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Rifleman
10-24-2007, 07:08 PM
We've cussed and discussed just about every conceivable rifle squad design on another thread. And I, for one, have really enjoyed everyone's input.

So moving on to a different take on the same issue: should light infantry organizations organize into permanent squads at all?

I'll start the ball rolling with two links to articles by British author William Owen. Owen advocates a small platoon divided into several big fire teams. The platoon leader could control all the teams himself or mix and match the teams into ad hoc squads for operations as he saw fit. So, using that theory, at different times you could have light squads, heavy squads, mixed squads, two team squads, three team squads, and various combinations.

Here are the links:


A small amount of study will reveal that the vast majority of the world’s infantry units are organised along roughly the same lines. This is often interpreted as being indicative of certain well-founded principles. Close examination shows this to be less than certain.

Complete article here: http://www.geocities.com/drakonok/Organising_Infantry.html


The purpose of this article is to describe an alternate tactical doctrine, training, and organization for light infantry units and subunits. The intended purpose of presenting an alternative is not to criticize current or existing concepts, but to aid thought and understanding by showing an alternative that may have some positive merit, if correctly understood and applied.

Complete article here:http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_95/ai_n16346580/pg_1

It seems to me that Owen's proposals would require the addition of one or two more platoons in a company to keep the end numbers roughly the same.

The firing line is ready. Commence firing!

Ken White
10-24-2007, 09:05 PM
First the positive.

He argues that more flexible infantry can be had through superior training, that most infantry units are capable of doing a far higher level of qwork than doctrine currently suggests. I totally agree.

He then discusses a training regimen that has merit.

He advocates as I have for many years a great deal more care in the selection of entry personnel for the infantry and better training for NCOs.

He objects to the process of placing trained infantrymen in support jobs. Good!

Second, the caution.

He essentially espouses elimination of blanket doctrine for local developed TTPs. While I personally have little problem with that, I believe both the Lawyers and the Legislators will have significant problems with the concept. Both of those tribes have great influence and neither is going away.

Lastly, the objections to his organizational proposal

The flaw in his organizational argument is exposed early on in your first link:


"This leads to a debate between soldier and accountant, where the soldier states that a section must be eight men, and the accountant then asks “can 6 men with the right equipment, do the same job as 8?”"

My counterpoint to that is to ask the Accountant if he can operate with two fewer Analysts and could better combine his auditing section with his compliance section. I suggest that excessive interference by accountants has already done enough damage to the force structure, no further involvement is needed. Owen then follows that inanity with another:


"Few have yet asked, “how do I best organise infantry to perform operations?”..."

That's been asked for at least one hundred years by a number of people -- who not only asked but have rigorously tested some answers. In the second link, he offers this near his summary:


" The first is that the majority of Soldiers are too stupid to understand what some believe to be a complex idea, and the second is that any entertaining of such an alternative doctrine would fatally undermine current concepts."

While I acknowledge there are those who would take one or both approaches, I do not believe the majority of professional soldiers would do so. They would look at what he offered, most with at least some acceptance that the Troops are capable of doing far more than we ask of them, we just generally do not train them as well as we should so if the Troops are not operating at full capability, the fault is with the senior leaders, not with the Troops. There will always be those who are reluctant to change -- again, they're a minority. Thus I suggest his postulation is flawed.

He then says:


"First, the idea is probably not complex. It is fundamentally simple and logical, as is 90 percent of real world infantry work once broken down into its component parts. It is only the layers of process that we insist on adding that make it appear complex. Stripped of its comic book mystique, sniping is a fundamentally simple skill; however arcane its exponents wish it to appear. It can also be taught and applied simply, and thorough practice and experience will almost always lead to a useful degree of skill. Someone unable to master its most basic knowledge and application probably has no place in an infantry unit. The absolute enemy of PBI is process, as expressed in the proliferation of procedure and drill. The aim of process and drill is to reduce judgement because judgement allows for error. The aim of PB is to require simple and rapid decisions at the lowest level."

Aside from a minor disagreement on sniping -- no mystique to it, it is simply not a job everyone can do and to say any Infantryman can do it is fatuous -- I agree with the rest of that paragraph. Unfortunately, it does not support his prescription, quite the opposite -- it negates it.

Simple and rapid decisions at the lowest level are made by Team Leaders on a daily basis and by Squad Leaders constantly. ant marginally competent Squad Leader -- much less Platoon Leader -- is capable of and often does set up a specific task structure at odds with the TOE.

A five man team is organizationally weak, one absence hurts, two make it inoperative and will lead to a combing teams. Even a nine man squad (inadequate but the Army appears stuck with it for a while) has some staying power, a five man team doesn't. Three days of full bore war would simply destroy the Team.

More importantly, he's missing the educational and training process of being a team Leader and then a Squad Leader and of learning to lead an ever increasing number of people in ever increasingly complex tasks.

Even worse, he's breaking the tight bond at squad level to place people in an amorphous Platoon -- and that's why it's a bad idea

wm
10-25-2007, 01:15 AM
Even worse, he's breaking the tight bond at squad level to place people in an amorphous Platoon -- and that's why it's a bad idea

Ken has hit on the the bottom line regarding the failing of the proposal.

Small units need to be small in order to prpoduce the bonds and interoperabality that makes actions on contact become second nature and instinctive. Even in sports, teams with more than 5 or 6 players on the field subdivide into smaller "teams": Football--5 linemen, 6 backs; baseball--infielders and outfielders; rugby--8 forwards, 7 backs; soccer--3-6 offensive players, 3-6 defenders. Even with these various sub-arrangements, I think they usually further sub-divide into even smaller "teams" that are in the 3-5 person range. As some one noted elsewhere on a thread, three's company.

I suspect a better answer at platoon level would be to keep the squads (although I want 10-man squads--2 5-man teams,one led by the SL and the other by his A/), add a large weapons squad with 3 3-4 man MG teams (gunner, a/gunner, 1-2 ammo bearers at least one of whom could also be a grenadier) that can be tasked out to the squads or held back as a GS base of fire for the Platoon as a whole.
At the company level along with the 3 line platoons include a robust weapons platoon that has both 2-3 MG squads of 3 guns each and 1 or 2 mortar sections with at least three tubes in each, which again can be attached to platoons or used in a DS, GS, R, or GSR role as mission, enemy, and situatiuon dictate/warrant. (Irwin Rommel considers MGs indirect fire weapons in his discussions of small unit tactics at company level and below in Infantry Attacks. I agree with that perception.)
I would probably also add a section equiped with a small UAS (like the Raven) to the Company HQs section.

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 01:23 AM
Very much agreed Ken.

This does not make for either a cohesive, let alone sustainable, fighting element. Using a four man brick to patrol the streets of Belfast in an Aid to the Civil Power operation is one thing; clearing such a city in an actual war is quite another. Use a 4-man brick to clear houses, and one of the times it goes into one, it will never come back out. That's a squad's/section's job; not a fire team job, not a platoon job. Same thing with clearing an enemy trench position. Sure, a fire team (led in turn by a buddy-team, one man covering, the other grenading/shooting/rolling-in/bayoneting/changing-mag/giving-thumbs-up for rest to move in, etc.) makes the break-in, and then the rest of the assaulting squad moves in; one fire team clears ahead, another guards the break-in point, and if you're USMC, you can rotate the fire teams doing the clearing with hardly skipping a beat - not giving the enemy any let-up. Meanwhile, the rest of the platoon watches your back and suppresses the enemy until they're sent in covered by the rest of the company.

To do the same thing with Owen's organization, the whole 30-man platoon would be required to do what a 13-man Marine squad can do all on its own, and half of that 30-man platoon would be better used elsewhere. One 5-man assault team makes the break-in, covered by the rest of the platoon, fine. Then another 5-man assault team has to follow to either cover the break-in, or to take over the lead during clearing. The rest of the platoon continues to cover. But there's a problem with this.

The 5-man assault team has only 2 riflemen to clear with. You don't clear unless you have to with an LMG, there's often not space, and it's too heavy to bring to bear before someone with a rifle or carbine beats you to the draw. Dead gunner. An LSW is even worse, being longer and almost as heavy - and having to be reloaded as often as a rifle. Dead LSW gunner. The Grenadier is also handling an unwieldy weapon, and if he's the team leader, dying early on would be rather bad form. And so, just because there's 5 men in the trench, doesn't mean you've got 5 guys to clear with. There's only 2, the others amounting almost to dead weight in close-quarters. So, a third 5-man team has to come in to rotate with the lead 5-man team clearing. That leaves a fourth 5-man assault team and a 5-man fire support team and a 5-man Plt HQ team (some Sherry while you wait, Sir?) more or less idle and taking up space, as the other platoons should be covering the assaulting platoon. But there's not enough strength left in the assaulting platoon for even another squad-level clearing. Wasteful.

And if you want to clear houses, you'll have to reorganize the entire platoon before doing so.

So, anything from an 8-9 man Section/Squad or a 13-man Marine Squad, and 3 of each per platoon = 24/27/39 infantry (not including Plt HQ), plus varying heavy weapons. Compare this to 30 per platoon (including 5 at Plt HQ and another 5 are with Heavy Weapons - leaving 20 for digging out and killing the enemy. And this is just at the beginning of a war (and assuming everyone's authorized TOE is full to start with - hehe).:wry:

In practice, cohesion matters aside (Ken took care of this once and for all), the 30-man platoon is going to die real fast. The 5-man assault teams will be down to 2 (at most) within a couple days of heavy, sustained battle, whereas the Commonwealth/US Army 8-9 man sections/squad will be down to about 4 men at most - a fire team. The USMC 13-man squad will still muster at least 6-men much of the time. So much for Owen's 5-man "Assault Team" in real-war conditions. Not to mention, with an LMG and an LSW, plus a grenadier, the 5-man "assault team" is left with only 2 riflemen best suited for the actual assault. The LMG is necessary, and so is the Grenadier, and so are the riflemen - but not the LSW.

If you want a dedicated rifleman to take out enemy crew-served weapons and other long-range targets, put a few riflemen with AR's with bipod and telescopic sight (like the LSW) at platoon HQ to do that; attach a said-equipped AR man to squad from platoon if tactically necessary - but don't task the assault team with both the close- and long-range firefights. At section/squad, they may be too preoccupied with suppressing the enemy immediately to their front to be able to deal with enemies further back.

And if the GPMG crews in the fire support team each need 2 guys to carry 2 belts of ammo, they better send their unfit carcasses to the rear and bring the physically fit forward. I carried the GPMG (my pet name for it was the "G-Pig") and not less than two belts of ammo on my person (only about twice did I carry more - one time was out of newbie stupidity [4 belts], the other time was against my will). A couple other guys were to carry three belts each (and this was as a Platoon-level weapon). At Section level, 2 belts of ammo carried by each individual GPMG gunner (so long as they are not assigned SF tasks as well, just the Light Role) is enough to start.

If you are using GPMGs as heavy weapons, and especially in the SF role, you need at least 4 men per gun, preferably 6. Each GPMG gunner (at platoon or company level in commonwealth Armies) is issued with 8 boxes of ammo (1,760 rounds); an SF Kit with Tripod (weighs more than the GPMG), spare barrel, two Tritium aiming lamps, aiming stakes, mortar dial-sight, tool and cleaning kit, spare parts, etc.; spade; plus his own and the team's personal weapons and kit. In addition, the Gun Commander has binoculars, range-finder, and a 1:50,000 scale map. And I'm not even adding a Gun Controller here to coordinate the fires of the guns.

Even without the Gun Controller, the 5-man fire support team is seriously undermanned (and I suspect rather under-equipped and under-supplied) to effectively crew 2 guns - and before battle losses. There are good reasons the USMC holds GPMGs at Company level, and only detaches them out to platoons when tactically appropriate; Commonwealth Armies typically either hold a single GPMG at each Company and Platoon HQ (the Brits briefly experimented with 2 GPMGs at Platoon, and scrapped it), or hold them all in a MG Platoon at Battalion. I have doubts about the US Army practice of 2 GPMGs at Platoon level.

What these articles don't seem to grasp is that the 8-man Commonwealth Section was too small for the jobs it had to do; it used to be 10 in practice and up to 11 in theory. Likewise for the 9-man US Army Squad; Army testing determined that a 13-man Squad was best, but an 11-man squad was cheaper and could still do the job - but for a shorter time than the 13-man squad, and once that squad reached 8, it could no longer function effectively as a squad. Turning around and saying that 5 men can do an 8-9man job is dubious; it is downright erroneous (attributable it seems to ignorance - Owen gives no indication that he is aware of what the size of the Commonwealth Section/US Army Squad was in fact intended to be in order to carry out its tasks) to say that 5 men can do the job of what has been found to require 11-13 men. Both the Commonwealth Armies and the US Army determined that not less than 11 men were required for the Section/Squad - not 10, not 9, not 8, and certainly not 5.

What Owen is describing is a reinforced Section, but calling it a Platoon.

Finally, Infantry NCOs should receive formal, thorough training at all levels. Owen is alright here. In the Commonwealth, each private infantryman should have six months of good solid basic infantry training, and in his first year in his Battalion, have received an additional 3-6 weeks advanced infantry training in either reconnaissance, machine-guns, mortars, AT, or assault pioneering. After about 3-4 years in the Infantry, he should go on his NCO course. In the Commonwealth, this may be either an Infantry Section Commander Course of about 14 weeks (qualifying the new NCO for command right through platoon sergeant), or separate Junior and Senior Leadership/Command Courses, taken a few years apart; either way, an NCO's basic NCO training should amount to 3 months of good, thorough training. And before anyone thinks that this is excessive, the Wehrmacht used to make its sergeants undergo as little as 3 and up to 6 months of NCO training.

I apologize for this long post, it's a fault of mine.:o

jcustis
10-25-2007, 01:42 AM
I'll offer these two points, as you guys are demonstrating a grasp of minor infantry tactics that is making my head swim right now.

First it seems that Owen wants a number of absolutes; with more sub-units a coy commander can constitute a full reserve. While I can see he point, a reserve need not be a complete platoon.

Take the movement to contact scenario, for example. Depending on the likelihood of enemy contact, a company commander could assign the flank security task to a platoon and pull a full squad from it and make it the reserve. I've established a small, but capable, reserve in the past. Committed properly, it can seize the day without the need for the entire 40+ man platoon to lumber into the attack.

I'm glad that the business of task-organizing is so ingrained into Marine infantry that we don't need neat structures to facilitate it.

Secondly, we'd have to bring in a former member of the RLI to confirm for me, but IIRC, the Rhodesian equivalent of a platoon in modern sense (for organization purposes) was a "troop" of 16 men organized into four 4-man sticks. These folks were definitely PBI, and for almost no other reason than COIN naturally drives the skill sets to focus on recce patrolling and observation.

The business of organizing in such a fashion could have come as much from the means of mobility as it did the abilities of the troop leaders. We must note that the Alouette could only carry 4 men, and the DC-3 Dakotas (carrying paratroopers for the follow-up sweeps) carried up to 16 men. We are no doubt re-organizing our infantry forces in Iraq due to their mobility. It makes sense to do so because it definitely makes no sense to have Jones from 2nd team in a vehicle manned by 3d team, but reporting to the 2nd team leader.

