"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[SWJED]

SWJ Blog - "Prime Candidates for Iraq" (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/prime-candidates-for-iraq/).


Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, reports on a new US State Department intitiative; nay, order; that will see additional diplomats taking posts in Iraq next year because of expected shortfalls in filling openings, the first such large-scale forced assignment since the Vietnam War. As far as we are concerned this is a long overdue move by State to fulfill its end of the 80% political, 20% military counterinsurgency (COIN) fight in Iraq.

... On Monday, 200 to 300 employees will be notified of their selection as "prime candidates" for 50 open positions in Iraq, said Harry K. Thomas, director general of the Foreign Service. Some are expected to respond by volunteering, he said. However, if an insufficient number volunteers by Nov. 12, a department panel will determine which ones will be ordered to report to the Baghdad embassy next summer...

While we applaud (what we call “long overdue”) this move, we do acknowledge that State and other non-military departments and agencies lack the resources to fulfill its COIN obligations. It is time for Congress to get serious and ensure that our Nation has the capacity to deploy fully-trained and mission-capable personnel that truly represent all elements of national power.

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

Have not done this for quite a while - but if you think this SWJ post is worth it - cast a vote at Real Clear Politics Reader's Articles (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/readerarticles/?period=all). Again, only if you think worthy - much appreciated.

Dave

[SWJED]

... from Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007/10/more-on-state-and-coin.html).


... At the operational level, Killebrew argues that the "inter-agency" will never be solved in Washington. Instead we should let local commanders and ambassadors work out issues on the ground as part of a action-oriented country team. (Some see the Khalilzad-Barno days in Afghanistan as one model to emulate.) As one who allegedly teaches about the inter-agency, Charlie has deep sympathy with Killebrew on this front.

All of this begs the question as to what State's role is in COIN campaigns? Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more. This blogger is pretty sure that if those people existed, they'd volunteer to be on the first flights overseas (and to the extent that those skills do exist, those folks are true first responders). But the Foreign Service exists to represent US interests in foreign capitols. If we want an expeditionary State Department, we're going to have to (re)create one in much the same way we have to (re)create those capabilities in the Army and Marine Corps as well.

[Rob Thornton]

Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more.

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

One way to refine these questions and get to some answers might be to set up something at DoS (if that is where the capacity is going to reside) along the lines of CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned) to go out and collect on PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) across the board, and PRT like organizations operating elsewhere under similar conditions to document the challenges they face so that skill sets can be prioritized, recruited, trained, etc. Perhaps this could be an Inter-Agency venture between DoS and DoD? While there is already some good collection and analysis done on PRTs - I'm not sure its been analyzed in terms of providing the basis for an Inter-Agency understanding - nor if it is linked and justified to strategic documents as part of greater political objectives.

Whoever takes on this challenge is going to have to grow capacity, or trade capacity in other areas. They may also be taking on new roles for foreign commitments that reduce the ability to respond to domestic commitment.

Even if you are talking about double billing professionals by "affording" an Inter-Agency experience such as the opportunity to work else where in the government, get ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling) or attend military PME such as CGSC/ILE or the War College - it means a desk or task goes absent unless those agencies have a surplus personnel account that affords those opportunities.

Good people can make a difference, even if their skill sets/professions don't exactly match up - a language skill, or a cultural experience that at least allows them to empathize helps allot - relationships such as the types built at embassies that allow people to reach back and ask questions, or shed light on a problem are also valuable - but that should be seen as a temporary solution.

If the problem is only temporary, then a temporary solution is probably acceptable. If the problem is persistent and matches to our view of the next decade or two - then we probably need to allocate the resources toward a solution that matches the problem. Otherwise we just grind down our existing resources and you get into an attrition of the willing where you just place more and more burden on those who stick around. Lots of good folks in State and the Inter-Agency, but the system does not seem to be set up to allow them as much flexibility as the situation appears to require.

Best, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

Many of them reside at USAID. However, in an era where so much of the specialist support in these areas is itself subcontracted from outside government, in-house technical capacity (regards development and institution-building) can be surprisingly thin in virtually all donor agencies.

