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Ray
05-19-2006, 09:15 PM
Friday, May 19, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

EDITORIAL: Project Afghanistan: Pakistan and NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) wants closer military and political relations with Pakistan. The quid pro quo: Islamabad should support the 26-member alliance’s operation in Afghanistan. Last Wednesday, a NATO spokesperson in Brussels said that “The essence of the relationship will be pragmatic”. What he described as “technical discussion, technical cooperation, specifically related to support in Afghanistan” can be deciphered thus: we (NATO) need operational and relevant political support from Pakistan for the ongoing operation in Afghanistan and in return are ready to help Pakistan. Therefore Project Help Pakistan presumably could include support at various levels: relief work (as happened after the earthquake), intelligence sharing, equipment provision, joint training, and so on.

One thing is clear. NATO does want closer cooperation with Pakistan since it is broadening its operation in Afghanistan and relieving US troops with NATO-ISAF contingents. NATO is also putting troops on the ground in southern Afghanistan, the hotbed of the Taliban, and it makes sense for it to try and enlist Pakistan’s support. Only last week NATO deputy secretary-general, Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, was in Pakistan along with a contingent and met General Pervez Musharraf and other senior officials of the defence and foreign ministry and intelligence services in Islamabad. Mr Rizzo was accompanied by NATO’s senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, Hikmet Cetin, a former Turkish foreign minister.

The presumption seems to be that at some point the security and other interests of NATO and Pakistan converge. As the spokesperson said, Mr Rizzo discussed southern Afghanistan with General Pervez Musharraf and “Pakistan of course wants ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) to succeed. They have the same interest as we all have.” NATO took command of the ISAF in August 2003. Afghanistan is the first mission for the alliance troops outside the Euro-Atlantic area since its formation. Its broad objective currently is to fight the war on terror. The presence in Afghanistan of its troops, whose strength will shortly go up from 9,000 to 15,000, is part of that mission.

The question for Pakistan, currently a major non-NATO ally of the United States, is: Do its interests in Afghanistan converge with those of NATO, and by extension that of the United States?

The presence of the NATO delegation in Islamabad meant that NATO also wants to know the answer to this question. There are two broad theories on it. One says that Pakistan is still supporting the Taliban; the other rejects this and says that Pakistan is doing as much as it can to control the situation on its side of the Durand Line. A third theory, which combines aspects of both, argues that while Pakistan is bent on eliminating Al Qaeda, its interest in the Taliban remains, though this is primarily because Kabul seems to be dancing to New Delhi’s tune. For its part Islamabad denies that it has any soft corner for the Taliban or that it wants to destabilise Afghanistan. Indeed, Islamabad has its own gripe against Kabul for trotting out this line and has accused President Hamid Karzai’s government of advancing India’s anti-Pakistan designs by fishing in Balochistan.

Be that as it may, it should be evident that a stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest. It should also be clear that Afghanistan cannot go against Pakistan’s interests beyond a certain point. It is landlocked and needs Pakistan for access to the outside world. Besides, Pakistan’s relations with NATO serve the interests of both sides and there is no reason that Pakistan should try to gain tactical points and lose sight of the larger strategic picture. NATO needs Pakistan and Islamabad should take advantage of its need by helping it secure Afghanistan. General Musharraf has reportedly discussed the possibility of opening NATO schools for Pakistani military personnel along the lines of the three such schools in Europe (Rome, Munich and Norway). NATO’s presence in this region is part of its drive to open up towards the countries of this region, an effort that is underpinned by the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative.

On the downside, Islamabad will have to be careful about how it communicates its interaction with NATO. The people largely look at NATO as an extension of the US, which is not entirely correct. However, this perception is strong for two reasons: the US is the core state of the alliance; and the US foots the major part of NATO’s bill. In tandem this means that the US also gets to influence NATO in a major way. However, NATO is present in Afghanistan under the UN mandate. In legal-political terms this is very different from Iraq, for instance, where the US embroiled itself against the wishes of even its own NATO allies and without a UN mandate.

Pakistan has therefore to look at its interaction with NATO only in terms of Afghanistan. It also needs to keep its interaction with NATO on a separate track from its relations with the US. When NATO sent its relief contingent for the quake-affected people, the political opposition raised Cain and accused the government of kowtowing to the US. Wild theories flew around and it seemed that NATO was in Pakistan to either take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or be the vanguard of the cordon against China. The key, therefore, is to sell this idea to the people as it is. That’s the tough part. *
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\05\19\story_19-5-2006_pg3_1


This is an editorial from a Pakistani newspaper Daily Times.

It raises interesting issues vis a vis the US, NATO, Pakistan and Afghanistan and with some reference to India too.

Unlike other countries, Afghanistan has always had strong warlords based polity with a nominal head at Kabul. It has been governed by tribal customs and have rarely been a cohesive nation as such. It is because of this situation that controlling Afghanistan has not been an easy task for anyone. Each warlord to his own, so to say.

Being landlocked and with a demanding terrain, while it is picturesque, it hardly supports agriculture or industries. Education has never been an attraction in Afghanistan.

In such a scenario, something more troublesome to govern that the "wild west", to have only 40,00 troops to "control" the nation and bring it to some semblance of democracy is well nigh impossible, especially since it is but small zones of tribal power centres and hardly a nation!

The current government or even the past ones were never friendly with Pakistan since there has always been the demand for Paktunistan (the land of the Pathans or Pashtuns or Pakhtoons) based on parts of Pakistan (inhabited by Pashtuns) and that of Afghanistan. And likewise Pakistan has always eyed Afghanistan with some suspicion. Afghans have never been easy with Paksitan. It must be remembered that Afghanistan is not a pure Pashtun country.

Therefore, for any organisation or country to expect Pakistan to assist without expecting anything in return is but a pipedream. That is why at regular intervals, Pakistan has to be woken from their reverie to take action in NWFP as was seen when President Bush visited Pakistan and admonished them for a tardy response to the War on Terror.

One wonders if the US is serious about bringing some semblance of order to Afghanistan. The Soviets had 120,000 troops and they failed (of course there were other reasons too). In India to contain the Pakistan sponsored cross border terrorism, there is a huge number of troops and para military (because India does not use artillery or air to control the terrorists) and yet the US expects to bring control with a mere 40,000!

One wonders how that could be possible.

Britain is sending 600 troops which is an understrength battalion in Indian terms.

Could someone explain how it is expected that Afghanistan can be 'normalised" with a mere 40,000 troops and with Pakistan being unable to control the Taliban and AQ from entering Afghanistan from Pakistan and return to their safe havens in Pakistan?

The worst case scenario being that Pakistan is actively aiding these Taliban and AQ to foment problems for ISAF!!

SWJED
06-21-2006, 12:40 PM
21 June Los Angeles Times commentary - NATO's Afghanistan Challenge (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot21jun21,0,7078228.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions) by Max Boot.


... On the plus side, the ISAF is that rare coalition in which soldiers from more than 30 nations, including such non-NATO allies as Australia and Macedonia, work together in relative harmony. In the Combined Joint Operations Center in Kabul, soldiers from different nations work side by side at computer terminals. Everyone communicates in English. The only way you can tell them apart is by the national flags on their shoulder patches...

Of course, protecting a group of visiting VIPs is one thing; protecting the people of southern Afghanistan from the Taliban and their narco-trafficker allies is a lot more difficult. This task has fallen primarily to 3,000 British, 2,200 Canadian and 1,500 Dutch troops. The other members of the ISAF prefer to serve in less perilous areas.

This points to one of NATO's biggest challenges — getting members to volunteer troops, and to do so without placing too many caveats on their deployment. In addition to limits of geography (many troops won't operate in the south or east), there are also tactical limits. For instance, some soldiers are not allowed by their governments to use chemicals like tear gas to disperse unruly crowds. This can become a major headache for ISAF commanders when figuring out how to deal with riots of the kind that rocked Kabul in May.

In theory, the ISAF is supposed to concentrate on the softer side of counterinsurgency, providing development aid and security, while U.S. troops focus on hunting down bad guys. In practice, the distinction can be hard to draw. NATO troops in the south can engage in "proactive self-defense," whatever that means. Fleshing out this nebulous mandate will be up to commanders on the spot, and the widespread expectation is that British and Canadian troops will be more aggressive than their more cautious Dutch colleagues.

It is a daunting task that NATO has taken on in a country that ranks 173 out of 178 on a basic index of human development, and one whose economy is more dependent on illegal drugs and foreign aid than any other nation...

Jedburgh
07-12-2006, 02:26 AM
I highly recommend this week's The Economist. Unfortunately, all the good stuff is restricted to "subscriber only" on-online.

This week features a very good Special Report on Afghanistan titled A Geographical Expression in Search of a State, that offers a balanced discussion of progress, failures and challenges. Couple that report with a longer (10 pages) survey of neighboring Pakistan, which The Economist calls "the most terrifying country in Asia", and it makes for an interesting read.

Jedburgh
07-12-2006, 10:15 PM
Very detailed report from HRW:

Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf)

Brutal attacks by armed opposition groups on Afghan teachers, students, and their schools have occurred throughout much of Afghanistan in recent months, particularly in the south. These attacks, and the inability of the government and its international backers to stop them, demonstrate the deteriorating security conditions under which many Afghans are now living. While ultimate responsibility lies with the perpetrators, much about the response of the international community and the Afghan government can and must be improved if Afghanistan is to move forward. The situation is not hopeless, yet....

Pages 109 to 114 of the pdf file are an analysis of the effect, or lack thereof, of military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A fairly close look is taken at the PRT concept and results.


Note: I know there are those who disdain any reporting from "Human Rights" organizations. However, I have a great deal of respect for the professionalism and balance of HRW, buttressed by personal observations of some of their personnel in action in Northern Iraq when they were still carrying out investigations into Saddam's Anfal operation against the Kurds.

Admittedly, there are times when their black-and-white views don't mesh well with the multiple shades of gray in the world we operate in, but I have found HRW to be very careful and precise in its findings and judgements. This is in great contrast to AI, which tends to be far more strident, and often exemplifies the reasons why many in the military look down upon "Human Rights" sources.

SWJED
08-04-2006, 09:02 AM
4 August Christian Science Monitor - Taliban Hinder NATO 'Ink-Spot' Strategy (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0804/p07s02-wosc.html) by Rachel Morarjee.


Any Taliban fighters approaching Camp Bastion are visible for miles because the main British base in southern Afghanistan is slap-bang in the middle of nowhere. There is nothing around Bastion but seas of dust.

"We have tied up thousands of troops protecting a white elephant in the middle of the desert. The Taliban won't be able to attack us, but we are not doing anything to protect the Afghan populace with this base," says a British officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

The location of the British base in southern Helmand Province highlights one of the many problems which face incoming NATO forces in the former Taliban strongholds of Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar Provinces.

NATO took over command of southern Afghanistan from US forces this week, promising to breathe new life into development, which has ground to a halt in the face of a reinvigorated Taliban. With double the number of forces that their US predecessors had, NATO plans to set up secure zones, then slowly expand them outwards like "ink spots" on blotting paper. But the virulence of insurgent attacks are already taxing the force, further delaying the reconstruction needed to win over what British commander Ed Butler refers to as the "floating voter."

"There is not a popular uprising in southern Afghanistan, but people are sitting on the fence. They are no longer sure whether the Taliban or the government will be the winning side," says Joanna Nathan, an analyst with the International Crisis Group.

Even before this week's handover, insurgents dramatically stepped up attacks in an apparent bid to knock off-balance the incoming NATO force. Nine British soldiers have died in the two months since they were deployed to Helmand, three of them in a well-planned ambush just a day after NATO took command of the region on July 31. Thursday, a Canadian soldier was killed by a roadside bomb, and 21 civilians died from a suicide car bomb in a Kandahar market. Over 1,000 people - most of them militants - have been killed since May.

NATO forces now number 8,000 across Afghanistan's four southern provinces, with some 4,000 departing US forces redeploying to eastern regions along the Pakistan border.

For the last four years US troops have focused their efforts on battling Al Qaeda and the fight to catch Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan's restive south. The task of rebuilding its shattered infrastructure has fallen by the wayside, and popular discontent has grown.

So has the opium crop, which is set to be the biggest ever this year in Helmand Province, which produces over 30 percent of Afghanistan's $2.8 billion harvest. In many parts of the south there are few other jobs.

Five years after the fall of the Taliban, the changes people expected to see in their lives have not materialized. Over 200 schools across southern Afghanistan have shut their doors in the face of violent threats and many more people have pulled their daughters out of the schools that remain open.

The Taliban have stepped into the security void that has opened up, setting up shadow administrations, offering people a chance to cultivate their drugs unmolested and promising a return to the law and order they enforced before 2001...

SWJED
09-05-2006, 05:52 AM
5 September USA Today - Deadline to Break Taliban: 6 Months (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060905/1a_lede05.art.htm) by Paul Wiseman.


NATO's commander here has set a six-month deadline to reverse a Taliban insurgency terrorizing southern Afghanistan or risk alienating Afghans undecided about whom to support.

British army Lt. Gen. David Richards said his troops must prove to Afghans in the south that the fundamentalist Islamic militia won't be able to undermine the democratically elected Afghan government or stop efforts to rebuild the shattered country.

Only 10% of the south's population supports the Taliban, Richards said, citing Afghan government surveys. In an interview, he said 70% won't declare their loyalty until they “see which side will win. They can't wait forever. We've got to show them we will win.”

Nearly five years after a U.S.-led campaign ousted the Taliban government that had sheltered al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Richards' troops have launched “Operation Medusa” in Panjwayi district in Kandahar province. The campaign aims to quell the Taliban's aggressive new offensive. NATO reported that more than 200 Taliban fighters were killed in the first two days of Medusa, which began Saturday.

The fighting also has brought NATO casualties. Monday, two U.S. warplanes mistakenly strafed NATO troops in Panjwayi district. A Canadian soldier was killed, said Maj. Scott Lundy, a NATO spokesman. A British soldier was killed in a suicide bombing in Kabul, the British Defense Ministry said. More than 130 NATO and coalition troops have died this year, the Associated Press reported, more than in all of 2005.

NATO took over responsibility for southern Afghanistan from the United States on July 31. As early as this month, NATO will take over for the U.S.-led multinational coalition in eastern Afghanistan...

SWJED
09-05-2006, 07:36 AM
5 September Reuters - NATO Says Offensive is Cornering Taliban (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090500063.html).


NATO said on Tuesday its major offensive to crush a revitalized Taliban in southern Afghanistan is pushing the guerrillas into a corner as heavy fighting continues.

"We are closing the circle on the Taliban -- we have got the Taliban in a bit of a trap," NATO spokesman Major Quentin Innes said.

NATO launched Operation Medusa, its biggest ground offensive against an increasingly active Taliban, last weekend in Kandahar province, the hardline Islamist group's spiritual heartland.

The operation is focused on Panjwai district, near the capital, Kandahar city, and is being supported by air strikes.

Medusa was launched after NATO forces encountered stiffer-than-expected Taliban resistance as it took over the south from U.S.-led troops, the alliance's biggest-ever ground operation.

Casualties have been high. NATO says it has killed more than 200 guerrillas, a claim the Taliban disputes. At least five Canadian soldiers have died in combat and 14 British troops were killed when their plane crashed early in the offensive...

SWJED
09-23-2006, 01:58 PM
23 September Wall Street Journal editorial - Operation Medusa (http://www.opinionjournal.com/weekend/hottopic/?id=110008987).


In the war on terror, few battles are as clear and decisive as the one fought these last few weeks in southern Afghanistan. Six thousand Canadian, British, American and other NATO troops trounced resurgent Taliban fighters who dared to fight in the open. "Operation Medusa" dislodged insurgents from trenches and tunnels near Kandahar, killing a thousand or more.

The intensity of the fighting surprised some NATO allies, who this summer took over the lead in southern Afghanistan from the U.S. More tests are to come. The insurgents will surely regroup, shun direct engagements with Western troops, and resort to the ad hoc terrorism perfected in Iraq. To adapt NATO's nomenclature, the Medusa was injured but the snakes are very much alive...

SWJED
09-29-2006, 12:52 PM
29 September USA Today - Nations Limit Use Of NATO Forces (http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060929/1a_bottomstrip29.art.htm) by Jim Michaels.


Countries sending their troops to Afghanistan have placed a web of restrictions on how they can be used, creating headaches for combat commanders and hurting the coalition's ability to fight a resurgent Taliban.

The restrictions, also called caveats, vary and are imposed by governments who fear casualties or don't agree with all parts of the mission. Other caveats are due to a lack of training or equipment.

The result is some forces can't fight at night or in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan...

Some restrictions

Germany (2,300 troops): No combat.

Netherlands (1,400 troops): No ground combat.

Others (identities classified by Pentagon): No night fighting.

SWJED
10-18-2006, 09:37 AM
18 October Globe and Mail - NATO Faces ‘Window of Opportunity' (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061018.wxafghan18/BNStory/Afghanistan/home) by Paul Koring.


Military successes over the Taliban in recent months have opened a crucial six-month “window of opportunity” to prove to Afghans in the south that long-promised reconstruction and security can be delivered, NATO's commander in Afghanistan said Tuesday.

However, British Lieutenant-General David Richards warned that “if we fail to deliver on the promises that they [the Afghan people] feel have been made to them,” the Taliban will be back in strength next summer. “If you do not have the consent of the people in a counterinsurgency, at the end of the day, you're probably going to lose. So we need to explore these ways to get the people onside.”

The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan failed to follow through as it should have after ousting the Taliban government in 2001, setting the stage for this year's deadly resurgence, he said. The mistake consisted of adopting “a peacetime approach” too early.

Gen. Richards stressed the urgent need for reconstruction, the development of a reliable and honest police force and alternatives to the poppy production that supports southern Afghanistan's economy.

Gen. Richards stressed the urgent need for reconstruction, the development of a reliable and honest police force and alternatives to the poppy production that supports southern Afghanistan's economy.

“At some point the military can do no more, because we don't offer solutions to all the other complex issues that are confronting the country. We are just part of the solution,” he said...

Jedburgh
10-21-2006, 03:19 AM
...a decidedly pessimistic point-of-view from Michael Scheuer at the Jamestown Foundation:

The West is Running Out of Time in Afghanistan (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=201)

...The old adage that familiarity breeds contempt is no place on earth truer than in Afghanistan, and there it additionally always breeds armed resistance. In the Afghans' view, the U.S.-led coalition has occupied Afghanistan for five-plus years, has failed to deliver a more prosperous and safer society, has killed a large number of Afghan civilians and shows no sign of planning a near-term departure. Always short of patience in regard to foreigners running their affairs, most Afghans probably would concur with Taliban spokesman Mutamen's statement that "the people of Afghanistan...never accept foreign dominance...America has attacked Afghanistan without any reasonable plan or suggestions. The Americans, therefore, get nothing but the death of their soldiers in Afghanistan. We want NATO and other foreign troops to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible" (Afghan Islamic Press, October 7). Ominously, another Taliban leader, Mullah Mehmood Allah Haq Yar, claims that not only has the Pashtun-dominated Taliban's patience run out, but that the forces of the late Ahmed Shah Masood—heretofore backing Karzai—are beginning to decide that they did not defeat and evict Moscow only to be ruled by the West. In late spring 2005, Yar claims to have talked with Northern Alliance representatives who "condemned the foreign presence in the country, but insisted that the Taliban take the lead [in attacking it] and then they would follow suit." Yar claims that the Taliban's contacts with the Alliance commanders are continuing (Asia Times, October 5).

Overall, the increasing pace of the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan suggests it is only a matter of time until the commanders of the U.S.-led coalition are faced with telling their political leaders that a decision must be made to either heavily reinforce coalition forces—it appears that more than the 120,000 men Moscow deployed to Afghanistan in the 1980s would be necessary—or begin preparations to withdraw from the country. If taken now, such a decision would be made in the context of polls showing popular opinion in Canada and Britain turning decidedly against continued participation in the Afghan war and media reports that France may begin to withdraw its special forces from Afghanistan next spring (Associated Press, October 15).

Jedburgh
10-23-2006, 01:05 PM
ISN, 23 Oct 06: Perspectives: Insurgency in Afghanistan (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16825)

NATO's mission in southern Afghanistan, the alliance's first land deployment outside Europe, is proving its toughest yet. NATO's command has set a six-month deadline to wipe out the Taliban insurgency in order to work toward its original goals, hoping to reverse the situation before the onset of winter. Much is now riding on NATO's ability to see its mission through, and many experts agree that Afghan stability will depend on the alliance's success in the southern region. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer warned that without greater international help, Afghanistan could again become a breeding ground for terrorists.