I think Owen is on point with the training aspect. I think any leader worth his rank has complained about those things limitng his ability to traing, whether it be ammo, batteries, equipment, or "area beautification" details. It hasn't changed much, although I must admit that the current goings-on have openend peoples' eyes and reduced the bull#### to a manageable level.

Permanent squads make the business of assigning subordinate tasks a bit easier because you are dealing with the rule of 3s. I can attest that the more maneuver elements you have, the more friction you inherit. While a looser organization may have some merit, I can only imagine certain tactiacl scenarios where we'd benefit from a more distributed structure.

Rifleman
10-25-2007, 02:04 AM
I remember reading in James McDonough's excellent book Platoon Leader that his first platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade consisted of three six man "squads." I've read elsewhere that many Vietnam era rifle squads were in reality big fire teams of 5-7 men. There was no squad fire and maneuver, only fire and movement forward or back. Enveloping attacks didn't begin until platoon level.

Since companies seem to arrive at small platoons divided into what amounts to large fire teams I thought it was worth considering having it as doctrine, as long as the company's total strength was the same. It would be the same number of troops, just broken down differently.

Look at it this way: a nine man rifle squad has to organize into a single fire team at about six men, or after about 33% casualties; a six man fire team has to combine with another fire team at about three men, or 50% casualties. I thought there might be some advantage to that.

All things considered, I like traditional squads best - at least when they're big squads. The only reason I thought Owen's proposals should be discussed is because the Army rifle platoon often arrives at something similar after sustained combat.

Rifleman
10-25-2007, 02:45 AM
Since companies seem to arrive at small platoons divided into what amounts to large fire teams I thought it was worth considering having it as doctrine, as long as the company's total strength was the same. It would be the same number of troops, just broken down differently.

You know, I read what I wrote again and realized that I didn't even believe it myself. :o

COIN, LIC, OOTW, etc., seems to be more of a platoon and squad fight, so it probably won't matter if the company end numbers are the same. Platoons, squads, and fire teams need to be where the robustness and sustainability is.

Here's to Owen's big five man fire teams.....grouped into big platoons and squads. ;)

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 12:41 PM
You know, I read what I wrote again and realized that I didn't even believe it myself. :o

COIN, LIC, OOTW, etc., seems to be more of a platoon and squad fight, so it probably won't matter if the company end numbers are the same. Platoons, squads, and fire teams need to be where the robustness and sustainability is.

Here's to Owen's big five man fire teams.....grouped into big platoons and squads. ;)

Especially in BIG Squads and Platoons.

Here, Here!:)

goesh
10-25-2007, 01:21 PM
Small group/unit cohesion and bonding that starts with a boot camp platoon should be disrupted by totaling reasigning everyone, completely mixing them up about half ways through and then again in infantry training. Granted, bonding is critical but small group bonding is familial in nature, maternal, and family roles can assume at times importance and status almost equal to the mandates of command and control, doctrine and discipline. You are putting people into an alien environment and they form family roles, very subtle things to understand, and I am only suggesting that C&C, D&D, which is paternal, has to intially take absolute precedent over the hearts and minds of the green weenies. Once they get into the real life of the military and direct application, they will bond with their brothers. 7 is a magic number when it comes to crew size IMO.

Norfolk
10-25-2007, 08:38 PM
7 is a magic number when it comes to crew size IMO.

goesh, how would this 7-man element be organized? Somewhat akin to the SEAL squad, or something else?

Steve Blair
10-26-2007, 12:39 PM
I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).

Norfolk
10-26-2007, 12:49 PM
I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).

Ah...I see. Steve, how was the SOG team kitted out? My understanding was that they were typically organized for/as Recon (with some exceptions perhaps), so usually "light" on the heavier weapons (typcially no LMGs/GPMGs, etc.)

As I recall, the SEAL squad organization was more akin to a conventional fire-and-movement infantry squad (albeit smaller to fit entirely into assault boats): a squad leader (a junior officer), and two 3-man fire teams, each with an LMG, a grenadier, and a rifleman. Two such squads made up a SEAL platoon (the senior squad leader commanding the paltoon, the junior squad leader as 2i/c). Of course that was a few years ago now, and things may have changed.

Steve Blair
10-26-2007, 01:03 PM
SOG teams tended to travel fairly light (so you're correct there)...basic weapon was the AK or CAR-15/XM-177E2. The Hatchet Force was obviously heavier and did carry LMGs. SOG did have tons of air ordnance on call, so that to a degree offset their light organic weaponry (note that it's to a degree, but their basic mission was recon/targeting).

During Vietnam the SEALs tended to operate in teams ranging from 3-7 men, if memory serves. They had heavier weapons, in part due to their use of the Stoner system that allowed for a fairly light LMG-type weapon. SEALs didn't tend to do tons of long range patrolling, so they could go heavy on weapons and light on other stuff. Platoons tended to break into two sections for operational purposes...one "on" and one "off" if memory serves (although I could be suffering from CRS, so any corrections are appreciated).

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

Norfolk
10-26-2007, 01:09 PM
On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.

OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!:D

Steve Blair
10-26-2007, 03:06 PM
Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.

OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!:D

I'll dig it up. They didn't go into tons of detail because it was an unclassified forum, but there was some sweet stuff in there.

The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....:wry:

Norfolk
10-26-2007, 03:31 PM
I'll dig it up.

The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....:wry:

Thanks Steve!:)

Steve Blair
10-26-2007, 03:33 PM
It's in the Summer 2000 issue of Special Warfare. The title is "One Zero Conference." I've got a pdf version if needed.

Rifleman
10-26-2007, 05:36 PM
On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.

I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.

Ken White
10-26-2007, 05:54 PM
talks to those guys, the even more devastating item is your comment that I highlighted below. The trend is, apparently in the direction of OVER control -- when it should be just the opposite.

Sad. :mad:


...
. . .
... Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.(emphasis added / kw)

Steve Blair
10-26-2007, 06:06 PM
I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.

I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.

I'm actually not sure. The article didn't go into much detail, and didn't discuss the 1-0 participants in terms of names. It's certainly worth a read, though. Some very good stuff.

Adam L
10-28-2007, 02:10 AM
I’ve been following this thread and the “Rifle squad composition“ and I just have to point out/ask a few things.


What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
I have been seeing a big range in size of platoons, squads, etc. and I am wondering if it is even reasonable to compare and 8, 13, 17 man squad. Are they even the in the same ball park?
Should the concept be better trained fireteams 3-7 men (for the sake of argument 4) with the capability to be combined into squads of different sizes and capabilities based on the demands of the operation. What I am really asking is should there be “sub” parts to squads and platoons to enhance flexibility. Should a 16 man squad be able to break down into 2 x8 man squads, or take 2 x 16 man squads and break it into 2 x 12 man squads + and 8 man squad. My point and question is should there be more of a move away from doctrine that will never meet every requirement and towards a more flexible system?Now, please tell me whats wrong with this.:D

jcustis
10-28-2007, 03:12 AM
What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.

I would like any squad to be capable of accomplishing the various roles found in MCWP 3-11.2, The Marine Rifle Squad. I forgot to reference that pub as a little evidence that the Corps has applied a lot of thought to the business of fighting the squad.

Norfolk
10-28-2007, 03:15 AM
I’ve been following this thread and the “Rifle squad composition“ and I just have to point out/ask a few things.


What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
I have been seeing a big range in size of platoons, squads, etc. and I am wondering if it is even reasonable to compare and 8, 13, 17 man squad. Are they even the in the same ball park?
Should the concept be better trained fireteams 3-7 men (for the sake of argument 4) with the capability to be combined into squads of different sizes and capabilities based on the demands of the operation. What I am really asking is should there be “sub” parts to squads and platoons to enhance flexibility. Should a 16 man squad be able to break down into 2 x8 man squads, or take 2 x 16 man squads and break it into 2 x 12 man squads + and 8 man squad. My point and question is should there be more of a move away from doctrine that will never meet every requirement and towards a more flexible system?Now, please tell me whats wrong with this.:D

Adam L, I think we're looking for a basic and generic rifle squad to build upon. I might be wrong, but it seems that a rough consensus is emerging in favour of larger squads. Tom, Ken, jcustis, and I like 13-14 men in a squad, and Rifleman likes it too, but would settle for the old 11-man if he could get it. And the reason for that preference seems to comes down to three major things.

The first is a preference for "1 Up, 2 or 3 Back" formations, especially in the attack, in order to maximize suppression of the enemy and minimize friendly losses. Of course you can get away with just two fire teams in a squad in a company or a platoon attack, but it's harder to do in an independent squad attack, since you don't have that third team to perform the assult while the other two suppress.

The second is the size of the rifle squad after sustained battle attrition. Cleary, an 8 or 9 man squad doesn't have to lose very many people before it becomes just a fire team, whereas a 13 or 14 man squad may still muster two small fire teams after suffering very heavy losses.

The third is that the 3-fire-team squad seems to naturally lend itself to adaptation, either by detaching fire teams out, or receiving attachments from elsewhere; the 3-team squad's triangular structure is shared more or less all the way up the hierarchy of echelons, where all sorts of task-organizations and cross-attachments occurr as a matter of course. And with this concept of the 3-team Squad in mind, it only seems natural that the Squad can likewise be task-organized when tactically appropriate. So, it can be expanded by adding fire teams or heavy weapons teams, or it can reduce or split up as needed (patrols, OPs/LPs, guard duties, etc.) But the 3-team structure always acts as the base, a basis for change. The 2-team squad seems a little more rigid in some ways, not least because if it detaches just one of its teams, it's reduced to a single team itself.

As for your "mix'n'match" proposal Adam, there's nothing particularly wrong with that.:) I don't see any particular difficulty in reorganizing a platoon or its squads as its commander sees fit to meet the tactical situation. But it seems that a large squad, of 3 teams, and a large platoon of 3 such squads, normally organized along the lines the USMC prefers, works quite well for most conventional infantry combat with little or no major modification.

And in those situations where major reorganization is required to meet less conventional (unconventional?) tactical situations, this organization provides a good, solid base upon which to make necessary changes. I think that a smaller squad, and a smaller platoon might be much more hard-pressed to make such changes out of hide, not least because it's starting out with less, and with only 2 rather than 3 teams per squad, it has less flexibility to begin with.

Rifleman
10-28-2007, 01:13 PM
As for your "mix'n'match" proposal Adam, there's nothing particularly wrong with that.:) I don't see any particular difficulty in reorganizing a platoon or its squads as its commander sees fit to meet the tactical situation. But it seems that a large squad, of 3 teams, and a large platoon of 3 such squads, normally organized along the lines the USMC prefers, works quite well for most conventional infantry combat with little or no major modification.

And in those situations where major reorganization is required to meet less conventional (unconventional?) tactical situations, this organization provides a good, solid base upon which to make necessary changes. I think that a smaller squad, and a smaller platoon might much more hard-pressed to make such changes out of hide, not least because it's starting out with less, and with only 2 rather than 3 teams per squad, it has less flexibility to begin with.

I know I'm going off topic here, but read what Norfolk wrote substituting brigade for squad and battalion for team.

There have always been times when two battalions were enough. There have always been times when four were needed. Hasn't a three battalion brigade proved to be a good, common sense sized base element to task organize up or down from? I'm talking about line battalions in a brigade. I'm not counting the cavalry squadron.

I remember reading somewhere that in light units some of these new two battalion brigades have deployed with a third battalion attached.

Coldstreamer
11-05-2007, 04:16 PM
Since when did military logic dictate the size of a force?

Ken White
11-05-2007, 05:17 PM
Benefit of 'civilian control.' Good news is that the "Force" allotted will make it work, mostly. If at considerably more cost than was expected... :(

William F. Owen
12-14-2007, 05:08 AM
I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).

SOG Teams, as concerns OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch, were entirely task organised, and there was no standard configuration. I interviewed 12 SOG patrol leaders for my novel (Blackfoot is Missing), and I discussed this particular issue with them at some length, as it was dear to my heart. Smallest "recon" team I know of was 4 men, (done only once) and the largest recon team I heard of was 12-13.

Dirty little secret - SOG OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch was the model for my Patrol Based Infantry concept - so while I understand all the reservations folks have posted, getting up to speed on SOG operations between 1965 and 71 may give some clues as to where I am coming from. - should anyone really care and I am amazed that some of you do!!

William F. Owen
12-14-2007, 05:37 AM
Since when did military logic dictate the size of a force?

Since when did we create military logic?

William F. Owen
12-14-2007, 05:52 AM
Adam L,

1. I think we're looking for a basic and generic rifle squad to build upon.

2. I might be wrong, but it seems that a rough consensus is emerging in favour of larger squads.


Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

Distiller
12-14-2007, 08:40 AM
Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

How do you see the question of keeping the squad small enough to fit "as one piece" into APCs (provided you procure/design one that can take 9+crew) and UH-60-type air assault helicopters?
You might be able to pack 14 men (another nice number for a 3 team squad) into a helicopter, but never into an APC.

William F. Owen
12-14-2007, 08:55 AM
How do you see the question of keeping the squad small enough to fit "as one piece" into APCs (provided you procure/design one that can take 9+crew) and UH-60-type air assault helicopters?
You might be able to pack 14 men (another nice number for a 3 team squad) into a helicopter, but never into an APC.

I believe Platoons should be optimised for their dismounted role. Mounting them in a vehicle or APC is just getting them from A-B. (MICVs are a whole different box of frogs!)

You do have to make a choice about total number of men versus available vehicles, so that does have an effect. "If" your platoons are 30 men, and your vehicle only carries 6 men, you'll need 5 APCs versus the 4 you'd need if they carried 8 - so the budget might not be their, and there might be logistic penalties as well. 3 APCs or MRAPs that can carry 10 men would life the whole platoon, but you'd have no spare seats.

Norfolk
12-14-2007, 03:08 PM
I believe Platoons should be optimised for their dismounted role. Mounting them in a vehicle or APC is just getting them from A-B. (MICVs are a whole different box of frogs!)

You do have to make a choice about total number of men versus available vehicles, so that does have an effect. "If" your platoons are 30 men, and your vehicle only carries 6 men, you'll need 5 APCs versus the 4 you'd need if they carried 8 - so the budget might not be their, and there might be logistic penalties as well. 3 APCs or MRAPs that can carry 10 men would life the whole platoon, but you'd have no spare seats.

Wilf, completely agreed on the point that all Infantry Platoons need to be optimized for thee dismounted role. Closing with and destroying the enemy is their raison d'etre.

I think our concern with Section/Squad size has to do with their ability or inability to perform Fire-and-Manoeuvre. It's the old, does the Section/Squad do one or the other (the "Old" way) or does it do both (the "New" way)? The "Old" way, when the Section/Squad either Fired or Manoeuvered within the context of the Platoon Attack made it possible to have maybe 10 men between the Gun Group and the Rifle Group, and Bob was your uncle. Now, the "New" way of course has two Fire Teams/Assault Groups alternating Fire-and-Movement all the way in during the Platoon Attack, as if the rest of the Platoon isn't even there.

That's wrong, and with only 8 men in the Section or 9 men in the Squad and no more or less stable base of fire to support them (like the old Gun Group did), they take a lot of looses on the way to the objective. In The RCR, we were told that an 8-man Section would take 60% losses in the first 24 hours of offensive operations (this was presumably against an entrenched Soviet Motor-Rifle Troops, with dug-in Tanks, IFVs, the lot).

