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Rifleman
10-31-2007, 08:20 PM
This was posted by Ken White on another thread:


I strongly agree with you the GP units can do much more than we ask of them; all that's required is proper training (and we do not yet have that right) for the job they're head for. That, as opposed to schools which should train to levels higher than the next job, is necessary due to unit turnover.. A decently trained Infantry Battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do -- and at far less cost; give any Battlion the training time, gear and money a Ranger Battalion has and he'll be close enough in capability for government work.


It caught my eye and started me wondering; however, I didn't want to hijack the thread it came from, so.....

Would creating a special mission task force from "regular" parachute infantry units have been a better long term option than the Ranger Battalions? I mean something similar to the Marine Corps MEU (SOC) concept for the Army: an Airborne Expeditionary Unit (Ranger Operations Capable), or whatever you'd choose to call it.

Would the capability to execute ranger-type missions have suffered if battalions from the 82nd had been detached from the division, assigned temporarily to a special task force headquarters, and trained up, tested, certified and put on standby to perform ranger-type operations?

After six months or so on standby they could stand down and another battalion could take over the role.

This would go way beyond the Division Ready Force that I remember. We weren't trained up and evaluated on a list of special operations missions before assuming DRF1 in my day.

It's sort of a pointless debate at this stage; it's not going to change now. It probably shouldn't change. After all, why disband a capability in one place only to re-create it in another form somewhere else? I'm just asking if this would have been a better option to begin with instead of forming the Ranger Battalions back in 1974?

Norfolk
10-31-2007, 11:03 PM
Rifleman, I think that creating new Ranger Battalions was probably unnecessary; with Ranger-type training and adequate resources, any regular infantry battalion can do the same thing.

We'll have to wait and see how Ken clarifies this when he posts, but I think that Ken seems to mean something more along German/Commonwealth lines rather than U.S. lines in this regard. What I mean is what Lord Slim said about any special operation requiring units larger than 5-man parties, that any properly-trained regular infantry unit should and can perform such operations. Slim was in favour of Special Forces like the SAS/SBS; he consciously rejected Commando Forces like the Army and Royal Marine Commandos, the Rangers, and their kind, considering them to be both unnecessary and a drain on the regular infantry battalions. He even believed that Parachute Operations should be a routine task for regular infantry battalions.

In short, I think what Ken is saying is that all regular infantry battalions should maintain Ranger Battalion-level standards, not just a select few. It must also be said that small Armies are often compelled by their small size to ensure that their regular units are capable of many "special operations" that larger armies can afford to have separate units for.

During the Second World War, the Imperial General Staff surveyed the CO's of the British and Commonwealth Infantry Battalions in the ETO about the acceptability of regular infantryman for Airborne Forces. The conclusion of the Infantry CO survey was that 2/3 rds of regular infantrymen would successfully pass Airborne Forces standards. Those standards included a 10-mile battle march within 2 hours with full kit, and a 20 mile forced march within 4 hours with full kit, amongst others. By comparison, the regular infantry were required to perform a 5-mile forced march within 1 hour, and a 20-mile route march within 5 hours, 20 minutes, both with full kit.

By the 1970's, the regular infantry battalions in Commonwealth Armies had taken over most of the tasks that formerly been the preserves of the Airborne and Commando Forces. Since then, the latter have been somewhat "heavied-up" and are used as much as elite shock troops as they are in their original roles. Although the British Airborne Forces have tweaked their standards in recent decades, and are now much closer to the Royal Marines in many ways than they used to be, those standards are hardly inaccessible to regular infantry. In any case, a 6-month basic infantry syllabus would be sufficient to achieve such standards without taking any "shortcuts". A 3- or 4-week Basic Parachute Course could be tacked on at the end. Basic Air Assault and Amphibious Assault training would be part of the aforesaid six months' basic infantry training.

I maintain some doubt that the standards of the Commando Forces would be quite so accessible, but Slim wrote that his own regular troops in India and Burma had been trained to the same high standards. Many Royal Marines instructors are of the view that a 9-month basic infantry and commando syllabus is necessary to bring select recruits up to such standards without either cutting some corners or losing trainees to injuries because they're being pushed too far too fast.

My principle objection to going this far is not that I don't believe regular infantry battalions are capaable of the same tasks and missions as Airborne Forces (or the Marines) with proper leadership and training. My principle objection is that most infantry battalions are (at least in my own experience) seriously under-funded for men and resources. Most units get by with just the minimum, if that. It is more "economical" in the view of planners for a few "elite" units to get the resources and funding that would give most regular infantry battalions (provided that they were on a German-style Divisional System or at least a British-style Regimental System, rather than an "individual"-based system) with proper leadership and training, the same capabilities. Otherwise, if I am reading Ken correctly, I quite agree with him.

At the very least, other than lack of resources, I see no good reason why the Airborne and Air Assault Divisions aren't all RIP-qualified, dispensing with the need for separate Ranger Battalions altogether. Same for the Marine Divisions; other than lack of resources, there seems little good reason for Marine Infantry Battalions to not all be SOC-capable - even the Marine Corps offically agrees on this point, theoretically. So, other than Special Forces, practically all other regular infantry units should be capable of what Marine-MEU-SOC and Ranger Battalions are capable of now.

Ken White
10-31-2007, 11:20 PM
"A decently trained Infantry Battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do -- and at far less cost; give any Battalion the training time, gear and money a Ranger Battalion has and he'll be close enough in capability for government work." (emphasis added / kw)

Your cite of Slim is apropos -- and that comment by him is one of the reasons I named him in my list on the Great Generals thread. Slim 'got it' -- pity about some of the others...

Only thing I'd add to your excellent post is that while some airborne capability is needed, most missions do not require that capability; what they do require are just well trained and competent units that are trusted to do missions without over supervision. The MEU(SOC) was a good start...

Norfolk
10-31-2007, 11:54 PM
Only thing I'd add to your excellent post is that while some airborne capability is needed, most missions do not require that capability; what they do require are just well trained and competent units that are trusted to do missions without over supervision. The MEU(SOC) was a good start...

Would it be fair to say then, Ken, that for strictly practical purposes, a smaller Commando Forces element (say Brigade Group/Separate Brigade-sized) would be (theoretically) more efficient than a pair of Airborne/Air Assault Divisions and a Ranger Regiment for Parachute Operations, and leave all the other conventional and special operations (excepting of course those that adhere to Slim's rule) to regular infantry formations and units?

slapout9
11-01-2007, 12:05 AM
Before the Ranger battalions were reformed the 82nd was already able to do those missions and a few others to boot. I am of the opinion that many of the so called special operations capabilities are nothing but good infantry training.

Norfolk
11-01-2007, 12:12 AM
Before the Ranger battalions were reformed the 82nd was already able to do those missions and a few others to boot. I am of the opinion that many of the so called special operations capabilities are nothing but good infantry training.

Totally agree slapout, and so true.:)

Ken White
11-01-2007, 12:46 AM
Would it be fair to say then, Ken, that for strictly practical purposes, a smaller Commando Forces element (say Brigade Group/Separate Brigade-sized) would be (theoretically) more efficient than a pair of Airborne/Air Assault Divisions and a Ranger Regiment for Parachute Operations, and leave all the other conventional and special operations (excepting of course those that adhere to Slim's rule) to regular infantry formations and units?

Heh. I can only give my opinion and not a definitive answer (obviously ;) ). slapout has an excellent point -- the Eighty Twice did in fact train for and perform those missions -- as did the 101st when they were still on jump status. Units in Alaska, Panama and Germany or later, Italy, also trained for them. Got pretty good at them, too. The 1st Ranger Bn was activated because training two Divisions and three Bde sized elements to do those missions was deemed too expensive. The other two Bns were activated because one was not enough.

I'm not a fan of the Division, any Division, I think they're an anachronism retained to justify GO slots -- of whom we have too many -- but given the current state of the world, I'd be inclined to go with six Separate parachute Bdes answering to an Airborne Corps for most -- which is what we now have. However, I'd up them to three Inf Bns plus the Cav Sqn.

The remaining Light Inf (12 Bdes) would get the same training less the parachute and all 18 Bdes would be on the ground -- and for most missions -- totally interchangeable.

Nor am I a fan of the Ranger Regiment (with all due apologies to denizens thereof, including Jorge and a few other friends... :) ). In fact, if you took those guys and spread them around...

One caveat -- We need a SOCOM or something similar and their direct action capability and they need a significant deployable Intel and backup element. IMO, that should all be a joint operation and removed from the services -- who also need a direct action capability but on an operational rather than a strategic scale. Tactical DA capability should be at Corps level, OpCon to Bdes as required. I'm inclined to think the SF Gps should revert to the Army and concentrate on the UW / ID missions but some form of effort with that SOCOM would certainly be necessary -- that needs some thought and study. not by me, I can't affect anything; by the Army and SOCOM..

That'll probably fire up some people who'll say I don't understand. I do, been there done that. All of it -- the issue is political and parochial whereas it should be nothing but effectiveness. Sadly, my perception is that is not the case.

Rifleman
11-02-2007, 05:08 PM
[QUOTE]I'm not a fan of the Division, any Division, I think they're an anachronism retained to justify GO slots -- of whom we have too many -- but given the current state of the world, I'd be inclined to go with six Separate parachute Bdes answering to an Airborne Corps for most -- which is what we now have. However, I'd up them to three Inf Bns plus the Cav Sqn.

