively late in the game that some actors began to engage the broader research and analytical community with expertise in these areas (DoS did some, the NIC and others had a brief flurry of doing it, and USAID had a longer history of doing it, but was already locked in a private sector growth/civil society empowerment/gender equity model that was of limited effectiveness).

The turning point, I think was Egypt in 2005. US pressure undoubtedly played a key role in both competitive presidential elections, and the parliamentary elections. However, when the regime responded to the Muslim Brotherhood's success in the latter, Washington shifted back to pre-9/11 strategy and essentially acquiesced in authoritarian measures.

J Wolfsberger
10-24-2007, 08:49 PM
On the democratization idea, the way I'm playing that in my book is that it was based on a complete misunderstanding of the Reagan administration. I y believe Bush badly wanted to be another Reagan. He saw the wave of democratization that took place in the former Soviet bloc in the 1980s and 1990s and concluded, "Gee, this is easy." In other words, he totally misunderstood the cultural and historical differences between Eastern Europe and the Arab world. I can write that off to his inexperience. But I will never for the life of me understand why brilliant people like Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Kristol, Muravchik, etc. couldn't see this.


The operational challenges of the agenda--how one balances off CT cooperation and pressuring authoritarian regimes, how one configures aid programs/MEPI, etc. were never thought through at all, but rather replaced with a lot of wishful thinking.


I think both enter into it. Misunderstanding cultural and historical differences goes back to the '60s, when Walt Rostow came up with the notion of transitional societies - basically nations evolving into modern nation-states with Western style parliamentary democracies. If I recall the theory correctly, all a western country (e.g. the U.S.) had to do was provide sufficient force to prop up the government and the society would "naturally" transform into a mini-US.

In systems engineering, that "natural" term is defined as "then a miracle occurs."

The big problem is that it blinds people to those elements of a culture that would allow a representative government to emerge based on organic cultures and traditions. In addition, Iraq was never a nation. It was a state the British Empire carved out of three different nations: Kurds, tribal Arab, and settled Arab. All of this resulted in the wishfull thinking Rex points out. (Think of the difference it made in Anbar when we started working with the tribal elders, trusting them to work out their own differences.)

Schmedlap
10-25-2007, 06:56 AM
This is a theme I've been building in my book: the United States tends to be successful operating intra-culture (e.g. Atlanticism). We encounter problems when we operate cross-culturally (Vietnam, Iraq). And the rub is that the current global security system puts us in a position of frequently operating cross culturally. And I don't think increased "cultural sensitivity" is going to fix that.

That's why I take issue with the well meaning Americans who argue that if we just had a better organization for "strategic communications," the problem would be solved. While our organization is sub-optimal, I don't think it's the root of the problem.
Do you think that we were capable of operating cross-culturally in the first half of the 20th century, such as the Phillipines (1899-1902) and Japan (1945)? If so, would it be reasonable to assert that we changed as a nation sometime in between the late 40's and early 60's (with Korea being a toss-up in the 1950s), leading to the poor performance that you mentioned in Vietnam (1960s) and Iraq (1991 - present)?

Schmedlap
10-25-2007, 07:40 AM
Several people in this thread who are likely older, wiser, and have done more research than I, made several comments and/or assumptions that strike me as being way off the mark...

- Arabs will never like us, therefore a strategy of winning hearts and minds is misguided
- Arabs believe the typical or modal American is one who is anti-Muslim and/or anti-Arab
- There is a growing number of Americans who confuse Muslim and terrorist or just simply dislike Muslims

In regard to the first one, I presume we all agree that "hearts and minds" does not equate to "they love us."

In regard to Arab perceptions of us, I suppose that this is not much of a rebuttal since it is purely anecdotal, but I've expended nearly 3 years of my life in Iraq. Recognizing that most Arabs are masters at telling you what you want to hear and there is much lost in translation, I nonetheless find it difficult to believe that even a significant minority of them (aside from armed jihadists and JAM SG) strongly dislike us or hold a view of the typical American as one who is anti-Muslim or anti-Arab. My impression is that they simply view us as bumbling fools who are too quick to drop bombs, though this impression improves when they interact with us directly.