If you have the time, sometime, these two pieces by my Regimental Adjutant
may provide an idea of where we're coming from:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk.htm

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk_part2.htm

William F. Owen
12-14-2007, 03:33 PM
I think our concern with Section/Squad size has to do with their ability or inability to perform Fire-and-Manoeuvre. :

[/URL]

I posted this in the platoon weapons thread. I think it is relevant here:

I see there as being two things that the platoon needs to do as concerns weapons. First you need Teams (3-5 men?) to conduct reconnaissance so that weapons teams – again 3-5 men – can get weapons into places where they can do the most damage to the enemy. This is as old as the hills and has been around for years. Wigram detailed this in his 1941 “Battlecraft” pamphlet, and then added to it in his post Sicily battle notes.

The “Recce” Teams should be lightly loaded so as they can best do their task. The weapons teams would then be optimised to support the weapons they are equipped with.

As a straw man and in the absence of any other ideas, I’d have 3-5 “Recce” teams under the platoon commander, and 2-4 weapons teams under the Platoon Sergeant.

...so why not emphasise F&M at the Platoon level instead of at the Squad/Section?

Yes, read the Regimental Rogue stuff some years ago.

Norfolk
12-14-2007, 03:40 PM
...so why not emphasise F&M at the Platoon level instead of at the Squad/Section?

Agreed, and we'd like to, but unfortunately "Peacetime Doctrine" has this fixation upon organic fire and movement within the Section - admittedly, that's a mindset that has to be fixed at higher echelons - the ones who write the doctrine - but it does spawn a "pepperpot straight into the enemy's guns" tactical mindset at Section and Platoon levels. In practice, Platoon and Section commanders are often discouraged or at least not encouraged to develop and use their own tactical judgement, and so just settle for a rote prescription.

Norfolk
12-14-2007, 03:45 PM
Agreed, and we'd like to, but unfortunately "Peacetime Doctrine" has this fixation upon organic fire and movement within the Section - admittedly, that's a mindset that has to be fixed at higher echelons - the ones who write the doctrine - but it does spawn a "pepperpot straight into the enemy's guns" tactical mindset at Section and Platoon levels. In practice, Platoon and Section commanders are often discouraged or at least not encouraged to develop and use their own tactical judgement, and so just settle for a rote prescription.

The basic reason why larger squads/sections seem to be favoured here, is to provide greater flexibility and ability to sustain battle losses in order to make F&M at that level work.

Edit: I pressed the wrong button: that's why this ended up being its own post, rather than just being an edit of the previous post. And I certainly did not intend to quote myself!

Penta
12-14-2007, 09:50 PM
Random query from an amateur observer: What about psychosocial issues in terms of span of control?

From my life experience, limited as that is, I've found that once you get much beyond 10 people (self included), you begin to need to split things up in order to be able to know the people involved (and coordinate their actions) to any substantive level. I can only imagine that gets worse in the environment faced by combat forces.

Is my perspective horribly broken? Is there something I'm onto here?

Norfolk
12-14-2007, 11:46 PM
Random query from an amateur observer: What about psychosocial issues in terms of span of control?

From my life experience, limited as that is, I've found that once you get much beyond 10 people (self included), you begin to need to split things up in order to be able to know the people involved (and coordinate their actions) to any substantive level. I can only imagine that gets worse in the environment faced by combat forces.

Is my perspective horribly broken? Is there something I'm onto here?

No Penta, you're asking very valid questions. Some of that is covered in the monographs that Rifleman has posted links to on this thread already. But unless we're going to dig up Granicus and other Span-of-Control Theory writers, the monographs are probably good enough. That, and especially the personal experience of the Infantrymen on this thread. Offhand, the US Army Infantry School's own studies indicate a ratio of leader to led of 1 to 5 is the max before things takle a slide; Granicus 40 or 50 years ago figured 3-6, with 4-5 as optimum. Penta, we're struggling with some of the same questions you are here.

slapout9
12-15-2007, 12:35 AM
I was around when the first Police SWAT teams were being formed in the late 70's and the model which still largeley exist today is a 5 man fire team. if it is a large incident and more teams are involved they are used in a similar manner as Wilf has described, and I just recognized the similarities at least if I understand him correctly. Some federal SWAT teams operate as larger units but we stayed away from them because it ended up turning in a cluster f...

Ken White
12-15-2007, 03:04 AM
... Some federal SWAT teams operate as larger units but we stayed away from them because it ended up turning in a cluster f...

Personalities and span of control can do you a job...

William F. Owen
12-15-2007, 03:11 AM
The British Platoon of 1918-1936 was comprised of 4 x 7 man sections/teams. 2 sections were rifleman, and the other 2 each had a Lewis gun and carried a lot of ammunition. The HQ was 3-4 men. Sergeants commanded most platoons. When the BREN was procured in 1936, the idea was to give each section a Bren gun, but to save money they reduced the sections to 3, and made them 8 men instead of 7. The 3 men now spare manned the new 2-inch mortar.

In 1943/44 Lt Col Lionel Wigram suggested, and may have practiced, what I call the Wigram grouping concept. Taking an under strength platoon of 24 men, 7 men under the platoon Sergeant manned the three Bren Guns, 3-4 men manned the 2-inch Mortar, and the rest under the platoon commander, formed 2 rifle sections. The Rifle sections main task was to get the Bren Guns as close to the enemy as possible, to kill the enemy. So the rifle teams found postions for the Bren group. Once the Brens were in place and firing the rifle teams went off to find or gain a closer or better position.

The Australians are experimenting with Platoon 1/39, which is 40 men organised into 6 x 4 man fire teams, and 3 x 4 man fire support teams. This can be configured anyway the platoon commander sees fit. Either as 3 x 8 man sections with a 12 man FS group or as 2 x 12 man sections of 2 fire teams and 1 support weapons team. David Kilcullen, whom I have met and discussed this at length with, was instrumental in this concept.

The IDF infantry have 36 man platoons (Machlaka) comprised of 3 x 12 man section (Klass) of 3 x 4 man teams (Huliyah). There is no platoon HQ. The Platoon commander leads one of the Klass. He is free to alter the exact number in each team or number of teams in each section, as best suits the mission.

All in all team based modularity aimed at making the Platoon the minimum manoeuvre unit does seem to be catching on, in sharp contrast to the current US and UK approach.

slapout9
12-15-2007, 05:14 AM
When I was in 72-75 the rule was to fight 3 to 1 if you had a choice. In other words a platoon would attack a squad. We did have an annual squad ORTT (operational readiness training test) which was done squad vs squad. But the platoon was the main unit, squads would do recon patrols or ambushes but it was always done as part of a platoon operation. Our platoons and squads were pretty small. When I first went in they were still drafting people and I think it was about 90 days later the draft ended. This put us at an extreme personnel shortage for awhile. In my company 1st platoon was 15 men for almost a year and a half, 2nd platoon was a little better and 3rd platoon my platoon was the largest at about 40 men. Which was broken down into 3-11 man squads and the rest was a Hq section to include PLt. Leadr,Sgt. and RTO's.

Distiller
12-15-2007, 06:50 AM
Looks a bit like the old German system again, or a light version of the weapons platoon, or a mini-company. 24 men rifle pool, GPMG teams, 60mm mortar teams, AT4 teams. 45 men.

slapout9
12-15-2007, 01:58 PM
Hi Distiller, a full platoon was actually 53 men as I recall. 3 rifle squads and a weapons squad, which consisted of 2 M-60 machine gun teams of 3 mean each plus a squad leader.

I have read your posts about the squad size relative to the vehicle you are using for transport and while not the main consideration of how big a squad can be it does have an impact. Example on Airmobile ops my squad (11 men) would have 8 on 1 Huey helicopter, the remaining 3 would be on another helicopter along with part of another squad to fill up all the spaces. I did not like breaking up my squad like that for movement and then sort them out and put them back togather to continue the mission.

Distiller
12-20-2007, 11:37 AM
I thought a little bit about it. Two developments I postulate: (i) the threshold for combined weapons ops is getting ever lower , (ii) new C3 technology enables a flat organization. Thus: If there is an echelon you could abandon it's the platoon. And you could organize the company - as the largest pure/non-combined unit - 100% flat along rifle-, GPMG-, MGL/mortar-, and guided missile teams. What you don't have at company level, you don't get. Non-combined-weapons units of battalion size and upwards (thinking about regiments here) will become rare I think, esp in small wars.

William F. Owen
12-20-2007, 12:16 PM
I thought a little bit about it. Two developments I postulate: (i) the threshold for combined weapons ops is getting ever lower , (ii) new C3 technology enables a flat organization. Thus: If there is an echelon you could abandon it's the platoon. And you could organize the company - as the largest pure/non-combined unit - 100% flat along rifle-, GPMG-, MGL/mortar-, and guided missile teams. What you don't have at company level, you don't get. Non-combined-weapons units of battalion size and upwards (thinking about regiments here) will become rare I think, esp in small wars.

Err....:eek: Want to give an example? How does C3 Technology alter the span of control? A Coy Commander Controls 12 Teams?

Distiller
12-20-2007, 01:18 PM
By giving the individual teams more freedom and responsibility, use technology to get away from micro-management (not the other way round, as it looks like now).
By turning unit leaders more into managers. (You might be familiar with the German "messen - steuern - regeln", inadequatly translated into English as "instrumentation, control, and automation", so more "regeln" than "steuern").
Then I think the question could be not about controlling the teams, but the action vectors (attack/defense/movement/...). And how many action vectors could you have in a company?
Expanded Auftragstaktik.

Norfolk
12-20-2007, 02:46 PM
By giving the individual teams more freedom and responsibility, use technology to get away from micro-management (not the other way round, as it looks like now).
By turning unit leaders more into managers. (You might be familiar with the German "messen - steuern - regeln", inadequatly translated into English as "instrumentation, control, and automation", so more "regeln" than "steuern").
Then I think the question could be not about controlling the teams, but the action vectors (attack/defense/movement/...). And how many action vectors could you have in a company?
Expanded Auftragstaktik.

I appreciate the innovation Distiller, but I must say that I very much doubt that what you propose is practical. One of the problems with it is that if, say the Company leadership is killed or incapacitated or communications is seriously disprupted (and it happens even with the Company Commander and the Company 2i/c in two separate locations), Command and Control breaks down almost completely. With the Platoon Level still there, one of the Platoon Commanders takes over the Company and the Coy carries on.

And Management does not work even at Higher Echelons - Leadership is necessary even there. In the Field, Management does not work at all, even in peacetime - there is just too much pressure and too much adversity and too many things going wrong, even on Ex - for Management to do anything but exert a dead-weight at best, or become a positive hindrance at worst. All the Echelons are necessary, and prior attempts to change that have all failed, because the basic needs of Command and Control revolve around Leadership; Management Theory and the like are hopelessly detached from its practical realities. Put no stock in them.

Rifleman
12-20-2007, 05:50 PM
SOG Teams, as concerns OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch, were entirely task organised, and there was no standard configuration. I interviewed 12 SOG patrol leaders for my novel (Blackfoot is Missing), and I discussed this particular issue with them at some length, as it was dear to my heart. Smallest "recon" team I know of was 4 men, (done only once) and the largest recon team I heard of was 12-13.

Dirty little secret - SOG OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch was the model for my Patrol Based Infantry concept - so while I understand all the reservations folks have posted, getting up to speed on SOG operations between 1965 and 71 may give some clues as to where I am coming from. - should anyone really care and I am amazed that some of you do!!

Wilf,

Point taken; however, I'm still not convinced that it's the way to go for standard infantry. Both flexibility and modularity have advantages, of course, but so does habitual association. Where to strike the balance?

The very experienced Special Forces NCOs leading Nungs and Montangnards in SOG made flexibility work to their advantage. But then again they finished the conflict with more Medals of Honor, per capita, than any other unit in Vietnam. That's a tremendous testimony to their ability. Do we think that most green 2d Lieutenants could or would be capable of operating that way?

It's also worth noting that some other SF projects like Popular Forces, Mobile Strike Forces, and Mobile Guerrilla Forces pretty much stuck to a traditional infantry organization.

I'll have to order a copy of Blackfoot is Missing. By the way, did you happen to interview retired Command Sergeant Major Samuel Hernandez? He was a one-zero at CCN and made the first HALO jump in Vietnam with RT Florida. John Plaster's book SOG mentions him. He was also my Battalion Command Sergeant Major from 1984-1988.

Rifleman
12-20-2007, 06:03 PM
Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

Wilf,

You're articulating your position very well, so yes, you are making sense.

It's just that if I was a green 2d Lieutenant and you gave me six fire teams, some heavy and some light, I would be tempted to habitually group the same teams together into defacto squads of two or three teams each, instead of mixing and matching differently for each contact.

I don't think I'd be alone in doing that either, so now we're back to where we started from.

Rifleman
12-20-2007, 06:30 PM
I posted this in the platoon weapons thread. I think it is relevant here:

I see there as being two things that the platoon needs to do as concerns weapons. First you need Teams (3-5 men?) to conduct reconnaissance so that weapons teams – again 3-5 men – can get weapons into places where they can do the most damage to the enemy. This is as old as the hills and has been around for years. Wigram detailed this in his 1941 “Battlecraft” pamphlet, and then added to it in his post Sicily battle notes.

The USMC squad seems to have been doing this well since 1945. Their squad design allows you to use one team as a scouting fire team.



The “Recce” Teams should be lightly loaded so as they can best do their task. The weapons teams would then be optimised to support the weapons they are equipped with.

The USMC teams have always been balanced - at least on paper - instead of light and heavy, but that's not carved in stone. Ken White wrote of a USMC squad leader in Korea who would sometimes consolidate his BARs into one team.



As a straw man and in the absence of any other ideas, I’d have 3-5 “Recce” teams under the platoon commander, and 2-4 weapons teams under the Platoon Sergeant.

I'll have to think about that.


...so why not emphasise F&M at the Platoon level instead of at the Squad/Section?

I'm not in a position, or experienced enough, to say that the platoon should or shouldn't be the focal point for fire and maneuver. In fact, I think with the U.S. Army it really has to be that way, since their squads are not really big enough to fire and maneuver.

Fire and maneuver usually became a platoon function for the Army in Vietnam anyway. Their squads - two fire team squads on paper, of course - always ended up as a machine gunner, grenadier, and a handfull of riflemen. More or less the German Gruppe. You can see this portrayed in the film Hamburger Hill and the novel The 13th Valley.

I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.

Wilf, keep writing please. :) I'm not always in agreement but it's always a pleasure to read.....so far. ;)

Oh, how do you like my avatar and signature? :D

Ken White
12-20-2007, 07:34 PM
I've stated my preference for the 13 man USMC squad, it is totally flexible and provides adequate power for almost every conceivable mission. The USMC organization also puts the crew served stuff at Co level where, as Norfolk says, it is best trained and controlled. It doesn't need a lot of tinkering.

Army squads can and do use fire and maneuver (as most understand that term) and are capable of independent operations -- and squads DO get (and should get) independent missions. The only time they don't is when a lack of leadership capability above their level gets on a "force protection" kick and is lacking in the testicular fortitude to trust 'em and let them do their jobs. Admittedly, that happens entirely too often nowadays...