I think that's Col. MacGregor's idea. That's way above the level I knew anything about (the way things worked just got sort of hazy for a young E-5 when you got above battalion level :confused:) but I think he makes a sensible argument. He certainly articulates his position well.


Nor am I a fan of the Ranger Regiment (with all due apologies to denizens thereof, including Jorge and a few other friends... :) ). In fact, if you took those guys and spread them around...

I think your former Marineness is showing. ;) Wasn't that the reason Raider Battalions were disbanded?


One caveat -- We need a SOCOM or something similar and their direct action capability and they need a significant deployable Intel and backup element. IMO, that should all be a joint operation and removed from the services --

CIA controlled perhaps?


I'm inclined to think the SF Gps should revert to the Army and concentrate on the UW / ID missions but some form of effort with that SOCOM would certainly be necessary -- that needs some thought and study. not by me, I can't affect anything; by the Army and SOCOM..

Again, it occurs to me that not all WWII OSS operatives were Army. Some were civilians. Should the CIA take over/handle all UW?

Ken White
11-02-2007, 05:53 PM
I think that's Col. MacGregor's idea. That's way above the level I knew anything about (the way things worked just got sort of hazy for a young E-5 when you got above battalion level :confused:) but I think he makes a sensible argument. He certainly articulates his position well.

Wasn't MacGregor's idea, that had been around since WW I; got greater emphasis after each succeeding war and MacGregor just stated it well, as you say. He also stated it at a time when it was feasible to implement it -- if only halfheartedly.


I think your former Marineness is showing. ;) Wasn't that the reason Raider Battalions were disbanded?

Maybe not :) -- I think there should be Raider Bns and no SEAL teams (different environment, parameters and training requirements than the Army, most notably a short notice employment probability); I do not think there should be a Ranger Regiment. I contend those missions can be done by a properly trained and resourced Infantry Bde. The mission in peacetime (fewer training dollars which is one factor that lead to the creation of the Ranger Bns) should be rotated among the Airborne Bdes which will improve the training and capability of all of them.

DoD needs to sit down and sort out the direct action and strategic recon missions and figure out what is entailed. I'd prefer a totally SOCOM DA outfit, no Army, no Navy, no AF, no Marines -- a true sixth service -- but I know that the Rice Bowl protection syndrome is unlikely to allow that. The down side of that is that SOCOM is already 'reluctant' to cooperate and share intel and that syndrome would be exacerbated (that is a generalization and there are exceptions); not good...


CIA controlled perhaps? . . . Again, it occurs to me that not all WWII OSS operatives were Army. Some were civilians. Should the CIA take over/handle all UW?

Some were also Marines and Navy. Langley needs to keep its covert DA capability but they should not take over all UW -- or DA msns (or even many missions in either domain). The nation also needs a military DA capability. I think UW and ID should be an Army Mission, strategic DA, recon and direct support intel for that DA a SOCOM mission. Others will differ.

Norfolk
11-03-2007, 03:06 AM
At the very least, tasking the 82nd Airborne Division as the sole Airborne Forces Formation in the US Army would be much more sensible. Keep the 4 PIR-based BCT's that the Division has now, and bring those BCT's up to full strength by amalgamating the Ranger Regiment with them. Re-assign the Pathfinder Company of the 101 Airborne Division to the 82nd along with most of its Aviation troops and equipment, and convert the 101st back to a regular infantry division.

This way, the 82nd Airborne Division, the only Airborne Formation in the US Army that has had an unbroken existence as an Airborne Division (the 17th Airborne Division was converted into the 101st Airborne Division back in the mid-1950's, the 101st having been disbanded right after WWII), would have the full range of Airborne tasks and capabilities in a single Formation. It would be trained, TOE'd, and tasked for Parachute Operations, Airmobile Operations, Commando Operations, etc. Clearly, such a Formation would be ideal for both Rapid-Reaction and Strategic Reserve roles.

Given the the expense of having not less than five Airborne Formations at present in the Army (the 82nd/101st Abn Divs, the 4th BCT/25th Inf Div, 173rd Abn Bge, and the 75th Ranger Rgt), it would make sense to economise where possible and consolidate training and equipment as much as possible in a single Formation. The 82nd Airborne Division is the senior Formation in this regard with an unbroken operational status as an Airborne Formation; it is located at Fort Bragg, where it can work with the Special Forces and provide them with support in DA operations and close to Camp Lejeune where it can participate in Amphibious Training and Operations (as the Rangers do) as well as Joint Operations with the USMC; it already works with the Air Force at Pope AFB on practically a daily basis anyway; and Fort Bragg is a much larger training area than Fort Campbell.

The Army needs regular infantry divisions: convert all the Light Infantry Divisions (and the 101st Airborne Division - let them keep their Airborne title just like the 1st Cav Div keeps its Cavalry title, even though it's formally an Armored Div) back to regular Infantry Divisions (except for the 10th Mtn Div - make it a real Mountain Division infact, not just name), run everyone in the 82nd through RIP and give them the resources the Rangers now get, and let the 82nd Airborne Division handle most of the rapid-reaction Light Formation role stuff. Organize Airborne Infantry Battalions and Brigades for Expeditionary Operations, much as the Marines do, and especially like the MEU-SOCs. Good stuff, and it would make for a more effective and efficient Army, and Airborne, than exists now.

Ken White
11-03-2007, 04:27 AM
The 17th was not "converted into" the 101st. Both Divisions were inactivated after WW II (fall of '45 for both). The 17th has never been reactivated. The 101st was reactivated in 1948 and again in 1954, both times as a Training Division (not airborne). It was transferred to Fort Campbell and reorganized as an airborne division in 1956-57. In 1968 it was removed from parachute status and became an Airmobile division. It still bears the title Airborne but it is not parachute qualified; it is effectively a light infantry division now and has been since '68.

Most of what you suggest for the 82d has been in place and operational for some time. All US Divisions have an Aviation Bde and the Division Aviation Bdes are now standardizing so the 82d doesn't need aircraft from the 101st. Tenth Mountain does a lot of real mountain training at several locations. Bragg is larger than Campbell but it also has environmental constraints that Campbell does not and both Divisions normally do a lot of off-post training in any event.

Experience has shown that the strategic and rapid reaction missions can often conflict. Thus I think that both PaCom and EuCom would object to your stealing 4/25 and the 173d from them.

I suspect the answer from the airborne Mafia would be "we don' need no steenkin' reform..." :)

That doesn't address the 75th which has morphed into something other than the original intent, a necessary mission -- though I could quibble about the details, somone has to do it. They will fight to stay as they are because SOCOM picks up the not inconsiderable bill.

Norfolk
11-03-2007, 01:52 PM
I stand corrected. Thanks Ken.:)

I thought the 101st's Aviation Brigade was much larger and more capable than the 82's - that the 101st was able to lift an entire brigade (hence the 101st's only Parachute Unit being an entire company of Pathfinders) at a time while the 82nd was only able to lift a battalion at a time. I may be mistaken in that regard apparently, too.

I'm sure the Lawndarts:) really would object to many of the "reforms" I propose, especially junking the Parachute Brigades in Alaska and Italy - and there is quite some merit in that. I was envisioning (though I neglected to put pen to paper here) that Fort Bragg would be the Divisional Home Station, but 3 of its 4 organic Parachute Brigades would be located at other Brigade Posts across the country. Each Parachute Brigade would be operationally attached to one of the active Army Corps.

Besides, I'm pretty sure the squaddies in the 82nd would be quite happy to take RIP.:D

And it was the 11th Airborne Division, not the 17th, - my mistake, I apologize:o - that served alongside the 82nd as one of the Army's only two permanent Parachute Divisions after WWII (until converted into the 24 th Infantry Division in Germany in 1958) - and brief re-activation in the mid-sixties being converted once again and of course this time, it was as the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) with an organic Parachute Brigade.

slapout9
11-03-2007, 02:19 PM
This is nit pickin,but the 101 is now 101 Air Assault they are rahter proud of that distinction. The 11th was reactivated as the 11th Air Assault Division (Test), then abosorbed into the 1st Cav(Airmoble) Division. One of my 1st Squad leaders SSGT Dickey Flett was from the Air Cav which had one Brigade Airborne when they were first created.

Distiller
12-20-2007, 07:32 PM
All these large airborne formations are of no use in a real war.
How do you deploy them? Parachuting into a SAM infested red zone? Got some airlifters too many?
Once they jumped they are just light infantry, since no U.S. airborne unit has BMD style vehicles to make the final dash to the objective.

And I don't even start talking about supplying a brigade from the air ...

Air-transportable yes (as much as possible).
Airborne only up to battalion level (mechanized airborne = cavalry, if possible).
Airmobile - fancy word. Every light infantry unit should be capable of that. Own dedicated formations? No. And why? Airbornes don't have C-17 attached to them, either.


@ all this "Special" forces thing: What about getting regular infantry units into shape, instead of creating the fifth or six service branch?
But isn't it, that everybody tries to get away from dirty and dangerous and into more technicalized units, and those who can't make it end up in infantry? Negative selection. And then if you need infantry units that really do the job you have to start anew (and pin SOCOM on them)?
SOCOM should be really limited to politically/diplomatically/militarily "toxic" missions.

Ken White
12-20-2007, 09:38 PM
All these large airborne formations are of no use in a real war.
How do you deploy them? Parachuting into a SAM infested red zone? Got some airlifters too many?

That would be sort of dumb. Why would one do that? Why not go where the SAMs are not?


