Retooling the Artilleryman

[Jedburgh]

Fires Bulletin (http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/), Sep-Dec 07: Retooling the Artilleryman (http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2007/sep_dec_2007/Sep_Dec_2007_pages_12_15.pdf)

The 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (2-17 FA), Steel, had returned from Ramadi, Iraq, in 2005 for only a few months when chatter started within the ranks about another deployment. For the Artillerymen of Steel, the talk about when Steel would return to Iraq seemed less important as to how it would return. Training is vital to every battalion, but 2-17 FA had not completed its transformation from a 155-mm Paladin unit into a 105-mm howitzer unit yet. The question was obvious: Train as infantry, train as Artillery or train as both?

The battalion commander attacked the problem by preparing the Redlegs for both missions—and not with 50 percent effort into each—ensuring Steel would be a multifunctional battalion able to accomplish FA as well as infantry missions. The battalion received essential support from the brigade commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, to ensure the Soldiers were “kitted out” like infantry.....

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have had this discussion with an Artillery officer I know. I have proposed to him that the Artillery MUST be able to transition to infantry, or better yet, MPs, upon transition to stability operations. He argues passionately that they cannot do both mission.

The bottom line is that once an Army Brigade Combat Team transitions to stability operations, the Artillery is poorly suited for that mission. They become a drag on resources unless they can transition. I could argue that in a BCT, somewhere between one-third and one-half of the soldiers in the unit are not suitable for stability operations depending on the type of BCT.

The Army has built a leaner, more lethal force that is not capable of performing the missions that is has been given.

Seems to me you have two choices (given that we cannot turn down missions). One, we look at expanding training for artillery, armor, ADA, and any other pure combat force so that they can perform MP, not infantry, missions to allow them to be relevant in stability operations, or you build and field a specific division/brigade designed for stability operations.

[Rob Thornton]

but she can cook.", is a euphemism that comes to mind. Artillery units, and other specialties have proven up to the task of doing both - as have many other specialized units and MOSs. There are consequences, and they may not be optimized in education, MTO&E, etc. - but they are doing it. The enabler has been leadership at all levels, it has proven the lever by which FA units (and others) have reorganized for stability related tasks.

Keep in mind that many FSOs and FECs are working non traditional roles within HQs and staffs to good measure. FSOs are often being called on to be Intel officers at the company level (I don't mean as in graduates from the MI ADV Course - but as analysts asking the "so what is the enemy trying to do questions based on new and existing information). FSNCOs are also being tasked to put their gray matter to other tasks as well such as IO or Intel (we re-rolled ours to good effect).

The GPF of today are capable of reorganizing to meet the tasks that grow out of METT-TC - they are both bright and adaptable. Will other tasks atrophy some - yes. That is the risk - and resources will have to be applied on the back end to really address them, however units are also mitigating this some by conducting training in theater - mortar and FA shoots for example, or in some cases they are asked t perform more traditional tasks in support of larger stability type missions - firing illum over large graveyards to prevent insurgents from caching IED materials and arms/equipment in those "sacred" type places during LIMVIS.

My personal observation is that FA units have provided a source of manpower and leadership in an existing, homogeneous organization to successfully complete a number of missions in a variety of conditions. They have met the challenge and shown what soldiers and leaders are capable of. We will probably never be resourced to be fully optimized for the range of military operations across the full spectrum of war, but we do have the human capitol required to adapt relatively quickly to meet them, and we are capable of resourcing and delivering the material and equipment they require to do so.

Best regards, Rob

[slapout9]

One of the benefits with Artillery is their concept of Targeting. All the confusion about some of the complexities of EBO concepts just melt away whne you begin to look at it from the standpoint of D3A. That should become the new holy mantra of the Army in my humble opinon. Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess. That is some Strategic Stuff there. all in 4 little words with big effects both leathal and non-leathal and anything in between. :wry:

[Rob Thornton]

Steve, good point - the targeting cycle has been around for a long time - since when people had to make choices about what (and how) to attack/influence, where and when to do it, again with how best given resources, and then if they were successful enough not to have to go after it again. I think that has been some of the unspoken thinking - we've been doing EBO stuff for a long time - we just did not need to obfuscate it with seemingly complex processes. I don't mind that we've written down how we might think about it, but the problem with doing so is that if you put it down into a Joint doctrine there is enough disparity and culture generated by the means and ways of doing it that it can create some real arguments as to how it plays out.

The other thing I'd say is that it also gets at something Steve Blair wrote me the other day about the dichotomy in war - "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult - dead Prussian theorist." There is allot of friction that goes into D3A as it plays out on the ground, not the least of which are the unintended consequences generated from action in a complex and interactive environment charged with fog, friction and chance. I think that is the reason that as a mantra you'll find "Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess" more culturally acceptable in the USAF and USN then the USA. That is not to slight our other services, but it does recognize that there are some unique conditions in which ground forces, air forces, and naval forces predominately operate in.

Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, I agree about the friction part. Friction is most likley to reveal itself on the ground IMO. It is not something that the AF or USN would see or have to deal with like the Army would. From their world friction is almost none exsistant... fly a plane..drop bomb....go home...check if you hit it. Meanwhile the army sees that there is a ton of rubble blocking a road so a food shipment can't get through or an ambulance or whatever. The Army has to deal with that right now. "The Remore Control Services":eek: just kind of wonder what the problem is. The final effect is best understood from a "Ground Assessment" before you start the cycle over again. Again just my opinion.

[TheCurmudgeon]

but she can cook.", is a euphemism that comes to mind. Artillery units, and other specialties have proven up to the task of doing both - as have many other specialized units and MOSs. There are consequences, and they may not be optimized in education, MTO&E, etc. - but they are doing it. The enabler has been leadership at all levels, it has proven the lever by which FA units (and others) have reorganized for stability related tasks.



We accept all missions. We do not have the luxury of saying "no, that is not my job". You hit on some key points regarding utilizing any unit outside thier normal specialty. 1) Training - Do they have the training (and the doctrine) to be able to competentaly accomplish the mission. 2) MTOE - do they come to the fight with the right equipment for the job. Did they have that equipment to train-up with prior to getting into theater.

Full Spectrum operations requires specialized training and equipment. We are learning on the fly. I think to simply say "don't worry, you guys are good, you can handle it" is denying the problem.

We will get through this because we have to. But if we don't recognize the problem and make the appropriate changes to our training, MTOEs, and Doctrine, then we will just repeat this mistake agian in the future.

[Rob Thornton]

I agree with you up to a point:


We will get through this because we have to. But if we don't recognize the problem and make the appropriate changes to our training, MTOEs, and Doctrine, then we will just repeat this mistake agian in the future.

But the requirements of being all to end all probably guarantee that we will always have a learning curve - the best we might do is adapt faster then the enemy.

The MTO&Es are not going to change too much - again it goes back to be structured to be the GPF to meet the full spectrum workload outlined as our responsibility - relevant and ready landvpower. The best we might hope for is recognition the full spectrum tasks require full spectrum MTO&Es and an expanded METL for those units which justify maintaining equipment and justifying resources.

The doctrine I believe will be most helpful is the capstone stuff and its supporting doctrine -ex. the new 3-0 justifies 3-24, etc. It will help leaders recognize and adapt faster to changes in conditions.

However, reading what SWC member Ken White (who really has been around since Jesus was a Pvt.:D) has penned here over time has led me to consider my own 22 years differently. Why do we seem to have to constantly relearn things? I'm beginning to think its more a condition then a problem. We're never going to be resourced in time, personnel, equipment, etc. to be prepared for all the military situations which might confront us - nor do I think we've ever been (although there have been time where by virtue of preparing for one thing, we were better prepared for another). As soon as you sink resources into the type of war you fought, or think you fought, or in this case are fighting, but want to conclude, somebody who has been watching you fight and who is concerned you are going to come to their neighborhood decides how to fight you differently enough to where you are not as prepared. Its the nature of an interactive, thinking enemy.

That is why we do the GPF boogaloo - aka the "Golden Mean". It provides us enough operational and strategic depth (fleshed out by some specialized capabilities like SOF) from which to out adapt our enemies across the spectrum and ROMO. It means the guys and gals who go first are going to incur a harsh damned penalty for playing the "away" game, but it provides us the flexibility to gather the needed resources to prevail.

I'd say that is also why the best military doctrine and writing are the stuff that helps you to think about war, vs. spelling out what to do. Its not easy, there are no well resourced low hanging fruit to be had for those of us living in GPF land - but through a well organized Institution we can develop leaders who can meet those challenges and better overcome the enduring fog, friction and chance and the differences in conditions we see in each new war we fight (or an evolution of the same war).

Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

The recent terminology shift from GPF to Multipurpose Forces (MPF) is a good harbinger, I think.