Even with the smaller Army unit size, you effectively get six four man recon (or whatever) teams and while I'd rather see the MG and Javelins * at Co level, the Weapons squad concept does work and does have the advantage of forcing the PSG and PL to think of weapons and support on a constant as opposed to an as required basis.

( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

Still, having been in both in conventional and COIN ops for real as well as in peacetime, stateside training -- the Marines have it right. The Army model will work and I have no doubt a competent Pl and PSG in either can do anything I've seen suggested in this and the related threads.

Either model can be reorganized internally and for specific missions as the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant decide; at least in my experience, they don't have to ask anybody. That said with the caveat that at the beginning of a war, some senior NCOs and Officers can be unduly hidebound -- but that is their problem and those types aren't likely to get to close to the booms, bees and snap of combat and can generally be politely and discretely ignored.

At the rifle Company level, bigger is better. There are a lot of force multipliers out there but at the level of the Infantry company, most are not terribly helpful; adequate strength to deal with human frailty, combat losses and other attritional factors is imperative. The Marines understand that; they also understand the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" rule... ;)

The factor many miss at that level when they start with the reorganizing what-ifs is the training value of Teams and Squads. Many theorists operate on the fallacy that every one in the Platoon (or any other level) is well or at least adequately trained in his job. They aren't and never will be; humans fail, need leave, dozens of factors -- there are ALWAYS new people coming in and, particularly in war time, they will never be fully trained and competent -- particularly at combat troop leading. That's why the civilian penchant for "flattening the pyramid" does not work for combat organizations (not to mention that it doesn't work all that well in civilian industry, either :wry:). Being a Team leader is the elementary school, Squad leader is Middle School and the PSG is the High School -- none of them need a degree, much less an advanced degree but..

Don't go to war without them. :D

Rifleman
12-20-2007, 09:03 PM
( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

Oh boy, I gotta tell you a story. It has nothing to do with this thread, but I gotta tell you a story. ;)

March of 1988: 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment - that great unit of units - has finished an FTX in Grafenwohr, Germany and is flying back to Vicenza, Italy. That great Alpha fire team leader extroidinaire (that would be your's truly, folks) who is due to ETS in one month has been selected by his platoon sergeant for the distinguished honor of jumping back into Italy with an item known as.....a Dragon Missile Jump Pack.

Why not, huh? We've got a squad full of cherries and the Bravo fire team leader is about 5'5". The cherries don't have enough jumps to be trusted with the thing and the Bravo fire team leader can barely get out the door without dragging his rucksack on the floor anyway. Your's truly is 5'11", had forty-something static line exits at that point, and used to jump the M60 regularly. So it falls to me. Who can fault the platoon sergeant's logic? :mad:

With a DMJP I should have been the lead jumper in the starboard side stick but I got bumped back to #3 somehow. IIRC, the jumper who took my door position was wearing gold oak leaves and was an "S" something or other but I might not be remembering that correctly. I believe #2 was the assistant "S" something or other.

We started in-flight rigging at two hours and twenty minutes out. Unlike the others I didn't do a complete rig, just main and reserve. At the twenty minute warning I stood up and the starboard side safety helped me hook up my ruck and the DMJP. I sat back down to watch a cherry across the isle blow chunks into a barf bag for a few more minutes of nap of the earth till the ten minute warning. :wry:

Oh boy, this is my last jump and I'm going to make it my best ever.

Red light, jump commands, doors open, fresh air, jumpmaster door check, green light!

Like a cherry that I wasn't supposed to be I brushed the DMJP on the leading edge of the starboard side troop door and staggered off the step in one of the sloppiest body positions I ever had. :o I more or less just fell into the prop blast.

Twists! Twists! Twists! Past the risers and halfway up the suspension lines.

Bicycle, bicycle, bicycle, bicycle!

When I cleared the twists I lowered my ruck and just got that *x#@* DMJP lowered when I heard my ruck hit the ground. The DMJP didn't make it all the way down my 15' lowering line.

I did get my feet and knees together but I didn't get much of a slip pulled.

Balls of the feet, buttocks (what happened to calf and thigh?) pushup muscle, and back of the head (added that one for good measure). Hey, at least I managed not to smack an elbow.

Ah, memories. Some days I miss it and some days I don't. Today.....I miss it!

Ken White
12-20-2007, 09:15 PM
We all get one like that sooner or later. I hit a tree one day and swung into it, smacking my canteen in to my kidney; cussed the AF, the tree and the canteen, finally climbed down my reserve and dropped ten feet to the ground, started to the Assembly point which meant crossing a corner of the DZ --and after I saw all the barbed wire fences and people with cuts was ready to go back and kiss the tree...

Lemme dispel a Jump School myth; body position has nothing to do with twists, it's the Static Line. If, in the process of unhooking it, tossing it over your shoulder and then eventually hooking up, you keep it perfectly straight, you won't have any twists; let it get twists in it before you hook up then exit the bird and that flat doubled over nylon strap will straighten itself out by twisting your deployment bag after the suspension lines are out and before the chute fully deploys. I convinced the 82d Jump School of that, they took it to Benning, Benning didn't want to hear it so they're still teaching it wrong. The Glory (and rep) of the School transcends mere reality...

Having said that, don't change your story, it's great... :D

Norfolk
12-20-2007, 10:03 PM
Airborne!:D

William F. Owen
12-21-2007, 01:55 AM
Wilf,

@The very experienced Special Forces NCOs leading Nungs and Montangnards in SOG made flexibility work to their advantage.

@It's also worth noting that some other SF projects like Popular Forces, Mobile Strike Forces, and Mobile Guerrilla Forces pretty much stuck to a traditional infantry organization.

@ did you happen to interview retired Command Sergeant Major Samuel Hernandez? He was a one-zero at CCN and made the first HALO jump in Vietnam with RT Florida.

@ Yep, but the Yards were pretty basic (every brave) folks. What works for them could well work elsewhere.

@ I had long talks with Ken Bowra who trained FANK Battalions in RVN. He even gave me copies of all their training programs. This was primarily to do with scaling equipment and inter-operability with conventional US Forces.

@Never met him. Doug Miller had agreed to talk to me and then fell ill and died. All the other guys I talked to are listed in the book. I have talked to many more since.




@ Fire and maneuver usually became a platoon function for the Army in Vietnam anyway. Their squads - two fire team squads on paper, of course - always ended up as a machine gunner, grenadier, and a handfull of riflemen.

@I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.

@ Oh, how do you like my avatar and signature? :D

@ In WW1 it certainly was and became so in WW2, for the UK. I have written extensively on the fact that the whole concept of section/squad F&M was a mistake caused by badly written manuals.

@ In Northern Ireland they just grouped 2 x 8 man sections together and formed "multiples," which were 3-4 x 4 man teams. Generally the platoon was split into 2 halves, one lead by the Platoon Commander and one by the Platoon Sergeant. This works. We have 25 years of continuous proof! In 1995 the UK did documented field trials which showed the same basic principles worked well for the Platoon attack as well.

@ Ah yes, the Avatar. Are you by any chance, an American? ;)

...and when Washington gives back all the plantations the rebels stole from my family, I'll be a lot happier! :wry:

William F. Owen
12-21-2007, 02:00 AM
( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)


I don't doubt the weapon sucked, but don't fixate on that. It's the idea. Look at the AT-7/13. Guided weapons in the Platoon is IMO, a very good idea, but Javelin is just too expensive for most armies, and maybe even the UK. We have now faired our entire war load of Javelins in Helmand!!

Ken White
12-21-2007, 02:28 AM
The idea is not which missile (I'd even go with a Carl Gustaf), it's just to avoid one that does not work and is unlikely to be made to do so.

Your ancestors went in the wrong direction. My Tory Great, Great, Great, Great Grandfather headed west to Kentucky and did rather well for himself... ;) So did my equal number of greats Rebel Grandfather. Alas, their Great, Great, Great Grandchildren married and squandered it all leaving me like unto a Churchmouse... :D

Norfolk
12-21-2007, 02:46 AM
On my mother's side (specifically through her mother's side), my ancestors were tarred and feathered and driven out of New England, Tories they were. As United Empire Loyalists, they made their way to Ontario. Once again, on my mother's side, a hundred years or so after the Great Tax Revolt Across the Great Lakes, more of my ancestors (specifically through her father's side) ran away from home in the logging camps of Michigan and came to Ontario. And my father's side were British soldiers, and English Bluebloods at that, for which they received Imperial landgrants for their service in the Boer War; my paternal grandmother (she was a US citizen) always complained that "The side of the family that stayed in England got the Lordship, and the side that came to Canada got the work."

And I have always viewed Rifleman's signature with much amusement; and a lot of those Hessians settled around the area where I live in the years after the Tax Revolt by Those People Down There and again after the War of 1812.

Ken, I respectfully object to the Eryx: after the Government bought them, the Infantry Battalions promptly put them into storage and kept using the Carl G's because the Eryx wasn't as good and the Gunner had to track the missile all the way to the target. At ranges of 600 m and less, that was not considered conducive to the survival of the Missile crew in the seconds after launch. The Carl G's of course could be fired and then you just got out of there macht schnell.

After a few years, DND got curious as to why they hadn't heard anything about the Eryx being used, and when they found out that the Battalions had simply locked them up and tossed the key away, DND got pretty unhappy and ordered the Carl G withdrawn from service and stored and the Eryx to be used by the Battalions. That, and a few other bright ideas like deleting the Assault Pioneer (since restored after battle experience in A-Stan) and Mortar Platoons (still waiting to hear if they will be restored) from the Infantry Battalions made DND even more popular with the Troops than they already were.

William F. Owen
12-21-2007, 03:34 AM
Ken, I respectfully object to the Eryx:

Eryx is a frigging joke, and yes Carl Gustav M3 with 1,000m HEDP, and the Simrad sight is a winner in comparison.

Ken White
12-21-2007, 03:35 AM
...
Ken, I respectfully object to the Eryx: after the Government bought them, the Infantry Battalions promptly put them into storage and kept using the Carl G's because the Eryx wasn't as good and the Gunner had to track the missile all the way to the target. At ranges of 600 m and less, that was not considered conducive to the survival of the Missile crew in the seconds after launch. The Carl G's of course could be fired and then you just got out of there macht schnell.

After a few years, DND got curious as to why they hadn't heard anything about the Eryx being used, and when they found out that the Battalions had simply locked them up and tossed the key away, DND got pretty unhappy and ordered the Carl G withdrawn from service and stored and the Eryx to be used by the Battalions. That, and a few other bright ideas like deleting the Assault Pioneer (since restored after battle experience in A-Stan) and Mortar Platoons (still waiting to hear if they will be restored) from the Infantry Battalions made DND even more popular with the Troops than they already were.

I just grabbed a name -- as I said, the issue was not to select a particular missile or system but to not select one particular missile. :wry:

As for the CG, not a great tank stopper but great for a lot of other things, if a bit weighty.

Re: the troops and DND -- world wide story... :(

I hope the Troops win. ;)

William F. Owen
12-21-2007, 04:01 AM
As for the CG, not a great tank stopper but great for a lot of other things, if a bit weighty.


Yep, CG even damaged an Argentine Corvette!!

A bit weighty!!! I carried the bl*ody the M2. 32lbs!! (The M3 is some 23lbs)

Plus my myself and the number 2, frequently hauled 4 rounds. Back when I was a Platoon Sergeant I watched a very stressed young soldier throw the CG into a drainage ditch, and seek to continue without it.

We had a quick discussion as the wisdom of his actions and then he then went in search of the missing item, which was successfully retrieved. - so yes, weight is an issue!!

Ken White
12-21-2007, 04:12 AM
. . .
A bit weighty!!! I carried the bl*ody the M2. 32lbs!! (The M3 is some 23lbs).
. . .

The M3 has a tendency to break. The Rangers and the SEALS have had some problems with it.

The M2 is ultra reliable; with either version you have a lot of ammo choice which is a good thing, add the Simrad sight and you've got a better deal than most missiles for most purposes.

jcustis
12-25-2007, 08:41 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Distiller
I thought a little bit about it. Two developments I postulate: (i) the threshold for combined weapons ops is getting ever lower , (ii) new C3 technology enables a flat organization. Thus: If there is an echelon you could abandon it's the platoon. And you could organize the company - as the largest pure/non-combined unit - 100% flat along rifle-, GPMG-, MGL/mortar-, and guided missile teams. What you don't have at company level, you don't get. Non-combined-weapons units of battalion size and upwards (thinking about regiments here) will become rare I think, esp in small wars.

Err.... Want to give an example? How does C3 Technology alter the span of control? A Coy Commander Controls 12 Teams?



By giving the individual teams more freedom and responsibility, use technology to get away from micro-management (not the other way round, as it looks like now).

While there is precedent for a coy commander commanding up to 12 teams (w/ assistance from a few Lts as "stick leaders"), decentralized control and freedom of maneuver did not always flow along the same lines. Depending on the C2 platform utilized to control the contact, 4-man sticks of the Rhodesian Security Forces were often held on a tight leash to avoid geometry of fires issues and focus the efforts of multiple small elements.

Even with robust and agile communications assets, I think we will still see a limit to the independent action that current planners and dreamers envision. There is so much we have to get right first, at least from the Marine Corps' perspective. First, the advanced training pipelines need to get squared away or we need to find a better way to deliver the same top-notch instruction that is available out of the schoolhouses. Second, we need a personnel stabilization system in place that addresses retention issues and truly puts the right pegs in the right holes. Lastly, the systems folks need to rdeuce the tinkering with gear and start settling on K.I.S.S. solutions that are robust enough to last a generation or accept modular upgrades without much fuss. Case in point, we went from ALICE to MOLLE to ILBE in less than ten years, and that damned MOLLE was only around long enough for some procurement officer and team to get a Navy-Commendation Medal and a round of performance bonuses (the pack subsequently proved itself to be junk).

This ballet has to happen together in order to make our larger DO plans fit, and I honestly do not see it headed in that direction. If we have well equipped teams/squads/platoons, but no one worth a damn to operate the gear and utilize proper minor tactics, the DO structure will devolve to some nastier incarnation of what we already have.


I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.

Excellent point. I think I commented as such elsewhere, but once you start taking troops out of their primary roles as shooters and make them the linguist handler, photographic documentor, tactical questioner, etc., there is a slight altering of the kinetic effects the previous 4-man teams can deliver. The business of strapping satcom to someone's back either means a commo sergeant (a'la SF) carries it, or we are going to continue to see specialists hump the set, yet that specialist will not be much of a snake-eater in other respects.

*On a totally unrelated subject, why is it that I can cursor through my cellphone's graphical user interface with ease and accomplish just about any task, but the screen face of the PRC-148, remote terminal screen of the PRC-150 and -117 kick my ass? When are the developers going to take a tip from the cellphone, game screen, and PDA?

Uboat509
12-26-2007, 11:03 AM
-The problem with six man teams vs. three squads of two or three teams is simply an issue of control. Asking a PL to maneuver six elements without the benefit of squad leaders would be a nightmare. PLs depend on the squad leaders. The fireteam leader is engaged in the fight with his team. His job is to lead literally from the front. The squad leader is somewhat disengaged from the fight, remaining where he can best control his subordinate team leaders. From there he is able to maintain much better situational awareness then the team leader. As such he is capable of maneuvering his element on his own as well as coordinating with the other elements in the platoon and assisting the PL.