Again, not much of a rebuttal, but I simply do not see the growing sentiment of Americans who are becoming more ignorant and more distrustful of Muslims in general. I am as cynical about the intellect and education of the average schmoe as anyone else, but I think that Americans are becoming more aware that most Arabs - most notably the Iraqi people - are more concerned with living their lives in their way, in their land, than in coming here to attack us. The greatest catalyst to this education is our current effort in Iraq. I think that people are increasingly beginning to realize that we are risking our lives in Iraq, working side-by-side with Iraq Security Forces, reconciling with former insurgents, and helping the Iraqi people because they are worth working with and worth helping - that they are not a bunch of crazed jihadists. Most Americans respect Soldiers and are slowly beginning to realize that if we think the Iraqis are worth helping, then maybe the Iraqis - and other Arabs - are not the inherently anti-American suicidal nutjobs that many perhaps once assumed.

skiguy
10-25-2007, 09:34 AM
I'm not saying there's a growing sentiment of racism, I'm only saying it's there and been there and I don't see much change since 9-11. I get perplexed at those who say they support OIF, yet in the next sentence, say Islam is evil. My "rebuttal" to them is "You are aware a majority of the Iraqis are Muslims, right?" I don't only see this attitude with the Christians, I see it with anyone who mostly listens to (and believes) Glen Beck or right-wing radio/TV. And let's not forget, Beck and FOX said an Islamic terorist started the fires in California. WTF?!? :rolleyes:

The average American (myself included) does not know or understand the different sects of Islam and that, IMO, is the biggest problem.
Maybe I'm just being naive or have false hope in the fact that people actually learn from history, but the argument that Muslims have been fighting each other since they began and won't/can't change doesn't fly with me. Never been there, but from what I hear and read from good sources, that's just not true.

tequila
10-25-2007, 09:35 AM
Do you think that we were capable of operating cross-culturally in the first half of the 20th century, such as the Phillipines (1899-1902) and Japan (1945)? If so, would it be reasonable to assert that we changed as a nation sometime in between the late 40's and early 60's (with Korea being a toss-up in the 1950s), leading to the poor performance that you mentioned in Vietnam (1960s) and Iraq (1991 - present)?

The ability to work cross-culturally is not the sole determinant of success in insurgencies. The Filipino insurgents were divided, lacked modern weaponry, and had no means of foreign support or refuge --- factors that were critical to the success of the Vietnamese. The occupation also benefited from officers like MacArthur and Otis who operated very much in the model of the Progressive movement back home with the "policy of attraction", which proved key in coopting Filipino support --- though this was not necessarily "cross-cultural" in nature. In Japan we benefited from a preexisting and largely intact bureaucratic structure combined with a massive occupation army and uncontested legitimacy due to the Emperor's unconditional surrender. South Korea under Hodge was a near-run disaster, however, that had much in common with postwar Iraq 2003-2004. Thankfully the Korean Communists overplayed their hand in 1946 and 1948, and geography prevented sufficient infiltration of arms and reinforcements to create a truly dangerous insurgency.


I don't only see this attitude with the Christians, I see it with anyone who mostly listens to (and believes) Glen Beck or right-wing radio/TV. And let's not forget, Beck and FOX said an Islamic terorist started the fires in California. WTF?!?

Remember, however, that Beck is one of the lowest rated (http://www.mediabistro.com/tvnewser/original/q207ranker.pdf)TV show hosts out there, and even FOX News (1-2m viewers), while highly rated for a cable network, still commands a small audience compared to the major network news (upwards of 25m viewers).

SteveMetz
10-25-2007, 11:27 AM
Do you think that we were capable of operating cross-culturally in the first half of the 20th century, such as the Phillipines (1899-1902) and Japan (1945)? If so, would it be reasonable to assert that we changed as a nation sometime in between the late 40's and early 60's (with Korea being a toss-up in the 1950s), leading to the poor performance that you mentioned in Vietnam (1960s) and Iraq (1991 - present)?

Interesting point but I'm not sure either of those cases disprove what I'm trying to suggest. When using the "mailed fist" or "defeat and occupy" approaches, cultural acuity is less significant. We have adopted a model of counterinsurgency--essentially the British one--which is predicated on cultural acuity. But we do not have it. That, I think, is a large part of our problem.

