PDA

View Full Version : Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare



JeffC
11-04-2007, 09:14 PM
This is an essay that I originally wrote for the AFCEA Intelligence Essay competition but didn't get it finished in time to meet the 10/31/07 deadline. I'm posting it here for feedback and review. It's still a work in progress.

-------------

Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

By Jeffrey Carr

"Consider yourself lightly. Consider the world deeply." - Miyamoto Musashi

In 1999, Psychology researchers at Harvard University organized what has now become a very famous study . The participants were asked to watch a video of a basketball game, and count the number of times that a “white shirt” team member passed the basketball. At the end of the video, participants were asked to record their count…, and whether or not they saw the person in the black gorilla suit in the middle of the action. About 50% completely missed the “guerilla”. Researchers call this phenomenon “inattentional blindness”, i.e., the failure to see something that’s in plain sight.

May 11, 1998 (New Delhi):“Today, at 1545 hours, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range.”

This announcement by the Prime Minister of India sent reverberations throughout the entire U.S. Intelligence Community, but particularly at CIA where analysts who had received satellite evidence 6 hours in advance of the test did nothing with it because no one believed that such an event was likely to occur. In the words of one official, “They would have been more vigilant if the policy community believed this was likely.”

Within 24 hours, DCI George Tenet named retired Admiral David Jeremiah to head an investigation into the IC’s embarrassing failure. According to Tenet’s letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:
“the site has been under periodic surveillance by photoreconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping satellites, which recorded increasing activity. But the images and activities they recorded in recent days were not interpreted clearly or quickly by the CIA.”

The evidence was there, but it wasn’t seen by the people who are responsible for applying objective clarity in the analysis of evidence. This is classic mirror-imaging, and Adm. Jeremiah addressed it in his recommendations :

Analytic Assumptions and Tradecraft

Add rigor to analysts’ thinking when major events unfold. Two mechanisms would help:


a. Bring in outside substantive experts in a more systematic fashion.
b. Bring in experts (who)… would serve, together with substantive specialists, as “Red Teams” on major analytic problems and work with analysts to study assumptions, mirror-imaging, and complex analytic processes.

In 2001, Dr. Rob Johnston accepted a fellowship with the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. His mandate was to “identify and describe conditions and variables that negatively affect intelligence analysis … using an applied anthropological methodology that would include interviews, direct and participant observation, and focus groups.” Dr. Johnston’s research was published in 2005 under the title “Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study”. In Chapter Six, he writes about the problem of ethnocentric bias (a more precise term than “mirror-imaging”):

"Ethnocentrism is a phenomenon that operates on a conscious level, but it is difficult to recognize in oneself and equally difficult to counteract. In part, this is because, in cases of ethnocentric thinking, an individual does not recognize that important information is missing or, more important, that his worldview and problem-solving heuristics interfere with the process of recognizing information that conflicts or refutes his assumptions."

In other words, the mandate to “try to think like them” is doomed to fail because analysts who make the effort still have to address the biological facts about how they perceive information to begin with.

The Biology of Perception
The question about how information travels from “out there” to “in here” has been a subject of inquiry by philosophers and scientists for several thousand years. The Platonic view is that light carries shadows of the external world into the brain, and the brain then matches those shadows with its own ideal forms. For Plato, perception was passive.

Not surprisingly, Aristotle disagreed. The brain, argued Aristotle, received information through the body’s interaction with its environment. As the body moved, touched, tasted, and listened to its surroundings, it sent information back to the brain where it was shaped by expectation and experience. One of the obvious problems with this model is that, practically speaking, we see what we expect to see; the cold slap of reality notwithstanding.

A leading researcher in this area is Dr. Walter J. Freeman, Professor Emeritus of Neurobiology, UC Berkeley. Freeman’s research demonstrates how our brains interact with the world through a cycle of Intention-Action-Perception-Assimilation, with Socialization as the platform. Imagine an early version of the Etch-O-Sketch. By turning a couple of knobs, you could draw shapes and figures. When you wanted to erase your work, you just flipped it upside down, shook it a couple of times, and your old work disappeared, leaving a blank slate in its place.

In Dr. Freeman’s model, chaos attractors replace the aluminum dust inside the Etch-O-Sketch. The two knobs that a user draws with become Action and Perception. The urge to flip the Etch-O-Sketch over, shake it up, and begin anew occurs in the brain when a person wants to be accepted into a family or group environment (gangs, the military, fraternities, terrorist organizations); a desire that is prompted by the pressures of socialization. Dr. Freeman explains the science behind the theory:

“Multiple chaos attractors, each representing one component of the overall landscape that is our environment; and each a receptor of an external stimulus, assemble themselves into a replica of what our action/perception chain tells us is out there. We learn through action and perception, but knowledge is gained through socialization. If the artificial construct that a person’s brain has organized does not equate with a different person’s construct, how can different people share experiences? The answer lies in socialization as a feedback mechanism…. (T)he brain induces chaos that dissolves its intentional structure and enables the emergence of new habits, beliefs and values through cooperative actions with others.

“These techniques do not change individuals through forgetting or loss of memory. They restructure the intentionality of individuals. They induce deep, often dramatic, rarely catastrophic, changes in values and points of view that typically are life-long. They provide additional evidence, if any is needed, that brains are dynamical systems and not logical devices.“

Applying Chaotic Dynamics Theory to Intelligence Analysis
Yorim Wind, Colin Crook, and Robert Gunther of The Wharton School have written a business book based on Dr. Freeman’s work in chaotic dynamics and the brain entitled “The Power of Impossible Thinking (Wharton School Publishing, 2004). In it they discuss how ground-breaking ideas have launched innovations long thought to be impossible such as the 4 minute mile and IBM’s adoption of Open Source, among many others. The seemingly impossible problems plaguing the Intelligence Community, such as Mirror-imaging, may be solved with the same application of insight and awareness.

The first step is realizing that what we think we know about any situation is several steps removed from that situation’s authentic components, based on how the brain processes information coming from outside of itself. The solution is to consciously break down and rebuild the brain’s internal model of the environment in question (i.e., the cultural and societal influences of religious terrorists in the Middle East or Central Asia). Based on Dr. Freeman’s research, we know that the brain can be influenced to break down its “intentional structure” through the pressures of socialization; i.e., the desire to belong, to be accepted, by a particular social group. In the Long War that the U.S. is presently engaged in, religious fanaticism is the primary building block upon which all of the enemy’s actions derive from. Analysts who seek to discern the intentions of that enemy should strive to adopt a parallel mindset.

For example, a Red Team of intelligence analysts are deployed to a facility where they are immersed in an environment as realistically constructed as possible to simulate the daily experience of a member of Al-Qae’da in Iraq, or the Taliban in Afghanistan. This may include religious education in the Koran, daily prayers to Allah, all written and spoken communication done only in Arabic, and other like-minded activities. Any scenario that displaces the previous mindset of the analyst and replaces it with one more closely aligned with the terrorist would accomplish the goal.

Once the internal structures of the brain have been dissolved and rebuilt, these analysts will be able to discern and predict enemy movements and plans from a much deeper and richer foundation of knowledge than ever before. While the axiom that “we don’t know what we don’t know” will still apply, these analysts will be much better prepared to spot the guerilla in the center of the basketball court.

Rex Brynen
11-05-2007, 12:06 AM
That is indeed interesting stuff, Jeff. It would be interesting how it would work out in a prolonged Red Team exercise--and whether the "immersion" could really display ingrained assumptions and world views enough to make a difference.

Personally, I'm not sure you need to go that far to develop the sort of empathy and understanding required to get inside the opponent's head, nor am I convinced that it can it can adequately accommodate the variety of non-cultural and ideological factors that shape insurgent decision-making. This can often be highly idiosyncratic, shaped by leadership styles, risk tolerance, adaptability, immediate (and highly dynamic) political context, group dynamics, etc. In other words, if I think of all the Islamists or members of armed non-state groups that I've known, they've varied dramatically in terms of attitudes and behaviours (just like, say, Republicans, US military officers, or environmentalists).

