Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all)

[tequila]

Excellent and informative article (http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/barfield2.pdf)on Pashtun customary law by Tom Barfield. Found via Afghanistanica (http://afghanistanica.com/2007/06/27/pashtuns-must-have-their-revenge-sometimes/).


...

Pashtuns, even wealthy ones, who moved to large cities were even farther removed from the values of the Pashtunwali because there they were enmeshed in state systems of government that restricted autonomy and cash economies that valued money more than honor. It is for this reason that examples of customary law as a living tradition are found mainly in the marginal areas of rural Afghanistan even though the ethos of the Pashtunwali is common to all rural Pashtuns ...

The blog has some nice commentary as well:



I would venture a guess that if it was possible to do a quantitative analysis of revenge in Afghanistan, a researcher would find that few Pashtuns actually attempt revenge and even fewer attain it. But damn it, that whole Pashtunwali thing makes for an interesting article. And never mind that it is a wee bit Orientalist and sensationalist; Whatsisname at that there newspaper wants to tell you that Pashtuns are an unthinking bunch of maniacs bent on revenge, guided only by their basest emotions and incapable of logic, reason, forgiveness or pragmatism. I’m not going to cite any articles because there are so many to choose from, and not just from second-rate rags like , but in quality sources such as [I]The Economist and The Christian Science Monitor.

What those journalists are leaving out are the concepts of Nanawatay, Rogha, Nagha and Jirga. All these concepts are, in some form or another, tools for reconciliation, forgiveness, compensation, punishment or justice. And guess what? They are included in Pashtunwali along with Badal.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 17 Oct 07: The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/101607_pashtunistan.pdf)

- The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007. Statistics show that although the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006,they show the same seasonal pattern.

- The nature of the incidents has however changed considerably since last year, with high numbers of armed clashes in the field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide.

- The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilianpopulation, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community.

- The more significant change in 2007 is the shift from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-style attacks. The former do still take place and as air support is often used, casualty figures are still high. On average however these clashes are fewer and smaller than in 2006.

- Possible reasons include the high numbers of Taliban fighters killed during summer 2007 including many mid-level and senior commanders. Another reason must be the realization that these types of attacks are futile against a modern conventionally equipped military force supported by a wide range of air assets. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also been improving throughout 2007
Complete 28 slide brief in pdf at the link.

[Shivan]

Thank you for posting. The data are useful.

I'm not sure what the CSIS purports to show besides providing quantifiable data on what we already know. If Cordesman is suggesting that Pashtunistan is a prime goal of the Taliban, he's wrong.

Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan will cede territory to form a Pashtun homeland. This is an old Pashtun dream, and revived in some quarters. To quote an Afghan specialist (whom I will not name here), the Afghan leaders, “like poker players at a card game, are more interested in dividing the pot than they are in dividing the table at which they sit." Hypothetically, if there was to be a Pashtunistan, it would not receive the funding Afghanistan receives, and would be beset by neighbors on many sides. Afghanistan is not the Balkans: the Balkans were various ethnicities hastily cobbled together; however, Afghans consider their multi-ethnic state the norm. While Pashtunistan is a sore point, Pashtun thought and aspirations are not homogenous, i.e., while there may be some support for Pashtunistan, it is not universal.

There are multiple causes for the mosaic insurgencies in Afghanistan, and voluntary support for the Taliban varies from clan to clan, sub-clan to sub-clan, village to village, and is more complex than can be described herein. Which gets us into the "cultural intelligence" aspect, i.e., why do many Pashtuns support the Taliban? Why is their gravitational attraction increasing, while the attraction of the democracy project continues to decline?

While Afghanistan may not be sectarian like Iraq, Cordesman fails to acknowledge the importance of its ethnic diversity, with about 55 identifiable ethnicities. It is also more linguistically diverse, with several dialects and languages falling into the broad category of Indo-European (e.g. Persian) and Turkic (e.g., Turko-Mongolian). I disagree with his claim that Afghanistan is religiously more "homogenous" (p.5): Sunni religious orthopraxy varies sharply, and there is no established orthodoxy in the land, and never has, despite the best efforts of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman (1880-1901). Finally, the Shi'ites come in several stripes: from Twelver Shi'a (as in Iran) to Sevener Shi'a (Ismā‘īlī) to Nizāri Ismā‘īlī (commonly, the "Assassins").

There is thus bound to be some friction, and why Afghanistan should devolve power to regions, be it by de jure or de facto means. A strong central state is not one which most Afghans favor, being accustomed to greater regional, local/tribal autonomy.

[Jedburgh]

Canadian Army Journal, Fall 07: The Way of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_3/CAJ_vol10.3_09_e.pdf)

.....Knowledge of the cultural norms and practices of Afghans is rudimentary at best. Few in Canada (http://www.molsoncanadian.ca/), and quite likely Europe and North America, have any real understanding of Afghanistan and its people. Tribal codes and practices seem as distant in time as the American frontier or the “wild west,” and more appropriate to an era dominated by imperial practices and the building of empires, certainly not the 21st Century. Many cannot conceive of a people who do not subscribe to the concept of rights and obligations we in Canada (http://mapleleafs.nhl.com/) take for granted, and whose lives differ so dramatically from the scope of the privileges that we are afforded in the West. Certainly, few can understand why the Pashtuns of Afghanistan believe what they do, or why it is important to them.

The purpose of this piece is to describe the code commonly referred to as Pashtunwali, paying specific attention to its tenets and guiding principles, as well as its applicability and usage. Additionally, I will examine its relationship with the Islamic concept of shari’a, as well as the role played by women in its day-to-day use. Lastly, I will close with some observations on the code and possible implications it could have for the conduct of ongoing NATO operations within Afghanistan. The topic warrants study and discussion, largely because of the significant interactions which are happening between westerners currently in Afghanistan as part of the “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) and “Operation ENDURING FREEDOM” (OEF), but also because if there is any real hope of ever rebuilding Afghanistan and making it a viable nation on the world stage, it is imperative that an understanding of its cultural norms and practices exists beyond that articulated in the popular press.....

[zenpundit]

Though it reads like a book report at times, it was one of the most informative reports on the details of Pustunwali that I've seen. Women appear to be able to influence male behavior under the Pushtunwali by subtlely positioning themselves in such a way that refusal of their request would be regarded as shameful for a man of authority and cause a loss of standing or honor.

I wonder how the Pustunwali compares with the Adat of the Chechens - anyone out there know?

[davidbfpo]

In December 2006 The Economist published an article on the Pashtun code of honour, it is a good account, but is not available freely on their website. It is on this link: http://www.scribd.com/doc/1302/The-Economist-Article-on-the-Pushtunwali-tribeAlas link no longer works (Jan 2010).

This link appears to suddenly end and hard copy of original article is at work, so will check out later today.

Or try this article, from July 2007, written by an Afghan now resident in Australia: http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/content/view/1952/81/

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

REI, 2 Apr 08: ‘Pashtunistan’: The Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan (http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/resources/file/eb7c5200fdda309/ARI37-2008_Harrison_Pashtunistan_Afghanistan_Pakistan.pd f?MOD=AJPERES&attachment=true)

Summary: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous, reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’.

This ARI examines the Pashtun claim for an independent territory, the historical and political roots of the Pashtun identity, the implications for the NATO- or Pakistani-led military operations in the area, the increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination and the reasons why the Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life.

[Entropy]

Excellent articles all. As for blogs, don't forget the Baluchis (http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.com/)!

[TROUFION]

In a review of both historical actions, the dubious validity of the Durand line and the recent battles in and around the Pashtun stronholds in both Afghanistan and Pakistan it appears the insurgent goals have changed slightly. This is more of a question to those who are interested in this region, are we seeing a merging of the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban in the pursuit of a new status quo: the formation of an independent Pushtunistan? A Pushtun ethnically centric tribal region carved from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This would then be a launch pad region for future conquest. THoughts?

[Ron Humphrey]

In a review of both historical actions, the dubious validity of the Durand line and the recent battles in and around the Pashtun stronholds in both Afghanistan and Pakistan it appears the insurgent goals have changed slightly. This is more of a question to those who are interested in this region, are we seeing a merging of the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban in the pursuit of a new status quo: the formation of an independent Pushtunistan? A Pushtun ethnically centric tribal region carved from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This would then be a launch pad region for future conquest. THoughts?

Wouldn't something like that almost place them at a larger disadvantage considering that not only would it help to further define the "safe Haven" but make them even more likely to be under attack by both Afghan/NATO forces but Pakistani forces on a much larger scale.

Bad guys do tend to band together when they need to but still not quite sure they could pull off what your suggesting even if they'd like to

[Hacksaw]

You would really have to divide this up among several players and sub-divide that by long and short term objectives...

Tribal folks - might long term enjoy having a Pashtun-stan, but only as a tribal federation

Taliban folks - might settle for a Pashtun-stan, but only as lesser outcome. Why settle for a sliver of area when you used to rule a country. Besides their style is a little too directive for tastes of mountain tribals. So Taliban and Tribal folks outlooks not really the same.

AQ folks - They don't need a constituted state, ungoverned areas are far more conducive to what they need now. A Pashtun-stan would have no big-daddy if they hosted terrorist training camps.

In light of all that, I don't see this great confluence of interests - long term.

Of course I'm dated in my understanding of the tribes and their affiliation/interests. As we could see in Iraq, those can change quickly.

[bourbon]

Insurgent goals or our goals (http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=8500&IBLOCK_ID=35)?

The foreign reaction to Ralph Peters' "Blood Borders" was very interesting. Some believe that it's concepts are driving our strategy. More discomforting is they trace the contemporary strain of this to the ideas of a center-right Israeli strategist named Oded Yinon. I've heard many Pakistani's think that we want to break up their country, and cite alleged support given to Baloch groups. A Pushtunistan would erode Pakistan's reason for being.

[Hacksaw]

Bourbon,
If it is me, then I wasn't nearly clear enough... I suppose either way I don't see any single group wanting a seperate nation of Pashtun-stan. My impression is that the huddled masses of Pashtun's on either side of the border are pretty ambivalent. In the FATA, they are already considered an autonomous zone, on the AFG side they are not nearly as postured to do what the Kurds did in the Northern Zone. Insurgents don't benefit from a Pahstun-stan - because the ambiguity of the current situation far better suits their needs. Neither the Pak nor Afg gov'ts want to jetison the areas.

So.... All around I don't see any group that when pressed would support the idea of Pashtun-stan.

Live well and row

[Ken White]

you said... :wry:

[TROUFION]

BUT, as I am ever in a debate mode here are some historical precedents and some of my own thoughts having been looking hard at the region lately.

Here is a JSTOR article from 1973. Dated yes, but the folks in this region don't follow timelines the way westerners do.
http://www.jstor.org/pss/2569059

The seed for the Pushtoonistan concept was planted in the 1947 at the time of the Partition of Pakistan and India. The Brits offered the NWFP residents the choice of Pakistan or India, and not of joining Afghanistan. It is deeper than that as it actually goes back several dynasties of Afghans claiming Peshawar, but for sake of this argument the 1947 date will suffice. There was a movement in the tribal agencies for a plebiscite for self determination as had been held in Kashmir. Pakistan held on and defeated this movement despite a 1949 Loya Jirga in Afghanistan in support of Pushtooinstan.

In any event there exists a deep rooted concept of pushtun ethnic unity that could be the basis of a greater organization.

Now looking at it many of the points made by council members are valid, an overt "state" would be futile. We cannot think in the terms of state in this region. That the Pakistan Taliban and the Afghan Taliban are one in the same, which is the concept here. Traditionalist Pashtuns forming up across the border as a tribal confederacy of sorts. The Taliban may be seeing greater gains in driving into Pakistan as it only has to face the Pakistan Army vice NATO. But this concept of Pushtunistan goes beyond that. It allows them to operate cross border without thought.

In any event the prominence of the minorities in the Afghan government are also a driving factor. Pashtuns are the majority but may feel under represented in the government. The Pashtuns Traditionalist may be looking at the world in a different way, a state for the Pashtuns, ethnically and religiously “pure”.

