A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan.

[SWJED]

Gordon Lubold in today’s Christian Science Monitor - A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1129/p01s05-usmi.html).


The top general of the Marine Corps is pushing hard to deploy marines to Afghanistan as he looks to draw down his forces in Iraq, but his proposal, which is under discussion at the Pentagon this week, faces deep resistance from other military leaders.

Commandant Gen. James Conway's plan, if approved, would deploy a large contingent of Marines to Afghanistan, perhaps as early as next year. The reinforcements would be used to fight the Taliban, which US officials concede is now defending its territory more effectively against allied and Afghan forces.

Within the Pentagon, General Conway's proposal has led to speculation about which, if any, American forces would be best suited to provide reinforcements for a mission that, most agree, has far more political appeal than the one in Iraq. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already recommended against the proposal, at least for now, a military official said Tuesday…

Conway says that Marines, who have been largely responsible for calming Anbar Province in Iraq, can either return home or "stay plugged into the fight" by essentially redeploying to Afghanistan...

Rick Rogers, San Diego Union-Tribune, on USMC current operations in Anbar, Iraq and implications for the Afghanistan mission - Marines' Duties go Well Beyond Combat (http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20071129-9999-1n29marines.html).


... some Marine commanders and defense specialists question whether the Corps' expeditionary combat strengths are being wasted in Anbar. The Marines are revered for their offensive capabilities, said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Va.

“At some point, we are going to have to ask why are we sending a quick-strike force to do nation building. It really would make more sense to send them to Afghanistan to chase insurgents than to have them helping locals in Anbar province build schools,” Thompson said.

“If the mission becomes more reconstruction, then it is more of an Army job,” he added.

The proposal for handing Marines the lead combat role in Afghanistan has been espoused by senior commanders such as Lt. Gen. [General] James Mattis, Helland's immediate predecessor at Camp Pendleton...

[tequila]

Does anyone else find it troubling that GEN Conway apparently has the idea that the Marines need to get back to a more kinetic role, and that the place to do this is Afghanistan?

If any theater fits the classical COIN model, it may be Afghanistan more so than Iraq.

On a personal level, I'd much rather go to Afghanistan in six months than Iraq - I'm learning to enjoy humping in the cold. But I'm not sure if GEN Conway's idea is what's best strategically for the U.S.

[pcmfr]

Unfortunately, we are already too kinetic in Afghanistan. The EKIA count increases significantly every week, but then so does the overall population controlled by the Taliban. Meanwhile the real problems are being driven by actors across the borders to the West and East.

[Eden]

Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, sending more US Marines to this country would be throwing good money after bad. General Conway apparently shares several common but nevertheless mistaken apprehensions:

1. That the greatest threat to Afghanistan is the Taliban. The Taliban is a spent strategic force. In a few localities they retain their traditional support, but they have lost whatever nationwide appeal they may have once had. In many cases, they have become mere criminals, selling protection or working for the local drug lord. No, the longer-term threat to nation-building are the narcotic kings, regional power brokers, and semi-criminal entrepreneurs who have traditionally run affairs in the area. The only reason they have not vigorously opposed the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan is due to the sheer ineffectiveness of some of our allies. Relatively heavy fighting is largely restricted to the southern and eastern portions of the country not because it is a hotbed of Taliban support, but because those are the only areas where the Brits, Canadians, and Americans are making life difficult for those Afghans pursuing their traditional livelihoods: smuggling, extortion, and pissing in the river upstream from your neighbor. Elsewhere, bad guys are happy to accept western largesse so long as NATO doesn't actually interfere with them.

2. That more troops will make a difference. Well, a lot more troops might make a difference. But even thousands of Marines will not. I suspect we would do more of the same with them: Guard our own bases, fruitlessly chase bad guys over mountains, and pretend to secure the borders. Maybe if the thousands of troops were CA, medical, construction engineers, etc. But riflemen? They'd be wasted.

3. That we are making progress that should be reinforced. Afghanistan is better off than it was in 2002, but only because it started in the stone age. Economic growth rates of 10-13% a year are impressive until you realize the baseline was only slightly above zero, and I'm not sure even that measure of progress can be linked beyond anything we accomplished since running the Taliban out. Besides, few Afghans want a strong central government. Just as throughout most of their history, they prefer a weak central government that they can use as a prop against their neighbors.