The broader issue you're addressing is absolutely vital. I've always thought that the best analysts combine subject knowledge, empathy, common sense, and a degree of imagination that is also firmly based in available evidence. It is not that hard to recognize, in my experience--but I haven't the faintest idea how you would test for it.

Brian Hanley
11-05-2007, 01:51 AM
I would say this sounds like some guys reaching into the stratosphere to get support for implementing expensive ideas that are all self-circumscribed. And I'm the sort who likes math and has studied chaos theory. In other words, you don't fix an inability to see outside the box by staying inside the box.

There is no substitute for field experience and wide reading. I'd say forget about trying to duplicate Al Qaeda. Send a group of guys out into the field alone, without any support but $10-$20K to spend 1 year without any help at all. Have them set up a business and survive in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, etcetera. Have them required to spend at least 50% of their time in country, and don't allow them to employ anyone that isn't a local. (Yes, some may not make it back. That's the price for learning what you need to.) Now, the really good info will start coming in the 2nd and 3rd years, but even 6 months will do a lot.

There are so many places this can happen. It's cheap as dirt by comparison. In the process, some of them will turn out to be pretty good at getting inside Al Qaeda, and others like them. Hell, I'm 4 handshakes from bin Laden myself. That sort of thing will pay off for years.

Look, there's just no way to do any kind of classroom exercise that teaches a man what he'll learn in 1 week in a bad neighborhood where he has no backup and just has to make it happen.

Here's another simple method of getting in touch with the world. There are women all over the world looking for dates with Americans. (And men too.) Just conversing with them will teach you a fair amount about their world and how they think if you talk about politics. They can also give you a guaranteed "in" to families. It's a basic fact that the women's network all over the world knows pretty much everything. Get the women to talk to you and you'll find out a hell of a lot. (That's true in the USA too...:D)

JeffC
11-05-2007, 05:29 AM
Thanks Rex and Brian for your feedback. I'm sure that there are many alternatives to the one that I recommended, and they should probably all be tried within certain cost and security parameters. In my opinion, the most important takeaway is the way that the brain processes external data, and what needs to be done to break apart and rebuild our internal models.

The other issue, which I didn't specifically call out in the essay, but perhaps I should, is that of translation. Accurate translation is frequently dependent on cultural context. That's why native speakers are so valuable versus American graduates from the Defense Language Institute. If you can't recruit a native speaker, then perhaps some "cultural context" can be instilled into Americans learning Arabic, Chinese, etc. through various innovative ways, such as we've discussed in this thread.

Beelzebubalicious
11-05-2007, 12:26 PM
Jeff, I agree with what you're saying in principle, but to do so, you'd essentially have to "erase" someone's mental models, memories, etc. and then replace them with these artificial ones. Makes me think of the Jason Bourne book and movie series...

I think what Brian writes echoes what's written in the "Power of Impossible Thinking". That is (paraphrasing), you need to continuously challenge your mental models, test them, reconstruct them and remain flexible and open to intuition (vs. the voice that says it should be this or that). The best way to do this is to immerse yourself in other cultures, preferrably other countries.

I've lived in 3 countries (more than 2 years each - Japan, Eritrea and now Ukraine) and while my degree of immersion varied, in the first two, I was 90% immersed and while I learned a whole lot about the culture(s) I was living in, I learned as much about myself and my own cultural and personal models. I still make a hell of a lot of mistakes, but one thing I have learned is never, never assume that I know what's going on or that my assumptions are right or real. I always try and triangulate my information sources if I can.

The problem with analysts is that if they're analyzing data in an office in Langely, then they're at a double disadvantage. They have their own American models and then they have their CIA training and culture to overcome. Kind of hopeless if you ask me. Hence, the efforts like these, I suppose.

By the way, Brian, the model you propose is pretty damn similar to the Peace Corps (I am a returned volunteer). I have a lot of interesting examples from my time in Eritrea. One construct or model I could never overcome was "time" and my sense of it. I tried, but could never fully embrace the Eritrean concept of time. Another simplistic, but interesting example, was how many Peace Corps volunteers used to "dress down" in an attempt to be closer to their colleagues, however, this was their own model and assumption. Eritreans are a very proud people and even the poorest would take meticulous care of their clothes and alwasy try to be as presentable as possible. Dressing down was indulgent and even offensive to some (even your poorest American is much wealthier than most Eritreans).

Well, I'm now too long-winded, but it's a subject I find very interesting. By the way, I found the link (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/analytic-culture-in-the-u-s-intelligence-community/full_title_page.htm) to Dr. Johnston's work. His whole study is published here.

Rex Brynen
11-05-2007, 12:56 PM
The problem with analysts is that if they're analyzing data in an office in Langely, then they're at a double disadvantage. They have their own American models and then they have their CIA training and culture to overcome. Kind of hopeless if you ask me. Hence, the efforts like these, I suppose.

I do have to say that there is some real quality product coming out of the IC--much, much better, I think, than many people presume.

That having been said, there is the problem of the analyst being cocooned in an organizational box. It is more of a potential problem in the US IC, where its possible to spend 95%+ of your time at (say) interacting with colleagues from your own agency, and very little reaching across DC to share (differing) perspectives with people in other branches of government, let alone the NGO, academic, (etc) communities. In the past couple of years ODNI and the NIC have been trying to address this, with some success.

In smaller ICs, there simply aren't enough folks in the analytical community to make this sort of organizational cocooning possible (although there are obviously other serious problems with a smaller analytical community).

A related complication for the US IC is that US diplomats are either restricted, self-restricted in their functioning in some countries of high interest, or not even present at all. Given the very considerable value of quality diplomatic reporting, this can be quite the disadvantage.

Jedburgh
11-05-2007, 02:23 PM
The title of the piece implies that it will discuss "intelligence analysis and asymetric warfare" - yet the operational example (India's nuclear test) is of analysis failing in a very conventional Cold-War type collection and analytic task.

.....The seemingly impossible problems plaguing the Intelligence Community, such as Mirror-imaging, may be solved with the same application of insight and awareness....
Mirror imaging is a common analytic failing of new and poorly trained analysts. However, to categorize it as a "seemingly impossible problem" is a gross exaggeration. Overall, the piece demonstrates a fundamental lack of knowledge about the community whose problems it presumes to address.

Solution to such problems are not "seemingly impossible"; they are simple. Hire good people, train and mentor them well, ensure that they have regular opportunities to travel within their areas of focus (for those who aren't already regionally-based) and have in place a functional professional-development program that ensures they keep up with emerging technology and methodology within the field.

wm
11-05-2007, 02:29 PM
I am going to go out on a limb here and suggest that the reason that the folks in the Harvard study did not see the gorilla is less due to the fact of “inattentional blindness” and more due to the fact of intentional focussing, AKA tunnel vision. If I am directed to look for a certain thing, I will tend to devote myself to that hunt. I will not attend to other things that might merit my attention because I have chosen to exclude them. Consider a “Where’s Waldo” picture as a case in point. In the back of Martin Handford’s books, one will usually find a list of other things to find in the pictures besides Waldo. When hunting for Waldo though, how often does one notice his dog Woof, his arch-enemy Odlaw, Professor Whitebeard, Wanda, or Wilma, not to mention all the other “punnily” described items in those lists?

Over and above the issue of selective attention, I suspect that we ought to consider some things like the nature of certainty, proof, and truth with more than just a passing handwave. The article’s single paragraph summations of Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology are massive oversimplifications, and therefore, distortions of some very detailed analyses. They set up the poles of a debate that still rages today. In that light, I’d suggest, as a minimum, that the work of a few 20th Century philosophers and mathematicians be consulted. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work, On Certainty is extremely insightful. In it he suggests that what often passes for verification of the truth is like buying several copies of the same newspaper and re-reading the same story (speaks to Rex's point about staying in the same agency). I heartily endorse R.G. Collingwood’s work on re-enactment in the philosophy of history as well as his consideration of absolute presuppositions and philosophical method. Godel’s incompleteness theorem is noteworthy for the fact that it shows the limits to proofs. I recommend reading the debate on the problems with translation and conceptual schemes between WVO Quine and Donald Davidson. The Confucian notion regarding rectification of names might be worth looking at too. And, while we’re at it, how about a look at a few Zen koans and the parables of Jesus to try to reframe the boxes in which we tend to do our conceptualizing?