SteveMetz
10-25-2007, 11:33 AM
Several people in this thread who are likely older, wiser, and have done more research than I, made several comments and/or assumptions that strike me as being way off the mark...

- Arabs will never like us, therefore a strategy of winning hearts and minds is misguided
- Arabs believe the typical or modal American is one who is anti-Muslim and/or anti-Arab
- There is a growing number of Americans who confuse Muslim and terrorist or just simply dislike Muslims

In regard to the first one, I presume we all agree that "hearts and minds" does not equate to "they love us."

In regard to Arab perceptions of us, I suppose that this is not much of a rebuttal since it is purely anecdotal, but I've expended nearly 3 years of my life in Iraq. Recognizing that most Arabs are masters at telling you what you want to hear and there is much lost in translation, I nonetheless find it difficult to believe that even a significant minority of them (aside from armed jihadists and JAM SG) strongly dislike us or hold a view of the typical American as one who is anti-Muslim or anti-Arab. My impression is that they simply view us as bumbling fools who are too quick to drop bombs, though this impression improves when they interact with us directly.

Again, not much of a rebuttal, but I simply do not see the growing sentiment of Americans who are becoming more ignorant and more distrustful of Muslims in general. I am as cynical about the intellect and education of the average schmoe as anyone else, but I think that Americans are becoming more aware that most Arabs - most notably the Iraqi people - are more concerned with living their lives in their way, in their land, than in coming here to attack us. The greatest catalyst to this education is our current effort in Iraq. I think that people are increasingly beginning to realize that we are risking our lives in Iraq, working side-by-side with Iraq Security Forces, reconciling with former insurgents, and helping the Iraqi people because they are worth working with and worth helping - that they are not a bunch of crazed jihadists. Most Americans respect Soldiers and are slowly beginning to realize that if we think the Iraqis are worth helping, then maybe the Iraqis - and other Arabs - are not the inherently anti-American suicidal nutjobs that many perhaps once assumed.

Great observations but one thing bothers me. Your descriptions is almost word for word the same as things I've heard from my buddies who were in Vietnam. While on a one to one basis, most Vietnamese just wanted to get on with their lives and were pretty decent folks, in the aggregate they had a culture and a system which generated and--more importalty--tolerated organized violence. Seems that the important point is not whether the average Iraqi is an OK fellow when you're sitting sipping tea, but how he responds to violence against Americans or against other Iraqis.

I'm not sure if this means anything or not. Perhaps it's just a brain fart.

tequila
10-25-2007, 12:01 PM
Great observations but one thing bothers me. Your descriptions is almost word for word the same as things I've heard from my buddies who were in Vietnam. While on a one to one basis, most Vietnamese just wanted to get on with their lives and were pretty decent folks, in the aggregate they had a culture and a system which generated and--more importalty--tolerated organized violence. Seems that the important point is not whether the average Iraqi is an OK fellow when you're sitting sipping tea, but how he responds to violence against Americans or against other Iraqis.

I'm not sure if this means anything or not. Perhaps it's just a brain fart.

All cultures and systems that I am aware of tolerate and generate organized violence, our own not least among them. Perhaps you mean tolerate and organize violence in opposition to American political goals?

Ken White
10-25-2007, 02:12 PM
Great observations but one thing bothers me. Your descriptions is almost word for word the same as things I've heard from my buddies who were in Vietnam. While on a one to one basis, most Vietnamese just wanted to get on with their lives and were pretty decent folks, in the aggregate they had a culture and a system which generated and--more importalty--tolerated organized violence. Seems that the important point is not whether the average Iraqi is an OK fellow when you're sitting sipping tea, but how he responds to violence against Americans or against other Iraqis.

I'm not sure if this means anything or not. Perhaps it's just a brain fart.(emphasis added / kw)

I'm not sure the sentence I emphasized makes a great deal of difference. In Korea, Viet Nam, the Mid East and elsewhere it's been my observation that, as a nation (opposed to as individuals) we are politely tolerated and little more. We annoy people in other nations on many levels. If there's a war going on, we tend to annoy them even more (for several reasons...).