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

On a related side note, while the US is still the world's largest provider of ODA, it still provides relatively little development aid as a proportion of GNP (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/37790990.pdf), much of this is clustered in a small number of countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt), and is in many other areas is stretched surprisingly thin. In central Africa, for example--location of some of the bloodiest and most regionally destabilizing wars of the post-WWII era, the US is only the 6th largest donor in DR Congo (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/31/1901167.gif), provides only $57 million a year for Rwanda (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/19/1878421.gif), etc. Are these the appropriate levels of commitment, given the stakes? It would make for an interesting discussion.


OECD, US aid at a glance (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/30/1860571.gif).

OECD, Aid recipient data (http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html#B).


Now, back to your regularly-scheduled discussion on the DoS...

[Rob Thornton]

Rex,

Could you go into more detail on this:


It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

in terms of:

-resident skill sets in those organizations & the roles those functions might be able to fill - maybe, what kind of model they might provide & maybe costs of doing so
-how we might access them more effectively (and if there are any problems in doing so)


I knew a guy in Ethiopia back in the 80s who worked for UNICEF - he was looking at soil samples to determine how the absence of key minerals effected pregnancy, infant and child development. Guys and gals like that would seem key to helping produce long term solutions. With all of our fears about pandemics, etc associated with globalization - I have become very curious about how the WHO is laid out and their importance.

I really think this is an important piece of the discussion - although the piece focused on DoS - I think what we're really talking about is more along the lines of capability as you describe.

Thanks, Rob

[Ken White]

multi-national agencies are prone to ask the US to do more while excoriating the US on many counts leads to a strong disinclination to support the use of those agencies in pursuit of US policy. Thus, I suspect we'll see little movement in that direction. Restoring USAID to its pre-Clinton size and mission would perhaps be a better plan. :)

There is little support for increased Government provided foreign aid from the US to developing nations due to beliefs that the money is often diverted to pockets of leaders, thoughts regarding the essential inefficiency of government programs (as witnessed by the flaws of many internal to the US) and the perception cited above -- that they'll take the money but don't appreciate it enough to avoid sometimes harsh criticism and actions that seem to be no more than "thumb your nose at the big guy." Pretty hard to get Joe Sixpack interested in supporting nations that routinely vote against you at the UN...

The counterpoint to that is that US private giving tops most everyone else; thus it is not stinginess nor a perceived lack of need; it is in the 'how to do it' pocket as opposed to what to do.

That is, of course my sensing of the national mood and I'm sure it bears little relationship to the consensus in the better watering holes. My sensing is also that mood encompasses, population wise, about 75%+ and the better watering holes account for <25%. ;)

[MattC86]

In regards to DoS, it's helpful to remember Kilcullen's comment on Charlie Rose - DoS is absolutely minute in comparison to DoD. This raises a difficult question about unity of command and purpose - so insisted upon by COIN theorists (actually all military theorists) from Galula on forward, when many of the resources needed are outside the domain of DoD. Using multinational organizations or NGOs for the "civilian" or political side of COIN is risky when these groups do not report to a single commander, whether that's POTUS or SecDef. But the capabilities are not inherent in DoD, nor do I think the Pentagon is going to invest in a lot of agricultural development experts anytime soon (side note: I'm taking a class on the economics of agricultural development; interesting stuff). That means for a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

something larger then an "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (http://www.state.gov/s/crs/)" and something more along the lines of a Bureau of Reconstruction and Stability that would provide more of a say at the table, offer continuity, incentivize, etc.?

Or would it be better suited to the culture of AID - the one that existed back in the 80s in Africa and S. America - I met some guys and gals in that line of work while in Addis as well who were smart and did not mind getting dirty?

Maybe the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability should be moved under AID and used to provide structure to those capabilities?

If you want
a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em. as Matt says, then that means something along the lines of what the military reflects as DOTLMPF type impacts and that requires willingness to change and resources ($$$) to do so.