One last point about using native speakers as translators: ever have anyone ask you if you want gravy on your spaghetti?*

Usually, one is a native speaker of only one language. Native speakers of Iraqi Arabic are English As A Second Language (ESL) speakers. They will have the same kinds of cultural disconnects when trying to get the words right for their English native speaking employers. And, that is without consideration for such things as idiolects, regionalisms, colloquialisms, and slang. My Nebraska-born father described a heavy rain storm as “a trash mover and a gully washer,” my New Hampshire-born grandmother talked about “ it raining pitchforks and hammer handles,” my Paris-born French teacher said it was “raining halberds” and most other folks I know say ”it’s raining cats and dogs.” While I might describe a certain car as “cool” or “hot,” my 10-year old describes it as a “sick” car. My brother-in-law might describe that same car as “the balls” or “the nuts.” We live within a few miles of each other and are, supposedly, speaking the same English. Now, that’s chaos!





*If you live in and around Chelsea, Massachusetts, "gravy" is what you probably call the tomato sauce put on pasta.

Brian Hanley
11-05-2007, 09:01 PM
Beelzebubalicious - The difference betweent that and the Peace Corps is that you are going in to develop a network of people that work for you in a business. Seriously, I think there is no better way to create a network that will give you "ins" into the real world. You aren't going to hobnob with the poor, you are going to get into the world of the rich and powerful. But aside from that, yes, it's got its similarities.


JeffC - The real concern I have with your proposal above is that it presumes that you even could create a simulated society of terrorists. The problem with that is that anything you come up with will be from your own map of the world. In this, Osama and his boys have an advantage over us. They know how we think and work because we broadcast it everywhere. We don 't even try to listen to what they are saying. If you are serious about it, and have no other resource, I would recommend following Al Jazeera and the major newspapers in Tehran, Lahore and Riyadh. It will be one hell of an eye-opener, that's for sure. I'm sure there must be a translated version of those available somewhere in the vast federal government bureacracy.

The first time you read an article on the front page of a major Arab paper that says, in all seriousness, that Israelis are harvesting Arab children to put their blood in passover matzoh, and you see that the author is a PhD professor at the university - well, you'll begin to realize how very different things are.

To really get inside the head of a fanatic though, one either has to have been one (of some religious persuasion) or else have been very close to one or more. Personally, I think one of the best resources we have in the USA on how those guys think is people like Falwell. They, like Osama, are "people of the book" and take its dictates as literally as possible. They both motivate large numbers of people. (Hope I didn't offend anyone here by saying that. They have different ideological maps, very different.)

Rex Brynen
11-05-2007, 09:51 PM
We don 't even try to listen to what they are saying.

That's simply not the case, Brian--the IC is full of people who know their files well, spend enormous time listening to public (and not-so-public) discourse, and write some excellent analytical product.

There will always be some things that we don't know because of the challenges of collection, the "other side's" OPSEC and CCD efforts, the complexities of human decision-making, the array of relevant variables, the challenges of prediction, etc.

Ted is absolutely right in highlighting the central importance of good recruitment, training, professional development and mentoring, and field (and, i would add, cross-disciplinary or interagency) familiarity.

Brian Hanley
11-05-2007, 10:06 PM
That's simply not the case, Brian--the IC is full of people who know their files well, spend enormous time listening to public (and not-so-public) discourse, and write some excellent analytical product.

OK. I sit corrected. However, I have not seen much evidence of it getting to people that need it or want it. And I'd say that includes the public. This is an ideological war first and foremost. I would still recommend going direct to translations before analysis for most. It makes the case better.

nichols
11-05-2007, 10:36 PM
Hell, I'm 4 handshakes from bin Laden myself.

Brian,

You should seriously think about joining the CIA:cool:

You post some interesting thoughts yet weave comments like the above into your posts.....your back ground in biology...please help me connect the dots.

What exactly is your intend / end state in this forum?:confused:

Brian Hanley
11-05-2007, 10:50 PM
My intentions are to have conversations with intelligent people and perhaps help some to be more effective. In my current incarnation I am in graduate school in microbiology. You may or may not be aware that college campuses are not places where such discussions can occur in a useful fashion very easily in most cases. ;)

My reasons for selecting my current graduate study area is biological warfare, which is something that Al Qaeda has said they want to acquire.

I suspect that my thoughts and comments will make people think. I tell it like I see it and call things as I see them.

nichols
11-05-2007, 11:17 PM
My reasons for selecting my current graduate study area is biological warfare, which is something that Al Qaeda has said they want to acquire.

You post that you're four handshakes away from bin Laden.

Why?

JeffC
11-06-2007, 12:30 AM
The title of the piece implies that it will discuss "intelligence analysis and asymetric warfare" - yet the operational example (India's nuclear test) is of analysis failing in a very conventional Cold-War type collection and analytic task..

--- I chose that example because it was a clear cut demonstration of missing the obvious, and because Red-teaming was one of Tenet's recommendations.



Mirror imaging is a common analytic failing of new and poorly trained analysts. However, to categorize it as a "seemingly impossible problem" is a gross exaggeration.

--- It is a pervasive problem according to Johnston's study and many more critiques of Intelligence analysis over the years. I could have filled a page with just references to that one issue.



Solution to such problems are not "seemingly impossible"; they are simple.

--- If the problem were simple, it would no longer be a problem. Clearly, for anyone who reads the literature, that's not the case.

JeffC
11-06-2007, 12:38 AM
JeffC - The real concern I have with your proposal above is that it presumes that you even could create a simulated society of terrorists. The problem with that is that anything you come up with will be from your own map of the world.
--- I'm certain that such a facility can be built and staffed inside Iraq or Egypt, possibly even Israel. And while it certainly wouldn't be perfect, it definitely would break apart the former mindset or mental model of the analysts that attended it, and replace it with one more in tune with that of an Islamic extremist.

--- More importantly, my suggested scenario is just a starting off point. I'm sure it would require a great deal of testing with alternate scenarios before the best solution would be arrived at.

Rex Brynen
11-06-2007, 01:17 AM
--- If the problem were simple, it would no longer be a problem. Clearly, for anyone who reads the literature, that's not the case.

I think Jedburgh has done more than just read the literature, Jeff.

In a robust assessment environment, people are on a look-out for this. Assumptions about social/cultural/political context, motive, intentions, and behaviour are questioned by analytical team members, team leaders, and higher-ups, and tested against evidence. (They had best also be on the look-out for the reverse of mirror-imaging too: that is, an almost caricatured image of the opponent.)

I'm not saying that its not a problem, but that it is perhaps less common of a problem than you suggest, and more readily dealt with by existing recruitment and training mechanisms than you presume.

Brian Hanley
11-06-2007, 03:12 AM
You post that you're four handshakes away from bin Laden. Why?

Sorry to be opaque there, or appear a bit dense. My intent was to signal how one can network by just getting out in the field and doing it. The context was to support what I was saying to JeffC about how nothing can replace that experience. I gave it as an example of the potential value of getting out there and mixing it up.

If someone wants to try to make some practical use of that info, they can write me and I can dig up the contact info that was 2 handshakes away from OBL. For the record, those parties are in Almaty. They are friends of a family there that I had a connection with through a relative. The friends of the family were reliably reported to have worked directly with bin Laden for a time in Afghanistan. So it's a cold lead now, but so is everything. At the time it was reported as fairly warm.

JeffC
11-06-2007, 03:27 AM
I'm not saying that its not a problem, but that it is perhaps less common of a problem than you suggest, and more readily dealt with by existing recruitment and training mechanisms than you presume.

Actually, my essay is based largely on reports issued by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. I relied on experts who have studied the problem for years. That's not to say that they're infallible, however I don't think that their findings should be dismissed without proof which counters their conclusions.