-Bottom up doctrine is a nonstarter. Individual squads, platoons and companies must have their own SOPs but these SOPs must adhere to a basic published doctrine. Without a solid frame work to build those SOPs individual units will end up doing things in very different ways. When those units do work together it tends to dissolve into chaos. I have to have a least an idea what the man to my left and right are going to do even if we have not worked together before.

-We cannot afford to ignore the effect of mechanization on infantry. As has been previously noted, few armored vehicles hold more than seven or eight dismounts. More importantly is the simple fact that mech infantry fights differently than light infantry. The presence of armor and the 25MM gun significantly changes things as well as adding more maneuver elements as well as more subordinate leaders.

-I do not understand the emphasis on the recce patrol and the LP/OP. Is this patrol based infantry supposed to be some sort of elite formation whose primary purpose is reconnaissance? It seems to me the author was advocating all infantry being organized this way.

SFC W

William F. Owen
12-27-2007, 02:05 AM
-I do not understand the emphasis on the recce patrol and the LP/OP. Is this patrol based infantry supposed to be some sort of elite formation whose primary purpose is reconnaissance? It seems to me the author was advocating all infantry being organized this way.

SFC W

Not sure how to explain it better than I did in the article, but here goes.

1. This was written to make people think about the how and why of dismounted operations. The base of the idea comes from a fairly in depth study of MACV-SOG, Ground Studies Branch, and the UKs Royal Marines, based on extensive interviews, and presentation/written feed back to concepts and ideas. - but so what! :wry:

2. Essentially modern infantry are not optimised, either in training or equipment to fulfil core functions in terrain where dismounted operations are the primary enabler. - thus my statement that infantry should aim to fulfil the FIND function. - which is why there is the Recce and OP emphasis.

3. Infantry should operate in a combined arms/joint approach to operations. This impacts on the carried weight issue, and can be looked at in terms of an actual loss in capability the more weapons and protection you have men carry.

4. Once on foot, all infantry should fight the same way, but the reasons they do not is nothing to do with the role of infantry. It is to do with equipment and organisation issues. A friend of mine who commanded a Para Battle Group, put one of his companies in Warrior MICVs for one exercise and guess what. Nothing changed. They just jumped out and did what they did, and when they needed to go somewhere they jumped back in.

5. A UK Lt Col actually wrote to me about this article saying he liked it, but said it was impossible to make work, as raising the infantry bar made people who thought they were "special" or "Elite" less elite, and thus the objection to this concept comes from the people whom it supports! :rolleyes:

...which goes a long way to informing my opinions about infantry doctrine, equipment and organisation being primarily the product of emotion and opinion, never held to rigour!

William F. Owen
12-27-2007, 02:16 AM
-

-Bottom up doctrine is a nonstarter. Individual squads, platoons and companies must have their own SOPs but these SOPs must adhere to a basic published doctrine. Without a solid frame work to build those SOPs individual units will end up doing things in very different ways. When those units do work together it tends to dissolve into chaos. I have to have a least an idea what the man to my left and right are going to do even if we have not worked together before.
SFC W

Agreed they must have their own SOPs but adhere to what published doctrine? This is exactly what I am saying. The soundest tactical SOPs come from the men who have to do them, and that should be a reflection of well written doctrine. Doctrine is WHY, not HOW. Bad SOPs can be error checked by doctrine, be that a VCP or searching a cave. - it's all been done before.

Look at the Battle Drill fiasco! Battle Drill was one of the most innovative and powerful infantry concepts of the 20th century. - and it was a made a total mess of by the so called "published doctrine," written by men who had no idea what it was - as most do not today, EG- the chap who wrote StormTrooper Tactics. - clearly understood nothing about battle drills - and the same mistake is made today by the US Army and their battle drills

William F. Owen
12-27-2007, 02:27 AM
-The problem with six man teams vs. three squads of two or three teams is simply an issue of control. Asking a PL to maneuver six elements without the benefit of squad leaders would be a nightmare. PLs depend on the squad leaders. The fireteam leader is engaged in the fight with his team. His job is to lead literally from the front. The squad leader is somewhat disengaged from the fight, remaining where he can best control his subordinate team leaders. From there he is able to maintain much better situational awareness then the team leader. As such he is capable of maneuvering his element on his own as well as coordinating with the other elements in the platoon and assisting the PL.


I disagree. it is not a control issue. Control is but one issue. Take 24 men and spilt them into 3 squads of 8. Put those squads under SLs, who can then sub-dived the squad as they see fit. - FG and RG or two fireteams - so they have to assign a Asst SL.

Alternatively, create 4 squads of six, all under SLs. For a 25% increase in span you have increased you basic maneuver options from 9 to 16, or 12-18 depending on method. - but because you have removed one level of command within the squads, you ability to control, as opposed to command should, and I submit is, increased in terms of effectiveness - and yes the SLs workload has increase by 1 man - and that is well within the accepted span of control.

Ultimately, losses and lack of combat participation makes the squad a non issue which is why I focus on the platoon as the basis for organisation, and in terms of principles, not mandated TOE.

jcustis
12-27-2007, 02:29 AM
Look at the Battle Drill fiasco! Battle Drill was one of the most innovative and powerful infantry concepts of the 20th century. - and it was a made a total mess of by the so called "published doctrine," written by men who had no idea what it was - as most do not today, EG- the chap who wrote StormTrooper Tactics. - clearly understood nothing about battle drills - and the same mistake is made today by the US Army and their battle drills

Could you expand upon this a bit? You call Battle Drill a concept, so exactly how was a mess made by published doctrine?

I'm asking pointed questions to be certain I understand clearly where you side. After spending years dealing with the Marine Corps battle drill system, I'm wondering if I'm thinking what you're thinking, or exact opposites.

William F. Owen
12-27-2007, 03:05 AM
Could you expand upon this a bit? You call Battle Drill a concept, so exactly how was a mess made by published doctrine?

I'm asking pointed questions to be certain I understand clearly where you side. After spending years dealing with the Marine Corps battle drill system, I'm wondering if I'm thinking what you're thinking, or exact opposites.

Battle Drill grew out of the UKs WW1 experience. It was revived in 1940 by two publications - I Corps Tactical Notes, and Wigram's Battlecraft.

Battle Drill essentially a tactical decision making process, so judgement was required. It relied on junior leaders clearly understanding what had to be done and how to it, so they could then do the next thing. - EG Locate the enemy, so they can then win the fire fight etc.

...but an essentially excellent idea then became corrupted, but poor teaching and that poor teaching then became the newer manuals etc. What I was taught battle drill in the 1980s it was a pale imitation of what it was meant to be, and relied on doing things in a very set stereotyped way - that became a method of stressing junior leaders in training rather than teaching them defeat the enemy.

In the mid 1950's US adopted General Fry's Assault Battle Drill, which is pretty poor stuff - I have a first edition - and it missed the point. Fry had the bones but IMO, he didn't know how to explain how it all fitted together.

jcustis
12-27-2007, 03:17 AM
Hmm. An early start tomorrow means I have to depart the pattern until the evening, but I'm curious now about this battle drill thing. I suppose I should have added it to the gear, manning, SOPs issues that I mentioned need to be resolved in synch. It was one of these threads here.

Perhaps a discussion of battle drill needs its own as well.

Uboat509
12-27-2007, 03:48 AM
Not sure how to explain it better than I did in the article, but here goes.

1. This was written to make people think about the how and why of dismounted operations. The base of the idea comes from a fairly in depth study of MACV-SOG, Ground Studies Branch, and the UKs Royal Marines, based on extensive interviews, and presentation/written feed back to concepts and ideas. - but so what! :wry:

I am not sure why MACV-SOG is relevant. They performed a much different mission than modern infantry.


2. Essentially modern infantry are not optimised, either in training or equipment to fulfil core functions in terrain where dismounted operations are the primary enabler. - thus my statement that infantry should aim to fulfil the FIND function. - which is why there is the Recce and OP emphasis.

Are you saying that modern infantry is not capable of performing combat missions other than find? Most infantrymen and commanders I have known might feel differently. Eight out of the ten divisions in the US Army are infantry divisions and the remaining two have huge infantry contingents. Infantry has performed the bulk of our fighting for years.



3. Infantry should operate in a combined arms/joint approach to operations. This impacts on the carried weight issue, and can be looked at in terms of an actual loss in capability the more weapons and protection you have men carry.

We do.


4. Once on foot, all infantry should fight the same way, but the reasons they do not is nothing to do with the role of infantry. It is to do with equipment and organisation issues. A friend of mine who commanded a Para Battle Group, put one of his companies in Warrior MICVs for one exercise and guess what. Nothing changed. They just jumped out and did what they did, and when they needed to go somewhere they jumped back in.

You're saying that this commander put his men in vehicles for which they had little or no training or experience and they didn't spontaneously change their SOPs to reflect the new vehicles over the course of a single exercise? I am not sure what that proves exactly.


5. A UK Lt Col actually wrote to me about this article saying he liked it, but said it was impossible to make work, as raising the infantry bar made people who thought they were "special" or "Elite" less elite, and thus the objection to this concept comes from the people whom it supports! :rolleyes:

...which goes a long way to informing my opinions about infantry doctrine, equipment and organisation being primarily the product of emotion and opinion, never held to rigour!


Raising the bar is fine but you have to bear in mind that the higher you raise bar the more people you eliminate from the force. This is why there are only three Ranger battalions. We have eight infantry divisions and manning eight divisions requires finding a standard that is high enough to perform the mission but not so high as make manning difficult to maintain.

SFC W

William F. Owen
12-27-2007, 04:04 AM
@ I am not sure why MACV-SOG is relevant. They performed a much different mission than modern infantry.

@ Are you saying that modern infantry is not capable of performing combat missions other than find? Most infantrymen and commanders I have known might feel differently. Eight out of the ten divisions in the US Army are infantry divisions and the remaining two have huge infantry contingents. Infantry has performed the bulk of our fighting for years.

@ We do.

@ You're saying that this commander put his men in vehicles for which they had little or no training or experience and they didn't spontaneously change their SOPs to reflect the new vehicles over the course of a single exercise? I am not sure what that proves exactly.

@ Raising the bar is fine but you have to bear in mind that the higher you raise bar the more people you eliminate from the force. This is why there are only three Ranger battalions. We have eight infantry divisions and manning eight divisions requires finding a standard that is high enough to perform the mission but not so high as make manning difficult to maintain.



@ Some of the mission may have been different, but the overall aims and means employed have wide utility today.

@ I am saying there needs to be more optimisation on the find function. - and I mean big time find function. Not just Recce. Anyone here learn how to do Vehicle Check points in Infantry Basic? House raids? Cordon and search? Road watching?

@ We do what? If Infantry are so well supported in the Joint environment, how come carried load is going up? - or has increased.

@ That is exactly what I am saying. What it suggests, rather than proves, is that there is not much difference between Mech and Light. The MICV is just an enabler like CAS or Arty.

@ Sensible and reasoned raising of the bar should get rid of people who should never have been there in the first place and ensure a useful degree of quality manpower.

U-boat, please note, I am writing this from a UK perspective. Not US. The original article was published in the British Army Doctrine and Training News. Infantry Magazine then wanted to publish it, so I'm not sure what its meaning to the US is.

Ken White
12-28-2007, 03:57 AM
@ Some of the mission may have been different, but the overall aims and means employed have wide utility today.

We can disagree on that, the difference in mission was so significant in comparison to most infantry missions as to preclude any meaningful correlation.


@ I am saying there needs to be more optimisation on the find function. - and I mean big time find function. Not just Recce. Anyone here learn how to do Vehicle Check points in Infantry Basic? House raids? Cordon and search? Road watching?

I agree with your statement of need but would point out that your task list is mission and area specific and is highly subject to unit SOP; thus none of those really should be taught in Basic or OSUT.


@ We do what? If Infantry are so well supported in the Joint environment, how come carried load is going up? - or has increased.

Because Armies are politically correct and slow to change and the troops are actually encouraged to carry more things than they need (like extra clothing and sleeping pads). There have been items added -- NVG for example -- so some weight gain was necessary. The biggest addition is in Armor...


@ That is exactly what I am saying. What it suggests, rather than proves, is that there is not much difference between Mech and Light. The MICV is just an enabler like CAS or Arty.

Yes and no. There isn't much difference but little things mean a lot. Three out of your nine have to stay with the vehicle; Driver, Gunner and a nominal dismount who doesn't dismount but has to stay aboard to pass up Ammo to the gunner...

So your nine man squad just became a six man squad. Then there's maintenance...

Add the fact that most MICV are more akin to a Light Tank than they are to a transport vehicle and tend to get employed like light tanks. Plus the reluctance of the Troops to move out of sight of their vehicle. People are so pesky about messing up good theories.


@ Sensible and reasoned raising of the bar should get rid of people who should never have been there in the first place and ensure a useful degree of quality manpower.

Can't argue with that one. ;)

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 04:28 AM
@ We can disagree on that, the difference in mission was so significant in comparison to most infantry missions as to preclude any meaningful correlation.

@ Because Armies are politically correct and slow to change and the troops are actually encouraged to carry more things than they need (like extra clothing and sleeping pads). There have been items added -- NVG for example -- so some weight gain was necessary. The biggest addition is in Armor...

@ Yes and no. There isn't much difference but little things mean a lot. Three out of your nine have to stay with the vehicle; Driver, Gunner and a nominal dismount who doesn't dismount but has to stay aboard to pass up Ammo to the gunner...



@ Well we will disagree then. Hatchet Fore, Mike Force (ok Not SOG) and Exploitation Platoons were all basically light infantry, as were the heavier recon teams. Operation Tailwind and the blocking of Route 96, were basically conventional Air mobile operations.

@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.

@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.

Ken White
12-28-2007, 06:05 AM
@ Well we will disagree then. Hatchet Fore, Mike Force (ok Not SOG) and Exploitation Platoons were all basically light infantry, as were the heavier recon teams. Operation Tailwind and the blocking of Route 96, were basically conventional Air mobile operations.

goalposts. Yes, those you mention were essentially light infantry but the SOG specific elements you cite existed solely to support the RTs -- and the SOG mission was more than those RTs as well. Tailwind was a one-off (well, almost...) and several of the blocks were not an advertisement for anything except courage under fire. I'd also say Tailwind wasn't conventional in hardly any respect...


@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.

What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.


@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.

Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver. The theory was that the Infantry units needing transport would be provided it from that Bn. Didn't work at all well in practice for several reasons so it was abandoned. Not least was the problem of getting the senior Infantry type aboard and the Track Commander to agree on routes, vehicle placement, targets for the .50 cal and so forth. There was also the minor problem that the PC folks though their job was to be a taxi and that any danger was to be avoided -- the transported Infantry OTOH, expected to get shot at and had a sense of mission that the track crews sometimes lacked -- there's that pesky human dimension again...

And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...

But it's a nice theory.