Bottom line is that if our goal is to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland the reinforcements wouldn't be enough. If our goal is simply to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist-free, what we have their now is sufficient.

[SWJED]

Surge Not Answer in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/surge-not-answer-in-afghanista/) at SWJ Blog.


Michael VIckers, the principal strategist for the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s and today the top Pentagon adviser on counterterrorism strategy (ASD SOLIC), says the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan is through “the indirect approach” - working “by, with and through” host-nation forces — rather than “surges” of U.S. troops according to an article in Army Times - Surge not answer in Afghanistan - by Sean Naylor.

[Ken White]

will listen to Vickers and not to the squirrels AEI.

It took us nine years in Viet Nam to realize that giving the South Viet Namese second hand stuff, little to no training help and short shrift so we could do it all was just really dumb. Surely we aren't going to go down that road again...

Are we?

[Ron Humphrey]

will listen to Vickers and not to the squirrels AEI.

It took us nine years in Viet Nam to realize that giving the South Viet Namese second hand stuff, little to no training help and short shrift so we could do it all was just really dumb. Surely we aren't going to go down that road again...

Are we?

The possible flashbacks many Afghans might have if huge numbers of soldiers begin flowing in.

The AQ and the Taliban have fought there in several different environments, it might not be the best idea to make what they are facing too familiar or to lead the populous to think the only way to beat them is with outside support.

Short term hard hits, GREEAAT, Long term Training and support BETTER.

[LawVol]

In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light. It didn't work and we needed more troops in Iraq to acheive some form of success. The Afghan model didn't work in Iraq. Why would we think that the obverse would work now? It seems to me that the folks over at AEI are one-trick ponies.

The lesson (or at least a lesson) here is that Afghanistan and Iraq are different. I would think some more creative thinking is in order. I'm no expert but it appears that Afghans are hyper-sensitive to the presence of foreign troops, even more so that Iraqis. Why would more foreign troops with weapons help the situation? Perhaps a coalition focus on human security issues, with US advised Afghan forces hunting down bad guys would be more workable. Am I way off here?

[Ken White]

In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light...Ah, but did we go in light, really? Another question is, light or not, did we go in correctly and prepared for the probable consequences of our entry?
...It didn't work and we needed more troops in Iraq to acheive some form of success...Did we -- or was that success really on the way due to a revised TTP regimen and the arrival of more troops merely coincidental...
...The Afghan model didn't work in Iraq. Why would we think that the obverse would work now? It seems to me that the folks over at AEI are one-trick ponies.Well, I can agree with the last bit. ;)
The lesson (or at least a lesson) here is that Afghanistan and Iraq are different...Perhaps a coalition focus on human security issues, with US advised Afghan forces hunting down bad guys would be more workable. Am I way off here?Can't speak for others but I think you're right on the money...

[pcmfr]

In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light.

IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.

[Rank amateur]

If we leave the Afghan Army in charge, won't the Taliban bribe the generals with drug money and make them look the other way?

[Ron Humphrey]

If we leave the Afghan Army in charge, won't the Taliban bribe the generals with drug money and make them look the other way?

There would not likely be many who took the bribe expecting to have everything be honky dory once the Taliban took power again. They have not been out of power long enough for the Afghans to forget how they run things. Couple that with the fact that their return would equal the elimination of many, many who have helped fight against them and I don't think you find a peoples too terribly excited about a return regardless how they may feel at the moment.

[Ken White]

A presence of westerners who do not do business in the south asian way deters a lot of that (but not all). The presence will be required for a long time, old habits fie hard...

[Rank amateur]

A presence of westerners who do not do business in the south asian way deters a lot of that (but not all). The presence will be required for a long time, old habits fie hard...

If we're needed for a long time, how do we determine the optimal number of troops? Doesn't doctrine say that COIN is very labor intensive?

[LawVol]

IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.

Maybe my memory is off, but didn't Gen Dunlap make a very similar argument and get ripped here?

This might work in the next "Iraq," but we'd need something to clean up the mess. If we had the ability to go into an area in the immediate aftermath of an air attack and rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, get the power going, kids in school, etc. maybe we wouldn't have to buy off as much. It would require a larger force than simply SOF, but it would go a long way toward winning over the majority of the population.