By the way I am not advocating this idea, I am only looking at the fight we have and see a change in the goals of the Taliban and their supporters. Namely the formation (even covert) of a Pushtoonistan- the fulfillment of an ancient desire to unify all Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line.

[Ron Humphrey]

BUT, as I am ever in a debate mode here are some historical precedents and some of my own thoughts having been looking hard at the region lately.

Aren't we all:wry:




By the way I am not advocating this idea, I am only looking at the fight we have and see a change in the goals of the Taliban and their supporters. Namely the formation (even covert) of a Pushtoonistan- the fulfillment of an ancient desire to unify all Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line.

You could very well be seeing a congruence of sorts between many of the parties to this and there would almost certainly be lineage as well as other factors used to encourage it. But I think it's probably more in lines with trying to find a way to bring bigger battles rather than small scuffles. Sorta an Afghan/Tali Tet as it were. I really don't know how far beyond that any particular grouping is gonna effectively stick considering how easily associations switch based on survival instincts of the varying tribal, religious, and military leaders.

[Jedburgh]

Two products requiring AKO Log-in and BCKS membership to access:

Micro Mission Guide: Afghanistan (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=698649&lang=en-US)

Afghanistan's history and culture are complex. This guide is a starting point that draws from the experiences of military operators, academics, and analysts. It complements existing cultural intelligence products on Afghanistan and gives deeper insight into the way Afghans conduct themselves when holding meetings, attending special events, and conducting negotiations.
NWFP and FATA Pakistan Regional Culture Smart Card (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=702100&lang=en-US)

This culture smart card provides unclassified information on NWFP and FATA culture. Topics addressed include:

Cultural History
Governing Laws
Pashtun Society
Tribal Agencies
Centers of Authority
Frontier Corps

[Entropy]

Ran across this over at Ghosts of Alexander (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2008/11/25/socio-economic-and-legal-political-processes-in-a-pashtun-village/) and it seems like it is something the COIN center in Kabul or any deployer would want to read. Maybe we can get a PDF copy here.

[Jedburgh]

First issue of a new publication from the Aryana Institute of Regional Research and Advocacy (http://www.airra.org/):

Kyber - The Voices of Pashtuns (http://www.airra.org/analysis/Khyber.pdf), June 2009

Kyber is an initiative to engage the Pashtun intelligentia and youth, both in the homeland and in the diaspora with the aim to discuss Pashtun issues and contribute to a more informed debate on the Pashtun question on both sides of the Durand Line. The magazine also intends to provide a forum to our youth to remain in touch with their culture, art and literature and at the same time, to illustrate a softer image of the Pashtun to the outer world.
Articles include:

Pashtun Population: An Estimate
Pashtun Besieged: Is there a way out?
Pashtun Ethnic Cleansing and Opportunity for Peace
What do we (Pashtun) need?
The code of Pashtunwali
IDPs Crisis and Governance Confusion
IDPs updates as on 8-5-2009
Irfan Khan Revealed Interview with Irfan Khan
Video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V1FbZmgINPo) (Specially edited for KHYBER)
Afghani Cuisine
Green Tea of Peshawar

[George L. Singleton]

Thanks for all these Pashtun background info posts, some of which I did not know about.

Simplified the folks who are the Taliban are Pakhtuns, in the main, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is nothing "honorable" about abusing women and children, and other more gross and fatal acts that are common practice by the Taliban "using the excuse of religion" in today's world.

But you all know this.

Again, thanks for some citations I will not take time to explore which I formerly was unaware of.

[George L. Singleton]

I have "read over" Jedburg's recent posting of the link to KHYBER, THE VOICES OF PASHTUNS, JUNE, 2009.

Summary comments: Exact same cast of names and personalties who have been among the frequent posters on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE a subdivision of KHYBER WATCH.

My abbreviated partial reviews now are critical in nature, there are some good points made by some of these writers:

1. M. Bilal Khan Yousafazai, article "Code of Pashtunwali", key point in his opening remarks is that this is an unwritten law and ideology, i.e., custom and practice open to widely differing interpretations. Conservative, oligarical...it in his view has developed into an "accepted constitution." It is under this unwritten constitution that Osama bin Laden is given protection under the guise of hospitality by those Pashtuns who are members of the Taliban. The Jirga system evolves from this "constitution" also. Jirgas are an old practice or custom, my remark (George)...the late King of Afghanistan in 2001-2002 returned briefly to Afghanistan to convene a Grand Jirga of the tribes of Afghanistan, most of whom are ethnic Pakhtuns numerically, to help the Allies restart a new government under Karzai.

2. Dr. Nbi Misdaq, who currently works for the US Department of State, Foreign Language Institute in Arlington, VA, leads off the listed articles advocating in a softly worded fashion an attempt to sell the secession of Pakhtuns from both Pakistan and Afghanistan to create a new nation-state of Pakhtuwana.

3. Mohammad Naeem, who is a young Canadian graduate student (told to me to be working on a Masters in Canada, but could as easily be a doctoral student there) is a regular posters on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE and has on occasion been verbally violent on line, cursing, etc., which that website has consistently overlooked at allowed (HUJRA). Here again is an activist damning the government of Pakistan, no matter who or which party is in power, and adocating secession.

4. Jahznzel & Fatima Ahmed (she is a Masters degree student in Canada, where both reside) offer some more of the same general remarks.

5. Samin Jan Kekah, one of the Islamic religiously focused Pahtun writers on this new site, talks about the Islamic angel Shaytaan as being the biggest scholar and most educated among the angels, among the chose of God, sort of describing this angel as the, my wording, "Patron Saint" of Pashtun separatism and secession to be a new stand alone ethnically based (racial) nation created out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This writer is from Quetta and is a university student at Balochistan University.

It needs to be understood that some of the Paskthun folks I am commenting on here represent a reverse racial superiority point of view, and have repeatedly told me in open forum of their disdain for "lesser" tribes and elites. Those who profess Islam are Sunnis, not Shiites, and they are not entirely friendly to Shiites as a matter of fact.

You find mixed messages and differeing opinions among these and other writers on the new and existing sites. This site, to me, is an attemt to create a direct forum with the world which supercedes their existing sites but builds on it and is in tandum with it.

You find here and there in these various writings mentioning of the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a major object and purpose of their writing, to eventually undo the 100+ year old border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Finally, the article about IDP (Internally displaced persons) by a free lance Pashtun journalist does provide some helpful statistical tables of where and how many IDPs are accommodated during the fighting.


Quraysh Khattak is a Pashtun Journalist who worked with many prestigious newspapers including The News. He is a freelance writer and works as a Program Manager in an Islamabad-based NGO. He writes in part:


Peshawar, Charsadda and Swabi.

The Ministry of Community Development (former Social Welfare Department) has conducted off camp registration in various areas. According to their record 77516 families of 462528 persons was living in rented houses or with their relatives in 11 districts of the province. But after the peace deal most of the IDPs went back to their home towns.


Quraysh Khattak is a Pashtun Journalist who worked with many prestigious newspapers including The News. He is a freelance writer and works as a Program Manager in an Islamabad-based NGO.

IDP’s updates on 8-5-2009
Aryana Insitute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA)
The ongoing militancy in Swat and the operation against the militants in the area has resulted in insurmountable hardships for a huge population of the area. The Islamic militants have imposed their own version of Islamic rules and regulations. They have occupied the houses, property and other places of the common public. The Army has come to rescue situation. But after the lapse of two long years, one of the strongest military in the Muslim world has yet to show the results. Frustration and disappointments compelled the population of the area to move to safer places in other parts of NWFP.

The controversial peace deal gave an opportunity to the militants to reorganize and regroup. They expanded their influence to District Buner,Shangla, Dir upper and Dir lower. They openly challenged the writ of the government and started militant activities in the areas. The liberals and opinion makers of the society welcomed the recent counter insurgency stance of the government, albeit with a caution. The people of the conflict zones are of the opinion that the supply lines, network and command and control structure of militants would need a ground assault on the part of the military but till now gun ship helicopters and jet aircrafts are used to target the militant hideouts.

The newly launched military operation resulted in huge migration of masses to down districts of the province and other parts of the country. Displacement of almost one million has taken place till now. Majority of the people have shifted to district Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Charsadda and Swabi.

The Ministry of Community Development (former Social Welfare Department) has conducted off camp registration in various areas. According to their record 77516 families of 462528 persons was living in rented houses or with their relatives in 11 districts of the province. But after the peace deal most of the IDPs went back to their home towns. *George note: This refers to the on again, off again jirga and Government of Pakistan attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban which we know then blew up and failed.

Experience tells us on SWJ that any displacement of a few million folks will have tons of problems, as was the case with the earth quakes in the Kashmir zone of Pakistan a few years ago. People gripe, sometimes genuinely, but massive logistics and resettlement and support is a horrendous job never suitable fixed to everyone's satisfaction, witness our Katrina on going repairs and resettlements here in the US.

End of "George's opinions" of the Pakhtuns, several of whom have dialogued with me since Nov. 2006 when I was invited to be a Member of KHYBER WATCH, sub set being GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE. I was separately invited to be a contributor, free will, up to me to contribute, on PAKHTUN WOMEN website, being told by the founder of that site that women in general were treated too rudely and hostilly on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE and thus set up their own blog site, separately. Such negative cultural norms toward females is a part of the unwritten Pukhwatawana "constitution."

[wmthomson]

I am new to the SWJ forum but an avid reader. I am beginning the research for small writing project I have created for myself on Afghanistan and COIN ops I have found research easy except for information on Pashtun tribes, peoples and most importantly Pashtunwali any one have any suggestions?

[davidbfpo]

WMThomson,

Welcome to SWC.


I am new to the SWJ forum but an avid reader. I am beginning the research for small writing project I have created for myself on Afghanistan and COIN ops I have found research easy except for information on Pashtun tribes, peoples and most importantly Pashtunwali any one have any suggestions?

There are some first steps:

1. Use the Advanced Search option: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6813
2. A few lines of introduction always help others understand, with OPSEC and abonymity if req'd on 'Tell Us About You' thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=51 . Now done (mins later: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=51 Post 1018.

I know there are some maps of the tribes and links to the Pashtun honour code, for example for maps: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6643 Post 7 and Pashtunwali: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4165

There's a starter and hopefully helpful.

davidbfpo

[Abu Suleyman]

I would start with Friedrik Barth (http://www.amazon.com/Political-Leadership-Economics-Monographs-Anthropology/dp/1845202783/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1248977512&sr=1-1), and work my way forward. I know that Barth is way outdated, and worked mostly in what is today Pakistan, and not afghanistan, but he had excellent insights into the lives, culture, and traditions of the Pashtuns (which he called by the old nomenclature of Pathans). More importantly, rather than just being an anthropologist, he was focused more on political and law questions, although they were almost all traditional.

If you have access to a database that does reference searches, you can rest assured that almost every academic study of Pashtunwali will cite him.

[Entropy]

Christian Bleuer's site is (http://afghanistan-analyst.org/default.aspx) an excellent place to start.

[marct]

I would also recommend pretty much anything by Thomas Barfield (http://web.bu.edu/anthrop/faculty/barfield/index.html). I had the chance to hear him talk and chat with him at NPS in March, and he has forgotten more about Afghanistan than most people have ever learned. Top notch scholar, and one of the few who has been working in the area for longer than 8 years :wry:.

[slapout9]

He will according to this Article from the new Military Review! he dose not have the right Strategy to win according to this article.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art004.pdf

Is there any merit to this article?

From Yadernye:
I am curious to hear other opinions about the analysis of the Af/Pak insurgency published by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason in the Nov/Dec edition of Military Review.

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

Johnson and Mason are not far off where my lines are crossing, but coming around it from the civilian side.

So many folks in Iraq were preaching "Democracy" out of a very naive school book version. In Maryland alone, there are 23 counties and the city of Baltimore, and hundreds of individual "towns" and community associations with varying authority. Interwoven into that are hundreds of independent and interagency bodies with special authority, from local school boards to regional transit authorities. It is indeed a complex and locally engaged web of legitimate governing relationships that actually make the tribal, valley-by-valley thing look simplistic.