Once they jumped they are just light infantry, since no U.S. airborne unit has BMD style vehicles to make the final dash to the objective.[

One presumes you've never fought good light infantry. They can really ruin your day and contrary to many myths, they do not end up being speed bumps for tanks. As for BMDs, a really poor little vehicle that offers great mobility and little else. I suppose what and where the objective was might determine ones need to dash...


And I don't even start talking about supplying a brigade from the air ...

Why not; with air superiority, it can be done easily today and has been done with difficulty in the past with smaller birds. Though I don't think anyone really contemplates that at this time.


Air-transportable yes (as much as possible).

Bad idea -- then you have the minuses of 'light infantry' and none of the pluses of Armor nor the flexibility of parachutes. Plus, how are you going to initially seize that airfield for your air trans troops to land?


Airborne only up to battalion level (mechanized airborne = cavalry, if possible).

That's the doctrine; higher formations exist for training control, a godfather role (to protect little battalions from those in the system who would hurt them -- or don't know what they can do... :wry: ) and limited tactical employment when feasible.


Airmobile - fancy word. Every light infantry unit should be capable of that...

Agreed.


Own dedicated formations? No. And why? Airbornes don't have C-17 attached to them, either.

I have no idea what you meant there.


@ all this "Special" forces thing: What about getting regular infantry units into shape, instead of creating the fifth or six service branch?

That's happening here; how about yours?


But isn't it, that everybody tries to get away from dirty and dangerous and into more technicalized units, and those who can't make it end up in infantry? Negative selection...

Once upon a time; pretty much passe now. We finally realized that Infantry takes as much skill as most; more than many. Your info seems dated in this as well as the foregoing.


...And then if you need infantry units that really do the job you have to start anew (and pin SOCOM on them)?
SOCOM should be really limited to politically/diplomatically/militarily "toxic" missions.

That effectively is the case with only slight exceptions. Most of those exceptions are due to interservice / intraservice turf and political battles more than operational concerns or TODAYS infantry capability. I don't know any Armed forces that escape that foolishness...

Sean Osborne
12-21-2007, 03:09 AM
Plus, how are you going to initially seize that airfield for your air trans troops to land?

Ken,

For what its worth.... Early Entry slash Dynamic Entry slash Forced Entry was a theoretical doctrine possibly/probably implemented by the 173rd during OIF-I.

The genesis of this type of op was the concept behind the EMPRS (Enroute Mission Planning Rehearsal System) being tested/developed by Army PEO C3T in conjuction with the 82nd (MG Vines) and possibly the 18th Abn Corps just prior to Millenium Challenge 02 and OIF in 2003. It was a follow-on to the AWE of the Y2K timerame.

EMPRS as an experimental program/system of the vision of Force XXI was nixed just prior to MC-02, but I do believe the overall concept did have life after "death" and was executed by the 173rd in OIF-I.

William F. Owen
12-21-2007, 03:47 AM
Err... Patrol based Infantry :wry:

So called Elite formations are usually based on a fitness test. Not military skills tests.

I submit if you can run 3,200m in 16 mins carrying a 22kg ruck sack, and then climb a 7m rope, with the 22kg ruck, you are fit enough for purpose.

Testing determination/guts/staying power is a different thing and need to be tested separately.

Jedburgh
12-21-2007, 03:55 AM
I think I posted this a bit over a year ago somewhere on the board, but I figure it also fits here as a bit of a reference piece in this discussion:

General Orders No. 10
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 25 September 2006

UNITS CREDITED WITH ASSAULT LANDINGS (http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/go0610.pdf)

II—LIST. The following units were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations as having participated in a parachute (to include freefall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.

......

b. Helmand Desert, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1845Z-0014Z hours, 19 October 2001 to 20 October 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C, Detachment

c. In the vicinity of Alimarden Kan-E-Bagat, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1800Z-2334Z hours, inclusive, 13 November 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

d. Near Chahar Borjak, Nimruz Province, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1345Z-1445Z hours, inclusive, 25 February 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company C, Detachment
504th Infantry, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

.......

w. Bashur Drop Zone in Northern Iraq (Parachute), 1700Z to 1737Z hours, inclusive, 26 March 2003.

1st Special Forces, 10th Special Forces Group, 2d Special Forces Battalion, Detachment
74th Infantry, Detachment
173d Airborne Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
173d Support Company
250th Medical Detachment
319th Field Artillery, Battery D
501st Support Company
503d Infantry, 2d Battalion
508th Infantry, 1st Battalion
4th Air Support Operations Squadron (United States Air Force)
86th Contingency Response Group (United States Air Force)

x. Northwestern Desert region of Iraq, in the vicinity of the town of Al Qaim, near the Syrian boarder (Parachute), 1830Z to 2230Z hours, inclusive, 24 March 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

y. At H1 airfield in western Iraq, west of the Haditha Dam and the town of Haditha (Parachute), 1835Z to 1200Z hours, 28 and 29 March 2003.

27th Engineer Battalion, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

z. Southeastern region of Afghanistan (Free Fall), 1735Z to 1800Z hours, inclusive, 3 July 2004.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Team 3

Ken White
12-21-2007, 04:02 AM
S'okay, I forgive you. ;)

You're right on all that. To add to it, airfield seizure used to be a Ranger Regiment primary mission long time ago, they've moved on to other things and the 82d and the two forward deployed airborne brigades have the mission -- and the training to go with it. They always had it as a METL task before there was a Ranger Regiment.

The 173d (a plain old airplane infantry battalion, no SOF outfit) did indeed do that and the single battalion of theirs that had the airfield mission was followed quickly by a dozen C17s with an M1 tank apiece. The other Battalion (-) did other things. Nothing really new, the Oil Slick concept included that and dates from the fifties.

The death of parachute troops has been predicted by many since 1940. Every time a non-airborne CoS Army gets in, destruction on the "Airborne Mafia" is wrought. Fred Weyand, when he took over as Chief of Staff at the death of Abrams called in almost all the Airborne Major Generals and fired 'em. Six years later there were just as many as there had been earlier. :wry:

Airborne troopies are sort of like aircraft Carriers; nobody likes the Airborne due to cost and arrogance -- until they need it. That will remain true until we find a better way to transport a large body of troops 5,000 or so miles and put it on the ground ready --and willing -- to fight anything. We will do that someday but not just yet... :D

Rifleman
12-21-2007, 06:18 AM
Distiller,

Take this with a grain of salt, since I readily confess to being branch biased. I think most people are biased though. Sometimes it comes down to which bias is the best bias to be biased with. :rolleyes:

Moving on.....

I fail to see how air assault and airlanding operations are any safer than a parachute assault if a SAM threat is present. Either way you've got troops in an aircraft flying through a SAM threat.

Sure, transport aircraft are vulnerable to SAMs; and ships are vulnerable to anti-ship missiles; and tanks are vulnerable to anti-tank missiles; and convoys are vulnerable to IEDs and RPGs; and troops are vulnerable to small arms fire.....

Even if SAMs are not present airlanding operations are not without problems: bottleneck comes to mind, and aircraft make a big targets for guerrillas with RPGs while unloading on the ground. Also, I think the Germans lost a lost of Ju52s at Maleme airfield on Crete due to beginning airlanding operations too soon.

All things considered, if the operation requires moving large numbers of troops long distances by fixed wing aircraft I think it makes sense to drop at least a brigade combat team before beginning airlanding operations.

Consider this: Point Salinas airstrip in Grenada was a cluster; Panama, while not without mistakes, generally went a lot smoother. In Panama the Army parachuted a reinforced brigade combat team from the 82nd and three Ranger Battalions; six infantry battalions, plus support. It made for a rapid build up of combat power.

I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?

William F. Owen
12-21-2007, 07:42 AM
I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?

There are actually some pretty good numbers on this. The really efficient and effective method is to have a strip that wide body cargo jets (747 or similar) can operate off and the cargo handling kit to unload them.

see here
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2005-02.pdf

Jedburgh
12-21-2007, 03:12 PM
I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?
Army and Joint Doctrine on Airborne ops has addressed that issue clearly since the period (http://ahecwebdds.carlisle.army.mil/Data/tmp/linearize_objYAsFmXks3WgmXh9DXXTYBjpHeRrj0hM20D6x9 mgtW4H0xntHwa7K81mmCSxkkW8UmDUkqoOW5_U_HB7u4ztA__. pdf) of the Berlin Airlift. And we've long had the capability (http://ahecwebdds.carlisle.army.mil/Data/tmp/linearize_objYAsFmXks3WgmXh9DXXTYBjpHeRrj06IJIy+VL drdG+ik0Is+xV9SukioQGwzG1gVKJLtr1PEy_7w8uUo8J5FhnH wehkv61.pdf). Simply put, the preferred method to supply the troops that have taken the airfield being landing of supplies by aircraft, with airdropping supplies being the alternative.