The same applies to Freeman's research findings. If the brain does create its own internal models, then certain things need to be done to break those models down. The fact remains that each person cannot know what he or she doesn't know, regardless of good intentions or re-doubled effort.

Jedburgh
11-06-2007, 03:40 AM
....--- It is a pervasive problem according to Johnston's study and many more critiques of Intelligence analysis over the years. I could have filled a page with just references to that one issue....

....If the problem were simple, it would no longer be a problem. Clearly, for anyone who reads the literature, that's not the case....
:rolleyes:

As stated, mirror imaging, along with falling into logical fallacies and permitting various biases to determine judgments, are a common failing among new and poorly trained analysts. However, "common" does not equate to "pervasive".

There are also significant differences in quality and type of analysis produced by the different agencies and services. There is perhaps an agency or two out there that hires far too many people who don't really deserve the title of "intelligence analyst"; but there are others that are lucky enough to have several consummate professionals on the payroll. Throughout the community we have many outstanding analysts who are very much in touch with reality as it exists on the ground and in the heads of the threat.

Reads the literature? Well, I've spent a couple of years as a collector and worked a bit of analysis here and there, and, as limited as my academic qualifications may be, I stand solidly by my opinions.

The disparagement of seemingly simple solutions is in itself an analytic failing. Despite the apparent simplicity, they are still dependent upon the human vagaries of the people implementing them. The existing problems with selection, training and professional development of career analysts may have a simple solution - but the primary obstacle is not so simple, as it tends to lie with bureaucrats outside the field of intelligence analysis. If you were able to conduct such a study in-depth, you would find that the degree of severity of these quality problems ebb and flow as much with changes in senior management as it does with hiring and training of analysts.

In any case, even if a brilliant analyst produces a truly insightful and timely product for national-level consumption, there may still exist yet another obstacle at the national strategic decision making level. The personal beliefs, biases and perceptions of a given policy maker make cause him to simply reject outright the conclusions, judgments and recommendations of the analyst. Then when everything goes tango uniform, "intelligence" is blamed. But the greater public rarely learns that the "intelligence" at fault was cherry-picked to conform to the policy-maker's predilictions, while the good intel that did exist was ignored or dismissed.

Along the lines of my last statement, I recommend giving a read of Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (http://www.amazon.com/Knowing-Ones-Enemies-Intelligence-Assessment/dp/0691006016/ref=sr_1_1/105-4181630-7573200?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194320159&sr=1-1). The book is a collection of essays that amply illustrate the point that, even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.

This is where you complexity in reaching an effective solution. Hell, its been over six years since the wake-up call and we're still not ready for work yet. Hiring, training and developing good analyst is the easy part.

JeffC
11-06-2007, 04:37 AM
:rolleyes:

As stated, mirror imaging, along with falling into logical fallacies and permitting various biases to determine judgments, are a common failing among new and poorly trained analysts. However, "common" does not equate to "pervasive".

If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?

For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.




There are also significant differences in quality and type of analysis produced by the different agencies and services. There is perhaps an agency or two out there that hires far too many people who don't really deserve the title of "intelligence analyst"; but there are others that are lucky enough to have several consummate professionals on the payroll. Throughout the community we have many outstanding analysts who are very much in touch with reality as it exists on the ground and in the heads of the threat.

I think so as well.



Reads the literature? Well, I've spent a couple of years as a collector and worked a bit of analysis here and there, and, as limited as my academic qualifications may be, I stand solidly by my opinions.

That's understandable.


The disparagement of seemingly simple solutions is in itself an analytic failing. Despite the apparent simplicity, they are still dependent upon the human vagaries of the people implementing them. The existing problems with selection, training and professional development of career analysts may have a simple solution - but the primary obstacle is not so simple, as it tends to lie with bureaucrats outside the field of intelligence analysis. If you were able to conduct such a study in-depth, you would find that the degree of severity of these quality problems ebb and flow as much with changes in senior management as it does with hiring and training of analysts.


I don't deny that it's a complex problem, nor that there can be a multitude of possible solutions. Mine is simply one of many. As long as solutions are being offered, implemented, and evaluated, I think that's all that anyone can expect, particularly in very large organizations.



Along the lines of my last statement, I recommend giving a read of Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (http://www.amazon.com/Knowing-Ones-Enemies-Intelligence-Assessment/dp/0691006016/ref=sr_1_1/105-4181630-7573200?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194320159&sr=1-1). The book is a collection of essays that amply illustrate the point that, even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.

Thanks for the recommendation. I'll add it to my reading list.




This is where you complexity in reaching an effective solution. Hell, its been over six years since the wake-up call and we're still not ready for work yet. Hiring, training and developing good analyst is the easy part.

Don't get me started. :)

Ken White
11-06-2007, 05:11 AM
I think he is correct.

However, I do not think your analysis of his statement is necessarily correct:


"If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?"

It is entirely possible that said senior people are competent but either bureaucratically constrained and more concerned with protecting their institution or simply are strongly inclined to not stick their necks out to demand competence and release those who are not capable.

Those alternatives are similar but not synonymous though the result is the same. There is, of course the possibility that pure incompetence is part of the problem and there are other alternatives but experience with our government leads me to believe my provided alternatives are more probable; as they say, "indications lead me to believe" the bureaucracy and it's natural ally, risk avoidance, are your culprits. :mad:


For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.

Having briefly been an analyst -- and not a good one, I'm too impatient and arbitrary; realized that and went on to other things :o -- I have to agree with others who point out that we can produce a large number of fair analysts but that good one are naturals and hard to find. I'm not at all sure they can be created without that talent. Lot of good basketball players out there, very few Michael Jordans.

I have been immersed in another culture fairly thoroughly for over a year -- I think maybe the Jesuits have it right; get 'em before they're seven -- after that, the culture in which they got to that age is pretty thoroughly embedded and is unlikely to be shed.

There are always exceptions but I'm unsure how you'd determine who would be receptive and who not. :confused:

You also have the factor that thorough cultural attunement with one grouping does not provide better analysis capability for a multinational and multi ethnic grouping...

Just some thoughts for your consideration.

Regards,
Ken

Brian Hanley
11-06-2007, 05:33 AM
He's to the point, and most of it rings true to me, although I have not seen the inner bureau side enough to be able to say one way or another. It fits the analysis of Soviet deficiencies well. I will say that from what I've seen the "boots on the ground" of our CIA are quite weak even now. Shot through with political correctness and using simplistic methodologies "out of the book". But basically, I think he's right and it goes wider than that to the public at large and the weird conversation that sometimes goes on there.

I honestly think that this discussion, JeffC, is a symptom of the problems. Why go to all that trouble simulating what you don't know instead of go out and see the real thing? Some journalists do it, even get to Quetta from time to time. (Though none I know of personally recently.) Is the reluctance because it's dangerous? I'm trying to wrap my mind around where you're coming from.

Stan
11-06-2007, 12:25 PM
There is no substitute for field experience and wide reading. I'd say forget about trying to duplicate Al Qaeda. Send a group of guys out into the field alone, without any support but $10-$20K to spend 1 year without any help at all. Have them set up a business and survive in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, etcetera. Have them required to spend at least 50% of their time in country, and don't allow them to employ anyone that isn't a local.

You are correct, there is no substitute for field experience. But, that’s where my concurrence ends.

Allow me to point out the blatantly obvious. We are talking about the US Armed forces, not setting up a shop in Sub-Sahara or the CIS for a large US-based company, with responsibilities such as entertaining guest speakers and smooching with drug lords.

Our missions include an exit strategy, not merely a 'do or die scenario' with good luck on the way out the door. Our missions often include, but are not limited to, social and political upheaval, civil war and subsequent refugee crises. While I understand you may have experienced these situations as an individual, you are applying your cookie cutter to hundreds of thousands (that can’t and don’t blend into the background or duck for cover around a corner).


(Yes, some may not make it back. That's the price for learning what you need to.)

Am I glad you didn't join the Armed Forces...No response to this is needed.