Sure, OK, there is a supposedly strong national government, but aside from some often-contested "must do's" (the Consititution), most actions from the top down are driven by carrots and sticks of payola and buy-offs. Else the idea fails to stick.

In Iraq, for a lot of immutable reasons, the power and rational of national ministries was inherent in the system---the DNA that operated in the background no matter what the US tried to do for reconstruction under a new "provincial" governance model.

By contrast, Afghanistan is two inherently conflicting fields of public---urban vs. rural, and the rural is tribal/district/sub-district.

Military and foreign service, on one year assignments, are not going to be able to grasp and engage these rural areas' leaders and formal and informal structures. Instead, any PRT cadre assigned to these areas (more like CORDS than PRTs) need to be something different than, for example, the PRTs deployed in Iraq.

I never understood the mishmash of Subject Matter Experts assigned down to PRTs in Iraq. Instead, the handful of Senior SMEs, in my opinion, should have been circuit riders to better support less top-heavy, younger, and more aggressively deployed PRTs (more like on an EPRT model as far as flexibility and local reach).

It would be far easier for me, for example, as a Senior Planning SME, to mini-train and coordinate programs and resources down to an engaged DRT System than to waste mine and their time and resources doing so for a few small villages.

What I took away from Johnson and Mason, as an organizational matter, is that a cadre of minimally cross-trained, but highly supported, DRTs, probably military for some time to come, would provide the best penetration/connections to the Pashtun (and other) rural villages---all as the necessary backstop to prevent Taliban encirclement of those urbanites.

Somewhere in the middle, you try to bridge gaps, whether by diplomacy or other means.

Is that about right?

Steve

[jmm99]

I'll leave aside the accuracy of their recollections of Vietnam. They point out the near-FUBAR state of the political effort in Astan. Their DRT concept seems a level too high. If Vietnam is any lesson, it is that security and political action must be solid at the village level. There are roughly 40,000 villages in Astan. That is the magnitude of the political action problem. No solution within our capabilities has been presented by anyone I've read.

[Bob's World]

I'll leave aside the accuracy of their recollections of Vietnam. They point out the near-FUBAR state of the political effort in Astan. Their DRT concept seems a level too high. If Vietnam is any lesson, it is that security and political action must be solid at the village level. There are roughly 40,000 villages in Astan. That is the magnitude of the political action problem. No solution within our capabilities has been presented by anyone I've read.

The lesson I take is that when a couple of outside actors waging a much larger competition use the populace of some smaller state to wage their contest in a form of pawn warfare don't be so blinded by your own ends that you are oblivious to those of the populace involved.

We propped up a series of three different ass-hats in Nam because we didn't want the Soviets to go "+1" in the global pawn warfare game that defined much of the Cold War; while the Soviets backed the side seeking freedom from the widely hated scourge of Western Colonialism.

Today there are a large number of populaces across the Middle East also seeking to get out from under the remnants of Western Colonialism and the governments imposed by the West during the Cold War to assure "friendly" relations and the flow of oil...

Once again, I believe we have picked the wrong side, and that is a hard hand to play. This is why I strongly recommned that we co-opt the majority of the AQ message and ussurp them as the champions of the populaces of the Middle East in their quest for better governance. Such a move would sweep AQ's feet out from under them and bring the U.S. into line with our national principles.

But one'll never see this with their nose pressed against Afghanistan; or with their brain obsessed with rhetoric of the ideology AQ employs. Afghanistan is just one of many states in play, and ideologies are like socks, you need them, but you can change them too. Step back and the picture gets clearer.

[jmm99]

My comment re: lesson learned in Vietnam applied to the tactical level - and a very basic level, that of the villages and their hamlets.

Your comment pertains to the strategic level, which is fine since that is what you do for a living. Your comment goes beyond one nation (Astan) and looks to the region (basically Indian Ocean littorals and continental land masses, from say Egypt to Indonesia to include most of the Muslim World).

Going back 40-50 years, we (US) were looking at containment of two Communist powers (SovComs and ChiComs) in the region of Southeast Asia. The result there was a "win" from our standpoint - Indochina became Communist; but the remainder remained non-Communist - though not a US proxy (ASEAN, etc.). The key was Indonesia which found its third way, not without a great deal of bloodshed.

Whether that "model" has any application to the Muslim World is another question. Your "friends" in the Kingdom certainly employ much of AQ's message - in truth, AQ has co-opted much of the Kingdom's message and added enhancements to it. Unless I've misunderstood much of what you have written, the Kingdom does not fall within your definition of "good governance".

What would this Muslim World "Third Way" message look like ? You know me, I like concrete examples.

Regards

Mike

[Yadernye]

I am curious to hear other opinions about the analysis of the Af/Pak insurgency (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art004.pdf) published by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason in the Nov/Dec edition of Military Review:

The point they made that leaped out at me was this:


Insurrections are hardly new phenomena in Afghanistan.10 Previous Afghan leaders have had varying degrees of success in subduing rural religious insurrection. The degree of that success depended on how much of the population viewed the regime as legitimate and how much it stayed out of the daily lives of the people. And Afghan history demonstrates conclusively that legitimacy of governance comes exclusively from two immutable sources: dynastic (monarchies and tribal patriarchies) and religious, or sometimes both.11 These equate to the traditional and religious sources cited by noted sociologist Max Weber.12

Unfortunately, the Karzai government owes its only claim to legitimacy to Weber’s third source, the legal one (e.g., western-style elections and the rule of law). This has no historical precedent as a basis for legitimizing Afghan rule at all, however, and the notion that the West can apply it to Afghan society like a coat of paint is simply wishful thinking. In essence, the Karzai government is illegitimate because it is elected.13

...This problem of illegitimacy is especially acute at the village level of rural Pashtun society, where dynastic and religious authority has been unquestioned for over a thousand years.14 The widespread perception among Afghans that the Karzai government is illegitimate—because it lacks any traditional or religious legitimacy—predates Karzai’s August disgrace by five years.

This explains a lot, in my opinion, and does not bode well. What I would like to know is how accurate his analysis is. Anthropology and sociology are not my specialties. Johnson is Director of the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and did not pull this assessment out of thin air. There is a page on NPS linking to a long line of his publications (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Research.html) that show the evolution of his analysis of the Pashtun insurgency, which is the most sophisticated that I have yet seen. I specifically recommend "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan - Afghanistan Frontier (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18241/no_sign_until_the_burst_of_fire.html?breadcrumb=%2 Fproject%2F58%2Fquarterly_journal%3Fparent_id%3D46 )" and "The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters) (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/Small_Wars_%20Pub.pdf)."

Cheers,

Yadernye

[davidbfpo]

Yadernye,

The Military Review article appeared a few days ago on the current thread on the Afghan campaign: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7128&page=27 With comments at Posts 530-540.

It was a short discussion, have a peek. If there is a lot you want to contribute you can go to that thread; if the discussion "takes off" a new thread can be created to keep the focus on the article's view of the Pashtun insurgency. Updated: earlier posts on other thread copied here.

Welcome aboard.

[MikeF]

Yaderyne,

Welcome Aboard, and thanks for the link. I enjoyed the article. Here's my take based off my current thoughts on small wars.

1. Similarities of differing insurgencies. The description provided by the authors was the strongest point of the article. The simple answer that they did not highlight was that both groups were conducting a version of Mao's Protracted War. IMO, it's THE playbook for a people's rebellion, social movement, or gang warfare. In each case, you take Mao broadly and apply it for METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, Civilians) in a given situation.

2. The Sine Qua Non of Counterinsurgency: Legitimacy. I disagree with this assertion, and IMO, it is something that we get fundamentally wrong when trying to understand small wars. Instead, the sine qua non of small wars is control. Legitimacy is merely a subset. For instance, does a farmer out in the boondocks care if Karzai is legitimate? No. He cares about his farm and his family. In terms of control, he wants to know who to go to IOT get fair settlements when he has disagreements with his neighbor.

Mike

[Bob's World]

Yaderyne,

Welcome Aboard, and thanks for the link. I enjoyed the article. Here's my take based off my current thoughts on small wars.

1. Similarities of differing insurgencies. The description provided by the authors was the strongest point of the article. The simple answer that they did not highlight was that both groups were conducting a version of Mao's Protracted War. IMO, it's THE playbook for a people's rebellion, social movement, or gang warfare. In each case, you take Mao broadly and apply it for METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, Civilians) in a given situation.

2. The Sine Qua Non of Counterinsurgency: Legitimacy. I disagree with this assertion, and IMO, it is something that we get fundamentally wrong when trying to understand small wars. Instead, the sine qua non of small wars is control. Legitimacy is merely a subset. For instance, does a farmer out in the boondocks care if Karzai is legitimate? No. He cares about his farm and his family. In terms of control, he wants to know who to go to IOT get fair settlements when he has disagreements with his neighbor.

Mike

I think it is probably more useful to consider any and all governments as "legitimate." I realize that flies in the face of traditional logic, but traditional logic also creates tremendous obstacles to effectively dealing with governments who's legitimacy WE disapprove of; and also causes us to overlook problems with the nature of the legitimacy of a government that WE do approve of. Bottom line on legitimacy is that what is important is that the populace served by any particular government recognizes its source of legitimacy.

The U.S. gets into a lot of trouble in meddling efforts to manipulate who gets into, gets removed from, or sustain in government over the populaces of others. We value OUR approval of such governments over how well the populaces of those same states approve. This is what, in my opinion, causes a manipulating outside state to become the target of a nationalist insurgency movement when the people act out to attempt to get a government whose legitimacy they recognize.

So, we ask the wrong question. We ask: "Is this government legitimate by our standards." What we should ask is "Does the relevant populace recognize the legitimacy of this government."

Next, "Control." The majority position that comes up over and over is that a measure of effective governance is its ability to control the populace. This is a slippery slope. Most people don't want to be "controlled," so much as they want the government to control the things that enable them to pursue their lives in relative peace and security. A fine nuance, but the government needs to exert reasonable (as defined by the populace) control over the environment the populace lives within, not over the populace themselves.

[MikeF]

I think it is probably more useful to consider any and all governments as "legitimate." I realize that flies in the face of traditional logic, but traditional logic also creates tremendous obstacles to effectively dealing with governments who's legitimacy WE disapprove of; and also causes us to overlook problems with the nature of the legitimacy of a government that WE do approve of. Bottom line on legitimacy is that what is important is that the populace served by any particular government recognizes its source of legitimacy.

Does this include 'shadow' governments (i.e. ISI in Iraq, Taliban in AfPak)?


Next, "Control." The majority position that comes up over and over is that a measure of effective governance is its ability to control the populace. This is a slippery slope. Most people don't want to be "controlled," so much as they want the government to control the things that enable them to pursue their lives in relative peace and security. A fine nuance, but the government needs to exert reasonable (as defined by the populace) control over the environment the populace lives within, not over the populace themselves.

Agreed, but my definition of 'control' has adapted over the last year. Today, it's more towards a 'social contract' defined by laws and LE rather than physical control. For instance, I believe that I can leave my apartment, go to the store, and conduct my business in a safe environment. I trust that the police are patrolling the streets, and our judicial system will take action when someone violates the laws. I feel secure. That's why events like Ft Hood, Colombine, and Va Tech scare folks. They attempt to unravel the social contract and present it as an illusion of control. So, in this sense, control is more of a feeling of security not manipulation by the gov't.