Uboat509
12-22-2007, 08:09 AM
Ken, I normally agree with a lot of the things you post but I have to say that I totally disagree with you on this one. First of all, cutting the funding and resourcing of the three Ranger Battalions and redistributing it to rest of the infantry battalions isn't going to make that much of a difference and it is just going to dilute those resources. Second, some of the assets and equipment that the Ranger Battalions have is only available in finite amounts so you are either left with diluting it to uselessness or going back to concentrating it into a few chosen units. Third, the Ranger Battalions have one thing that will always give them an advantage, let's call it exclusivity for lack of a better word. To be in the Ranger Battalions you have to pass Basic, AIT, Airborne, RIP and still maintain an extremely high standard each and every day. To be in a regular infantry battalion you have to pass Basic, AIT and not be convicted of a felony. In the Ranger Battalions if you have a weak link then you get rid of him, period. In the regular infantry, if you have weak link then you have a weak link. If it is a Joe you will eat up hours and hours with counseling, retraining, "rehabilitative transfers," nonjudicial punishment, more counseling, multiple trips to JAG and finally, if you are lucky you can chapter him out or push him to S and T platoon. If it is an NCO then you might be able to get him pushed to a staff job but more often then not you will just have to work around him. I was in the infantry for seven years before joining the Special Forces. There are a lot or really good guys in the regular infantry who would probably do well in the Ranger Battalions but there are also a lot who would never make it and I am not just talking about the sh*tbags who need to be booted out, I am talking about otherwise good guys who are just not quite up to Ranger Battalion standards. In Ranger Battalion you don't have the guys who just joined for the college money or because 11B happened to have the best bonus. You don't have the guys who discovered that joining the Army was a bad idea for them and they are now just riding out their time. You don't get the guys who can quote verbatim from AR670-1 and always have perfect uniforms but couldn't lead fat people to a doughnut shop. Most of those guys will never even try to go to Batt and those that do either won't make it or won't last long. One of the SOF truths is that "You cannot mass produce SF." This is absolutely true. You cannot bring everyone up to the same standard as the elite few. If you were to try to bring up all the infantry battalions to the same standards as the Rangers, ignoring the resource shortfalls, you are still going to find that either A) you weed out your units to the point where they are seriously undermanned or B) you will have to lower the standard. I know that it sounds like I am bagging on the regular infantry but I am not. I believe that our light infantry is the best in the world but that does not mean that they all can be as elite as the Rangers.


I'm inclined to think the SF Gps should revert to the Army


No, NO, NO, hell no, *$#@ NO. You do that and Group will be gutted and misused and its budget and resources raided. The mistrust and outright animosity by many big Army commanders is palpable. Ask any SF guy who joined SF out of the 82nd how he was treated after he informed his chain of command that he was going to selection and you will probably hear a story reminicent of how lepers used to be treated. Having said that, SOCOM is not ideal either, dominated as it is by JSOC guys but it is better than the alternative.

SFC W

Ken White
12-28-2007, 07:17 AM
Ken, I normally agree with a lot of the things you post but I have to say that I totally disagree with you on this one. First of all, cutting the funding and resourcing of the three Ranger Battalions and redistributing it to rest of the infantry battalions isn't going to make that much of a difference and it is just going to dilute those resources.

Possibly different perspectives at work here; I retired with 27 years 2 years after 1st Batt formed so all the things they were supposed to do for over 25 years of my time in, the two less well resourced and trained Abn Divs provided the muscle for -- acceptably, I believe. ;)


... Second, some of the assets and equipment that the Ranger Battalions have is only available in finite amounts so you are either left with diluting it to uselessness or going back to concentrating it into a few chosen units.

True and as I mentioned, that was one of the prime drivers in their formation. Some of the stuff they have for the msn of a few years ago isn't getting much use now, is it?

My experience with mechanical stuff is that if you don't use it tends to break down...

The non-mechanical stuff? Most, not all, of that is already in most infantry units, is it not?


...Third, the Ranger Battalions have one thing that will always give them an advantage, let's call it exclusivity for lack of a better word. To be in the Ranger Battalions you have to pass Basic, AIT, Airborne, RIP and still maintain an extremely high standard each and every day. To be in a regular infantry battalion you have to pass Basic, AIT and not be convicted of a felony. In the Ranger Battalions if you have a weak link then you get rid of him, period. In the regular infantry, if you have weak link then you have a weak link. If it is a Joe you will eat up hours and hours with counseling, retraining, "rehabilitative transfers," nonjudicial punishment, more counseling, multiple trips to JAG and finally, if you are lucky you can chapter him out or push him to S and T platoon. If it is an NCO then you might be able to get him pushed to a staff job but more often then not you will just have to work around him. I was in the infantry for seven years before joining the Special Forces. There are a lot or really good guys in the regular infantry who would probably do well in the Ranger Battalions but there are also a lot who would never make it and I am not just talking about the sh*tbags who need to be booted out, I am talking about otherwise good guys who are just not quite up to Ranger Battalion standards. In Ranger Battalion you don't have the guys who just joined for the college money or because 11B happened to have the best bonus. You don't have the guys who discovered that joining the Army was a bad idea for them and they are now just riding out their time. You don't get the guys who can quote verbatim from AR670-1 and always have perfect uniforms but couldn't lead fat people to a doughnut shop. Most of those guys will never even try to go to Batt and those that do either won't make it or won't last long.

All true. You take what the pipeline provides and you train it and make it work. It ain't easy, it's often a pain -- but anyone who spends excess time with his slugs instead of training his good people is not doing it right IMO. Been there, done that -- and in my recollection it was not as bad as you seem to recall. I'd also suggest that easily getting rid of problem children is an easy way to be 'elite.' Nobody ever said leadership was easy...

We are still not training Infantrymen properly or adequately and, last time I knew, both BNOC and ANCOC were pretty sad. My contention is that Infantry Battalions are now better trained than they ever have been -- but we can still do better; that's all.


... One of the SOF truths is that "You cannot mass produce SF." This is absolutely true....

True -- and if you'll recall, I've said that here a couple of times. Nor do I suggest that SF doesn't need to exist.


...You cannot bring everyone up to the same standard as the elite few. If you were to try to bring up all the infantry battalions to the same standards as the Rangers, ignoring the resource shortfalls, you are still going to find that either A) you weed out your units to the point where they are seriously undermanned or B) you will have to lower the standard. I know that it sounds like I am bagging on the regular infantry but I am not. I believe that our light infantry is the best in the world but that does not mean that they all can be as elite as the Rangers.

I don't believe I said that they could be as 'elite' as the Rangers; I did say that IMO, the Regiment was unnecessary (and that is partly based on today's missions) -- I don't think those two things are quite the same thing. There is such a thing as over training -- and also overkill...

Best is the enemy of good enough (as the old saying goes...).


No, NO, NO, hell no, *$#@ NO. You do that and Group will be gutted and misused and its budget and resources raided. The mistrust and outright animosity by many big Army commanders is palpable. Ask any SF guy who joined SF out of the 82nd how he was treated after he informed his chain of command that he was going to selection and you will probably hear a story reminicent of how lepers used to be treated. Having said that, SOCOM is not ideal either, dominated as it is by JSOC guys but it is better than the alternative.

SFC W

Hmm. Don't recollect the 77th having much problem with that back in my day. Biggest bitch was having to wear Unassigned brass and having Teal Blue Guidons... :D

And the Beret, didn't have that then either. Long before Bill Ruddy got to put his on JFK's grave..

I'm fully aware of how the Smoke Bomb Hill and Gela Street view each other, lived on both. Gruber Road does not connect them, nor does Ardennes... :wry:

You can ask anyone who's ever left the Eighty Twice for a potentially greener pasture (no pun intended) anywhere aside from SF and that attitude's pretty much the same. You can also ask anyone who left Group of his own volition how he was treated when he announced that he wanted to leave...

I'm also aware of the number of Big Army Gen-Gens who mightily distrust SF; been that way probably back to the time of the Pharoahs. Fortunately, there are always a few smart guys around who control the dumb ones. That antipathy existed back in the day but rarely hampered ops and on the odd occasion when it did, briefly, it got fixed quickly.

As you know, there are also people in the Groups who totally despise the rest of the Army and are not shy about flinging their beret in everyone's face.

Some fault on both sides there, I suspect. Used to be, anyway.

I don't have any hard and fast concerns over it but I do believe that ID and UW are Army and not SOC missions. Aside from the potential budget and staffing issues, I imagine SOCOM if honest would say the same thing -- therein, I think, lies your problem, the JSOC mode will generally win and IMO, SF will lose in the long run; hope I'm wrong. We'll see...

Uboat509
12-28-2007, 08:17 AM
All true. You take what the pipeline provides and you train it and make it work. It ain't easy, it's often a pain -- but anyone who spends excess time with his slugs instead of training his good people is not doing it right IMO. Been there, done that -- and in my recollection it was not as bad as you seem to recall. I'd also suggest that easily getting rid of problem children is an easy way to be 'elite.' Nobody ever said leadership was easy...

We are still not training Infantrymen properly or adequately and, last time I knew, both BNOC and ANCOC were pretty sad. My contention is that Infantry Battalions are now better trained than they ever have been -- but we can still do better; that's all..

This is why we have the finest infantry in the world, but you are correct. They could absolutely be better.




True -- and if you'll recall, I've said that here a couple of times. Nor do I suggest that SF doesn't need to exist..

I actually meant that as it applies to Rangers as well.



I don't believe I said that they could be as 'elite' as the Rangers; I did say that IMO, the Regiment was unnecessary (and that is partly based on today's missions) -- I don't think those two things are quite the same thing. There is such a thing as over training -- and also overkill...

Best is the enemy of good enough (as the old saying goes...)....

Fair enough but I still maintain that the Rangers perform a specific mission set that requires a higher level of skill and training than is possible in a regular Army formation.




Hmm. Don't recollect the 77th having much problem with that back in my day. Biggest bitch was having to wear Unassigned brass and having Teal Blue Guidons... :D

And the Beret, didn't have that then either. Long before Bill Ruddy got to put his on JFK's grave..

I'm fully aware of how the Smoke Bomb Hill and Gela Street view each other, lived on both. Gruber Road does not connect them, nor does Ardennes... :wry:...