The Marines could be ahead of the power curve and effectively leverage the old MRU(SOC) into an MEU(COIN); I submit the Army can do the same thing.

The key is the doctrine. We did not train on COIN or ID for over 30 years because the doctrine lay dormant and we didn't want to play. We have no choice in whether we play or not; we have got to be prepared to play and play the total spectrum of warfare whenever the civilian heirarchy says "Go out and play in the traffic..."

We will not get to choose whether that traffic is comprised of fleets of 18 wheelers or a dozen baby buggies or whatever in between; we've got to be prepared to f do it all. We owe that much to the Nation, to the troops and even to the institutions themselves. Competence is justification to the max...

If the Doctrine says that FA Bns should be prepared to function as MPs in the post attack phase (Great idea, BTW) and the Spt Bn has to guard its own compounds and convoys, then we will resource, train for and be able to do that. If it says that Light Infantry will do the foot mobile missions, that the Stryker BCTs will do the Mech AND foot mobile missions and that Armor Bns will be able to provide Armor elements OR wheel vehicle mounted patrols OnO or any of dozens of potential variations on that theme -- then we'll do that.

If the Doctrine says that Cat I units are authorized 10% overstrength, stabilized, fully resourced and trained and equipped for both primary and alternate (and even supplemental) missions, then we will do that. If that Doctrine says that CAT II units will be at strength, train and be resourced for their primary mission and be capable of receiving an equipment set and training for an alternate (or even also a supplementary) mission in 60 days, then we will do that. Cat II units get 80% fill and 90 days...

We have the capability to do these things; the troops have the capability to absorb the training and do the tasks. If we spend wisely (not our strong point :rolleyes: ) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.

The capability is there, all that's needed is the will in high places...

Oh. Rob, the answer to your question is one word. We have to relearn things because of -- egos.

The very sad thing is that our very excessive branch parochiality, our tendency to adopt fads, our rejection of anything our predecessors did, our rejection of any good ideas until they become our ideas causes the effect that as new brooms move in and sweep out the old, they always do the baby - bathwater bit... :mad:

P.S.

That competence? It also goes a long way toward making bad guys think twice before they mess with you in any venue...

Lot of advantages to that...

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out:D

Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."

I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF. If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? The GPMG thing is a bad analogy on my part- machines are not people. Maybe I can answer the broader question I just asked myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:

General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas

Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.

This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.

I'd qualify this by saying we'll have to acknowledge that when conditions call for a large commitment there will be some risk in that not all might have had recent training in all requisite areas - but there are no perfect answers.

I like the idea - it sounds feasible and mitigates strategic risk.

Best, Rob

[TheCurmudgeon]

We have the capability to do these things; the troops have the capability to absorb the training and do the tasks. If we spend wisely (not our strong point :rolleyes: ) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.

The capability is there, all that's needed is the will in high places...

Oh. Rob, the answer to your question is one word. We have to relearn things because of -- egos.


I agree with you on both points. I don't think we give our soldiers as much credit as they deserve, or believe that they are as capable of taking on multiple complex missions. It is often the officers who, as you said, are parochial about their branch, that fail to fully appreciate this.

There is more than ego. There is no glamour in stability operations ... being a glorified policeman, a "peacekeeper". Without that glamour the leadership does not want to do it and Congress doesn't want to pay for it.

I am not sure if you could really use the same units that kicked in the door to immediately shift to providing security in a way that does not alienate the population, in a manner that co-opts any potential insurgency rather than reinforces thier themes. For the Infantry I don't think this is feasible or wise. I want them on the top of thier game. But some of the other units, like FA and ADA could make the shift. But I still have reservations on how to get the second, supplemental set of equipment into theater. It would also require the DIV HQ to be able to make that shift. But now I am just rambling.

I remember seeing what we used to call RACO, Rear Area Combat Operations, slowly fall by the wayside. All the Corps support assets transitioned into front line units. We lost ASGs and the likes as more BCTs were built. Now we have the "Non-Contiguous Battlefield". To me, that just means that we have ceded control of sections of the battlefield to the enemy. I am wandering off down a rabbit hole but I feel that the two subjects are related. It seems to me that if we quit concentraing on lean and lethal we might make some progress toward a force that is capable of performing all the missions that we need to be able to handle.

[Ken White]

Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out:D

Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."

I think egos are the principal driver but your contextual understanding and a strong (and sad) disregard for history contribute. There are other minor contributors as well. The personnel system is itself a major contributor to both the context and ego elements. I've had more than one GO tell me that just as they finally learned the job, they moved.

That same personnel system -- which needs to be destroyed -- is also responsible for insisting that the new brooms hit the road running and achieve rapid results; it forces the egos into overdrive and does not allow time for contextual scanning.


I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF....

I have friends in low places... :D


If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? Maybe I can answer it myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:

General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas

Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.

Works for me. The big plus I see is that at least someone in the Pentazoo is thinking -- that's always a plus.


This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.

True -- and we already have the DMETL today. We also have humungous stocks of predeployed equipment much of which is ancient and will need to be replaced soon. Or does it? A little jiggle of the POM and... ;)


I'd qualify this by saying we'll have to acknowledge that when conditions call for a large commitment there will be some risk in that not all might have had recent training in all requisite areas - but there are no perfect answers.

Also true, always a possibility and 'no perfects' is correct. The key IMO, is the Intel -- I'm not nearly as confident about that piece as I am about the capability of units to do multiple missions.

One thing that I think would help with the Intel on a global basis is to form a MilAssistAdvisoryCmd with a BG / MG Cdr as a counterpart to the SOCom at each Combatant Commander. Staff it with regional FAOs and interface it with the DAO, MEDTs and SOC elms...

Provided, of course, that we start to realize the value of the FAOs.


I like the idea - it sounds feasible and mitigates strategic risk.

Best, Rob

We'll see what they come up with. At least it's being looked at. I just hope we don't go too far down the "COIN is God" route. We're bad about over correcting...

[wm]

Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out:D

Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."

I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF. If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? The GPMG thing is a bad analogy on my part- machines are not people. Maybe I can answer the broader question I just asked myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:

General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas

Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.

This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.


Regarding the relearning issue--I suspect it is the centralized selection process and up or out promotion system that requires one to do something "different" (even though it really isn't) in order to get a good report card and stand out from one's peers to get picked up for those career enhancing nominative assignments and promotions more than ego that is the reason for all the wheel re-invention we do (unless we equate ego to getting promoted to as high a rank as possible, regardless of actual ability).

My take on GPF vs. MPF:
GPF = jack of all trades, master of none.
MPF = jack of many trades, master of some. Combat engineers are MPF--they really can fight as infantry when required :cool:

[slapout9]

:confused:I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

[Rob Thornton]

I can see it working out well -

ex. BCT Alpha receives a mission that tells it to conduct FID in a COIN environment in country #1. During its MA it decides it needs X number of MiTTs, Y number of PTTs & SPTT, and Z number of PRTs (augmented with Inter-Agency folks and contractors). It develops at Task Org that puts one BN TF like organization for the MiTTs, one for the PTT & SPTTs, and one for the PRTs - this provides the C2 and support structure within each to plan, execute, coordinate resources for, and generally sustain all of those missions while securing its own LOCs. It might decide it needs to keep one or two company sized elements back for QRF like organizations, and one or two company sized elements back for FOB security of the BCT HQs and sustainment base (if not contracted or run by a higher HQs). This does not mean its OIF or OEF - it might be in support of AFRICOM or another Regional COCOM.

From the moment of alert and initial MA - the training base moves to support the resources required - from hardware to movement - from language and cultural training, from Inter-Agency augmentees to a CTC like path that provides a MRE tailored to that mission.

I believe we can do that!

Meanwhile...

HBCT Bravo get told to do TSC where it is told to go out and do a combination deterrence against a conventional threat to an ally while conducting TSC by helping them train their conventional mechanized forces to secure their sovereignty - they also task organize accordingly based off their MA and the training base gets in line to assist and resource.

and the list of possibilities goes on to include units training in CONUS and OCONUS against a suite of most likely enemy COAs, etc.

I think that is an executable balance given the possibilities that exist, and well within our ability to execute - I do think getting the extra BCTs online is critical to meet the demand and have enough capability training n the various categories to meet the demand and have depth - but those can only be built so fast.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

MPF = jack of many trades, master of some. Combat engineers are MPF--they really can fight as infantry when required

Wayne- good catch! Sappers are among the most versatile and creative soldiers I know.

Best, Rob

[TheCurmudgeon]

:confused:I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

That would be my option #2, build specific SASO or what I call Rear Area, Stability and Reconstruction Brigades/Division. I like that name because RASR (pronounced RAZOR) sounds cooler than SASO (Got to start stroking those egos early).

I like this idea both as a rear area security element and, once the main battle is over, the elements that transition into the stability and reconstrution units. The Brigade would be built around two MP BNs, one EN BN and a CA/PA BN along with the normal support stuff. Just a thought.