Mike

[jmm99]

The Johnson-Mason article compares Astan to Vnam; finds similar indigenous governance problems in both; bashes the so-called Big Army "Concept"; etc., etc.; but comes up with a proposed solution, starting here (pp. 6-7):


The Critical Difference

There is, however, one critical positive difference between Afghanistan and Vietnam—one which might salvage the war if decision makers grasp it. As we have argued, the central task is establishing legitimacy of governance to deny political control to the Taliban. In Afghanistan, as in South Vietnam, at the national level, this is simply impossible in the time available. It is beyond our power to change an entire society. However, in Afghanistan, this critical legitimacy does not have to be national; it can be local. Governance in the rural areas of Afghanistan has historically been decentralized and tribal, and stability has come from a complex, interlocking web of tribal networks.23 If Western leaders can think outside the box created by the Treaty of Westphalia and embrace non-Western forms of legitimacy, they could possibly reverse the descending trajectory of the war. Instead of focusing energy and resources on building a sand castle at the water’s edge, as we did repeatedly in Saigon after each new coup, we have argued for years that we should focus on rebuilding the traditional local legitimacy of governance in the existing networks of tribal leaders.24 A culturally adept policy would seek to reestablish stability in rural Afghanistan by putting it back the way it was before the Soviets invaded in 1979. This means re-empowering the village elders as contrasted with the current policy of trying to further marginalize them with local elections (and thus more local illegitimacy). Recent research has demonstrated conclusively that the Community Development Councils set up by the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development in parallel to the tribal system increase instability and conflict, rather than reducing it.25 Reestablishing local legitimacy of governance is, in fact, the one remaining chance to pull something resembling our security goals in Afghanistan out of the fatally flawed Bonn Process and the yawning jaws of defeat. The tragedy of Vietnam was that there were no political solutions. The tragedy of Afghanistan is that there is a political solution, but we keep ignoring it in favor of trying to force them to be like us.

Implementation of this "crucial difference" would be via some 200 District Reconstruction Teams (DRTs), whose base areas would like something like so (p.12):


At the district level, there must be a very obvious Afghan face on the mission. The international element of security, some 70 or 80 American men and women, should be discreetly at the center of concentric rings of security, with police “security” in the outer ring outside the FOB, and the Afghan National Army in the middle ring inside the FOB providing the visible security. The locals will know the Americans are there, able to call in fire support for the Afghan army (and the local base) if necessary, but serving as the hidden “big stick” of the local forces while they, the local forces, have the confidence to conduct security operations in support of the local tribal leaders.

Curious that the article dumps on the Big Army "Concept", but retains the FOB focus point. In any event, the proposal is far different from the Marine CAPs pilot program, and its much bigger brother the Vietnamese Pacifcation program (of which, CORDS was only a part) - where both operated on the village-hamlet level sans FOBs.

Beyond summarizing what seems the meat of the proposal, I'll pass on a military evaluation. I would be interested in what Phil Ritterhof (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=947) thinks of the proposal as compared to the Marine CAPs and associated Vnam programs.

As to the political situation in Astan, I've stated elsewhere that it is near-FUBAR (so the OP comment that it "does not bode well" is if anything charitable). Politically, I'd rate Astan lower on the scale than 1967-1972 Vietnam.

Best to all

Mike

[omarali50]

In most wars (all wars?) one side has to win for the other to lose. One would imagine that if the US and its allies are about to lose, somebody must be about to win. Who would that be? It can be more than one group. But it must be SOMEONE. I would like to submit that the US can still "win" in afghanistan because the taliban are NOT the Vietnamese communists. Left to themselves, a purely Afghan Taliban could indeed win an insurgency (though not necessarily all of Afghanistan). But they are not all alone. Just like the US and its allies are capable of mucking up local afghan forces that COULD have held most of Afghanistan with some help from their friends, the taliban have become ever more enmeshed with groups of jihadis that are so insane, they can snatch defeat from the jaws of any victory. I have to run, but I will expand on this idea soon inshallah. ....it aint over till the fat lady sings.

[Yadernye]

Thanks for the welcome, folks.

To me, the interesting thing about Johnson's arguments is that he provides an explanation for the Pashtun insurgency that isn't focused on the Taliban/AQ relationship. He argues that the problem driving the insurgency is the breakdown of traditional tribal structures based on Pashtunwali self-government. This breakdown began with efforts in the 1970s by the Pakistani government to impose conservative Islam on the Pashtuns to quell any incipient nationalism. The Islamization of the Pashtuns accelerated during the Soviet occupation, which the Pakistanis exploited with their support for the Taliban in the 90s.

As McChrystal's ISAF evaluation points out, the Taliban are now only one of several Pashtun insurgent groups, loosely affiliated through their opposition to both the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Johnson argues that the way to quell this insurgency is to reconstruct the traditional balance between tribal elders, mullahs and central governments that existed before the early 1970s, and to restore the primacy of Pashtunwali-based Pashtun self-government.

If Johnson's argument is correct, than any COIN CONOP that involves pushing the authority of a central government upon Pashtun tribes who have never submitted to such an arrangement is akin to pouring gasoline on a fire. But...the focus of current U.S. strategy is to strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, thereby allowing U.S. military forces to depart.

[jcustis]

If Johnson's argument is correct, than any COIN CONOP that involves pushing the authority of a central government upon Pashtun tribes who have never submitted to such an arrangement is akin to pouring gasoline on a fire. But...the focus of current U.S. strategy is to strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, thereby allowing U.S. military forces to depart.

Since we are tied into that plan pretty deeply by now, and desire to have a government that can be relied on to live up to its part of the bargain (minimal corruption, more efficiency, etc., etc.), do we need to modify the approach and shape that government into a body that can be less a dose of gasoline and more like a pan lid that can quell the fire somewhat?

Put another way, can we ever facilitate central government power over Pashtun areas in a way that compliments their daily way of life, as opposed to being two pieces of sand paper rubbing against each other? If the honest answer is no, then we have some serious decisions within decisions that have to be made. Why we would have elements of a overall strategy that work at cross purposes is depressing at times. :confused:

In better news, there were 9 military servicemember deaths in Iraq last month, by CNN's tally. Only 2 of them were due to hostile action. The preceding few months are similar. Sectarianism aside, Iraqis at least had a tradition of a strong central base they had lived under, perhaps making it easier to return to central government control.

[jmm99]

Focus on the "the breakdown of traditional tribal structures based on Pashtunwali self-government" is nothing new. Kilcullen spends quite a bit of time on it in The Accidental Guerrilla. And, any thinking person knows that it is a combined Pstan and Astan problem because the Pashtuns are on both sides of the artificial border.

The question is how to solve the "Pashtun Problem". One solution is the top down approach of the Coalition in Astan to enhance the central Karzai government; which has its counterpart in the Pakistani efforts against the Taliban and associated groups in its own Pashtunistan.

Neither takes into account local governance in any real sense (compare the Taliban approach, which does provide governance down to the village level, no matter how flawed we think that "shadow governance" is).

Johnson-Mason would attempt to get back to the pre-SovCom Invasion structure of a weak central government and strong local tribal structures by moving reconstruction teams down to the district level. How this would differ from a top down (essentially a rule by law, nor rule of law) approach is not readily apparent to me.

From our (US and ISAF) standpoint, the lack of a non-Taliban center of gravity (or centers of gravity) among the Pashtuns is a real hurdle. Correct me if I am wrong, but I have not read of any large Pashtun group that could be co-opted, either as an ally of the Karzai government, or as a solid regional group that would be willing to take our side (even if not loving of Mr Karzai).

Another, and far more radical, approach is that suggested in Steve Pressfield's series of articles (http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/) on reaching down to the tribes. There we can link to Jim Gant's One Tribe At A Time (http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf), which lays down in as much detail as he could provide the TTP for co-opting one small tribe via one ODA (e.g., p.28).


Bottom line: The GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) must find a way to incorporate the historical tribal structures into the national political system. It will not look like anything we can envision at this point, and may vary from province to province or even from tribe to tribe. But it can be done. Tribal Engagement Teams can help facilitate this.

A very good read, etc.

Again, MAJ Gant's approach is not new - it goes back to the initial stages of the CIA-SF operations in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. By very local work, the indigenous tribe is assisted to create its own security zone and, as an important incidence of that, its own local governance. As such, it creates a "rule of law" situation (a bubble up from the indigenous villagers), which is far removed from the "rule by law" situation imposed by many versions of population-centric counter-insurgency.

The problem with Jim Gant's solution is that it is in effect a form of revolutionary counter-insurgency. The indigenous villagers come to realize their own value and power, which reinforces their primary loyalty to their own institutions. To the extent they have secondary loyalty, it is to the US SF soldiers who assisted them (and who represent the US in their eyes). All of that is contrary to established US policy in Astan (as it was in Vietnam).

If we were starting this from scratch, I'd vote for MAJ Gant's solution. Given the policies in place, I'm quite certain that is not going to be the solution adopted by the "Powers That Be". I expect to see more of the same.

And, some form of conversation between ISAF officers similar to this between two French officers during the First Indochina War, after their unit (6th Spahis) had spent much of a week clearing a village and adjacent area of Viet Minh (well, not quite completely, as the dialogue suggests). It makes a point as the two officers discuss a five person civic action team, all Vietnamese, who had just joined them and who now had to "hold and build". The conversation is from Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy (http://www.amazon.com/Street-Without-Joy-Bernard-Fall/dp/0811717003), pp.154-155):


MAJ Derrieu: Funny, they just never seem to succeed in striking the right note with the population. Either they come in and try to apologize for the mess we've just made with our planes and tanks; or they swagger and threaten the farmers as if they were enemy nationals which - let's face it - they are in many cases.

LT Dujardin: That may be so, but I wouldn't care to be in his shoes tonight when we pull out. He's going to stay right here in the house which the Commie commander still occupied yesterday, all by himself with the four other guys of his administrative team, with the nearest [military] post 300 metres away. Hell, I'll bet he won't even sleep here but sleep in the post anyway.

MAJ: He probably will, and he'll immediately lose face with the population and become useless.

LT: And if he doesn't, he'll probably be dead by tomorrow, and just as useless. In any case, there goes the whole psychological effect of the operation and we can start the whole thing all over again three months from now. What a hopeless mess.

And so it goes ....

Regards to all

Mike

[jmm99]

Glad you joined the discourse - and provided this astute observation:


Put another way, can we ever facilitate central government power over Pashtun areas in a way that compliments their daily way of life, as opposed to being two pieces of sand paper rubbing against each other? If the honest answer is no, then we have some serious decisions within decisions that have to be made. Why we would have elements of a overall strategy that work at cross purposes is depressing at times.

We are both depressed for the same reasons. The answer to your question is, of course, affirmative - if we were willing to spend the decades slowly building Jim Gant's small tribal infrastructures and melding them with a very accommodating central government (add honesty and integrity to the adjectives).

As it stands, our dialog will be that of the two French officers (you can stay the MAJ; I'll play the LT cuz I agree with his bottom line). So, the "decisions within decisions" is probably pre-ordained.

You hit Iraq right on the head. Iraq was ruled by a very centralized, authoritarian police state for decades. In such situations, a rather authoritarian population-centric "COIN" strategy will work because the people are used to it. Of course, it also involves quite a bit of local honey (just as Saddam did) as Mike Few and Niel Smith are waxing fine in another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8925).

Best as always

Mike

[jcustis]

Kilcullen spends quite a bit of time on it in The Accidental Guerrilla.

I've had that for some time, yet have not cracked it open yet.

Your comments about the Gant piece are what have been nagging at me for a while too. Gan't approach just requires time (strategic time) that we might not have.

EDITED TO ADD: Upon posting, I see that you made specific reference to time as well...

[jmm99]

The Accidental Guerrilla is worth cracking - not the Bible, but worth the read; especially as to the destruction of the traditional systems of local tribal governance in Astan and elsewhere. Another one addressing some of the same issues is Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, which I'm just finishing. Neither gives any pat solutions to the "hopeless mess".

I found MAJ Gant's little piece fascinating. Since there are some 40,000 villages in Astan, the picture of 40K ODAs (or their equivalent) is not what I expect to see. However, it could be the answer if we (US) wanted to get a firm hold on a key strategic piece of geography. Let us say, a base for conducting direct actions against AQ. In that situation, it wouldn't matter if that region had loyalty to the central government - so long as its inhabitants had primary loyalty to themselves and a secondary loyalty to us. E.g., the Montagnards in Vietnam.

In a sense, we would be engaging in the Management of Savagery (Chaos) and taking what seems to be a situation of local instability and turning it to our advantage. Naji thinks that AQ can manage savagery; I think we could do even better if we kept in mind the enlightened self-interests of ourselves and the local indigenous people - adapt, improvise and overcome. In such limited cases, the timeframe might well be acceptable.

And, oui, M. Legrange, I am stealing a bit from your thoughts as I have been digesting them. Colonialement.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

so long as its inhabitants had primary loyalty to themselves and a secondary loyalty to us.