I am only 36 so I will have to take your word for that:D


You can ask anyone who's ever left the Eighty Twice for a potentially greener pasture (no pun intended) anywhere aside from SF and that attitude's pretty much the same. You can also ask anyone who left Group of his own volition how he was treated when he announced that he wanted to leave......

I haven't honestly seen that attitude much in group but then not many leave either.


I'm also aware of the number of Big Army Gen-Gens who mightily distrust SF; been that way probably back to the time of the Pharoahs. Fortunately, there are always a few smart guys around who control the dumb ones. That antipathy existed back in the day but rarely hampered ops and on the odd occasion when it did, briefly, it got fixed quickly.....

My issue is not so much with the GOs who are haters. I don't deal often with them, that is why we have 18As. My issue is with the field grade officers who are haters. My experience during my last trip was that working for or around big Army is a huge pain in the ass. It got really old, dealing with all the friction.


As you know, there are also people in the Groups who totally despise the rest of the Army and are not shy about flinging their beret in everyone's face....

Sadly true.


Some fault on both sides there, I suspect. Used to be, anyway.

I don't have any hard and fast concerns over it but I do believe that ID and UW are Army and not SOC missions. Aside from the potential budget and staffing issues, I imagine SOCOM if honest would say the same thing -- therein, I think, lies your problem, the JSOC mode will generally win and IMO, SF will lose in the long run; hope I'm wrong. We'll see...

We will have to disagree on this one as well. I don't think that DA is the only SOC mission, or even the most important one. It just happens to be the most sexy. Big Army doesn't do UW at all and only does FID when forced to do so. There are a lot of things that we do these days that need to stay on the SOCOM side of the house.

SFC W

Ken White
12-28-2007, 04:36 PM
This is why we have the finest infantry in the world, but you are correct. They could absolutely be better.

Amen!


Fair enough but I still maintain that the Rangers perform a specific mission set that requires a higher level of skill and training than is possible in a regular Army formation.

I'm out, clearance long gone but my understanding is the former primary mission has gone back to where it was long ago and the new mission as I understand it I don't think is beyond a decently trained light infantry unit. Still, probably more than enough said on the subject and we can disagree a bit.


I am only 36 so I will have to take your word for that:D

It is not nice to brag... :D


My issue is not so much with the GOs who are haters. I don't deal often with them, that is why we have 18As. My issue is with the field grade officers who are haters. My experience during my last trip was that working for or around big Army is a huge pain in the ass. It got really old, dealing with all the friction.

Hear that, best solution I found was to ignore most of it and them and take subversive steps to lessen contact; exercise that old Group innovation quotient... ;)


We will have to disagree on this one as well. I don't think that DA is the only SOC mission, or even the most important one. It just happens to be the most sexy. Big Army doesn't do UW at all and only does FID when forced to do so...

I'm not totally sure I agree with ID and UW being a SOCOM mission -- and I base that primarily on pure numbers required versus likely numbers available in some scenarios (Iraq being one) AND in some cases and some senses wasting a Cadillac to do a Ford job...

You might give those two factors some thought. I do agree that the Army doesn't want to do ID or UW (either... :) ); to my mind the question isn't who wants to do what but how the nation is likely to be best served.


...There are a lot of things that we do these days that need to stay on the SOCOM side of the house.

SFC W

I know and I know what some of those are. There a couple that I don't think Group should be doing; Strat Recon for example is highly specialized and requires a special breed of cat. So does UW and the two are not similar missions. A really good guy can do both; problem is that even in the Groups, everyone isn't a really good guy...

I'm just questioning whether what we're doing is the best solution. Having done most of those missions for real, I'm not convinced we're being all that smart about the allocations. Still, that's just my opinion and I certainly don't expect many to agree with me, much less everyone.

Distiller
01-19-2008, 10:20 AM
Somewhere further up there was the notion that aerial supply can be with commercial freighters, and the Berlin air lift also came up.

Uh, hello! If you can fly in with a commerical transporter, you don't need a lot of combat troops for the operation. Certainly not a "Airborne Expeditionary Unit".

And Berlin airlift was a non-contestetd ops. These days you could that with the CRAF.

No, the question is how to supply an air mobile unit after air drop.
Assuming that you can't drop them over the target, but only right outside the red zone, they have to have some motorisation/mechanization. At that moment the tonmile requirements explode.

And if you can drop them right OVER the target, then it's probably some sort of more-or-less unopposed grab-the-airstrip action. Secure the objective, wait for the C-17s to arrive. Not a big logistic challenge.

We did the numbers back then for Eurocorps and then the EU Battlegroups, and quite simply, even for a few hundred kilometers away from homebase (like accross the Med, or into Caucasus), there were not enough transporters in all of EU-land to sustain even a brigade sized mechanized combined arms formation purely from the air. No secret.

A dash-grab-and-hold (for some time) is possible. Exactly what the Soviets had planned for, btw. Against HQ, SAM sites, missiles launch areas, &c. Possible but suicide. None of these troops were expected to be welcomed back on Red Square.

Norfolk
08-04-2008, 05:01 PM
Spinning off some of the ideas on the Gavin's Paratroopers thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=53804#post53804) back to this one, Rifleman (drawing on Mike Sparks) and Wilf raise some pretty important points for the potential employment of Airborne Forces.

Rifleman's reminder of Spark's proposal to mechanize (when and where appropriate) one of an Airborne Infantry Battalion's rifle companies and Wilf's thoughts on the CVR(T) in support of Abn Inf Bns form an outline of one possible way to maximize agility>surprise>shock effect during Airborne Operations. And right from the beginning, when it counts most and success or failure is immediately in the balance. While the M-113 doesn't really appeal to me, and I have doubts about the CVR(T) series (Spartan is the APC version, isn't it?), the CVR(T) may provide a most useful starting point for considering the role and types of armoured vehicles that might be useful in Airborne ops. The Scorpion CVR(T) light tanks rendered surprisingly useful service in the Falkands during a sustained land campaign, and the CVR(T) possess the added advantage of being able to be underslung some heavy-lift helicopters for short-length hauls. Scorprion of course possessed a 76mm that fired HESH - good for close support - as well as others, and Scimitar of course had a 30mm.

Drawing on these musings, might an Airborne Expeditionary Unit profit considerably (rather than only marginally) by the possession of an organic light tank platoon as well as sufficient light APCs to mechanize a Rifle Coy, if and when deemed necessary, particularly during Airfield seizures in HIC or sustained campaigning in LIC/MIC?

reed11b
08-04-2008, 05:21 PM
If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures. I feel it is more important to be capable when you arrive, then to arrive quickly. Want expiditionary warfare? Buy sealift, not planes. Intelligent unit sizing and rotational readyness would do more for our ability to quickly project force globaly then light airborne armor would.
Reed

William F. Owen
08-05-2008, 06:03 AM
If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures.
Reed

Concur. - unless you believe that there have been more successful airborne operations that amphibious ones!! - some poor folk do!



Drawing on these musings, might an Airborne Expeditionary Unit profit considerably (rather than only marginally) by the possession of an organic light tank platoon as well as sufficient light APCs to mechanize a Rifle Coy, if and when deemed necessary, particularly during Airfield seizures in HIC or sustained campaigning in LIC/MIC?

CVR-T had/has massive limitations. Main armament was never stabilised and the levels of protection were near non-existent. It is a 1969 design, and has an aluminium hull. There is a version with a 90mm gun, but carries less than 20 rounds and (IIRC) can only fire while halted! - an assault gun?

Stormer however is the 1997 version and a very capable beast. - and it could be more capable. - however the world is currently set against <20 tonne tracked APCs or AFVs for a whole raft of silly reasons.

Partial mechanisation is a valid and respectable solution especially for COIN/LIC. However armies generally want to keep this quiet in case the accountants try and make it "the solution" versus "a solution."

TT
08-05-2008, 06:28 PM
Reed posted: If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures. I feel it is more important to be capable when you arrive, then to arrive quickly. Want expiditionary warfare? Buy sealift, not planes. Intelligent unit sizing and rotational readyness would do more for our ability to quickly project force globaly then light airborne armor would.

I have been following this thread with some interest.

Your post, Reed, captures the issue that the Army seeming has been grappling with since 1991/2 very well (and it touches on an important issue related to my research on mil change in the US Army). It does relate at least obliquely to the thread, but if this is well off topic, my apologies.

The issue is/was that the US Army found itself in the 1990s, to use my irreverent colloquialism, ‘too light to fight, too fat to fly’, and this has been a driving concern – if not always obvious - since the first Gulf War behind the movement towards the Objective/Future force concept and, to a lesser extent, Modularization.

As everyone remembers, the US' initial 'rapid response' to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait was to deploy the 82nd Airborne to Saudi and there was concern at the time that should the 3 Iraqi divisions on the Kuwait/Saudi border drive south that the 82nd Airborne would be little more than a ‘speed bump’. (As an ignorant outsider this seemed a bit of an overstatement to me - think airpower support but then I am easily :confused:). By contrast, to deploy armour divisions took many months, until Oct 91 for a ‘defensive’ force and Feb/March for an offensive force. Gen Sullivan (and others ) recognized that the US was moving into an era of expeditionary ops and was concerned about the future role of the Army due to this problem. So he instigated a process of thinking through how deal with it (and other issues) through the New Louisiana Maneuvers Experiments and then the Army After Next concept studies (and the Force XXI plays at the margins vice C2 for smaller sized units that the AAN was playing with conceptually).