[slapout9]

Maybe my memory is off, but didn't Gen Dunlap make a very similar argument and get ripped here?



I don't know if Dunlap did but General Wayne Downing did before he died. Colonel Warden did and still does believe this is a much better way to handle these types of wars. He is rather amazed that the Army has not put Special forces at the for front since UW, Special Warfare is what they are all about.

[Ken White]

If we're needed for a long time, how do we determine the optimal number of troops? Doesn't doctrine say that COIN is very labor intensive?

does, sort of; it postulates about 20 COIN personnel including police per 1,000 of population. The figure ranges from 18 to 35 depending on which version you wish to believe, that gives a median of 27, err on the side of caution and go with 20, any combination of either allies or host nation.

They need to do it, we just need to help.

[TROUFION]

Face it a surge is simply a reinforcement in order to regain or recapture the momentum that was/is being lost to a "surge" re-SURGEnt opposing force. The ability for a commander in the field to call for and recieve local reinforcement is very improtant. The main issue will be the duration and the question that will linger-will more FORIEGN troops be needed. I believe the stated concept of the USMC reinforcement of the Afghan effort is clearly the right design. A MEU to reinfore the NATO combat effort and a BN reinforced to reinforce the training and assistance effort. These are smart moves. The timing is also right as it will reinforce prior to the warm weather and carry through the historically most dangerous months.

The bottomline, the US and NATO need to hold the line long enough and push back the Taliban enough to allow Afghan forces to train and equip to stand on their own. How long and at what cost are still to be determined. BUT a reinforcement to regain momentum and get the effort through a danger zone is a smart thing to do.

-T

[Granite_State]

IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.

That's interesting, I've only ever seen that argument made by Air Force officers and maybe Colonel MacGregor. But wasn't Saddam's Army, Republican Guard, and Fedayeen a totally different beast than the Taliban, and, Kurdistan aside, with no credible domestic opposition? Seems to me like the truck-mounted Fedayeen, at the least, could have dodged our bombs as well as the Serbs did in Kosovo.

[TROUFION]

The initial invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq went off in masterful applications of force. Both operations were handled with superb directness of purpose. They were entirely different operations. In afghan the Northern Alliance provided the major ground forces which the SF-backed by airpower- could leverage against a fanatical but militarily weak Taliban. Further the small generally rural population of Afghanistan contributed to the success of SF. Nothing of the sort existed in Iraq. The all SF/airpower plan would have run aground in there. Believe me it was a very good thing to have a Comapany of M1A1 and a CAAT Platoon to defeat the dispersed units of t-55 an t-72's that were engaged in the cities and suburbs. The population of Iraq, the urban nature of this population and the lack of a solid indigenous support base would have left an all SF operation hanging in a very precarious position. Remember the invasion was highly successful and complete in just 3 weeks despite hard fighting and heavy resistance in certain areas.

Most of the confusion comes from the aftermath of the two invasions, the post invasion actions. The draw down of coalition forces, the realignment of local forces and the transition to COIN and stability-reconstruction operations. In both cases this transition was handled ineligantly. Mostly the reason for this was a lack of knowledge, lack of training,lack of coordination, lack of willingness and lack of vision by the administration, local forces and field commanders to accept these new missions.

-T

[Eden]

When we attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is true that US forces consisted mainly of SF and airpower. However, they worked hand-in-hand with the Northern Alliance and several other like groupings. The indigenous forces provided the conventional troops required to force the Taliban to mass so that we could hammer them with airpower. Once the Taliban figured out that they were in a no-win situation, they rapidly collapsed. In Iraq, there were no indigenous armies on the ground to provide security for the SF and force the enemy to present himself as a target. We had to provide that army.

Even if we could have crushed the Iraqis with a slightly pumped up version of Afghanistan, you still need troops to occupy the country. Those who say we did not need to occupy the country miss the point of the war in the first place: not just to topple Saddam, but to create a democratic outpost in the Middle East. Furthermore, our failure to follow up our victory in Afghanistan - due to lack of resources and troops on the ground - foreshadowed our lack of vision in Iraq. It just took longer for those particular fowl to come home to roost.

Just proof that preparing for the last war is not the sole perogative of conventional thinkers.

