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SteveMetz
11-13-2007, 06:58 PM
Anyone have any opinions on the Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers (http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/InterimCounterinsurgencyGuide(Oct2007).pdf)manual? I'm heading down tomorrow for the workshop on it that Kilcullen is running.

Ken White
11-13-2007, 08:16 PM
Anyone have any opinions on the Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers (http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/InterimCounterinsurgencyGuide(Oct2007).pdf)manual? I'm heading down tomorrow for the workshop on it that Kilcullen is running.

I'd suggest is removing the words "defeat" and "victory" -- even though their usage in this pub is basically benign -- totally. Those two words in a modern insurgency can lead to false expectations on the part of politcians and the international public as well as those engaged in the operation and, IMO, their use should be actively discouraged.

Thanks for linking it. Give 'em fits at the workshop. ;)

invictus0972
11-13-2007, 08:35 PM
As a whole, I thought the document was fairly good. However, I am not sure why they tried to separate terrorists and insurgents:

"This objective differentiates insurgents from terrorists, whose objectives do not necessarily include the creation of an alternative governing authority capable of controlling a given area or country."

It seems to me that all terrorists are insurgents but not all insurgents are terrorists. In other words, terrorists fit the mold of an insurgency because they are trying overthrow a government or force it to change specific policies. We all know the debate surrounding the term "terrorism". If I were writing this document, I would not have tried to throw the sentence in their separating terrorists from insurgents. I suspect it is in there for political reasons; it is advantageous to label an entity a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of terrorism.

Also, the whole government approach to COIN planning is very good, but where is the part of the USG that deals with information? According to this document and FM 3-24, information is the glue that holds all the pillars together. Unfortunately, we only give strategic communications partial support through the State Department! If information is really so important, the USG needs to reestablish the USIA or something like it.

Overall, the document is very good. Organizations such as USAID may have more of an impact than a full military division, which is why we should increase their funding. Also, working with IGOs and NGOs is a great way to increase legitimacy for COIN operations!

Very respectfully,

Invictus

kehenry1
11-13-2007, 08:44 PM
It seems to me that all terrorists are insurgents but not all insurgents are terrorists. In other words, terrorists fit the mold of an insurgency because they are trying overthrow a government or force it to change specific policies. We all know the debate surrounding the term "terrorism". If I were writing this document, I would not have tried to throw the sentence in their separating terrorists from insurgents. I suspect it is in there for political reasons; it is advantageous to label an entity a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of terrorism.

Not just that, but our inability to name the enemy. I don't just mean the question of its Islamic nature, but most enemies name their organization and it is one organization. When you are fighting a decentralized enemy whose forces set up separate "armies" under the flag umbrella and call their organization something different, yet the ideology, though the same, is not given a name (like Nazis), it's a little difficult to be specific.

At the same time, it is important to separate "terrorists" from "insurgents" when you are performing COIN. "Insurgents" are indigenous to the location, have local grievances and can be negotiated with to eventually resolve the situation. "Terrorists" or whatever we want to call the Islamic Fanatics usually have a whole other agenda, don't have anything personal at risk in the location and are, by nature, implacable and impossible to negotiate with.

I assume that is the reason he separated them. He just didn't know what PC name he was supposed to give it or didn't want to for "political reasons".

invictus0972
11-13-2007, 09:00 PM
Hi Kehenry!

Great point on not being able to define the enemy!

Borrowing from Michael Schuerer, I prefer to use the term "Global Islamic Insurgency". I think this best describes the specific threat we face today, though the document Steve posted was meant to deal with insurgencies in general.

Later!

Invictus

Gian P Gentile
11-13-2007, 09:05 PM
There are limits some times to what a military force can accomplish in a counterinsurgency operation; even one armed with the best counterinsurgency doctrine available and a trained counterinsurgency force winning—in all of its domestic political, international, and operational context--may be beyond its means and that should be acknowledged up front in a manual to policy makers on this subject. I imagine that the atmosphere of this conference will be drunk with success from the Surge and the idea that these things are doable if we just get the right doctrine and force on board.

Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.

Finally, I disagree with the straw-man approach under the theory section that poses two theories for Coin: enemy centric and population centric. Coin is more complicated than this binary conception. By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct the manual removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns Coin into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus the manual actually removes the element of friction from war too. So for policy makers who read this manual a series of scientific processes, coordinated through the interagency process, can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Coin for policy makers now becomes a relatively simple matter of inter-agency coordination, applied scientific processes across a set of lines of operations.

Beware; we are in the grips of armed social scientists.

Ken White
11-13-2007, 09:34 PM
There are limits some times to what a military force can accomplish in a counterinsurgency operation; even one armed with the best counterinsurgency doctrine available and a trained counterinsurgency force winning—in all of its domestic political, international, and operational context--may be beyond its means and that should be acknowledged up front in a manual to policy makers on this subject. I imagine that the atmosphere of this conference will be drunk with success from the Surge and the idea that these things are doable if we just get the right doctrine and force on board.

Totally agree with the thrust. In regard to the last sentence, I'd hope not on the drunk with success part and surely they won't succumb to believe that's all it takes for success -- and, conversely will acknowledge that these things are doable. Difficult, eminently dislikeable, to be avoided if at all possible but if not, doable.


Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.

Also true -- though I'd suggest the reality is even more than just killing and dying. Still your point is valid, that death, destruction and fighting are usually going to be required and the policy makers and deciders need to know and acknowledge that up front. They also need to worst case those effects else they'll make a dumb decision.


Finally, I disagree with the straw-man approach under the theory section that poses two theories for Coin: enemy centric and population centric. Coin is more complicated than this binary conception. By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct the manual removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns Coin into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus the manual actually removes the element of friction from war too. So for policy makers who read this manual a series of scientific processes, coordinated through the interagency process, can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Coin for policy makers now becomes a relatively simple matter of inter-agency coordination, applied scientific processes across a set of lines of operations.

Agreed. It ain't that easy...


Beware; we are in the grips of armed social scientists.

Heh, true -- and in my observation, have been since the early 60s... :wry:

invictus0972
11-13-2007, 09:51 PM
Gentlemen,

Your underlying assumption is that war and politics are two different entities, but they are one and the same. . .always have been. War and politics are inseperable! According to Dr. Colin Gray, "2. The United States has a persisting strategy deficit. Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are muchless successful in fighting in such a way that they secure thestrategic and, hence, political, rewards they seek. The United
States continues to have difficulty regarding war and politics as a unity, with war needing to be permeated by politicalconsiderations." LTC Nagl further makes this point in his book when he says that one of the biggest mistakes we made in Vietnam was not realizing earlier that it was a political endeavor. This is contrary to many who say, "The only reason we lost in 'Nam is because the politicians got involved!" This is what my dad alway says. Anyway, I agree with Dr. Gray and LTC Nagl. It is impossible to separate the two.

Although I do not recomment it to military leaders with thin skin, I have inserted a link to the article:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB650.pdf

Very respectfully,

Invictus

Ken White
11-13-2007, 10:11 PM
and nowhere did I see anything that led me to believe anyone who'd commented questioned the consanguinity of politics and war. Where did you get the idea that anyone did question it?

Gray's comment is true, Nagl's less so. The WH knew it was political (on several counts) from the start; DoD and the JCS not so much; ComUSMACV initially did not but finally woke up, knew it was political but still refused to adapt and tried to fight a land war in Europe in the rice paddies of SE Asia (until Abrams took over). The point being that 'knowing' and doing are two different things --as Gray points out...

FYI, the Gray monograph has been linked here a couple of times and many have read it, I suspect.

invictus0972
11-13-2007, 10:32 PM
Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.

Hi Ken!

You are correct! The post did not explicitly say that war and politics are separate entities. This is why I said the assumption of the post was that war and politics are separate. My assertion was based on the quote above. Of course I could be misunderstanding Gian P Gentile's point.

Please elaborate on your comment concerning Vietnam War strategy; I'd love to read your thoughts!

Very respectfully,

Invictus

SteveMetz
11-13-2007, 10:35 PM
Gentlemen,

Your underlying assumption is that war and politics are two different entities, but they are one and the same. . .always have been. War and politics are inseperable! According to Dr. Colin Gray, "2. The United States has a persisting strategy deficit. Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are muchless successful in fighting in such a way that they secure thestrategic and, hence, political, rewards they seek. The United
States continues to have difficulty regarding war and politics as a unity, with war needing to be permeated by politicalconsiderations." LTC Nagl further makes this point in his book when he says that one of the biggest mistakes we made in Vietnam was not realizing earlier that it was a political endeavor. This is contrary to many who say, "The only reason we lost in 'Nam is because the politicians got involved!" This is what my dad alway says. Anyway, I agree with Dr. Gray and LTC Nagl. It is impossible to separate the two.