Point being, the average person is not stirred to action due to that, only those who object violently become problematic and they are a fairly small percentage. We are never going to win many hearts -- and most minds, fortunately, eschew violence. The key is thus not the average local national but the unhappily disposed, a fairly small percentage. Almost by default you can woo in one way or another about half of those; the other half aren't going to play nice under most any circumstances. All you need to do with the average local is avoid hacking him or her off to the maximum extent possible.

We don't do that too well, mostly due to this


"We have adopted a model of counterinsurgency -- essentially the British one -- which is predicated on cultural acuity. But we do not have it. That, I think, is a large part of our problem.

For whatever reason, a lot of Brits do this fairly well; few Americans do.

Steve Blair
10-25-2007, 02:19 PM
Actually, I don't know if it's a matter of the Brits "doing cultural acuity well" (in fact, I'd say given some of their recent problems with imigrant assimilation I'd say they may have some issues here). To me it's more a matter of them being able to pick out their local surrogates with a high degree of precision and effectiveness. That and it was typically an issue of "using" the local nation for economic purposes...they didn't tend to come in with the same level of missionary/moral baggage that we cart around. Behind the "white man's burden" rehtoric the British always seemed to have an acute sense of the bottom line and got out when the cost started to exceed the benefit. Most other colonial powers didn't follow this example, and we went into it with an excess of spirits left over from the abolition movement (IMO). Once the crusading New England types freed the black man, they moved on to the red man and then the yellow/green/purple/whatever man. So there was always an unspoken (or spoken) sense of moral purpose often disconnected with either the national interest or any sort of bottom line.

But, as always, YMMV with this. And I'm speaking in generalities, of course. We've had our successes, just as the British have had their failures.

tequila
10-25-2007, 02:35 PM
My own feeling is that "cultural acuity", while certainly useful, is definitely not a cure-all or even a genuine prerequisite. While absolutely critical for achieving a clear-eyed analytical picture, it does not help at all if shackled to a politically unrealistic target.

Rory Stewart's analysis of Gertrude Bell (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20691)seems to be relevant here. It's hard to imagine any Westerner with more genuine field experience and "cultural acuity" than Dame Bell and her contemporaries. Yet they still failed utterly to construct a British-allied, stable Iraq.


...

Some suggest today that the US failure in Iraq is due simply to lack of planning; to specific policy errors— debaathification, looting, the abolition of the army, and lack of troops; and to the absence of a trained cadre of Arabists and professional nation-builders. They should consider Bell and her colleagues, such as Colonel Leachman or Bertram Thomas, a political officer on the Euphrates. All three were fluent and highly experienced Arabists, won medals from the Royal Geographical Society for their Arabian journeys, and were greatly admired for their political work. Thomas was driven from his office in Shatra by a tribal mob. Colonel Leachman, who was famed for being able to kill a tribesman dead in his own tent without a hand lifted against him, was shot in the back in Fallujah. Bell's defeat was slower but more comprehensive. Of the kingdom she created, with its Sunni monarch and Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish subjects, there is today no king, no Sunni government, and something close to civil war. Perhaps soon there will be no country.

Bell is thus both the model of a policymaker and an example of the inescapable frailty and ineptitude on the part of Western powers in the face of all that is chaotic and uncertain in the fashion for "nation-building." Despite the prejudices of her culture and the contortions of her bureaucratic environment, she was highly intelligent, articulate, and courageous. Her colleagues were talented, creative, well informed, and determined to succeed. They had an imperial confidence. They were not unduly constrained by the press or by their own bureaucracies. They were dealing with a simpler Iraq: a smaller, more rural population at a time when Arab national-ism and political Islam were yet to develop their modern strength and appeal.

But their task was still impossible. Iraqis refused to permit foreign political officers to play at founding their new nation. T.E. Lawrence was right to demand the withdrawal of every British soldier and no stronger link between Britain and Iraq than existed between Britain and Canada. For the same reason, more language training and contact with the tribes, more troops and better counterinsurgency tactics—in short a more considered imperial approach—are equally unlikely to allow the US today to build a state in Iraq, in southern Afghanistan, or Iran. If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 02:35 PM
[QUOTE=Ken White;29411For whatever reason, a lot of Brits do this fairly well; few Americans do.[/QUOTE]

Different culture, socially and militarily (people-, not things-oriented).