Ken White
12-28-2007, 06:13 AM
@ Well we will disagree then. Hatchet Fore, Mike Force (ok Not SOG) and Exploitation Platoons were all basically light infantry, as were the heavier recon teams. Operation Tailwind and the blocking of Route 96, were basically conventional Air mobile operations.

goalposts. Yes, those you mention were essentially light infantry but the SOG specific elements you cite existed solely to support the RTs -- and the SOG mission was more than those RTs as well. Tailwind was a one-off (well, almost...) and several of the blocks were not an advertisement for anything except courage under fire. I'd also say Tailwind wasn't conventional in hardly any respect...

And yes, Mike Force elms were not SOG.

You probably also noted that the 'light infantry' "heavier recon teams" were those that had the most difficulty; the early guys like Dick Meadows who went out and snuck around didn't have nearly the problems (acknowledging that the NVA put more people out in later years as well). Strategic Recon will only succeed by stealth and wits, light infantry stuff (and thinking) will get you killed in that environment. Totally different job and focus.


@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.

What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.


@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.

Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver. The theory was that the Infantry units needing transport would be provided it from that Bn. Didn't work at all well in practice for several reasons so it was abandoned. Not least was the problem of getting the senior Infantry type aboard and the Track Commander to agree on routes, vehicle placement, targets for the .50 cal and so forth. There was also the minor problem that the PC folks though their job was to be a taxi and that any danger was to be avoided -- the transported Infantry OTOH, expected to get shot at and had a sense of mission that the track crews sometimes lacked -- there's that pesky human dimension again...

And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...

But it's a nice theory.

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 06:49 AM
What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.


I presented this at the RUSI about two years ago. There's a .ppt out there somewhere, but here goes the basics.

The need for infantry to carry excessive weight is based on the belief that they can subsist for X-days without re-supply. Why carry 3 days food and water when you have 20 mins of ammo?

Load is everything and trade offs have to be made. The idea that infantry must operate is isolation is major flaw, as is the idea that infantry should be able operate unsupported. Here some of the ideas I bounced around,

@ - Re-supply conducted by Attack Helicopters
@ - Low power wide area re-broadcast conducted by UAVs, to conserve battery life.
@ - Form groupings dedicated to load carrying support for dismounted infantry operations.
@ - Acceptance that supply limited operations are a "special condition" and not the norm.
@- rationalise equipment design, based on load and support. - Eg An effective sleeping bag can costs less than some mortar bombs or similar munitions, so why not make them disposable and supply-able, or "one night items" - make up 70kg (IIRC) "Platoon Overnight kits" to be dropped/pushed in as and when required

... and most of this came from looking at how SOG-RTs formulated their loads and conducted their re-supply. :wry:

Ratzel
12-28-2007, 07:04 AM
@ - Form groupings dedicated to load carrying support for dismounted infantry operations.


Can you explain this idea in depth? I was watching something on TV the other day about robot/wagons that would carry the squads gear. Please explain this "load carrying group" and if you could, include a combat scenario on how it would work. Thank you sir

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 07:05 AM
Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver.

And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...

But it's a nice theory.

I suggest it was tried once and done badly. In the British Army, APCs were routinely crewed by RTC drivers in Malaya, Aden, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. The Kangaroo Carriers used in WW2 were not crewed by infantry and worked fine. No one says helicopters have to be flown by combat arms. No one ever says that MBTs working in close support of infantry have to be manned by infantry. So why MICVs?

besides all I am arguing is that even if organic to the OOB, the vehicles do not have to be crewed by Infantry. They can be crewed by dedicated armor operators, who come from an armor training stream.

The Royal Marines have a dedicated Armoured Support group, not dedicated to any Commando Battle Group and that works fine. OK crews are commando trained, but they just pick and lift anyone, including Army light infantry units - as being done in Helmand right now. Its all about leadership and professionalism.

Don't understand why maintenance is an issue. When I was in FV-432s we had a REME LAD at the Coy level for repairs and engine changes etc. The driver did all the "vehicle jobs" and he would get helped by one or two rifleman if needed. The rifleman had no technical training, but how hard is it to check track pins, oil levels etc? Lazy crews made a big deal out of it. Good crews just did it.

Formation Recce CVR-T crews seemed to do just fine on maintenance and they only had a crew of three. - and again, why did we take valuable infantry manpower and allocate them to mech recce tasks, when the vehicles and manpower could have come from dedicated units.

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 07:13 AM
Can you explain this idea in depth? I was watching something on TV the other day about robot/wagons that would carry the squads gear. Please explain this "load carrying group" and if you could, include a combat scenario on how it would work. Thank you sir

If you were operating in jungle, - worst case- you would/could allocate assets, such as Helicopters, APCs, MRAP, C-130 para drop, to specifically support units or sub-units, on a continuous basis. - as was done for the Chindits. (A whole Air Force!) You would view re-supply as inherent as Arty or CAS. Your unit level S4 actually becomes a "Go-No Go" link in the chain. Not a "make this work regardless" factor.

...and for anyone who says, we do that, look at some of the planning assumptions for Operation Anaconda.

Uboat509
12-28-2007, 07:31 AM
The need for infantry to carry excessive weight is based on the belief that they can subsist for X-days without re-supply. Why carry 3 days food and water when you have 20 mins of ammo

It is hardly uncommon to go three days and not have 20 minutes of contact. I met guys on my last trip who were on their second tour and had only been in their second fire fight. My own experience during my tour was that I was IED'd a number of times but only got into one firefight that lasted all of two minutes.


Load is everything and trade offs have to be made. The idea that infantry must operate is isolation is major flaw, as is the idea that infantry should be able operate unsupported. Here some of the ideas I bounced around,

With eight infantry divisions out of a total of ten it is hardly out of the realm of possibility that individual infantry formations will have to operate for extended periods of time with minimal support.


@ - Re-supply conducted by Attack Helicopters

How? US attack helicopters are incapable of carrying any meaningful load.


@ - Low power wide area re-broadcast conducted by UAVs, to conserve battery life.

I will take your word on this one. I don't have any experience with the actual operation of UAVs.


@ - Form groupings dedicated to load carrying support for dismounted infantry operations.

We already have logistics units and even light infantry has some vehicles for logistical support down to company level.


@ - Acceptance that supply limited operations are a "special condition" and not the norm.

That depends entirely on the enemy and the specific fight that we are in.


@- rationalize equipment design, based on load and support. - Eg An effective sleeping bag can costs less than some mortar bombs or similar munitions, so why not make them disposable and supply-able, or "one night items" - make up 70kg (IIRC) "Platoon Overnight kits" to be dropped/pushed in as and when required .

No argument here. Our procurement system sucks and my experience is that decisions are often made based on a single variable rather than all the possible variables. Body armor is a prime example. Prior to OIF no one wore body armor except in very specific circumstances. Now you can't leave the gate with out full body armor with all the bells and whistles. In Iraq that is not such a problem where foot patrols are largely only in urban areas and last no more than a few hours after which the soldier will usually go back to a safe area where he can refit. I have not been to Afghanistan but friends of mine are telling me that foot patrols can be significantly longer in the mountains and forty pounds of body armor in addition to weapons, ammo and equipment plus whatever sustainment load there is seriously degrades a unit's ability to operate in that environment. Unfortunately the Army often does not look at things in that light. To many commanders, body armor stops bullets and shrapnel so we will wear it any time we are out of the wire and that is all there is to it. At what point does the body armor become more of a hindrance than it is worth?

SFC W

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 08:46 AM
How? US attack helicopters are incapable of carrying any meaningful load.



With great ease. You just trade one or more pylon loads for a re-supply pod. I am told the design exists, and I have it on some good authority that it would be easy to adapt the ferry fuel tanks for than role.

Each pylon can take about 500kg IIRC. I crunched some numbers a while back and that indicated that 1 x AH-64 could easily deliver most of the small arms ammo, rations and water needed for a dismounted company of 3 platoons. Volume seems more of an issue than weight.

SOCOM folks tell me that this was widely discussed for SF, but it went away as no AH-64s were on the SOCOM OOB at the time. - eg MH-60 would be the preferred method.

...and of course AH pilots don't want to haul ammo and rations!

Ratzel
12-28-2007, 09:05 AM
Body armor is a prime example. Prior to OIF no one wore body armor except in very specific circumstances. Now you can't leave the gate with out full body armor with all the bells and whistles. In Iraq that is not such a problem where foot patrols are largely only in urban areas and last no more than a few hours after which the soldier will usually go back to a safe area where he can refit. I have not been to Afghanistan but friends of mine are telling me that foot patrols can be significantly longer in the mountains and forty pounds of body armor in addition to weapons, ammo and equipment plus whatever sustainment load there is seriously degrades a unit's ability to operate in that environment. Unfortunately the Army often does not look at things in that light. To many commanders, body armor stops bullets and shrapnel so we will wear it any time we are out of the wire and that is all there is to it. At what point does the body armor become more of a hindrance than it is worth?
SFC W

What I wonder is, if we were fighting the Vietnam war, would we be wearing body armour? Can you imagine a 2 or 3 day foot patrol with an interceptor vest? Iraq would seem to be a proper place for it, but what about other areas, especially hot and humid areas? The jungle would be pure misery with the interceptor. What about the Kevlar helmet?

This is why I would hope, that high on the priority list, is an effort to constantly improve the gear that is most useful to the ground fighter.

Lighter more comfortable boots, Better small arms, Lighter more protective body armour, lighter and better night-vision, better BDU's, lighter squad radios, etc,etc.

Besides these improvements, what I wonder, is if there's a group of NCO's and Junior Officers who discuss issues like this and get paid for it? Is there a "Think Tank" for NCO's and Junior Officers? It would seem, that the type of discussion we're having right here should be undertaken and financed by DoD. Discussing issues of load carrying weight, or conditions for body armour, could be discussed in this "Think Tank." This "Think Tank" would do what all Think Tanks do, in which they would conduct studies, have discussions, and write literature away from politics of the Pentagon and especially congress. If its decided that more money is needed in these ground fighter areas, and away from a congressman's pet defense contractor, this Think Tank should be shielded from those pressures.

Does one exist?

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 09:19 AM
What I wonder is, if we were fighting the Vietnam war, would we be wearing body armour? Can you imagine a 2 or 3 day foot patrol with an interceptor vest?

So take it off. You have the option to wear a plate carrier, if you believe you need one, or only use plates for specific operations.

Body armour and helmets should not be mandated. It's like anything. Use when required. Do not use when not useful.

That's why you pay leaders to lead. They have to make decisions as to when to trade security for activity.

The two things that have the greatest potential to lighten a soldiers load is better training and leadership - at all levels!

Steve Blair
12-28-2007, 02:03 PM
What I wonder is, if we were fighting the Vietnam war, would we be wearing body armour? Can you imagine a 2 or 3 day foot patrol with an interceptor vest? Iraq would seem to be a proper place for it, but what about other areas, especially hot and humid areas? The jungle would be pure misery with the interceptor. What about the Kevlar helmet?


Some units did. If memory serves, most Marine units around the DMZ were required to wear body armor, but it was more a question of unit policy during that war. In some units only the point man wore a vest, while in others no one did and just down the road you'd find a company where everyone wore the flak jacket and helmet anytime they left the wire.

The Marine examples were from '67-'68 or '69, and they did foot patrols.

Uboat509
12-28-2007, 03:19 PM
So take it off. You have the option to wear a plate carrier, if you believe you need one, or only use plates for specific operations.

Body armour and helmets should not be mandated. It's like anything. Use when required. Do not use when not useful.

That's why you pay leaders to lead. They have to make decisions as to when to trade security for activity.

The two things that have the greatest potential to lighten a soldiers load is better training and leadership - at all levels!

It would be nice to have this option but it they do not now. I was reading an article recently about a unit in Afghanistan that was doing patrols in the mountains. They could not patrol more than a day nor could they go too high because of the mandated body-armor. I do not know at what level the authority to use or not use body armor rests but I suspect that it is at least at division level. I can remember leaving FOBs in Iraq and there would be a guy at the gate whose only job was to make sure that everyone leaving the FOB had body armor and a helmet on. I suspect that few commanders would let their men operate without body armor anyway. If one of his men did get killed or wounded there would likely be a shrapnel sh*tstorm.

SFC W

Uboat509
12-28-2007, 03:35 PM
With great ease. You just trade one or more pylon loads for a re-supply pod. I am told the design exists, and I have it on some good authority that it would be easy to adapt the ferry fuel tanks for than role.

Each pylon can take about 500kg IIRC. I crunched some numbers a while back and that indicated that 1 x AH-64 could easily deliver most of the small arms ammo, rations and water needed for a dismounted company of 3 platoons. Volume seems more of an issue than weight.

SOCOM folks tell me that this was widely discussed for SF, but it went away as no AH-64s were on the SOCOM OOB at the time. - eg MH-60 would be the preferred method.

...and of course AH pilots don't want to haul ammo and rations!


Can you provide a link to some info on this? I have not heard of it. 500 KG seems a bit high honestly, that would be over a ton with both pylons loaded, but I have never really been around them.

I am not really sure how many Ah-64s there are in the inventory. I don't remember seeing any on my last trip although I did see a lot of Kiowas. I doubt that the would allow any to be used for logistics rolls. I doubt there are any in theater that are not already committed to combat patrols. In any case there are a lot more utility helicopters than attack helicopters in the inventory and they already do logistic resupply. Why would we need to use attack helicopters for this roll? It strikes me as being like using an Abrams tank to carry logistics instead of a cargo truck.

SFC W

Uboat509
12-28-2007, 03:43 PM
This is why I would hope, that high on the priority list, is an effort to constantly improve the gear that is most useful to the ground fighter.


Lighter more comfortable boots, Better small arms, Lighter more protective body armour, lighter and better night-vision, better BDU's, lighter squad radios, etc,etc. Like the ACU? :D My experience is that as equipment gets lighter, they issue more of it. I had a team sergeant that used to joke about carrying a hundred pounds of lightweight equipment.


Besides these improvements, what I wonder, is if there's a group of NCO's and Junior Officers who discuss issues like this and get paid for it? Is there a "Think Tank" for NCO's and Junior Officers? It would seem, that the type of discussion we're having right here should be undertaken and financed by DoD. Discussing issues of load carrying weight, or conditions for body armour, could be discussed in this "Think Tank." This "Think Tank" would do what all Think Tanks do, in which they would conduct studies, have discussions, and write literature away from politics of the Pentagon and especially congress. If its decided that more money is needed in these ground fighter areas, and away from a congressman's pet defense contractor, this Think Tank should be shielded from those pressures.

Does one exist?

The closest I have seen to this personally is when I was OPFOR at JRTC. NATIC would periodically give us equipment to test in the field and then would would fill out a report about it. I don't think that I have ever been actually issued any of the equipment that I tested, even the good stuff.

SFC W

William F. Owen
12-28-2007, 04:49 PM
Can you provide a link to some info on this? I have not heard of it. 500 KG seems a bit high honestly, that would be over a ton with both pylons loaded, but I have never really been around them.

SFC W

I crunched these numbers a while back. IIRC this is based on the an AH-64 using a 230 US gallon external tank. That's 871 litres. IIRC to calculate JP-4 weight you x0.8 so 871 litres = 696kg per tank.