[slapout9]

SF was suppsed to have been supported by the Iraqi Army similar to the Northern Alliance. Downing and Several people thought that many Iraqi generals could be convinced to turn and overthrow Saddam with SF/Airpower support. Which in hindsight sounds really good but at the time may have seemed very questionable. However just recently 60 minutes did and interview of the FBI agent incharge of Saddam's interrogation. He had apparently already given orders for the Iraqi Army to stall the invasion for 2 weeks and then convert to a guerrilla campaign. How believable Saddam was is subject to opinion but that is what the FBI recorded him as saying during their interview.

[Ken White]

He even told us so -- and we were all too dumb to pick up on it. He announced he was going to arm everyone, let all the prisoners out of the jails, many things. he told us what he was going to do and we in our stupid arrogance ignored him. He gave those two Russian Generals medals just before the invasion and I remember thinking "Boy, they didn't do you any favors, why a medal?" After a week I woke up and realized why -- they told him he'd never beat the US conventionally; let 'em in, go to ground and they'll leave. We got suckered (again).

I doubt that Downings plan would have worked, I think the fear was too pervasive and the bulk of the Iraqi Generals were loyal enough that none would have turned. Langley also espoused that idea and IIRC, there was really only one Div Cdr that flipped. Langley also thought they had a couple of insiders turned as agents. Apparently not.

[AEI Squirrel]

There is no necessary contradiction between Mike Vickers' quite sensible long-term approach to Afghanistan - of course, a decisive outcome can only be achieved by the Afghans themselves - and the need for a short-term plus-up of forces in the south, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. The 2009 and 2010 (per the current calendar) elections in Afghanistan are important points of deflection. Current conditions would not allow those elections to be held safely in the south (remember that the polling must be verified by the UN to be seen as legitimate). The British and Canadian contingents who are doing all the hard fighting in the south would welcome additional capabilities and numbers they simply don't have; the government in Kabul also sees this as a crucial time and would welcome an additional US commitment (and there's not really any other force available and even a US "surge" would be limited by strains on the force).

While I now work at AEI, I was also once was the editor of Army Times (and was lucky enough to have hired Sean Naylor in the first place), so my suspicion is that Sean wrote the story to make the conflict seem greater than it probably really is. Remember, Vickers' speech did not mention the AEI work and sounds to me like the kind of approach that he's long advocated. I also think it's likely that Mike understands that in the course of "building partnership capacity" in Afghanistan there may be moments where a more direct helping hand is required; the need to conduct successful elections - and to begin to set the conditions for that now - seems like one of those moments.

The esteemed readers of this journal should have a more sophisticated understanding of the way Us policy is made and ought to be wary of conspiracy theories - it's the bureaucratic equivalent of Okham's Razor: never explain by conspiracy what you can explain as confusion or incompetence.

Tom Donnelly

[Ken White]

There is no necessary contradiction between Mike Vickers' quite sensible long-term approach to Afghanistan - of course, a decisive outcome can only be achieved by the Afghans themselves - and the need for a short-term plus-up of forces in the south, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar.Didn't say there was, my point was only that AEI, like most other tanks, has ideas that may or may not have merit. My perception of AEI is that they get some right and some wrong but that they generally have an agenda. That agenda may or may not coincide with that of the Prez -- or mine :D. It also may accord priorities in a different order than some. Is a sustained effort in Afghanistan going to be enhanced by a short term surge that will exacerbate the stretching of the force? AEI thinks yea, I think nay.
The 2009 and 2010 (per the current calendar) elections in Afghanistan are important points of deflection. Current conditions would not allow those elections to be held safely in the south (remember that the polling must be verified by the UN to be seen as legitimate).I can remember that the polling must be verified by the UN in the eyes of some to be seen as legitimate...
The British and Canadian contingents who are doing all the hard fighting in the south would welcome additional capabilities and numbers they simply don't haveNot all, most. I'm sure they would appreciate more help. Most commanders will ask for more troops at the slightest provocation -- or with no provocation :)
the government in Kabul also sees this as a crucial time and would welcome an additional US commitment (and there's not really any other force available and even a US "surge" would be limited by strains on the force).[ Yep. To both points.
While I now work at AEI, I was also once was the editor of Army Times (and was lucky enough to have hired Sean Naylor in the first place)...And be assured, we won't hold that against you. We all have some things in pour past... ;)
Remember, Vickers' speech did not mention the AEI work and sounds to me like the kind of approach that he's long advocated. I also think it's likely that Mike understands that in the course of "building partnership capacity" in Afghanistan there may be moments where a more direct helping hand is required; the need to conduct successful elections - and to begin to set the conditions for that now - seems like one of those moments. Probably true.
The esteemed readers of this journal should have a more sophisticated understanding of the way Us policy is made and ought to be wary of conspiracy theories - it's the bureaucratic equivalent of Okham's Razor: never explain by conspiracy what you can explain as confusion or incompetence. I'm certainly not esteemed but I can assure you I discard conspiracy theories for the almost certain problems of incompetence or, more common, extreme bureaucratic stupidity. :mad:

I just think the surge idea(s) and 'more boots on the ground' mentality are incorrect. These things take time and overstretching the force will not appreciably speed them up, ergo, it's sort of wasted effort. Your 'surge' in Iraq may speed things up slightly but that's about all it'll do. Afghanistan, OTOH, is not amenable to a speed up. Different strokes, as they say.

The real problem is which boots are where and doing what, not how many there are.

It should be noted that, in some respects anyway, we're getting better and smarter about that everyday...

[AEI Squirrel]

The strategic purpose of the Iraq surge - well, one of them - was to slow things down: namely, the rush to withdrawal in response to the events of 2006. To win in the long run, it helps not to be defeated in the short run. Likewise, the failure to hold legitimate elections (and while I'm not fan of the UN, that's the standard, if for no other reason that it was the standard in 2004; to walk back on that would itself be a problem) in 2009 will be very bad news, though probably not as immediately disastrous as what we faced in Iraq last year. Historical footnote: the AEI Afghanistan surge is really for one brigade, based on force generation realities. Ideally, you might want three, but you do really need something in Kandahar and Helmand.

[Ken White]

The strategic purpose of the Iraq surge - well, one of them - was to slow things down: namely, the rush to withdrawal in response to the events of 2006. To win in the long run, it helps not to be defeated in the short run.Or the politically desirable? :wry:

I acknowledge it was the latter among other things. It had and has no bearing on the former in the military or geo-strategic sense. And, yes, I realize that domestic politics have a part to play -- I would simply suggest that their importance is often overstated. W. wasn't going anywhere and no way Congress could've forced the issue. Well, they could've but, more accurately, they wouldn't have...
Likewise, the failure to hold legitimate elections (and while I'm not fan of the UN, that's the standard, if for no other reason that it was the standard in 2004; to walk back on that would itself be a problem) in 2009 will be very bad news, though probably not as immediately disastrous as what we faced in Iraq last year. I undersand the relevance of a UN imprimatur in the eyes of many. My suspicion is that G.W. Bush is not particularly concerned with that -- nor am I. I again recognize the political sensibilities involved but question the actual political necessity (particularly when it's bounced against the military desirability).
Historical footnote: the AEI Afghanistan surge is really for one brigade, based on force generation realities. Ideally, you might want three, but you do really need something in Kandahar and Helmand.I'd read that. Since I have reservations about one, you can imagine my reaction to three ;) .

Perhaps surprisingly, I do not disagree with you that Kanadahar and Helmand are problematic at this time. I strongly agree something should be done about that. We simply differ on what to do about it. The reason for the problem, of course, is the bad guys realize those two nations are a far easier target for turning public opinion toward withdrawal than are we and are thus concentrating their affection on them. Aside from the rather interesting fact the opposition has revealed a glaring weakness in that acknowledgment, I think there's another message in that. I'd also suggest there are some good things in the combined action arena going on for NATO and us in both areas and that indications are someone in country has had the same thoughts as I have about missions, structure and locations.

In the geo strategic arena, as you know, the issue is balancing domestic versus international politics versus military capability. Three legged stools are notoriously easy to tip, particularly if you over stress one leg. :D

[slapout9]

Link for those interested on various plans that were pending the Iraq invasion. Look towards the bottom of link and you will desert storm lite,Downing/Afghan plan, etc. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq-options.htm

[Jedburgh]

Senlis Council, 18 Feb 08: US Policy in Afghanistan: Senlis Council Recommendations (http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/us_policy_recommendations)

I. Security recommendations

Recommendation I: The US should actively participate in and help form a “NATO-Plus” force: more ground troops, caveat-free and an active involvement of the military in humanitarian aid and development delivery.