Although I do not recomment it to military leaders with thin skin, I have inserted a link to the article:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB650.pdf

Very respectfully,

Invictus

I'm trying to get Colin to write the foreword to my book.

Old Eagle
11-13-2007, 10:38 PM
A Work in Progress

invictus0972
11-13-2007, 10:40 PM
I have only read this article; I am sure he has several other great writings. I was telling Ken that I should have known, considering the audience, that this article had be referenced many times.

By the way, have a great trip tomorrow!!

V/r

Invictus

SteveMetz
11-13-2007, 10:56 PM
I have only read this article; I am sure he has several other great writings. I was telling Ken that I should have known, considering the audience, that this article had be referenced many times.

By the way, have a great trip tomorrow!!

V/r

Invictus

Colin is always a difficult read, but worth the effort. He makes kind of an interesting counterpoint to Martin van Creveld--both are towering intellects but Colin is very much the strategic traditionalist who believes that traditional state war will again rear its hideous head in the future, while Martin contends that the world has reached the point where conflicts pitting states against nonstate actors will be the dominant if not the only form.

slapout9
11-14-2007, 12:36 AM
Hi Steve, don't know if this will help but at the Smart Wars workshop our metrics/country assessment were done this way.

1-Assets

2-Attitude(population)

3-Technology

4-Scope

5-Obstacles

6-Momentum

We prepared one for each system we dealt with and they were prepared from the stand point of what we wanted these metrics to look like in the future. In my case it was 8 months out from the start of the Operation. We prepared one for Turkey, The PPK and The International system all designed to look a certain way in the future. By the categories you see that you can make these as brief or as detailed as you want or the situation demands.

Go Army

Gian P Gentile
11-14-2007, 01:37 AM
[QUOTE=Gian P Gentile;31321]

This is why I said the assumption of the post was that war and politics are separate. My assertion was based on the quote above. Of course I could be misunderstanding Gian P Gentile's point.

Of course i do not believe that war and politics are separate. i am a disciple of the great one, St Carl von Clausewitz. The two are so inexorably mixed that they can not be seperated in whatever kind of war one is fighting.

My point is that clever cliches like "armed politics" make counterinsurgency war, which is still war and at its most basic level is death, violence and fighting, into something that it is not. This is a term that the armed social scientists have thrust upon us and i feel it actually reduces the complexity of Coin to the point where it appears to the uniformed to be a simple process of applying lines of operations and other pop-anthropolgical theories to achieve "victory." To quote Ken White in an earlier posting on this threat, "It ain't that easy."

Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???

gian

Ken White
11-14-2007, 02:08 AM
Please elaborate on your comment concerning Vietnam War strategy; I'd love to read your thoughts!
Very respectfully,
Invictus

Sounds like masochism to me... ;)

It's all in the books, idealistic WH looks for a way to boost the economy, get the nation out of the doldrums and spread democracy, seizes on Viet Nam as a likely candidate -- and has Eisnehower's treaty as a fall guy for the decision -- and away we go. (Moral: Idealism is dangerous)

Joint Chiefs aren't pleased with the idea so changes are made there and the buildup begins. Paul Harkins was ComUSMACV and tried to get the VC to stand up and fight like men -- and tried to get the south Viet Namese to do the same thing. Little success either way. (Moral: Can't change the culture)

Kennedy is shot, Johnson took over. Johnson was breathtakingly shrewd; he was also a great and crooked politician -- but knew zilch about geo politics (as was true of MacNamara and Rusk wasn't much better off) -- and he decided to cement his reelection by upping the war several notches.

Westmoreland replaced Harkins and used US troops to try to get the VC (who were being chewed up pretty bad by several things and were increasingly replaced by the PAVN, later NVA) to stand and fight. They generally didn't elect to do that, when they did they got whipped (which was why they normally tried to avoid it, d'oh...). The South Viet Namese reaction to that was to hang back to husband strength because they knew we'd leave. (Morals: [1] "Corrupt" does not mean stupid; [2] One can win battles and lose the war)

Long story short; we tried to fight a European style war in the rice paddies from 1962 until late 1968 because of two Euro-centric Generals. When Abrams took over and CORDS got going, the war turned around and was effectively won by 1973. It is very important to note that the final tactical solution was a mix of COIN doctrine plus Armor * and infantry tactical battles suited to the terrain and the enemy both relying on good intel. Unfortunately or fortunately (viewpoint dependent) US domestic politics -- which started the war in the first place -- ended it. :rolleyes:

ERRATA: Apologies to RTK, CavGuy, Ironhorse, Gian and all the other Treadh... er, Tankers and Cavalrymen for omitting Armor above (*). I plead old age; last time I ran the TCPC was in an M41A1C... ;)

NOTE: That is not to say that the politicians 'lost' the war, they did not. Nor did the Media 'lose' it for us; they didn't help but they don't have nearly as much power as they like to think. First there is no lose or win, no 'victory' or 'defeat' in any modern insurgency. Second, a satisfactory outcome was not reached because the Army fought the wrong war; took to long to get its act together though it eventually did but by the time they did, the American people and their elected pols had tired of it. It's far more complicated than that but that's the gist. :(

I can remember standing on the beach at Tuy Hoa in 1966 and saying "We'll be here another 10 years, spend fifty billion and get 100K KIA all to give Uncle Ho 15 airfields." That doesn't mean I was particulalry prescient, a number of Officers and senior NCOs believed along those lines. I was off on the time and the numbers but fortunately, I was too high on everything, particularly the KIA, except the dollars. However, it's the thought that counts...

Two lessons out of Viet Nam appropriate today are; one does not always get to fight the war one wishes to fight, own politicians and the enemy have votes in that. That and be very careful to do your homework BEFORE you decide to commit troops and be very aware that Americans do not care that much about casualties, they expect them in a war and will give you a couple of years but then they want progress or cessation.

On that first point, I'd note that every single war or major operation outside CONUS in which we have engaged since 1945; from the Greek Civil War forward has been one picked by the Politicians we elected and was decidedly not one with which the Armed Forces really wanted to be involved or one for which they were really prepared (we would've flat been prepared for a land war in Europe, though...) Note further that only a few have had satisfactory conclusions.

I think there's a message in there somewhere...

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 06:47 AM
Quote:
Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
Also true -- though I'd suggest the reality is even more than just killing and dying. Still your point is valid, that death, destruction and fighting are usually going to be required and the policy makers and deciders need to know and acknowledge that up front. They also need to worst case those effects else they'll make a dumb decision.

Actually, I always thought that Clausewitz's theory on the interaction of war and politics was applicable to COIN. Not just that war is an extension of politics, though that may be true. But when he wrote:

On War - Book I, Chpt 1: What is War (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK1ch01.html)


11.—The political object now reappears.

Here, now, forces itself again into consideration a question which we had laid aside (see No. 2), that is, the political object of the war. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward.

In relation to counterinsurgency, I believe that this applies, not just at a strategic national level, but in a very localized micro-level. In each area of operations, war and politics are at a continuous ebb and flow, each taking precedent over the other, each shaping the other as the circumstances warrant. Until, as Clausewitz notes, the political objective diminishes (or is satisfied) for one side or the other or even both together. The need to act or fight is diminished in relationship to the rise of the political solution.

I often think that the argument about which is predominant in counterinsurgency or war is a fallacy that is projected by either proponents' history and occupation. It seems, by nature, fighting men want to fight and believe that is the the decisive factor. Politicians want to politic or negotiate and believe that this is the decisive factor. Neither is apt to see the other as a partner to achieving the ends. Each sees the objective differently. One sees it as "defeating the enemy in combat" (or, as Clausewitz indicates, disarming or destroying the enemy physically) and the other sees it as reaching a political agreement that will satisfy political objectives and end combat. Each sees the other as a hindrance to obtaining their determined objective. Neither sees the other as complimentary.

Clausewitz also noted that war is about conjecture and probabilities, not absolutes. We can apply this to the question of whether combat (fighting) is the appropriate means or politics. There are no set points that determines which is appropriate. It's something we have to determine by weighing the situation. To decide war or combat without weighing the cost, whether in blood, treasure or political fallout, is foolish. To rely solely on politics, without having the means or will to enforce the decision (military) is bound for failure.