Here's another simple method of getting in touch with the world. There are women all over the world looking for dates with Americans.

We don’t turn loose our soldiers so they can begin fraternizing with whomever while overseas. There are still rules and regulations (you’ve concluded it’s bureaucracy). Furthermore, most developed nations aren’t still chasing American males around, and certainly are not introducing their 'ticket out of the country' to mom and dad. Not everybody will be going to Georgia or Romania on missions. This IMHO is of limited value.


He's to the point, and most of it rings true to me, although I have not seen the inner bureau side enough to be able to say one way or another. It fits the analysis of Soviet deficiencies well. I will say that from what I've seen the "boots on the ground" of our CIA are quite weak even now. Shot through with political correctness and using simplistic methodologies "out of the book". But basically, I think he's right and it goes wider than that to the public at large and the weird conversation that sometimes goes on there.

You’re striking a comparison between the CIA today and Soviet deficiencies? Care to run that one by with a little more detail? We’ve sufficiently covered your background of an Embassy’s inner workings, so I’m wondering where you collected all this info on the CIA.


I honestly think that this discussion, JeffC, is a symptom of the problems. Why go to all that trouble simulating what you don't know instead of go out and see the real thing? Some journalists do it, even get to Quetta from time to time. (Though none I know of personally recently.) Is the reluctance because it's dangerous? I'm trying to wrap my mind around where you're coming from.

There’s inherent danger in anything the US Military does. The object of training and simulation is to remove the ‘stupid’ factor. The Armed Forces do not automatically factor in death with her missions abroad.

I’ve been through Kwatah city more than five times in the last 3 years. What’s the big deal in visiting basically a huge flea market? Might be dangerous if you ate something :wry:

Brian Hanley
11-06-2007, 12:56 PM
You are correct, there is not substitute for field experience. But, that’s where my concurrence ends.

Allow me to point out the blatantly obvious. We are talking about the US Armed forces, ...

We don’t turn loose our soldiers so they can begin fraternizing with whomever while overseas. There are still rules and regulations (you’ve concluded it’s bureaucracy).

There’s inherent danger in anything the US Military does. The object of training and simulation is to remove the ‘stupid’ factor. The Armed Forces do not automatically factor in death with her missions abroad.

I’ve been through Kwatah city more than five times in the last 3 years. What’s the big deal in visiting basically a huge flea market? Might be dangerous if you ate something :wry:

Stan, he's talking about training of analysts for intelligence work. You appear to be talking about training of regular soldiers for combat. Perhaps if you were discussing the same topic it might work better? (Biting my toungue over the 'stupid factor' opening... ;))

Stan
11-06-2007, 01:23 PM
Stan, he's talking about training of analysts for intelligence work. You appear to be talking about training of regular soldiers for combat. Perhaps if you were discussing the same topic it might work better? (Biting my toungue over the 'stupid factor' opening... ;))

Brian, the analysts I know and have worked for are Soldiers, and members of CIA and DIA. Furthermore, the analysts that work in the field are fully exposed to basic military functions. Training and simulations that Chris is referring to, if approved and further defined, would in fact be used in other areas.

We probably still won't be using your versions in place of traditional and simulated training.

Ken White
11-06-2007, 04:36 PM
Stan, he's talking about training of analysts for intelligence work. You appear to be talking about training of regular soldiers for combat. Perhaps if you were discussing the same topic it might work better? (Biting my toungue over the 'stupid factor' opening... ;))

analysts -- and others -- a lot of guvmint agencies have been sending people to other nations (a bunch of them...) for a couple of years or more as civilians and in various modes to live on the economy and learn the culture as you suggest. Been doing it for years, a lot of years, even before WW II and in large numbers since then. Most everyone here's aware of that.

Fear's not an issue. Excessive publicity about it isn't helpful to a lot of programs though it is not classified. Just Google 'foreign area specialists' and skim the subjects on the first eight or ten pages.

Sometimes all of us wrongfully assume that everyone knows all the things we know... :wry:

Stan
11-06-2007, 05:27 PM
analysts -- and others -- a lot of guvmint agencies have been sending people to other nations (a bunch of them...) for a couple of years or more as civilians and in various modes to live on the economy and learn the culture as you suggest. Been doing it for years, a lot of years, even before WW II and in large numbers since then. Most everyone here's aware of that.

Fear's not an issue. Excessive publicity about it isn't helpful to a lot of programs though it is not classified. Just Google 'foreign area specialists' and skim the subjects on the first eight or ten pages.

Sometimes all of us wrongfully assume that everyone knows all the things we know... :wry:

I wasn't gonna go there just yet.

An excellent point, Ken. I have the utmost respect for those and the FAO program in general. Regretfully, most know little about our service's finest. Little however need be said, and attention we don't need.

At about the 10-year 'time in service' mark, a single individual can, and often does pay back his/her service training ten-fold.

Ken White
11-06-2007, 05:47 PM
wife and kids. Sorry, didn't mean to preempt... :o

Your comment is true on all counts.

Stan
11-06-2007, 06:08 PM
wife and kids. Sorry, didn't mean to preempt... :o

Your comment is true on all counts.

No worries mate !

I might add for the uninitiated, that these Soldiers are not exempt from the stringent rules and regulations that govern the Armed Forces. They are, more often than not, faced with greater moral dilemmas.

Sadly, as Jedburgh once pointed out, some of our intel folks are literally forced into service without the benefits of language training. Granted, these fine men and women excel all on their own and could be considered masters of their occupational specialty.

I see no good reason to send a soldier anywhere unprepared.

Shivan
11-07-2007, 02:30 AM
For example, a Red Team of intelligence analysts are deployed to a facility where they are immersed in an environment as realistically constructed as possible to simulate the daily experience of a member of Al-Qae’da in Iraq, or the Taliban in Afghanistan. This may include religious education in the Koran, daily prayers to Allah, all written and spoken communication done only in Arabic, and other like-minded activities. Any scenario that displaces the previous mindset of the analyst and replaces it with one more closely aligned with the terrorist would accomplish the goal.


Usually, one is a native speaker of only one language. Native speakers of Iraqi Arabic are English As A Second Language (ESL) speakers. They will have the same kinds of cultural disconnects when trying to get the words right for their English native speaking employers. And, that is without consideration for such things as idiolects, regionalisms, colloquialisms, and slang.

Interesting. The problems I see with simulation as described above is that we cannot replicate the social-cultural and religious norms and rituals learned natively, beginning in the crib; nor the language issues that "wm" raises above. One of my Arabic instructors replied to a question I posed, "the only way you can learn [fill in the blank] is if you have an Arab mother." Holds true for different situations, I have discovered. Further, many Arab relationships are via kinship ties, which prevent us from truly entering their domains socially, or being seeing them with their guard down, i.e., with their true souls bared.

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

Thanks all for your comments. Very helpful.

nichols
11-07-2007, 04:53 AM
Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

We are striving to identify as much of the cultural ignorance as possible during future mission rehearsals using simulations. Multiple stovepipes are being worked on now which will eventually within 12-18 months lead to a mission rehearsal capability that should cover as much of the warfighters environmental spectrum as possible.

The foundation of the simulation is the VBS-2 / VTK:

http://www.vbs2.com/site/index.html

http://community.bistudio.com/wiki/Virtual_Tool_Kit

The requirements for the VTK were driven by a cognitive task analysis done for anti terrorism force protection. The end state for the VTK is a tool kit that is as 'nicholized' as possible in order for the non-gamer trainer to create realistic scenarios with geo-specific virtual terrain. A key piece is the open API that will allow the Marines to 'plug-in' third party artificial intelligence.

The next stove pipe is the Tactical Language series of simulations that currently uses the Unreal game engine:

www.tacticallanguage.com

This contract is known as ALTS; Automated Language Training System. A portion of it is plugable language and geo-specific culture artificial intelligence that will give the trainer the ability to verbally engage the avatars in the target language. Currently it is being built to plug into VBS2/VTK and DARPA's Real World simulation. The other portion of ALTS is a web based application that we are doing in conjunction with the Air Force (gotta aim high:D). This will be available through Marine Net as part of distance education.