Violence in Afghanistan continues to escalate, and is said to be worse than at any time since US-led forces invaded the country in 2001 to remove the Taliban. As such, NATO's mission has seen its mandate and its rules of engagement expanded well beyond the original duties of peacekeeping.

Complicating matters, last week, air strikes by NATO helicopters hunting Taliban fighters tore through three homes in southern Afghanistan as villagers slept, killing at least nine civilians, including women and children, according to news agency reports. Residents of the village of Ashogho condemned the attack. At around the same time on Wednesday morning, a rocket struck a house in a village to the west, killing 13 people. The strikes come at a time when NATO was counting on local support for the counterinsurgency.

Is NATO capable of handling the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan or will troops be there for two more decades, as one British military official opined recently, thanks to the sidelining of the Afghan mission because of the invasion of Iraq?

ISN Security Watch asked you to share your views on NATO's mission in Afghanistan...
Some interesting commentary follows...

Tom Odom
10-23-2006, 02:45 PM
Very detailed report from HRW:

Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf)


Pages 109 to 114 of the pdf file are an analysis of the effect, or lack thereof, of military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A fairly close look is taken at the PRT concept and results.


Note: I know there are those who disdain any reporting from "Human Rights" organizations. However, I have a great deal of respect for the professionalism and balance of HRW, buttressed by personal observations of some of their personnel in action in Northern Iraq when they were still carrying out investigations into Saddam's Anfal operation against the Kurds.

Admittedly, there are times when their black-and-white views don't mesh well with the multiple shades of gray in the world we operate in, but I have found HRW to be very careful and precise in its findings and judgements. This is in great contrast to AI, which tends to be far more strident, and often exemplifies the reasons why many in the military look down upon "Human Rights" sources.


Jed,

I generally like HRW. Their work in Rwanda was excellent; that said, they operate from their core belief that all violence and all war is a violation of human rights. In particular, HRW "reporting" of organized killings by the new GOR in late summer/early fall was suspect in my view then and remains so today.

Other organizations like AI are highly suspect; they draw funding by making dramatic claims, many of which are effectively proved to be overstated or even false. Then again there is MSF; if I talk about the MSF in Rwanda we will have to move this post to the "rant" column. Then again MSF in Goma was one of the few NGOs willing to speak out against what was happening in the camps and act on it.

I did a quick scan read of this one; looks good and well judged in its assessments.

Best
Tom

marct
10-23-2006, 03:02 PM
On of the comments following the ISN piece was


The lynchpin to watch is Canada. Since moving into the south of the country this summer, its troops there have borne some of the heaviest fighting. At the same time its political investment in the success of the Afghan adventure is more in line with European members than with America or even the UK. The fear that a Canadian withdrawal will prompt a strategic re-evaluation in European capitals is a very real one.

Coming on top of that, CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/10/22/afganistan.html) just posted an interesting story



Military considers longer tours of duty in Afghanistan
Last Updated: Sunday, October 22, 2006 | 11:32 AM ET
CBC News

The Canadian military wants to increase the time served by its troops in Afghanistan to nine months, up from six, a general told soldiers gathered in Edmonton on Saturday.

Brig.-Gen Mark Skidmore spoke after a change of command ceremony that put him in charge of army forces in Western Canada.

The career soldier from London, Ont., took over the job from Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant, who will become commander of Task Force Afghanistan for six months.

"If you're a member of the Canadian military, particularly a soldier with a skill set that's required in Afghanistan, and you haven't been yet, I think chances are very good that the opportunity is going to be there to serve," Skidmore told the assembled troops at the Jefferson Armouries.

On Wednesday, Gen. Rick Hillier, chief of defence staff, said the Armed Forces will be looking outside combat units to find troops.

"We will re-role people that are in the training system right now but who are designed to be something else," he told the Commons defence committee.

... more

There are some very odd maneuvers going on politically here :rolleyes:

Marc

Ray
10-23-2006, 03:04 PM
One cannot wipe out the Taliban with the way it is being approached.

Unless one "seals" the border (though that is well nigh impossible), the Taliban terrorists will keep coming in and going into the areas cleared.

Therefore, two types of force is required.

One, those that seal the border.

Two, rear areas security force i.e. those that clear the area and then ensure that whatever trickles in is removed forthwith.

marct
10-23-2006, 03:24 PM
One cannot wipe out the Taliban with the way it is being approached.

Unless one "seals" the border (though that is well nigh impossible), the Taliban terrorists will keep coming in and going into the areas cleared.

Therefore, two types of force is required.

One, those that seal the border.

Two, rear areas security force i.e. those that clear the area and then ensure that whatever trickles in is removed forthwith.

Good points but, unfortunately, there is no way it can be done as things now stand. If you look at the case in the south-east, the border into North and South Waziristan is wide open and the Pakistani Government has no hope of being able to seal their side. One totally radical suggestion, that I know the Pakistanis won't accept, is to return Waziristan to Afghanistan (they used to be Afghan provinces and are dominated by the Pashtun tribe). The key to "winning" in Afghanistan, IMHO, lies to a large degree in recognizing that the current borders are illusions and operating on that recognition.

We lost the best chance for "winning" when the Loya Jirga met in 2003 and the king was shuffled aside - Karzai doesn't have the same personal authority, either moral or organizational. And, while I do respect him for a lot of the work he has done, he is not going to be able to unify the country as long as he is viewed as a puppet for the West. A victory in Afghanistan must be a victory by Afghans along the lines of the 2nd Afghan war (1878-1881).

Marc

SWJED
10-31-2006, 08:22 AM
31 October London Times - Troops Turn Away From 'Ink Spots' For Control (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2429379,00.html) by Anthony Loyd.


... “If you listen to all the rumours then you would never go out or do anything,” said Colonel Ian Huntley, the Royal Marine commander in the capital of the restive Helmand province of Afghanistan. “It was always expected that there would be a period of asymmetric war, suicide bombings, et cetera. Generally, though, the place is relatively benign. I’m sure there are many worse places in the world to work.”

The colonel’s phlegmatic approach typifies the attitude of 3 Commando Brigade, which arrived in Helmand a month ago. Its mission — to support the Afghan Government with the necessary security measures to allow civil development — had been slanted more to war fighting than reconstruction after the outgoing 16 Air Assault Brigade spent the summer engaged in heated battles with insurgents.

Development was all but non-existent in Helmand by the time the Marines arrived, its concept still pinned on the failed idea of “ink spots”, whereby isolated northern towns, including Musa Qala and Sangin, were supposed to be the seeds of an expanding stability rather than the scenes of fierce fighting and rancour.

In the absence of officials from the Department for International Development, who rarely venture out of Kabul, the development of Helmand — the key to making progress in southern Afghanistan — has fallen largely on the military’s shoulders. The “ink spot” idea has been killed off, replaced by the concept of the “ADZ”, the Afghan Development Zone, a lozenge-shaped area, approximately 40 km (25 miles) long by 20 km wide, stretching along the Helmand river valley from the town of Gereshk to the city of Lashkar Gah.

Despite the threat of the suicide attacks, British patrols are deploying daily from their base in Lashkar Gah, home to about 350 soldiers and Marines, and assessing the potential of redevelopment sites within the ADZ.

The speed of progress might be slow, but the mission is up and running. And unlike in Iraq, where British officers and men have expressed doubts openly about the advantage of their continued presence in the country, in Helmand hope in the mission still remains high...

Jedburgh
11-02-2006, 10:30 PM
ICG, 2 Nov 06: Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/123_countering_afghanistans_insurgency.pdf)

...The desire for a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace is what has brought Afghanistan to the present, increasingly dangerous situation. It has to be recognised that the armed conflict will last many years but the population needs to be reassured now that there is a clear political goal of an inclusive state. Actions to fight the insurgency must be based on and enforce the rule of law with priority given to the reform of the police and judiciary. Short-term measures such as reliance on ill-trained and poorly disciplined militias, harsh, ad hoc anti-terrorism legislation and discredited power brokers from past eras will only undermine the long-term goal of building sustainable institutions. Political strategy talk seems to focus increasingly on making a deal with the Taliban. That is a bad idea. The key to restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan is not making concessions to the violent extremists but meeting the legitimate grievances of the population – who for the most part have eagerly supported democratisation...

SWJED
11-07-2006, 08:27 AM
7 November Los Angeles Times editorial - Make a Drug Deal with Afghanistan (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-hari6nov06,0,2531827.story?coll=la-opinion-center).


... The Afghan people are rebelling because the U.S. government is currently committed to destroying 60% of their economy. In the name of the "war on drugs," a U.S. corporation, Dyncorp, is being paid to barge into the fields of some of the poorest people in the world and systematically destroy their only livelihood.

These Afghans are growing poppies — from which heroin is derived — out of need, not greed. A quarter of all Afghan babies die before their fifth birthday. The Senlis Council warns that if Western governments continue this program of economic destruction — and the negative propaganda bonanza it creates — the Taliban may be sufficiently rejuvenated to march on Kabul, depose President Hamid Karzai and pin up a "Welcome home, Mr. Bin Laden" banner.

There is an alternative to this disastrous spiral. The world is suffering from a shortage of legal opiates. The World Health Organization describes it as "an unprecedented global pain crisis." About 80% of the world's population has almost no access to these painkillers at all. Even in developed countries, for cancer care alone there is an unmet annual need for 550 metric tons more opium to make morphine.

Afghan farmers continue to produce the stuff, only to be made into criminals because of it. Meanwhile, in a Kabul hospital, half the patients who need opiates are thrashing about in agony because they can't get them, while in fields only a few miles away opium crops are being hacked to pieces.

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

marct
11-07-2006, 01:52 PM
The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

Actually, this is one that the Western governments really shouldn't do - the UN or private companies operating under UN and national government oversight should. There are just too many resonances with the Opium War if national governments by themselves are doing it.

Marc

Jedburgh
11-13-2006, 02:08 PM
The Economist, 13 Nov 06: Afghanistan after the Taliban: Five Years On (http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8159467&top_story=1)

...Some worry that this will prove to be the high point of progress in Afghanistan. Analysts discuss the risk of successes of the past five years now draining away. There have been real achievements, if unevenly distributed. Afghanistan has an elected and popular president, Hamid Karzai, and a parliament that, despite some doubtful members, has proved itself generally responsible. Some 4.5m refugees have come home and 6.5m children are back in school. A national army of 35,000 men has been built from scratch, along with a police force of 55,000, although the latter is woefully corrupt and needs reforming. A UN disarmament campaign has processed 63,000 members of illegal armed groups and impounded 10,000 tanks and other heavy weapons. Some 4,000 health posts and 10,000km of roads have been built or rebuilt, although it unclear how these will be maintained in the long term...

...The prospects for long-term recovery depend, ultimately, on getting stability and flattening the Taliban. NATO commanders admit that they would like more troops to do that, but Western public opinion may not tolerate a long and bloody campaign. The Taliban, by contrast, appear happy to plan for the long term. As one Taliban commander recently boasted: “You have the clocks but we have the time.”...

CaptCav_CoVan
11-14-2006, 04:58 PM
Interesting piece on Afghanistan from The Asia Foundation:

Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey06.pdf)


November 13, 5:01 pm

The Asia Foundation (http://www.asiafoundation.org/) has just released Afghanistan in 2006: a Survey of the Afghan People (http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey06.html), one the most comprehensive surveys of Afghan public opinion. Questions ranging from government performance to security and reconstruction progress were asked of 6226 respondents throughout the country. The Asia Foundation does note, however, that due to security concerns they were unable to conduct the survey in Zabul and Uruzgan provinces.
The 128-page report contains both good and bad news. First the good, 44 percent of Afghan's believe the country is on the right path and have an optimistic view of the future. The bad news is that this number is significantly smaller than The Asia Foundation's 2004 survey (PDF (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/afghan_voter-ed04.pdf)) in which 64 percent felt the country was heading in the right direction.
Strangely, security is not the number one reason cited by Afghans as shaping their opinion on the country's direction. A bad economy, the lack of reconstruction progress, poor government performance and unemployment all trump security as major concerns.

Below are some of the key findings (PDF (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-surveyfindings_english.pdf)) that we think are especially interesting:


The national mood was found to be positive on the whole, with 44 percent of Afghans saying the country is headed in the right direction. While 21 percent felt it is headed in the wrong direction, 29 percent had mixed feelings and four percent were unsure.
Good security was cited as a reason for the country going in the right direction. For people who were disappointed with the direction, however, lack of security was not seen as one of the major reasons.
Though 80 percent felt poppy cultivation was wrong, they cited economic reasons for continued cultivation, and few made any linkage of poppy cultivation to terrorism, insecurity, or greater corruption.
An overwhelming majority (86%) of Afghans surveyed said they agreed to the principle of 'equal rights regardless of gender, ethnicity, and religion.'
A significant majority of survey respondents were in favor of women's rights to education and work.
Almost half of the respondents felt that men and women should have equal representation in political leadership.
For reporting a crime, 63 percent of the survey respondents went to the police, while for resolving problems the preference was to go to elders of the local shura (44%), followed by the police (37%). While 61 percent felt religious leaders should be consulted on problems, most reported having resolved problems through local elders. [Full Article, PDF (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey06.pdf)]One of the best aspects of this survey is that it includes a description of the methodology as well as a copy of the questionnaire used. Don't have time to read a 128-page report? Turn to page 90 and you can quickly see what questions were asked, how they were asked and the exact percentages for each answer. Take a look, the Afghan perspective provided in this survey is well worth your time.

Jedburgh
11-15-2006, 08:52 PM
CSIS, 15 Nov 06:

Transforming NATO (...again): A Primer for the Summit in Riga 2006 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061114_nato_primer.pdf)

The portion of the report dealing with Afghanistan and its potential effects upon the Riga summit and NATO's future is on page 48 of the pdf document.

...The NATO operation in Afghanistan is in itself a remarkable achievement. Given the distance from Brussels, complexity, and operational environment, ISAF would have been an unimaginable mission just ten years ago.

Many observers believe the ISAF mission marks the birth of a “global NATO” that is willing and able to face 21st century threats. Others, however, are increasingly skeptical about the operation’s long-term sustainability. SACEUR General James Jones called for an additional 2,000 troops in September 2006. The deafening silence that followed raised questions about whether NATO had the political will and adequate capabilities to succeed....

SWJED
11-28-2006, 08:36 AM
28 November NY Times editorial - Slouching Toward Riga (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/opinion/28tue2.html)


When NATO leaders gather in Latvia this week, there will undoubtedly be a lot of grand talk about how the cold-war alliance has managed to elude irrelevance, bringing in new members, dispatching humanitarian aid and deploying peacekeepers beyond Europe’s borders.

But the real issue before the annual summit meeting is that NATO is failing its most significant post-Soviet test: stabilizing Afghanistan. Violence is spiraling as the Taliban and Al Qaeda reassert their power. The economy is addicted to opium production. The pro-Western government in Kabul looks increasingly powerless and irrelevant.

Unless NATO’s members commit to sending in more troops and more resources, Afghanistan could go the way of Iraq. There may not be many more chances after this week’s meeting.

The current 32,000-member NATO force is too small. Some provinces — including those along the border with Pakistan, where the Taliban have their sanctuaries — have little or no allied presence...

jcustis
11-28-2006, 01:10 PM
NATO cannot win there. We need to increase our commitment, reconstruction efforts, and get it done. Just call it a hunch.

marct
12-12-2006, 01:31 PM
From CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/12/11/duceppe-afghanistan.html)



Duceppe threatens to topple government over Afghan mission
Last Updated: Monday, December 11, 2006 | 7:34 PM ET
CBC News

Bloc Québécois Leader Gilles Duceppe threatened Monday to try to topple the Harper government over the mission in Afghanistan unless the current mandate is changed.

Duceppe warned he might table a no-confidence motion if the mission isn't "rapidly and profoundly" altered, with more resources put into reconstruction instead of fighting.
....

Jedburgh
12-13-2006, 02:43 PM
CSIS Briefing, 12 Dec 06:

Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061212_afghanistan.pdf)

Key Trends
- Development of effective government and economy will take at least 5-10 years; no instant success is possible.
- Current Afghan government, and US and NATO aid and activity levels are inadequate.
- Reconstituted enemy is more lethal and shows increased capacity for effective asymmetric warfare, including effective information operations
- Pakistan sanctuary is an enemy advantage
- Major rise in violence in West and South
- Rising threat in other areas
- Violence likely to be at least equal next year and may well be higher.
- Afghan forces developing but require major increases in aid and years of support.
- NATO effort has insufficient forces and only US, Canadian, British, Danes, Estonians,and Dutch forces are in the fight. Romanians have been in limited action but are largely road bound due to wrong APCs.
- Increased Narco-trafficking/crime
- Threat exploits limited transportation infrastructure.
- Image-risk of US defeat in Iraq strong morale builder for Taliban-Al Qa’ida
(Much more detail in the 71 slide pdf presentation)

Edit to add: Press Briefing Transcript (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/press/061213_cordesman_afghan.pdf)

marct
12-15-2006, 04:36 PM
From CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/14/senlis-report-061214.html)


Troops bear brunt of 'misguided' Afghan aid policies: report
Last Updated: Thursday, December 14, 2006 | 2:30 PM ET
CBC News

International agencies, including the Canadian International Development Agency, have failed to tackle the food emergency in southern Afghanistan, and NATO soldiers in the region are paying the price, a new report says.

The paper, released Thursday by the Senlis Council, an international think tank, says "misguided" policies by agencies such as CIDA and the British Department for International Development have left the local population hungry and angry towards the international community.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/14/senlis-report-061214.html)

The full report (4MB) is available at http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/HM_report_full

Marc

Tom Odom
12-15-2006, 06:26 PM
From page 54 of the Senlis report.


Even if you don't accept the veracity of the figures, the message is still there in this chart, one I delivered to an Israeli colonel in my history seminar in 1987.

It is for this reason I still maintain that "civilian" or worse, "collateral" casualties must be treated as friendly. "Us and them" has to be "we."

tom

Jedburgh
01-01-2007, 02:08 PM
Culture note, from The Economist, 19 Dec 06:

Pushtunwali: Honor Among Them (http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8345531)

...It is over 250 years since Afghanistan was cobbled together, from many ethnic groups, and two centuries since British colonisers tried stretching their writ to India's (now Pakistan's) north-western frontier, where the plains crumple up towards the Hindu Kush. Yet, in both places, a large part of the population is still wedded to Pushtunwali. Some 15m Pushtuns live in Afghanistan, or 50% of its population; and 28m in Pakistan, mostly in NWFP, representing about 15% of the population there. Most of them are ruled by their tribal code, the notable exception being where the rival Islamist code, of the stringent Saudi variety which is preached by the Taliban and quite new to Afghanistan, is strong. Islamism has rivalled Pushtunwali for centuries; it has often gained prominence, as currently, in time of war. More typically, the two competing ways have cross-fertilised in Afghanistan, each subtly influencing the other...

SWJED
01-27-2007, 07:41 AM
U.S. Says Afghan Troops Issue Critical to NATO's Future (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-01-26-voa80.cfm) - VOA.


A top U.S. State Department official warned Friday that NATO's future may hinge on alliance members dropping conditions they have placed on their troops' service in Afghanistan. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns says the so-called "caveats" on what various contingents may do in that country are an "existential" issue for NATO.

The Bush administration has made clear its irritation over conditions some NATO countries have placed on their soldiers' activity in Afghanistan...

NATO Allies Wary of Adding Troops in Afghanistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/asia/26cnd-afghan.html?) - NY Times.


America’s European allies remained noncommittal about sending additional troops to Afghanistan today, even as the Bush administration sought to inject new energy into the NATO mission against the Taliban by offering more American soldiers and money.

Officially, the language at a NATO meeting here today reflected resolve and commitment on Afghanistan. NATO “is stepping up its game in Afghanistan on all fronts,” the alliance’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands, said. “The fact that you saw so many people from the international community sitting around the table is a strong message itself.”

But beyond the sound bytes, the realities that have troubled the NATO mission in Afghanistan since the 26-member trans-Atlantic alliance took command last year remained on display. France and Germany continued to limit their combat role; both countries have refused to deploy troops in the south of the country, where Taliban forces are strongest. Germany’s Parliament has yet to approve a proposal to send six Tornado reconnaissance jets to southern Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi is battling allies in own party and government who oppose the Afghan mission and want the government to set a deadline for withdrawing the country’s 1,800 troops...