As for the watering holes - there is going to be a good one down at Sines on the 30th (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=29535#post29535) and I hear Rex has shifted his "free beer" commitment to some reporter:D

[skiguy]

If I'm wrong, someone please tell me. It seems the problem is not only the agency's (State) operations, it's the people who are employed by State. Do they have the experience but aren't volunteering for foreign service? That's kind of what I'm getting from reading much of this.

if an insufficient number volunteers

Not to be snarky, but if you got hired as a FSO, where do you expect to work? From home?
It just appears half, or perhaps more, of the problem is that the people who are needed most just aren't volunterring to go.

Like I said, if I'm wrong or completely misunderstanding this, tell me.

[Ken White]

problem is that we're just a kinder and gentler America. A lot of the PRT guys in Viet Nam were not volunteers and most had been through a three or four month course on the job that included some language training.

I imagine that in the intervening years, the culture got to the point where we expected folks to volunteer --or get paid mega bucks -- to go to unhealthy places. Far as I know the SecState has always had the authority to order any FSO to any station. I do not know what training they're given now but given the standard US ploy of skimping on training (at great cost in the long run), I bet they aren't getting three or four months.

None of which answers the obvious question; why wasn't this done three or four years ago...

[John T. Fishel]

FSOs, neither does AID, and we lost more than another bureaucratic HQ when we amalgamated USIA with State. In addition, State and AID have gone to outsourcing at least as much as DOD with the same kinds of problems.

It is interesting to note that Civil Affairs was cionceived by General Marshall in WWII as an organism that should be transferred, lock, stock, and barrel, to State after the shooting stopped. didn't happen and maybe it could not have but it would have given State the capability that many are calling for now.

[skiguy]

Some questions:
Why does DoS and AID have a shortage?
Why are the standards so high (PhD)for HTTs, and I believe as far as civilians go, PRTs as well? IMHO, someone with a lowly BA in Middle Eastern Studies, who already knows at least intermediate Arabic is not going to be in the way and would likely be quite helpful.
How many universities are on board with this? My UG degree program at AMU is intensive as far as Middle Eastern culture/history/etc courses go, but I don't see much in the way of actual training/education that prepares me to work for a government agency like State.
And what does the training consist of? One can learn all he wants about Iraq or what it will be like working in a conflict zone, but the individual doesn't really know until he actually goes there.

[Ken White]

FSOs, neither does AID, and we lost more than another bureaucratic HQ when we amalgamated USIA with State. In addition, State and AID have gone to outsourcing at least as much as DOD with the same kinds of problems.

It is interesting to note that Civil Affairs was cionceived by General Marshall in WWII as an organism that should be transferred, lock, stock, and barrel, to State after the shooting stopped. didn't happen and maybe it could not have but it would have given State the capability that many are calling for now.

dumb shortfall for a lot of folks to share. Between Jesse Helms, the Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton admins (and I won't even go into the emasculation of the CIA and DIA by every one from Nixon forward, a related batch of stupidity) at a time when the future need should have been obvious, the US elected to do its usual "post war dividend" act and slice needed capabilities at the behest of a number of Congresses so that said squirrels could buy votes with more "entitlements." Yes, I know that's simplistic and to an extent unfair -- but not by much.

Almost as bad as "We fight the nation's big wars..." :mad:

Iraq and Afghanistan both are in dire need of police trainers. Germany was supposed to pick that up. They have not, so we cobble something together three years after we knew that Police trainers were an urgent need, that the Germans were not going to do it and that failure to act was simply because of fears in several quarters that the ideal folks to do this, the MPs, should not be so used due to (fill in the blank based on parochial concern).

Aargh!!! You not only hit my last nerve, John, you stood on it.... ;)

No bets on, say, five to seven years from now. :wry:

[John T. Fishel]

Skiguy--

I can only take on the first question at this point. It has to do with downsizing and doing more with less. We went from 800,000 people in the Army to around 400,000 in the last 20 years. We cut State's FSOs from avout 16,000 +/- to 6000 and 2000 in AID. That 6000 includes the folk who were in USIA before 1999. As far as AID is concerned, we outsource much more than we did before. In the mind of the government (Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II) the private sector can do the job cheaper and better. In this, we followed the lead of Maggie Thatcher's UK but she didn't automaticly assume that the private sector would be more efficient - the Brits made govt and private agencies compete for govt contracts (and some went ot govt entities). So, it's a combination of ideology, pragmatism, and simply being cheap!:eek: IMHO