With one exception, that Clausewitz also points out: if the enemy is set on combat and attacks us, then the enemy has made his decision and necessarily changes our plans, sometimes against our will. If we are working on political solutions in a localized area and the enemy attacks us, then we are forced to respond with violence. Thus, war or combat coming to the fore. As his actions are countered and diminishes, then the political aspect returns to the fore.

Ebb and flow.


26.—They may all be regarded as political acts.

Returning now to the main subject, although it is true that in one kind of war the political element seems almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one is as political as the other; for if we regard the state policy as the intelligence of the personified state, then amongst all the constellations in the political sky which it has to compute, those must be included which arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great war. It is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in general, but the conventional conception of a cautious, subtle, also dishonest craftiness, averse from violence, that the latter kind of war may belong more to policy than the first.


ON War - Book I, Chpt 2: Ends and Means of War (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK1ch02.html)


The second way is to select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than two different directions in which our force may be employed, the first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the enemy's army, while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the question. According to the usual mode of speaking we should say that the first is more military, the other more political. But if we take our view from the highest point, both are equally military, and neither the one nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case.[snip]

These are the circumstances in general connected with the aim which we have to pursue in war; let us now turn to the means.

There is only one single means, it is the Fight. However diversified this may be in form, however widely it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand encounter, whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting, still it is always implied in the conception of war, that all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat. [snip]

Thus, the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears, therefore, always as the superior and more effectual means, to which all others must give way.

But certainly it is only when there is a supposed equality in all other conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's armed force a greater efficacy. It would, therefore, be a great mistake to draw from it the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the victory over skill and caution. An unskilful attack would lead to the destruction of our own and not of the enemy's force, and therefore is not what is here meant. The superior efficacy belongs not to the means but to the end, and we are only comparing the effect of one realised aim with the other

Now, I don't claim to have read the COIN manual front to back, so I can't say for certain that it places politics above combat. But, it would seem, by the reporting on the current implementation of the strategy, that it is both and neither can be considered successful without the other.

SteveMetz
11-14-2007, 11:16 AM
[QUOTE=invictus0972;31329]

Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???

gian

Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 11:46 AM
Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.

I think I would agree with you. The phrase "to the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail" is apt. The "extent" is the issue. Obviously, counterinsurgency will contain elements of combat. The problem seems to be whether adherents of Clausewitz choose to jettison his commentary on political objectives and how much effect politics have on war. Or, in this case, counterinsurgency.

Of course, Clausewitz spent limited time on this part of his "theory" because he was ultimately a soldier whose theater was war. It didn't make his commentary on the political aspects less astute or applicable. It does mean that the emphasis should be on this extract of his thesis and supplemented with Mao and others who focus on the balance of the political with combat.

Not because the political aspect is the only "means" to the end of an insurgency. Particularly when that insurgency is extensive and very violent. However, politics are the cause of insurgencies, thus, politics are the final solution. In between combat and politics ebb and flow.

Soldiers are generally and by nature warriors focused on combat as was Clausewitz. They are conditioned for traditional war, to confronting the enemy with violence. Thus, the extent to which politics are emphasized in the education of military leaders and the common soldier is simply an attempt to balance out natural inclinations and previous training in order effectively conduct a counterinsurgency.

Because it is a counterinsurgency against violent insurgents and these counterinsurgencies, for the US, are expeditionary counterinsurgencies in other nations, it requires combat capable forces that can also act as political arbitrators. They must be able make war and negotiate peace at the same time.

Counterinsurgency is the balance of politics and war; the application of law and directed violence. It's yin and yang, feng shui, whatever term of balancing we want to use. It's just that the last weight that is dropped on the scale is always political.

Rob Thornton
11-14-2007, 11:54 AM
Ken - I really appreciate that post - it shows the value of a military leader who recognizes the need to adapt while preserving most of a full range of options against an enemy who thinks, has options himself, and if possible will take advantage of opportunities presented him; or because he may want it more then you do - might do something we just could not or would not expect (or chose to ignore). I believe our current MNF-I leadership has also done that - while the story would seem to be in the various lines of effort (political, etc.) and that is OK, but there is an awful lot of combat power that has been preserved there for more offensive and defensive operations, and that is at least occasionally needed against an aggressive enemy.


Long story short; we tried to fight a European style war in the rice paddies from 1962 until late 1968 because of two Euro-centric Generals. When Abrams took over and CORDS got going, the war turned around and was effectively won by 1973. It is very important to note that the final tactical solution was a mix of COIN doctrine plus Armor * and infantry tactical battles suited to the terrain and the enemy both relying on good intel. Unfortunately or fortunately (viewpoint dependent) US domestic politics -- which started the war in the first place -- ended it.

If we find ourselves in similar situations in the future, its probable that it will also go down in a locale where the neighbors have a surly disposition and have their own objectives in mind - a situation where for whatever reason the unlikely happens. Here we will be best served with agile, adaptive leadership that have the full range of tools (with respect to proportion to the mission at hand) to do something about it.

Here is to balance and consistency combined with the very best leadership we can field!

Best, Rob

Best Regards, Rob

Gian P Gentile
11-14-2007, 12:02 PM
Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.

Sorry Steve but i dont buy your answer. I have a much more cynical view as to why the manual left out St Carl from its classic reading list and this was confirmed to me by an individual who was involved in the writing. That the writers (not the busy-body writers but the rock-star types) wanted to bludgeon the conventionally minded, big-battle focussed hard-wired officers (i guess like me) out of the darkness of our cold-war mindset and into the light of Galula-like coin operations. That is why St Carl was removed. In my mind, absurd and inexecusable. How does our army forsake the brilliance and immediate relevance of Clausewitz, in any kind of war, for the pop-theories of the armed social scientists?

Also Steve do you really mean that Coin is not war "at the strategic level?" I wonder if General Patreaus would agree with that statement since he is our strategic general in command in Iraq? I imagine from time to time on Victory Base in Baghdad he has attended memorial ceremonies for dead american service men and women killed in action in Iraq. Hard to believe that he would think that he is not at war.

good luck at your conference.

gian

SteveMetz
11-14-2007, 12:42 PM
Sorry Steve but i dont buy your answer. I have a much more cynical view as to why the manual left out St Carl from its classic reading list and this was confirmed to me by an individual who was involved in the writing. That the writers (not the busy-body writers but the rock-star types) wanted to bludgeon the conventionally minded, big-battle focussed hard-wired officers (i guess like me) out of the darkness of our cold-war mindset and into the light of Galula-like coin operations. That is why St Carl was removed. In my mind, absurd and inexecusable. How does our army forsake the brilliance and immediate relevance of Clausewitz, in any kind of war, for the pop-theories of the armed social scientists?

Also Steve do you really mean that Coin is not war "at the strategic level?" I wonder if General Patreaus would agree with that statement since he is our strategic general in command in Iraq? I imagine from time to time on Victory Base in Baghdad he has attended memorial ceremonies for dead american service men and women killed in action in Iraq. Hard to believe that he would think that he is not at war.

good luck at your conference.

gian

Well, I was kind of involved in the writing myself and I'm co-authoring a book with the main scribe, Con Crane. The idea that subversives were able to pull a fast one generals Petraeus and Mattis and all of the other flag officers who signed off on the manual is a bit far fetched.

And your second paragraph illustrates the point I just made: that troops are killed does not make something war (although there is similarity at the tactical level). But, the fact that a general rather than a civilian is seen as the primary architect of the counterinsurgency effort shows that the United States cannot fully transcend the idea that counterinsurgency is just a small war. That may be the reason that over the past fifty years, we've brought one out of the four counterinsurgency efforts we were involved in to a successful resolution.

slapout9
11-14-2007, 01:48 PM
Steve Metz, almost forgot if you have not left yet. Check with Colonel Rod Zastrow Air Force rep at the Army War College. He has a bunch of things from the SMART wars workshop that he was very impressed with that are not being taught anywhere. He has read a lot about Killcullen. You might find some usefull information for discussion at your workshop. Good Luck Slap...from that other Universe.:wry:

SteveMetz
11-14-2007, 02:07 PM
Steve Metz, almost forgot if you have not left yet. Check with Colonel Rod Zastrow Air Force rep at the Army War College. He has a bunch of things from the SMART wars workshop that he was very impressed with that are not being taught anywhere. He has read a lot about Killcullen. You might find some usefull information for discussion at your workshop. Good Luck Slap...from that other Universe.:wry:

I once lived in Millbrook so I've actually BEEN to Slapout. Not something that I put on my resume, though! Isn't the town slogan "Slapout--Gateway to Wetumpka"?