And from this I wonder if we can gain, from some serious "living among them" effort, a sense of loyalty derived from the Pashtunwali code. If that code could be exploited through IO, engagement, development, etc., in order to allow support for our efforts, and that support was in harmony with faith in Allah, we'd probably be headed along the right track (let's term it the "Gant Path").

The beautiful thing about Gant's proposal is that we don't have to do it in all 40,000 villages in the country. That's why we orient on key terrain at times...all 40K villages are not key, but the need to determine the ones that are is paramount.

I wonder how we'd fair if we could all just grow beards as a first best practice. :D

[William F. Owen]

..hang on a second. Seems here that some things are getting mixed up.

a.) Can you defeat "the insurgency." Yes. It's just a matter of time, resources, and political will. The argument "oh but the Soviets lost" is hokum, because they might have won, if they had been prepared to invade all the safe-havens, and the Mujahadeen were in pretty dire straights till they got US funding.

....NATO has neither of those problems. Pakistan is an ally, are they not.

b.) Is there a strategic goal worth the time, blood, money and effort? - Dunno.

Just my take.

[tequila]

The argument "oh but the Soviets lost" is hokum, because they might have won, if they had been prepared to invade all the safe-havens, and the Mujahadeen were in pretty dire straights till they got US funding.

This implies that the Soviet Union would have had to invade Pakistan in order to win the war, which means they had no chance to win at all. Somehow I doubt invading FATA and Baluchistan would have ended the insurgency --- instead it would have simply continued in even more intensified fashion from Punjab and Sindh, with all of Pakistan drawn in as opposed to just the ISI. The whole of Pakistan would likely have been radicalized as a result.

Never mind the diplomatic and Cold War implications of another Soviet invasion of a sovereign country after Afghanistan. The Kremlin chose wisely to avoid this.

[William F. Owen]

This implies that the Soviet Union would have had to invade Pakistan in order to win the war, which means they had no chance to win at all. Somehow I doubt invading FATA and Baluchistan would have ended the insurgency --- instead it would have simply continued in even more intensified fashion from Punjab and Sindh, with all of Pakistan drawn in as opposed to just the ISI. The whole of Pakistan would likely have been radicalized as a result.


Maybe. I'm not playing "what if" history here. What I am trying to point out is that the argument that the "Afghan Guerilla" is some how un-beatable, is simply not true. He only manages to survive because of the political context of Afghanistan being a basically worthless cross-roads in the middle of nowhere, which no one wants to risk their future over.

They can be beaten, but basically unless their is a valid strategic goal, there is no point in making the investment. Like the US and NATO, the Soviets wanted a friendly regime in Kabul. OK, assuming that is somehow a good idea, what do you want to pay politically and diplomatically?

[tequila]

What I am trying to point out is that the argument that the "Afghan Guerilla" is some how un-beatable, is simply not true. He only manages to survive because of the political context of Afghanistan being a basically worthless cross-roads in the middle of nowhere, which no one wants to risk their future over.


Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

[Cavguy]

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

The issue isn't whether it is possible to subdue the insurgency in Afghanstan. Given enough resources and time it's possible. The question is whether it is worth it in the strategic calculus. I think that's the crux of the President's decision and why it is taking so long - I don't think he's deciding between 20,000 and 40,000 troops, but whether to do it at all, given all the other constraints on the nation, and whether such an effort would benefit national security in proportion to the lives and treasure invested to make it work.

[William F. Owen]

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

Precisely my point. So what is the political objective in Afghanistan again? Why are NATO and US there?

a.) Is it important?
b.) How much will it cost?

The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit.

[omarali50]

We can take the very reasonable view that some responses to terrorism (Afghan war, Iraq war? not sure if that even counts as a "response to terrorism", but whatever) have actually led to even more terrorism and that these are not the best responses. Maybe we should be removing "root causes" (Israel? Oil?). Maybe we should be arresting people and bringing them to court and dealing with nations that harbor such criminals by imposing X or Y UN backed sanctions. Still, its hard to see how you can get out of Afghanistan, after having gone in, without that being a major defeat with serious consequences (not to have gone in at all may have been a good idea, but that toothpaste has long since been pushed out of the tube).

Afghanistan is a god-forsaken cross roads with little appeal, but there IS a strategic reason for making Afghanistan work and that reason is Pakistan. Pakistan is the center of the loosely networked Islamist fanatics that have launched major terrorist operations in many different parts of the world. The most spectacular being the 9-11 attack. Pakistan is practically the only way a worldwide jihadist effort can ever be something bigger than a particularly bothersome irritant. IF defeat in Afghanistan leads to jihadi-sponsoring Pakistan, then its a serious matter.

One reason for confusion on this issue that I have noticed is that some people are saying "pakistan is an ally now, so that job is done, why bother about afghanistan". Well, if this were totally true, then definitely, leave afghanistan to the afghans. The country is just Somalia X 3 with better organized contestants (northern alliance and taliban being the main ones) and if the world can live with Somalia (not sure about that, but lets assume we can) then the world can live with the taliban and northern alliance fighting on in afghanistan. In any case, its a headache for regional powers, not for the US and Europe. But is that statement about Pakistan really true and is it permanently true?

I think it is not. I think the Pakistani army still has a lot of people who think they can use the taliban to project power westwards and the jihadis as proxies against India and if they gain the upper hand, then Pakistan will be jihad central, not just locally, but with distant consequences. IF the US and NATO leave without securing Afghanistan (and I have said before that securing is a very loose term with very flexible meaning, but NOT infinitely flexible) then the Pakistani army is likely to revert to its Jihadist position. Not overnight, not even as part of some clever plan, but just as the path of least resistance.

I also think there is a real salafist terrorist movement in the world that will be emboldened by an American defeat in Afghanistan. But I personally dont think THAT justifies hundreds of billions in money and thousands of casualties. Because I dont think they are that big a threat IF the Pakistani and Saudi states were both determined to stay away from these people. They would then be little more than Baader-Meinhof and company. OK, substantially more than Baader Meinhoff, mainly because so many of them have already been trained and organized into cells and because salafi Islam is a bigger movement than radical Marxism ever was, but I still think that in the bigger scheme of things these kind of movements have no future. NO country is as penetrated by Salafi ideology as Saudi Arabia, yet when push comes to shove, the Saudi state can and does act against them. Not just recently, but as long ago as 1930 (battle of Sibillia).

Pakistan is not as well organized a state as modern Saudi Arabia, but even in Pakistan these people will eventually lose IF the state is determined to act against them. IF the Pakistani army sees that going back to the good old days of using taliban and jihadi proxies are not really an option anymore, then there will be an almightly mess in Pakistan for a few years, but I have no doubt about who would win. The state would win. The real reason there is any doubt is because the jihadist factions of the army can still convince their fellow officers to keep some "good taliban" and "good jihadis" in reserve for the day when America leaves (and Obama's prolonged decision dance has not helped in this matter).

I am not saying the US HAS to stay. Its possible that there is some strategy that allows leaving Afghanistan while making sure Pakistan does not backtrack. But that will have to be specifically planned and cannot be taken as a given just because "now they are our allies". IF that can be done...IF things are so arranged that leaving afghanistan does not lead to triumphant victory celebrations in Pakistan, then by all means, leave. Can that be done?

Btw, I dont think offering the Pak army "help with resolving issues with India" is as brilliant an idea as its sometimes projeted. India can help or hinder this process to some extent, but it is not the crucial link. If the nexus with the salafists is broken (as it can be, if America is smart about it) then Pakistan and India can manage affairs without war and terrorism and that will be enough. No more is needed in the medium term. Trade and other links will change the equation over time. No grand deal has to be made in the interim and putting one on the table just gives the jihadi element in the Pak army another chance to push their agenda and delay things.

sorry for repetitions and disorganized thoughts. this was written in between real work. Got to run..

[William F. Owen]

The issue isn't whether it is possible to subdue the insurgency in Afghanstan. Given enough resources and time it's possible. The question is whether it is worth it in the strategic calculus. I think that's the crux of the President's decision and why it is taking so long - I don't think he's deciding between 20,000 and 40,000 troops, but whether to do it at all, given all the other constraints on the nation, and whether such an effort would benefit national security in proportion to the lives and treasure invested to make it work.

Thanks Cav. Simple and coherent as ever! Good job!

[jcustis]

The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit.

I did a bit of thinking about this statement while reading up on the "Night Letters" phenomena being employed by the Taliban, and in this day and age I don't think military force can defeat a very critical component: insurgent will. Their will/motivation is an important target that is very difficult to attack when his IO effort out-cycles yours, you're already considered an invader, and the government you are partnered with is not nearly as transparent as it should be.

For that effort, the full spectrum of resources need to be brought to the table, and frankly, force is probably about 20-25%.

[Ken White]

"The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit."

... I don't think military force can defeat a very critical component: insurgent will...For that effort, the full spectrum of resources need to be brought to the table, and frankly, force is probably about 20-25%.Will cannot be defeated but it can be rendered only marginally if at all relevant. The determinant is simply how much force you are willing to use. If you use enough, their will won't be defeated but you will make it too costly for their will to be effective thus achieving a more acceptable result for yourself.

That, in essence, in this case, gets back to the cost not matching the benefit...

Which, in turn, creates a problem for the west in the current case because the west is unwilling to use enough force (or to be mean or brutal enough, to put it another way) and thus provides prospective opponents a very exploitable failure of political will. The Comintern and Socialist International did their jobs well.

The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.

Turning the other cheek got us where we are...

[Surferbeetle]

...and railway ties in a room finished with gypsum.:wry:


Turning the other cheek got us where we are...

A market segmentation approach would acknowledge the impression two simultaneous wars have on the youth bulge while acknowledging the long-term view of our resident grey-beards.


That, in essence, in this case, gets back to the cost not matching the benefit...

Can we find a way to cost effectively improve America's position?


Which, in turn, creates a problem for the west in the current case because the west is unwilling to use enough force (or to be mean or brutal enough, to put it another way) and thus provides prospective opponents a very exploitable failure of political will. The Comintern and Socialist International did their jobs well.

The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.

The Comintern & Socialist International comment has me scratching my head...are you saying these folks abolished the bourgeois and associated state in Afghanistan?

I take issue with the apparent implication that all that is needed to regulate conflict is the application of that single variable, force/security.

Over the course of a year in Iraq I learned first hand that the deft application of a mixture of variables (security, governance, economics, information, and diplomacy) in a AO can more or less cost effectively regulate conflict levels. I also note that the daily application of this multivariate formula, to regulate conflict, is often used to great success inside of a variety of nation-states to include the US :wry:

[Ken White]

...and railway ties in a room finished with gypsum.:wry:Bad allegory in most senses but very good in one -- do not try to do a job with the wrong tools and materials...
A market segmentation approach would acknowledge the impression two simultaneous wars have on the youth bulge while acknowledging the long-term view of our resident grey-beards.Equally bad silliness. No market involved; The youth bulge is, mostly, too shallow and narcissistic to really have a clue and the grey beards obviously aren't into long term views. If they were, we wouldn't be in this position. Apply that to, not least, the education system * , moral values * , the health care issues -- plural -- the economic situation or the wars ** . The wars at least have causes not solely related to US arrogance, greed, intransigence and stupidity even though all those adverse attributes plus a glaring lack of imagination and military acumen are obvious in the way we are 'fighting' them.
Can we find a way to cost effectively improve America's position?Easy -- stop interfering with other nations, develop that missing long term view and when attacked, repel the attack rapidly, forcefully, effectively with the right tools for the job and don't get stuck on stupid and expensive (in all aspects) long term building projects while fighting people you don't need to fight.
The Comintern & Socialist International comment has me scratching my head...are you saying these folks abolished the bourgeois and associated state in Afghanistan?Not at all; over the last three quarters of a Century, they purposely have preached non-violence etc. etc. (for the west, not themselves), they infiltrated the educational systems, provided moral dysfunction to weaken the west (see the asterisked items above) and have generally aimed toward world government on the so-called Social Democratic model and they did all that quite well. They effectively emasculated their perceived enemy in the strictest sense of the word. They also fomented hate and discontent on all the fault lines that the British and French created by drawing lines on maps to establish territorial jurisdictions which are now, nominally Nations. They did that in the course of weakening the west (the double asterisks above) and, again, were quite successful.
I take issue with the apparent implication that all that is needed to regulate conflict is the application of that single variable, force/security.Your perception of an implication is your problem. I did not write nor did I imply what you say. What I did write was that the measured application of force can negate willpower, no more. I also said that the west is unlikely to apply great -- I will now say 'adequate' -- force due to the aforesaid emasculation and current societal norms. That failure (and it is that) literally invites us into still more expensive FID rebuilding fiascoes when the object should be to avoid them due to their base inefficiency as a mechanism, their tendency to provide low rate but continuing casualties and the long term commitment and expense entailed.
Over the course of a year in Iraq I learned first hand that the deft application of a mixture of variables (security, governance, economics, information, and diplomacy) in a AO can more or less cost effectively regulate conflict levels. I also note that the daily application of this multivariate formula, to regulate conflict, is often used to great success inside of a variety of nation-states to include the US :wry:I do not doubt that, I've seen that application -- rarely at all deft, just clumsily adequate -- many places and know it can do that. I also have seen tailored and effective (not necessarily massive, just well designed) force properly and rapidly applied then as rapidly removed when the message was sent and received eliminate the need to do the multivirate, multi-year and multi-expensive thing...

