Sanchez Delivers Democratic Party Weekly Radio Address

[SWJED]

Sanchez Delivers Democratic Party Weekly Radio Address (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/sanchez-delivers-democratic-pa/) - SWJ Blog.


... Sanchez’s statement on his “firsthand account” implies that somehow he was a blameless bystander and not the one entrusted with day-to-day operations during the critical year following regime change in Iraq...

[Tom Odom]

Sanchez Delivers Democratic Party Weekly Radio Address (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/sanchez-delivers-democratic-pa/) - SWJ Blog.

Simply amazing....

And disgusting.....

Tom

[RTK]

My question is simple:

Is he so dumb so as to not realize how he's being played right now as a political pawn?

A few of us on here have worked, either directly or indirectly, under this man over the course of his career. I don't think anyone here has anything good to say about him, either. I know I don't.

[Shivan]

Given his inability to accept any responsibility, I'm glad he's out of the Army and MNF-I, and Petraeus et al. are in charge. Let him win accolades among the anti-war crowd for his Bush-bashing. The rest of us should ignore him since we know better.

[Rank amateur]

Our Army and Marine Corps are struggling with changing deployment schedules that are disrupting combat readiness training and straining the patience and daily lives of military families. It will take the Army at least a decade to repair the damage done to its full spectrum readiness, which is at its lowest level since the Vietnam War. .

If this is true, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with Sanchez saying it.


Had Sanchez recognized the nature of the emerging threat (insurgency) and planned and implemented a theater-wide counterinsurgency campaign with the resources at hand, [during the critical year following regime change in Iraq] we may have avoided some of the difficulties later encountered.

Just my opinion, but I think it’s fair more likely that Sanchez would’ve been fired.


CNN Aired November 17, 2006 - 17:00 (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0611/17/sitroom.02.html[/url])

DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: The solution is not military. The solution to that obviously is what Prime Minister Maliki is trying to do and that is a reach out to the Sunni community to attempt to fashion a reconciliation process that will bring together the elements of this country.

Washington Post November 30 2005 Page A18 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/29/AR2005112901405.html [/url])

Last weekend, while other Americans were watching football and eating leftover turkey, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ended the Iraqi insurgency.
It was easy, really: He declared that the insurgents would, henceforth, no longer be called insurgents.

Over the weekend, I thought to myself, 'You know, that gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to merit,”


Reported everywhere June 20 2005 (http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/05/30/cheney.iraq/ [/url])

“The insurgency in Iraq is in the last throes," Vice President Dick Cheney


Christian Science Monitor, June 27, 2005 ( http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0627/dailyUpdate.html [/url])

As part of a public relations campaign leading up to President Bush addressing the nation Tuesday night about the war in Iraq, members of the Bush administration have been trying to downplay the strength of the insurgency in Iraq.




Unless there was some backdoor dialogue occurring that we are not privy too, it appears Sanchez did not have a problem with the U.S. strategy at that time… Bremer and Gen. Sanchez hated each other. They barely talked.

IMO, not talking can be considered possible evidence of a disagreement.



Shifting the primary mission of our troops away from combat will lead to a smaller U.S. military presence, and a greater obligation on the part of the Iraqis to take the lead in solving their country’s problems.


The U.S. now has a proper strategy in place, a COIN strategy that is population-centric unlike earlier enemy-centric strategies that yielded little or no results. Former senior MNF-I COIN adviser Dr. David Kilcullen describes this strategy

If I understand Kilcullen, he says:

1) COIN forces in Iraq don’t need to be American. They can be Iraqi.
2) The only way insurgencies end is with a political agreement amongst all the parties involved.

IMO, Sanchez’s statement is consistent with COIN doctrine.


“Although we cannot withdraw precipitously from Iraq

That’s also consistent with the COIN strategy.



Furthermore, the bill puts America on the path to regaining our moral authority by requiring all government employees to abide by the Army Field Manual on interrogations, which is in compliance with the Geneva Conventions. America must accept nothing less.

That’s consistent with the council’s foremost expert on the subject.