Rob Thornton
11-14-2007, 02:13 PM
If armed insurgency is a form of warfare adopted by a group(s) who cannot openly take on either the ruling government under which it currently exists (perhaps they lack the means), and/or is adopted by an outside state which seeks to foment a change in the balance of its neighbor - then wouldn't "insurgency" still be a considered a manner to wage war to a political end?

I'll agree that inurgency and counter-insurgency require greater political effort - because the means at the disposal of the insurgents are employed toward the de-legitimization of the of the political body to afford an opportunity to emplace its own politics, however - I think it could transition sharply at some point given a change in the means at the disposal of any one side - as such if we are glued to any one view we may miss the transition and the opportunities.

Kilcullen mentioned counter-insurgency to counter war - an interesting point I thought as you are trying to diminish the chances of the insurgents from gaining the politcal power and the means to move from one form of warfare to another.

However - I think we must consider it war, if we are employing warfare to political purpose. This is also another place where I think Clausewitz would fit well because he does discuss this - however I suppose interpretation matters . During this phase - politics may have more weight then armed force in regards to countering the efforts of the insurgents, but it must be backed up with security, and it must be prepared for new variables to be introduced which might change the weighting of the efforts - at the tactical, operational, theater strategic and strategic - there are a number of complex relationships operating in this environment that make it a combination of regional Jenga and Twister.

I'm not quibbling, but I think its a mistake to try and box this in one camp or the other. Consequently we must be prepared to consider the nature of the war from multiple perspectives at every level.

I don't think we can say this is not "war" at the strategic level - if for no other reason because the domestic and iternational audience consider it so for a number of reasons - and that has consequences. Clausewitz was not the first or last to put forward these ideas - as long as people have contemplated politics, people and the use of force they have considered it - but Clausewitz does provide a broad theoretical framework for considering the spectrum of war, its possibilities, causes and the objective and subjective nature of war - as such I read what I want and ignore most lists - I also pick and choose out of doctrine because I believe that while it provides good content - it is still an attempt (however well it is done) to distill art into science so we can all benefit from it in varying degrees.

Best, Rob

slapout9
11-14-2007, 02:15 PM
Yeah i remember you saying you lived in Millbrook. You are not going to believe this but for the last 2 or 3 years Millbrook has been the fastest growing city in Alabama:eek: you probably would not recongnize it. As for Slapout we are coming right along we now have our own Subway, 2 gas stations, and there is talk of changing the caution light to a real stoplight because of traffic congestion.:wry: Wetumpka is going to have one of the largest casinos in the state on an (Indian reservation).....and then SlapVegas!!!

SteveMetz
11-14-2007, 02:31 PM
Yeah i remember you saying you lived in Millbrook. You are not going to believe this but for the last 2 or 3 years Millbrook has been the fastest growing city in Alabama:eek: you probably would not recongnize it. As for Slapout we are coming right along we now have our own Subway, 2 gas stations, and there is talk of changing the caution light to a real stoplight because of traffic congestion.:wry: Wetumpka is going to have one of the largest casinos in the state on an (Indian reservation).....and then SlapVegas!!!

I lived on South Cobb Loop. If you exit the Interstate on Cobb Road, take the first left then the first right.

I had to go to Wetumpka to get a driver's license. I felt like Joseph making the trip to Bethlehem to pay his taxes.

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 03:29 PM
In regards to Gian's comment about taking Clausewitz off the reading list for this counterinsurgency manual...

Am I wrong, or isn't Clausewitz on the general reading list for officers in the officers manual? And, isn't he still taught at military academies? And on the reading lists given to officers through OCS?

I am not sure that his lack of inclusion is necessarily a lack of endorsement of his general theories. However, I might agree that he was not included on this list because the focus was on counterinsurgency and that it was meant to shape the ideas and tactics used by officers in that regard. Is that "browbeating" combat officers into changing their minds about the role of combat and politics in a counterinsurgency? I suppose you could call it that, but I am unsure why the attempt to reshape strategy and tactics for a given type of war is incorrect or reviled.

On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.

It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.

So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"

Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?

marct
11-14-2007, 03:59 PM
Some good points all around. I particular, I am really pleased to see so much discussion of semantics :D.

Gian, as you know I disagree with your conclusion that COIN is "war" and, therefore, can be treated as semantically equivalent to all other wars. I do tend to agree with SteveM that it may be "war" at the tactical level, but not at the level of Grand Strategy (Steve, I think Gian does have about about the Strategic level...).

I'll admit that a lot of my disagreement with Gian comes from our differing backgrounds. Personally, I don't see "war" as a first order concept but, rather, as a second order concept. I see "conflict" as a first order concept, with "war" being only a single sub-set of conflict (I also use fuzzy sets for definitions, not crisp sets). Other sub-sets of conflict, to my mind, include economic competition, party politics, symbolic competition (with or without overt "religious" tones), sports, intra-social group conflict (e.g. class, race, ethnicity, religious, etc.), etc.

I tend to view the semantic "hardening" of taxonomies as both a core feature of "culture" and, also, a neurobiological process and both are susceptible to change over time dependent on environment. So. let's take this back to "war" and "politics"....

How do we define politics? I think this is a crucial question that is not being asked here. Rather, the term "politics" is being tossed around as if we all agree on exactly what it is. I don't think that there is agreement and, furthermore, I think the range of assumed meaning is quite broad which is causing a large amount of semantic confusion. To start the ball rolling, I'll give you my own definition of politics as "the ecology of human interaction".

Norfolk
11-14-2007, 04:21 PM
I tend to view the semantic "hardening" of taxonomies as both a core feature of "culture" and, also, a neurobiological process and both are susceptible to change over time dependent on environment. So. let's take this back to "war" and "politics"....

How do we define politics? I think this is a crucial question that is not being asked here. Rather, the term "politics" is being tossed around as if we all agree on exactly what it is. I don't think that there is agreement and, furthermore, I think the range of assumed meaning is quite broad which is causing a large amount of semantic confusion. To start the ball rolling, I'll give you my own definition of politics as "the ecology of human interaction".

I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.

marct
11-14-2007, 04:27 PM
I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.

That works for me, although unpacking it gets into all sorts of interesting areas ;).

Norfolk
11-14-2007, 04:43 PM
That works for me, although unpacking it gets into all sorts of interesting areas ;).

Oh yes...and may all the ways remain uncounted.:wry:

Rank amateur
11-14-2007, 04:47 PM
A couple of points. Overall, I think that Gian's message is starting to get through. I have seen a subtle change in Kilcullen's choice of words. He talks more about kinetic operations, killing etc. There is now more emphasis on tactical elements like denying sanctuary, controlling op tempo etc.

I think, however, that the overall COIN message is clear enough that an amateur can understand it. Killing is not strategic, because the insurgents can control their lost rates by running. (As opposed to the first Gulf War where retreat did nothing except change where the Iraqis died.) Insurgents are able to control their loss rate by hiding in the population. The strategy, therefore, is pretty simple.

The strategic objective is to separate insurgents from the population. The strategy is population control. Once the insurgents are separated from the population, you can kill them. (Good luck. Have fun. Don't take any pictures.)

Put more simply, kill them while they hide in the population: lose. Separate them from the population first and then kill them: win.

But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 05:40 PM
"Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other."

I think that is a pretty good general statement. If we did unpack it further I believe that "politics" encompasses the entire efforts that are not "combat" (ie, shooting, killing, arresting or disrupting the enemy; but would include intelligence gathering and other activities directly linked to carrying out "combat" operations). That would include building government infrastructure, negotiating power sharing, developing economy, reconstructing physical infrastructure and all the other variants of that which do not directly relate to actual "combat".

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 05:49 PM
But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.

I'll repeat the title there: separating the insurgents IS political in nature. Carrots and sticks are political. Negotiating power sharing, whether democratic or other, is political.

Further, I think there is a reason that we separate the "indigent insurgents" from the "global insurgents" and how we deal with them. We don't have to kill all or even a significant portion of the indigent insurgents in order to win the "war". That can still be handled through a mix of political and combat that may reduce casualties on all sides. In a previous thread, we discussed that "local" insurgents have their own agenda and is tied to their local goals and gains. The risk of losing that may result in more political resolutions.