SWJED
03-06-2007, 08:50 PM
6 March Washington Post - NATO Launches Major Operation in Afghanistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/06/AR2007030600109.html) by Griff Witte.


NATO and Afghan forces launched what commanders described as a major operation in a key province of southern Afghanistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/afghanistan.html?nav=el) Tuesday morning, part of a bid to win back territory that has become a haven for insurgents.

The operation, the international force's largest to date in the country, was centered in the northern part of the Helmand province (http://www.nationalgeographic.com/landincrisis/020312/political_sw.html), where Afghan government authorities have very little control and insurgents have been able to move with relative impunity. The province's governor said 700 al Qaeda fighters recently moved into the region, and were planning to continue the wave of suicide bombings and other attacks that have besieged Afghanistan for the past year and a half.

Both sides have said this is likely to be a bloody spring for the country, and Tuesday's operation seemed to mark a significant escalation. NATO forces said the operation began at 5 a.m. and ultimately would involve 4,500 NATO troops from the U.S., Britain, Canada and the Netherlands, plus 1,000 Afghan soldiers...

SWJED
04-12-2007, 08:43 AM
The Australian - Diggers Get Afghan Boost (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21537078-31477,00.html).


Australian special forces will go back on the offensive against Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan in an effort to regain the upper hand in Oruzgan province.

The return of the special forces comes at a crucial time, with Taliban insurgents threatening to retake control of key areas in the south, including inaccessible parts of Oruzgan.

John Howard said yesterday the 300-strong special operations task group - part of a plan to double Australia's military commitment in the country - would be sent to Oruzgan for at least two years...

The Australian - Pressure on Howard to do More (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21537076-31477,00.html).


Australia's defence chiefs are already reconciled to a long-term Australian military presence in Afghanistan.

Yesterday's announcement of a return of special forces to Afghanistan confirms that that country remains at the centre of Australia's military contribution to the global jihadist war.

The SAS and the commandos are essential to ensuring that our engineers and trade specialists can go about their civic rebuilding tasks with the support of localAfghans. The ground forces are sustained by headquarters, intelligence and logistics staff, as well as vital air support, bringing the total size of the force to at least 1000.

The experience of the past few months has shown that without aggressive, long-range patrolling and intelligence gathering by Australian special forces, the threat posed by Taliban insurgents in Oruzgan province will soon rebound. Tight rules of engagement for a number of NATO countries, including The Netherlands, inhibit their combat forces from taking on the Taliban in offensive operations.

John Howard conceded yesterday that there was a long way to go in Afghanistan, saying the war could not be won without "renewed and increased effort" on the part of coalition forces...

Globe and Mail - Death of Six Canadians Shatters Afghan Calm (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070409.wxafghanmain09/BNStory/Afghanistan/home).


Canada suffered its worst day in battle since the Korean War as six soldiers were killed yesterday and two injured by a roadside bomb in Afghanistan.

The powerful strike on their LAV III armoured vehicle marked a stunning end to a relatively peaceful winter enjoyed by the Canadian troops, who had not suffered a death by enemy action in more than four months.

The attack also signified the first major salvo from the Taliban in response to Operation Achilles, as thousands of NATO troops roll into Helmand province to confront insurgents openly defying government rule...

Globe and Mail - Two Soldiers Die in Wave of Taliban Bombings (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070411.wafghanmain0412/BNStory/National/home).


Two more Canadian soldiers died in a wave of Taliban bombings yesterday, making this the military's worst week on the battlefield in half a century.

Three days after six Canadian soldiers died in a roadside explosion on Easter Sunday, a helicopter thundered into Kandahar Air Field last night and medical crews hurried onto the floodlit tarmac to unload a seriously injured soldier on a stretcher, while another staggered into the military hospital with his arms around two comrades. A second helicopter set down moments later, carrying the two bodies.

By the end of the day, three explosions had injured three Canadian soldiers and as many as 10 civilians, and raised the total of Canada's war dead in Afghanistan to 53 soldiers and one diplomat...

Stan
04-12-2007, 10:50 AM
I just returned from Kabul performing an assessment visit for potential EOD/EDD vacancies. Hmmm, tempting offer. Where did the vacancies come from :rolleyes:

The recent attacks also killed 7 Afgan deminers, injured two and killed two Mine Detection Dogs :mad:

The last time deminers were attacked in 2005, the UN suspended demining activities.

marct
04-12-2007, 12:43 PM
Much as I abhor our recent casualties in Afghanistan, they came at a time which may well backfire on the Taliban. Over the past couple of weeks, there has been a lot of concentration on the restoration of the Canadian war memorial in France and on a remebrance of the Vimy Ridge battle. Vimy holds a psition in Canadian ppular culture somewhat analogous to that of Gallipoli in Australian culture - except we won that one after the Brits and the French couldn't. I'm not sure how it will play out in popular culture, but I suspect that it will harden popular support in at least some areas. After all, we suffered over 3,000 casualties at Vimy...

Marc

Tom Odom
04-12-2007, 02:06 PM
For Marc and the Canadians. Canadian wounded at Vimy Ridge...

marct
04-12-2007, 03:14 PM
For Marc and the Canadians. Canadian wounded at Vimy Ridge...

Thanks, Tom. My Great Uncle fought there (and in most of the major battles of WWI with Canadians in them). His descriptions were, to say the least, somewhat "chilling" :wry:.

On a related story from CBC


Canadian Forces expected to renew aging fleet of tanks
Last Updated: Thursday, April 12, 2007 | 6:21 AM ET
CBC News

The Canadian Forces is set to announce plans on Thursday to refresh its fleet of aging tanks with newer Leopard tanks purchased from NATO allies.

The newer, more modern machines will be purchased second-hand from the Netherlands. But they will be of a newer generation than the 30-year-old Leopard C2s currently being used by the Canadians in Afghanistan.

In the short term, the Canadian military will likely lease 20 state-of-the-art Leopard A6Ms from Germany.
....
Canada currently has 17 Leopard C2 tanks in Afghanistan. By updating its fleet, the military has reversed the former Liberal government's decision to do away with the tanks altogether.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/04/12/leopard-tanks-070412.html)

On Vimy from CBC Shock and Awe: 1917 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/vimy/)

Marc

SWJED
04-15-2007, 09:29 AM
14 April The Australian - Digging in All Over Again (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21552787-31477,00.html) by Patrick Walters.


Australia is being slowly yet inexorably being drawn into a novel 21st-century version of the "great game" in Afghanistan as our military prepares for its most sustained fighting since Vietnam.

The upgraded Afghanistan mission promises to be long and hazardous, and Australia's defence chiefs know there is no guarantee of victory.

Our overall troop commitment is much likelier to rise than fall in the next two years as the battle intensifies to stabilise Afghanistan. But, unlike Australia's two most recent wars, in Vietnam and Iraq, the war in Afghanistan is a full bipartisan commitment from the Government and the ALP.

John Howard this week warned that Australia's national interests were involved in Afghanistan. He said the war could not be won without "renewed and increased effort" by the US and its allies. Describing Afghanistan as being at a crucial stage in its history, the Prime Minister warned of a deteriorating environment in southern Afghanistan and the threat of a resurgent Taliban and al-Qa'ida.

"But while I am very conscious of the history of Afghanistan, you can't see what is occurring there just as part of the historical continuity. There is another element and a very real element to the sort of world in which we now live," he said.

For Howard the new player in the near 200-year-old great game is al-Qa'ida and the fanatical Taliban. The risk for Australia is that Afghanistan will once again become a safe haven for terrorists as it was in the late 1990s when it was the global headquarters for al-Qa'ida and Osama bin Laden...

14 April The Australian - Rules of War (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21552786-31477,00.html) by Greg Sheridan.


Prime Minister John Howard wrote to Pakistan's military dictator, President Pervez Musharraf, in February. The tone of the letter was emollient and friendly, but it bore a heavy message. Howard likes Musharraf. They talk about cricket and the Commonwealth. There is a kind of Sam Browne belt quality to their relationship.

Howard admires the way Musharraf turned Pakistan around after the 9/11 al-Qa'ida terror attacks and made it into an ally of the West in the war on terror.

But if that Howard-Musharraf relationship was worth anything, it needed to be put to use now. This week Howard announced the effective doubling of Australia's military commitment to Afghanistan. This will reach 1000 Diggers by next year. It is one of the most dangerous and militarily important troop commitments Australia has made in decades...

14 April The Australian - PM Asks Pakistan to Curb Taliban (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21554448-31477,00.html) by Greg Sheridan and Bruce Loudon.


John Howard has written to Pakistan's military dictator, imploring him to do more to stop the flow of Taliban forces into southern Afghanistan in an effort to reduce the threat to Australian troops being sent to the region.

As Australia was preparing to double its troop commitment in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister told Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf in a personal letter sent in February, that the Taliban flow from Pakistan threatened the lives of Australian troops sent to Oruzgan province.

But General Musharraf yesterday lashed out at Western critics of his attitude to the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, bluntly threatening to quit the war on terror unless criticism of him abated.

US President George W.Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other Western leaders have put pressure on General Musharraf to crack down on terrorist activities along the border between his country and Afghanistan.

Western military analysts believe Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency is continuing some level of co-operation with the Taliban - a claim General Musharraf attacked this week...

SWJED
04-15-2007, 09:35 AM
14 April Globe and Mail - Deadly 'IED Cell' Aims to Disrupt Canadian Efforts (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070413.wafghan0414/BNStory/International/home) by Grame Smith.


Canadians and their allies are hunting for a group of Taliban bombers who have infiltrated the farmland west of Kandahar from neighbouring Helmand province, military officials confirmed yesterday.

But the insurgents' strike with an improvised explosive device in Zhari district this week, which killed two Canadians, does not mean the Taliban's spring offensive has arrived, said Lieutenant-Colonel Rob Walker, the battle group commander. Nor does the bombing mean that the security situation in Zhari has deteriorated, he added.

“We were just in the process of starting operations to target that particular cell when we had this most recent IED strike,” Lt.-Col. Walker said.

“It's my understanding that this IED cell is still there, and it certainly will be a focus of both the Afghan national army and police, and our collective efforts over the next number of days, to try get better definition on it, so that we can collectively work together to try to detain, capture, or persuade them to leave the area.”...

13 April Globe and Mail - Rising Toll Prompts Purchase of Tanks (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070413.wdefence13/BNStory/Afghanistan/home) by Alan Freeman.


Insisting that tanks can save the lives of Canadian soldiers deployed in its increasingly dangerous Afghan mission, the government announced yesterday it would spend $650-million to acquire up to 100 second-hand tanks from the Netherlands and lease 20 more from Germany.

The German-designed Leopard 2 tanks will replace Canada's 30-year-old Leopard 1 tanks deployed to Afghanistan last fall, which are not air-conditioned and could leave troops sweltering in 60-degree temperatures in the Afghan summer.

“We feel that it's best for our troops that we acquire stronger, heavily armoured main tanks that increase protection,” said Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, who made the announcement at the end of a meeting of defence ministers from the eight countries participating in the NATO-led force in southern Afghanistan.

The acquisition of 100 tanks for a mission that now uses only 17 indicates that the armed forces have persuaded the government that Canada will need a robust tank force in the future...

SWJED
04-18-2007, 08:34 AM
18 April Washington Times - Afghan Offensive to Test NATO Credibility (http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070417-101212-4508r.htm) by David Sands.


The United States and its NATO allies are making progress in Afghanistan but face a critical test of the alliance's credibility from an expected spring offensive from the Islamist insurgency, Dutch Ambassador to the United States Christiaan Mark Johan Kroner said in an interview yesterday.

The U.S. and Dutch armies are among the few NATO countries carrying out the bulk of the military operations against resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan's restive south and east.

The 2,100-member Dutch force has taken command of the volatile southern sector from Canada, but several NATO powers have placed restrictions -- known as "caveats" -- on the deployment of their forces to Afghanistan's more dangerous regions.

The war is a "critical test of NATO's credibility," Mr. Kroner said in a luncheon with editors and reporters at The Washington Times.

"If NATO does not succeed there, it will be a disaster -- not just for Afghanistan and the region but for NATO itself," the veteran Dutch diplomat said. "It would certainly be a blow to the credibility of the West to deal with a crisis."...

SWJED
05-08-2007, 09:49 AM
8 May Washington Times - NATO Paces Afghan Offensive (http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070507-115823-8325r.htm) by Philip Smucker.


NATO officers and diplomats say they are selectively securing some areas of southern Afghanistan ahead of others, hoping the contrast between Taliban and government rule will gradually undermine support for the Islamist insurgents.

Officers responsible for "Operation Achilles," the spring offensive being undertaken by U.S., British and Canadian forces, say they are in no hurry to drive the Taliban from some of the strongholds they captured in northern Helmand province last year.

"We will move into these Taliban areas at a time of our choosing," British Lt. Col. Charlie Mayo said, when asked why NATO forces had not yet challenged the hard-line Islamist organization's grip on Musa Qala, a major town in this key battleground province.

NATO is trying to set examples of development and stability in enclaves already under Afghan government control, Col. Mayo said...

SoiCowboy
05-08-2007, 11:16 AM
It comes across more as NATO weakness than strategic brilliance.

goesh
05-08-2007, 11:23 AM
- they may be waiting for the Dutch to decide if they want to engage armed Talis or not, the Dutch need multiple E&E routes ya' know and it takes time to map them out:p

jcustis
05-08-2007, 11:31 AM
From what I've seen of combat camera footage of the Dutch in action, those guys are the last thing that could be holding NATO up.

Old Eagle
05-08-2007, 01:46 PM
I'm not sanguine about this approach. It is basically a reprise of the approach taken around Brcko, BH. Federation-controlled areas were pumped full of redevelopment projects while Serb areas, since we were having problems with the little darlin's, were left to languish. Intended message -- behave and good things happen. Message received -- Croats and Bozniacs are willing to sell their souls for money, but we Serbs are too proud and strong for that! Tribalism wins out.

Pls note -- this is history. I have not been to Brcko in nearly a decade; I am not trying to describe current ground truth.

TROUFION
05-08-2007, 01:48 PM
European troops in general tend to be excellent. Well trained well supplied and motivated. Unfortunatley they seem to be hampered by vacillating Governments and Commanders who, again seem, to give in when presented a dilemma that puts their men and their national policy at any risk.

Example: Srebrenica: The United Nations had previously declared Srebrenica a UN protected "safe area", but they did not prevent the massacre, even though 400 armed Dutch peacekeepers were present at the time.[12]
http://www.gendercide.org/case_srebrenica.html

Of course Srebrenica was a peace keeping operation so ROE was a factor BUT...

tequila
05-08-2007, 02:12 PM
Apropos - even supposed America-lover / Muslim-basher Sarkozy is eager to withdraw (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070426/ap_on_re_eu/france_election)from Afghanistan. I remember that Jacques Chirac was also a great lover of America when he won office.

SWJED
05-20-2007, 09:33 AM
20 May Washington Post - Bush, NATO Chief Seek Ways To Bolster Afghanistan Mission (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/19/AR2007051900963.html) by Michael Fletcher.


NATO's top official is scheduled to arrive here Sunday for talks with President Bush amid growing anger in Afghanistan about civilian casualties from the alliance's war there and continued reluctance among many NATO members to increase their commitment to the six-year-old conflict.

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Bush are to meet Sunday and Monday at the president's ranch in hopes of solidifying NATO's efforts in Afghanistan. Some experts worry that the international effort is fraying as the violence in Afghanistan has intensified in the past year, exposing fissures between alliance members.

The 26 NATO member nations have assumed vastly different levels of risk in the Afghanistan mission. Countries including Germany, Italy and Spain have largely had their troops deployed in nonviolent areas of Afghanistan, leaving the volatile south to allies including Americans, Canadians, British and the Dutch...

SWJED
05-30-2007, 09:10 AM
30 May Washington Post - NATO General Tells of Taliban Setbacks (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052901938.html) by Jason Ukman.


A top NATO alliance general said yesterday that Afghanistan's Taliban militia has lost its ability to control large swaths of territory, even if the hard-line Islamic movement remains strong in "small pockets" of the country.

Dutch Maj. Gen. Ton van Loon, who this month ended his tour as commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan's volatile south, said Taliban fighters had been driven out of the regions where they had sought to gain a foothold, including Kandahar city and parts of Helmand province...

Shivan
10-25-2007, 02:09 AM
Daily Telegraph (UK) writes "As Robert Gates, the American Defence Secretary, remarked recently, the [NATO] alliance has more than two million soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen at its disposal, but only a fraction of that number is available to participate in the most important mission in Nato's history because of the national caveats that the governments of many member states have imposed on their forces deploying to areas where they might be in danger of suffering casualties."

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/10/25/dl2502.xml

davidbfpo
10-25-2007, 08:05 AM
The BBC Radio 4 is quoting seven hundred dead since ISAF arrived, I accept the vast bulk are from "the willing". That alone will put politicians off deploying. In an article alongside the one cited is a comment by Lord Ashdown, ex-Bosnia governor, that Afghanistan is lost.

The steady UK losses are regularly reported and arouse to date little public discussion. If this continues without the Afghans playing a bigger role I cannot see the UK public accepting the burden in say five years time. What does resonate here is the contradiction in providing security and the booming poppy harvest - the large bulk of the heroin reportedly comes here to Western Europe. I know this has led to debate before on SWJ.

If the Canadians and the Dutch leave or stop committing combat troops it is easy to hear the argument here in the UK, why should we remain?

Robert Hunter, on BBC Radio just quipped the heroin buyers are putting more money into Afghanistan than NATO in eceonomic aid (missed the announcement of who was speaking, but recognised the voice).

davidbfpo

Shivan
10-25-2007, 01:52 PM
Times (London) headline above, article here: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2733769.ece

The Brits, Canadians, US and Dutch have been pulling their weight, but not the other NATO countries. And what UK/US is asking of these other members are not combat forces, but logistical and reconstruction support. The combat forces have been holding their own (or better), but these reconstruction efforts are a necessary part of counter-insurgency.

This brings to fore the issue of US in NATO, does it not? Why is there such a huge one-sided commitment by Americans to an entity that invoked Art. 5 but has not followed through? Separate discussion thread would be necessary for that though!

Thanks!

marct
10-26-2007, 01:36 PM
I suspect that part of the problem has to do with how NATO is reconstructing itself. I remember chatting with a senior German policy advisor about Germany's role in Afghanistan, and he pointed out the somewhat ironic position where for years Germany was told they were "bad" for being militaristic and were now being told they were "bad" for not being militaristic enough :wry:.

Marc

Armchairguy
10-26-2007, 09:21 PM
After the USA spent a large part of its wealth in the defence of Europe through the cold war while Europe invested in social programs there should be some equity. Unless the alliance coughs up some more troops I don't see what the point of NATO is and why it should exist. I'm betting the alliance will dissolve without a stronger commitment.

Rank amateur
10-26-2007, 10:07 PM
I bet if the US moved 30,000 troops out of Iraq and into Afghanistan NATO would be much more willing to send more troops.

BRUZ_LEE
11-05-2007, 07:38 PM
... I don't see what the point of NATO is and why it should exist....

NATO will definitely not be a self-financing Foreign Legion for the US Government....
Talking about Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan I see the fundamental problem in the lack of an overall, coherent NATO strategy for COIN in Afghanistan. And if there is no overall approved strategy what should the nations do other what they individually think is best in their respective AORs? Some nations focus on defeating the enemy while others focus on non-kinetic nationbuilding. Both has its own right in COIN doctrine. But it definitely doesn't make sense if you do the one thing exclusively in the North and the other one in the South; that is not going to work...
And putting the blame on the other side will not be a solution; and it will only serve the Taliban...
First of all, NATO needs to agree on a COIN doctrine. Then develop a strategy for Afghanistan. Then look what has to be done, what forces there are and then attribute troops to tasks.
...and BTW, stop the counternarcotics program in AFG. That's right now a main recruiting factor for the insurgency.

BRUZ

P.S. Coalition Warfare. Here is an interesting video about a French ETT (SOF?) with ANA:

http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/special-reports/FRANCE-24-Reports/Reporters-FRANCE-24

Wagram
11-06-2007, 06:52 PM
These guys aren't SOF they belong to the 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade LRRP unit which is called the GCM in French.