[slapout9]

RAZOR sounds cool, it has MOJO as you say that is important. Like the organization to. MP's can hold it, Engineers can build it, CA can win support for it.

[Rob Thornton]

By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

I think we're getting there with the ways we're restructure the ME (maneuver enhancement) BDEs and also the BTSB (Brigade Special Troops BN) - which some BCTs have made good use of - but they had to work it to fit their needs. I'd also say some of these capabilities might be built in the ARNG because we get the dual use out of it - Title 10 and Title 32. Not much $$$$ though for states in IBCTs and ME BDEs with lots of MPs - hard to get some of that Title 10 money. It also means that when policy decides to do something where we anticipate a big Stability type commitment where we'd like to have lots of MPs - it means activating the ARNG - because that's where the "bulk" would reside. But again - it does fit with their Title 32 - enabling civil support type responsibilities. However you do it - the AC and RC components are going to be (and should be) interdependent - we just need to decide both what makes sense and what is doable in the face of state politics.
Best, Rob

Best, Rob

[wm]

That would be my option #2, build specific SASO or what I call Rear Area, Stability and Reconstruction Brigades/Division. I like that name because RASR (pronounced RAZOR) sounds cooler than SASO (Got to start stroking those egos early).

I like this idea both as a rear area security element and, once the main battle is over, the elements that transition into the stability and reconstrution units. The Brigade would be built around two MP BNs, one EN BN and a CA/PA BN along with the normal support stuff. Just a thought.

This organization sounds a lot like one of the "augmentation" Bdes discussed early on in the transformation process-it was called a Maneuver Enhancement Bde---BOI was going to be maybe one per lower level command and control headquarters (UEx--somewhere between a div and a corps)--all depended on the COCOM's RFF and strategic tailoring IIRC. The Army used to have rear area protection/rear area combat operations (RAP/RACO) units--it was a secondary mission for sustainment/MP forces in the rear (back in the days of linear battlefields in Europe with Spetsnaz trying to disrupt our rear area activities.

[selil]

:confused:I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

Just use those cannon cockers and civilian kitchen staff.

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.


Egads I think I'm choking on my own sarcasm.

[Penta]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

[Norfolk]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

Very good point Penta!:) Why indeed should senior officers have to be up-or-out by 55 (at the latest), never mind junior officers that are automatically tossed if they don't make Major within 10 years? The present system was based on what was introduced to clear out the deadwood back in the early days of WWII, but is based on more of a corporate (ie. individual career track) rather than an institutional model.

Not surprisingly, that leads to many officers in general and many flag officers in particular not only developing along much the same lines as businessmen (and for many of the same sorts of reasons), but given that they're going to need a civvie job when they retire, they're already going to be looking ahead to that day when they take off the uniform and put on a business suit. If mandatory retirement (and FULL pension and benefits) were available at an age limit of say 60, there may be somewhat less incentive for senior officers to learn the often less useful traits of businessmen and subsequently to prepare their way for employment in business after their military career.

There really isn't so much of a military-industrial complex so much as there is a political-industrial complex; military spending is just grist for its mill, and military officers who go along with it in their careers become accomplices to it. Professionalism is necessary for the Army; careerism, it goes without saying, is seriously damaging to it. And of course the system as it exists is mostly about the latter, to the detriment of the former.

Now, to the topic of the thread at hand. Unless the Army is going to form Constabulary Regiments like it had two generations ago, and to do that it will have to come out of someone else's hide - principally the BCTs, then it's just going to have to keep doing what every other Army in the English-speaking world has been doing since the 1960's. And that is taking units of all the Combat Arms and re-rolling and -training them as infantry for low-intensity warfare. It is a huge disruption to unit (and parent Formation) training and readiness.

And to give just an example, several years ago, a Commonwealth Artillery Regiment being sent to Cyprus on UN duties not only was (obviously) re-rolled as infantry for the duration, but required a draft of troops from an Armour Regiment just to bring itself up to strength. And no, it's not practically possible to do both infantry training and operations [I]and/I] keep up one's parent Arms training and skills. Something will suffer. Ask the Brits or the Canadians, they've been doing this for over 40 years, and it never gets any easier.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think we're getting there with the ways we're restructure the ME (maneuver enhancement) BDEs and also the BTSB (Brigade Special Troops BN) - which some BCTs have made good use of - but they had to work it to fit their needs.



A CSB(ME) is exactly that, a support unit for Maneuver elements. The BSB is very maintenance heavy. It is not intended for this type of mission even though it is modular in concept. Besides, it falls under the Maneuver Division. A RASR would be a Corps asset. Ideally, it would have its own DIV HQ that would have a CMOC with an extended interagency capability.

[Ken White]

...
There is more than ego. There is no glamour in stability operations ... being a glorified policeman, a "peacekeeper". Without that glamour the leadership does not want to do it and Congress doesn't want to pay for it.

Agree -- but I suggest the glamor aspect is partly ego. In fairness, there was / is a true concern for the troops and the institution (not necessarily in that order in all cases); COIN is ugly, tedious work. Certainly best avoided -- but not to the point of trying to deny one will ever do that mission.

Congress doesn't want to pay for much of anything that won't benefit multiple districts. I've condemned them for that for over forty years. However, in fairness to them, the Army (and DoD) have gone along with that chicanery for that same forty years. It's a case of everyone remembering what their oath says and doing the right thing instead of the expedient thing. Ten years ago I despaired of that ever changing. Today, thanks to the internet and blogs like this, hope may be at hand. ;)


I am not sure if you could really use the same units that kicked in the door to immediately shift to providing security in a way that does not alienate the population, in a manner that co-opts any potential insurgency rather than reinforces thier themes. For the Infantry I don't think this is feasible or wise. I want them on the top of thier game...

Done both as an Infantryman in two countries in different services, it's not at all hard to shift gears IF the troops are even reasonably well trained. We still do not train well, even though we're pretty much doing it better now than ever before.


...But some of the other units, like FA and ADA could make the shift. But I still have reservations on how to get the second, supplemental set of equipment into theater. It would also require the DIV HQ to be able to make that shift. But now I am just rambling.

The 'second' set should be part of the MTOE and should deploy with the unit to the staging area for short term hold than rapid movement forward.


I remember seeing what we used to call RACO, Rear Area Combat Operations, slowly fall by the wayside. All the Corps support assets transitioned into front line units...

The MPs picked up the mission and did it well (even though DA did not resource them well for the mission until 2004) -- if Rumsfeld hadn't screwed with the TPFDL, there'd have been a reinforced MP Bde right behind 3d ID --- instead, there was one Bn. Micromangement has its flaws...


We lost ASGs and the likes as more BCTs were built. Now we have the "Non-Contiguous Battlefield". To me, that just means that we have ceded control of sections of the battlefield to the enemy. I am wandering off down a rabbit hole but I feel that the two subjects are related. It seems to me that if we quit concentraing on lean and lethal we might make some progress toward a force that is capable of performing all the missions that we need to be able to handle.

I'm not sure it's as bad as you think. Lot of serving folks I talk too think there's still too much tail. In any event, the non-contiguous battlefield is reality, not a question of ceding territory, it's a question of available bayonets. Fortunately, the ISTAR assets cover the holes and the MQ1-C, Guided GMLRS, Excalibur and some other toys should make it mostly a non-problem.

[Ken White]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

Or, more accurately, the altitude. Oops -- attitude. While there are a few (very few) who an beat the odds, most folks past 40 do not function well in combat, they get overly cautious. The more combat they've had, the lower the age that caution becomes a detriment instead of a blessing.

While there are indeed those in their 70s -- even 90s -- out running, not too many of them are multiple tour ground combat veterans; that job is hard on the old bod, it gets beaten up a lot.

There's a reason for 20 year and 30 year marks for retirement. Only things that need to happen to the retirement system are to make it contributory and thus portable and give the whole package in cash and cut the benefits (I await multiple slings and arrows... :D ).

I guess the answer to your question is that the physical is only part of it, mental attitude, tolerance for risk and rapidity of thought are very important. So yes, a very, very few 70 year olds could hack it, most could not.

[Ken White]

Very good point Penta!:) Why indeed should senior officers have to be up-or-out by 55 (at the latest),

Mostly to avoid having 50 year old Captains with 20 years in grade who can't keep up mentally with their young charges... ;)


...The present system was based on what was introduced to clear out the deadwood back in the early days of WWII, but is based on more of a corporate (ie. individual career track) rather than an institutional model.

The latter part is correct, the first is not; up or out was introduced in the late 60s informally and by the book in the 70s. All through WW II, the 50s and early 60s, 40 year old Captains commanding their third or fourth Company weren't all that rare.