"Global Insurgents", like Al Qaida and their recruits, are working towards a global construct that little cares about the local populations conditions beyond serving their global agenda. they are less likely to negotiate or accept "political" resolutions and are more likely to be or need to be killed off in great numbers in order to result in a secession of combat. Equally, the way we separate them from the "population" may have a different variation than what we do with the "locals".

wm
11-14-2007, 05:51 PM
I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.

I was impressed that MarcT finally suggested shifting the discussion to the definition of politics. I also am impressed that the Guvernator has almost the same definition for politics that Aristotle has. (Maybe I'm just easily impressed :wry:) I think a good summary of Aristotle's definition is "a practical body of knowledge that tries to explain how people get along in groups (anything from a family to a polis)." (BTW, I'm not quoting anyone here, just using the quotation marks as a stylistic device to set off my proposed summation of Aristotle's definition.)

marct
11-14-2007, 05:55 PM
Hmmm, I can see why you would cut out combat operations but, on the whole, I would tend to include them. For example, sometimes shooting and killing people is not "war" it is "law enforcement", and sometimes it's just cultural expectation (e.g. blood feuds, honour killings, gang initiations, etc.).

Personally, I tend to draw distinctions between the "formal" institution and the "real" institution - I've found it a very useful distinction that, I believe, has been clouded quite badly in the case of "war" (consider the war on drugs, the war on poverty, etc.). As I mentioned in my earlier post, I tend to use fuzzy sets rather than crisp sets, so I really have no problems with the idea that a singular observed action / event can be part of more than one "term". I would suggest that some level of violence has always been part of politics, even if that violence is only implied.

selil
11-14-2007, 06:06 PM
.....As I mentioned in my earlier post, I tend to use fuzzy sets rather than crisp sets, so I really have no problems with the idea that a singular observed action / event can be part of more than one "term"....

So you aren't really talking about "sets" you're talking about confidence intervals. In general these "terms" fall within this area but not always.

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 06:12 PM
marct...I know what you're getting at and yes "combat" or "violence" is part of social interaction and thus, can be construed as "political". and, yes, Clausewitz at once makes combat and politics the same while simultaneously making them separate. Probably what confuses people.

however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency.

marct
11-14-2007, 06:18 PM
So you aren't really talking about "sets" you're talking about confidence intervals. In general these "terms" fall within this area but not always.

Nope, I am talking about sets, but using Zadeh's fuzzy set theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_set) where different variables defining the boundary conditions of a set have different membership values for each particular instance. The "sets" become ideal types in the Weberian sense (at least depending on how they are defined). Also, it's not the terms that fall into the sets, although that happens with lower order terms being partial members of upper order terms, but, rather, particular instances or events that fall into an area (basically, a topological manifold).

John T. Fishel
11-14-2007, 06:27 PM
I agree with you - given your definition of conflict. I would only add that the word that is translated as "politics" is, in German, "politika." That same word in Spanish is "politica" which correctly tranlates to English as BOTH politics and policy. Thus, the classic quote from St. Carl is translated both ways depending on context. Sometimes both words correctly capture the essence at the same time. To wit, language is a slippery devil.:cool:

JohnT

marct
11-14-2007, 06:34 PM
Hi kehenry1,


marct...I know what you're getting at and yes "combat" or "violence" is part of social interaction and thus, can be construed as "political". and, yes, Clausewitz at once makes combat and politics the same while simultaneously making them separate. Probably what confuses people.

Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics. If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.


however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency.

Agreed - it's one of the reasons why I brought up the issue of defining politics. Hearkening back to that formal-informal distinction, I think we can also look at the range of actions defined as "acceptable" in a formal setting (either through mutual agreement, e.g. the Laws of War or via mutual acceptance without formal agreement, e.g. "collateral damage") vs. those that are not "acceptable" in a formal setting (e.g. non-state actors engaging in "warfare", terrorist tactics, etc.). Again, I would suggest that we are seeing a change over time in the membership function of any given action/event being included in a given term.

One of the reasons why I "pick on" Gian's comments so much (apologies for that - it's not personal at all and I'll be more than happy to buy the first round if/when we can get some f2f time :D), is that his stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates. You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.

invictus0972
11-14-2007, 06:54 PM
[QUOTE=invictus0972;31329]

Of course i do not believe that war and politics are separate. i am a disciple of the great one, St Carl von Clausewitz. The two are so inexorably mixed that they can not be seperated in whatever kind of war one is fighting.

My point is that clever cliches like "armed politics" make counterinsurgency war, which is still war and at its most basic level is death, violence and fighting, into something that it is not. This is a term that the armed social scientists have thrust upon us and i feel it actually reduces the complexity of Coin to the point where it appears to the uniformed to be a simple process of applying lines of operations and other pop-anthropolgical theories to achieve "victory." To quote Ken White in an earlier posting on this threat, "It ain't that easy."

Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???

gian

Hi Gentile,

I get you now. As you and everyone already know, Gray says this very thing in his article. War is war! Thanks for the clarification.

V/r

Invictus

Ken White
11-14-2007, 07:00 PM
...
. . .
On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.

True, however recall that the opponent has a voice in everything and he is generally more agile than will be the COIN force.


It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.

So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"

Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?

Because the Armed forces of the US due to many factors tend to tamp down flexibility until it really becomes vital (in the true sense of the word). We are big, heirarchial, bureaucratic and ritualistic. We undertrain people at all levels but particularly at entry, officer or enlisted. We are overly imbued with protecting the institutions and thus almost allergic to any misjudgment that may embarrass the institutions -- all that works to stifle initiative and flexibility.

The fact that a lot of flexibility and initiative are shown is a credit to the people in the units who develop and operate well in spite of the unintentionally oppressive stifling.

The good news is that when initiative and flexibility become imperative and / or the system has rid itself of peace time soldiering oriented folks-- as in the latter stages of WW II -- we can outflex most. We aren't there yet.

From a later post:


"however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency."

That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.

For a large percentage of the insurgents, other tactics can and should be used; for others, they will be seen as a weakness and will merely embolden those opponents.

I think that a part Gian's concern -- and I know a large concern of mine -- is that that Army, as it is prone to do, will swing the "we don't do counter insurgency" gate too far in the opposite direction and forget that it has to be full spectrum. We have a record of doing that -- and in each gate swing, a little more initiative and flexibility get stifled.

That occurs because the senior leadership sets the course and the mavericks and nay sayers are ruthlessly purged. Thus each gate swing gets a few more free thinkers to disappear.

I suggest that the last quote from you I included above is indicative of how this occurs. It is very easy to grab the fad of the day and decide it is the holy grail. It almost never is and the flexibility you properly advocate and cite as apparently missing gives the ability to look at the latest fad, accept the good -- and not throw out that which is proven necessary and to work. Every insurgency, every war is different.

Most of all, that flexibility requires, in COIN or conventional combat, the ability to rapidly assess and act and to do so without relying on dogma.

Ken White
11-14-2007, 07:07 PM
Agree wtih you and particularly with your last paragraph:


"But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works."

True dat... ;)

Don't think it's a change in emphasis as much as it implementing, where appropriate, a doctrine we learned in the 60s and then parked for a few years.

invictus0972
11-14-2007, 07:08 PM
Sounds like masochism to me... ;)


NOTE: That is not to say that the politicians 'lost' the war, they did not. Nor did the Media 'lose' it for us; they didn't help but they don't have nearly as much power as they like to think. First there is no lose or win, no 'victory' or 'defeat' in any modern insurgency. Second, a satisfactory outcome was not reached because the Army fought the wrong war; took to long to get its act together though it eventually did but by the time they did, the American people and their elected pols had tired of it. It's far more complicated than that but that's the gist. :(

Ken,

Thanks for your thoughts! I love to hear these things from primary sources, those who lived it. I agree with your statements about there not being victory or defeat in insurgency. It seems these terms do not apply. Perhaps success is a better term. EXAMPLE: In Malaysia, the British successfully conducted a counterinsurgency. Maybe this all that can be said on these matters.

In college, I had a seminar on Vietnam, and I came away agreeing with my professor who said that it was an "unwinnable" war. His assertion was that the only path to victory was full mobilization of the military; and, because of our Cold War commitments in Eastern Europe, this was an absolute impossibility. Do you agree?