TT
01-15-2008, 10:29 AM
Allies Feel Strain of Afghan War, Wash Post 15 Jan



After more than six years of coalition warfare in Afghanistan, NATO is a bundle of frayed nerves and tension over nearly every aspect of the conflict, including troop levels and missions, reconstruction, anti-narcotics efforts, and even counterinsurgency strategy. Stress has grown along with casualties, domestic pressures and a sense that the war is not improving, according to a wide range of senior U.S. and NATO-member officials who agreed to discuss sensitive alliance issues on the condition of anonymity.
While Washington has long called for allies to send more forces, NATO countries involved in some of the fiercest fighting have complained that they are suffering the heaviest losses. The United States supplies about half of the 54,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan, they say, but the British, Canadians and Dutch are engaged in regular combat in the volatile south.
"We have one-tenth of the troops and we do more fighting than you do," a Canadian official said of his country's 2,500 troops in Kandahar province. "So do the Dutch." The Canadian death rate, proportional to the overall size of its force, is higher than that of U.S. troops in Afghanistan or Iraq, a Canadian government analysis concluded last year.
British officials note that the eastern region, where most U.S. forces are based, is far quieter than the Taliban-saturated center of British operations in Helmand, the country's top opium-producing province. The American rejoinder, spoken only in private with references to British operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is that superior U.S. skills have made it so.
NATO has long been divided between those with fighting forces in Afghanistan and those who have restricted their involvement to noncombat activities. Now, as the United States begins a slow drawdown from Iraq, the attention of even combat partners has turned toward whether more U.S. troops will be free to fight in the "forgotten" war in Afghanistan.
……………………………………….

Both President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have toned down their public pressure on allies. When German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Bush at his Texas ranch in November, U.S. and German officials said, she told him that while Bonn would step up its contribution in quiet northern Afghanistan, any change in Germany's noncombat role would spell political disaster for her conservative government.
"It's not an excuse; it's simply reality -- coalition reality and domestic reality," a German official said. Merkel came away with Bush's pledge to praise Germany's efforts and stop criticizing.

More at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/14/AR2008011402722_pf.html

Stan
01-16-2008, 12:30 PM
Foreign Minister Paet Visits Afghanistan (http://www.mfa.ee/eng/kat_138/9200.html)


Last year the government passed an Afghanistan conception which contains no set date for when Estonia’s military or civilian mission in Afghanistan should end,” said Foreign Minister Paet. “We are prepared to participate in the stabilisation and building up of Afghanistan until the goals set by the government of Afghanistan and the international community have been met,” he emphasized.

Last year Estonia supported the paediatric ward of the Bost Hospital in Helmand province with 1.1 million kroons. The Foreign Ministry also allocated 469,400 kroons (30,000 EUR) from its civilian mission budget to support the European Union Police mission EUPOL.

This year, Estonia has already provided support for the creation of a new building for the Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University and for a population census in Afghanistan.


Estonia to send health care specialist to Helmand (http://www.mfa.ee/eng/kat_138/9206.html)


President Karzai highly values Estonia’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). “We are very grateful that this tiny nation so far away from Afghanistan is helping us in as complicated a region as Helmand province,” said President Karzai.

Foreign Minister Paet confirmed that Estonia plans to significantly increase its civil contribution. “We’re sending a medical expert to Helmand, who will be responsible for developing the medical system for the whole province and coordinating international aid,” Paet said.

Foreign Minister Urmas Paet said that Estonia is sending one police officer to join the ranks of the European Union Police Mission. Last year Estonia gave 469,000 kroons (30,000 EUR) to support the EU Police Mission EUPOL Afghanistan, which aims to help the development of the Afghanistani police force.

Rex Brynen
01-17-2008, 02:12 AM
Gates faults NATO force in southern Afghanistan (http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-fg-usafghan16jan16,0,174967,full.story?coll=la-home-center)

The U.S. Defense secretary says he thinks alliance troops do not know how to fight a guerrilla insurgency.

Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2008


WASHINGTON -- In an unusual public criticism, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he believes NATO forces currently deployed in southern Afghanistan do not know how to combat a guerrilla insurgency, a deficiency that could be contributing to the rising violence in the fight against the Taliban.

"I'm worried we're deploying [military advisors] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counterinsurgency operations," Gates said in an interview.

and

MacKay downplays U.S. criticism of Afghan allies (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080116.wnato0116/BNStory/International/home)

Globe and Mail, January 16, 2008


OTTAWA — Defence Minister Peter MacKay dealt with a case of diplomatic friendly fire Wednesday and was forced to defend the inadvertent criticism of his U.S. counterpart about the quality of NATO forces fighting in southern Afghanistan.

The reported comments by U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates rankled allies around the world and touched a raw nerve in Canada at a time when the Conservative government is trying to convince a reluctant public that the Kandahar mission should continue in some form.


Outrage as US accuses Britain of inexperience in Taleban conflict (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3201002.ece)
The Times, 17 January 2007


Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, risked an unprecedented rift with Britain and other close allies after accusing Nato countries fighting in southern Afghanistan of lacking experience in counter-insurgency warfare.

Mr Gates said failings in the south were contributing to the rising violence in the fight against the Taleban.

His outspoken criticism, voiced in an interview with an American newspaper, provoked instant reactions from Britain, Canada and the Netherlands, the three most prominent members of the alliance, who have endured much of the fiercest fighting in southern Afghanistan.

Norfolk
01-17-2008, 02:30 AM
I suspect that Secretary Gates is largely right, but maybe not for the reasons that some might assume. The other NATO countries are not really engaged in true COIN operations, let alone adhering to a true COIN strategy. But the reason for this is twofold: 1. There simply are not anywhere near enough NATO troops in the south of Afghanistan to allow them to adopt a true COIN strategy, rather than just sallying out from their bases or outposts to destroy Taleban or AQ when and where they find them; and 2. There is no true unity of effort - Eden talked about that - amongst them. The Brits, Canadians, Danes, and Dutch all go about things more or less their own way - and the Dutch seem hardly to be fighting at all; whether that's a good approach or not, I can't say. They are all just left doing their own thing, more or less. The Americans in the East don't have anywhere near that problem, since so much of their forces are well, American, and there are not the same political issues there.

So Mr. Gates is quite right about the other NATO countries not engaging in COIN; but the truth is, the reasons aren't because they're not properly trained in COIN - they certainly are - but COIN is simply impossible given the political obstacles to unity of effort and the gross lack of troops and resources required for a COIN strategy. They couldn't pursue a COIN strategy if they wanted to, so all they can do is hunt and kill, conventional-style, because that's all they have the means for at hand. Consequently, pretty much all they can do is search and destroy - a fist into water - and nothing else.

Eden
01-17-2008, 03:19 PM
Excellent points on NATO in Afghanistan. Having worked in ISAF, I can confirm that the command structure is only slightly more functional than the French army at Agincourt. Why is that?

1. Genuine professional differences of opinion. The Dutch, the British, the Canadians, the Americans, and others involved have different approaches to the mission. The Brits tend to be much more willing to compromise and negotiate with local bad guys, the Americans are much more kinetically-minded, the Dutch are committed to a soft-cap approach, etc. Each has its good points and its faults - but the point is that local commanders can and do refuse to modify their tactics to fit an overarching NATO operational concept.

2. Poor troop-to-task fit. NATO countries want to participate in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the force generation process is so disordered and riven by politics that the troops who actually show up are sometimes not what the alliance truly needs. Every month we would be notified that a Polish engineer battalion or Romanian force protection company was on its way, when what we really needed was infantry, aviation, or civil affairs. As a result, our operations - and to a lesser extent our tactics - were severely constrained by the nearly random selection of forces at our disposal.

3. Political nervousness. Many contingent commanders had to keep one eye firmly cocked over their shoulders. I know of at least one occasion when a national representative of the defense ministry sat in the operations center of an infantry battalion, satellite phone in hand, to report back on current ops in real time. Some commanders were under tremendous personal and professional pressure, which reduced their ability to operate according to a common NATO plan.

4. Money. You need money to fight insurgents and rebuild countries. NATO doesn't have money. Many individual countries don't have money. Some had money but preferred to spend it on national (and therefore outside the NATO span of control) programs. Nobody had money like the Americans, and even they didn't have enough.

5. Higher headquarters. Some may find this hard to believe, but NATO - as a military headquarters - contributes very little value added to the war in Afghanistan. ISAF is essentially a fiefdom, whose commander feels very little constrained by the NATO Supreme Commander. Thus, there is no higher headquarters - a la CENTCOM - providing continuity or guidance as the command of ISAF rotates. More importantly, there is no Eisenhower-figure, empowered by the alliance nations to impose discipline on subordinate national commanders.

Enough. Things are getting better in some ways. NATO officers are not idiots or incompetent. The problems are recognized and some minor patches made, but I agree that the alliance is going to be weaker coming out of Afghanistan than it was going in.

By the way, and a lot of us Americans forget this, but the US is in NATO also. We sinned as much as anyone in not fulfilling our troop committments, in refusing to modify our tactics, and in imposing caveats on the use of our troops. If NATO fails, we will have contributed to the problem.

Stan
01-17-2008, 03:30 PM
"The Pentagon chief said he reluctantly asked President George W. Bush to approve the 3,200 additional troops announced on Tuesday because it was clear European nations would not boost their force levels in Afghanistan (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN1614819820080117)."


WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon does not plan to send more U.S. troops to Afghanistan beyond the additional Marines promised this week despite a lingering shortfall in trainers for the Afghan forces...

"I think it was pretty clear it was not going to come from NATO," Gates said in the interview, according to a text of his remarks. "And as much as I was reluctant to recommend to the president that we add additional forces there, I think it was important to build on the military successes that we had in 2007."

"We certainly don't have any plans to send further troops to Afghanistan beyond what we've just announced."

The additional Marines being sent to Afghanistan to counter rising Taliban violence, will raise the number of U.S. forces there by more than 10 percent.

J Wolfsberger
01-17-2008, 07:31 PM
I first heard about this listening to Radio Netherlands on Sirius - World Radio news. The Dutch have had 14 KIA in Afghanistan ( a big number, given their population) and were, shall we say, miffed. I was looking forward to reading Gates' interview. Imagine my surprise that the LA Times hasn't actually published the interview.:rolleyes:

Here's what they have published:

"I'm worried we're deploying [military advisors] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counterinsurgency operations," Gates said in an interview. (What was the question? )

"Most of the European forces, NATO forces, are not trained in counterinsurgency; they were trained for the Fulda Gap," Gates said ... (Again, what was the question?)

"Our guys in the east, under Gen. Rodriguez, are doing a terrific job. They've got the [counterinsurgency] thing down pat," Gates said. "But I think our allies over there, this is not something they have any experience with." (Again, what was the question?)

Huh. Damn short interview.

Let me help the LA Times state the intro more accurately. "The LA Times accuses Sec Def Gates of insulting NATO allies in an unpublished interview."

Stan
01-17-2008, 08:04 PM
WASHINGTON, Jan 17 (Reuters) (http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N17228486.htm)- U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Thursday denied reports of discontent between Washington and NATO allies over Afghanistan, a day after a newspaper quoted him criticizing NATO's counterinsurgency skills.


Gates projected an image of unity among Western nations involved in Afghanistan during a Pentagon news briefing, praising the "valor and sacrifice" of NATO forces battling Taliban militants in the country's volatile south.

"Allied forces from the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia and Denmark and other nations have stepped up to the plate and are playing a significant and powerful role in Afghanistan," the U.S. defense chief said in remarks that struck a conciliatory tone.

CONCERN AMONG ALLIES

NATO allies responded to the Times interview with concern.

Britain insisted its troops had extensive counterinsurgency training, while the Netherlands summoned the U.S. ambassador for an explanation. Gates phoned his Canadian counterpart to say his quotes had been taken out of context.

"I mention this because there have been several recent media reports of discontent in the United States and among other NATO members about operations in Afghanistan," he said. "This does not reflect reality or, I believe, the views of our governments."

Anyone for the Tennessee two-step ?

Jedburgh
01-19-2008, 12:37 PM
Threats Watch, 18 Jan 08: A Flip of the COIN (http://threatswatch.org/commentary/2008/01/a-flip-of-the-coin/)

....But while Secretary Gates will publicly refer to ‘training’ and counterinsurgency ‘know how,’ the matter at hand is clearly one of will, not skill. Furthermore, it is a matter in the hands of our allies’ political leadership, not in the performance of their fielded forces who operate as directed. The commanders know it. Secretary Gates knows it. And the NATO political leaders retorting and taking offense to criticism of “training” and “tactics” know it all too well. They simply dare not say it. Instead, they respond safely within the public cover the US Secretary of Defense graciously provided by stopping short of addressing some of our allies’ flagging will.

One thing is for certain. The recent decision to send in an additional 3,200 seasoned United States Marines, who decidedly “know how to do counterinsurgency operations,” is indicative of Washington’s lack of confidence that there will be any shift in our allies’ political will any time soon. Not even against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Stan
01-19-2008, 08:09 PM
Beth Gorham, The Canadian Press (http://www.thestar.com/News/article/294986) - U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates scrambled today to praise Canada and other NATO allies fighting in Afghanistan, saying reports that he’s unhappy with their efforts don’t “reflect reality” or the views of the American government.


Countries like Canada that are committing combat troops are playing a significant and powerful role, Gates told a news conference called to quell an international furor after he told the Los Angeles Times this week he’s worried some allied forces weren’t trained in counterinsurgency operations.

As a result of the valour and sacrifice of these allies, the Taliban has suffered significant losses and no longer holds real estate of any consequence, said Gates, who announced this week he’s sending 3,200 extra U.S. marines.

He insisted he wasn’t singling out any country when he told the L.A. newspaper that U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan are doing a terrific job, but he’s concerned NATO allies in the violent south aren’t well trained in counterinsurgency.

Asked whether he was talking about Canada, Gates said: “I do not include the Canadians in that respect.”

Yet he repeated his concerns about NATO’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns against the militants.

More at the link...

DGreen
01-31-2008, 03:22 PM
I'm looking for practical solutions to help NATO in southern Afghanistan with the planning assumption that we will not get any significant infusion of troops outside the currently planned Marine deployment. Initial thoughts:

1. Move SEALs from Iraq to the south.
2. Embed civil-affairs teams with NATO units to provide on-the-ground CERP capability, advice, limited fighting capacity
3. Provide military liaisons who would be embedded with the Dutch, the British, the Canadians to improve coordination among the provinces and pass on accumulated expertise from U.S. forces with respect to fighting insurgencies.
4. Approach "moderate" Muslim countries such as Turkey, UAE. Jordan, etc to provide troops, development and reconstruction capabilities, aid, etc...
5. Undertake a determined training program among the NATO forces on basics of counter-insurgency with a particular focus on population protection approaches, civil-affairs, information operations, etc.
6. Eliminate physical safehavens. Use as a planning assumption that each district needs one forward operating base or, at minimum, a reinforced rifle platoon house.
7. Create robust civil affairs deliverables for each population center: power generation, agricultural programs, health, education, etc.
8. Eliminate tribal safe havens by bolstering the Provincial Council, District Councils, and members of Parliament and working to make sure they are representative and efficacious.
9. Hire civilians with key skills sets (e.g. water engineers, agricultural specialists, etc.) for each province (although my preference is each district) and give them a career path. Tactically harden them and ensure they have the same benefits as a person in uniform.
10. Deploy and embed Human Terrain Team members with NATO forces.

Some initial thoughts....I look forward to seeing your ideas.

Progressive Ranger
01-31-2008, 04:38 PM
The southern area is a disaster. When I was in A-stan (Afg-Pak) border, Paktika had just cooled off as the hot zone. A year before we got there it was "the most dangerous place on earth" according to the conventional guys that were there. US moved forces in, bad guys moved out and went south. Same thing will happen again as the #s just aren't there to maintain sustained presence in all of the hot spots across the problem areas (Kunar, border region and Helmand - let's not even mention Kabul).

The CERP piece is interesting. Problem is there are not enough teams to implement CERP. My team had an AID guy attached to us with MUCH greater funding pools that helped us do some serious infrasturcture development - thereby helping to reduce the underlying causes of extremism and violent groups - poverty, education, unemployment, etc. We were able to build the trust of the locals, the shuras, the district, etc, plus we were teamed with Afg Army (ANA) to increase gov't provided security and ultimately provide some much needed legitimacy to GoA since not a single rep of GoA had been to the area in over 56 years!

However, I think an even better tool would be for AID to bring in Development Contractors (not the big aerospace guys or security contractors that think they can run development work just because DOD is throwing money there) but actual devlopment companies, to run the CERP piece. They can respond much quicker, have a history of doing small grant programs as part of AID's OTI program in Iraq (managed ~ $500m over 3 years) and can implement much faster. The company can have numerous reps to allow AID to focus its people elsewhere (we all know how limited they are) and work directly with MNF, as well as US ODAs and CAT-A (CA teams).

We are already doing this in a couple of areas in A-stan and it has been incredibly successful with big down turns in violence.

Just my $.02.

Ken White
01-31-2008, 05:38 PM
...
1. Move SEALs from Iraq to the south.
2. Embed civil-affairs teams with NATO units to provide on-the-ground CERP capability, advice, limited fighting capacity
3. Provide military liaisons who would be embedded with the Dutch, the British, the Canadians to improve coordination among the provinces and pass on accumulated expertise from U.S. forces with respect to fighting insurgencies.
4. Approach "moderate" Muslim countries such as Turkey, UAE. Jordan, etc to provide troops, development and reconstruction capabilities, aid, etc...
5. Undertake a determined training program among the NATO forces on basics of counter-insurgency with a particular focus on population protection approaches, civil-affairs, information operations, etc.
6. Eliminate physical safehavens. Use as a planning assumption that each district needs one forward operating base or, at minimum, a reinforced rifle platoon house.
7. Create robust civil affairs deliverables for each population center: power generation, agricultural programs, health, education, etc.
8. Eliminate tribal safe havens by bolstering the Provincial Council, District Councils, and members of Parliament and working to make sure they are representative and efficacious.
9. Hire civilians with key skills sets (e.g. water engineers, agricultural specialists, etc.) for each province (although my preference is each district) and give them a career path. Tactically harden them and ensure they have the same benefits as a person in uniform.
10. Deploy and embed Human Terrain Team members with NATO forces.

Some initial thoughts....I look forward to seeing your ideas.
The "S" is SEAL stands for Sea. Afghanistan is far from it and people work best in a familiar environment. Putting SEAL Teams in the 'Stan never made a whole lot of sense. They've been there and done some great things but Afghan conditions are not their bag.

Your offers of 'help' to other Nations are unlikely to be well received and could be taken as Yankee arrogance. The Brits think they do COIN better than we do. They don't but perception is reality and most of NATO would, properly, tell us to butt out. We, after all, invited and cajoled NATO to go in there...

There are between 350 and 400 Districts there. They range in population from a few hundred to well over 100K. The terrain varies widely as does the geographic area. Thus it seems that more than a Platoon would be required in some districts. Accepting your Platoon/District fit and the common figure of 366 Districts, you need 366 Platoons -- that equates to roughly 14 Brigades. With the support slice that's about 140,000 troops -- about double the number now present . Where would those additional troops come from?

Aside from that number -- which posits no reserve -- you're confronted with the fact that a Platoon base is a target for 300-400 bad guys and if all your Platoons are farmed out, they won't be able to help each other.

Good luck with getting any Muslim nation other than Turkey to assist. Consider also that Afghans really do NOT like Arabs.

Your last three suggestions are obviously ideal but it does not appear that the Afghans are quite there yet and may be dome time in getting there. It's rather difficult to turn around 3,000 plus years in just a few. Then there's the problem of getting that batch of civilian expertise to go to a combat zone...

DGreen
01-31-2008, 06:15 PM
How many districts are there in Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar?

I know Uruzgan has six and I think Kandahar has sixteen and Helmand has thirteen for a total of thirty-five.

I believe the SEALs (Sea, Air, and Land, can't forget the "Land" part) are pretty bored in Anbar so sending them to Afghanistan would at least have them focused on fighting.

At this point in their deployments I think many of the NATO countries have had to alter their strategies and realize their own unique approaches may not be working that well.

My sense is that the UAE and Jordan have pretty good reputations in that part of the world due to their humanitarian and development assistance. It's certainly worth a try.

Progressive Ranger
01-31-2008, 07:27 PM
We worked with Arab allies on the Afg-Pak border and were very effective with the partnership.