Further, I've noted that such an effort removes the need to regulate conflict because the short sharp conflict causes less damage and fewer casualties of all types in the long term.

It is not cost effective to enter into a long term multivariate application of security, governance, economic, information, and diplomatic actions when a short, sharp blow can be as or more effective in eliminating a threat or ameliorating a problem. There may be times when such missions are unavoidable. I've not seen one that met that criteria since 1949. Not one.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Wilf


The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit.

Posted by Ken


The problem is thus lack of political will, not a failure of force. Applying minimal force -- up to your (and the COIN crowd's) probable level -- will doom us to a never ending conflict in which the opposition will ultimately gain the advantage due to western emotional exhaustion.

Turning the other cheek got us where we are...


Easy -- stop interfering with other nations, develop that missing long term view and when attacked, repel the attack rapidly, forcefully, effectively with the right tools for the job and don't get stuck on stupid and expensive (in all aspects) long term building projects while fighting people you don't need to fight.

I agree with Wilf to a point, but there is a large degree of asymmetry in our current western way of conducting political warfare compared to our foes. Insurgency is political warfare at the tactical level (conventional warfare is also waged for political purposes, but the political aspects are generally waged at the strategic level, military force compells State leaders to negotiate).

The communists, the taliban, and others are successful with their use of force because they direct it against the people to the degree necessary to force them to organize politically under their party (dissenters either keep quiet or have a short life). On the other hand, we come in with our western ideas of economic development, free markets, and democracy. In short we're pushing more chaos on top of chaos in a post conflict situation, under the "assumption" that the people will embrace this, when what they're looking for at this point is some degree of security and predictability, not blue dye on their finger. The other side is doing a better job of providing this. If we're going to meddle in other people's affairs, then we need to slow the train down, apply the appropriate level force to suppress the will of the people to fight us, force a form of political organization upon them (the closer to their accepted norms the easier it will be), and then, and only then, if we can afford to be altruistic we can gradually "encourage" them to evolve towards democracy and more effective economic models. I agree with Wilf, insurgencies can be defeated or perhaps more accurately suppressed, but probably not by western forces using our current doctrine. We're too impatient and prolong the conflict by pushing democracy too quickly.

To Ken's points I agree 100%. We have other options (or at least we did before we articulated to the world we were going to spread democracy and free markets) for detering attacks, and we can respond to attacks with overwhelming force when appropriate. We don't have to default to occupation and nation building in every case. Other options generally have a greater chance of success (regardless if that success is short lived or not, because realistically that is the best we can hope for in many cases). Furthermore, in the long run they are less cruel than the current norm of protracted conflict.

In some situations it is in our interests to engage in protracted conflicts, but there seems to be this thought that our nation's strategy requires us to rebuild Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia and a handfull of other countries in our image because that is the only way we can win, which IMO is simply a day dream, and a very dangerous one.

[Ken White]

is an admirable goal, folks forget that military force is not at all amenable to that -- those are intelligence, diplomatic and aid related efforts, all mostly civilian and non-combat functions. Plus the effort is most often not going to produce results worth the risk and cost.

I do not question that we need well trained and adequately resourced IW, CA and PsyOps elements to do FID and SFA. Nor do I question they will be needed when all other options fail. They simply should not be the first -- or the only -- choice. We neglected those areas for too long and while we have now hauled them back aboard, we still need to do more to enhance their capabilities.

However, we also need to do far better in efforts to avoid their use AFTER the issue has developed into a need for force and GPF commitment. We must have the capability to do that but we somehow have to sort out the conflicts that arise from simply having a capability means to many that it must be used. I've carried a concealed firearm, legally and illegally (in some places) for many years but I have yet to use any of them other than twice in quite different circumstances as a display of capability.

This statement of yours:
"...there seems to be this thought that our nation's strategy requires us to rebuild Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia and a handful of other countries in our image because that is the only way we can win, which IMO is simply a day dream, and a very dangerous one." is quite correct and attempts to 'help' that cause more problems and chaos do not really help anyone.

That statement ranks right up there with Dave Maxwell's:
"Perhaps we should strike COIN and CT from the lexicon and talk about real strategy of ends, ways, and means instead of trying to devise strategy based on formulas (e.g., 20-25 troops for every 1000 people) - of course we love the science because it is too hard to explain the art."Strategy is indeed an art -- and good strategy avoids conflict or if conflict must happen, sets the parameters to one's own advantage.

Playing by the other guy's rules is just dumb, no matter how well you attempt to play...

[rborum]

I have heard this argument several times, mostly anecdotally. Matthew Hoh raised it in his letter of resignation.

The assertion is that most of the Pashtun insurgents are not fighting for the Taliban, but rather against foreign presence and a corrupt national government.

I have also heard some suggest - again, anecdotally - that the Taliban knows this and uses that rhetoric in their recruitment / propaganda efforts more than promoting Taliban ideals.

I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:

1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)

2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?

[davidbfpo]

Randy,


I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:

1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)

2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?

I am not sure about polling data for Q.1; which has been discussed here before. As for national government corruption, which is endemic, on the ANP thread(s) their corruption and illegal activities have featured several times. There was a recent story that newly arrived ANP were so bad the locals called for the Taliban's return IIRC.

In Q.2 then, the issue of external support for corrupt local government has appeared in Helmand Province, when the governor was removed due to alleged heroin trading (tons found in his residence) and on a SWC thread (possibly that on the UK role in Afghanistan). Drugs aside he was an effective governor, whose fighters then joined the Taliban!

Late in the day to say more.

[omarali50]

I know my opinion is not based on any direct knowledge of the afghan insurgency, but I am still doubtful about the very term "pashtun insurgency". I think some people are seeing what they are primed to think. I think the people doing the actual fighting are almost all motivated first and foremost by loyalty to the Taliban, not to some idea of Pashtun nationalism. The taliban may appeal to the pride of the Pakhtuns but they are primarily a religious movement. The idea of "Pashtun card" owes more to some Pakistani strategists thinking this is the best way to put forward a "secular" argument against the current Afghan regime. I could be wrong...

[tequila]

How much was the insurgency in South Vietnam driven by Vietnamese nationalism as opposed to Communist belief, a better land reform program, preference for the NLF government over the RVN government, the largest occupying force in the area at the time, etc. ? I don't think we're ever going to get a really solid answer to those questions, moreover because preferences and priorities change over time and vary from place to place.

[IntelTrooper]

The foreign presence thing is a drum beat by savvy Taliban recruiters and leaders. Foreign troops and other personnel frequently offend rural Afghans through ignorant actions more than just being viewed as "occupiers."

[rborum]

IntelTrooper - I love that you have a quote from wilf in your signature line. Great stuff.

What I gather from the comments so far is that (1) there is no systematic (at least open source) data available on the extent to which US presence trumps religious ideology as an insurgent motivator in AFG; (2) it would be near impossible to disaggregate those sentiments from other insurgent motivations anyway.

[j37]

There is some polling data that has been conducted by the BBC. I found it in an article on foreignpolicy.com The article ( http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/afghanistan_is_still_worth_the_fight?page=full ) ran a few days ago. If you'd like to skip the commentary, here is a link to the bbc polling data http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf

I hope this information sheds some light on the subject.

[rborum]

I hope this information sheds some light on the subject.

Very helpful. Thanks j37.

[bellz]

I wouldn't put any money on the accuracy of any poll coming out of Afghanistan on public attitudes, its just simply impossible to get a decent sample

[Schmedlap]

I checked up on Ghosts of Alexander (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/) today and saw that it has been declared dead (who knew that ghosts could die again?). D'oh.

But, I re-read a couple of his older posts, including Petraeus and McChrystal Drink Major Gant's Snake Oil (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2010/01/18/petraeus-and-mcchrystal-drink-major-gants-snake-oil/) and Gravediggers Disinter Tribal Militia Corpse (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2009/11/23/gravediggers-disinter-tribal-militia-corpse/). In doing so, I came across something that I had overlooked before. In his critique of the writings of the Jim Gants's of the world, he posted this piece from the Human Terrain System, published in September 2009.

My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun “Tribes” in Afghanistan (http://www.scribd.com/doc/19595786/My-Cousins-Enemy-is-My-Friend-A-Study-of-Pashtun-Tribes-)

I read through it and found it to be a good explanation for why tribes may not be a good (or even less bad) conduit for us to work through or not a good / less bad unit to empower. That is, it's a good explanation if the observations are valid and the reasoning is sound. It made sense to me, but I'm not an anthropologist and I've never been to Afghanistan.

My question to the board: Is anyone aware of any informed critiques of this paper - positive or negative? Or, for those with relevant knowledge/experience, what are your thoughts on the paper?

[Entropy]

Schmedlap,

I read the paper a couple months ago and, like you, found it compelling. I haven't seen any critiques either.

There was a discussion over at Col. Pat Lang's blog (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/11/how-the-us-funds-the-taliban-roston/) on this topic and he's advocated an approach similar to what's proscribed by Maj. Gant. Col. Lang was also an adviser to the HTT program. I asked him his opinion on the apparent discrepancy between between the two papers regarding tribes. His reply (in the comments to that post linked above):


Some of the HTS crowd are perforce deeply committed to the social science method of looking at just about everything. That means, in this case, that one studies some phenomeneon at the smallest scale possible, with the greatest rigor, and little tolerance for intuition.

UW methods like those promoted by Major Gant work with any set of groups that have self identity in numbers small enough to be affected by you. Villagers, tribesmen, people working on collective farms, moshavniks. You can name any number of categories.

They have to have some leadership. If not then you can provide it yourself. They should have a perceived grievance. Movies are fun. I remember the Nuristani/Kaffiristani villagers in "The Man Who would be King." Their grievance was that the villagers up-stream were "pissing in the river."

That's about all I've seen besides the Ghost's of Alexander posts you linked to above.

[Infanteer]

Maj Gant's article and the debate it has spawned is very interesting and I'm currently trying to catch what I can.

The rebuttal on the "Alexander" blog was alright - the ad hominem attack in the form of "war crime" and "ethnic cleansing" was a silly piece of fluff, and nothing will alienate a significant target audience (and reduce the power of one's own argument) then attacking one of their own like that.

However, the attack on Maj Gant's focus on the tribes is worthy of consideration. Honing in on an area and finding success can be a double-edged sword as success is tied to the unique conditions that spawned it (and the problem). I consider it akin to the analogy of three blind men trying to describe an elephant. One is grabbing the trunk, another the tail and another the foot. When you say "elephant", you are going to get three different answers which all contain an element of the truth.

Maj Gant seems to put a lot of emphasis on "tribes". I have simply not seen this in my experience in Afghanistan, at least not to the level he seems to describe it. I've seen villages sharing the same tribal background badmouth eachother due to feuds that may or may not have anything to do with the insurgency. Even within villages, longstanding disagreements between villagers draw on outside sources to leverage themselves within their community. It is in this maelstrom that things like "Taliban", "ISAF", and "ANSF" find themselves in.