Cheers

JohnT

[John T. Fishel]

having been involved with police training in Panama (we had to call it advising to stay legal) and police training (peripherally in El Salvador - there we had to call it training to stay legal:confused:), we are not well organized to do that job. Since we have no National Police we make do with cobbled togther contractors from local police or MPs or the FBI (active and retired)and wish we had the capability of the RCMP or the Italian Carabinieri. Part of the problem with providing police from the outside - whether to do policing or as trainers - is that few police units in the world have the redundancy of the military. Police tend to train on the job and surge by going to 2 shifts from 3. if they really need a surge, the call in the military - in the US the order is police from other jurisdictions, National Guard, regular military (see the LA riots of 1992 for example). So, the problem is a tough one even if we were better equipped to do it than we are but we keep relying on others even when it is obvious that we need that sort of capbility ourselves.

One interesting story from Panama: We had an offer from the Georgia State Police to provide the training for the Panama National Police - an organization that was much mor capable than the FBI because its mission was more like that of the PNP. ICITAP (then part of both DOJ [FBI] and State) rejected the offer and it took them a full 6 months to get a decent training program functioning...

Fun, ain't it?

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

some of that, mostly because I was still working and our hotshot Garrison MP Company commander went down with some of her troops on a rotation shortly after the dust settled.

Our ability to reinvent pentagonal wheels when the round variety is right in front of us never ceases to amaze me. :wry:

With no Federal uniformed Police (except the Park Service; not counting the essentially security crowds here and there), training a Reserve (not ARNG) MP Battalion or two as a police instructor cadre to be augmented by other MP (or AF Scty guys and gals) as required seems like a no-brainer to me -- but then, I'm just a dumb ridgerunner from Kentucky... :D

[John T. Fishel]

SOUTHCOM's Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) we used to call ideas like yours the "almost obvious" - that is they should have been obvious to anyone with half a brain but were not until somebody actually stated them!:D

As an old Reserve guy, that is one I should have seen, but didn't. A USAR MP unit with the mission to train foreign police in both a constabulary and community policing role makes good sense and could be tailored to include a significant interagency component like ICITAP and various state and local police organizations.

then we get to the practical: Where would it be based? How would it drill? who would be recrutied to staff it?

sounds like fun!:cool:

[Ken White]

the problems that cropped up in DS/DS was that their absence put a lot of small departments in a real hurt.

Many of these guys and gals are already in MP units. Given the tendency toward non-violence (was that well worded or what ;)) and a desire to help others in the NE and on the West coast plus the large number of big cities; seems like those would be ideal locations.

The units could cater to the older guys; that lends maturity and experience to the unit and gives the older folks a slightly less stressful active duty job. Plus, being from the larger cities, they'd be used to dealing with a diverse population (and a weird bureaucracy :rolleyes:).

One of the many benefits the RC folks bring to work is the wide variety of skills from their civilian life; that and a willingness to do missions the AC won't do or want to do because they 'know better' or fear the task will not be career enhancing.

If we don't tap into that for the Advisory mission, we're nuts. You want builders? Farmers? Electrical power supply experts? Paramedics? Paralegals? Transportation specialists? Bankers? Hospital Administrators? Cops? The Reserve and Guard are full of 'em.

All it would take to do that is breaking a few Rice Bowls... :D

[John T. Fishel]

we worked with a jury rigged system we called RC Cops. What later became USACAPOC pulled in civilian cops who were in SF, PSYOP,and CA units for 30 day tours - they were teamed with AC SF teams. Worked well but didn't catch the cops from other types of units.

I certainly agree that it is worth a shot or 3 and all it would do is break a few rice bowls!!!!:cool:

[TROUFION]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071031/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq_embassy

"WASHINGTON - Several hundred U.S. diplomats vented anger and frustration Wednesday about the State Department's decision to force foreign service officers to take jobs in Iraq, with some likening it to a "potential death sentence."