Now, to the topic of the thread at hand. Unless the Army is going to form Constabulary Regiments like it had two generations ago, and to do that it will have to come out of someone else's hide - principally the BCTs, then it's just going to have to keep doing what every other Army in the English-speaking world has been doing since the 1960's. And that is taking units of all the Combat Arms and re-rolling and -training them as infantry for low-intensity warfare. It is a huge disruption to unit (and parent Formation) training and readiness.

Heaven forbid on the Constabulary Units. Why are you trying to terrify me??? :o

Shifting to low intensity operations from high is not at all difficult. Shifting the training need not be though my observation is that about 50% of the units make it unnecessarily so. The key is not to shift but to do it as an integrated part of mission training; we aren't talking rocket science here. It's got to be integrated so it is presumed a part of the normal operational methodology; it thus is ingrained in Joe Tentpeg. Train him for two years to kill in a fraction of a second, then for 30-60 days to pass out bags of rice while armed and you're asking for trouble. Train him to switch gears for two years then he can do it -- and you don't need to waste 30-60 days in 're' training.


And to give just an example, several years ago, a Commonwealth Artillery Regiment being sent to Cyprus on UN duties not only was (obviously) re-rolled as infantry for the duration, but required a draft of troops from an Armour Regiment just to bring itself up to strength. And no, it's not practically possible to do both infantry training and operations [I]and/I] keep up one's parent Arms training and skills. Something will suffer. Ask the Brits or the Canadians, they've been doing this for over 40 years, and it never gets any easier.

Ah. Re roling, not re training. Very different animal - and to be totally avoided UNLESS it's integrated at all times...

Re roling Artillery to Infantry isn't wise, 500 man Bn can't do a 700 man Bns jobs. Re role 'em to MPs; 500 to 500 -- that'll work. Acknowledging that sometimes one has no choice. :(

[Norfolk]

[...] Constabulary Units. Why are you trying to terrify me??? :o

Ah. Re roling, not re training. Very different animal - and to be totally avoided UNLESS it's integrated at all times...

Re roling Artillery to Infantry isn't wise, 500 man Bn can't do a 700 man Bns jobs. Re role 'em to MPs; 500 to 500 -- that'll work. Acknowledging that sometimes one has no choice.

Wait a minute Ken, I really heard you say (well, actually saw you write) that something actually terrified you?;) Well, it terrifies me too, and if some keener of a Parliamentary staffer reads this and suggests it to his Minister (good thing Canadian politicos by and large have never even heard of the SWC), then after the next Federal election up here, the whole Canadian Army might find itself converted into "Constabulary" units - it came very close to that in the 90's, and only the events of 2001 stopped that from probably becoming a reality.

And Re-rolling is almost as bad. Not quite, but almost.:wry:

And about 50 year-old Captains, Ken (hehe): just imagine the circles you could have run around doddering Field Grades and positively geriatric Flag Officers in your DoD years? I mean, there are some advantages to such a system, given its inherent bureaucratic nature anyway.:rolleyes:

[Jim Rodgers]

This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.

Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.

Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.

This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both

-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level

is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.

There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.

But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.

That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.

IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.

And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of

-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things

IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either

-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard

Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.

[Ken White]

Wait a minute Ken, I really heard you say (well, actually saw you write) that something actually terrified you?;)

"Constabulary," my Wife and Brussels Sprouts... :eek:

Yea, verily on re-roling. You folks did have a bad patch for a while there. The little guy from Shawinigan was almost as dangerous as was Gary. My son was an instructor at Ranger School back in those days and the one or two Canadians in most classes always came in near the top of the Class and frequently took Honor Grad. Benefit of solid training -- so the Army didn't slack off on what was important.


And about 50 year-old Captains, Ken (hehe): just imagine the circles you could have run around doddering Field Grades and positively geriatric Flag Officers in your DoD years? I mean, there are some advantages to such a system, given its inherent bureaucratic nature anyway.:rolleyes:

True but that's no challenge; the excessively bright and annointed (in their opinion), energetic young are so much more fun to discombobulate... :cool:

[Jim Rodgers]

Re: the assigning of other METL tasks, arty as MPs etc.

I'll start by pointing out that many of you think of MPs as, apparently, an "easy", but still relevant MOS. As an Armor guy, in the process of converting to MPs, I don't think that's the case. When I moved over, I was shocked by how much was going on in an MP unit that I hadn't realized. Of course, if what you really want is gun trucks and dismounts, that's not that hard. That, alone, doesn't make an MP. If what you really want is troopers with an outstanding grasp of EOF criteria, intelligence integrated by doctrine, experience and assigned ASIs, trained prison guards, Army Law Enforcement personnel, etc etc, then you can't just slap a badge on some redlegs and expect them to perform the same way.

I don't think that's an ego or branch bias thing. But the branches that are largely soft skill focused have legitimate concerns of their own. I can't fly a Kiowa or calculate winds aloft, which wouldn't surprise an Aviator or Artilleryman. I don't see why we would think that they should have the same situational awareness as an experienced cop, just because it's a soft skill, instead of a hard one.

With that said, this isn't an attempt to keep the 5 MP METL tasks all to ourselves. Some sort of rollover\fallback METL tasks make a lot of sense, particularly for branches like arty. Formalizing it makes sense. You can't expect the redlegs to be full fledged MPs, but you could expect them to take over Interment and Resettlement Operations under conditions x or y, under the leadership of the Brigade Provost, or to support IO, or to do Civil Affairs project nominations, or whatever. Planning and training for that contingency makes sense, as you could plan for the inherent limitations. It makes a lot of sense in the MPF scenario that Rob and Ken talk about, because the commanders would have a road map given a certain set of conditions\guidance.

[Rob Thornton]

What about giving the BCT CDR the resources and authorities to contract skill sets and services back at Home Station to meet needs it anticipates as part of its multi-role mission set?

Ex. Allow BCTs to partner with local university on 1/2/3 year contracts to hire folks working toward their degrees in social sciences (anthropology/sociology/economists/etc.), earth sciences (geologists/climatologists/geographers/biologists/etc.), media and linguists to form something that sort of smells like a HTT but is more functional – and then integrate them into existing shell structure headed up by some uniformed folks. They could be with the BDE from MA to train up to deployment – possibly even several cycles.

This would be a long lasting partnership between the military and partner universities and strengthen CIV/MIL relations at a local / community level – more then just the folks at base are deployed – the community so to speak deploys in a stronger way then just the absent revenue (I’m not trying to slight local leaders – some are very good at integrating their military members). As a type of internship it would provide people going into those fields – a type of internship/field experience not available anywhere else. There would be some challenges, but I think we could overcome them.

The other thing I’d consider it the HSOC concept. This would be more permanent. It would involve contracting mostly retired/former military/law enforcement/social service workers/intelligence/contracting officers and like type services (with active clearances) to stand up and maintain a Home Station Operations Command for a BCT (I suppose not every BCT would need its own all the time – but ideally if the unit had a mission it’d have a dedicated one) where the command could build a relationship (you need trust!). This would provide the deployed BCT unparalleled reachback to assist in coordination with OGAs at the local/state and federal level to leverage other relationships. This would be very useful in places where the sustainment, communication and contractor architecture is not developed. I understand the COCOM or the JIATF may have some of those requirements – but I’m not sure you’d get the same type of services or response as the folks you have a relationship with and that are on your payroll – not to mention folks that are plugged into the community. An HSOC would also have the ability to do installation continuity – they could be tasked with getting the resources and sorting things out to giver the re-deploying unit a jump on getting back into the swing of things at the unit. If we were looking for economies - you might also roll up those functions currently under the Rear-Det - such as replacement training and flow - potentially even hire a couple of the spouses to compensate them for the increasing workloads undertaken in support of the FRG (Family Readiness Groups) - the key here is flexibility.

What I’m really talking about is ways to enable a BCT to better perform its multi-role mission from the time it receives that mission to it returns and gets plugged back into a rotation. If we are going to rely on the BCT structure to do this over a sustained high OPTEMPO couple of decades – they are going to need more enablers. While it probably looks expensive – I think this might be a case of where those services and funds reside. While some $$$ need to stay with the installation based on the services they provide to the tenant units – some operational type funds might be better leveraged toward effectiveness if given to the BCTs. Like I mentioned it has some very positive side benefits – but mostly what I think it does is place the flexibility in support of the deploying end of the spear.

Best Regards, Rob

[TheCurmudgeon]

Agree -- but I suggest the glamor aspect is partly ego. In fairness, there was / is a true concern for the troops and the institution (not necessarily in that order in all cases); COIN is ugly, tedious work. Certainly best avoided -- but not to the point of trying to deny one will ever do that mission..

I think that a military officer has to have an ego to begin with. I mean, to be a Platoon Leader you have to start with the idea that you can lead better than any of your 30 or so troopers. The trick is how do you restrain this. But that is another conversation on professionalism.