Ken White
01-31-2008, 07:47 PM
How many districts are there in Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar?

I know Uruzgan has six and I think Kandahar has sixteen and Helmand has thirteen for a total of thirty-five.You want to ignore the rest of the country and concentrate on the south? Cool. Mullah Omar will say "Go west and north, Young Man...

However, covering only 35 Districts of different sizes with varying terrain and populations cuts the troop requirement -- it does not obviate your tactical problem.
I believe the SEALs (Sea, Air, and Land, can't forget the "Land" part) are pretty bored in Anbar so sending them to Afghanistan would at least have them focused on fighting.Is the object to focus the SEAL Teams on fighting or to achieve an acceptable outcome in the 'Stan?
At this point in their deployments I think many of the NATO countries have had to alter their strategies and realize their own unique approaches may not be working that well.I don't think any of them have altered their strategy at all -- that would entail leaving the country, they may have tried different TTP -- as have we. Doesn't affect the fact that you're suggesting trampling on National pride and can expect rejection -- or them leaving the country, a move most of those nations voters would support.
My sense is that the UAE and Jordan have pretty good reputations in that part of the world due to their humanitarian and development assistance. It's certainly worth a try.They do indeed have such a reputation in the ME, less so in south Asia where the mores and attitudes differ a bit. However, that's not the issue -- Bismallah the average Afghans reaction to Arabs is the issue. Plus the fact that most Muslims are still not at all sure what we're up to and and are reluctant to interfere in other Muslim nations. You are certainly welcome to try.

Oh, and while looking for all those civilians that would be nice to have there, ponder the thought of our Congress, already upset with many NATO nations (relative) lack of effort in Afghanistan, agreeing to allow us to expend CERP funds for some of those nations...

I'm not trying to rain on your parade, honest. You asked for thoughts and I gave you some. No question what you suggest would be beneficial, the questions I raise are solely addressed not at how good or bad the ideas are but at some considerations and what might be realistically achievable.

Eden
01-31-2008, 07:59 PM
Making the assumption that resources are not constrained - which they most definitely are - and evaluating each point on its own merits:

1. Why not? SF were the most effective combat multipliers we had. The SEALs are not ideally fitted for the environment or the overall mission, but they would be a useful asset.
2. Absolutely. CA teams with money are highly useful, and our NATO allies do not have the deep pockets or the flexibility that CERP affords their US counterparts. Would be a great help.
3. There is already a southern regional headquarters, essentially a brigade(+) hq, that should be coordinating provincial activities. The lack of coordination is not due to a spare command structure or lack of communications, it is caused by competing military and politcal agendas. More liaison officers would not help and could possibly harm what cooperation and coordination already exists.
4. This has already happened and is happening. There were Turks, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, and Jordanians in Afghanistan when I was there, and a UAE SF unit. You are unlikely to get much additional help from that quarter.
5. With limited exceptions, NATO does not train national forces, so any effort like this would have to be US acting more or less unilaterally. Assuming that we have our own act together on the subject, which is debatable, your suggestion implies that there is a "right" way to do COIN in Afghanistan. There is not. Afghanistan is not one war, it is multiple conflicts with many actors with shifting loyalties, objectives, and tactics. The fact that we in Paktia and the Dutch in Uruzgan take different approaches is not (necessarily) a bad thing. The idea that we all need to operate in a common way is, if not bad, an unnecessary constraint on local commanders.
6. All for eliminating safe havens. However, it cannot be done by establishing platoon houses, multiple FOBs, or any other form of blockhouses. The terrain is too rough and the area too large for that. Plus there is that pesky Pakistan...
7. Right on. Repairing the irrigation system would do more for the country than any thing else I can think of.
8. Ummm, who do you think sits on those councils? The weakening of tribal influences brought on by three decades of continuous war is one of the things that has contributed to higer levels of violence in Afghanistan. This suggestion indicates a lack of understanding on how the society you want to help actually operates.
9. These are called contractors. If you meant indigenous engineers, etc., you'll have to bring them back from wherever they fled years ago.
10. I don't know what a Human Terrain Team is, but they sound awfully effective. I would guess they are experts at discovering the mechanisms that drive society, linking important players, and analyzing the needs of specific localities, and not a bunch of soldiers who have read three books on Afghanistan. I'll defer judgment on this one.

Good luck

DGreen
01-31-2008, 09:29 PM
I'm not ignoring the rest of the country at all. I'm focused on trying to fix a particular problem in the south. That is where most of NATO's forces are fighting right now. I'm quite aware that we need a national counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan that is well resourced and comprehensive.

davidbfpo
01-31-2008, 11:15 PM
1. Buy the heroin crop
2. Build tarmac'd roads - using local labour
3. Pay the Afghan Army (ANA) & Afghan Police (ANP) on time
4. Pay the ANA & ANP if necessary direct and 50% to family if not living local
5. Forget about new NATO or other forces arriving
6. Expect the Canadians and Dutch to leave in 2009

davidbfpo

kehenry1
02-02-2008, 05:10 AM
Actually, skip buying the poppy crop and start buying other crops at higher rates. They need competing markets for space and fertile land, not a re-enforcement of bad behavior that, if I read the reports correctly, result in an inability to provide food for their internal needs, much less external markets.

In fact, the government could constitute a "grain reserve" program by building up effective storage areas in the districts and building capacity that would stabilize the price of wheat and other necessary food stuffs, provide a stable, comparative income and facilitate government control and good will as a provider to the people as opposed to USAID or other outside sources. Not to mention, stave off the possibility of starving millions of Afghanis.

Of course, that would require building up the irrigation and road systems, along with grain storage, much faster than is happening now. I keep thinking about the seabees of WWII and how fast they could throw up a base or air port or road and wonder at how long it takes us today.

Tie that in with local governance and tribal allegiances as a coop with some sort of plan for security from the tribes,makes their survivability and relationship with their own and the government a little more imperative.

There is a double edged sword to providing food aid to people who are more interested in growing poppies than in growing food. Money cannot buy what is not available and the income simply means imports are more expensive.

I think the tribal elders would gain back some additional control from the Islamists if they had a sustained capacity for providing for their people. We're not talking necessarily western standards, but the basics with the potential for additional development.

Of course, there is the issue of what agricultural basins exist, what crops they suited for and whether anyone could compete with the poppy trade. And the issue of protected government insiders and parliamentarians who traffic in it without any retribution from state for fear of "pashtunwali". there has to be an effective deterence AND replacement system. We're just to afraid to do it or push for it (so is the Afghan government) since we fear the rear guard action in the middle of trying to fight of the Taliban.

Still, start small enough. There has got to be some concept of self sufficiency built into the program or they will never leave the poppies.

Ron Humphrey
02-02-2008, 11:20 PM
Actually, skip buying the poppy crop and start buying other crops at higher rates. They need competing markets for space and fertile land, not a re-enforcement of bad behavior that, if I read the reports correctly, result in an inability to provide food for their internal needs, much less external markets.



I think the assertion that they will not give it up until there is not only a viable but a much more attractive alternative is probably widely accepted. Doesn't that fact in and of itself speak to the possible necessity of outbidding the current clientel for the product and creating a dependancy on the governmental structure for sustained purchase and approval for what is grown. Once this is done it drys up much of the extra funding the Taliban and AQ are able to subvert from this trade and would make them have to seek alternative forms or other locals within which to work it.

It also places the Govt in a positin to give the growers a directive a little further on which products to grow and over time to transition to a more supply and demand both internally and internationally in a different competetive market. This is would seem counter intuitive to US thought but for a country in which the market is as it is , the only way to trasition it to a more free market reflective agriculture base may be to first bring it into the government owned type but all the while watching for opportunity to push it back out into the private sector with a different focus.

It makes me uncomfortable to consider it such as state owned anything so often tends to lead into marxist, leninist type societies but as with anything what the goal is and what it will take to get it there has to be considered.

Thought's:confused:

Stan
02-06-2008, 09:34 PM
Belgium (http://www.f-16.net/news_article2731.html) to deploy 4 F-16s to Afghanistan


The move came in response to a NATO call for more troops to be deployed in Afghanistan.

For four months starting from September, 100 Belgian troops will support Dutch troops stationed in the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan.

The four F-16 jets will be deployed in Kandahar (KAF) from September 1.

Twenty military instructors are also to be sent to Afghanistan after October 1 to help train Afghan military personnel. They will be based at either Kabul or Kunduz.

Canada government may extend Afghan mission (http://www.lcsun-news.com/ci_8185983)


TORONTO—Canada's minority Conservative government said Wednesday it will ask Parliament to extend the country's combat mission in Afghanistan, and indicated it might be willing to put itself on the line to make sure the unpopular measure passes.

The refusal of some major European allies to send significant number of troops to Afghanistan's southern front lines has opened a rift within NATO. Troops from Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States have borne the brunt of a resurgence of Taliban violence in the region, with support from Denmark, Romania, Estonia and non-NATO nation Australia.

Germany to dispatch 200 additional troops (http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=1068542) to Afghanistan


BERLIN, Feb 6 (KUNA) -- Germany will send some 200 additional troops to serve in a so-called quick reaction force in the relatively calm northern Afghanistan, fulfilling a request from NATO.

Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung told reporters Wednesday that the troops would be based along with Germany's other roughly 3,000 ISAF troops in the north.

Jung said the quick reaction force would be available for support missions "elsewhere in Afghanistan"...

He reiterated his refusal to send German troops to southern Afghanistan, where ISAF troops and Taliban militants are engaged in clashes.

...Jung added that he would seek to increase German military transport planes from six at present to eight in the future.

davidbfpo
02-23-2008, 12:17 AM
In the (London) Daily Telegraph today:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/02/22/wcanada122.xml

Reports that Canada has an exit date from Afghanistan in 2011.

davidbfpo

Norfolk
02-23-2008, 06:06 AM
"Taliban sees Canada vulnerable for now: general" (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2145698120080222?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews), by Randall Palmer, Reuters, Feb 22, 2008:



The Taliban may have mounted suicide attacks on Canadian troops this week expressly to dissuade Parliament from extending the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, Canada's outspoken top soldier said on Friday.

Chief of the defense staff Gen. Rick Hillier also said it was important for the Canadian Forces to be given a clear mandate for its future role in Afghanistan as soon as possible.

"We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability. The longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link," Hillier said in a speech.


More at the link.

General Hillier has had to publicly "intervene" a few times already in order to stiffen Government resolve when it has appeared to flag or to wander off in the wrong direction. The distinction between Civilian supremacy and Military obedience becomes increasingly blurred as the General, out of sheer necessity, must step in to fill the political/strategic vaccuum that a strategically and militarily ignorant and/or inept political leadership persistently fails to even attempt to fill itself.

The Taleban can smell blood in the water a mile away, and rarely miss a chance to strike when they do. It is bad enough that two of the major Opposition Parties are incorrigible contrarians; it is even worse that the main Opposition party, the former Government that sent Canadian troops to fight in Afghanistan in the first place likewise persistently attempts to subvert support for the war effort, and propose utterly nonsensical alternatives that would doom it. Having realized, tacitly, the consequences of their proposals, they are nevertheless unwilling to suffer the loss of face that doing the right thing would entail. Their apparent deal with the present Government to withdraw at the end of 2011 mitigates some of its worst aspects in the short term, but tacitly accedes to a potential Taleban victory in the long term. What a waste.

DGreen
02-26-2008, 04:11 PM
NATO Confronts Surprisingly Fierce Taliban
Militia Undermines Rebuilding Efforts in Southern Province of Uruzgan

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/25/AR2008022503089_pf.html

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, February 26, 2008; A01

TARIN KOT, Afghanistan -- Lt. Col. Wilfred Rietdijk, a 6-foot-7 blond Dutchman, took command of his military's reconstruction team in the southern Afghan district of Deh Rawood in September. Tranquil and welcoming, it seemed like the perfect place for the Netherlands' mission to help rebuild this country.

Intelligence reports indicated that the district was free of the Taliban, allowing the soldiers greater freedom of movement than elsewhere in Uruzgan province.

"We could go out on foot," Rietdijk said.

Reconstruction teams, escorted by a platoon of soldiers, fanned across the fertile countryside, building bridges over streams and canals, repairing irrigation systems, and distributing books and pens to local schools.

But the day after Rietdijk arrived in Afghanistan, his field officers reported hundreds of villagers suddenly fleeing parts of Deh Rawood. "Within a few weeks, everybody was gone," Rietdijk said. "We didn't understand why."

Now the Dutch say they realize what happened. Even as the soldiers believed they had won the support of the local population, the Taliban had secretly returned to reclaim Deh Rawood, home district of the group's revered leader, Mohammad Omar. It took only a few months for the Taliban to undermine nearly six years of intelligence work by U.S. forces and almost two years of goodwill efforts by Dutch soldiers.

See the rest of the article at the link...

SWJED
03-29-2008, 11:20 PM
NATO: Bucharest and Beyond (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/nato-bucharest-and-beyond-1/) by Dave Dilegge at SWJ Blog.


National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies has posted its proceedings of the 2008 European Symposium - NATO: Bucharest and Beyond. Here are several take-aways from the report:

1) The NATO-ISAF operation poses the most critical test to date of NATO’s ability to generate the military forces required to meet its level of political ambition. In several categories, ranging from maneuver battalions to helicopters to C4ISR assets to Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) intended to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Allied nations as a group are not filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) set by NATO Military Authorities. This allows opposition forces to operate in the space between what NATO-ISAF has and what it requires.

2) There exists a lack of “political will” among Allies whose publics and parliaments are questioning the goals and strategy of the Alliance commitment and, in some cases, are increasingly worried about casualties suffered by their forces and/or incidents of collateral damage affecting Afghan civilians. In addition, numerous Allies lack the required capabilities and/or funding to deploy and sustain their forces, particularly in the more challenging operational environment of Afghanistan. For some Allies, this is complicated further by their competing commitments to other operations (e.g., in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Africa.)...

More at the link.

Icebreaker
04-02-2008, 04:02 AM
As a non-military type, I would like to get some input from those more knowledgeable to help me understand an article I read in the "Economist" magazine regarding Afghanistan "A ray of light in a dark defile".

The following is a link to the article for those interested:

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10919203

The article had a chart title "Killing season" that showed the casulaties for the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom. This chart showed the "United States" casulaties and "Other" casualties. The thing that confused me was that the chart indicated that the casualties for the other nations (non-US) were higher then those for the US in Calendar Years 2006, 2007 and so far in 2008.

My understanding was that the majority of troops in Afghanistan were American and that the Americans were in the most dangerous areas (please note that I am in no way lessening the contributions and suffering of the other countries). It seems logical that the US should be incurring the most casulaties. The source for the chart was www.icasualties.org, and the Economist is usually a very reliaable source. Is the information inaccurate? If the information is accurate then why are the non US countries suffering such heavy casualties (I have heard reports that the Taliban is specifically targeting countries like Canada and Germany to increase pressure on these countries to quit the war)?

Also, I think this issue illustrates one of the most frustrating things for non-professionals in regards to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - finding accurate and relaible sources of information.

Thank you

wm
04-02-2008, 12:07 PM
The article had a chart title "Killing season" that showed the casulaties for the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom. This chart showed the "United States" casulaties and "Other" casualties. The thing that confused me was that the chart indicated that the casualties for the other nations (non-US) were higher then those for the US in Calendar Years 2006, 2007 and so far in 2008.

My understanding was that the majority of troops in Afghanistan were American and that the Americans were in the most dangerous areas (please note that I am in no way lessening the contributions and suffering of the other countries). It seems logical that the US should be incurring the most casulaties. The source for the chart was www.icasualties.org, and

Thank you
The lines below are excerpted from the icasualties web link that you provided. I do not see how, except in 08, you can claim that ISAF casualties exceed those of the US.

Year US Other Total
2008 16 24 40
2007 117 115 232
2006 98 93 191

Entropy
04-02-2008, 02:19 PM
First of all, comparing US casualties to ISAF isn't completely helpful because many US forces are part of ISAF.

Secondly, the type of chart used is confusing - it's called a "stacked area chart." Google it for an explanation of how they work, but the highest peaks are the total casualties, not the total ISAF casualties.

Eden
04-02-2008, 04:29 PM
The command structure in Afghanistan is very arcane, and so is national participation in ISAF. Not all US forces in Afghanistan are part of NATO, but the majority have been under NATO command as part of ISAF since late 2006.
For that matter, there are other non-US military forces in Afghanistan that are not under ISAF, such as special forces who are working as part of SOCOM.

What used to be an independent US command - CJTF-76 - is now technically Regional Command (East), a subordinate to ISAF. There are also US forces operating as part of Regional Command (South), a subordinate command that rotates between the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands. If you look at current photos, you will see many US soldiers wearing an ISAF patch on their shoulder.

So when a US soldier becomes a casualty, he may also be counted as an ISAF casualty - or he may not, depending on how he is assigned to the theater.

As for the most dangerous part of the theater, well, that depends on how you classify it. I guess I would characterize the regions this way: In RC(East) there is a great deal of contact, but generally this is a result of the US forces seeking out the enemy; in RC(South) there is also a great deal of intense action, but this is generally a result of the enemy seeking contact. In other words, you may have roughly equal chances of becoming a casualty in either region, but RC(South) is more dangerous in the sense that we (meaning ISAF) have not yet claimed the initiative and do not control the pace of operations.

As for seeking info, this forum is a great place to start.

Stan
04-15-2008, 06:31 PM
On the surface, it seems Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin each got what they wanted most at the NATO and Sochi summits (http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/361932.htm).



Bush is moving forward with the placement of anti-Iranian missiles in Poland, and Putin kept Ukraine out of NATO, at least for the time being.

In fact, Bush's anti-Iranian missile plan was a godsend for Putin. It gave him something to protest as long as he got what he really wanted -- to keep Ukraine out of NATO.

Losing his temper, Putin revealed his real attitude toward Ukraine..."Do you understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state?" Putin told Bush in an outburst at a closed session of the NATO-Russian Council in Bucharest...

What is beyond doubt, however, is that the Poles are hitting up Washington for billions in military aid in exchange for allowing 10 missiles to be based on their territory. But Moscow's demands for a permanent monitoring presence on Polish territory could be a deal-breaker. Moreover, Warsaw is aware that if the next U.S. president is a Democrat he or she will be very unlikely to sign onto this foolish, costly and unpopular project. In other words, the U.S. missile-defense system, which might not work anyway, may never get built in the first place. That hardly sounds like a success.

But this Bush initiative did succeed in one respect. It infuriated the Russians. Of course, only the most paranoid and gullible could believe that these missiles would ever be targeted at Russia.

This could lead to hostilities...

The Kremlin has already threatened to target Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and now it might just be tempted to use them.

But hold on a minute...

Thanks to Bush, there might be a missile-defense system in Poland that now could be used to shoot down Russian missiles -- the first 10 anyway.

Jedburgh
04-16-2008, 03:52 PM
Eurasia Insight, 2 Apr 08: Russia and NATO: A Meeting of the Minds on Afghanistan? (http://www.eurasianet.org:80/departments/insight/articles/eav040208a.shtml)

During the run-up to the NATO summit in Bucharest, expert attention has tended to focus on the differences between Russia and members of the Atlantic alliance, specifically on Kosovo’s independence, a Central European anti-missile shield and Georgia’s and Ukraine’s gravitation toward Brussels. But there is one important area where interests are converging -- in Afghanistan.

Both Russia and Washington have become alarmed by the revived Islamic radical insurgency in Afghanistan. And both countries want to stamp it out. Of course, there is no way that Russia will deploy troops to Afghanistan. For one, NATO would not consent to it. And, more importantly, the Soviet legacy of brutalization, left behind after the 1979-89 occupation, precludes such an option.

Still, Russia is interested in doing what it can do to help the United States and NATO keep Islamic radicalism at bay in Central Asia....

AdamG
04-22-2008, 02:45 PM
In 1919, a young British army officer, Francis Stockdale, was deployed to the Waziristan area of British India.

The title of his book, "Walk Warily in Waziristan" seems no less appropriate now than it did 90 years ago, because today the autonomous Pakistani tribal region of North and South Waziristan is the centre of militancy orchestrated by pro-Taleban and al-Qaeda militants.

It is also an area where many believe the al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, may be hiding after the September 2001 World Trade Centre attacks.

It wasn't until the 1980s that Capt Stockdale's family published a handful of copies of the book, only a few of which survive. But because or renewed interest in the region, the family in the English county of Norfolk are considering reprinting it.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7325117.stm

Summon the publishers!