Recommendation II: Increase support for Pakistan’s security forces through training and limited US special forces’ operations.

Recommendation III: Help the Afghan Government establish Neighborhood Security Groups
Details of the above recommendations and additional recommendations for Counternarcotics and Development are at the link.

[DaveDoyle]

Bottom line is that if our goal is to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland the reinforcements wouldn't be enough. If our goal is simply to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist-free, what we have their now is sufficient.

I can't agree with this statement. What we have in the way of troop numbers (combat, combat support and combat service support) is NOT sufficient to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist free. The troops there now are fighting to buy time for the Afghans, but the terrorists are the ones accelerating the struggle.

Our troops are operating at increased risk based on the slim margins that are currently accepted as the norm in Afghanistan. Lack of aviation assets for direct action missions, logistics, and medevac operations put our operations regularly at higher level of risk. Even PRT missions, and "humanitarian" efforts have to deal with this critical constraint.

Factor that with the size of the operating environment that our troops deal with and you can see that more Marines would be a good thing. In many cases platoons at combat outposts have enough personnel to conduct their own force protection mission and only periodic engagement with the villages and rural areas surrounding them. That's no way to build a rapport or collect intelligence, or assist Afghan security efforts.

A coordinated plan with MORE troops will make a difference - maybe not a Switzerland, but some place less inclined to support and produce terrorists with a global reach.

[jcustis]

1. That the greatest threat to Afghanistan is the Taliban. The Taliban is a spent strategic force. In a few localities they retain their traditional support, but they have lost whatever nationwide appeal they may have once had. In many cases, they have become mere criminals, selling protection or working for the local drug lord. No, the longer-term threat to nation-building are the narcotic kings, regional power brokers, and semi-criminal entrepreneurs who have traditionally run affairs in the area. The only reason they have not vigorously opposed the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan is due to the sheer ineffectiveness of some of our allies. Relatively heavy fighting is largely restricted to the southern and eastern portions of the country not because it is a hotbed of Taliban support, but because those are the only areas where the Brits, Canadians, and Americans are making life difficult for those Afghans pursuing their traditional livelihoods: smuggling, extortion, and pissing in the river upstream from your neighbor. Elsewhere, bad guys are happy to accept western largesse so long as NATO doesn't actually interfere with them.

Is Afghanistan more akin to Columbia right now, in your mind Eden?

[Eden]

I think that there are some superficial resemblances to Columbia, in that you have a synergistic relationship between an insurgency and criminals - the one enabling the other, the other returning the favor. But I would say it is more like the Columbia of twenty years ago, when there was less blurring of the lines between insurgent and drug criminal.

The other difference is that the insurgents in Afghanistan (I am grossly oversimplifying here, but stay with me) have international support, and a steady stream of foreign volunteers, plus a secure sanctuary over the border in Pakistan. Hmmm, agains, it does sound like Columbia, but 20-30 years ago.

[wm]

I can't agree with this statement. What we have in the way of troop numbers (combat, combat support and combat service support) is NOT sufficient to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist free. The troops there now are fighting to buy time for the Afghans, but the terrorists are the ones accelerating the struggle.

Our troops are operating at increased risk based on the slim margins that are currently accepted as the norm in Afghanistan. Lack of aviation assets for direct action missions, logistics, and medevac operations put our operations regularly at higher level of risk. Even PRT missions, and "humanitarian" efforts have to deal with this critical constraint.

Factor that with the size of the operating environment that our troops deal with and you can see that more Marines would be a good thing. In many cases platoons at combat outposts have enough personnel to conduct their own force protection mission and only periodic engagement with the villages and rural areas surrounding them. That's no way to build a rapport or collect intelligence, or assist Afghan security efforts.

A coordinated plan with MORE troops will make a difference - maybe not a Switzerland, but some place less inclined to support and produce terrorists with a global reach.

Two posts almost 9 months apart--situations change. What may have been true in 11/07 may now be OBE. Or, it could be that we (to include ISAF) still have sufficient forces in the AOR and are just not using them in an optimal fashion to accomplish the assigned mission(s).