Done both as an Infantryman in two countries in different services, it's not at all hard to shift gears IF the troops are even reasonably well trained. We still do not train well, even though we're pretty much doing it better now than ever before.

After a good nights sleep I have to agree it can be done. I have spoken to a couple of Infantry Officers who have done it in both Bosnia and Iraq. Thier complaint was that the rest of the infrastructure to run a legal system was not there, so in essence, they ran a "catch and release" program. I think to make it effective you need to have a "court-in-a-can" capability that deploys with the lead element. Here is where the "trained" MPs and SJA come into play.

One other point that you may or may not agree with. Whether we like it or not, we need to act as the soveign for between 12-36 months (or longer) until the rest of the structure is there. Then we turn it over. The FIDD and MITT missions need to be complete, not in-progress.

I also think that the Stryker BCT could easily be retooled to perform this mission. Their equipment set provides the mobility needed and would require the least additional MTOE to make the transition.

I think the Marines have done this type of work in the past. Us Army types are used to having a big footprint. The Marines are used to doing more with less. I think we could learn a lot from them if we took the time.




The 'second' set should be part of the MTOE and should deploy with the unit to the staging area for short term hold than rapid movement forward..

See above on Strykers.




The MPs picked up the mission and did it well (even though DA did not resource them well for the mission until 2004) -- if Rumsfeld hadn't screwed with the TPFDL, there'd have been a reinforced MP Bde right behind 3d ID --- instead, there was one Bn. Micromangement has its flaws....

That may be true, but that is only an excuse for OIF 1 and 2. We never tried to transition over to MP type operations until recently in the Surge. Prior to that we relied on kenetic or lethal type operations to solve a problem better suited for the MPs who would get out and engage the population. For many this was a matter of risk adversion. I could go on about this but I think I will start a seperate string when I have my thoughts in order.




I'm not sure it's as bad as you think. Lot of serving folks I talk too think there's still too much tail. In any event, the non-contiguous battlefield is reality, not a question of ceding territory, it's a question of available bayonets. Fortunately, the ISTAR assets cover the holes and the MQ1-C, Guided GMLRS, Excalibur and some other toys should make it mostly a non-problem.

I disagree. If you look a little into where the IEDs are going off they are in the uncontroled seems between AOs. The non-contiguous battelfield is only a reality as long as we posture ourselves for the "NTC war": the quick battle that takes thirty days or less and then we go home. Again, I think we are relearning lessons from the past. If the battlefield is large enough that the BCT cannot control it, then we need to give the BCTs some help with thier Corps rear. I don't think that is as hard as it sounds and could be done with a minimal force if that force is trained and equiped poperly.

One other point I would like to add. In the old days we (the Army) used to be force-on-force oriented. We were going to fight a big battle against a near-peer nation-state. Today, because of GWOT, we are looking at operations in failed states or even ungoverned territories. Our doctrine really does not cover this. COIN is a start, but it is a response to a specific situation we are dealing with today. As was pointed out earlier, we need to be careful not to spend too much time designing a military that can ONLY do COIN.

[SteveMetz]

Just use those cannon cockers and civilian kitchen staff.

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.


Egads I think I'm choking on my own sarcasm.


Don't scoff. In Baghdad late April 2003 I came to a check point that was manned with a Paladin. The gun was lowered to the horizontal, direct fire position. I imagine one of those firing into your windshield from 20 meters would get your attention.

[selil]

Don't scoff. In Baghdad late April 2003 I came to a check point that was manned with a Paladin. The gun was lowered to the horizontal, direct fire position. I imagine one of those firing into your windshield from 20 meters would get your attention.

Can you imagine seeing that on Interstate 95 pointing up traffic with a RADAR sign that says "Your speed is....." above it? High impact policing I like it.

[Rex Brynen]

I think Jim and Selil have highlighted an important point here, that I hope we don't lose in the discussion: it may not be all that easy retooling into MPs, and especially not for the broad range of tasks that MPs may be called upon to perform in COIN and stability operations (checkpoints, escorts, detention, law enforcement, training assistance to local police forces, liaison, broader contributions to rule-of-law efforts, etc, etc.). As we saw at Abu Ghraib, poorly or inappropriately trained MPs may do far more harm than good.

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?

[slapout9]

For Jim Rodgers. I just realized you were tlaking about me in one of your post on EBO-D3A. There are a lot of Steve's around here:wry: I am at my day job and sure enough something reallygood comes up and I am having a busy monday morning. I will respond tonight, you bring up good points that I will try to address. I will try and drop in during the day and monitor what is going on but as I say I will respond tonight. Slap or Steve or what ever:wry:

[Tom Odom]

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?

Rex

From my perspective here I would say that active MP units have been among the most adaptative. That said, much of what you describe was already in their kit bag as relatively well practiced TTPs due to the Balkans. In the case of the AG MPs, that was a reserve unit. The real need has been all along not enough MP units to do MP tasks. And that has led to using a variety of units to perform MP tasks.

best

Tom

[TheCurmudgeon]

Just had a quick conversation with MY FA buddy. He reinforced his position that FA cannot be dual trained as MPs. His primary argument is that MPs are too diverse and complicated to be trained as a secondary MOS. In addition, the FA proficiency requires too much training time. They could be secondary as Infantry, but not MPs.

He also emphasized that as the equipment becomes more technically capable the personnel requirements to man the equipment drops. This means that you really don't have as many soldiers in a FA BN as you would in an MP BN. There is not parity in capabilties if you simply "switch" the FA BN in a BCT to an MP role.

[Ken White]

I think that a military officer has to have an ego to begin with. I mean, to be a Platoon Leader you have to start with the idea that you can lead better than any of your 30 or so troopers. The trick is how do you restrain this. But that is another conversation on professionalism.

Agree on all counts -- the problem is that all platoon leaders are not better leaders than all their troops; the key is to realize and accept that and still get the job tune. Egos just need tuning. So does ambition. another thread, another time...


After a good nights sleep I have to agree it can be done. I have spoken to a couple of Infantry Officers who have done it in both Bosnia and Iraq. Thier complaint was that the rest of the infrastructure to run a legal system was not there, so in essence, they ran a "catch and release" program. I think to make it effective you need to have a "court-in-a-can" capability that deploys with the lead element. Here is where the "trained" MPs and SJA come into play.

Good point in this day and age with mass communication; not a significant requirement in my pre-history time. :wry:


One other point that you may or may not agree with. Whether we like it or not, we need to act as the soveign for between 12-36 months (or longer) until the rest of the structure is there. Then we turn it over. The FIDD and MITT missions need to be complete, not in-progress.

I agree with the thought, adding the caveat that we may or may not achieve that sovereign state or retain it for a set period. In all our post WW II experience, we have not truly had that 'sovereign' status. I'd also add that the MITT msn may -- usually will -- last longer then 36 months.
...


I think the Marines have done this type of work in the past. Us Army types are used to having a big footprint. The Marines are used to doing more with less. I think we could learn a lot from them if we took the time.

Strongly agree. Egos again... ;)


That may be true, but that is only an excuse for OIF 1 and 2. We never tried to transition over to MP type operations until recently in the Surge. Prior to that we relied on kenetic or lethal type operations to solve a problem better suited for the MPs who would get out and engage the population. For many this was a matter of risk adversion. I could go on about this but I think I will start a seperate string when I have my thoughts in order.

I didn't offer it as an excuse, merely pointed it out as a contributing factor to the onset of the insurgency. Your point on early operational techniques is totally true and was a result of almost 30 years of head in the sand ignoring COIN hoping it would go away. That and putting the wrong guy in the job as Commander -- he'd already erred sadly and badly in Kosovo thus his actions were predictable...


I disagree. If you look a little into where the IEDs are going off they are in the uncontroled seems between AOs. The non-contiguous battelfield is only a reality as long as we posture ourselves for the "NTC war": the quick battle that takes thirty days or less and then we go home. Again, I think we are relearning lessons from the past. If the battlefield is large enough that the BCT cannot control it, then we need to give the BCTs some help with thier Corps rear. I don't think that is as hard as it sounds and could be done with a minimal force if that force is trained and equiped poperly.

We can disagree on that. Hard is not the issue, end strength and worst case tactical reality are the drivers.


One other point I would like to add. In the old days we (the Army) used to be force-on-force oriented. We were going to fight a big battle against a near-peer nation-state. Today, because of GWOT, we are looking at operations in failed states or even ungoverned territories. Our doctrine really does not cover this. COIN is a start, but it is a response to a specific situation we are dealing with today. As was pointed out earlier, we need to be careful not to spend too much time designing a military that can ONLY do COIN.

Agree.

Your later comment:
Just had a quick conversation with MY FA buddy. He reinforced his position that FA cannot be dual trained as MPs. His primary argument is that MPs are too diverse and complicated to be trained as a secondary MOS. In addition, the FA proficiency requires too much training time. They could be secondary as Infantry, but not MPs.