That said, there is also the issue of pride (not to mention other similar matters), and I suspect that this often tends to be rather worse with certain cultures. I would tentatively submit that while we may have our share of arrogance and ignorance (Western cultures inclusive), Pride, per se, is perhaps rather less of a problem in many ways (at least relating to the conduct of war, diplomacy, etc.) than in other cultures.

I remember in "The General's War" by Gordon and Trainor, that when the Coalition Forces were preparing to breach the Iraqi defensive lines in 1991, a senior Arab general refused the offer of mine-breaching equipment (his Army had none), and preferred his men to make the breach the old-fashioned way. As the American general who made the offer was told, the reason for this was "Pride". And Pride, as well as related emotions and the like, plays no small role in how people feel, and act, particularly in cultures like many of those in the Near East.

tequila
10-25-2007, 02:57 PM
That example reminds me more than anything else of Omar Bradley's rejection of Pete Corlett's advice on the value of naval gunnery in the amphibious assault during Operation Overlord, all because Corlett had learned his trade against the Japanese. Bradley had no intention of listening to someone from a "bush league theater." The troops at Omaha got 20 minutes of prep fire from one battleship and suffered three times as many casualties as at Tarawa, which was fought six months earlier. If not for the sheer guts and determination of the American infantryman, the battle might have been lost.

"Pride" is not an exclusively Arab term.

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 02:57 PM
My own feeling is that "cultural acuity", while certainly useful, is definitely not a cure-all or even a genuine prerequisite. While absolutely critical for achieving a clear-eyed analytical picture, it does not help at all if shackled to a politically unrealistic target.

Rory Stewart's analysis of Gertrude Bell (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20691)seems to be relevant here. It's hard to imagine any Westerner with more genuine field experience and "cultural acuity" than Dame Bell and her contemporaries. Yet they still failed utterly to construct a British-allied, stable Iraq.

I would also submit that the indigenous rulers of what is now Iraq have typically had mixed success at best, and at their worst, did far worse than either the British or the US. Sargon the Great may have been the first historically-recognized conqueror of the Fertile Crescent (now to a great extent the "Shia Crescent"), but he spent a good deal of his time re-conquering those whom he had already conquered. This pattern has remained largely the same for whoever has followed over the last 5,000 years (with few exceptions) as rulers over what is now Iraq.

As is, if the locals, who have far greater understanding of the prevailing conditions than we, cannot sort this out themsleves, then we shouldn't be beating ourselves up too much over our inadequacies in the same areas. This does not relieve Western Armies (and Western policy-makers, et al) of their responsibility to understand and adapt as best they can to said circumstances, but it puts our situation in a clearer perspective.

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 03:03 PM
"Pride" is not an exclusively Arab term.

No, it's not, but "Pride" does not usually assume at the tactical and operational level in present-day Western Armies the same place that it still does in many Near-Eastern Armies (or insurgent groups). Our troops are rather less inclined to jump out in the middle of a street, spray wildly and ineffectually for the benefit of the locals watching from the sidewalk, and then beat a hasty retreat before the other side responds in kind.

The example at the operational level that I cited from "The General's War" stands.

tequila
10-25-2007, 03:12 PM
I believe that leads into the last part of Stewart's article:


If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

The beating up should perhaps commence at the very idea of attempting to impose an externally directed model.


No, it's not, but "Pride" does not usually assume at the tactical and operational level in present-day Western Armies the same place that it still does in many Near-Eastern Armies (or insurgent groups). Our troops are rather less inclined to jump out in the middle of a street, spray wildly and ineffectually for the benefit of the locals watching from the sidewalk, and then beat a hasty retreat before the other side responds in kind.


Actually, their side has been more likely to plant roadside bombs and trigger from safety than indulge in the sort of behavior you are referring to.


The example at the operational level that I cited from "The General's War" stands.

As does my rather more costly example from Operation Overlord.

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 03:23 PM
Actually, their side has been more likely to plant roadside bombs and trigger from safety than indulge in the sort of behavior you are referring to.