Very respectfully,

Invictus

Ken White
11-14-2007, 07:20 PM
You said:


"...stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates."

While that is certainly a correct statement in regard to much argumenation, I'd also suggest that there are those who have very flexible views on those "certain terms" but in certain fora elect to not reveal that flexibility and instead take an exceptionally strong position for a variety of reasons not least to impress upon others the urgency of what they're saying with respect to a particular aspect -- and concomitantly force those in disagreement to take an exceptionally or even excessively contrary position and thus reveal weaknesses.

Been my observation that the truth usually lies in between... :wry:

kehenry1
11-14-2007, 07:24 PM
marct...


Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics.

Clausewitz's writing style was certainly influenced by the overall style of the day. I'm not afraid to admit that the first time I read him, being non-military, non-19th century, I was left scratching my head going "huh?"

Kind of like reading Milton's Paradise Lost in the original language. It has a certain rhythm and language that would do the same unless you've been exposed to shakespearian language.


If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.

Exactly.


I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates.

I believe that's why I stated in an earlier post that the question of which takes precedence is sometimes related to the person's experience. Combat oriented may focus on the combat while "state" oriented may focus on the non-kinetic, political aspects. Thus, someone has to be able to balance them and figure out when the right time to apply either/or/both is.


You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.

may be true and may also be trying to communicate in the simplest, most recognizable terms. A US infantry man with his "political" experience in the states, probably doesn't associate "politics" with physical violence. Thus, it is meant to translate based on his experiences.

Ken..


That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.

First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is. Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.

The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".

marct
11-14-2007, 07:46 PM
Hi Ken,


While that is certainly a correct statement in regard to much argumenation, I'd also suggest that there are those who have very flexible views on those "certain terms" but in certain fora elect to not reveal that flexibility and instead take an exceptionally strong position for a variety of reasons not least to impress upon others the urgency of what they're saying with respect to a particular aspect -- and concomitantly force those in disagreement to take an exceptionally or even excessively contrary position and thus reveal weaknesses.

Been my observation that the truth usually lies in between... :wry:

I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas ;) - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here (:D) and just talk.

Rob Thornton
11-14-2007, 08:32 PM
remembered - from which parts will we draw lessons available?

What was John Ford trying to tell us when Jimmy Stewart admits to not having killed Lee Marvin in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (http://www.film.u-net.com/Movies/Reviews/Man_Who_Shot_Lib.html)?

I have some concern that when OIF is reviewed we will pick and choose what we want to learn out of it. If we were doing a review right now what would we lay out as the top 5 or so takeaways and how would that effect change? I'm a bit concerned that as a military we might go for the low hanging fruit instead of really being introspective and looking forward with regards not only to our own war, but the other wars going on around us, and how potential adversaries might be eyeballing us and their neighbors.

Do we simplify things through aggregation of events to get our arms around it -a kind of historical compression - where important bits get crushed in order to make the larger event fit the place we assign it? Do we linearize historical events to a point where they are seen only in relation to previous and subsequent events and as such lose important context, or are discarded as irrelevant? We have to be real careful not to do this.

At certain points in OIF you'll find some serious fights where the nature of war became reasonably unbridled and pure for the combatants, even if outside of that it was more tethered to its political context. This not only happened during the invasion, but in Ramadi, Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and several other places between the invasion and up to 2007. We still consider there is a possibility of large scale fights that might happen as a result of JAM, folks lying low until we start to withdraw BCTs or if events exterior to OIF should occur - we have to in order to lessen the chance of being surprised. We should not write those fights off as anomalies - nor should we cite them as the norm. Maybe its just the way chance and probability are going to play out to scale given the stakes of interested parties. What appears of tactical consequence to us, might be perceived as strategic to somebody else - and their reaction might be as well.

Consider what it takes to deploy and sustain a large military force of air, sea and ground components capable of doing what we did in the initial phase of OIF - too many times I think policy folks (and even ourselves) don't understand or forget the mechanisms involved in that task until we actually have to do it. As such we often lack an appreciation for the overhead required to adjust to the friction of doing these big muscle movements with all the supporting ones that make it possible.

I don't think we can operate on a business model that espouses efficiency over effectiveness and operate in the type of high risk environments we do in the spectrum of war while maintaining the potential for success that we like to go to war with. The ability to operate successfully in those away games does not develop overnight, and once you start pulling the plug on it or converting it, its hard to get back (you might never get it back) - which I think is one reason the Marines are concerned that they have a growing generation gap of leaders who have never done amphibious operations.

Its also not just about if you will ever use it or not - having it and showing the resolve to use it is in fact a deterrent that might limit or even prevent its use, or create other strategic, operational and tactical opportunities. FDOs (Flexible Deterrent Options) in themselves have probably swayed many a decision by some foreign leader who would rather not wait for a more peaceful and less fulfilling settlement. Both of those require that the force be more then just an off the shelf concept - these capabilities require training and exercise to get over the friction that occurs in war and to a lesser degree realistic training where things break, bad weather occurs, people get tired, and #### happens to force leaders to recognize the impact and adapt in order to accomplish the mission. Sims not so much - but are easier to resource to scale.

Training requires resources - the one that is hardest for us to generate is time - time to get good enough at all the tasks we must do. So we have to make tough choices about balancing those that are most likely with those those that are more catastrophic if we fail. The more I think about it the more I think that range of possibilities and the cost of failing in the deep end are going to require we accept a learning curve in the more shallow end - even if 4/5ths of the pool is shallow - meaning we may not be able to afford to be optimized for anything, but must remain a GPF force capable of doing it all. Trust me, as someone who loves the Army, this is a choice that sucks - we want to win all the time, everywhere we go, and we want to be the best at everything we are tasked with - its who we are.

This is where investing in leaders (even more then we have so far) from team leader to GO may be the only mitigation strategy we can pull off. We have to have guys and gals who can take a concept out of doctrine (science) and implement it within the context of the operational conditions (art) to accomplish the mission - whatever it may be. Its a tall order, and why we require the best people be placed where they can be best used.

Regards, Rob

Ken White
11-14-2007, 08:42 PM
...
. . .
Ken.
First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is...

Realized that and am simply unsure you're correct. My sensing is that the first 18 months were overly violent on our part, the next 18 were, effectively a learning phase where a balance was sought and the last 18 have seen a pretty good amalgam. IOW, I do not think that last "more often" is now true.

It should be noted there were examples of units that did the balance bit very well early on and others that do not do it well today. All units have never and will never perform the same way in a given situation. Both the Army and the Marines are far from monolithic or standard in their tactical methodology. That's okay. It better be because it's highly unlikely to change. :o


...Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.

Read and generally agreed with that.


The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".

The "gut instinct" is, practically, the action of an intuitive commander. Fortunately, there are some of them about. The unfortunate counterpoint is that Steve Metz hit a nail with his comment about interchangeable Colonels (substitute any rank); it is anathema to the personnel 'managers' to say that any one of a given grade and specialty cannot do any job requiring that specialty. It is a fact of life that perhaps anyone may be able to do the job but the most capable should probably be employed to do a specific job. Unfortunately, that is not the American way...

True, there never are any absolutes. In war, any variety, there are not even too many probables... :D

Rob Thornton
11-14-2007, 08:44 PM
I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here () and just talk.

You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.

What say JFCOM - got a few grand laying around - you could even have the SWC do a sim:D - of course after we drink your beer, we're back to being ourselves.

Best, Rob

Ken White
11-14-2007, 08:47 PM
Hi Ken,
I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas ;) - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here (:D) and just talk.

I did glide over the "stated views" didn't I? Sorry about that. I can only attribute it to a lack of vino impacting my veritas, a condition i will rectify shortly -- the sun surely being over the yardarm in Bermuda by now... :D

Ken White
11-14-2007, 09:37 PM
for "opener of cans of worms" ??? :D


"In college, I had a seminar on Vietnam, and I came away agreeing with my professor who said that it was an "unwinnable" war. His assertion was that the only path to victory was full mobilization of the military; and, because of our Cold War commitments in Eastern Europe, this was an absolute impossibility. Do you agree?"

How many pages did Karnow have to do this stuff??? :confused:

My opinions...