Even if those are 771 litre tanks they'll weigh 616kg approx

I know Apache pylons can take over 200kg because they can load 4 x AGM-114 plus the launcher on one pylon.

Rifleman
12-28-2007, 05:13 PM
Like the ACU? :D

Come on now! The ACU blends great in western rangeland environments; the best stuff for sagebrush I've ever seen. So if we ever have to fight a war in Wyoming, we're ready. ;)

Tukhachevskii
06-06-2013, 07:28 PM
With great ease. You just trade one or more pylon loads for a re-supply pod. I am told the design exists, and I have it on some good authority that it would be easy to adapt the ferry fuel tanks for than role.
Each pylon can take about 500kg IIRC. I crunched some numbers a while back and that indicated that 1 x AH-64 could easily deliver most of the small arms ammo, rations and water needed for a dismounted company of 3 platoons. Volume seems more of an issue than weight.


...when I first read this comment, oh a while ago now, it bugged me that I was sure I had seen something like this depicted somewhere. It kept bugging me (typical duyslexic trait that, to keep fixating on an item of information, among many such items, until you find it) until yesterday evening. I was clearing out my room (a rare enough occurance that) and found a load of old books I bought as a teen. Flicking through one of them (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Warplanes-Future-David-Oliver/dp/1840650850), I found this!

Infanteer
06-14-2013, 01:19 PM
I miss these threads...it's what brought me to the SWJ.

gute
06-14-2013, 04:19 PM
I miss these threads...it's what brought me to the SWJ.

You mean you did not come to the SWJ for the threads about the NBA finals - I'm shocked:eek:

Seriously, I'm with you. I miss the discussions regarding squad, platoon, ad company organizations; squad, platoon weapons; use of fires, etc. I would like to see some of these discussions re-energized with what has been learned during the last 10 years+ and the inclusion of anticipated new weapons.

Fuchs
06-14-2013, 06:58 PM
Infantry squad organisation and equipment is very, very sexy to many people. It's not very important, though.

Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.

Speaking of TO&E; it's not even relevant for training. Most training is done in understrength, and the understrength issue becomes even more severe if an army deploys many formations simultaneously (thus being unable to cannibalise some to fill up the deployed ones). The de facto TO&E after the first few contacts will bear very little resemblance to the TO&Es in field manuals which are the subject of so much discussion.


Infantry quality is about intangibles and improvisation much more than about the sexy items and charts discussed so repeatedly and vividly.


The one question regarding infantry small unit design that I'm still interested in is whether one should focus on burst or sustained capabilities. I lean towards burst, as competent hostiles could have so much fire support on call that breaking contact after at most two minutes should be a habit.

Infanteer
06-15-2013, 03:12 PM
TO&Es are accountants tools. How many people and equipment should I give to this organization?

By D+1, you ain't fighting by a TO&E.

gute
06-15-2013, 06:46 PM
Infantry squad organisation and equipment is very, very sexy to many people. It's not very important, though.

Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.

Speaking of TO&E; it's not even relevant for training. Most training is done in understrength, and the understrength issue becomes even more severe if an army deploys many formations simultaneously (thus being unable to cannibalise some to fill up the deployed ones). The de facto TO&E after the first few contacts will bear very little resemblance to the TO&Es in field manuals which are the subject of so much discussion.


Infantry quality is about intangibles and improvisation much more than about the sexy items and charts discussed so repeatedly and vividly.


The one question regarding infantry small unit design that I'm still interested in is whether one should focus on burst or sustained capabilities. I lean towards burst, as competent hostiles could have so much fire support on call that breaking contact after at most two minutes should be a habit.

IMO flexibility of the small unit of action is key. Allowing the small unit leaders to have a free hand to organize their unit (platoon, company, battalion) to meet their assigned objectives.

A few months ago there was an interesting article about that buzzword "transformation" and the next transformation would be battalion combat teams. The author argued in his article that battalion task forces or battle groups are the logical next step and would allow the U.S. to more easily serve alongside our European allies. He also argued the small unit of action would no longer be the squad, but a section of 18-20.

Word association and mindset IMO go hand in hand. Maybe we need new words for small unit organizations. New words which emphasize flexibility. The swarming model discussed here at SWJ had such words such as pods and clusters. I don't like either - can you imagine being assigned to "cluster F":D

Tukhachevskii
06-15-2013, 07:02 PM
Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.



Funny you should say that. I was reading Royal Marines (http://www.amazon.co.uk/books/dp/0283063157) and some things really caught my eye. From 1943 to about the early 1960s (maybe a bit later for some units) the RM Cdo was organised into five troops with a HQ and Weapons troop (2 x mortar 2 x MMG). Each troop (a large platoon sized org) had 63 all ranks. Organised as either four ten man sections, a 10 man spt section and a 13man HQ (1943) or two 26 man sections (two 11 man sub-sections and a fure support sub-section) c. 1950s. There simply was no Sqn (Coy) HQ. From I have read the Company organisation was introduced for better interoperability with Army units when rotating especially during the whole East of Suez drawdown. Given the mission of the RM I suppose it made sense to have large Troops. Would love to know how well the system worked (i.e., without a Coy HQ/layer of command) though in practice given it lasted over 20 years and was tested by WWII combat conditions.

gute
06-15-2013, 08:49 PM
Funny you should say that. I was reading Royal Marines (http://www.amazon.co.uk/books/dp/0283063157) and some things really caught my eye. From 1943 to about the early 1960s (maybe a bit later for some units) the RM Cdo was organised into five troops with a HQ and Weapons troop (2 x mortar 2 x MMG). Each troop (a large platoon sized org) had 63 all ranks. Organised as either four ten man sections, a 10 man spt section and a 13man HQ (1943) or two 26 man sections (two 11 man sub-sections and a fure support sub-section) c. 1950s. There simply was no Sqn (Coy) HQ. From I have read the Company organisation was introduced for better interoperability with Army units when rotating especially during the whole East of Suez drawdown. Given the mission of the RM I suppose it made sense to have large Troops. Would love to know how well the system worked (i.e., without a Coy HQ/layer of command) though in practice given it lasted over 20 years and was tested by WWII combat conditions.

The U.S. Army Rangers organized the same way. If you go to Bayonet Strength you can look at the MTOE for British Commando, etc.

http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/General/site_map.htm

gute
06-15-2013, 08:58 PM
Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.

So tactical success or failure is determined by leadership?

Fuchs
06-15-2013, 11:08 PM
So tactical success or failure is determined by leadership?

At times.
But most often, logistics, peacetime training, heavy weapons, fire support, "do and don't" orders, sensors, terrain, the enemy's nature, missions and at times even *gulp* planning limit the range of possible outcomes so much that individual platoons are really just a small part of the whole.

I suppose very few infantry platoons (if any) had a substantial impact during the invasion of Iraq 2003.

Kiwigrunt
06-16-2013, 01:47 AM
Infanteer:

I miss these threads...it's what brought me to the SWJ.

Same.

Fuchs:

Infantry squad organisation and equipment is very, very sexy to many people.

Guilty.


Fuchs:

It's not very important, though.

Oh, shut up.


Fuchs:

Infantry quality is about intangibles and improvisation much more than about the sexy items and charts discussed so repeatedly and vividly.

Oh, alright then…


Fuchs:

The one question regarding infantry small unit design that I'm still interested in is whether one should focus on burst or sustained capabilities. I lean towards burst, as competent hostiles could have so much fire support on call that breaking contact after at most two minutes should be a habit.

Interesting. But would that not be very much situation dependent? The Taliban have learnt to do this because they can melt into the populace and become invisible. But in WWIII, will a coy breaking contact be able to hide from the enemy’s sensors and outrun his fire support?


Infanteer:

TO&Es are accountants tools. How many people and equipment should I give to this organization?

By D+1, you ain't fighting by a TO&E.

Often even by D. Think about how landing craft for Overlord were occupied, in a deliberate bid to ‘scramble’ the TO&E.


Gute:

IMO flexibility of the small unit of action is key. Allowing the small unit leaders to have a free hand to organize their unit (platoon, company, battalion) to meet their assigned objectives.

But they can only (re)organise their units from a given starting point. Which gets us back to some form of TO&E.


Fuchs:

But most often, logistics, peacetime training, heavy weapons, fire support, "do and don't" orders, sensors, terrain, the enemy's nature, missions and at times even ual platoons are really just a small part of the whole.

I suppose very few infantry platoons (if any) had a substantial impact during the invasion of Iraq 2003.*gulp* planning limit the range of possible outcomes so much that individual platoons are really just a small part of the whole.

Indeed, I wonder if the overall course and outcomes of the adventures over the last ten years would have been any different if coalition forces would have been armed with SMLEs, STENs and BRENs. But that does not mean that nothing can be gained from improving the quality of an M4, or decreasing the weight, or rate of issue, of a GPMG.

In these threads we tend to perhaps over-emphasise the importance of micro. But that said, a focus on macro should not come at the detriment of micro. If ‘I’ have a slightly better chance of getting home alive, or even just a better chance of doing my job well (what ever that means), with an M4 over an SMLE, than I want that M4. If you want to focus on micro to the point that discussing the diameter of an M4 firing-pin is important or just interesting (as I think it is, in the right context), than a forum like lightfighters is the place to be. At SWC we tent to hover from minutia-micro to macro philosophy, and back again. That makes it harder to satisfy the agendas of all players and to define a context within which to focus a conversation. However, these trigger puller threads are more micro orientated – the pointy end of the spear (or firing-pin).


After all that, I really just wanted to post this link. (http://www.allworldwars.com/Small-Unit-Actions-During-German-Campaign-in-Russia.html#374)
It highlights the importance of some of the other variables that Fuchs point out. Like here:


The Germans found, however, that to be acquainted with Russian tactics and organization was useful but by no means decisive in achieving victory in battle. Far more important was the proper understanding of the Russian soldier's psyche, a process involving the analysis of his natural impulses and reactions in different situations. Only thus were the Germans able to anticipate Russian behavior in a given situation and draw the necessary conclusions for their own course of action. Any analysis of the outstanding characteristics of the Russian soldier must begin with his innate qualities.

Kiwigrunt
06-16-2013, 01:53 AM
Tukh, I vaguely remember reading somewhere (may well have been one Julian Thompson’s books) that the commando organisations were suited for just that, commando type independent operations. The platoon/company/battalion structures were deemed more suitable for a wider scope of more conventional situations. Or something to that effect.

Fuchs
06-16-2013, 02:39 AM
But in WWIII, will a coy breaking contact be able to hide from the enemy’s sensors and outrun his fire support?

The problem is to break contact in the first place.

Leaders won't do it in time when things are seemingly going well and other times their (small) unit will simply be pinned, for no route for withdrawal has been reserved or can be created.

Breaking contact as a small unit and delaying action as a unit are the most interesting tactical challenges against capable opponents in my opinion. These are going to be the WWIII equivalents of WWI's infiltration attack and artillery fire plans. Master these and you're half-way there.

gute
06-16-2013, 03:45 AM
Gute:


But they can only (re)organise their units from a given starting point. Which gets us back to some form of TO&E.

Yep, same thought went through my mind 30 seconds after posting the above. I don't know else modern armies would organize without squads, platoons, companies, etc. I think this will be the way we organize until we have one man super troopers in combat suits like in the book Star Ship Troopers. Maybe that's why TOEs interest me because I believe we can organize to be more efficient/effective.

Tukhachevskii
04-09-2014, 11:43 PM
The platoon/company/battalion structures were deemed more suitable for a wider scope of more conventional situations.

I wonder if "conventional" and "unconventional" actually mean anything these days and what that means for "traditional" organisations. The commando approach seems to me to typify the kind of small unit battles troops find themselves in. In many ways the old Commando organisation prefigures the distributed operations stuff that came out of the USMC.

David I Evans
06-23-2014, 07:34 PM
And if the GPMG crews in the fire support team each need 2 guys to carry 2 belts of ammo, they better send their unfit carcasses to the rear and bring the physically fit forward. I carried the GPMG (my pet name for it was the "G-Pig") and not less than two belts of ammo on my person (only about twice did I carry more - one time was out of newbie stupidity [4 belts], the other time was against my will). A couple other guys were to carry three belts each (and this was as a Platoon-level weapon). At Section level, 2 belts of ammo carried by each individual GPMG gunner (so long as they are not assigned SF tasks as well, just the Light Role) is enough to start.

If you are using GPMGs as heavy weapons, and especially in the SF role, you need at least 4 men per gun, preferably 6. Each GPMG gunner (at platoon or company level in commonwealth Armies) is issued with 8 boxes of ammo (1,760 rounds); an SF Kit with Tripod (weighs more than the GPMG), spare barrel, two Tritium aiming lamps, aiming stakes, mortar dial-sight, tool and cleaning kit, spare parts, etc.; spade; plus his own and the team's personal weapons and kit. In addition, the Gun Commander has binoculars, range-finder, and a 1:50,000 scale map. And I'm not even adding a Gun Controller here to coordinate the fires of the guns.



GPMG in the light role is normally scaled for between 600 to 800 rds per man in the pair, that's about 24 to 32 minutes fire at the normal rate of fire, half that at rapid. Weight between 32 to 43kg for 1200 to 1600 rounds. You'd normally drop 400 round per gun and break them into belts of 100 and dump them onto the platoon for them to carry.

The ammo scale for GPMG(SF) is 5,000 rounds per gun with 3 guns per section. That's 135kgs of belt per gun, 405kgs per section. That's 50 minutes at the normal rate of fire, half that at rapid.

WFE gave you a 3 man gun team, of gunner, controller and ammo bearer.

You just can not carry 405kgs between 11 bods for a WFE gun section with 3 guns so once upon a time a section would have 3 LR with trailers or the CSM of the Company you're attached gets a big pile of ammo or the OC gets told by the Guns Section Commander "My rate of advance is about 2km a hour"

In the SF role you'd be looking for a flank position to give the maximum beaten zone area over enemy positions so that the bulk of targets are between 800 to 1100m from your gun line.

I've carried 1,000 rounds of link and it's slow movement time, I think my heaviest load on the GPMG (SF) section Commanders course was about 54kgs and took us about 2 hours to cover 5km cross country as a Guns platoon.

The GPMG is heading back into Support Company holdings post Herrick and post FSG but it would be interesting to see what happens next.

BTW. The beaten zone of the GPMG is, in part, created by the nature of the kinetic energy upon the weight of the gun. A relativity tight beaten zone where a 20 round burst will impact in an area with a maximum length of 100m and a maximum width of 9m. Repeated bursts will keep landing in the same area, if the gunner keeps his point of aim consistent. Make the gun too light and the trade off is that the beaten zone for a burst will grow in size for less effect.

carl
06-24-2014, 01:05 AM
I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

flagg
06-24-2014, 01:53 AM
I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

My experience is based on C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) with the AR magazine well withdrawn from service(now 7.62 Minimi) and the MAG58/GPMG.

Talking to folks who were around when a modified Steyr AUG was considered as a complement to the Steyr rifle, one expression used to describe it's deficiencies(which includes the Bren) is the "built in stoppage".

Which seems to be an issue here....but if the Marines are happy working around the "built in stoppage" with their M27 IAR, then maybe it's not as big an issue as many seem to think.

Since we are growing closer again with the US(particularly the USMC), maybe this will be re-evaluated in the future.