Surferbeetle
05-04-2008, 03:36 AM
From the Spanish Newspaper El Pais (http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Espana/resiste/incrementar/presencia/militar/Afganistan/elpepiint/20080403elpepiint_5/Tes)

‘Spain resists increasing its military presence in Afghanistan’


Aunque Bush volvió a reclamar ayer la solidaridad de los aliados, el ministro de Defensa en funciones, José Antonio Alonso, reiteró antes de salir de Madrid que se mantendría "en las mismas condiciones" el compromiso militar en Afganistán. Con 750 efectivos, España es la contribuyente número 11 de la ISAF (Fuerza de Asistencia de la OTAN para Afganistán) sobre un total de 40 países y 47.000 soldados, pero perderá peso si se concretan los refuerzos anunciados por diez países.

My 'soldiers spanish' is a bit rough so please bear with me...

‘Although (President) Bush turned this (Spain keeps its forces from working in the south or participating in offensive operations) into a claim of solidarity of the allies, the minister of defense, José Antonio Alonso, repeated after the departure for Madrid (a Spanish delegation led by Mr. Zapatero was in Bucharest) that they will maintain “in the same conditions” the military commitment in Afghanistan. With 750 personnel Spain is number 11 in contributing to ISAF (Assistance Force of NATO for Afghanistan) among 40 nations and 47,000 soldiers, despite the small contribution it is a concrete/specific announcement of reinforcement among ten nations.’

More in Spanish at the link....

Surferbeetle
05-04-2008, 03:53 AM
From the NYT (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/03/world/asia/03military.html?em&ex=1209960000&en=fdcb4b424d17ca36&ei=5087%0A)


WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is considering sending as many as 7,000 more American troops to Afghanistan next year to make up for a shortfall in contributions from NATO allies, senior Bush administration officials said. They said the step would push the number of American forces there to roughly 40,000, the highest level since the war began more than six years ago, and would require at least a modest reduction in troops from Iraq.

The planning began in recent weeks, reflecting a growing resignation to the fact that NATO is unable or unwilling to contribute more troops despite public pledges of an intensified effort in Afghanistan from the presidents and prime ministers who attended an alliance summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, last month.


Only one country so far has actually begun preparing more troops to deploy: France, which is sending 700 to Afghanistan, NATO officials said.

This article is referenced in a fair number of the european papers.

Surferbeetle
05-04-2008, 04:04 AM
From the NATO website (http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/reconst_develop.html)


RC(N)

* Since 2002, 1,054 PRT projects totalling 31.5 million USD, and 6842 other major infrastructure projects totalling 2.2 million USD
* 185 ongoing R&D projects totalling 6.5 million USD in 2007. Total R&D project for 2007 is 21.3 million USD.

RC(S)

* Since 2002, 1,362 PRT projects totalling 175.3 million USD, and 4,150 other major infrastructure projects totalling 1.8 million USD
* Kajaki Dam in Helmand aimed at providing power to 1.7 million people, irrigation to farmers, jobs to thousands within the next 2-3 years
* The major Gershk-Sangin-Kajaki road-building project has started and progresses north
* ANA patrol bases and 18 new permanent security check points being constructed

davidbfpo
06-16-2008, 08:50 PM
Curiously UK government announces more troops for Afghanistan when President Bush visits London: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7456551.stm

Interesting details within the statement, although how this "drip surge" can be sustained is unclear.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-22-2008, 10:08 AM
In today's Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/frontline/2171923/General-Sir-Michael-Jackson-We-must-maintain-our-will-in-Afghanistan.html

Timing is interesting.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-03-2008, 09:29 PM
An article from (UK) The Times, with the headline Afghanistan: ‘It was a battlefield last time I was here. The progress is remarkable’, which has some clear spin in and appears with a commentary on the Kings of War blogsite: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com (second article down).

davidbfpo

Rex Brynen
07-14-2008, 01:58 AM
Growing violence in Kandahar 'insignificant,' top soldier says (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080713.wafghan14/BNStory/Afghanistan/home)
GRAEME SMITH
Globe and Mail Update
July 13, 2008 at 4:49 PM EDT


KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — Canada's top soldier has dismissed the growing violence in Kandahar as “insignificant,” contradicting all public data and highlighting the growing gap between Canada's upbeat view of the war and the sober analysis from other NATO countries.

...

A comparison of the past two months against the same period in the previous year shows that insurgent attacks have more than doubled in the current fighting season, from 134 in 2007 to 289 in 2008.

For the year to date, VSSA counted 532 insurgent attacks as of July 6, up 77 per cent from 300 last year.

Canadian military officials have argued that the shifting nature of the Taliban's attacks shows that the insurgents are growing weaker, because they are increasingly relying on bombs, or improvised explosive devices, instead of confronting their enemy in direct combat.

In fact, the statistics for Kandahar don't show a clear trend toward bombs as the weapon of choice for the insurgents. While IEDs were the most common type of attack last year, the number of successful IED strikes was slightly smaller this year than the number of so-called complex attacks – ambushes using more than one type of weapon. Such multi-layered attacks have increased this year by 116 per cent, to 123, according the VSSA numbers.

RTK
07-14-2008, 03:44 AM
Seems to be some disagreement in this...


U.S. officials say militant attacks in Afghanistan are becoming more complex, intense and better coordinated than a year ago. Monthly death tolls of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan surpassed U.S. military deaths in Iraq in May and June. And last Monday, a homicide bomber attacked the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing 58 people in the deadliest attack in the Afghan capital since 2001.

U.S. officials are considering drawing down additional forces from Iraq in coming months, in part because of the need for additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have said they need at least three more brigades in Afghanistan — or more than 10,000 troops.


More at the link (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,381403,00.html)

Rex Brynen
07-14-2008, 03:49 AM
Sadly, I'm rather inclined to the latter view...

Rex Brynen
07-15-2008, 05:29 PM
We don't feel secure, Afghans say
Locals perplexed. Disagree with new chief's rosy analysis (http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=0c0fd84a-3303-4ab8-974b-7cca823abec2)
GRAHAM THOMSON, Canwest News Service
15 July 2008


On Saturday Canada's top soldier said Afghans "feel more secure" and the residents of Kandahar City "have returned to the normal pattern of life" after a spectacular prison break that freed 400 Taliban sympathizers last month.

Yesterday that's not how some local Afghans described their situation.

Rex Brynen
07-16-2008, 04:18 AM
Taliban control more of Kandahar: analysis (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080715.wafghan-stats16/BNStory/International/home)
GRAEME SMITH
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
July 15, 2008 at 7:53 PM EDT


KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — More districts of Kandahar are controlled by the Taliban than by the Afghan government, according to a U.S. assessment that casts doubt on Canada's upbeat view of the war.

A detailed analysis by U.S. security officials shows that foreign troops and their local allies hold sway over the core, highly populated districts of Kandahar, but the zone of government control remains a small part of the vast territory assigned to Canadian responsibility two years ago.

The assessment divides Kandahar's districts into four categories: contested, Taliban controlled, locally controlled, and government controlled. Only four of 16 districts were classified as government controlled. The Taliban were described as controlling six districts.

...

Many other provinces also suffer from a strong Taliban presence according to the analysis, which found insurgents controlling or contesting roughly 130 of 398 districts assessed across the country.

Most of the districts heavily influenced by the insurgency were located in the south and east, but the study also found that the militants had gained a foothold in areas near Kabul, such as Wardak and Logar provinces.

marct
07-16-2008, 04:02 PM
Rex, I have suspected for some time that the "assessments" being released are for the home environment. One key indicator, to me at least, was the ban on posting pictures or bloging by active CF personnelle. I am a touch surprised at the current "assessment"; at least with Hillier, we could count on a fairly accurate (if that has any meaning :wry:) series of statements. I'm not so sanguine about the current form appearing...

Rex Brynen
07-27-2008, 10:43 PM
Angus Reid Global Monitor : Polls & Research
Fewer Norwegians Support Afghan Mission (http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/fewer_norwegians_support_afghan_mission/)
July 26, 2008



Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Backing for Norway’s military engagement in Afghanistan has dwindled, according to a poll by Norstat released by NRK. 42 per cent of respondents support Norway’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), down 15 points since January.

Rex Brynen
09-04-2008, 09:40 PM
Most Canadians say Afghan mission too costly, poll suggests (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080904.wafghanpoll0904/BNStory/National/home)

MURRAY BREWSTER
THE CANADIAN PRESS
Globe & Mail
September 4, 2008 at 4:30 PM EDT


OTTAWA — A new poll suggests a majority of Canadians believe the country is paying too high a price in blood and treasure for its involvement in Afghanistan.

The Canadian Press-Harris Decima survey also shows an overwhelming number of respondents were uncertain about whether the Kandahar mission has been a success.

...

To date, 96 Canadian soldiers, one diplomat and two aid workers have died in Afghanistan. The Conservative government has set aside $1.9-billion for aid and reconstruction in the war-torn country.

The survey found that 61 per cent of respondents believed the cost of the country's mission in lives and money has been unacceptable, while only one in three – 32 per cent – said it was acceptable.

When asked overall, whether they would say the mission in Afghanistan has been a success, a failure or that it is too soon to tell, a majority of respondents, roughly 48 per cent, took the wait-and-see answer.

At least 30 per cent were prepared to categorically declare the mission a success.

It also appears that Canadians are resigned to carrying out the country's duty in Kandahar until 2011, but would oppose attempts to “lengthen or increase its commitment.”

The survey said 57 per cent of respondents didn't want to stay longer in Afghanistan, even if the request came from United States.

...

UrsaMaior
09-05-2008, 05:41 AM
It maybe my ignorance, but I have only recently realised that the population of Afghanistan is almost double of the iraqi (32 million vs 18).

I wonder whether planners are two feet on the ground thinking that so many, knowingly xenophobic people can be "stabilised" with a mere 47000+ troops. Or do they have to cook with what is available?

Surferbeetle
09-18-2009, 02:39 PM
From the NYT By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. and RACHEL DONADIO Afghan Blast Raises New Doubts in Europe (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/asia/18afghan.html?_r=1&ref=world)


Earlier in the day, Umberto Bossi, the leader of the Northern League, arguably the most powerful party in Mr. Berlusconi’s coalition, reiterated his calls for an immediate withdrawal of Italian troops. “I hope by Christmas everyone can come home,” Mr. Bossi said, according to the news agency ANSA.

But the Italian defense minister, Ignazio La Russa, said in Parliament that the bomb attack would not stop Italy’s “firm commitment” to the international mission.

The powerful suicide car bomb exploded about noon in central Kabul near the heart of the American and NATO military command. It blew an Italian armored vehicle across two lanes of traffic and, according to Italian officials, left six soldiers dead and four wounded.

Surferbeetle
10-30-2009, 02:29 PM
...by TGV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TGV)

From today's Times Online: Afghan lawsuit adds pressure for Sarkozyto agree troop withdrawal (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6896248.ece)


Relatives of French soldiers killed in an ambush by insurgents in Afghanistan are to file a criminal lawsuit alleging that officers placed their troops’ lives at risk through a series of blunders.

The lawsuit is likely to add to President Sarkozy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarkozy)’s difficulties as he seeks to defend the French military presence in Afghanistan in the face of increasing public scepticism.

Mr Sarkozy has worked hard to improve relations with Nato, whose military arm France boycotted for several decades. But with 36 French soldiers killed in the conflict since 2001, 64 per cent of French voters believe that France should withdraw from Nato’s Afghanistan force. The percentage in favour has fallen by nine points in a year, the survey found.


Martine Aubry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martine_Aubry), the leader of the opposition French Socialist Party, has called on France to “get out of the quagmire”, although the Left is split over the issue of complete withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Fuchs
10-30-2009, 02:37 PM
...by TGV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TGV)

From today's Times Online: Afghan lawsuit adds pressure for Sarkozyto agree troop withdrawal (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6896248.ece)

Sarkozy is erratic. I doubt that any rational arguments like pressure here or there have decisive influence on his decisions about French troops in Afghanistan.

Surferbeetle
10-30-2009, 02:55 PM
Sarkozy is erratic. I doubt that any rational arguments like pressure here or there have decisive influence on his decisions about French troops in Afghanistan.

His post-president ambitions will certainly be of interest...Tony Blair Deux?

From the Economist: Europe's new president, Jostling for position (http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14781695&source=features_box_main)


The new president’s job involves chairing summits of the 27 national leaders of the EU, and representing them in meetings with other world leaders. The post will be created by the Lisbon treaty, which is now inching towards ratification. At the summit Europe’s leaders offered a written reassurance to the Czech Republic—the only country that has not yet signed the treaty—that nothing in Lisbon can lead to fresh property claims by ethnic Germans whose descendants were expelled from Czechoslovakia after the second world war. The fiercely Eurosceptic Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, has given what senior officials call a “political guarantee” that he will drop his opposition to Lisbon and sign the document, shortly after the Czech constitutional court gives it a green light at a hearing set for November 3rd.

Fuchs
10-30-2009, 06:27 PM
Oops, Jedburgh. I was a bit puzzled by the editing until I learned that I had apparently mixed two threads that were opened in my browser at the same time.

I figure the edited-out part looked really kind of inappropriate. :o

M-A Lagrange
10-30-2009, 06:39 PM
Originally Posted by Fuchs. Sarkozy is erratic. I doubt that any rational arguments like pressure here or there have decisive influence on his decisions about French troops in Afghanistan.

Do not think that Our beloved Sarkozy will have any effect on the presence of French troops or not in Afghanistan. Neither will the legal action.
According to the blog Secret Defense http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/


Un avocat, Me Laurent Epailly, consacre lui aussi un post sur son blog : "La procédure suivie ne me paraît pas idoine. Elle ne risque d'ailleurs pas de se solder par un "classement sans suite" ou un "débouté", pour répondre à vos lecteurs, mais par un non-lieu, afin d'être simplement précis.
A Lawyer, Mr Laurent Epailly also has a page on his blog : the actual procedure does not seems to be the ideal one. It may end up not to a dead end but to a non-lieu (non pronunciation of the court).

Also the reaction of the troops is extremely strong and against that legal action.

Sarkozy has very little credit from the troops compare to his predecessors who were all officers with active service during wars (WWII for Mitterand and Algeria for Chirac). He is looking for a recognition as a “supreme commander”.

He will not withdraw.

davidbfpo
10-30-2009, 07:08 PM
An interesting paper: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations, by Stephen Saideman; CIPS Policy Brief No. 6, October 2009: http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/cepi-cips/eng/policybriefs.asp#saideman_6

National caveats that restrict the activities of different NATO contingents in Afghanistan are more than just operationally problematic; they represent profound differences among NATO countries on the use of force.

These differences have had significant domestic political repercussions so that it is unlikely that NATO will be able to agree on deploying “out of area” operations in the near to medium future.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
02-21-2010, 08:09 PM
Amidst a political crisis in Holland, over when Dutch forces will leave Afghanistan, it appears certain that no more extensions to their presence will be forthcoming and they will exit August 2010:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8526933.stm

Fuchs
02-21-2010, 09:31 PM
I expect that some will *cry* about the Dutch move/stomach just as they did about the Spanish years ago.

It's important to have a full view on the topic, though.
A continuation of the Dutch mission would have hurt democracy and freedom more in the Netherlands than it would have promoted the same in Afghanistan.
The Dutch participation in the AFG civil war was a cabinet war, waged against a solid and significant majority of the own population. The Netherlands have a political crisis that is much more general than just AFG, they lost their political stability years ago due to an assassination of a right wing populist and they simply need a government that governs in the interest and in majority consensus with the own people to settle down and resume their admirably reform-capable politics.

It's good news that their AFG mission will end soon.

davidbfpo
02-21-2010, 09:43 PM
Fuchs,


I expect that some will *cry* about the Dutch move/stomach just as they did about the Spanish years ago.

Just in case I assume you mean when the Spanish left Iraq, after the Atocha train station bombings and a change of government? The Spanish are still on the ground in Afghanistan, IIRC in Herat.

Fuchs
02-21-2010, 10:30 PM
Yes, there were some stupid comments at the time that asserted that the Spanish had succumbed to terrorist's demands. It did look very different to me; like an electorate disposing of a lying government that didn't govern in the nation's interests.

Euro-bashing is quite popular in some circles, and the Dutch will likely receive an increased dosage in the next months.

Firn
02-22-2010, 08:52 AM
It is hardly surprising, that in a war of choice, in which the influence political logic is more pronounced and visible, there are great internal and external differences in thought and action. The conflict in Afghanistan or in the larger theater is not existential for any Western nation, and the dynamics of Dutch democracy rightly influence the Dutch foreign policies through the Dutch politics.

So in short nothing surprising, just democracy at work.


Firn

Firn
02-23-2010, 08:10 AM
According to the NYTimes (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/world/asia/23afghan.html?ref=asia) the attack against three vehicles near the mountain pass of Khotal Chowzar, in central Afghanistan, was not requested by troops on the ground.



The Special Forces helicopters were hunting for insurgents who had escaped the NATO offensive in the Marja area, about 150 miles away, according to Gen. Abdul Hameed, an Afghan National Army commander in Dehrawood, which is part of Oruzgan Province. General Hameed, interviewed by telephone, said there had been no request from any ground forces to carry out an attack.

...


“If the reports are true, this is the worst case since McChrystal has announced his new strategy of reducing the use of air power,” Nadir Nadery, commissioner of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, said Monday. “In Kunduz, the target was legitimate militarily but the bombing was disproportionate, 70-plus civilians died, but at least it was a justified military target.”


It does look bad and begs a lot of questions. A very great deal of faith seems to have been put into remote surveillance, if we consider the long distance and long hours travelled by this civilians who were believed to be insurgents.


Firn

Tukhachevskii
02-23-2010, 10:06 AM
Civilian deaths in strikes have caused widespread resentment in Afghanistanhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8527627.stm

This is a general response to the “moral” fallout from the death of civilians in Operation Moshtarak in the open source media and from “heated” diatribes I often hear Muslims deliver on the streets of my home town (there was a time when Hyde Park corner sufficed to satiate these types).

Our overwhelming superiority in firepower is our major strength (war, after all, is about “killing and destruction” as per Gian Gentile) , our congenital inability to apply that without second guessing ourselves or adopting ROEs with will only lead into strategic cul-de-sacs and coffins being flown home is our greatest weakness. A weakness they exploit. So what if 20 civilians die on an operation against the Taliban? Why are WE apologising? How many Muslims currently residing in the “West” condemned the attacks of 7/7, 9/11 etc.? They didn’t. They justified/absolved them (ironically, Arab public opinion seemed less clear cut) and shifted the blame/passed the buck. If the Afghan people (whoever they are and that’s a different matter) don’t like the presence of NATO forces on their soil they should be reminded of why we are there...because of the Taliban. If civilians are dying in operations conducted by NATO to destroy the Taliban who hide like cowards “amongst the people” then that is the fault of the Taliban. Just compare the range of “services” we strain ourselves to supply to the Afghans (at no cost to themselves) with what the Taliban did and make the Afghan’s decide. If the Afghans want us out why don’t we tie that demand in to the destruction of the Taliban. Once they are long gone (difficult metric to satisfy I know) so will we be and leave the Pakistanis, and Iranians to sort out the mess/responsibility (and blame should they fail); after all Pakistan’s role in this imbroglio nor its responsibility should not be forgotten. Instead of trying to “capture” the hearts and minds of the “Afghan” people why aren’t we making them participants, stakeholders or whatever buzzword is currently in fashion, in a process that will finally get us to some kind of satisfactory situation (another flammable metric) where we can get out “with honour”? Why are we adhering to these Liberal neo-colonial (there’s no two ways about it) preconceptions that somehow these “primitive children” can be “forced to be free”, that inside every Gook or Arab or Afghan is a middle-class, atheistic, latte drinking, Franz Fanon reading, sexually confused, moral-relativist trying to get out? Take for instance the following neo-developmentalist/modernisation drivel;

“1-18. The Narrative: Mobilising the Population. The narrative is central to the counterinsurgency effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.” (British Army Field Manual, Vol.1, Pt. 10, Counter Insurgency, October 2009)


Yet those “deep cultural undercurrents”, their words and imagery (or symbols and the narratives that they “illustrate”) are part of the whole problem in the first place. Don’t get me started with the Pushtunwali code or even the meaning of “deliver” (liberal-economic analogies be damned! ...how well do our own governments “deliver” on their pledges) or of the meaning of “justice” (man-made law anyone?). As J. K. Akins points out,
“To fight today’s international terrorism, we must fight jihad. To fight jihad, we must understand Islam, and to understand Islam, we must first put away our own ethnocentric view of religion and values and try to comprehend a culture in which women bear and raise children just so they can become suicide bombers and kill Jews. We must also recognize that Islamist terrorism is more accurately understood as the product of the history of Islam than as the product of the history of terrorism” (“A Broader Conceptualisation of Islam and Terrorism”, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 45, 2007, p. 72)


WE are not in business of propping up failed states or building new ones (there’s a pun in there somewhere). I don’t think we got out of the imperial policing business just to return and make the same mistakes. Just think of all the filoos/money that we have spent pouring down the drain in Afghanistan (amongst other places) that could have been spent in our recession hit economies and, more importantly, on homeland defence. WE do not have the answers for THEM (and it’s important we remember that distinction) nor do we need to waste the lives of our young men and women on installing dams or generators when they will be inoperable within a decade after we have gone. Let’s admit that, get the job done (i.e., make a point of killing as many Taliban as possible to send a message to anyone who tries that in the future) and get out of there. And if we really must educate them in the ways of democracy then let’s introduce them to the concept of accountability for ones actions. Why aren’t we being straight with everyone concerned? “Look”, we say, “we are here because AQ launched attacks on us from your territory with the aid/acquiescence of the Taliban and we are not leaving until AQ and the Taliban in Afghanistan have been wiped off the face of the map. If your civilians get killed along the way you know who to blame...that’s right, the Taliban. So if you want us out then help us kill every last Taliban fighter and their foreign friends and we will leave you alone to go back to your tribal feuds. Inshallah”. Perhaps that’s the language of a bygone era but it was an era in which our self-confidence, honour and prestige was unmatched for the ferocity of its “delivery”.