He also emphasized that as the equipment becomes more technically capable the personnel requirements to man the equipment drops. This means that you really don't have as many soldiers in a FA BN as you would in an MP BN. There is not parity in capabilties if you simply "switch" the FA BN in a BCT to an MP role.

Nor do you have as many soldiers in a FA Bn as you have in an Infantry Bn (which, last time I checked, was bigger than an MP Bn). It is noteworthy that a lot of re-roleing of FA to Inf has occurred in both Afhanistan and iraq. Seems to work okay in the latter but not so well in the former. METT-T.

On the training aspect, I disagree with him. The basic problem is we do not provide adequate full spectrum initial entry training; we send poorly trained kids to units and then they really get trained on the job. That shortfall is due to a number of impactors but I'm sure the biggest is cost -- and I'd bet that if you life cycled those costs, it would pay to double our IET training time. It takes about three years in peacetime to develop a fully trained Infantryman, still takes almost a year in combat (and even then there are gaps). That, too is for another thread...

And to address some other comments:

Rex Brynen said:

I think Jim and Selil have highlighted an important point here, that I hope we don't lose in the discussion: it may not be all that easy retooling into MPs, and especially not for the broad range of tasks that MPs may be called upon to perform in COIN and stability operations (checkpoints, escorts, detention, law enforcement, training assistance to local police forces, liaison, broader contributions to rule-of-law efforts, etc, etc.). As we saw at Abu Ghraib, poorly or inappropriately trained MPs may do far more harm than good.Totally true -- thus a selective set of tasks and missions is a necessity. That's why we have a Deployment mission task list. As we also saw at Abu Gharaib, the wrong folks doing the wrong mission with no supervision can be problematic...

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?My understanding is that in the last two-three years, considerable adaptation has occurred but I'm sure someone who's far more current than I am can address that.

Tom Odom said:
...The real need has been all along not enough MP units to do MP tasks. And that has led to using a variety of units to perform MP tasks. Agreed -- and my understanding is that is being rectified.

Selil said:
Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop. With two sons who are cops with about 35 years service between them, yeah, I understand the scope of the problem. I'm also easy, we can re-role the FA as Infantry -- after all that's a low skill job... :D

Jim Rodgers said:
I'll start by pointing out that many of you think of MPs as, apparently, an "easy", but still relevant MOS. As an Armor guy, in the process of converting to MPs, I don't think that's the case. When I moved over, I was shocked by how much was going on in an MP unit that I hadn't realized. Of course, if what you really want is gun trucks and dismounts, that's not that hard. That, alone, doesn't make an MP. If what you really want is troopers with an outstanding grasp of EOF criteria, intelligence integrated by doctrine, experience and assigned ASIs, trained prison guards, Army Law Enforcement personnel, etc etc, then you can't just slap a badge on some redlegs and expect them to perform the same way.

I give up, curmudgeon said:
One, we look at expanding training for artillery, armor, ADA, and any other pure combat force so that they can perform MP, not infantry, missions to allow them to be relevant in stability operations...

I agreed and still think that's a good idea. However, I'll bow to the consensus and to Norfolk and the FA can be re-roled as Constabulary. :cool:

[wm]

I'll bow to the consensus and to Norfolk and the FA can be re-roled as Constabulary. :cool:

Ken,

If we do that to the King of Battle (which we know got that name because it has balls and puts them where the Queen (AKA the Infantry) wants them, then who will bring class to the brawl? :D CAS???:eek:

[120mm]

Has anyone touched on how we did all this post Spanish-American war?

Seems the turn of the century army already learned how to suck this particular egg.

Like I need something else to read, is there some particular book(s) available on the subject?

[Norfolk]

I agreed and still think that's a good idea. However, I'll bow to the consensus and to Norfolk and the FA can be re-roled as Constabulary. :cool:

:eek:I can't believe that you said that Ken! Double:eek::eek:! Now you're scaring ME! I LOATHE the entire Constabulary concept! Uh-uh, re-role FA and Armour to Infantry if you have to for COIN, but NOT to Constabulary roles. Draft policeman if you need MP's.

[Ken White]

on mission requirements, discard the parochialism ("too hard," "lengthy training," "too many tasks" and so forth) and not get wrapped around the semantic axle (the choice of words, terms or branches as opposed to the other, philosophical 'semantic' axle). :D

Makes no difference if you re-role the FA as Infantry, Military Police, Constabulary, Imperial Strom Troopers or Plerztbarginfers -- what will make a difference is that they're productively employed.

FWIW, I've been briefly an Artilleryman, a Radio Section Chief and a Tanker, for a longer period Cavalry, SF and MI and for a far longer period, an Infantryman. I've "advised" two Armies (at Bn and at GHQ level) and served alongside almost a dozen more. Having also been in the Marines as a Tanker and a Scout Swimmer I'm the very soul of eclecticism (new word). Point of all that is not a brag but to lend credence when I say most branch "difficult, constant training, etc." noise is turf protection and parochial bias, no more (before anyone flames, this applies at the entry and basic military tasks application levels, not to full spectrum operations and the coordination and conduct thereof). All those jobs are difficult and all do require some specialized training -- but todays troops are capable of a whole lot more than a 1970 Project 100,000 model -- for whom our training system was designed (and which is only now starting to change).

A change resisted by many who like the old ways...

Which are gone, never to return.

Anyway, we can discard the Constab term and go with Plerztbarginfers, which we can abbreviate as PBI. :D

[Ken White]

Has anyone touched on how we did all this post Spanish-American war?

Seems the turn of the century army already learned how to suck this particular egg.

Like I need something else to read, is there some particular book(s) available on the subject?

There were no MPs, there was beaucoup Infantry and the Infantry just went to work. Some Cavalry also very little FA. Life was simple. The guys did everything from public sanitation, to school teaching to road building to combat ops...

Here's a good book, read it early this year but it belonged to a Friend so i don't have a copy. The review at the link is a good abstract. LINK (http://www.jhu.edu/news_info/news/home06/apr06/kramer.html)

[Jim Rodgers]

Ken said,

"Totally true -- thus a selective set of tasks and missions is a necessity. That's why we have a Deployment mission task list. As we also saw at Abu Gharaib, the wrong folks doing the wrong mission with no supervision can be problematic..."

"Makes no difference if you re-role the FA as Infantry, Military Police, Constabulary, Imperial Strom Troopers or Plerztbarginfers -- what will make a difference is that they're productively employed."

Ken - if you believe these things, then we disagree less than you seem to think. Sorry to make you want to "give up". I do think the labels matter, though - at least a little. I have no interest in branch parochialism. I have something of a reputation of shooting WAY outside of my lane to try (haven't gotten very far yet) and train my soldiers in other areas of expertise. I'd be more than happy to sit down and help plan training to temporarily re-role soldiers to perform my, or anyone elses, METL tasks (at a level of proficiency tbd by the amount of time and resources we're willing to throw at it). Soldiers are soldiers, and can handle alot, usually faster and better than we expect. None of those things devalue subject matter expertise, though.

[Jim Rodgers]

Rex,

Re doctrinal and other changes to the MP Corps -

First - alot of new MP units are being stood up, particularly, but not exclusively, in the reserve component.

One of the key issues of the last few years is that MPs usually aren't set up to own battlespace. There are exceptions, but its fairly common to be parceled out to the manuever commanders. That's not all that controversial - just something to keep in mind when assessing the role of MPs on the battlefield.

Re doctrine - in the last few years, the MPs have added Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) as a battlefield function\METL task (now a total of 5). It's more controversial than it should be, usually because it's either misunderstood or the intel guys think we're trying to horn in. PIO supplements IPB, it doesn't replace it. It does allow for some great opportunites, e.g. our MP school teaches a dedicated link analysis course. There are some unclassified briefings available - PM me if you're interested.

The biggest other changes I can think of are the addition of a MP platoon and a MP captain to every manuever brigade, and the gradual deemphaisis of on post law enforcement. There are some second order effects from both of those. Anyone with AKO access might be interested in the 89th MP Brigade PIO AAR, which addresses the impact of the latter on situational awareness - it's FOUO, so it can't be posted here.

[Rex Brynen]

Jim:

Thanks for the information (and ditto everyone else).

I suppose the issue that is of particular interest to me is the current and potential use of MPs for the training/mentoring of indig police and security forces.

If there is one thing we know from the record of past multilateral stability and PKOs, it is that CIVPOL and rule-of-law development is one of the hardest part of governance capacity-building, partly because it requires enormous cultural understanding (policing techniques being far more culturally embedded than warfighting), and partly because assistance to local police development makes little difference unless judicial and legal reforms, anti-corruption measures, etc. are undertaken in parallel. A case in point is Haiti, where many good intentions and large amounts of aid and technical assistance has had depressingly little positive effect over the years.