I see an argument to allow and call for more Military Officers and Enlisted to take many of these jobs AND it should be done on a 'seconding' format. A military officer or enlisted should be able to volunteer to fill one of these unfilled billets and be seconded to the DOS, meaning DOS pays the salary of the military personnel at the GS rate. This would no doubt be a substantial pay raise. This would not be a drain on the services since the target audience would be middle level officers and more senior enlisted which are not the critically short ranks. This could be scene as a b-billet as in the Marine Corps. IMHO. --T

[Rob Thornton]

You got to love that image of somebody "venting" anger and frustration - it sounds so diplomatic:D

I read Monday that we'd scaled back our diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan because of unrest and it made me think. Given what these FSOs would likely be doing in Iraq - working at the Green Zone, or on a large FOB possibly going out to do some PRT work if they are of the caliber I've known a few to be (vs. trying to do it from inside the FOB - few of those out there too), they would probably be safer with service in Iraq or Afghanistan then in some of the other places we're at. It may just be my mindset, but if you are in a place where you are conscious of the danger, and have the tools around you to mitigate it, then you are better of then being in a place that offers a permissive environment to terrorists, narco-traffickers, kidnappers, organized crime, health risks, etc., but one in which you are ignorant of the dangers and blind to reality.

The world is a dangerous place, and I'm not sure its getting any better. So if you are an FSO and your objection is that DoS is handing out death sentences because its sending you to do your job in Iraq, I'd recommend you reconsider your line of work - maybe take a job with a beltway think tank, work from your house, start up an Internet business or something along those lines with lots of insulation from the dangers of the real world.

Also - these guys are not just getting their GS pay - they are getting that and then some. I'd recommend State start heavily recruiting at the military job fairs, and offering training and good $$$s for those who have served abroad to come in serve abroad again - we're pretty understanding types so we acknowledge that the word "foreign" in the job description means we'll serve where needed, not just where we'd like.

Best, Rob

[skiguy]

I'd recommend State start heavily recruiting at the military job fairs
and at AMU. :D

[MattC86]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071031/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iraq_embassy

"WASHINGTON - Several hundred U.S. diplomats vented anger and frustration Wednesday about the State Department's decision to force foreign service officers to take jobs in Iraq, with some likening it to a "potential death sentence."

I see an argument to allow and call for more Military Officers and Enlisted to take many of these jobs AND it should be done on a 'seconding' format. A military officer or enlisted should be able to volunteer to fill one of these unfilled billets and be seconded to the DOS, meaning DOS pays the salary of the military personnel at the GS rate. This would no doubt be a substantial pay raise. This would not be a drain on the services since the target audience would be middle level officers and more senior enlisted which are not the critically short ranks. This could be scene as a b-billet as in the Marine Corps. IMHO. --T

Depending on what exactly what jobs you're suggesting military personnel take over, I strongly disagree, and here's why.

The problem with USAID in particular, and State political, economic, and agricultural experts in general, at least in terms of their track records in Africa and elsewhere, is that they are painfully inflexible. While NGOs have been quick to adapt to local conditions and modify their aid or assistance programs, USAID (again, in the past - not sure how they've been the last few years, but I've heard bad things) has a well-earned reputation from the days of Structural Adjustment Policies for being ideologically rigid and stubborn. The SAPs essentially said to recipient nations, "our way or we're hitting the highway with our money."

In order to be successful, economic development programs, particularly with respect to agriculture, must be tailor-made for local conditions; thus a combination of local cultural expertise and economic experience. While military personnel with experience in Iraq may be adaptable, flexible, and skilled, I doubt they will have the prerequisite skills that State really needs right now.

That said, after extolling the adaptability and flexibility of NGO aid or development organizations, I still don't think they're the answer unless we can subordinate them somehow to a unified command.

Matt

[Old Eagle]

at the temper tantrum at the FS town hall. It validates what many of the foreign service's detractors have claimed for decades -- that the FS is a group of effete snobs. While I don't hold that view myself, it's probably time for a purge in the FS, so only motivated foreign policy experts remain.