Our real front lines are, IMO, our rear areas or home fronts. Once we inoculate ourselves against Islam and everything it touches ( a touchy subject given our inability to treat Islam as anything other than a religion. Cf comments above and below re: church/state) at home while rediscovering pride in ourselves and our civilisation what, then, must we fear from our enemies abroad? They manage to smuggle a suicide bomber onto our planes, trains and automobiles (jocularity aside) then we TLAM a village (perhaps where we went wrong in Afghanistan was occupying territory when we should simply have toppled the regime and let local forces battle it out to stalemate).

Ruthless?

Definitely, but that’s a language THEY understand (psychologically speaking); in the face of overwhelming power Islam retreats (even to the extent of releasing its spell on Muslims); “The situation changed rapidly a month into the Allied campaign against the Taliban. Muslims saw the unequivocal power of American military might, and turned away from bin Laden and the Taliban” (Lazar Berman , “Understanding Arab Culture”, Small Wars Journal, p.6). That Islam and Muslims recoil in the face of power is a historical fact (i.e., the Battle of Tours and the Siege of Vienna) and a psychological-semiotic sore-nerve in their system in which the MASTER/SLAVE (Domination/ subordination) dialectic has been taken to the extreme (but without hope of an aufhebung) i.e., God is the Master and Muslims, those who have submitted, are his slaves (notice the popularity of the prefix ‘Abd for male names, flippant as observations go, but ethnographically telling all the same)...their only consolation from resignation to their earthly misery being the ability to enslave others themselves (ghanima) and thus feel like masters... but never of their own destiny [al-mustaqbal ‘ind-Allah].


Do they threaten our oil lines of communication, or SLOC for that matter, then seek alternatives or get our buddies in the region who profit from us (while funding our enemies I might add) to do the leg work or lose our support (offshore balancing I think they call it). Trying to export a foreign way of life (and all the tacit premises, which we forget, that underpin it) to people for whom it represents a greater threat than the presence of our troops (who are seen to be advancing that “unintended” colonial/anti-Islamic agenda anyway) is hardly money or, more importantly, lives well spent; Afghanistan is not worth the lives of even one Allied grenadier.

Am I being more than usually naive?

Maybe I need a latte?

Rant over.

Apologies to all those who are offended and there will, no doubt, be many and for good reason which passion blinds me from seeing at the present moment in time. I take full responsibility for the above opinions, offensive as they may be to some, and am aware that my opinions may lead to my banishment/disbarment from the SWC. I accept that responsibility (I am used to the “wilderness”). I just needed to get that frustration off my chest and, well who knows, maybe wiser heads (and, thankfully, there are many of those in the SWC), will prevail and counsel me (no pun intended) regarding these doubts/fears/frustrations.

davidbfpo
02-23-2010, 07:14 PM
Taken from a lengthy comment by Tukhachevskii:
How many Muslims currently residing in the “West” condemned the attacks of 7/7, 9/11 etc.? They didn’t.

It may suit your argument, but many Muslims not only in the West condemned the attacks of 7/7 and 9/11. Some quite loudly at the time, with very little press attention beyond their cities. What we often ignore - in the UK - is that some Muslims cautioned against our "alliances" with the Jihadist faction and long before we opposed "radicalism" ideologically contested the "extremist" outlook. Yes, in a few places, notably London, there was a strange "alliance" formed to oust extremist clerics and long before law enforcement got involved.

I see no reason to deny responsibility and apologise if we kill a group of civilians by mistake / error in Afghanistan. Quickly too.

The JFQ quote:
To fight today’s international terrorism, we must fight jihad. To fight jihad, we must understand Islam, and to understand Islam, we must first put away our own ethnocentric view of religion and values and try to comprehend a culture in which women bear and raise children just so they can become suicide bombers and kill Jews. We must also recognize that Islamist terrorism is more accurately understood as the product of the history of Islam than as the product of the history of terrorism” (“A Broader Conceptualisation of Islam and Terrorism”, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 45, 2007, p. 72)

I find odd, being diplomatic and we are not at war with Islam. We are at 'war' with those within the religion of Islam who follow their violent Jihad, from a very different interpretation of the faith than the vast majority. A majority who want little to do with them, yes they may share some of their concerns over political and other issues - not the use of terrorism.

The world is a complex place, always has been and your 'rant' does not aid understanding or comprehension - either in our "armchairs" or for those we send to faraway places.

JarodParker
02-24-2010, 03:35 AM
The few valid points you were beginning to raise were drowned out by the rest of your rant.


Civilian deaths in strikes have caused widespread resentment in Afghanistanhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8527627.stm
This is a general response to the “moral” fallout from the death of civilians in Operation Moshtarak in the open source media and from “heated” diatribes I often hear Muslims deliver on the streets of my home town (there was a time when Hyde Park corner sufficed to satiate these types).

Our overwhelming superiority in firepower is our major strength (war, after all, is about “killing and destruction” as per Gian Gentile) , our congenital inability to apply that without second guessing ourselves or adopting ROEs with will only lead into strategic cul-de-sacs and coffins being flown home is our greatest weakness. A weakness they exploit.
I could be wrong, but I don’t think Col Gentile is a proponent of using indiscriminate firepower.


So what if 20 civilians die on an operation against the Taliban? Why are WE apologising? How many Muslims currently residing in the “West” condemned the attacks of 7/7, 9/11 etc.? They didn’t. They justified/absolved them (ironically, Arab public opinion seemed less clear cut) and shifted the blame/passed the buck.
Assuming the Muslims in the west never condemned these terrorist acts, why should they have to? They didn't do it. As a Christian/Conservative, am I required to publicly condemn the actions of the Westboro Baptist Church (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westboro_Baptist_Church)?
As a liberal, should I write my closest military recruiting office and apologize for the actions of Code Pink (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_Pink)? Just because somebody is of the same religion/political party/nationality/etc, that doesn’t mean they are obligated to publicly counter-balance the views of extremists?


If the Afghan people (whoever they are and that’s a different matter) don’t like the presence of NATO forces on their soil they should be reminded of why we are there...because of the Taliban. If civilians are dying in operations conducted by NATO to destroy the Taliban who hide like cowards “amongst the people” then that is the fault of the Taliban.
High speed police chase in Los Angeles... innocent bystander gets run over by cop car... who does the family blame?


Just compare the range of “services” we strain ourselves to supply to the Afghans (at no cost to themselves) with what the Taliban did and make the Afghan’s decide.
But they didn't ask for these services. Furthermore, this argument has been tried many times colonials but it usually fails to convince the natives to just play along (i know, i know, our intentions are noble). Not to mention the fact that some of the reports published state that we (or our partners) haven't even been that great at providing these services. I believe one of the articles posted in the Marjah thread claimed that the Taliban are much better at providing said services.


If the Afghans want us out why don’t we tie that demand in to the destruction of the Taliban. Once they are long gone (difficult metric to satisfy I know) so will we be and leave the Pakistanis, and Iranians to sort out the mess/responsibility (and blame should they fail); after all Pakistan’s role in this imbroglio nor its responsibility should not be forgotten. Instead of trying to “capture” the hearts and minds of the “Afghan” people why aren’t we making them participants, stakeholders or whatever buzzword is currently in fashion, in a process that will finally get us to some kind of satisfactory situation (another flammable metric) where we can get out “with honour”?
Even if the message "we will stay here as long as it takes, so you better help us" was going to work, how will it play out at home.


Why are we adhering to these Liberal neo-colonial (there’s no two ways about it) preconceptions that somehow these “primitive children” can be “forced to be free”, that inside every Gook or Arab or Afghan is a middle-class, atheistic, latte drinking, Franz Fanon reading, sexually confused, moral-relativist trying to get out? Take for instance the following neo-developmentalist/modernisation drivel;
I'm not touching this one.


WE [shouldn't be] in business of propping up failed states or building new ones (there’s a pun in there somewhere). I don’t think we got out of the imperial policing business just to return and make the same mistakes. Just think of all the filoos/money that we have spent pouring down the drain in Afghanistan (amongst other places) that could have been spent in our recession hit economies and, more importantly, on homeland defence. WE do not have the answers for THEM (and it’s important we remember that distinction) nor do we need to waste the lives of our young men and women on installing dams or generators when they will be inoperable within a decade after we have gone.
I kind of agree that the resources would've been better spent at home.


And if we really must educate them in the ways of democracy then let’s introduce them to the concept of accountability for ones actions.
But you have a problem with NATO taking responsibility for civilian casualties.


Definitely, but that’s a language THEY understand (psychologically speaking); in the face of overwhelming power Islam retreats (even to the extent of releasing its spell on Muslims); “The situation changed rapidly a month into the Allied campaign against the Taliban. Muslims saw the unequivocal power of American military might, and turned away from bin Laden and the Taliban” (Lazar Berman , “Understanding Arab Culture”, Small Wars Journal, p.6).
Your basing your argument on a 10-page article by an arguable biased IDF Lt with no hard data and a citation from this guy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Pipes#Support_of_Pipes.27_views_on_Islam). You both seem to be making some giant leaps and cherry picking.

carl
02-24-2010, 04:14 AM
A strike carried out by spec ops units on their own hook, without the knowledge of the battlespace owner (I hope I am using that term correctly), that greatly displeases the general in charge, who used to command spec ops forces: as Firn states, that does beg a lot of questions.

Such as:

Is it a habit of spec ops to do things without consulting the forces who live there?

Are they really under control of Gen. McChrstal or only sort of under control?

And what kind of, apparently very flawed, knowledge prompted the strike?

William F. Owen
02-24-2010, 06:08 AM
Civilian deaths in strikes have caused widespread resentment in Afghanistanhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8527627.stm
....and? From where I stand, no one really cares. There are never UN War Crimes investigations into US/NATO action.

Our overwhelming superiority in firepower is our major strength (war, after all, is about “killing and destruction” as per Gian Gentile) , our congenital inability to apply that without second guessing ourselves or adopting ROEs with will only lead into strategic cul-de-sacs and coffins being flown home is our greatest weakness.
Whoah there, me old Deep Battle Chap!
Warfare requires killing and destruction OF THE ENEMY! - Clausewitz, not Col Gian - and the skill here is killing the enemy, IF POSSIBLE - without killing too many civilians. ROE is not moral. It is policy driven, and is the art of the possible, not the absolute requirement.

27 dead US Marines is far more of a problem for the US and NATO than 27 dead civilians. Marines matter more, as concerns US policy.

Whole page on the BBC web site about the Taliban using Human Shields. Wow? Who knew? - Hang on.... I hear the "trees of hypocrisy creaking in the wind of apathy."

Bob's World
02-24-2010, 09:04 AM
Every Insurgent is a civilian. But not every civilian is an insurgent.

Another case of where we are hamstrung by our poor lexicon.

In a place like Afghanistan, most of the "insurgents" are "civilians" for half of the year, and "insurgents" for the other half.

It is really more an issue of "innocent" and "liable" parties; and accomplice liability applies.

One really needs to apply of mix of criminal terminology and military prosecution to get closer a workable scheme in a COIN effort; trending to civil prosecution as the situation settles. None of this is directly related to the incident in Uruzgon, but our sloppy terminology is not helpful in general, and certainly not in a situation like this.

(As to the incident in Uruzgon, it is a tragedy, regardless of whose "facts" one applies. But currently the truth is being lost as "facts" are created or manipulated to support political positions. Patience.)

Fuchs
02-24-2010, 10:11 AM
....and? From where I stand, no one really cares. There are never UN War Crimes investigations into US/NATO action.

Backlash doesn't need to be official and civilized to hurt.

27 dead US Marines is far more of a problem for the US and NATO than 27 dead civilians. Marines matter more, as concerns US policy.

Too bad that it isn't only about U.S. policy, but also about Afghan politics and opinions.

Whole page on the BBC web site about the Taliban using Human Shields. Wow? Who knew? - Hang on.... I hear the "trees of hypocrisy creaking in the wind of apathy."

I've become tired of "human shield" accusations because too many simply don't fit to what's actually forbidden in the Geneva Conventions. This concerns both parties.

Tukhachevskii
02-24-2010, 10:56 AM
Am I being more than usually naive?

I just needed to get that frustration off my chest and, well who knows, maybe wiser heads (and, thankfully, there are many of those in the SWC), will prevail and counsel me (no pun intended) regarding these doubts/fears/frustrations.

I am pleased to say I was not disappointed. Thank you all for your valuable comments and, in future, I will try to count to ten (at minimum) before posting.

William F. Owen
02-24-2010, 01:18 PM
I've become tired of "human shield" accusations because too many simply don't fit to what's actually forbidden in the Geneva Conventions. This concerns both parties.
Concur. Human shield is simplistic from the perspective of description. However, some people do use the civilian population to ameliorate themselves from the effects of enemy fire.

In "information and effects" terms the Geneva conventions are utterly irrelevant to a lot of people.

Firn
02-24-2010, 01:22 PM
Every Insurgent is a civilian. But not every civilian is an insurgent.

Another case of where we are hamstrung by our poor lexicon.

In a place like Afghanistan, most of the "insurgents" are "civilians" for half of the year, and "insurgents" for the other half.

It is really more an issue of "innocent" and "liable" parties; and accomplice liability applies.

One really needs to apply of mix of criminal terminology and military prosecution to get closer a workable scheme in a COIN effort; trending to civil prosecution as the situation settles. None of this is directly related to the incident in Uruzgon, but our sloppy terminology is not helpful in general, and certainly not in a situation like this.

(As to the incident in Uruzgon, it is a tragedy, regardless of whose "facts" one applies. But currently the truth is being lost as "facts" are created or manipulated to support political positions. Patience.)

Bob, I think I understand the points you are raising and in war the simpliest things become very difficult. Still I wonder if in the specific case other methods, like the insertion of a blocking force on the way to the mountain pass might not have been the better choice. It is hindsight, yes, but perhaps a legitimate question.

Silent enim leges inter arma is not an entirely correct concept, as laws just as politics permeate war, but it captures the clear difference between the application (or the lack of it) and interpretation of both in times of war. But be it as it may, the attack made today's headlines about Afghanistan.

Concerning your comment about the "facts". A very interesting and very profound take on the issue is shown in Rashomon (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCZ9TguVOIA). This might touch on of the biggest questions in philosophy or better epistemology. Of course this discussion is just of limited interest for the dead and their relatives.


Firn

davidbfpo
03-14-2010, 07:47 PM
A short article comparing casualty rates in Afghanistan and ends with this:
And of all the countries on the list, it is probably Denmark and Canada that have borne the greatest political shocks overall. It is a wonder they have stayed as committed as they have for as long as they have.

The figures:


Denmark, 1 per 177,000 (31 deaths)
Estonia, 1 per 186,000 (7 deaths)
United Kingdom, 1 per 224,000 (272 deaths)
Canada, 1 per 236,000 (140 deaths)
United States, 1 per 302,000 (1017 deaths)
Latvia, 1 per 733,000 (3 deaths)
Netherlands, 1 per 810,000 (21 deaths)

Some other major European countries have been less burdened, per capita:
Spain, 1 per 1,500,000 (28 deaths)
France, 1 per 1,600,000 (40 deaths)
Germany, 1 per 2,400,000 (34 deaths)
Poland, 1 per 2,400,000 (16 deaths)
Italy, 1 per 2,600,000 (22 deaths)

Read more:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/03/burden-sharing.html

Fuchs
03-14-2010, 08:44 PM
I've read some really angry comments about the behaviour of Mrs. Clinton in Buenos Aires and in regard to the Falklands topic. Other U.S. politicians seem to have incited some British anger as well (one is even reported to have called the islands "Malvinas").

My observations are certainly not representative, but I assume that the next polls from the UK about the "special relationship" will be interesting.

davidbfpo
03-14-2010, 10:56 PM
Fuchs,

The remarks of Hilary Clinton over the Falkland Islands were reported here critically, but I doubt if published, public opinion polls will focus on the 'Special Relationship'. We are in a pre-General Election period and other issues take precedence.

A US diplomat recently stated opinion polls found public support in the UK for the 'relationship' remained strong; without citing the source alas.

My own view is that, even with allowance for the end of President Bush, is that the 'Special Relationship' remains beloved in Whitehall-Westminster, but has less support amongst the public for a variety of reasons.

An insight into this diplomatic tussle can be found on KoW: http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/03/dear-abby-my-girlfriend-is-a-circus-fat-lady-and-shes-hankering-after-argentine-beef-whats-a-skinny-boy-to-do/ An earlier commentary on the UK-US link: http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2009/10/british-strategy-britains-place-in-the-world-some-idle-musings/

Tukhachevskii
06-21-2010, 02:08 PM
Spain confirms troop withdrawal in Summer 2011 (www.ansamed.info/en/news/ME01.XAM12062.html)

davidbfpo
08-01-2010, 08:06 PM
The Dutch have ended their active role:
The Netherlands has ended its military involvement in Afghanistan after four years in which its 1,950 troops have won praise for their effectiveness.

Nato had wanted the Netherlands to extend its mission, but the request triggered a political row which brought down the country's coalition government in February.

Professor Ko Colijn, a senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, told the BBC that the public supported the withdrawal "with a slight majority", and that domestic policy had forced the move.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10831294

davidbfpo
08-05-2010, 08:05 AM
An independent assessment of the Dutch campaign, by a group I've not heard of (spotted by an Australian think tank) and did not download fully here. Maybe of interest?

Link:http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/sites/default/files/province-district-assessments/TLO-Uruzgan-Assessment-final.pdf

fnord
08-05-2010, 02:33 PM
Sirs. Very interesting thread. Would like to point out that the Norwegian contigent has been pretty consistent through the whole play, and still contributes. There is a disturbing frequency-shift of contacts around Mazar and Meymaneh. We lost 4 just recently, and our SF guys are almost run down because of brutal rotation-rates on mountain specialists.

I think one aspect that is central is that all actions taken in the last years are unfortunately mostly trying to fix our own sins by omission in the 2001-2006 period in Afghansitan. I seriously hope some of the wizards who are thinking contigency takes that wisdom into account for any new adventures. We need integrated command-teams with basic unit cohesion, that have worked together. Inter-alliance tribalism seems to be rampant at times...? (Disclaimer: I am not active service military, just an old draftee.)

JMA
08-07-2010, 02:13 PM
Sirs. ... and our SF guys are almost run down because of brutal rotation-rates on mountain specialists.