The next stove pipe is part of Doc Silverman's PMServ artificial intelligence:

http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~barryg/HBMR.html

ONR is working on this one, eventually it will get transitioned over to Trasys.

We are attempting to develop a capability to do the following scenario:

The MEU is sitting off the coast of Africa, Burkina Faso has just launched the balloon and a NEO Op is ordered. On the big boat the intell bubbas pull down NGA data sets for Ouagadougou and import then into the virtual world. Mean while back at the embassy the Gunney or Embassy Stan type bubba sends the detailed buildings that they have created of thier hooch via secure line to the big boat. The intell bubbas put this into the virtual world. Now they pull up the AI library and insert Sahel French language and culture plugin. The final effort is edit the artificial intelligence to match current intel. Now the intell bubbas can go watch a movie.

Down in the bowels of the ships, the running around the flight deck 300 times to get a miles lenth of running has ceased. No more chow lines, the Marines are plugging the DVTE computers into the SWAN to begin mission rehearsal for the upcoming NEO. During the rehearsal da Gunney notices that everytime Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word...talks to a local avatar, the avatar gets pissed off. A decision is made to assign Rudy to LZ security and he is not to talk to any local people. After the NEO has finished, Rudy is told in loving terms to log on Marine Net and take the targeted language course because they still have another 5 months to go before they are CONUS.

We aren't to far from being able to create the above scenario.

Stan
11-07-2007, 09:55 AM
Hi Shivan !


Interesting. The problems I see with simulation as described above is that we cannot replicate the social-cultural and religious norms and rituals learned natively, beginning in the crib; nor the language issues that "wm" raises above. One of my Arabic instructors replied to a question I posed, "the only way you can learn [fill in the blank] is if you have an Arab mother." Holds true for different situations, I have discovered. Further, many Arab relationships are via kinship ties, which prevent us from truly entering their domains socially, or being seeing them with their guard down, i.e., with their true souls bared.

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.

Thanks all for your comments. Very helpful.

I don’t think we’ll ever get that many soldiers to ‘natively’ learn the Arabic language, cultural and religious norms. Even though I’ve lived and worked here for 12 years, speak colloquial Estonian and even recite poetry from the 13th century, I still can’t fool everybody. You’re 110% correct, you have to start from birth.

But that’s not the point of the simulation training packages today. I think Jeff's first post explained it best.


The first step is realizing that what we think we know about any situation is several steps removed from that situation’s authentic components, based on how the brain processes information coming from outside of itself. The solution is to consciously break down and rebuild the brain’s internal model of the environment in question (i.e., the cultural and societal influences of religious terrorists in the Middle East or Central Asia).

This will in effect allow common soldiers and analysts to not only understand the Arabs (or Africans) better, but more importantly those nuances such as social taboos. Although I’m very effective on my own, it took years to get ‘there’ and I had nothing more than 13 weeks of language training to prepare for my tour. That barely prepared me for anything Estonian.

Paul and I (we were both previously station in Africa) have observed how a typical military situation can rapidly escalate from ‘calm to a firefight’ over little more than a misunderstanding. One could simply say that 50% of the blame was the African that didn’t understand the circumstances or situation, and fair enough.

But what we’d like out of our soldiers, is to remove the other 50% and level the playing field. The other good news about simulation training is getting shot, does not result in death :wry:

wm
11-07-2007, 11:59 AM
This will in effect allow common soldiers and analysts to not only understand the Arabs (or Africans) better, but more importantly those nuances such as social taboos. Although I’m very effective on my own, it took years to get ‘there’ and I had nothing more than 13 weeks of language training to prepare for my tour. That barely prepared me for anything Estonian.

Paul and I (we were both previously station in Africa) have observed how a typical military situation can rapidly escalate from ‘calm to a firefight’ over little more than a misunderstanding. One could simply say that 50% of the blame was the African that didn’t understand the circumstances or situation, and fair enough.

But what we’d like out of our soldiers, is to remove the other 50% and level the playing field. The other good news about simulation training is getting shot, does not result in death :wry:

I have these visions of a scene in the movie "Men In Black," the one where during marksmanship testing with the military's "best of the best," Will Smith/James Edwards blows away the sim of the little girl carrying the physics book rather than the aliens being blasted by everyone else. I would be very impressed if our situatonal awareness training would allow a successful graduate to be able to give the kind of explanation that Smith gave for his action:


[in a shooting range, confronted with numerous menacing-looking targets, Edwards shoots a cardboard little girl]
Zed: May I ask why you felt little Tiffany deserved to die?
James Edwards: Well, she was the only one that actually seemed dangerous at the time, sir.
Zed: How'd you come to that conclusion?
James Edwards: Well, first I was gonna pop this guy hanging from the street light, and I realized, y'know, he's just working out. I mean, how would I feel if somebody come runnin' in the gym and bust me in my ass while I'm on the treadmill? Then I saw this snarling beast guy, and I noticed he had a tissue in his hand, and I'm realizing, y'know, he's not snarling, he's sneezing. Y'know, ain't no real threat there. Then I saw little Tiffany. I'm thinking, y'know, eight-year-old white girl, middle of the ghetto, bunch of monsters, this time of night with quantum physics books? She about to start some ####, Zed. She's about eight years old, those books are WAY too advanced for her. If you ask me, I'd say she's up to something. ...

JeffC
11-07-2007, 04:54 PM
Interesting. The problems I see with simulation as described above is that we cannot replicate the social-cultural and religious norms and rituals learned natively, beginning in the crib; nor the language issues that "wm" raises above. ...

Simulation/immersion is great, and will go a long way toward reducing mirror imaging and cultural ignorance, but it can only do so much.


Agreed. One of the most surprising revelations to me as I was working on that essay was the artificial roadblocks that CIA has in place in terms of their hiring practices. Lack of qualified translators is a serious issue for them, yet they reject applicants who are, in fact, from the Middle East because they don't have a four-year degree, or because they're gay (which is even more ludicrous).

Brian Hanley
11-07-2007, 05:50 PM
I was a bit of a leader in VR once, have a videotape "Fundamentals of Virtual Reality" sold to over 4000 universities around the world through UVC (now defunct.) Worked on image processing real time acquisitions since. I am aware of the state of AI etcetera. We are a ways from that scenario still.

What we aren't so far from is a situation where actors can play virtual parts who are in a distant location. That's doable now.

That said, while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard. Etcetera.

Ken White
11-07-2007, 05:57 PM
...

That said, while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard. Etcetera.

Now, if we can just convince those great brains in Congress who insist on no contacts with the less savory much less the totally illegal... :rolleyes:

Rex Brynen
11-07-2007, 05:58 PM
...or because they're gay (which is even more ludicrous).

The CIA ended its prohibition on hiring gay employees in 1991. Indeed, there is even an Agency Network of Gay and Lesbian Employees (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E6D9113FF93AA35755C0A9669C8B 63&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Organizations/C/Central%20Intelligence%20Agency).

Stan
11-07-2007, 06:14 PM
The CIA ended its prohibition on hiring gay employees in 1991. Indeed, there is even an Agency Network of Gay and Lesbian Employees (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E6D9113FF93AA35755C0A9669C8B 63&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Organizations/C/Central%20Intelligence%20Agency).

Thanks for that, Rex.

I think Jeff needs real CIA contact and perhaps even an interview. Just because an individual claims to be an area expert or linguist, does not automatically equate to employment. There's a lot of gays around today...just don't tell, and I won't ask :rolleyes:

The general thrust of this thread was a mistake an (ahem) agent made by watching a video, but yet missed something (I feel he/she fell asleep during that exciting video). We then concluded his/her brain was shut down or poorly programmed. Huh ? If one has the attention span of a gerbil, there's little modern science or the CIA can do...it's too late.

Jedburgh
11-07-2007, 06:59 PM
....while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard.
There is a lot of opinion based on assumption in this thread; much of that assumption itself based on poorly informed and/or dated sources.