Justifying the use of torture because terrorists are criminal scum and not a conventional enemy only brings us down to their level…… Bluntly put, torture is both morally wrong and operationally ineffective.

Seems to me Sanchez is saying: We should lower our forces quickly, because the military is strained and large numbers of troops are not producing any progress toward the political agreement that is needed.

And the editorial is saying: We should lower our forces slowly, because even though large numbers of troops aren’t producing any political progress, they might.

Though since I don’t want to be accused of misquoting, here re the exact words, edited and slightly out of order.

Sanchez notes, and is correct, that so far there is no evidence that there is movement towards political reconciliation at the national government level….While the jury is still out on the ultimate success of this new strategy … it has provided the Iraqi government a window of opportunity to seek a national reconciliation. .



It’s a pretty minor disagreement except for the fact that Democrats are one side and Republicans on the other.

[Rank amateur]

For some reason, this wouldn't fit above. (Maybe there's a space limit on editorial rebuttals.;)) I thought it was relevant.


Unless there was some backdoor dialogue occurring that we are not privy too, it appears Sanchez did not have a problem with the U.S. strategy at that time

He wasn’t the only one.

"]PBS Dec 04 (”http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec04/insurgents_12-22.html [/url)

COL. THOMAS HAMMES: I think one of the problems has been our failure to properly man the training staffs. Gen. Petreus was sent in, in March 2004 with the idea of taking over training of all the security services.


Vice President Dick Cheney, at a campaign debate 2004, expressed confidence in the new Iraqi government and in Iraqi forces.
VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY: We also are actively, rapidly training Iraqis to take on the security responsibility. Those two steps are crucial to success in Iraq. They're well in hand, well under way, and I'm confident that in fact we'll get the job done.
Dec 24, 2004
LT. GEN. JOHN SATTLER: We feel right now that we have, as I mentioned, broken the back of the insurgency and we have taken away this safe haven.

"CPA Press Conference Nov 19 2003 (”http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20031120_Nov-19-BG-Kimmitt-Briefing-post.htm [/url)

Q Steve Komarow with USA Today. A lot of these targets have been show-of-force sort of things, empty buildings, that sort of thing. Can you give me a historical precedent where such shows of force have resulted in an insurrection like this being ended?

GEN. KIMMITT: I can show you plenty of historical examples that when you have defeated an enemy, and you've taken away his resources and you've taken away his will to fight, that insurgency has collapsed. That fight has collapsed.

[Stu-6]

It is not that he is making inaccurate statements, it's that he bears some responsibility for these same things. He wasn't some lowly private unable to influence the situation.

[historyguy99]

History tells us of another General, who after failing to adjust to a fast moving battlefield and always underestimated his enemy was replaced. General George B. McCellan resurfaced to become the Democratic nominee in 1864, running on an anti-war platform that sought negotiations with the Confederacy. He was forced to repudiate this position after the new strategies pursued by Grant and Sherman turned the tide of war. General Sanchez in becoming partisan, has diluted any arguement he presents, to a tepid gruel.

[SWJED]

... lot of great links, I'm sure. Also, your postings are quite busy and don't cut-to-the-quick. Can you boil it down to what you think and why? I might be able to churn out some type of response. Right now I'm not so inclined to. Thanks.

[ProfessorB]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

[RTK]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

You're right. Let's be honest. Let's also utilize the search device and take a look at how poorly this guy was viewed by his Soldiers well before this week's address.

[Tom Odom]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

To answer your posed question, I for one would be complaining if Sanchez delivered the same messages. I am neither Republicanas you assume nor Democrat My issues with Sanchez deal with his performance when it counted and his statements now on that period.

Tom

[Stu-6]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address.

If he was doing that I would be dismissing him as a partisan fool like General Franks. It isn't what he said or where he said it. It is the fact that he is a least partly responsible. But just like the political bosses he now criticizes he pretends to be the victim excepting none of the responsibility.

[MattC86]

I'm more disappointed in the Democrats for associating themselves with this guy.