With my aforementioned there is no 'win,' well, yeah it was 'unwinnable.' I do think it could have been brought to a more satisfactory conclusion but I have to caveat that by saying had it been, the 30% probability is that we'd have had a North and South Korea like situation and an altered relationship with both China and Russia today. The greater probability, the 50% solution, is that we and they would be about where we are now due to our inability to stem the North's -- and many in the South's -- strong sense of nationalism and dedication. Not to mention the fact that there was really no overarching national interest at stake in Viet Nam and people here were more aware of that than they were at the time of Korea and thus there would have been little support for a continued troop presence -- and the North would have known that. (The other 20% is all over the place,dozens of possibilities)

I disagree with him that full mobilization would have been required; there were adequate forces in country, they just weren't properly employed for a too lengthy period. Once they were, the combat was reduced to very minor efforts on the part of the North and the South effectively countered most of them.

The commitments in Europe were actually hollowed out significantly to support the war in Viet Nam; Seventh Army was a veritable shell and the USSR knew that so I disagree on using Europe as an excuse. Full mobilization was not called for due to US domestic political constraints and for no other reason. Most were not convinced that Viet Nam was a necessary war.

I think it was marginally necessary but very poorly planned and fought initially. One can argue about the rationale for Eisenhower signing and the Senate ratifying the mutual support treaty but both actions were taken. We did have a Treaty obligation . One can also argue about the wisdom of the Kennedy Admin in convincing the South to invoke that treaty and then argue more about the Admin's actions early on -- not to mention Johnson's stupidity. Then there was Nixon's campaign promise to get us out. All in all, domestic politics intruded into that war in a major way to the extent that a more satisfactory outcome was denied.

Long way of saying that we probably agreed to a treaty that we should not have, went in as obligated by that treaty which was the right thing to do; went in wrong and stayed wrong for too long, finally got it half right and then left. We would not have 'won' but the capability for a much better end result was squandered. Europe and Cold War considerations there were not an impediment, US domestic politics were the arbiter.

FWIW, to me the military lessons are: (1) Our egos are way too big. (2) Our politicians are way too dumb.

(1a) We knew how to fight insurgencies, we'd done it a number of places but our ego centric leadership refuses to learn from the past and want to do it their way, we are masters at reinventing wheels. The Troops early on had trained for COIN, the Generals had not (1b) We are cultural illiterates, we consistently ignore the rest of the world, partly due to incompetent media but again egos strike -- we have FAOs and ignore what they say. Thus we wander into other nations like clueless boobs. (1c) We refuse to be Bismarkian and learn from the mistakes of others; bad as a bunch of teenagers. (1d) We're too arrogant, a military fallibility that causes continuing underestimation of opponents.

(2) That's obvious and needs no explanation. :mad:

Rank amateur
11-14-2007, 11:14 PM
Agree wtih you and particularly with your last paragraph:



True dat... ;)

Don't think it's a change in emphasis as much as it implementing, where appropriate, a doctrine we learned in the 60s and then parked for a few years.

Thanks. I've watched all the Kilcullen links posted here carefully. His "talking points" have shifted. (But remember, I'm an ad guy/spin doctor. ) It's probably both going on at once: more aggressive tactics and trying to communicate in a way that elicits more "oo-rahs"/ prepares the public to expect more explosions on their TV.) Paetreus et al. are providing much better spin than anything coming out of our politicians. Kudos to them. Shame on the civilian leadership.


Further, I think there is a reason that we separate the "indigent insurgents" from the "global insurgents" and how we deal with them.

My main objection to their current strategy - assuming that there is one, and that I more or less understand it - is that there isn't enough strategic differentiation. We need to fight the global insurgents. The Shiites and the Kurds aren't going to provide them sanctuary. The Sunnis are pretty good at killing whomever they want to kill. They seem pretty motivated to go after AQI. A small presence in the triangle should be all we need to help the Sunnis kick their butt. And it would be a global PR victory for us.

But we seem to have defined success as getting a political agreement between all the diverse local militias, without a full fledged civil war or partition. Much harder, much more expensive and much more likely that the world will eventually conclude that we were defeated.



I have some concern that when OIF is reviewed we will pick and choose what we want to learn out of it. If we were doing a review right now what would we lay out as the top 5 or so takeaways and how would that effect change?

Start a thread on that. I'd like to peel that onion.

Ken White
11-14-2007, 11:30 PM
Thanks. I've watched all the Kilcullen links posted here carefully. His "talking points" have shifted. (But remember, I'm an ad guy/spin doctor. ) It's probably both going on at once: more aggressive tactics and trying to communicate in a way that elicits more "oo-rahs"/ prepares the public to expect more explosions on their TV.) Paetreus et al. are providing much better spin than anything coming out of our politicians. Kudos to them. Shame on the civilian leadership.

in my overlong life at getting their message out... :rolleyes:

I don't pay much attention to any of the spokes types; the tendency to spin is too great. I just cull a dozen or so sites a day and try to keep up with what's actually happening; not easy but one can get a fair idea. If you know what to look for it's out there.

Of course, it helps to not have a day job... :D

And, if I may:


My main objection to their current strategy - assuming that there is one, and that I more or less understand it - is that there isn't enough strategic differentiation. We need to fight the global insurgents...

We are. We just don't talk about it and thus all eyes are on I-rak and that's good.

selil
11-14-2007, 11:36 PM
You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.

What say JFCOM - got a few grand laying around - you could even have the SWC do a sim:D - of course after we drink your beer, we're back to being ourselves.

Best, Rob


Make it a conference with blind peer reviewed papers and I can get my bosses to spring for my travel... Let's see right now I'm working on a paper titled "Public risks associated with widespread dependence upon computers" i could change that around to "Military risk......"

Ken White
11-14-2007, 11:39 PM
"I don't think we can operate on a business model that espouses efficiency over effectiveness and operate in the type of high risk environments we do in the spectrum of war while maintaining the potential for success that we like to go to war with."

That seems to me to summarize a great many synergistic things that put us where we are. I'm going to work on a post on that after Turkey Day, pretty crammed up between now and then -- be outa town from Fri until the Tue after the day.


"This is where investing in leaders (even more then we have so far) from team leader to GO may be the only mitigation strategy we can pull off. We have to have guys and gals who can take a concept out of doctrine (science) and implement it within the context of the operational conditions (art) to accomplish the mission - whatever it may be. Its a tall order, and why we require the best people be placed where they can be best used."

That, too is a critical point. Very critical.

Rank amatuer is right, you oughta start a thread on that five items idea...;)

Rank amateur
11-14-2007, 11:41 PM
I don't pay much attention to any of the spokes types; the tendency to spin is too great.

Spin is what I do for a living. By deciphering spin I get a pretty good idea of where Rob will be spending his next 15 month deployment. Maybe there are more valuable skills, but I don't have any of them.


We are. We just don't talk about it and thus all eyes are on I-rak and that's good.

I agree. Except for the last word. Our eyes should be on the most important fight. It's the only way to make sure we don't get sucker punched by a cheap shot we don't see coming.



One of the reasons why I "pick on" Gian's comments so much (apologies for that - it's not personal at all and I'll be more than happy to buy the first round if/when we can get some f2f time :D), is that his stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging.

He tends to come across that way, but I think what he means is "I know which tactics work, and defining the new strategy in a touchy feely way will lead to ineffective tactics, which will get people killed."

Of course, if he's smart enough to teach at West Point, he's smart enough to speak for himself.


Rank amatuer is right, you oughta start a thread on that five items idea...;)

I think this is the first time I've been right twice in one thread.


This administration is the worst, is in my overlong life at getting their message out... :rolleyes:

Two points. One: It's not over long. Hang around. We need you.

Two: Purely as a spin doctor: no idealogical underpinnings. I think that with every administration spin has become more important and reality less important. But the gap between the two can't become too large. "I did not have sex with that woman" and four years of "Stay the course. We're making progress." are moments when the spin doctors lost all credibility and therefore the presidents they work for lost all credibility.

On a personal note, however, it's nice to be reminded that spin can effect the real world. It makes me realize that maybe my skills have some value after all.

Norfolk
11-14-2007, 11:43 PM
You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.

What say JFCOM - got a few grand laying around - you could even have the SWC do a sim:D - of course after we drink your beer, we're back to being ourselves.

Best, Rob

Given the number of Canadians on this board, a layout of a little more than a few $k may be rather prudent, unless of course the rest are taking up teetotalling for the duration of the "sim",:eek: with all the attendent negative consequences for Joint and Multi-National Operations that would entail.

kehenry1 - Quote:

I believe that's why I stated in an earlier post that the question of which takes precedence is sometimes related to the person's experience. Combat oriented may focus on the combat while "state" oriented may focus on the non-kinetic, political aspects. Thus, someone has to be able to balance them and figure out when the right time to apply either/or/both is.