While the nuts and bolts of source ops and building networks is not something that is up for discussion in this forum, I will just throw a thought out there for y'all:

To infil Afghan, Albanian, Indonesian, Nigerian or Russian organized crime networks - let alone getting into the core of al-Qa'ida, Chechen or JI terror structures - ain't as simple as just getting someone to approve mixing in with the bad guys - or of the operator being up to speed on language and cultural nuances. These groups operate on tight-knit trust networks, and are generally composed of individuals linked by kinship and friendship ties that are very difficult to compose and live cover to enough of a degree to get inside. It is also not exactly easy to spot and recruit someone inside one of those targets from the outside. So its a helluva difficult and dangerous job that should never be underestimated or taken for granted - but don't assume that nothing is going on in that regard.

JeffC
11-07-2007, 11:38 PM
The CIA ended its prohibition on hiring gay employees in 1991. Indeed, there is even an Agency Network of Gay and Lesbian Employees (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E6D9113FF93AA35755C0A9669C8B 63&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Organizations/C/Central%20Intelligence%20Agency).

Indeed. My mistake. It's the Defense Language Institute that gave the boot to Arabic linguists for their sexual orientation (and still will).

CIA still has internal roadblocks (like a 4-year degree among other issues) that are stopping them from filling a critical need for qualified translators. As of June, 2005, they are supposed to be reviewing those procedures.

Jedburgh
11-08-2007, 12:16 AM
Indeed. My mistake. It's the Defense Language Institute that gave the boot to Arabic linguists for their sexual orientation (and still will).
Just to be clear, its not DLI that kicks out service members for their sexual orientation, it is the individual service commands at DLI. Speaking to the Army side of that, there are only two ways in which a soldier can be booted out for their orientation: be caught in a homosexual act or put in writing that he (or she) is a homosexual and run it up through a bureaucratic process confirming their sexual orientation several times prior to the actual chapter taking place. A soldier has to work at it to get kicked out for being gay.

During my time at DLI, the soldiers I observed being given the boot were consciously trying to get out of the Army. They fell into two categories. The first were the slackers and cowards, who decided that Army life was not for them (or the thought of being deployed into a combat zone after graduation scared the hell out of'em), and that declaring homosexuality was an easy out. Still a lot of red tape, but faster than the old "food-for-freedom" route (which was eventually closed).

The others were the parasites - they'd wait until they were about to graduate from the course, and then declare their homosexuality and get themselves kicked out after having completed nearly two years of world-class language training at taxpayer expense.

However, taken as a whole, the numbers kicked out for this reason were insignificant compared to either disciplinary chapters or academic attrition.

Rex Brynen
11-08-2007, 12:25 AM
A soldier has to work at it to get kicked out for being gay.

Although I have to say that even considering sexual orientation as grounds for exclusion from the military seems to me the height of foolishness (not to mention, just plain morally wrong).

(Now back to our regularly scheduled thread.)

Shivan
11-08-2007, 02:37 AM
Thank all for the comments.


. . .We aren't to far from being able to create the above scenario.

This stuff is amazing. Thank you for posting the links, esp. to Silverman's work at U/Penn. I had no idea how close simulation was to the real deal. I'm still reading through material to educate myself.


To infil Afghan, Albanian, Indonesian, Nigerian or Russian organized crime networks - let alone getting into the core of al-Qa'ida, Chechen or JI terror structures - ain't as simple as just getting someone to approve mixing in with the bad guys - or of the operator being up to speed on language and cultural nuances. These groups operate on tight-knit trust networks, and are generally composed of individuals linked by kinship and friendship ties that are very difficult to compose and live cover to enough of a degree to get inside. It is also not exactly easy to spot and recruit someone inside one of those targets from the outside. So its a helluva difficult and dangerous job that should never be underestimated or taken for granted - but don't assume that nothing is going on in that regard.

Agree wholeheartedly, which is what I was thinking of vis-a-vis simulation and immersion for intel collectors. Useful, but hard to break into the kinship networks. The old Italian mob started getting infiltrated as the old generations moved on, and the American born crowd allowed people in who did not have ties to the old country; this is happening a little with the Russian mob in the U.S. Long story short - hard to do with AQ etc, but not impossible, as Jedburgh notes.

For intel analysts, simulation & immersion will improve their skills exponentially.

Salaam y'all

nichols
11-08-2007, 02:55 AM
Brian,

In your attempt to be the Renaissance man of the board, you are exposing your ignorance on certain subjects.

I even provided links to the multiple thrusts to this project.:wry:


I was a bit of a leader in VR once, have a videotape "Fundamentals of Virtual Reality" sold to over 4000 universities around the world through UVC (now defunct.) .

The operative words are 'once' and 'defunct.' This helps explain why you don't work at DARPA, ONR, or answer our BAAs and FedBiz Ops announcements.

I wrote a Workbook for a simulation that is still used for the SSgt Non-resident Course PME and for the FA-57 course out at Leavenworth. That's past history, granted it got me this job 5 years ago but the knowledge, while a cutting edge application for a simple simulation was big news back then....it's dated.


Worked on image processing real time acquisitions since. I am aware of the state of AI etcetera. We are a ways from that scenario still.

Try reading the links, we are within 12-18 months to having this capability. The pieces are already developed, we have tested them using HLA, now we are doing direct plugins using open APIs.

All of this has been made possible through multiple cognitive task analysis, training effectiveness evaluations and pushing the limits on industry.....it ain't rocket science.

I've been in the acquisition side since Novemeber 2002 ; I'm still getting paychecks, I must be doing something right.:D


What we aren't so far from is a situation where actors can play virtual parts who are in a distant location. That's doable now.

Brian, this has been going onin the civilian side for at least 10 years. On the military side for over 6 years. Fort Lewis uses units in country to send back and train TTPs with CONUS units. In July we had Marines at 29 Palms in a convoy trainer calling in AC-130s in the simulation at Hurlbert using the J-10.


That said, while military regulations may restrict fraternization

I missed that memo, I was 'fraternizing' while in country and married her 3 years later in CA......guess I'm a bad boy, shame on me.:o

Brian Hanley
11-08-2007, 04:53 PM
Brian,
In your attempt to be the Renaissance man of the board, you are exposing your ignorance on certain subjects.
I even provided links to the multiple thrusts to this project.:wry:
Looked at them. Careful about assumptions regarding responses. I developed the virtual work immersion system design which is still, today, ahead of its time. (BTW - UVC was a distribution outfit, not an engineering firm - I mentioned that for completeness if anyone tried to look it up.) I solved a basic problem of synchronization unique to battlefield sims (bullets move fast) that is doubtless still in use. (Or it should be. Things sometimes get lost.) I'm the kind of guy that is sometimes sitting there while some board chairman or stuffed suit blathers bull#### to people who don't know any better. Always remember that a demo is just that, a demo.



... we are within 12-18 months to having this capability. The pieces are already developed, we have tested them using HLA, now we are doing direct plugins using open APIs.
What is "this capability"? There's a long ways between "pieces developed", APIs and a VTK and putting high level stuff together.


I've been in the acquisition side since Novemeber 2002 ; I'm still getting paychecks, I must be doing something right.:D
I'll note that I have been on the development side for considerably longer than that, and that the military has been supporting this stuff for 19 years. (With similar predictions from folks in your position along much of the way.)

Let's go through, point by point, your statement that generated my response.


The MEU is sitting off the coast of Africa, Burkina Faso has just launched the balloon and a NEO Op is ordered. On the big boat the intell bubbas pull down NGA data sets for Ouagadougou and import then into the virtual world. Completely doable. Those can be put together and canned ahead of time.


Mean while back at the embassy the Gunney or Embassy Stan type bubba sends the detailed buildings that they have created of thier hooch via secure line to the big boat. The intell bubbas put this into the virtual world. Doable. But I think it's unlikely those building plans would come from the embassy unless they had them on file. It would make far more sense to have them on file stateside. For more likely you'd have satellite photographs and stateside (or shipside) teams putting together any custom VR world than to offload it to somebody at an embassy. Even definition files can be tricky.