While I am still officially working on the precept that the FS needs to be expanded and made more robust, there may indeed be a place for culling the herd. Cut the FS back to about 10% of its current strength, let those volunteer for posts in places like Paris, London and Tokyo, under the supervision of politically appointed ambassadors. They could go to all the parties and write mindless reports on exchange rates and the number of remaining endangered animals. Then open up all of the remaining difficult posts (Oh! I might get a hangnail!) to "seconded" military folk. Might also help the officer retention challenge on the other thread. I would make a dandy ambassador in a small to medium-sized country (think Estonia).

The fact of the matter is that the FS is filled with tough, dedicated and talented professionals. They need to be singled out for advancement, while the wusses need to be eliminated. They must not be rewarded with cush jobs while the pros embrace the suck.

[Rob Thornton]

I have it on good authority by a buddy who was on a PRT that the $$s to be made are:

Over base pay for the FSO:

25% hazzardous duty
25% locality
Deployment bonus incentive ranging from 12-80K

I hear their cap is at 200K

We need to start pitching this to guys making the decision to leave the military - employing them by DoS will help shape the DoS culture to something that works within the policies proscribed by the elected officials vs. believeing that the elected folks should shape their policies around the views held by folks who don't want to deploy.

The suggestion that only those FSOs in agreement with policies in Iraq should have to go is bordering on treasonous IMHO - certainly its insubordiantion. We take the King's schilling - we often do things we may not agree with on a personal level - that is just the way it is.
Best, Rob

[goesh]

- if duty and committment is good enough for the troops in tents, it's good enough for State weenies in the green zone and I may well be speaking for a large segment of the tax paying Public here

[Norfolk]

I have it on good authority by a buddy who was on a PRT that the $$s to be made are:

Over base pay for the FSO:

25% hazzardous duty
25% locality
Deployment bonus incentive ranging from 12-80K

I hear their cap is at 200K

We need to start pitching this to guys making the decision to leave the military - employing them by DoS will help shape the DoS culture to something that works within the policies proscribed by the elected officials vs. believeing that the elected folks should shape their policies around the views held by folks who don't want to deploy.

The suggestion that only those FSOs in agreement with policies in Iraq should have to go is bordering on treasonous IMHO - certainly its insubordiantion. We take the King's schilling - we often do things we may not agree with on a personal level - that is just the way it is.
Best, Rob

Rob, this sounds so, so subversive...of the way things are handled at State;): I like it.:cool: Radically transform the Department from the inside, by infiltrating military professionals into its ranks.

Wouldn't that come as a shock to sensibilities in certain quarters.:D The conduct of US Foreign Policy would certainly undergo some changes in due time.

Although competition for the Paris postings (at the wives' behest) might lead to the employment of a little more aggression towards such an end than some Foreign Service types are accustomed to.

[John T. Fishel]

The Foreign Service is on a different pay scale than the Civil Service although pay is roughly comparable (as it is with military pay - key word is "roughly":D). GS 15 is roughly equivalent to FSO 1 to O6. Big differentials in locality pay, overseas pay, hazardous duty pay, etc. as Rob pointed out.

The Foreign Service, like military officers, is commissioned service with the USG, unlike the Civil Service. As a result, the SECSTATE as always had the authority to direct assignments just like the military. It has been a long time since any Secretary exercised that authority until now.

That said, there are many members of the Foreign Service who are willing to go anywhere their country needs them. Witness the high success rate in getting volunteers for both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as for PRTs. Clearly, there are plenty of wimps as well but we shouldn't tar the whole bunch with that brush.

Regarding USAID: My experience with them has generally been positive in spite of rules that in previous times appeared to preclude cooperating with the military. Still, we in Southcom, were able to work with reluctant AID guys in many places - in El Salvador we had an SF CPT assigned to the AID mission in 87 and 88 with a lot of success. But Matt, as far as SAP goes, the problem is not in AID but rather in USG policy which AID, like State, is charged with executing. BTW, structural adjustment is/was not all bad. It worked well in some countries and badly in others. I should say I am not a fan and haven't been one for over 40 years but the real question is why it works or doesn't work. Where it works, as in Chile, what made it successful? Why doesn't it work elsewhere? Subject for much research that needs to be undertaken without ideological bias IMHO.