Maj Gant is rightfully receiving accolades for showing how engagements at the lowest - and what are most likely the most stable and legitimate - levels of Afghan society can provide success. However, every small platoon or company out there is going to be fighting a unique little war in its collection of villages, paths and fields and it has to be smart and make the proper assessment (and apply the proper protocol from above) before inserting itself into that conflict.

Anyways, my 2 cents.
Infanteer

[davidbfpo]

This BBC story fits here IMHO:
As the biggest offensive in Afghanistan since 2001 continues in southern Helmand province, the head of council for Helmand's tribal elders, Haji Abdurahman Sabir, tells BBC Pashto's Emal Pasarly about the frustrations of local residents.

More on this:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8522176.stm

[davidbfpo]

Again the BBC:
When Taliban fighters change sides. The Afghan government is having some success in winning over pro-Taliban fighters but the difficulty then is how to guarantee the security of those who give up their arms, as Martin Patience discovered.

More on link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8520754.stm

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to FRI for this description of how engagement works and is apparently ignored by officialdom:
While the battle for Marjah plays out I want to go back and talk tribes with a post about one of the few places in Afghanistan where the traditional tribal system is relevant – the border area with Pakistan in the southeastern provinces of Paktia and Khost.

See:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2604

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den, who commend reading 'Doing Pashto
Pashtunwali as the ideal of honourable behaviour and tribal life
among the Pashtuns' on:http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/20110321LR-Pashtunwali-FINAL.pdf

I am sure there is a thread on such culture matters, but dropped in here. Ah, it was a 2009 RFI and has other sources:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7941

[Granite_State]

Can anyone recommend a good short (30 pages max), readable article or chapter on Pashtunwali I could use to educate my junior Marines (LCpls and below)? Failing that, maybe something a little more in-depth for officers and NCOs?

I did a short search here prior to posting this, but if I missed a SWC thread on the specific subject please let me know.

[Everlasting_Gobstopper]

Although this is not the exact answer to your RFI, there is plenty of cultural information here. Happy hunting.

http://www.dliflc.edu/index.html

[Guardian]

Go to Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. They have Pashtunwali smart cards.

It's a good tool to familiarize Marines with how locals think. However, once deployed, you should try and analyze how locals deviate or follow other patterns of behavior.

[ganulv]

but what I know about the study of social organization in general might throw some light on the initial posters’ query. Elman Service (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Elman_Service) codified the traditional neo-evolutionary band –> tribe –> chiefdom –> state sequence in 1962. The inclusion of tribe within the model was critiqued by otherwise sympathetic scholars due to the lack of a unified definition for the term (Fried 1966; Hymes 1968). In 1985 Joan Townsend proposed ‘autonomous village’ as an alternative (see Carneiro 1987:760–61).

The band/tribe/chiefdom/state typology is still commonly trotted out in Anthro 101 lectures and introductory level textbooks but I personally find the substitution of autonomous village for tribe to be a vast refinement for the following reason: the terms autonomous village, band, and state are consistently used to refer to institutions that have governance as their primary function while the referents of the term tribe typically do not. There certainly do exist tribes which are about the doing of politics. Historical research of such an institution will typically reveal that it emerged out of colonial administrators’ need to have a formally delimited and vetted group with whom to transact business. Such is the case with those tribes recognized (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Federally_recognized_tribes) by the BIA (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Bureau_of_Indian_Affairs) as well as with the Montagnards (for which, see Salemink 1991). Correct me if I am wrong, but don’t the Tribal Areas of Pakistan have an analogous history?

All of that to allow me to say that if you are a representative and/or policy maker from a foreign land looking for parties with whom to negotiate, tribes—excepting of course those you know to be of the sort built to interface with colonial administrators—are probably not the best place to look.



Carneiro, Robert L. 1987. “Cross-currents in the theory of state formation.” American Ethnologist 14 (4): 756–70. doi:10.1525/ae.1987.14.4.02a00110 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ae.1987.14.4.02a00110).

Fried, Morton H. 1966. “On the concepts of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal society.’” Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, ser. 2 28 (4): 527–40.

Hymes, Dell H. 1968. Linguistic problems in defining the concept of ‘tribe.’ In Essays on the problem of tribe, ed. June Helm, 23–48. Proceedings of the 1967 Annual Meeting, American Ethnological Society. Seattle: American Ethnological Society and University of Washington Press. Reprint, Language in use: readings in sociolinguistics, ed. John Baugh and Joel Sherzer. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984, 7–27.

Salemink, Oscar. 1991. Mois and Maquis: the invention and appropriation of Vietnam’s Montagnards from Sabatier to the CIA. In Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge, ed. George W. Stocking, 243–84. Vol. 7 in History of Anthropology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Service, Elman. 1962. Primitive social organization. An evolutionary perspective. Random House Studies in Anthropology, AS3. New York.

[jcustis]

Go to Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. They have Pashtunwali smart cards.

It's a good tool to familiarize Marines with how locals think. However, once deployed, you should try and analyze how locals deviate or follow other patterns of behavior.

Concur on this. I started writing the following before I circled back and saw that Guardian had posted much the same:


There is a small hip-pocket guide book (actually just a small booklet/smart card) put out, if I remember correctly by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity which I found to be functional and practical. It deals specifically with Pashtunwali, and is fairly accurate. I believe it was produced in concert with the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Language (CAOCL). I will have to dig out my copy in order to figure out the title, but the boys in the S-2 shop should be able to get dozens easily

The guide is one of the small products that appeared before the last deployment. The second one that is relevant is the Afghanistan Micro Mission Guide. That one delves with the Pashtunwali in an small way, but is actually more focused on the aspects of initial meetings, how to conduct oneself in a shura, and how to "do the dance" relative to addressing the concerns of the local without promising too much, and while ensuring the elders maintain face. It's a good product too, and when paired with the discussions you will have with the linguists you guys will see attached to the Bn later in the training plan, will give you a good foundation. The rest requires being on the ground.

Take note though that you will likely be dealing with a mix of Pashtun and other tribes, to include Kuchi Pashtun Hit me up offline via .mil email and I will fill you in with more info due to the OPSEC issues.

I cannot remember the name of the blog webpage, but it was produced by some Army folks who I think were on an ETT, and they wanted to share lessons learned with those headed downrange. One of the clutch comments made on a post referred to the time when an elder came to the author and complained about the detention of one of the local men, who was in fact a known insurgent facilitator or such. The elder was giving the author a lot of guff about this guy, proclaiming his innocence to no end. The author flipped Pashtunwali on him in a way, and said something to the effect of, "why do you ask me to compromise my honor as a soldier by asking for me to release these men? I am only doing my duty as I know how to do it. If this man is innocent, then the rule of law will prevail, but I am not responsible for the law. The Afghan people are responsible for the law, and I am here to simply help the security forces enforce it."

Remarkably simple and effective right? I would agree that it was, and I had to use that several times last deploy to put and end to some of the discussion about dead-end topics.

If for some reason you cannot score either of the two aforementioned guides without drama, shoot me an email and I'll dig them up and you can stop by (I am at AITB now) and grab mine. They are good material for the concurrent training at the individual level you guys are doing. The Pashtunwali guide is just right for PFC to Maj/LtCol, so no need for stratification of training at the lower enlisted level, and then the officer level.

BTW, have you hit up some of the XO's to discuss the issue? I can recommend one or two who should have decent gouge, based on their experience from the last deployment, who you could seek out and discuss this requirement with.

If I had to do it all over again, I would try to convince the boss to not worry about the language stuff or cultural training all that much. Having a solid grasp on greetings, a few key words dealing with security and governance, and a grasp of 50-100 control words and about 30-40 control phrases is all you will need to know to do your job. Save the time some devote to Rosetta Stone to studying the threat, the AARs, and talking with the guys (especially the NCOs) from the last deployment. Understanding body language, and talking with the LEPs to get a read on the subtle cues when a suspect is being deceptive, is also a skill you might not otherwise have. Learning it is not intuitive.

The people know you are going to goof it up regardless, and they are very forgiving. Being able to show you are doing what you do in good faith, can listen well, and are sincere, are the most desirable traits I think come into play. I think the cultural consultants have gotten themselves into a pretty nice boondoggle and are making mad cash with little return on investment, or at least relevant return.

[thomasruttigAAN]

try this one, just published. but read the disclaimer (in the intro) that this about pashtunwali's ideal version: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=1567

[Jedburgh]

....There is a small hip-pocket guide book (actually just a small booklet/smart card) put out, if I remember correctly by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity which I found to be functional and practical. It deals specifically with Pashtunwali, and is fairly accurate. I believe it was produced in concert with the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Language (CAOCL). I will have to dig out my copy in order to figure out the title, but the boys in the S-2 shop should be able to get dozens easily....
I think you're referring to the CAOCL pub Afghanistan: Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel, published back in May '09.

...The second one that is relevant is the Afghanistan Micro Mission Guide.
That is also an excellent, concise reference - second the recommendation.

There's also an AWG smart-card type product, their Tactical Pocket Reference: Afghan Key Leader Engagement. And then there's a publicly available CALL pub, Afghan Culture: Observations, Insights, and Lessons (http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p15040coll4&CISOPTR=26&filename=27.pdf), published last Sep and the TRADOC Culture Center's Afghanistan Smart Book (https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/418844/file/55375/Afghan_Smart_Book-Second_Edition.pdf), updated this Jan. And of course there's always the DLIFLC Cultural Awareness and Area Studies webpage (http://www.dliflc.edu/LangPortal/co.html)

Aside from the references, etc., there are a couple of existing briefs floating around out there that you could simply download and update for your needs. One is also from the MCIA, Afghan Cultural Awareness, original dated 3 Jun 10; the other is by LCDR Tauseef Badar of the 3rd Marine Air Wing, Afghanistan for Dummies, original dated 4 Mar 10. PM or e-mail me if you need assistance in finding these.

[jcustis]

Ridicule as a Tool for IO/PSYOPS in Afghanistan (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=46)

I would separate this article above for a more deliberate review at the upper levels of the chain of command, but there are some concepts that go a long way towards explaining why Afghan men do what they do.

It is pretty lame that even though I am required to use my CAC card to get to a sharepoint portal page that appears to support Afghanistan mission prep training, it is very thin on resources, and the ones I did find came after significant digging. Not intuitive at all.

I was able to find your mention
Afghanistan: Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel, published back in May '09. Ted, but that is not the booklet I remember. It is specifically about using Pashtunwali offensively, and that may even be the title. I looked in my deployer bag, and I think I left that one behind for my replacement, since he had never seen it.

Granitestate, like I said before, the S-2 section should be able to get it for you. I just cannot provide the title or publication number at this point. Look for anything titled: Operational Pashtunwali, and with a front cover pic of Afghan elders sitting and looking over their shoulder at the photog. I think I remember it to be spiral bound as opposed to a fold-out like most culture cards. It will have a section that mentions specific Pashto Pashtunwali terms and expressions, and makes liberal mention of the concept of shame, how men use subtle teasing to bring breakers of the code back into line, and the lengths a Pashtun male will go to in order to restore honor. It is an excellent tool because it will help the Marines understand that lying, when set in the Afghan context of shame and honor, has a totally different significance than what we in the West hold.

Additionally, I had the blog page bookmarked after all:

Chai and the Pashtunwali (http://afghanlessons.blogspot.com/2009/05/chapter-3-culture-lesson-3a-chai-and.html)

[Jedburgh]

....I was able to find your mention Ted, but that is not the booklet I remember. It is specifically about using Pashtunwali offensively, and that may even be the title....
There's one that fits that description, but its not a CAOCL or MCIA product - it was published by the NPS Program for Culture and Conflict Studies in June '09 (and is one of the references in the IO article you linked), Understanding Afghan Culture: Operational Pashtunwali:

U.S. personnel hear a lot about Pashtunwali. Most soldiers know from their training that the word means "the way of the Pashtun" people, and that it is a set of social values that determine how a Pashtun man will react and make decisions. Often lacking from training however is the operational linkage: How do you factor Pashtunwali into the planning process? And how do you use it on the street on a patrol? This short article is intended to provide guidance on how Pashtunwali can be translated into operational use.