Now they pull up the AI library and insert Sahel French language and culture plugin. The final effort is edit the artificial intelligence to match current intel.
You could make some very dumb bots and place them in the world. You might even be able to do some degree of speech recognition. You could have a library of canned "characters" but they would not be capable of intelligent interaction. Look, I am quite aware of the state of "AI", it's various branches, production systems, (Minsky-esque) neural nets, KNN, Fuzzy systems, etcetera. Whether "AI" even exists is highly debatable. What we have now can, if stretched, imitate a cockroach's intelligence. We aren't up to mouse yet. Everything else is just a production system or an illusion of grammar, a la ELISA.

Which is not to say such things can't be useful as far as they go. But be careful about overselling them and particularly careful about throwing "AI" around. Cheers. ;)

Stan
11-08-2007, 05:19 PM
Brian,


Looked at them. Careful about assumptions regarding responses. I developed the virtual work immersion system design which is still, today, ahead of its time. (BTW - UVC was a distribution outfit, not an engineering firm - I mentioned that for completeness if anyone tried to look it up.) I solved a basic problem of synchronization unique to battlefield sims (bullets move fast) that is doubtless still in use. (Or it should be. Things sometimes get lost.) I'm the kind of guy that is sometimes sitting there while some board chairman or stuffed suit blathers bull#### to people who don't know any better. Always remember that a demo is just that, a demo.

As a common courtesy to the entire SWJ, please include (you can still edit your post) links that justify and support your opinions and/or statements above (this also applies to future posts, and is also considered common courtesy herein).


Doable. But I think it's unlikely those building plans would come from the embassy unless they had them on file. It would make far more sense to have them on file stateside. For more likely you'd have satellite photographs and stateside (or shipside) teams putting together any custom VR world than to offload it to somebody at an embassy. Even definition files can be tricky.

We're back to (mis) understanding responsibilities and inner functions of American Embassies. Sadly, you never served in one. Who, in your opinion, is the 'in-country' source of knowledge ? Yes, we do indeed 'file' information in CONUS, but updates can and do often occur in minutes during upheavals and civil wars. Imagine this (I've done it three times): Country X implodes and the US Embassy is evacuated with the exception of essential staff and most of the US Military members. The USG directs a Marine landing force to X for whatever reason. Information as you clearly indicated is only available stateside and is now hours or days old (useless).

So, you then do what...Commander ? Enough said. Please discontinue second guessing our functions at home and abroad.

slapout9
11-08-2007, 09:20 PM
Question for Brian. Are you the same Brian Hanley that was an associate professor at the Air Force Academy?

nichols
11-09-2007, 12:51 AM
Looked at them. Careful about assumptions

Brian,

Good advise one should be careful about assumptions. Stan had a pretty good piece of advise also about posting links, at the same time I understand why you can't provide links to your subjective assessment of the current state of simulation.

I note how you went from "Still a ways from that" regarding the scenario to now most of the scenario is 'doable' :rolleyes: what made you change your mind?

Your knowledge of simulation may be dated due to your exploits in Tbilisi, I think you were working for a pharmaceutical company. Were you maintaining your simulation knowledge then or was Tbilisi a simulation:D

Please go ahead and read the links that I provided for you, the speech recognizer in the Tactical Language sim is much further advanced then you think it is. As to giving values to the avatars, check out Barry Silerman's AI piece. These are all past the 'demo' stage. As to the Virtual Took Kit, check out Bohemia's link, specifically the VTK API section.

I know you posted that you read the links, if you did then you may not comprehend what it means. The files that you feel should be stored in CONUS, wouldn't be. The people at the posts would be creating and adjusting the model as the GSO changes wall configurations.

The drive of the VTK is for end user creation, not going back to the contractor to create virtual dirt.

Times are a changing Brian, if you want to keep up, you have to read.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/usmc-buying-vbs-gamingsimulation-engine-02580/

JeffC
12-19-2007, 11:06 PM
For example, a Red Team of intelligence analysts are deployed to a facility where they are immersed in an environment as realistically constructed as possible to simulate the daily experience of a member of Al-Qae’da in Iraq, or the Taliban in Afghanistan. This may include religious education in the Koran, daily prayers to Allah, all written and spoken communication done only in Arabic, and other like-minded activities. Any scenario that displaces the previous mindset of the analyst and replaces it with one more closely aligned with the terrorist would accomplish the goal.

Once the internal structures of the brain have been dissolved and rebuilt, these analysts will be able to discern and predict enemy movements and plans from a much deeper and richer foundation of knowledge than ever before. While the axiom that “we don’t know what we don’t know” will still apply, these analysts will be much better prepared to spot the guerilla in the center of the basketball court.

It's nice to see that Bruce Hoffman agrees with me regarding the need to get into the enemy's mindset. Here's a quote from his article "Countering Terrorist Use of the Web as a Weapon" in the 12/2007 issue of CTC Sentinel (Thanks, Ted)

"To do so, we first need to better understand the mindset and minutia of the al-Qa`ida movement, the animosity and arguments that underpin it and indeed the regions of the world from which its struggle emanated and upon which its hungry gaze still rests. Without knowing our enemy we cannot successfully penetrate their cells; we cannot knowledgeably sow discord and dissension in their ranks and thus weaken them from within; we cannot effectively counter their propaganda and messages of hate and clarion calls to violence; and, we cannot fulfill the most basic requirements of an effective counter-terrorist strategy: preempting and preventing terrorist operations and deterring their attacks.

"Until we recognize the importance of this vital prerequisite, America will remain perennially on the defensive: inherently reactive rather than proactive, deprived of the capacity to recognize, much less anticipate, important changes in our enemy’s modus operandi, recruitment and targeting."

JeffC
12-23-2007, 12:00 AM
Part of thinking outside of the box is being able to find those in the local populace who can also see beyond that which they know.

One problem we might have with US born individuals from any given area is that their predispositions may not be any less offpoint then others. They may however have an easier time getting buy-in thru distant familial ties and thats always a starting point.

Hafez has some very good points also, some of which might be dangerous not to give due diligence to

I pointed to this article in my old Intelligence forum thread on my paper Chaotic Dynamics, particularly for those here who argued that the problem isn't mirror-imaging or ethno-centric bias, but just putting into place better training for the analysts. Training people without first altering their POV or mindset is typically an exercise in futility.

Jedburgh
12-23-2007, 04:56 AM
I pointed to this article in my old Intelligence forum thread on my paper Chaotic Dynamics, particularly for those here who argued that the problem isn't mirror-imaging or ethno-centric bias, but just putting into place better training for the analysts. Training people without first altering their POV or mindset is typically an exercise in futility.
Jeff, again, mirror-imaging and ethno-theo-cultural-or-national biases are all classic analytic failings that have been recognized and understand to be seriously damaging to effective analysis by intelligence professionals since long before either of us was born. However, neither the various agencies nor the military can alter POV or mindset before they train a new analyst.

The ability to understand a spectrum of perceptions and various points of view, to effectively conduct alternatives analysis, to put themselves in the fully textured context of the other to "red team" the analysis - these all form an integral part of good training for analysts. To reiterate, it is not something that can be instilled prior to training analysts - it is an aspect of critical thinking that must be fused with the fundamental skills of analysis and integrated into analytic training from beginning to end.

JeffC
12-23-2007, 05:55 AM
The ability to understand a spectrum of perceptions and various points of view, to effectively conduct alternatives analysis, to put themselves in the fully textured context of the other to "red team" the analysis - these all form an integral part of good training for analysts.

This implies that effective training regimens currently exist to solve this problem. If that's the case, then the solution is simple - provide more training. Unfortunately, study after study indicates that this ISN'T the case. Ever since the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, blue-badge analysts at CIA have undergone more training than ever before, and yet the problem still persists.

That tells me that the solution to this problem hasn't been found yet, and that the existing training regime isn't adequate to the task. Innovaton and outside-the-box thinking is typically what's called for in solving "hard problems" like this. Once a more effective method is found to solve this problem, it can be integrated into a required training set, but we don't appear to be there as of yet.