Cheers

JohnT

[TROUFION]

mATTc86-- I dont disagree with you that professional area expert FSO's should be filling these jobs, but the point is most are unwilling. Those that have volunteered have done well in most cases. But they are too few. The idea of 'seconding' military folks (along with sending them to schools like the Naval Postgrad, Civilian University or the FS Institute for training) would be a cover our behinds right now move. Bottom line there are not enough FSO ready to roll. There are military professionals willing to take their place and they are ready to learn as well as execute.

BTW on a monetary front 'seconding' would require the paying of base military pay augmented by the equivalent GS pay and bonuses, with the cap still hitting 200k.

-T

[skiguy]

TROUFION, I agree with what you are saying on one hand, but disagree that it should only be military or prior military personnel. There are civilians out there who are going to school for one reason and that's to do this type of work. It pisses me off, not only that they went public with their crying, but that there are so many working for DoS now who are unwilling to do their job. It would piss me off more if they wouldn't hire me or let me go because I "only" have a BA and no experience whatsoever in foreign service. Train me! I want to go. I want to serve my country. It's the reason I am going to school.
If I ever get a job at State or somewhere else, I'll volunteer the first time they ask.

I regret 2 things in my life: that I started school so late (but I'm doing it now) and that I didn't reenlist when I had the chance. Of the many reasons I regret the latter, one is because I could have gotten foreign service experience and would have a better chance of getting a job. I guess I'll just have to work that much harder.

[Rob Thornton]

this sounds so, so subversive...of the way things are handled at State: I like it. Radically transform the Department from the inside, by infiltrating military professionals into its ranks.

I have learned a few things over the last few years that seem to apply on and off field:

1) The shortest distance between 2 points is not always a straight line
2) A direct head-on approach often gets bogged down or turned and results in allot of flash/bang, but no real change
3) Subversion from the inside is often a more subtle, economy of force way of doing things:D

The changes we need to occur are are across the broad spectrum of our Inter-Agency - the world changed some for us, and if we don't figure out and reflect how it changed we're putting ourselves at a disadvantage (you an also get it wrong - just changing is not enough - we've got to get it more right then wrong). When I see the arguments that were made public at the AFSA meeting, it seems to me they also have a culture that resists change - we had that long thread on adaptability where we discussed how change occurs in the military - DoS is having the same issues. I've know some incredible talented and sacrificing folks at DoS, but I've also known some duds who had the highest sense of over self importance I've ever seen. They'd probably say something similar about us. It'll be interesting to see how their adaptation to the things proceeds. We can only hope they get it more right then wrong.

Best, Rob

[Jedburgh]

An opinion piece by a retired FSO and CORDS vet in the Nov 07 FSJ:

Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam (http://www.afsa.org/fsj/nov07/speaking_out.pdf)

....Civilian Foreign Service personnel should never be used as “totems” — symbols of a decision by our government’s most senior political officials that every element of the U.S. government must be represented on the battlefield in order to signal our determination to do whatever it takes to win.

Foreign Service officers are not combat professionals, and no amount of training in combat skills, weaponry and self-protection will ever enable them to be more than hostages to luck in a combat environment. As such, they will also never be more than a burden on those military and security forces who have to protect them, and they are unlikely to be able to significantly assist in postwar reconstruction and the transition to democratic institutions in the countries where they serve.

Assigning Foreign Service professionals to such environments does not demonstrate commitment on the part of our government so much as a lack of sound judgment. Nor does it send a signal that this administration intends to win in Iraq and Afghanistan. It merely endangers lives — and not only those of Foreign Service personnel, but also those of the military and security forces who have to protect them.

[Brian Hanley]

I guess the argument could be made that with one of Blackwater's primary tasks being protection of foriegn service personnel that they are quite the diplomatic liability. Hmmm. Hadn't thought of it that way, but it certainly makes sense.

I did a quick stat that suggests life in Iraq is pretty close to as survivable as life in the USA for foriegn service.

3/2000 (approximately 2000) foriegn service workers over 5.5 years of war have died. That's about 28 per 100,000 per year.