The same problem emerges in Kosovo. Reportedly, the US considered inserting the 82nd Airborne into Kosovo very early but decided against doing so out of concern that the Serb military would go after them with deadly consequences for the 82nd (too light…) In contrast – again – was Task Force Hawk which demonstrated again the logistics/deployability problem (too fat...). TF Hawk was embarrassing for the Army and of course spurred Gen. Shinseki to take the bull by the horns and start the process of developing the Objective/Future force with its very tight deadlines for deployment into theatre and for combat readiness once on the ground (essentially arrive combat ready and capable). In other words, to be irreverent again, the FCS is supposed to be ‘fat enough to fight, light enough to fly’.

So Reed's observations - as well as others - seems to me be quite relevant given the current development problems with the FCS system (or ‘system of systems’, if you will :eek:) and underscores the problem the US Army still faces in becoming an 'expeditionary force' capable of a rapid response with combat capable forces (and I acknowledge that 'combat capable' may or even likely depend on the 'enemy' to be faced). Clearly finding a solution to the problem - if one thinks it is a problem - is very difficult.

Anyway, thank you all for your comments on the thread, for they all have helped me make more sense of the issue/problem, thereby lifting a little bit of my fog of ignorance. :)

Tom Odom
08-05-2008, 07:25 PM
As everyone remembers, the US' initial 'rapid response' to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait was to deploy the 82nd Airborne to Saudi and there was concern at the time that should the 3 Iraqi divisions on the Kuwait/Saudi border drive south that the 82nd Airborne would be little more than a ‘speed bump’. (As an ignorant outsider this seemed a bit of an overstatement to me - think airpower support but then I am easily ).

true but not all of it. Remember the 101st went quickly after the 82d. The real sweaty palms issue for the first 90 days or so was a shortage of AT munitions for the platforms (fixed and rotary) in theater. Plus by the time the second month rolled around the 3 Iraqi divisions were well reinforced:


In transitioning to the defense, Iraqi dispositions reflected Saddam's emerging strategy of deterrence. His forces soon established an echeloned defense of Kuwait and a strategic defense of Iraq, both designed to make an attacker pay dearly. By late September, the Iraqi defenses in the KTO had 22 divisions—13 light and 9 heavy. Fourteen were in the forward defenses. Ten infantry divisions defended the Saudi border and the coastline, backed by four heavy divisions immediately available as corps reserve. In addition, the Iraqis retained six Guard and two regular army divisions in the theater reserve, of which five were heavy divisions. Evidence of mobilization and training throughout Iraq suggested that more military forces would be dispatched to the KTO as soon as they were nominally ready.
From Certain Victory written by yours truly :D

Where the 82d speed bump thing really made me sweat was when I learned that the AF planners had a gleem in their eye to "take down" Iraq without putting airpower against those divisions.

The too light to fight too fat to fly also came into play for Restore Hope. We went light when those of us who had been in Somalia said send an ACR.

Best

Tom

TT
08-05-2008, 07:44 PM
Tom posted: Remember the 101st went quickly after the 82d.

You are of course correct (when are you not?). My memory is not what it used to be and I forgot about this 'reinforcement'. Thank you for your point about the AT munitions shortage.


Tom Posted From Certain Victory written by yours truly

I hope you get royalties, for I bought a copy to read in late May (unfortunately, I have not had time to read it yet, :( due to moving continents and other work commitments).


Tom Posted: Where the 82d speed bump thing really made me sweat was when I learned that the AF planners had a gleem in their eye to "take down" Iraq without putting airpower against those divisions.

I have not run across this (yet), so thank you for this insight.


Tom posted: The too light to fight too fat to fly also came into play for Restore Hope. We went light when those of us who had been in Somalia said send an ACR.

Very interesting, for I was not aware that this 'problem' was an issue in Restore Hope (but then I was not looking for it). So, again, my sincere thanks (in spite of it meaning more research! :wry:). May I ask if you know whether this issue appeared in any of the post-op 'lessons learned' for the operation?

Thanks!

Tom Odom
08-05-2008, 08:05 PM
Quote:
Tom Posted: Where the 82d speed bump thing really made me sweat was when I learned that the AF planners had a gleem in their eye to "take down" Iraq without putting airpower against those divisions.

I have not run across this (yet), so thank you for this insight.

Take a look at Certain Victory-- (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert)it is on line at CSI Press by the way. I recounted in there an episode of getting briefed on this plan in late August in Checkmate. no royalties for active duty writers :cool:

On the AT weapons, I work here with retired SMA Bill Gates; we talk from time to time about this period and the AT munitions shortages always comes up.

My take on the light versus heavy issue on restore hope was there was very much a "put us in, Coach," mentality for those concerned with validating light forces after being left out in Gulf War 1, matched by a sense we did not want to start reloading tanks on ships when we had just completed the Desert Shield/Storm retrograde. The idea of loading an ACR was snuffed pretty quickly--and then resurfaced when the request for tanks came in the next spring, only to be snuffed by Les Aspin as were requests for AC130s. You won't find mention of the ACR idea; you will find much on the issue of armor and AC 130s. Remember Aspin resigned taking responsibility for saying no to the armor. What a concept!

Tom

Ken White
08-05-2008, 08:17 PM
Lots of fog. Agree with the bulk of your first four paragraphs, though...


...The same problem emerges in Kosovo. Reportedly, the US considered inserting the 82nd Airborne into Kosovo very early but decided against doing so out of concern that the Serb military would go after them with deadly consequences for the 82nd (too light…).True -- but that decision was made by the Mech (Heavy) centric USAREUR. The 82d and its troops were not nearly as concerned. Was the USAREUR concern actually for Force Protection reasons or due to Heavy - Light parochiality? We'll never know but that factor cannot be summarily dismissed. In any event, I submit that was far, far more a political then a military decision. It is noteworthy that then BG R. Sanchez was the first USArEur Commander in Kosovo, that he took over a week to ford a river (to the amusement of the British and French and the chagrin of the Engineers who he forced to wait until it was 'safe') and when he finally arrived late in Kosovo discovered the 82d had LTs and SSGs out in the Villages playing Mayor and Police Chief -- and doing it well. All was quiet. His response to that? Pull them all back in and ALL patrols will henceforth have a field Grade Officer. May not have been the most stupid edict ever but it had to be in the top five. Sanchez' force (self?) protection glands apparently worked overtime.
... In contrast – again – was Task Force Hawk which demonstrated again the logistics/deployability problem (too fat...). TF Hawk was embarrassing for the Army...Not really, the Army just took one in the shorts for the good of the cause. In this case, it was a DoD / CJCS objection to Wes Clark dictating more than they wanted Wes to dictate; TF Hawk was deliberately stalled to avoid a commitment that many did not agree with.
...and of course spurred Gen. Shinseki to take the bull by the horns and start the process of developing the Objective/Future force with its very tight deadlines for deployment into theatre and for combat readiness once on the ground (essentially arrive combat ready and capable). In other words, to be irreverent again, the FCS is supposed to be ‘fat enough to fight, light enough to fly’.That was and is the dream, it won't happen but that's another story and thread...
So Reed's observations - as well as others - seems to me be quite relevant given the current development problems with the FCS system (or ‘system of systems’, if you will :eek:) and underscores the problem the US Army still faces in becoming an 'expeditionary force' capable of a rapid response with combat capable forces (and I acknowledge that 'combat capable' may or even likely depend on the 'enemy' to be faced). Clearly finding a solution to the problem - if one thinks it is a problem - is very difficult.In order; Reed may be partly correct but at this time the only way one can transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything, including airfield seizure (IF one is lucky enough to have such handy, might not always be one where you need to go...), is with Parachute troops. They have their uses and halfway decently trained they aren't nearly the pushover many think. Having been a Tanker, A CavGuy and an airplane Infantry type, if I were Tanking today, I worry a whole lot more about a bunch of nut case paratroopers than I would about other Tanks. You can see other Tanks at about the same time they see you -- and if you have a reach advantage on them...

OTOH, LGOP have ruined the day of a lot of Armor over the years -- for real and not least at the NTC where an 82d rotation is the bane of the OCs existence because the Troops are all over the place in small packets and they -- and the OpFor -- cannot keep up with them...

The development of FCS is and will remain problematic -- and, if completed, is not likely IMO to offer the panacea that some might wish. As you point out, the determinant is, as always, METT-TC. Something we forget all too often -- and that applies to when and where one uses parachute elements...

TT
08-05-2008, 09:23 PM
Ken posted: but that decision was made by the Mech (Heavy) centric USAREUR. The 82d and its troops were not nearly as concerned. Was the USAREUR concern actually for Force Protection reasons or due to Heavy - Light parochiality? We'll never know but that factor cannot be summarily dismissed. In any event, I submit that was far, far more a political then a military decision.

The possibility of 'Heavy - Light parochiality' is an interesting observation, and one that I will have to keep a keen eye out for (it speaks to intra-service 'tribal culture'). I have no doubt that you are right that it was more a political than military decision. So far, in what is still early days in my research (I am still writing up my work on the USMC - sigh), I have only run across across a brief mention of the idea of inserting the 82nd. So there is lots in what you note for me to look for. Thank you.


the Army just took one in the shorts for the good of the cause

True. I realize that there was stalling going on, but I was thinking of the 'perception' of the problems that attended the deployment and the perception of many that this was the sole reason for the development of FCS (which based on my research I do not agree with - the attendant public 'embarassment' re TF Hawk was the final straw) .


That was and is the dream, it won't happen...The development of FCS is and will remain problematic -- and, if completed, is not likely IMO to offer the panacea that some might wish.