Can you explain this please?

davidbfpo
10-12-2010, 07:03 PM
Just found this report:
(Sub-title) Italy has become the latest NATO country to say it will begin withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan next summer. (Then) Franco Frattini, Italy's foreign minister said its 3,400 troops will have left the country by 2014.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/8059786/Italy-to-withdraw-troops-from-Afghanistan.html

davidbfpo
10-15-2010, 07:32 AM
Taken from KoW and yes, a Swedish viewpoint; an EU member, not a NATO member who has an infantry battalion deployed in the north:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/10/stay-or-go-a-swedish-perspective-on-afghanistan/

Which cites a Swedish newspaper article:http://www.dn.se/debatt/darfor-maste-svensk-trupp-stanna-i-norra-afghanistan-1.1187784

KoW ends with this pithy comment:
...the aim may be to be part of the mission until the end, to do the best possible in their area of operations, and to thereby enhance Sweden’s standing internationally, even if this means partaking in an eventual strategic failure. There is a curious logic to that, but is this a cause worth sacrificing Swedish soldiers for?

Bob's World
10-15-2010, 11:01 AM
I think the U.S. has presented many friendly governments with difficult dilemma.

Essentially the must choose as to if their national interest of maintaining strong relations with the US (to included keeping the US in NATO) is more important than the other national interests that they must compromise or put at risk by supporting US national interests elsewhere.

The US paints the problem as being every state's problem. That may be true, but the U.S. solution is not every state's solution, and there-in lies the rub.

The key, IMO, to keeping NATO allies engaged is for the U.S. to be more empathetic to the concerns and interests of others and tailor our efforts to be more supportive of those differences.

SWJ Blog
12-30-2010, 12:30 AM
New NATO Library Guide: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/new-nato-library-guide-counter/)

Entry Excerpt:

Via e-mail from NATO: The NATO Multimedia Library has just published a new title in its LibGuides series. 'Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan' (http://natolibguides.info/counterinsurgency) is a web-based research guide bringing you the latest information (articles, news, videos, websites etc.) on issues related to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, in particular in the NATO context.



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carl
03-04-2011, 12:54 AM
Here is link to a news story about 2 American helicopters killing 9 of 10 Afghan boys out collecting firewood.

http://www.statesman.com/news/world/nato-admits-mistakenly-killing-9-afghan-boys-1293470.html?cxtype=ynews_rss

The survivor, aged 11, said this.


We were almost done collecting the wood when suddenly we saw the helicopters come," said Hemad, who, like many Afghans, has only one name. "There were two of them. The helicopters hovered over us, scanned us and we saw a green flash from the helicopters. Then they flew back high up, and in a second round they hovered over us and started shooting. They fired a rocket that landed on a tree. The tree branches fell over me, and shrapnel hit my right hand and my side.

This is a very terrible and tragic thing for everybody. Given the boy's description of the event, I don't understand how the helo crews could have made such a mistake. If somebody who is knowledgeable about attack helo ops could give some info on how this could have happened it would be helpful.

This is event is a nightmare.

Fuchs
03-04-2011, 04:14 PM
The translation sounds fishy, but I read about the general story elsewhere, too.
Btw, your link is broken.

carl
03-04-2011, 06:33 PM
Fuchs:

I didn't think of that, even so it is very very bad. This link should work.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/asia/03afghan.html

The final report on this thing, if we ever get to see it, will not be pleasant reading.

taabistan
03-04-2011, 07:46 PM
I supervised a grievance board in Ghazni/Wardak, serving as a liaison between local Afghans and the US military on issues of air strikes, house searches, arrests, wrongful deaths, and compensation. It struck me how severely disconnected the US military officers were from the situation, making me believe my post was merely figurehead causing me to eventually quit. Time and again, I provided specific names of village youth joining the local Taliban resistance and it being a direct effect from an air strike or a mission they conducted in the region. They were more concerned about Taliban locations, rather than develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate recruitment. It was incredibly frustrating and I don't envy my successor in the least bit.

carl
03-04-2011, 08:06 PM
I supervised a grievance board in Ghazni/Wardak, serving as a liaison between local Afghans and the US military on issues of air strikes, house searches, arrests, wrongful deaths, and compensation. It struck me how severely disconnected the US military officers were from the situation, making me believe my post was merely figurehead causing me to eventually quit. Time and again, I provided specific names of village youth joining the local Taliban resistance and it being a direct effect from an air strike or a mission they conducted in the region. They were more concerned about Taliban locations, rather than develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate recruitment. It was incredibly frustrating and I don't envy my successor in the least bit.

Your post and your post bring question after question to my mind and I hope you don't mind a short string.

Did the mood or opinions of the Afghans you worked with about these things change during your time?

Were there any differences between the services or the various nationalities about these things?

What did they say when you brought up the importance of these things driving Taliban & company recruitment?

Were there any differences in attitude between senior and junior officers or between spec ops and regular forces?

It is sad that some don't get it after all these years.

taabistan
03-21-2011, 11:04 PM
Your post and your post bring question after question to my mind and I hope you don't mind a short string.

Did the mood or opinions of the Afghans you worked with about these things change during your time?

Were there any differences between the services or the various nationalities about these things?

What did they say when you brought up the importance of these things driving Taliban & company recruitment?

Were there any differences in attitude between senior and junior officers or between spec ops and regular forces?

It is sad that some don't get it after all these years.

Hey carl, what's up? Sorry for the late reply. Most (if not all) Afghans were for the invasion, and still believe we can salvage a brighter future if we reform certain policies (i.e. air strikes, house searches, detention facilities). My personal opinion is mixed. I was part of a negotiation team which spoke with Taliban delegates about the closing of al-Qaeda camps and handing Osama bin Laden to a "neutral" country. I believed the Taliban were very receptive and sought to avoid tarnishing their reputation by creating a smokescreen through their "fatwas", extolling the faith of Osama and calling him a "mujahid." Most people will disagree with me.

Most of these colleagues have been dismayed by the way this war has regressed to, citing the US' focus on Iraq as being pivotal for Taliban resurgence. Others, particularly native Afghans from the Pashtun south, have been dismayed by the loss of civilian life. Others like Hazara Afghans from the west obviously don't prioritize this the same way but are worried about the so-called "Pashtunification" of Afghanistan.

The American soldiers were generally professional and courteous towards me, although I do speak english and have lived in both Canada and the States, which may have been a factor. I feel there is a sense of frustration, particularly those troops who have experienced combat for so long, and with a great deal spent in areas like Kunar and Khost were violence is rampant. I've noticed that American soldiers involved in some cultural and developmental projects (i.e. opening of a school, enjoying Muslim celebrations with the locals) have a better understanding of their mission and are generally more understanding. I think these activities, which are seemingly unimportant, actually help boost morale. They also improve relations with the locals, which is a HUGE asset in deterring Taliban activity. Even if locals weren't inclined to support us, they wouldn't support Taliban fighters searching for places to launch attacks from.

The US commanders were surprisingly astute and knowledgeable about local terrain, customs, error of their policies, etc. One commander confessed that his hands are tied behind his back when it comes to detention of Afghans; in his mind, half of them were innocent and had no involvement with the Taliban. I have only met one member of Delta force and he was quite an intelligent man, speaking Farsi, Arabic and Pashtu. He was extremely observant about local conditions and the changes in Afghan domestic affairs, and quite receptive to many of the ideas I proposed.

I think the latest pictures released reveal the need for us to step back and reassess our overall strategy in Afghanistan. If we don't, American soldiers will have to pull out.

Kiwigrunt
04-17-2011, 10:41 PM
As some coalition partners are leaving Afghanistan, we (http://msn.nzherald.co.nz/politics/news/article.cfm?c_id=280&objectid=10720058) appear to be digging ourselves in a little deeper.

davidbfpo
05-04-2011, 06:53 PM
On the BBC's running log on UBL's demise this:
1326: France is considering speeding up its timetable of withdrawing (Added 4,000 strong) troops from Afghanistan after Bin Laden's death, according to Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. "It is one of the options we're going to consider," he told France 24 TV.

1331: Mr Juppe pointed out the goal of France's presence in Afghanistan "was not to eliminate Bin Laden. It was and remains to help the Afghan government establish its authority over the whole territory of Afghanistan and to ensure peace and democracy for its population". "Sadly, that result has not yet been achieved," he added.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12307698

carl
05-13-2011, 04:11 AM
This is a link to a very interesting article by Kate Clark of the Afghan Analyst Network about the Takhar airstrike in 2010.

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/11/the_takhar_attack_targeted_killings_and_two_worlds _in_afghanistan

There is a radical difference in what the US military and what the AAN and the locals think about the identity of the people who were killed. Ms. Clark says the following about this.

Dealing with the U.S. military, it has felt like we are from parallel worlds. Their Afghanistan, where knowledge is often driven largely by signals intelligence and reports provided by a very limited number of local informants, with a very narrow focus on insurgent behaviour, and the normal, everyday world of Afghan politics. In the case of the Takhar attack, these two worlds simply did not connect.

Taabistan said something similar in his post of 3-4-2011.

(I found this article at Free Range International and Baba Tim excerpted the very same quote. I hope he will forgive me stealing it and putting it here.)

SWJ Blog
06-11-2011, 01:00 PM
Is the NATO Surge Working in Afghanistan? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/is-the-nato-surge-working-in-a/)

Entry Excerpt:

As troop drawdown nears, is NATO surge working in Afghanistan? (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0610/As-troop-drawdown-nears-is-NATO-surge-working-in-Afghanistan) Christian Science Monitor special report by Anna Mulrine and Tom A. Peter. BLUF: "As Obama's promise of a troop drawdown nears, the US military says the surge of tens of thousands of NATO reinforcements that began last year has won some and lost some against the Taliban but needs more time to succeed."

Also, US troops confident of Afghan war counterinsurgency strategy (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0610/US-troops-confident-of-Afghan-war-counterinsurgency-strategy) by Tom A. Peter, Christian Science Monitor. BLUF: "The counterinsurgency strategy of the Afghan war surge shows signs of success, say US troops, who point to fewer attacks better local relations."



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SWJ Blog
12-13-2011, 11:02 PM
Afghanistan Plan Would Reduce NATO Combat Role (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/afghanistan-plan-would-reduce-nato-combat-role)

Entry Excerpt:



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davidbfpo
01-28-2012, 11:55 AM
After the ANSF officer's attack on French trainers a few days ago (details below), I spotted this today in UK-related report:
...the announcement by France's President Nicolas Sarkozy on Friday, following talks with President Karzai, that France will pull its troops out a year earlier than planned. Mr Karzai said in Paris that Afghan troops would replace the French.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9046140/David-Cameron-and-President-Hamid-Karzai-to-sign-agreement-on-Afghanistans-future.html

The French will leave by 2013, a year earlier than the NATO / ISAF plan for no combat role by 2014. In view of their training role being suspended after the deaths I have my doubts that role will resume.

Background (pre-announcement):
France currently has about 3,600 soldiers in Afghanistan. Paris wants to bring home 1,000 of its soldiers this year, with only a few hundred left after 2013. In a survey published on Thursday, 84% of French people said they supported the full withdrawal of troops by the end of this year.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16771301

Details on the death of the French trainers:
Four French soldiers have been killed in northern Afghanistan after a serviceman from the Afghan National Army opened fire, officials say. Another 16 French soldiers were injured, some seriously, in the incident in Kapisa province. An official told the BBC that an Afghan non-commissioned officer got into a "verbal clash" and opened fire.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16659291

Fuchs
01-28-2012, 02:03 PM
The German parliament-imposed limit for German troops in AFG has been reduced by a couple hundred.
This was as far as I know a largely symbolic move, since the actual head count in AFG was already at about that level.

It's being called "Einstieg in den Ausstieg" (~ entry into the exit), and this sounds like typical German slow political movement. Things are regularly being delayed on all major topics, until something really extreme happens and suddenly the Merkel administration moves at unprecedented speed (compare the government's move towards delaying the long since planned exit from nuclear power, followed by the Fukushima accident, followed by the incredibly quick end for nuclear power in Germany).


So basically nothing substantial has happened, but with this administration we could see a sudden pull-out of all troops any time, given a substantial exogenous shock.


This administration is labelled as conservative-liberal, but Chancellor Merkel has repeatedly proved that she has a breaking point. Once this breaking point is reached, she can jump to highly popular arch-green positions. The true driver at the top of both coalition parties doesn't appear to be either (social) conservatism or liberalism (in the original and European meaning of the word), but simply thirst for power. They're remarkably non-ideological these days.

ganulv
01-28-2012, 02:38 PM
The French will leave by 2013, a year earlier than the NATO / ISAF plan for no combat role by 2014. In view of their training role being suspended after the deaths I have my doubts that role will resume.
My guess would be that the couple of years following the exit of NATO forces will look more or less the same in Afghanistan regardless of whether they commence two years from now or a decade from now. I’m not a Sarkozy fan but I can’t really fault him too much for being in on this decision.

davidbfpo
02-24-2012, 12:21 PM
A Brussels-based pundit's commentary, who has some experience of Afghanistan, which offers:
A closer analysis shows that the French government is ahead of other allies in recognising that NATO's strategy has not worked.


The reality is that many provinces have become less stable since the US-led surge of 2009, yet NATO stubbornly claims that its strategy remains on course.

Link:http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2012/02/why-france-is-leaving-afghanistan.html

Firn
02-24-2012, 06:55 PM
A Brussels-based pundit's commentary, who has some experience of Afghanistan, which offers:



Link:http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2012/02/why-france-is-leaving-afghanistan.html

Using Clauswitz I think that the extent of the positive purpose of the Western allies in Afghanistan was just a too big one. It is one thing to give the allies of a terror network a good and proper beating, another one is to create a stable democratic state out of fragmentated and bloody reality. The former requires little and short cooperation by the local population, if at all, the latter a very great deal of it and a massive effort by themselves while the Western public partly expected their military doing a benign mix of policing and reconstruction.

As that Afghan cooperation and effort was for the most part just not forthcoming even a better and wiser strategy with even more ressources would have most likely failed. It is the old story of the horse and the water.

carl
02-24-2012, 08:18 PM
David: That was a very good article. The French came. They evaluated the situation and determined things could not work as they stood. Then they determined that they couldn't change our behavior. If that couldn't be done there was no sense staying so they leave. Sensible behavior that takes into account conditions as they are.

Our behavior, on the other hand, is based upon what we determined things would be and no change permitted. We decided Karzai was the man for the job and no matter what happens we will back him. The article mentions American military objecting to something the French wanted because that would interfere with a timetable. Again, we decided things were going to go one way and no change permitted, regardless of conditions.

There is a lesson of some kind to be learned from this. The French will change if something doesn't work. We won't and will instead just pretend.

Firn: I don't agree that Afghan cooperation wasn't forthcoming. We never used the power we had to demand things from the gov. We paid all the bills. All of them. If we want something, like less stealing, we should be able to throw our weight around and get it. We never really did. Instead we just hoped that our man Karzai would do the right thing. But we never forced him to.

We got bluffed by Karzai as badly as we got bluffed by the Pak Army/ISI. In both cases we proclaimed our confidence in them and in both cases we just refused to admit we made a mistake. It is like the hallmark of our big gov/military culture is an absolute belief that we can predict the correct course of action right off the bat. All that ensues is predicated on preserving that belief so we won't change and pretend that things are just swell.

gute
02-25-2012, 05:06 PM
As far as I'm concerned this is all a moot point after this latest 'koran burning' b.s. What a bunch of f-ing savages! Let's get the hell out of there and let em sort it out - maybe when it's all over the "Afghan" will become a endangered species.

Okay, I feel better. Anyways, as much as I appreciate what or allies have done, etc - I've never quite understood why a country like the U.S. with 300+ million could not handle Afghanistan by ourselves. I get the whole NATO thing, but we should have done this by ourselves. Again, I do very much appreciate what our allies have done, are doing and their sacrifices.

IMO, we (the U.S.) do not nation build well, at least not in non-western countries/cultures because we are not willing to do what is necessary to bring stability and make the people conform.

Firn
02-25-2012, 06:18 PM
Firn: I don't agree that Afghan cooperation wasn't forthcoming. We never used the power we had to demand things from the gov. We paid all the bills. All of them. If we want something, like less stealing, we should be able to throw our weight around and get it. We never really did. Instead we just hoped that our man Karzai would do the right thing. But we never forced him to.

We got bluffed by Karzai as badly as we got bluffed by the Pak Army/ISI. In both cases we proclaimed our confidence in them and in both cases we just refused to admit we made a mistake. It is like the hallmark of our big gov/military culture is an absolute belief that we can predict the correct course of action right off the bat. All that ensues is predicated on preserving that belief so we won't change and pretend that things are just swell.

I just wanted to point out that it is far easier to achieve a limited political goal depending mostly on your own ressources then doing so with a far more bigger political goal where you depend to a large degree on the 'hearts and minds' of others...

Overall I agree with you.

SWJ Blog
02-26-2012, 12:33 AM
NATO Advisors Withdrawn from Afghan Ministries after 2 Officers Killed (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nato-advisors-withdrawn-from-afghan-ministries-after-2-officers-killed)

Entry Excerpt:



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Presley Cannady
03-01-2012, 01:13 AM
...maybe when it's all over the "Afghan" will become a endangered species.

Like the last time around?

tequila
03-01-2012, 04:45 AM
As far as I'm concerned this is all a moot point after this latest 'koran burning' b.s. What a bunch of f-ing savages! Let's get the hell out of there and let em sort it out - maybe when it's all over the "Afghan" will become a endangered species.

Okay, I feel better. Anyways, as much as I appreciate what or allies have done, etc - I've never quite understood why a country like the U.S. with 300+ million could not handle Afghanistan by ourselves. I get the whole NATO thing, but we should have done this by ourselves. Again, I do very much appreciate what our allies have done, are doing and their sacrifices.

IMO, we (the U.S.) do not nation build well, at least not in non-western countries/cultures because we are not willing to do what is necessary to bring stability and make the people conform.

If the goal of this war was ever to "make the people conform", it was lost before the first bomb dropped. Three hundred million people or no, you're not going to make any society in the modern world "conform" to what a bunch of foreigners want.

The Soviets and their Khalqi semi-allies tried to do so and killed millions. Was that a worthy goal? Did Afghan society become more or less radicalized as a result?

SWJ Blog
05-21-2012, 11:23 AM
A New Way Forward for NATO Strategy in Afghanistan? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-new-way-forward-for-nato-strategy-in-afghanistan)

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SWJ Blog
06-04-2012, 09:34 AM
Military Design in Practice: A Case from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in 2012 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/military-design-in-practice-a-case-from-nato-training-mission-afghanistan-in-2012)

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davidbfpo
01-18-2013, 11:32 AM
Listening to a BBC Radio yesterday a former Kabul correspondent referred to the exit of the Norwegian contingent from a northern province - Faryab (RC-North), after nine years and the apparent increase in local Taliban activity.

I had not seen any reporting here that Norway had left.

A quick search found they left in October 2012, with nine deaths:http://www.newsinenglish.no/2012/09/11/worries-rise-over-afghanistan-pullout/

A small presence remains (97 persons), probably a PRT and those in Kabul:http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/norway/index.php

Given the closeness of the Nordic nations on many foreign policy matters I note both Denmark and Sweden have remained, with battalion-sized contingents - in RC-N and RC-SW respectively.

davidbfpo
10-17-2013, 09:49 PM
Sadly I missed the end of the Danish combat role, but a Danish contact explained this week what happened. The Danes have been fighting for twelve years, largely in Helmand - alongside and under UK command, until the 22nd July 2013:
The dozen years in Afghanistan cost the lives of 43 Danish soldiers and resulted in total costs of approximately 15 billion kroner. An additional 211 soldiers were injured in Afghanistan....Although the last combat troops have now left Afghanistan, a number of Danish defence personnel will remain in the country in order to train the Afghan police force and to man special units and tanks.

Link:http://cphpost.dk/international/combat-mission-afghanistan-over

The Danish exit contrary to political expectations is due to the UK's draw down:
Camp Price, where the Danish soldiers are stationed, is run by the British and will be closed down in August, prompting an early return for the Danish soldiers.

Link:http://cphpost.dk/international/denmark-pull-out-afghanistan-early

SWJ Blog
12-28-2014, 05:25 PM
US, NATO Mark End of War in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-nato-mark-end-of-war-in-afghanistan)

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SWJ Blog
12-05-2015, 11:33 PM
The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan: A Game-Changer; Lest We Forget. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-nato-training-mission-afghanistan-a-game-changer-lest-we-forget)

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SWJ Blog
12-30-2015, 02:11 PM
More Troops May be Needed in Afghanistan, Says US and NATO Chief (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-troops-may-be-needed-in-afghanistan-says-us-and-nato-chief)

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