According to CDC http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_19.pdf (scroll down to death rates by age and sex) the 35-44 year old age group has a 400 deaths per 100,000 rate from all causes. If you look at table 18, you see that 56 deaths per 100,000 are to be expected from all causes of injury. (Using the lower age adjusted figure rounded down to be conservative.)

That indicates that foriegn service personnel are probably significantly safer in Iraq than at home.

[goesh]

yeh - I thought mortaring the green zone had become less a fad than previously. I think they should have to sleep wearing those goofy looking, bare helments, painted OD

[Surferbeetle]

The FSO Team that I worked with in Iraq was outside the wire everyday, spoke the language, had practical suggestions, and were able to implement some solid ideas. My assessment was a thumbs up. :cool:

[jcustis]

This is definitely a dead-thread resurrection, but I just finished reading an advance copy for review purposes of Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent, and in the heyday of state-sponsored terrorism, diplomats had many occupational hazards abroad.

As I read details of hit-team assasination attempts, snatches off of the streets of Beirut, etc., I routinely asked myself the rhetorical question: Have the dips forgotten their history?

[Jedburgh]

MSNBC, 29 May 08: A Special Appeal from Secretary Rice (http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/05/29/1077026.aspx)

....the Human Resources bureau at the State Department has been reviewing a list of diplomats that are up for assignments in 2009 to find those who are "particularly well-qualified" to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the coming months, those individuals will be contacted "to encourage them to volunteer," the official said.

There are an estimated 300 slots for Iraq that need to be filled for 2009. State Department officials say they are hopeful that enough volunteers will surface to avoid these so-called "directed assignments."....

[sandbag]

I have some experience with State in this regard. The ones I've met either:

1) are strictly academics, who want to work only in diplomacy-related, office-type stuff, or

2) want desperately to be Agency guys, but filled out the wrong application. There truly is no greater Hell than having a 23-year-old Georgetown grad with a goatee and earring teach a senior NCO or officer a soldier's trade.

That said, there are exceptional State guys, and I've found most of their senior field people to be great problem solvers and quite competent. It's the younger ones that scare me. I can only assume they have the same problems we have with our younger folks. It still doesn't explain the "what-do-you-mean-I-might-actually-have-to-go-overseas?" mentality I sometimes bump into on the Beltway. I see it in my own Army, so it does not surprise me to encounter it in other Government agencies, I guess.


If I'm wrong, someone please tell me. It seems the problem is not only the agency's (State) operations, it's the people who are employed by State. Do they have the experience but aren't volunteering for foreign service? That's kind of what I'm getting from reading much of this.


Not to be snarky, but if you got hired as a FSO, where do you expect to work? From home?
It just appears half, or perhaps more, of the problem is that the people who are needed most just aren't volunterring to go.

Like I said, if I'm wrong or completely misunderstanding this, tell me.

[Jedburgh]

Foreign Service Journal, Jun 08: Who is the Total Candidate? FSO Hiring Today (http://www.afsa.org/fsj/june08/whoIs.pdf)

....To gain a comprehensive picture of the changes being implemented, the Journal spoke with officials in the Bureau of Human Resources, the Office of Recruitment, Examination and Employment, and the Board of Examiners. We also followed online discussions among the two exam Yahoo Groups, corresponding directly with more than a dozen FSO candidates — nine of whom have taken both the old and the new tests....

....In part because the new hiring process is being initiated during a time when the demand for people to serve in Iraq is putting a strain on the whole personnel system, some FSOs have assumed that the changes were being made to fill Iraq jobs. But there does not appear to be a direct connection: all incoming FS personnel agree to worldwide availability, which is nothing new. That said, staffing demands for Iraq, and to some extent Afghanistan, do dictate that many officers joining today will need to serve there.

More generally, the number of unaccompanied postings has risen dramatically, from about 200 a few years ago to over 900 positions today (generalist and specialist positions combined). Incoming FSOs should probably expect to serve in an unaccompanied post at some point in their careers, and directed assignments to war zone posts are not out of the question. State may now need many more so-called “expeditionary” diplomats, but HR tells the Journal that the examiners do not select on that basis.....