To get back to the "retooling" issue that began this thread, it seems to me essential that if artillerymen (or anyone else) are being retooled to perform MP-like duties, we be clear on what tasks are relatively easily learned, and what are much more specialized and challenging.

Second, I wonder where primary responsibility for indig police mentoring ought to "lie" within the USG. In Canada we have very little real capacity in this area within the Armed Forces, but we're fortunate to have some capacity in the RCMP (which has cross-cultural policing in northern and aboriginal communities as a key part of its normal activities).

Rex

[Ken White]

has been addressed briefly on other threads but for the US, there is no easy resolution. The RCMP and AFP in Austraia are in far better position to support their governments, do so and do it well. Our solution in the past was USAID -- but that got curtailed in the 90s and since, we have relied on contractors, mostly DynCorp. as you can guess, the performance is spotty, some great cases and some disasters.

Lacking any police organization of national scope, it seems to me our best bet is to use the MPs who could, with just a couple of selected Bns, pick that up as a primary mission. The use of civilian police academies and training to get them adapted to the LE versus the tactical role should be no problem. Even more advantages would accrue with some ArNG / USAR MP Bns as those near large urban areas generally have a high number of older, experienced police officers in their membership, those guys would love that mission. Not to mention that said cities have a lot of cultures in the mix... :)

RE; Jim's comment on Police Intel; the close hold mentality of the Intel community is long standing, they are ultra source, information -- and turf -- protective to a fault. Virtually every Advisory Detachment in Viet Nam found they had to develop their own agent net due to that failure to share. My son's unit in both Afghanistan and Iraq '04 to 06 did the same thing.

That issue really needs to be fixed...

[slapout9]

This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.

Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.

Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.

This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both

-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level

is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.

There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.

But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.

That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.

IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.

And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of

-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things

IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either

-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard

Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.


Hi Jim, no you haven't missed anything you are tracking right on. My comment dealt strictly with the fact that between EBO and D3A...D3A is better and it is a lot simpler and will still achieve the same effect(pun intended) that is all I meant by it.

Having said that, when EBO was first conceived it had several steps to it not just targeting. These steps in the process are pretty much gone so I wouldn't worry to much about it ( based upon the J9 EBA unclassified manual I read). To review the history though for something to be a true EBO operation you would have to have great intelligence,Precision Guided Munitions, the ability to attack all targets in parallel. All that had to be there or it was not likely to work out as it was originally conceived.

It is no longer published but if you can find the Air Command and Staff College student handbook on planning the Air Campaign you would see how simple it really was. I have checked and the old handbook is no longer on line:(


Point two and it is a big one EBO is based on systems theory (not chaos theory) if you don't believe in this it will not work. The hybrid theory of combing EBO with D3A will just make things more complicated in my opinion. D3A is already integrated in the MDMP and that would be a better choice. The worst thing is to make things more complicated which EBA is doing IMO. Hell I don't even understand that anymore. When did the military start attacking "Nodes":eek: thats just non-sense IMO. They should have left PEMSI(I keep wanting to say Pepsi) as the 5 rings it has the same effect:wry:

Final point. EBO in one word is why? Why will attacking this target lead you to your final objective. If you can't answer that... it might work out... but it probably want.

Hope this helps or do you have more questions? Slap

Here is a link to one of the best papers I ever read on the subject.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.htm

[selil]

Has anyone touched on how we did all this post Spanish-American war?

Seems the turn of the century army already learned how to suck this particular egg.

Like I need something else to read, is there some particular book(s) available on the subject?

I'm thinking every cop, and former cop on the board just groaned. There's no difference between law enforcement of today and a decade ago. Really.

[Ken White]

COIN, given the "...after the Spanish American War" dating...

[selil]

COIN, given the "...after the Spanish American War" dating...

Maybe I missed something. I gotta admit I've got an axe to grind in this discussion. I've spent a lot of effort trying to get small departments trained up and making the case that good training results in excellent cops. The number one thing I fight against is the "anybody can be a copy it's not that big of deal". Then you have to clean up after them.

[Ken White]

Maybe I missed something. I gotta admit I've got an axe to grind in this discussion. I've spent a lot of effort trying to get small departments trained up and making the case that good training results in excellent cops. The number one thing I fight against is the "anybody can be a copy it's not that big of deal". Then you have to clean up after them.

any argument from me on that score, I'm with you 100+% on that. Got two sons, one on each coast, who've been on the job for over 35 years between 'em and I'm along with some others fighting Florida's IMO too lax training time requirement trying to get it to model the GA POST requirement with respect to standards, length and in-service requirements. Plus in most posts here, I'm beating the training drum for more and better of the military variety, all levels.

I think the issue here, though, is troop training requirements for COIN...

[slapout9]

Cops and COIN go together. In just about anything I have read on COIN they always talk about Police type operations. They always talk about heavy patrolling on foot near the people. So I think one is tied to the other. If you don't have enough Cops the closest military equivalent is the Infantry. So with proper training it would be easier to cross train them than Artillery.
What we call the modern Police officer is only about 150 years old before that is was usually handled by the Military. COIN was just putting down the rebellion.

[Ken White]

Cops and COIN go together. In just about anything I have read on COIN they always talk about Police type operations. They always talk about heavy patrolling on foot near the people. So I think one is tied to the other. If you don't have enough Cops the closest military equivalent is the Infantry. So with proper training it would be easier to cross train them than Artillery.
What we call the modern Police officer is only about 150 years old before that is was usually handled by the Military. COIN was just putting down the rebellion.

Yes, Cops and COIN do go together -- so do Infantry and COIN and even more so. Cops and Infantry are very different creatures; MPs in the modern US Army sense are a blend and a good one. The two Cop sons both served, one as an MP and he had no trouble adapting to civilian police work; the other as an airplane infantry type -- and he had trouble scaling back...

Foot patrolling is indeed a COIN requirement and I'd submit that the Infantry is -- or should be -- far more about foot patrolling than are police officers OR MPs. Any Army or military force is always likely to have far more infantry available than MPs. I'm not at all convinced that training the FA for dismounted COIN work is at all difficult -- and I don't really think it makes much difference what you call 'em in that re-roleing... :) . No cross training of Infantry should be needed, COIN is a mission, one that has always existed and one that should be trained from the start.

Consider the fact that had we not neglected that mission for many years, there'd be no reason for this Board to exist. Krulak tried to tell everyone but egos got in the way and no one listened.

COIN has always been more than putting down the Rebellion, lot of historical examples as far back as Alexander in the west and ol' overquoted Sun Tzu in the east of doing it right -- and wrong. ..

[slapout9]

I am going to post this here because it bears on the posts related to D3A. This is from the new edition of the Air and Space Power journal.
Covers the subject of Dynamic Targeting about mid down it discusses some of the D3A problems form the writers viewpoint. It is a little off the general discussion of this thread but does relate to some of the posts.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/win07/brown.html

[Griz882]

All in all I think this a fascinating thread and it brings to mind an idea I once floated concerning the structure of the Army National Guard (of which I am a member).

Most of you may recall the strange days following Hurricane Katrina in which no one could fix the blame for a poor/late NG response. Political hay-makers tried to say it was the "Back Door Draft" had taken the NG away from the states (a bogus issue). Others blamed the loss of equipment to the war effort (a real issue). At the same time US ground forces are using their units well outside described doctrine, training, and TO&E capabilities. I propose that both items could be solved by restructuring the reserve forces (USAR/ARNG) as follows:

1. eliminate USAR, roll soldiers into ARNG
2. eliminate existing force structure of BCT's, MEB's, Sustainment BDE's and so forth
3. have each state establish a number of "Peace Enforcement Regiments" based on their available manpower with small states like New Hampshire providing something like three battalions to the structure and larger states providing multiple regiments.

The structure of each regiment/battalion would be MOS skill based, but the unit would not be branch based. Thus, a PEB would look something like this:

HHC - HQ Plt - Sig Plt - Lift Plt (helos) - Med Plt - Log Plt - Civil Affairs Plt
A Co - Infantry
B Co - MP
C Co - Engineer
D Co - Transport

Every battalion would have the same TO&E thus avoiding the current structure that has artillery units in some states with no ranges and heavy truck units in major urban areas that don't have motor pool space.

The end product would be an element that could function in both local emergency stabilization situations like Katrina and overseas in the post-combat stabilization stage. Imagine if the force planners could reach into a pool of over 400 "peace enforcement battalions" for duty in places like Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and so on. More over, they would be able to do so without the requirement of re-tooling the unit training. ARNG training could then focus on a stabilization/COIN/enforcement operations training cycle that would continuously feed into real world missions be it fighting fires in California, rescuing stranded flood victims in Louisiana, or providing stabilization in Iraq.