Agree. While I have read (can't remember where, it is somewhere in a file in a sealed box at the moment) that deployment of the armour bolstered 82nd into northern Iraq indicated that the deployment timelines and the on-the-ground quick combat readiness attached to the Future Force concept were achievable, these days the FCS as 'a dream' seems apt. There have already been a lot of compromises in the design of the platforms (so two aircraft instead of one to move) and, while it is beyond my competence to judge, there seems to be a lot of concern about combat effectiveness of the FCS as a medium weight force (even though the Brits and French are going down this road too). But as you say, that is another thread.


transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything

This is a dilemma, for sure. I take your point, though, that airborne forces may not be the push over some think (not least as it conforms with my initial ill-informed default assumption ;)).

Thanks.

TT
08-05-2008, 09:42 PM
Tom posted: it is on line at CSI Press by the way.

Rats! I would not mind paying for a copy if you at least got a drink out of it. :( Nonetheless, thank you for letting me know it is available on-line (don't know how I missed it) I will get round reading it in the sort-of near future and will definitely look for your account of the briefing you mention. Interesting, though, is that this points to the Army's long standing wariness about getting CAS from the USAF.

On the lack of AT munitions, my view that the airborne would not be simply a 'speed bump' stemmed in no small part from my assumption that the 82nd would have had at least adequate AT capability munitions (and air support). Once again I was obviously wrong. :D


My take on the light versus heavy issue on restore hope was there was very much a "put us in, Coach," mentality

Thank you very much for this. I am aware of the issue later in the operation that resulted in Aspin resigning but not at the start. There is a hint of parochial intra-service tribal rivalry in your observation which potentially converges with Ken's observation (do I detect an emerging theme in this?). So I will at some point poke around the literature on Restore Hope to see what I can find, if anything, on this.

Ken White
08-05-2008, 09:58 PM
The possibility of 'Heavy - Light parochiality' is an interesting observation, and one that I will have to keep a keen eye out for (it speaks to intra-service 'tribal culture').If that's an issue, also be aware there are Band disputes within the Tribes... ;). For example, the airborne unit the Tanks joined via C-17 in northern Iraq in 2003 was not the 82d, it was the 173d Airborne Brigade out of SETAF in Vicenza; folks from the 82d will tell you the 173d really aren't paratroopers (until a guy from the 82d gets assigned to the 173d, then he switches and announces the 82d are a bunch of showboats). Seems minor and of no consequence but that rivalry can have real impact on decisions as to who does what or where they do it. Former Commanders now Generals have been known to 'take care' of their former commands -- even if it's dumb.
... I have no doubt that you are right that it was more a political than military decision. So far, in what is still early days in my research (I am still writing up my work on the USMC - sigh), I have only run across across a brief mention of the idea of inserting the 82nd. So there is lots in what you note for me to look for. Thank you.Regrettably, too many of our seeming military decisions are political -- and I do not mean national or international political (though that obviously is an important factor) -- I mean internal military politics.
...which based on my research I do not agree with - the attendant public 'embarassment' re TF Hawk was the final straw...Or the cited final straw, it certainly contributed though I suggest that the hassle of getting the M1 Tanks from Germany to 'protect' the Aircraft had more to do with than did the Aviation shortfall and 'embarassment.'
...there seems to be a lot of concern about combat effectiveness of the FCS as a medium weight force (even though the Brits and French are going down this road too). ..It needs to be pursued but not seen as the holy grail.

TT
08-05-2008, 10:17 PM
Correct as always. Mea culpa. I had the 82nd on my brain when I was typing.....:o

I do know that 'commander's' etc do lobby for particular forces to be used for parochial reasons, just not all the many examples. Not sure yet how much of an issue service/tribal/Band parochialism is through the 1990s for the views and decisions that led over time to the Future Force concept, but org culture often shapes decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions, and so I think it is worth paying attention to as I get deeper into the weeds of my research.


Ken posted: I suggest that the hassle of getting the M1 Tanks from Germany to 'protect' the Aircraft

I remember this particular issue, but so far I have not seen or heard it referred to as playing into the decision to move forward on the Future Force. Again, thanks, for I had forgotten about the 'tanks, and I will keep my eye out for this issue in future readings and interviews.

Ken White
08-05-2008, 11:29 PM
may be the rather interesting saga of how we got the Bradley and what ever happened to the M8 Mobile Protected Gun system. And why... :wry:

You can also move up a notch and see why we selected the YUH-60 rather than the YUH 61. Or the M1 Tank from then Chrysler instead of the GM prototype...

Never underestimate the effect of politics at many levels on 'military' decisions. Add to that the minor phemonena that III Corps staffers will tell you that contrary to many rumors, the 1st Cavalry Division does not command III Corps -- the fact that the Corps Staff absorbs so many 1st Cav alumnae who will give the Cav pretty much what it wants just make it seem that way. Same thing happens vis a vis XVII Abn Corps and the 82d -- much to the chagrin of the poor 10th Mountain (but the 3d ID doesn't care, since they're Heavy, the Corps at Bragg pays them little attention). Politics and relationships are very much more important than most realize.

TT
08-06-2008, 04:29 AM
Ken, thank you for your useful observations. I am familiar with the Bradley story, and am aware of the influence of politics and relationship on procurement decisions (indeed, I think it safe to say all procurement decisions). The studies on this aspect of the US military are fairly extensive.

I have heard somewhere about the story you relate with respect to the command relationships re the 1st Cav and III Corps, but not the other relationship.

Studying military organizations as I do I have learned, as you say, that politics and relationships are, or can be, very influential, and are always on my list of factors to look for and consider. My chore as a researcher is to discover the particular politics and relationships involved in what I am studying, to see what influence, good or ill, these had. Never easy, as these factors are often neither officially reported (or at least very obscure) nor to be found in public reports or in archival documents (at least that I can view) (but sometimes they can be found, for one of those hallelujah moments). But for the most part these two factors, particularly at the mid and lower levels, exist in the experiences and recollections of those involved.

Tom and you have made several points/observations I was not aware of so far and I do appreciate your help. I am profoundly aware that what I do not know exceeds very greatly what I do know, and this will always be th case, so I am always willing to listen and learn.

My apologies to all, for my first interjection in this thread has led the discussion astray (however much I found the digression interesting and helpful). :o Sorry!

reed11b
08-06-2008, 04:35 AM
Reed may be partly correct but at this time the only way one can transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything, including airfield seizure (IF one is lucky enough to have such handy, might not always be one where you need to go...), is with Parachute troops. ...

Or air assualt or driving. Namely driving. I have a hard time inventing a scenario where not only is the region out of driving range from a friendly county and without a shoreline and lacking in capablilty eneough that an airborne division is needed. If we had big long range VTOL transports, then the idea might have more merit, maybe. Again I like our airborne units and I think that they are under-rated in capability, but they can fly in and land to the vast majority of any missions the future may hold for them. Haite could have been done from the sea, Grenada and Panama as well. Rowanda could have been air-landed, Iran is not paratrooper friendly terain nor is china. Anything I miss?
Reed

Ken White
08-06-2008, 05:41 AM
Or air assualt or driving. Namely driving. I have a hard time inventing a scenario where not only is the region out of driving range from a friendly county and without a shoreline and lacking in capablilty eneough that an airborne division is needed. If we had big long range VTOL transports, then the idea might have more merit, maybe. Again I like our airborne units and I think that they are under-rated in capability, but they can fly in and land to the vast majority of any missions the future may hold for them. Haite could have been done from the sea, Grenada and Panama as well. Rowanda could have been air-landed, Iran is not paratrooper friendly terain nor is china. Anything I miss?Perhaps you missed these facts:

(1) We didn't drive to Afghanistan... Sometimes you want to go places that other people don't want you to go and the driving then becomes sort of a problem but if you can overfly them and get behind them their advantage disappears and a long drive isn't necessary.

(2) Air assault will be great if you're doing it locally and the opposition has no ADA (or small arms, for that matter). Be nice if we had those big VTOL transports for longer range stuff but they aren't here yet. You lose fewer aircraft in overflying hot spots and dropping loads than you do trying to land on a hot LZ.

(3) We can indeed fly in and seize an airfield for many missions; just not for all -- probably not for most -- of them. Haiti, Grenada and Panama all had a seaborne operation; Grenada's parachute op was totally unnecessary; Panama's wasn't imperative but it did help because the seaborne capability was limited for several reasons and the drive-in capability from the Canal Zone for several of the same reasons, not least a really poor road net, was also limited. One DZ was for an airfield seizure, the other was to cut off reinforcements. Haiti was an airland and an air assault, even, off a Carrier -- not a jump. Air Assaults from the sea work, the Marines are good at them and the first big batch of troops on the ground in Afghanistan were Marines because the times and location of troops supported that -- and southern Afghanistan was barely in range and that only with the assistance of Pakistan (who might not be helpful another time).The first troops into Saudi for DS/DS, OTOH were parachute infantry flown from CONUS -- due to time requirements and, again troop locations. As I keep saying, METT-TC rules.

(4) No place is Paratrooper friendly, they take all the girls and the local guys get hacked off. :D China and Iran, OTOH as really large nations aren't susceptible to seizure by any airborne elements; those are indeed driving operations (which is why we're in Korea and Iraq) -- however, once one is in those two countries and in combat, the possibility of several types of parachute operations not only exists but could be desirable.

