View Full Version : Urgent Need to Strengthen Nuke Non-Proliferation

01-16-2006, 04:57 PM
The Urgent Need to Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO25.Goldschmidt.FINAL2.pdf)

The crisis over Iranís non-compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations leads many officials and observers to conclude that the non-proliferation regime is doomed to failure. Some say that the regime worked exceptionally well for three decades, which is a great achievement, but has been eroded to the point of collapse by the tides of history. Others say that treaty-based non-proliferation was always a foolís errand, and the folly is finally being exposed.

Such pessimism is premature, dangerous, and potentially self-fulfilling. Moreover, by castigating the non-proliferation regime or inspections, the pessimists deflect attention from where the real problem lies: the weak will and short-sighted nuclear policies of the international community...

01-18-2006, 12:32 AM
Im not sure that it has been a total success. The treaty was agreed upon by the primaries and open for ratification in 1968, yet France did not accept until 1992 and the Chinese until 2000. Israel, India, and Pakistan have never agreed to the document, and the South Africans did so only after they proved to themselves that if forced to, they could produce a weapon with minimal effort.

05-26-2006, 06:36 PM
From the 25 May International Terrorism & Non-Proliferation subcommittee hearing: The A.Q. Khan Network: Case Closed?

David Albright, ISIS: A.Q. Khan Network: The Case is Not Closed (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/alb052506.pdf)

Khan’s actions have made the world far more dangerous. His ground-breaking methods to acquire and then help others build nuclear weapons dramatize a path to nuclear proliferation that poses the greatest threat to our security today. Too long underappreciated, illicit nuclear trade is a scourge lying at the heart of all efforts by America’s current enemies to build or expand a nuclear arsenal. Motivated by greed or fanaticism, nuclear smuggling rings continue to find ready customers willing to pay exorbitant prices. The busting of the Khan network has not stopped Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and others from seeking items illegally for their nuclear weapons programs. With such deadly materials and expertise on the black market, terrorist groups may finally find a way to obtain a nuclear weapon. Finding effective ways to stop this illicit trade will be one of the most important priorities for decades to come.
Leonard Weiss Testimony on the A.Q. Khan Network (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/wei052506.pdf)

...one cannot stop proliferation without having and enforcing rules by which all must live. Letting countries we consider friends to make nuclear weapons, and reserving our power only to try to prevent those who are not our friends from making such weapons is a prescription for ultimate failure. We failed to stop the Pakistanis and failed to roll up the Khan network when it was possible to do so. We now face an increased risk of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials falling into the hands of radical jihadist elements that exist in Pakistan. Providing more incentives for Pakistan to make more weapons does not seem to me to make logical sense.
A.Q. Khan Network Case Closed? (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/koc052506.pdf) testimony of Andrew Koch.

Although the arrests of AQ Khan, Tahir and several other top members of their nuclear smuggling network have eliminated a major source of atomic goods to would-be proliferators, it has not ended the trade in nuclear wares. In fact, evidence suggests the Khan network was run as more of a decentralized white-collar criminal group than a topdown organization, with the implication that participants in the network could remain undiscovered and fully able to operate again. As one senior international investigator recently told me about what is know to date: “there is no reason to believe this is the whole story”.

One theory gaining credence and support among the investigators is that the parts of the network yet to be uncovered are more senior than previously believed. The simplicity in which the current predominant view explains how the Khan network easily shuffled closely guarded nuclear goods to Libya, Iran and North Korea is not reasonable, proponents of this alternate theory say, leading them to believe that more powerful forces were at work behind the scenes.

On the ground, the recently illicit procurement push by Iranian agents and to a lesser degree Pakistani ones suggests such a reconfiguration of suppliers is occurring, with the result that illicit trade in nuclear goods continues to be available for those with the means and desire to buy.