In military terms, for planning purposes, Pashtunwali could be split into two types of operational use: "defensive Pashtunwali" and "offensive Pashtunwali."
"Defensive Pashtunwali" could be described as a form of force protection. It means observing certain rules of behavior that will avoid angering the local men to the point where they want to set an IED or mortar your FOB to get some payback for being dishonored or insulted. In other words, avoiding negatives outcomes.
"Offensive Pashtunwali" is going a step farther, and using these cultural principles proactively to achieve positive outcomes. The enemy is using Pashtunwali every day against us in effective ways -- but it is a two-edged sword, and we can use it, too.
There's also another MCIA product that may be useful, also from June '09, Cultural Islam in Afghanistan: How the Unique Practices of Afghan Islam Affect the Insurgency Battle:

...Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discouraging local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.

[jcustis]

Once again, you are dead spot-on jedburgh. That is the product for sure.

Granite_State, go to this page: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/index.html


The CCS Occasional Paper Series seeks to further the education and discussion of issues pertaining to culture and conflict in South and Central Asia. CCS disseminates scholarly essays on an ongoing basis that attempt to contribute to the creation of a more stable environment in Afghanistan. These papers identify and discuss contemporary and interdisciplinary issues that affect U.S. national security interests including politics, economics, ethnographic intelligence, culture, geostrategic interests, national and local development methods, regional and cooperative security, terrorism, and tribal relations. CCS papers are written by faculty and staff members of the Naval Postgraduate School, alumni, and guest contributors.

The CCS Occasional Paper series can be emailed to appropriate .mil email addresses. To receive a copy of any or all of our occasional papers, please contact us at ccsinfo@nps.edu or you may contact Professor Thomas H. Johnson directly at: thjohnso@nps.edu. Our papers include:

• Operational Pashtunwali: This paper on "“Operational Pashtunwali” is a slight departure from our previous CCS papers. In response to innumerable requests, we have created a tactical product specifically for squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders that explains the culture of the Afghan south and how to use it in tactical operations. We hope this paper answers the requests, by explaining how the “code” of the Pashtun people can be used both for force protection and as an offensive force multiplier.

And do the footwork to see if the command can request hard copies already bound. Messing around with electronic copies will work as a stop-gap until the products arrive, but the Marines need to booklets. I happened to stumble on the copy I wound up using. I think I came into owning it because Highlander 6 picked up a copy at one of the cultural training sessions he attended at the Division-level before the deploy.


There's also an AWG smart-card type product, their Tactical Pocket Reference: Afghan Key Leader Engagement.

This is also a good piece of gear. I drafted the battalion's KLE SOP with this product in front of me.

Again, this is just my personal commentary, but it's a shame that a product as simple as this could not be highlighted by the right people, to the people who need it. We've got plenty of experts telling us how important it is to use the appropriate greeting and buzzword, but that isn't operationalized to make us more combat effective. The single most important tool I used during the deployment came into my possession through random chance. I don't think we are getting the return on the investment that the cultural gurus tell us that we are.

[Fmr11A]

I doubt any one of these is exactly what you are looking for, but you can excerpt from them, as necessary.

Afghanistan Research Reachback Center, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun “Tribes” in Afghanistan, TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System 5 – 24 (United States Army 2009) available online (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cousinsenemy.pdf).

Thomas Barfield, Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War & Peace, Yale University (February 23, 2007) available online (http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/colloqpapers/19weapons.pdf).

Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, "Tribes" and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005, Crisis States Research Center, Working Paper No. 7 (London School of Economics, September 2006) available online (http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/58063/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/68A83D80-5802-4BAD-89A1-19E4F70BCE67/en/wp7.2.pdf).

Bernt Glatzer, The Pashtun Tribal System in Georg Pfeffer, Deepak Kumar Behera, Contemporary Society Tribal Studies, Volume 5, The Concept of Tribal Society 265 (Concept Publishing Company 2002) available online (http://liportal.inwent.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oeffentlich/afghanistan/40_gesellschaft/glatzer_pashtun_tribal_system.pdf).

Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: Internal Dynamics and Socio-Economic Dynamics and Groupings, 4 WRITENET Paper No. 14/2002 (March 2003), available online (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3e9ae5535.html).

Susanne Schmeidl and Masood Karokhail, The Role of Non-State Actors in "Community-Based Policing' - And Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan, 30 Contemporary Security Policy 318 available online (http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/sites/default/files/Research-And-Analysis/Role-of-Non-State-Actors-in-Community-Based-Policing-Arbakai-South-Eastern-Afghanistan-SCHMEIDL-KAROKHAIL.pdf).

[Jedburgh]

....And do the footwork to see if the command can request hard copies already bound. Messing around with electronic copies will work as a stop-gap until the products arrive, but the Marines need to booklets. ...
Well, I believe someone has taken a look at this discussion thread - CAOCL just uploaded the pdf booklet version of that NPS CCS paper this morning on their CAC-access website.

[blueblood]

Sorry for going offtopic but I found the title "Ghosts of Alexander" mildly amusing because as a race Pukhtoons didn't exists back then. Alexander fought Hindu King Puru (Porus) before the advent of Islam. According to the North Indian folklores, Alexander didn't defeated Porus but got injured during the battle and left along with his Army, thus war remained inconclusive. Some Indian historians too believe that since the Western historians at that time were Hellicentric, the actual report never found it's true place and the Western version became the only version.

[jcustis]

Bonus...:D

That's the way it's supposed to work, when this community can support other communities in their quest to get better and remain relevant. I like that.

ETA: Unfortunately, it is farily un-intuitive to be able to get to the document. Granite_State, I emailed you a copy of the link that should take you directly to the shareport portal and the link to allow access to the .pdf file.

[carl]

The people know you are going to goof it up regardless, and they are very forgiving. Being able to show you are doing what you do in good faith, can listen well, and are sincere, are the most desirable traits I think come into play.

These are very wise words. The same thing works in Africa for civilians too. If falls under the rubric of being a gentleman I guess.


The author flipped Pashtunwali on him in a way, and said something to the effect of, "why do you ask me to compromise my honor as a soldier by asking for me to release these men? I am only doing my duty as I know how to do it. If this man is innocent, then the rule of law will prevail, but I am not responsible for the law. The Afghan people are responsible for the law, and I am here to simply help the security forces enforce it."

This worked in Africa too sometimes when fending off bribe solicitations, sort an honorable man approach. Being a gentleman again, people respect that.

[82redleg]

A couple of links that might be of use:

http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1567

http://www.usip.org/files/file/clash_two_goods.pdf

[davidbfpo]

A book review by SWC contributor Hamid Hussain of The Pashtun Question by Abubakar Siddique:
The Pashtun Question is a timely arrival in view of winding down of U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. Abubakar Siddique is well qualified to tackle the Pashtun question. He is a Pashtun from the tribal territory of South Waziristan and spent his early childhood there. He is anthropologist by training and in his career as journalist he covered Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as Afghanistan. He spent lot of time in the field and familiar with major actors in Pashtun lands on both sides of the Durand Line; boundary separating Pakistan and Afghanistan.
This book is a good resource for general reader as it provides the background of the genesis of conflict on both sides of the Durand Line with detailed analysis of civil war in Afghanistan. For experts, it condenses the thirty year long civil war in less than three hundred pages. Book also provides details of rise of extremism in the region that is now plaguing a large swath of territory and impeding the political and economic progress both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The book’s format is in chronological order of events that provides a very readable historical narrative. Abubakar provides some details about conflict in Waziristan based on his own and other available resources. This segment could have been expanded especially the process of dismantling of tribal structure in a very short period of time. Physical elimination and flight of traditional tribal elders, destruction of traditional instruments of stability in a tribal society and entrenchment of extremist elements in tribal lands needs further exploration. However, coverage of this subject is extremely dangerous and it is very difficult to engage people in serious discussion even those who have fled their lands in tribal territory to cities (this is based on my own visits to the region and interactions with Pashtuns from diverse backgrounds). Many tribal leaders have been assassinated even in major cities of Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Karachi. I was reminded of this fact when few years ago, I was reviewing some old colonial era files at Peshawar archives. I was going through the file of a tribal elder of Mohmand tribe spanning his life in first half of twentieth century. One of the officer working in the archives was also from Mohmand tribal agency and he told me that the son of this tribal elder fled to Peshawar after militants took control of the area. He was shot dead near his house in Peshawar.

In writing about an ethnic group, the narratives of a native and outsider provide unique perspectives. An outsider can be more objective in his analysis of the group as he is not part of the intra-group rivalries. However, he can easily miss the insight of the group due to language and cultural barriers. This is the case of most of the work done about Pashtuns in English language by British military and civil administrators. A native can bring the insight in view of being the member of the group but he can also downplay the inherent weaknesses of the group and tend to blame everything bad to outside forces. There is very limited scholarly material published by Pashtun authors. Abubakar’s work is a welcome addition and being a Pashtun, he is able to bring mirror in the room to highlight the weaknesses of Pashtun society. He skillfully analyzes how Pashtun groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan used outside sources for power struggles in their lands. Armed conflict is a painful event but it has its own rules. No matter what outside forces want, it was Pashtun who happily blew up electricity pylon on Jalalabad-Kabul highway for a handout of $100 in 1980s and 1990s and today ideological indoctrination from an extremist Arab and hand out from a rich Arab living in luxury in his own country, he is beheading his own people and blowing up schools. He is responsible for his acts and must be held accountable for destroying the present and future of his own people.

The author argues in the book that rise of extremism and violence in Pashtun lands is due to failure of nation states of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is not unique to Pashtun areas and violence emerges from some kind of failure of the state and society. This rule is equally applicable to the carnage of two world wars where belligerents were developed countries as well as violence in failing states of Africa. Pushtuns have also been beneficiaries where they ruled Afghanistan as royalists, communists and Islamists and in case of Pakistan were able to get more than fair share in civil and military bureaucracies as well as economic sphere. The author addresses the important question of how to extricate the Pashtun society in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the violent cycles by resolving existing border disagreements, adhering to principle of non-interference and political and economic progress of both countries.

The Pashtun Question is a must read for those engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan. More importantly, it should be read by Pakistanis and Afghanis especially Pashtuns. This will help jump start a discussion among Pushtuns about their future. Th author should seriously consider translation of the book into Urdu and Pashtu to make it available to a wider audience in the region.

Available from London based Hurst & Co:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-pashtun-question/ or via Amazon:http://www.amazon.com/Pashtun-Question-Unresolved-Pakistan-Afghanistan/dp/1849042926/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1398517435&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Pashtun+Question

[davidbfpo]

Welcome aboard.

Alas the Forum Search function is not working nowadays.

However I know we had stuff so took the long route. TRy these threads, assuming you have not found them:


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?8975-The-Pashtun-factor-(catch-all)
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?7941-Pashtunwali
One of them points to this PDF (20 pgs) http://www.afghanistan-analysts.net/uploads/20110321LR-Pashtunwali-FINAL.pdf
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?4165-The-Struggle-for-Pashtunistan
Mike Martin has two books, the first being reviewed by moi in Post 120 via:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?19742-What-Are-You-Currently-Reading-2014/page6 and a more general book:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?27247-New-book-Why-We-Fight-by-Mike-Martin&highlight=martin
Have you looked at Carter Malkasian's book, also on Helmand? Which has comments in Posts 56, 57, 58 & 68 via:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?3192-What-Are-You-Currently-Reading-2013/page4
Finally try this NGO website, even if it covers the FATA, not Afghanistan:http://www.understandingfata.org/about-u-fata.php

[davidbfpo]

I have merged four threads here and changed the title to Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all).

Alas the search function no longer works well.

[davidbfpo]

A topical update from National Interest. It is sub-titled:
The resurgent Taliban are driven only partly by religion. They are motivated equally, if not more, by the search for Pashtun dignity and revenge.
Link:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182? (https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-and-changing-nature-pashtun-nationalism-41182?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ebb%2014.01.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief&page=0%2C1)