I'm a fan of the new 7.62 Minimi. It's a great tool. It has the firepower of the MAG58/GPMG at reduced weight...while brand new it's quite a good system, I can't help but wonder about longevity much like the C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) near it's end of life the accuracy/grouping capacity was becoming shockingly bad.

We've only recently introduced the 7.62 Minimi and not long before that the LMT DM rifle. An announcement was just made that we will be replacing the Steyr rifle in the next 2 years.

I wonder if there is a possibility of not just seeing an AR platform purchased here for individual issue, but also evaluating the USMC's recent M27 IAR choice and role in the section/platoon.

Time will tell.

carl
06-24-2014, 02:44 AM
Talking to folks who were around when a modified Steyr AUG was considered as a complement to the Steyr rifle, one expression used to describe it's deficiencies(which includes the Bren) is the "built in stoppage".

That surprises me. I've read (and only read, I have zero practical experience) that the Bren was quite reliable, at least in WWII.

Kiwigrunt
06-24-2014, 03:48 AM
That surprises me. I've read (and only read, I have zero practical experience) that the Bren was quite reliable, at least in WWII.

The built in stoppage reflects the limitations of a mag-fed vs. beltfed. It stops every 30 rounds.;)

The Bren (and L4) was indeed very reliable. And also very accurate. Often regarded as too accurate for area fire. Mounted on a tripod it had a beaten zone of .303" (or 7.62mm for the L4). I exaggerate, but only a little bit. I think this may have been partly due to a significantly lower rate of fire, at just over 500 rpm. Those aspects made it a very useful light machine gun, leaving the SF role to the Vickers. A GPMG wants to do a bit of both, so there are compromises. I suppose anything that starts with 'general purpose' imposes compromises.


I'm a fan of the new 7.62 Minimi. It's a great tool. It has the firepower of the MAG58/GPMG at reduced weight...while brand new it's quite a good system, I can't help but wonder about longevity much like the C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) near it's end of life the accuracy/grouping capacity was becoming shockingly bad.

Light MGs like the Minimi (both calibres) obviously attain their reduced weight – and manufacturing cost - by virtue of lighter materials. The compromise is that the gun will rattle to bits a lot faster than a MAG58. That suggests that they should be replaced a lot sooner. Been-counters won't like that, because that would nullify the lower procurement costs.


I wonder if there is a possibility of not just seeing an AR platform purchased here for individual issue, but also evaluating the USMC's recent M27 IAR choice and role in the section/platoon.

The M27 is really just an HK416, not unlike the standard Norwegian rifle.
One of the main advantages that its (essentially G36) piston holds over the AR direct impingement tube, is that it is 'frogman friendly'. Fill that skinny AR gas tube up with water and you have problems trying to fire it. That is as I understand it the main reason why Dutch special forces replaced their C8s with 416s.

As for the new Kiwi rifle, I wonder if the army was a step ahead by selecting a direct impingement DMW. Purely speculation, but a new DI rifle might make sense. In which case, look no further (http://coltcanada.com/upgrades.html). The L119A2 was made especially for us.....I'm sure....:)

Compost
06-24-2014, 06:32 AM
I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?
My experience of MGs was mainly as a reservist and did not involve combat operations.

The top-mounted magazine made the Bren LMG fast to reload and easy to carry and use particularly when prone. Also its downward ejection was low observable except when in a dustbowl. For a right-handed firer the sight was unobscured, less applicable to left-handed. Weapon was overlong but well-balanced and very reliable and accurate. During 1970s, AusArmy reintroduced the Bren especially for patrolling to complement the troublesome M-60 GPMG.

With regard to built-in stoppages, a manageable sized belt of say 30 to 100 rounds used up without extension makes for a much slower one-man reload than does a box magazine.

As a MAG-58 type GPMG, the M-60 was usefully compact and well balanced for carriage and ready fire. But it had many dysfunctional aspects. In fact so many problem areas that during the 1970s AusArmy reintroduced the Bren especially for patrolling.

Have handled but not trialed and fired the MAG-58. Found it overlong and poorly balanced with the belt-feed too far forward of the trigger grip. But durability/functioning and robustness/ruggedness count for a lot everywhere. In general the MAG-58 is thoroughly proven as suitable – though not ideal – for squad/section, and better as a GPMG/MMG for use above that level.

Currently there are two well-credentialled LMGs contending for squad/section level use. The Mark48 and Negev 7 are each compact and seem well balanced with belt-feed near the trigger grip. The Mark-48 has great lineage. But so does the NG7. Assuming similar durability/maintainability and robustness/ruggedness my vote goes to the NG7 for its single shot capability and alternate use of bottom-mounted box magazine.

Of course would prefer to see both modified to provide downward ejection alongside - or via a chute in - the belt container. Also as a lesser priority belt-feed from left and right sides. Plus immediate alternate use preferably in either belt-feed slot of say a 30-round box mag. ..... etc

Chris jM
06-24-2014, 10:07 AM
Light MGs like the Minimi (both calibres) obviously attain their reduced weight – and manufacturing cost - by virtue of lighter materials. The compromise is that the gun will rattle to bits a lot faster than a MAG58. That suggests that they should be replaced a lot sooner. Been-counters won't like that, because that would nullify the lower procurement costs.

You're pretty much spot on here. I'd also add, though, that the MAG58 is capable of sustained fire for extended periods. The smaller Light MGs are suited for bursts over extended periods - while you can put a belt through them in a single burst, it tends to drastically reduce the life of said barrel (and rest of the weapon). It really is a compromise. When you're patrolling or assaulting, the LMGs like the 7.62 Minimi are wonderful. It's when you're prone behind the gun firing, though, that you simply can't beat the heavier, solid MAG58.

As to the USMC IAR I've got my own doubts about it. I suspect that it is in many ways a product of the recent wars where 'winning the firefight' was achieved against a lightly armed and elusive enemy. If you're facing an enemy firing interlocking machine guns back at you from dug-in positions, I suspect the weight of fire from a belt-fed machine-gun to regain some form of initiative/suppress the enemy's own rapid firing weapons, especially when you know roughly where they could be firing from but can't identify the exact firing points is worth more than a heavy assault rifle (IAR).

However, despite my above reservations about the IAR I also think that the USMC may have made the right decision albeit for the wrong reasons. With the improved sights we are now getting down to personal weapons, a heavy rifle with magnified optics and the ability to acquire targets through thermal, IR or hybrid views the ability to identify and acquire a target is greatly improved. If you can deliver accurate, repeated fire then the traditional need for bursts to suppress an area is almost removed. I'm pretty much in love with 7.62mm DMWs, you might have noticed :D

carl
06-24-2014, 05:29 PM
However, despite my above reservations about the IAR I also think that the USMC may have made the right decision albeit for the wrong reasons. With the improved sights we are now getting down to personal weapons, a heavy rifle with magnified optics and the ability to acquire targets through thermal, IR or hybrid views the ability to identify and acquire a target is greatly improved. If you can deliver accurate, repeated fire then the traditional need for bursts to suppress an area is almost removed. I'm pretty much in love with 7.62mm DMWs, you might have noticed :D

Doesn't that get us back to something like a Bren or a BAR with good optics?

Compost
06-25-2014, 09:28 AM
Of course would prefer to see both modified to provide downward ejection alongside - or via a chute in - the belt container. Also as a lesser priority belt-feed from left and right sides. Plus immediate alternate use preferably in either belt-feed slot of say a 30-round box mag. ..... etc

The above was an effort at humour and easy to misread despite the "..... etc. "
Addition of a wishlist of nice-to-have features is a sure way to turn a good basic design into a poor system.

The Israelis are keen on prophylactic fire. Hence their NG7 must carry its belt containers of up to 200 rounds – wide and about 7kg full – centrally below the receiver. That makes downward ejection difficult to arrange. Belt feed is from the left with ejection to the right and non-reversible as is appropriate for a LMG. A box magazine can be attached below as an alternate to the belt container.

The fanciful wishlist can be reduced to a single nice-to-have. Either downward ejection or if that is impractical it could for concealment and left-handed gunners be useful to add a ready attach/detach deflector to force right-side ejected cases downward. But any sensible D and E team would have assessed both already. The Israelis with a well-earned reputation for good sense must have assessed both as troublesome. And the wishlist then has no genuine entries.

JMA
06-25-2014, 11:11 AM
I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

Horses for courses. Only did training on the Bren which were converted from 303 to 7.62. No wow or Gee-whizz with that baby.

As you will be aware the RLI contacts on Fire Force (Rhodesia) were close range 10m or less. If they were running into you, you waited till you couldn't miss. Under those conditions you wanted fire power right up front - and so FN MAGs were carried on a scale of one per 4-man stick with 500 rounds in 50 belts and no spare barrel. Was used as a personal weapon with no number 2 crewman to assist. Controlled bursts only of 2-3 rounds. Can't think of what more you can possibly need to lay down immediate - devastating - fire power to win the fire fight. All you need are lads strong enough to carry and handle the weapon - firing mainly standing from the hip or from the squat - on a ratio of 1:4 among your troops.

carl
06-25-2014, 10:44 PM
Horses for courses. Only did training on the Bren which were converted from 303 to 7.62. No wow or Gee-whizz with that baby.

As you will be aware the RLI contacts on Fire Force (Rhodesia) were close range 10m or less. If they were running into you, you waited till you couldn't miss. Under those conditions you wanted fire power right up front - and so FN MAGs were carried on a scale of one per 4-man stick with 500 rounds in 50 belts and no spare barrel. Was used as a personal weapon with no number 2 crewman to assist. Controlled bursts only of 2-3 rounds. Can't think of what more you can possibly need to lay down immediate - devastating - fire power to win the fire fight. All you need are lads strong enough to carry and handle the weapon - firing mainly standing from the hip or from the squat - on a ratio of 1:4 among your troops.

There was a board game many (like 35) years ago called Firefight. It simulated combat in the ETO and the units went down to individual vehicles and groups of two men. It is interesting that in that game the most effective way to organize the infantry was exactly as you said, 1 MG per 4 man group.

JMA
06-26-2014, 09:45 AM
There was a board game many (like 35) years ago called Firefight. It simulated combat in the ETO and the units went down to individual vehicles and groups of two men. It is interesting that in that game the most effective way to organize the infantry was exactly as you said, 1 MG per 4 man group.

I agree but with the caveat that not all MG are equal. ;)

Compost
06-28-2014, 10:26 AM
The Israelis are keen on prophylactic fire. Hence their NG7 must carry its belt containers of up to 200 rounds – wide and about 7kg full – centrally below the receiver. That makes downward ejection difficult to arrange. Belt feed is from the left with ejection to the right and non-reversible as is appropriate for a LMG. A box magazine can be attached below as an alternate to the belt container.


OK in a blurb on the NG7 I misread " Ammo. box, Assault drum " as ' Ammo: Box, Assault drum '.

The NG7 does not accept box magazines. Take one point off me, and one off the NG7.

JMA
06-28-2014, 12:38 PM
Have handled but not trialed and fired the MAG-58. Found it overlong and poorly balanced with the belt-feed too far forward of the trigger grip. But durability/functioning and robustness/ruggedness count for a lot everywhere. In general the MAG-58 is thoroughly proven as suitable – though not ideal – for squad/section, and better as a GPMG/MMG for use above that level.

With the greatest respect ... before you can pronounce on the MAG-58 you would need to have more than fired it but carried it, fired it and employed it in combat on a number of occasions.

Having done a Sustained Fire course (back in the day) - where we used the MAG on tripods - I am not sold on its ability in the sustained fire role.

So we find ourselves with diametrically opposite opinions. Feel free to respond.

Compost
06-29-2014, 12:34 AM
With the greatest respect ... before you can pronounce on the MAG-58 you would need to have more than fired it but carried it, fired it and employed it in combat on a number of occasions.

Having done a Sustained Fire course (back in the day) - where we used the MAG on tripods - I am not sold on its ability in the sustained fire role.

So we find ourselves with diametrically opposite opinions. Feel free to respond.
My opinion not based on combat experience is that a squad/section patrolling or otherwise on the move should currently have a compact 7.62mm LMG. That would be the NG7 or Mark 48 with a barrel of about 500mm and preferably none of the 350 to 400mm flash-bang variety. A squad/section in and around a location should have a more robust even though cumbersome 7.62mm GPMG/MMG. ('"currently" because 7.62 and also 5.56mm are going to be eventually succeeded by new calibres).

Hence, believe a company ‘arms room’ should enable a modern version of the Bren-M60 combination as previously used by AusArmy. That was one LMG plus one GPMG/MMG for each squad/section in an infantry platoon. So issue of all its NG7s and MAG58s to a modern platoon would put one in each 4-man team.

If location of the ‘arms room’ - or ‘arms rooms’ spread across several company or platoon vehicles – were remote or lacking then some reduced number of one type of MG or mix of both types would be on issue for portable use. Decision on the number and type(s) of MG on issue should always be made by PL CMDR subject to overrule by COY CMDR. See also post 117 on Trigger thread Size of the Platoon and Company. Some CMDRs might routinely prefer a 50/50 split.

Understand your apparent preference for the MAG58, probably supported by something like a slow-firing L3 Browning with fixed headspace and QCBs. Further back there is the water-cooled version and also the remarkable but hard-to-manoeuvre Vickers. Makes one wonder if/when the water-cooled SFMG might reappear as a vehicle weapon.

jcustis
06-29-2014, 04:19 PM
My experience is based on C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) with the AR magazine well withdrawn from service(now 7.62 Minimi) and the MAG58/GPMG.

Talking to folks who were around when a modified Steyr AUG was considered as a complement to the Steyr rifle, one expression used to describe it's deficiencies(which includes the Bren) is the "built in stoppage".

Which seems to be an issue here....but if the Marines are happy working around the "built in stoppage" with their M27 IAR, then maybe it's not as big an issue as many seem to think.

Since we are growing closer again with the US(particularly the USMC), maybe this will be re-evaluated in the future.

I'm a fan of the new 7.62 Minimi. It's a great tool. It has the firepower of the MAG58/GPMG at reduced weight...while brand new it's quite a good system, I can't help but wonder about longevity much like the C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) near it's end of life the accuracy/grouping capacity was becoming shockingly bad.

We've only recently introduced the 7.62 Minimi and not long before that the LMT DM rifle. An announcement was just made that we will be replacing the Steyr rifle in the next 2 years.

I wonder if there is a possibility of not just seeing an AR platform purchased here for individual issue, but also evaluating the USMC's recent M27 IAR choice and role in the section/platoon.

Time will tell.

The M27 does not have a section or platoon role. It fits team and squad roles only.

We really mis-employed the Minimi as a team-level weapon, expecting it to do many things yet never properly resourcing or training the gunners who lugged it around.

During its testing, even a previous Commandant, Gen Conway, couldn't get his head wrapped around the fact that the IAR should not be expected to maintain the rates of fire obtainable with the Minimi--a LMG.

As odd as it may be, it took Gen Amos, of aviator pedigree, to look at things differently and sign off on its full procurement.

Although it may take a generation of platoon commanders to pass, I foresee an resurgence of the Emma Gees as crew-served MGs are folded back into the proper support role we strayed away from (by necessity of course) in late OIF and almost all of OEF.