As does my rather more costly example from Operation Overlord.

As to the first:

Does not change the fact that the Iraqi insurgents still engage in such "tactical" behaviour openly, and with some regularlity, whilst the Western troops there are typically loathe to do so themselves.

As to the second:

The point with the last example is that the senior US commander actually judged that it was tactically and operationally inapplicable, however erroneously that judgement was made; in the case of the Arab general, he knew that the mineclearing equipment was tactically necessary and chose to reject it anyway because it would have demonstrated Arab reliance upon Western military expertise; the two examples are not comparable.

tequila
10-25-2007, 03:57 PM
Does not change the fact that the Iraqi insurgents still engage in such "tactical" behaviour openly, and with some regularlity, whilst the Western troops there are typically loathe to do so themselves.


How much of this is due to a cultural reliance on "pride" vs lack of training + watching too many Hollywood films which portray this as effective? For example, does the Egyptian Army do this? The Iranians? How about Hizbullah in 2006 or Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el-Bahred?


The point with the last example is that the senior US commander actually judged that it was tactically and operationally inapplicable, however erroneously that judgement was made; in the case of the Arab general, he knew that the mineclearing equipment was tactically necessary and chose to reject it anyway because it would have demonstrated Arab reliance upon Western military expertise; the two examples are not comparable.

Bradley disregarded Corlett's advice because he believed he had nothing to learn from someone who had only fought the Japanese, despite the fact that Corlett had commanded two major amphibious assaults in the face of opposition and Bradley none. This in addition to Corlett being specifically detached to provide advice on amphibious landings by GEN George Marshall. You don't think an irrational pride had anything to do with that?

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 05:21 PM
How much of this is due to a cultural reliance on "pride" vs lack of training + watching too many Hollywood films which portray this as effective? For example, does the Egyptian Army do this? The Iranians? How about Hizbullah in 2006 or Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el-think an irrational pride had anything to do with that?

Remember the Zarqawi video with the Minimi? It's not just restricted to the insurgency. The Iraqi Army has a bit of a problem in that regard as well - and I'll leave aside the Saudis at Khafji in 1991:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200512/iraq-army/4

For Arab Pride try "Arab pride, US prejudice" by Abdel-Moneim Said:

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/640/op111.htm

Corlett was indeed ignored, as were British offers of specialist armoured assault engineers (from Hobart's 79th Div) that made the British/Canadian landing that much easier, but this was in the belief that such were not tactically necessary given the different conditions of North-West Europe as opposed to those in the Pacific, not merely out of pride. In this case, there was no clear recognition that the tactical situation deed indeed require such proffered assistance. Ther senior US general beleived that he already had the means at hand to make the breech successfully, not that he saw that he did not have such means and wilfully went ahead anyway.

On the other hand, with Saudis preparing to make a breach during Desert Storm, this was a case of a clear recognition by the Arab general that mine-clearing equipment was tactically necessary, and he refused to countenance said equipment and training anyway, openly admitting that it was out of quote, "Pride", unquote. The two cases are not directly comparable.

tequila
10-25-2007, 06:09 PM
Remember the Zarqawi video with the Minimi?

Zarqawi was a convict and former street thug whose formal weapons handling training approximated zero. The better comparison would be between Zarqawi and your average mid-level Crip leader rather than Zarqawi and an American soldier.

Compare vs. Arab forces which are actually motivated and trained as Western forces are --- i.e. Hizbullah and Amal, both trained by Iranians. Even their village militias showed excellent fire discipline in 2006.

If you want to believe that Omar Bradley made a perfectly reasonable decision based totally on his own military judgment in 1944, I suppose I won't be convincing you otherwise. Corlett himself thought that Bradley was snubbing him out of prideful disdain rather than reasonable disagreement, however. According to Corlett:

"I was pretty well squelched for my question [regarding why Army troops would attack using LCVPs and LCAs instead of LVTs]. I soon got the feeling that American generals in England considered anything that had happened in the Pacific strictly 'Bush League stuff' which didn't merit any consideration. I felt like an expert according to the Naval definition, 'A son-of-a-bitch from out of town.'"