...may be true and may also be trying to communicate in the simplest, most recognizable terms. A US infantry man with his "political" experience in the states, probably doesn't associate "politics" with physical violence. Thus, it is meant to translate based on his experiences.

-Unquote

Excellent point kehenry, although I would refine that statement to say that one's experience of politics simply translates so, rather than is intended to translate so. As such, it's no wonder that a US infantry man whose experience of politics back home involves little to no violence, let alone war, is left perhaps a little befuddled when politics is very much entwined with both violence and war in such places as the Near East.

But going back even within living memory, a British Army officer might not have suffered the same confusion. During the days of the Empire, and even for some time afterwards, an officer was quite aware that his role was not simply that of a military leader, but as an agent of his Government's policies; his conduct was directed towards that end, and if that end required military means to achieve, he was well-positioned to see to it. In effect, the Imperial officer was a sort of minor legate, and an Imperial general officer a sort of proconsul. In any case, the role of the officer, though uniquely military, was inherently and above all political in nature, and his duties conducted in that light.

Clausewitz was quite correct in tying politics and war directly together, and if we take the simple (simple to state at least) definition of politics as how people relate to each other, then war, as a possible condition of those relations, is not only inherently political in its ultimate objective, but so are its actors, even the lowly infantryman. As far as that goes, Lt. Col. Gentile is likewise correct when he objects to the absence of Clausewitz as a reference in COIN Doctrine.

Where I would disagree with Col. Gentile, and very much agree with Ken and marc, is making a hard distinction between war on the one hand, and COIN on the other. COIN is inherently political, as is war, and both require soldiers to wage it, who are themselves inescapably political actors. Likewise, the insurgents have a political objective in mind, and act as such. That is not to say that all aspects of COIN are necessarily about war or even military operations; most certainly not. In many COIN campaigns, police and other civil and paramilitary security forces have often borne the brunt of the COIN fight; similarly, not all insurgent acts of violence are necessarily acts of war or even military in nature, such as rioting, sabotage and subversion, assassination, terrorism, etc.

But when extremists elements surpass such acts and move on to the occupation of territories and military control of populations, engage in guerrilla/partisan operations, and even wage the odd pitched battle now and then, they have clearly crossed over the ambiguous line that separates extremist violence from low-intensity war. It is no longer just crimes committed with political ends in mind. COIN, therefore, is war, even if it involves much more than just military operations.

And so, all that said, it's vital to have a definition of what "politics" means that is comprehensive yet practical; but it will also require a definition of "war" that meets the same standard. Clausewitz, of course, defined war as the conduct of politics by other means. While it's basically correct, it requires some qualification and explanation to be comprehensive, yet practical.

Rob Thornton
11-15-2007, 01:31 AM
"I don't think we can operate on a business model that espouses efficiency over effectiveness and operate in the type of high risk environments we do in the spectrum of war while maintaining the potential for success that we like to go to war with."
That seems to me to summarize a great many synergistic things that put us where we are. I'm going to work on a post on that after Turkey Day, pretty crammed up between now and then -- be outa town from Fri until the Tue after the day.

What do you make of this:



Federal Times
November 12, 2007
Pg. 1

DoD Executives To Take More Jobs Held By Generals

By Stephen Losey

Career civilian executives at the Defense Department will be taking over more leadership posts held by generals and admirals in the coming months.

Positions overseeing logistics and other non-war-fighting operations — traditionally considered as military billets — will increasingly be done by members of the Defense Department’s Senior Executive Service (SES), said Patricia Bradshaw, the deputy undersecretary of Defense for civilian personnel policy.

A directive signed Oct. 25 by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England formally gives the top tier of senior career executives authority comparable to some of the military’s three-star generals and admirals and political appointees.

“They’ll be invited to senior meetings and have a seat at the table,” Bradshaw said. “They’ll occupy positions that have real scope of authority and responsibility for major portions of the organization.”

.
........ If you go back to a lot of our SES, they’ll say, ‘I could always be a deputy, but I could never be in charge.’”

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are helping drive the changes in the way the Pentagon thinks about its civilian executive corps............


Praise and concerns

Carol Bonosaro, president of the Senior Executives Association, applauded the Pentagon’s plans.

“This opens up a new avenue of opportunities for senior executives,” Bonosaro said. “It’s refreshing to see the department take on a comprehensive view for managing its senior executive corps.”

But she said she’s concerned the plan could keep a lid on salaries for the vast majority of senior executives who are not in the top tier of enterprise executives.

Also, she said the plan could force senior executives to accept jobs they don’t want. The new directive requires executives to sign a document agreeing to accept reassignments when asked.

You know I was fortunate enough to receive a tour of the Capitol building via Senator Mitch McConnell's office last Friday with some of ginger's family - I was amazed at how young everyone who seemed to work there was - our guide was a sharp fellow out of UK, and the other young men and ladies in the two offices were also sharp - but what struck with me was the idea that these folks were pretty much going to grow up in the beltway and thus within the system. When I read this article yesterday I thought about what kind of people would fill those positions and wondered what experiences they would have had? How will they understand those unknowable frictions which gobble up resources - how will they build that in? There was a piece of justification which I did not paste in as I did not want to put the whole article in which said - "this will allow those generals to go where they are needed" which seemed a little odd in itself. I've no doubt that the SESs are good people wanting to serve their country - but I just wonder about how much they've contemplated the difference between War and the boardroom?

Best, Rob

Ken White
11-15-2007, 02:07 AM
Having been one of those Deputy types, there are pluses. Continuity instead of a new guy every two or three years, knowing the job, less costly and more. There are minuses. One, you're a civilian and no matter how good you are or how much cred you have, you're still a civilian to some serving types. Two, there are places you cannot go and things you cannot do (mostly metaphorically speaking). Three, you have to rate military people. I don't agree with civilians rating military people of any rank. I did it, got a profile at DA and the whole bit, probably rated eight or ten MAJs and a like number of LTCs and even two COLs but I did not and do not agree with it.

I also served for a fair time as the Acting BBMFIC on a few occasions. Made the job even easier but I did not have a Green Suit and that had its down side in some venues (and several of my nominal civilian peers said they wouldn't do the amount of traveling I did during those periods...)

Add to that this quote you provided:


"Also, she said the plan could force senior executives to accept jobs they don’t want. The new directive requires executives to sign a document agreeing to accept reassignments when asked."

Most will do that with no problem but a healthy minority will quibble about moves, or will sign the agreement to get a job and a promotion and then quibble about moves. Or sluff in that job they didn't want...

There is one more minor plus, the repeal of the Dual Compensation Act in 2000 will bring in more retired Officers and Warrants (Regulars, it did not apply to the RC) so some nominal subject knowledge will be available. Though I can hear the screaming now when the first COL retires and takes an SES job replacing his former boss... :D

This is not a good plan. And that's the good news....

The really bad news is that I seriously doubt the number of FlagOs will be reduced so all those stars are going to be somewhere out in the force.

There goes any dream of enhanced flexibility and agility...

kehenry1
11-15-2007, 06:08 AM
The really bad news is that I seriously doubt the number of FlagOs will be reduced so all those stars are going to be somewhere out in the force.

There goes any dream of enhanced flexibility and agility...

You know, I am reminded of the Civil War where everyone and their brother was a general, colonel or major and they were all over the battle field. Sometimes it was good and sometimes it was bad.

marct
11-15-2007, 05:21 PM
Hi Guys,


You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.


Given the number of Canadians on this board, a layout of a little more than a few $k may be rather prudent, unless of course the rest are taking up teetotalling for the duration of the "sim",:eek: with all the attendent negative consequences for Joint and Multi-National Operations that would entail.

Hey, I'm up for it ;). Norfolk is, however, totally correct - a couple of k won't even cover the beer :D!

Rank amateur
11-16-2007, 12:23 AM
Back on topic. Steve, how was the seminar?

SteveMetz
11-16-2007, 09:10 PM
Back on topic. Steve, how was the seminar?

Well, I had to put up with Kilcullen and Hammes. Actually, pretty interesting. Most of the the people were practitioners, so I learned quite a bit particularly on the USAID aspects. Appears the final guide book is probably a year out, but I think it's going to be a good product.