They're so willing to embrace anyone who is anti-Bush or antiwar, especially if he wears a uniform so they can cover their perceived deficiency in national security (which is crap - Bush is no more qualified in national security and foreign affairs, and probably much less so, than Al Gore or John Kerry were), that they trot out Sanchez.

Very disappointing to me, and I've never voted anything other than Democrat (though I've only been voting for three years. . .)

Matt

[selil]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

I disagree I think Sanchez would be disparaged in any case. I would have been just as disappointed, but then again I like Gravel for a Democrat nominee.

[SWJED]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

I will be honest, very honest - I'd take issue with his remarks if he was delivering them from Mount Sinai.

[kehenry1]

Frankly, I have to agree with a bunch of folks on here. He could have been giving this little anti-pep talk at the next Republican Convention and I'd still think he was playing dog in the manger.

1) He's a day late and a dollar short. COIN strategy appears to be working. Listening to his diatribe was like having someone shout "who farted" right in the middle of an EF Hutton commercial. (Pardon my crudeness)

2) Just by his words, I think the assumption that he would have instigated a counter-insurgency plan if not for the fear of being fired or from taking too much direction from Rumsfield, et al is bogus. It seems clear he is a "Powell Doctrine" kind of guy and really didn't want to be doing COIN or nation building. In fact, that he would have been the person in charge of giving information to Rumsfeld, et al on the war and a major source of input on the "how to" fight in that combat theater including numbers and strategy.

In short, he's a conventional warfare guy who got stuck with an insurgency and now wants everyone to believe, in the middle of a successful counterinsurgency, that we should back out and focus on conventional warfare planning for some other threat.

I am constantly amazed that we refuse to plan for and execute both.

[goesh]

Well, he maybe can get a 5th star if Hillary wins the White House and be dubbed Commander of the Planets Free Forces and get a newly designed uniform with lots of gold braids and other fanciful things, though he ain't nearly as pretty as Wes Clark IMO.

[historyguy99]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

This little post got more response in this thread, than the original comments by Sanchez. I agree, the Democrats should have known better than to hitch their hopes on a guy who had lost the credibility of the men he led, long before he retired.
As for former Flags jumping into politics, most made that leap, only after they were successful on the battlefield. IE, Washington, Jackson, Grant, T. Roosevelt, and Eisenhower.

Patton once said: "Americans love a winner, and will not tolerate a loser." This rule still applies.

[Steve Blair]

I am constantly amazed that we refuse to plan for and execute both.

AMEN! This is one of my biggest pet rocks in the whole thing: the seemingly hard-wired "either/or" approach that we seem to take.

And as far as Sanchez goes...I have no use for his comments, no matter what podium he's standing behind when he utters them. Let's not mask questions of competence behind political grandstanding by any side.

[Ron Humphrey]

AMEN! This is one of my biggest pet rocks in the whole thing: the seemingly hard-wired "either/or" approach that we seem to take.

And as far as Sanchez goes...I have no use for his comments, no matter what podium he's standing behind when he utters them. Let's not mask questions of competence behind political grandstanding by any side.



I always find that you can tell a lot about someone by their actions after they realize they screwed up, especially when it seems like they went against their own principles in doing so.

:(

[Cavguy]

Frankly, I have to agree with a bunch of folks on here. He could have been giving this little anti-pep talk at the next Republican Convention and I'd still think he was playing dog in the manger.

...

2) Just by his words, ... It seems clear he is a "Powell Doctrine" kind of guy and really didn't want to be doing COIN or nation building. In fact, that he would have been the person in charge of giving information to Rumsfeld, et al on the war and a major source of input on the "how to" fight in that combat theater including numbers and strategy.

In short, he's a conventional warfare guy who got stuck with an insurgency and now wants everyone to believe, in the middle of a successful counterinsurgency, that we should back out and focus on conventional warfare planning for some other threat.

I am constantly amazed that we refuse to plan for and execute both.

I had held off commenting on the Sanchez threads because of my hard personal opinions on him, but can't resist anymore.