(5) You did notice that, as I mentioned above, Afghanistan was not a drive in operation? Neither would an operation in a lot of places be -- take Bolivia for example. Ah-ah, don't say never...:wry:

(6) In 1949, the then Chief of Staff of the Army, a Five Star General announced there would never be another large amphibious operation. About a year later, I crossed the mud flats in Inchon Harbor on D+1. Several Chiefs of Staff have tried to gut or remove the parachute infantry battalions because they are 'unnecessary in modern war.' Right...

(7) Tanks are expensive. Parachute units are expensive. A lot of folks would like to get rid of both and spend the money elsewhere. The demise of the Tank has been long predicted. Many armchair strategists will tell you that there is no need for Parachute Infantry Battalions. Note the Tanks are still here -- and so are parachute infantry battalions. That is true in both cases in spite of their expense because they offer a capability that cannot otherwise be had.

Nah, you didn't miss much. ;)

reed11b
08-06-2008, 05:52 AM
..but I get the feeling that most of those "airborne" operations you sited, had larger then needed troop drops out of politics more then anything else. Afghan was an air-land, not an air-drop, big differance. Deffinetly need some airborne capability, but I think that discusions focused around airborne DIVISIONS (<<--- channeling a little sparky there) are a little silly.

(4) No place is Paratrooper friendly, they take all the girls and the local guys get hacked off.
OK now that was funny, even if i disagree with you on the validity of LARGE airborne ops, I am still very proud to be a paratrooper.:D
Reed

Ken White
08-06-2008, 06:14 AM
..but I get the feeling that most of those "airborne" operations you sited, had larger then needed troop drops out of politics more then anything else. I didn't cite them, you did. I agreed with you that Grenada was purely political and unnecessary; I disagreed with you on Panama, there was an element of politics but the drops did serve valid purposes and were successful. I pointed out that Haiti was solely air land , there was no drop -- and yes, Haiti was pure political theater but the Army just did what it was told.
Afghan was an air-land, not an air-drop, big differance.As I also said -- and I pointed out that it was Marine Air land at that -- and that it could not have happened without Pakistani cooperation.
Deffinetly need some airborne capability, but I think that discusions focused around airborne DIVISIONS (<<--- channeling a little sparky there) are a little silly.Your prerogative. Who mentioned division sized operations? I didn't.
even if i disagree with you on the validity of LARGE airborne ops, I am still very proud to be a paratrooper.:DDepends on what large is doesn't it? Are five BCTs dropping in to grab five airfields nearly simultaneously a large operation or five small ones?

Yet again, METT-TC is the driver. Always...

reed11b
08-06-2008, 03:46 PM
Your prerogative. Who mentioned division sized operations? I didn't.
I inferred it from this statement...

In order; Reed may be partly correct but at this time the only way one can transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything, including airfield seizure (IF one is lucky enough to have such handy, might not always be one where you need to go...), is with Parachute troops.
Sounds like we just had an argument over...nothing. I feel that ops bigger then reinforced batalion size for a paradrop mission are unwise, but battalion to Brigade is not an argument I care to try and justify. Perhaps we could just go with rock-paper-scissors?
Reed

Ken White
08-06-2008, 04:16 PM
covers rocks, breaks scissors and scrawls "Tailor your force to what's achievable and needed" on paper...:D

wm
08-06-2008, 04:41 PM
METT-TC covers rocks, breaks scissors and scrawls "Tailor your force to what's achievable and needed" on paper...:D
Whn I was a kid playing rock-paper-scissors, we threw out one finger and called that dynamite. It was trumps in the game just as Ken has shown that METT-TC is, when applied properly in the planning process. But when used improperly, METT-TC , like dynamite, can also blow your legs off.

jkm_101_fso
08-06-2008, 07:45 PM
We didn't drive to Afghanistan... Sometimes you want to go places that other people don't want you to go and the driving then becomes sort of a problem but if you can overfly them and get behind them their advantage disappears and a long drive isn't necessary.

Ken, just out of curiosity, do you think the 173rd's Drop was necessary?

Do you even consider it a real "combat jump"?

Uboat509
08-06-2008, 08:42 PM
On my last ODA, the Team Sergeant had been on the drop zone with 10th Group when the 173rd jumped in. The Junior Engineer was in the 173rd at the time and made the jump. Needless to say there was a lot of smack talk but eventually the Engineer did admit that the hardest thing about the jump was that the hot coffee was gone by the time that he got to his link-up point. I would submit that the 173rd jump was unnecessary.

SFC W

jkm_101_fso
08-06-2008, 08:50 PM
On my last ODA, the Team Sergeant had been on the drop zone with 10th Group when the 173rd jumped in. The Junior Engineer was in the 173rd at the time and made the jump. Needless to say there was a lot of smack talk but eventually the Engineer did admit that the hardest thing about the jump was that the hot coffee was gone by the time that he got to his link-up point. I would submit that the 173rd jump was unnecessary.

I concur. It was Kurdistan, for God sakes!

Ken White
08-06-2008, 09:40 PM
Ken, just out of curiosity, do you think the 173rd's Drop was necessary?Nope -- but we gotta keep Jump Pay going...;)
Do you even consider it a real "combat jump"?I don't, DA probably will -- as many medals as they kick out nowadays, they'll probably tell the Herd to put a wreath around their combat jump star... :(

The M1s were of little benefit -- other than to demonstrate a capability (which no one questioned that we had in any event...).

Seriously, not militarily necessary, both the drop and the tanks were pure PR -- I don't know when the Army's going to realize that kind of stuff, like poor PFC Lynch, is totally counterproductive -- not least because it cheapens the actuality for those who participate.

FWIW, the biggest US combat jump in Viet Nam by 2-503 of the then 173d was also militarily unnecessary as was the second jump in Korea by the 187 and Operation Varsity by three divisions in WW II. All IMO, of course.

120mm
08-07-2008, 12:16 PM
I'm slowly, over the years, coming around to the idea that "purely political" airdrops ARE in fact, necessary.

They help demonstrate capability, if nothing else.

As I stated in the other thread, maintenance of airborne units retain true light infantry. I think that without airborne, the US wouldn't have light infantry.

Also, the "attitude" that accompanies airborne units is important. It might be crucial.

And now, reading Ken, I'm starting to wonder about the way the Army views airborne, and equating it with their chronic misuse of recon, which I am more attuned to, and seeing parallels.

jkm_101_fso
08-07-2008, 12:30 PM
I'm slowly, over the years, coming around to the idea that "purely political" airdrops ARE in fact, necessary.

They help demonstrate capability, if nothing else.

As I stated in the other thread, maintenance of airborne units retain true light infantry. I think that without airborne, the US wouldn't have light infantry.

Also, the "attitude" that accompanies airborne units is important. It might be crucial.

Concur on all. Good point.

Rifleman
08-08-2008, 06:31 PM
I would submit that the 173rd jump was unnecessary.

SFC W

Of course! So was Suart's ride around McClellan.

But a good time was had by all.....both times! :D

Rifleman
08-10-2008, 03:30 AM
We often talk about this airborne operation or that one as being unnecessary. Okay, doubtless that's true. Yet, consider this: might some of history's unnecessary airborne operations still have been the best way to achieve the objecitves?

We might find many things that are unnecessary for the success of a particular operation; yet, said things are still the best option for success.

And how come it's usually the unnecessary airborne operation that seems to receive the most criticism? Have we never conducted an operation involving an air assault, amphibious operation, armored thrust, artillery barrage, air strike, convoy, etc., when the operation stood a good chance of success with out it?

Ken White
08-10-2008, 04:09 AM
it's all about jump pay... :D

I joke. Well, sort of. That's part of it. It's just that the drops generally -- all of them, necessary or not -- do get truly excessive publicity (that always annoys those who get less) and add in the generally high casualty rate (which is why there is jump pay) plus the likelihood of a partial success and there's plenty of things for picking. Still sort of irrelevant, parachute troopies are for Armies like a gun is for a civilian here in the States, you don't usually need one but when you do you need it really bad.

For example, consider reinforcing Georgia (the Republic, not the State).

NOTE: I am NOT suggesting we do that, merely saying look at the map and consider what you can get there and how. Oh -- and add in the complication that the airfield for any airland would become an immediate target for Frogfoots (Frogfeet?) or worse... ;)

Rifleman
08-10-2008, 04:58 AM
It's just that the drops generally -- all of them, necessary or not -- do get truly excessive publicity.....

I reckon that's true; yet, the MIKE Force operations in Vietnam got hardly any puplicity at all.

Incidently, one of my favorite (and one of the more obscure) jump stories comes from one of the MIKE Force jumps. Supposedly, some SF NCOs had to hook up some of the 'Yards. The little fellers just weren't tall enough to reach the anchor line cable! But when the green light came on they went out the door like big men! Nary a jump refusal.

Airborne!

Ken White
08-10-2008, 05:07 AM
to be leaving a VNAF C-123.

Not that I'd blame them for that...:D

Friend of mine made that 173d jump in VN as JM, Catherine Leroy LINK (http://www.173rdairborne.net/images/RVN-1-img_0496A.jpg) was on his bird. He always smiled when he said she was short and he had to hook her up...

Tom Odom
08-10-2008, 12:11 PM
to be leaving a VNAF C-123.

Not that I'd blame them for that...:D

Friend of mine made that 173d jump in VN as JM, Catherine Leroy LINK (http://www.173rdairborne.net/images/RVN-1-img_0496A.jpg) was on his bird. He always smiled when he said she was short and he had to hook her up...

The JM inspection would have to be thorough...:D