I was in 1AD under Sanchez, and I'll back up RTK an others and confirm that Sanchez's leadership left much to be desired in the eyes of his subordinates. I never saw anything positive come from him on any of my interactions.

My final straw was at the UN Bombing in August 2003 - elements of 1/1 AD and 2ACR had been pulling bodies and doing CASEVAC for 6 hours when he showed up in 140 degree heat. He proceeded to chew out the leaders on site for some minor BS and left the scene. Classic for him - seagull management - fly in, sh*t all over, fly out. I saw it back in Germany too many times to mention. (Fortunately, MG Dempsey (now LTG) was a 180 degree difference for 1AD)

The final straw started when he returned to Germany commanding V Corps and his "I was screwed out of a fourth star" narrative began. It started awhile ago inside of military circles, and only has come public recently. He is the epitome of what LTC Yingling talked about - there is more consequence for a PVT losing a rifle than a LTG losing a war. Yes, he wasn't set up fully for success, but the difference is in those who make their environments work and those who are dominated by their circumstances.

Sorry General, you were in charge, and therefore you are responsible for everything good or bad that occurs in your command. Drilled into me during ROTC, but somewhere he forgot that, as evidenced by his "wasn't me" Abu Gharib reaction (along with BG Kerpinski(sp?)).

Fred Kaplan's column in Slate (http://www.slate.com/id/2177691/) the other day captures some of it as well.

It doesn't matter to me whether he speaks for the Democrats or Republicans, both positions have some intellectual merit. But his credibility is highly suspect in my eyes given his rant a few weeks ago.

[kehenry1]

Karpinski...colonel now. And, yes, I think her excuse was pretty much lame as dried pile of dog doo. Regardless of checkered lines of reporting, you know the right and wrong, could have put discipline in place and made sure your butt and those in your command were covered. Further, it may take moral courage to keep asking, but there is nothing else that keeps someone from asking. Of course, maybe she felt put off by Sanchez's command style of "I don't have time to deal with this petty BS". which turned into a giant red target on the army's back. Karpinski was out of her league and then couldn't admit it to herself.

I am also reminded of the generals and a few field grades who were trying hard to back out of the Tillman fiasco. They made a bad call and then tried to cover it, made more bad calls and then tried to cover it. It could have stopped a long time before that. Another big black mark on the army record.

Most of these folks are so focused on their own careers and pain, they lose sight of the big picture.

[Ken White]

Let's be honest with ourselves, shall we? No one would be complaining if Sanchez had delivered the weekly Republican radio address. Let's not mask rank partisanship in the guise of sober reflections on Sanchez' credibility (or lack thereof).

Same applies to all the other Generals taking either side...

[120mm]

Karpinski...colonel now. And, yes, I think her excuse was pretty much lame as dried pile of dog doo. Regardless of checkered lines of reporting, you know the right and wrong, could have put discipline in place and made sure your butt and those in your command were covered. Further, it may take moral courage to keep asking, but there is nothing else that keeps someone from asking. Of course, maybe she felt put off by Sanchez's command style of "I don't have time to deal with this petty BS". which turned into a giant red target on the army's back. Karpinski was out of her league and then couldn't admit it to herself.

I am also reminded of the generals and a few field grades who were trying hard to back out of the Tillman fiasco. They made a bad call and then tried to cover it, made more bad calls and then tried to cover it. It could have stopped a long time before that. Another big black mark on the army record.

Most of these folks are so focused on their own careers and pain, they lose sight of the big picture.

Actually, the case with Karpinski, was that she would NOT leave the V Corps TOC. She was waaay too busy kissing Sanchez's ass and he was way to busy being flattered with the ass-kissing. Because of that, she had no CLUE what her MPs were doing.

The difference between COL Spain and BG Karpinski were like day and night, respectively.

And, oh yeah, Sanchez didn't have a frickin' CLUE what was going on "on the ground" in Iraq, or an idea of what to do about it. In the words of his "former" battle captain, (I currently work with the guy) "Sanchez was a 'sunshine up', #### down' kind of officer."