I recognize that that many "branch disciples" would be aghast at the type of force mixing I am recommending here, but I believe it brings the strength of branch training and a unit mission-focused training cycle together in the positive way. On my last Iraq tour I can’t tell you how many ersatz units I encountered that were made up of armor, engineers, infantry, MPs, artillery, and ADA (just to name a few) – most of whom spoke a common language separated by branch dogma and doctrine.

I say leave artillery to their mission. Leave infantry and armor to theirs. The same goes for ADA and MP. In short, create a force you can use in multiple ways (and at necessary times) while maintaining army for the bigger fight.

[Ken White]

I am going to post this here because it bears on the posts related to D3A. This is from the new edition of the Air and Space Power journal.
Covers the subject of Dynamic Targeting about mid down it discusses some of the D3A problems form the writers viewpoint. It is a little off the general discussion of this thread but does relate to some of the posts.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/win07/brown.html

Good article. Two minor comments. I have no problem with EBO or with Boyd's ideas but I would posit two thoughts with respect to EBO, the critical action is asking the right questions to determine what effects you need. With respect to Boyd; some folks can work inside an OODA loop rapidly and succesfully, not everyone can. The point in both cases is that, in my observation, our one size fits all personnel system is inimical to the concepts.

Thus I think the concepts are too advanced for the culture or, far more likely, the culture is not advanced enough for the concepts...

Though it easily could be.

Secondly, as I said, good article but I'd also suggest that if the USAF dropped their intransigence in refusing to freely allow the Army to control Air, what he recommends could occur quickly and easily. I understand the AF whys, I just don't agree with 'em. :wry:

[Ken White]

All in all I think this a fascinating thread and it brings to mind an idea I once floated concerning the structure of the Army National Guard (of which I am a member).
. . .
...I propose that both items could be solved by restructuring the reserve forces (USAR/ARNG) as follows:

1. eliminate USAR, roll soldiers into ARNG
2. eliminate existing force structure of BCT's, MEB's, Sustainment BDE's and so forth
3. have each state establish a number of "Peace Enforcement Regiments" based on their available manpower with small states like New Hampshire providing something like three battalions to the structure and larger states providing multiple regiments.

The structure of each regiment/battalion would be MOS skill based, but the unit would not be branch based. Thus, a PEB would look something like this:

HHC - HQ Plt - Sig Plt - Lift Plt (helos) - Med Plt - Log Plt - Civil Affairs Plt
A Co - Infantry
B Co - MP
C Co - Engineer
D Co - Transport
. . .
I recognize that that many "branch disciples" would be aghast at the type of force mixing I am recommending here, but I believe it brings the strength of branch training and a unit mission-focused training cycle together in the positive way. On my last Iraq tour I can’t tell you how many ersatz units I encountered that were made up of armor, engineers, infantry, MPs, artillery, and ADA (just to name a few) – most of whom spoke a common language separated by branch dogma and doctrine.

I say leave artillery to their mission. Leave infantry and armor to theirs. The same goes for ADA and MP. In short, create a force you can use in multiple ways (and at necessary times) while maintaining army for the bigger fight.

It is a good idea. I and others proposed variations on that theme many years ago. Big differences were a Medical Company instead of a Platoon and two Rifle Companies (for the manpower as much as anything); like your proposal apparently, they didn't fly. There are three problems that then impacted the idea and all are still valid:

1. The USAR isn't going away for a number of reasons. Mostly political but also practical. Having a title 10 Reserve structure gives DoD and the Army a lot of flexibility that could never exist with the Guard

2. While your idea has merit IF future war is OEF / OIF-like, what do we do if it's a mid to large size conventional war? The ArNG isn't going to give up the Combat role and even if NGB and the States were willing, Congress would be unlikely to go along. That's probably prudent.

3. The major benefit to the AC in having the RC is the ability to rapidly reinforce said AC with like units and it's far cheaper, easier and quicker to do that with the RC than it is to recruit off the street and build up to equipment issue. We did that in 1940 and the institution that is the Army of the United States doesn't want to have to do it again -- particularly with the speed at which things can occur today. That is akin to but not the same as number 2, above.

Having said all that, I think that the organization of one to half dozen Battalions along the line you suggest in each State should be fairly easy to do and is within manpower capability if some combat brigades were to go to cadre strength (which TAGs will fight :wry: ) -- which many are, practically speaking, today at any rate. Man those Composite Bns with the older more experienced guys in the State...

Idea has merit, you ought to work on it. Remembering to tailor your Compo Bns so they can advise /assist a Host Nation Brigade or even two or three... ;)

[davidbfpo]

Been away a few days and have not read all this thread - just the last few comments.

The British Army had an extensive history of deploying non-infantry units to Northern Ireland during "The Troubles", mainly from Germany (where we were deployed to face the USSR etc). This even included specialist units, armour, engineer, air defence and nuclear missile. I am sure there are articles in the British Army publications (British Army Review notably) on this theme.

Infantry units also had to be re-trained, for six month tours and several units did longer three year tours.

At one point, for several years wayback in the 1970's, the Army had primacy in security and law enforcement, as the police, the RUC, effectively collapsed and had little credibilty (a very short explanation). Today the RUC offer their COIN expertise around the world - not always without criticism.

At that time the Army deployed two very large military police regiments, to do "ordinary" policing and provide support to deployed army units. There are several, now dated published books on this period.

After a very long time the Army had a system for adapting to this COIN / support the police environment. I suspect non-infantry and artillery unit deployments declined.

I'll leave the use of police in COIN to another time.

davidbfpo

[wm]

Seems to me that we may be tying up the wrong sorts of assets doing some of the missions in SWA. For example, convoy and rear area security are (or used to be) ARTEP common tasks and common soldier skills. It does not take a specialized unit to do them. In fact some CA/CS units, like FA, are (or were once upon a time) probably better at them than other CS/CSS units that have been traditionally associated with such missions. If we have MP units doing rear area security and convoy escort in theater, then that is a huge misuse of their other special expertise. I have no clear current knowledge of how such matters are being handled in theater, but before folks start talking about not having enough of the right kinds of assets, I think how units are currently being employed ought to be reviewed.

[Ken White]

can't say for sure but I've heard some anecdotal stuff that seems to imply some of that occurs. One MP did tell me that his Co occasionally escorted a convoy of civilian truckers which meant the total escort package, sometimes two platoons worth but that most frequently they only provided a couple of HMMWVs and two or three M1117s for C2 and heavier firepower for military convoys with the convoy vehicles expected to self defend.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Seems to me that we may be tying up the wrong sorts of assets doing some of the missions in SWA. For example, convoy and rear area security are (or used to be) ARTEP common tasks and common soldier skills. It does not take a specialized unit to do them.

True, but is does take specialized equipment. In the article at the lead of this thread it took 13 fully equiped M1113s (UA HMMWV) to "retool" a single atrillery battery for use outside the wire. This is more than just assigning people to a new mission. This really breaks into two issues: First what did you need that you didn't bring, and two, what did you bring that you no longer need. To bring everything you need you will need two complete sets of MTOE for FA/AR/ADA units to be able to perform these missions. Once they shift missions, for an armor unit, you still have a huge logistical train that is not needed because the M1s are really being utilized when you reorganize the Armor as infantry.

My engineer unit had to provide it's own security for road construction operations. We were trained to do it, as all Engineers have the task "Reorganize as Infantry" even if many do not train for it. The problem was the equipment required to do it, both in vehicles and in firepower. I ended up signing for equipment from anyone I could scavenge it from. We were using mothballed M-60D machine guns that most of my younger soldiers had never seen. These are not big issues, we managed fine. The issue is, when you see a problem, do you let it go until the next war when we have to find solutions for it all over again, or do you look for a solution that is viable across the spectrum of combat operations.


In fact some CA/CS units, like FA, are (or were once upon a time) probably better at them than other CS/CSS units that have been traditionally associated with such missions. If we have MP units doing rear area security and convoy escort in theater, then that is a huge misuse of their other special expertise. I have no clear current knowledge of how such matters are being handled in theater, but before folks start talking about not having enough of the right kinds of assets, I think how units are currently being employed ought to be reviewed.

Most of my data is anedotal also. I am currently at Ft Leavenworth attending CGSC and this tends to be the topic dejur. The infantry understand that they have to do this mission in COIN as well as in any Failed State situation like Bosnia or Haiti. The Armor and Artillery hate the idea, particularly in the current rotation cycle. If you have spent the last three years either training for infantry mission or conducting infantry missions in theater, it means you haven't fired a tank table in that long. At NTC most units do a COIN type rotaion. When a unit asks to do a force-on-force battle the controllers are not prepared. Many of the Majors I have spoken to feel pretty strongly about this.

As far as using the MPs for Area Security I think that is the perfect model (even though they can do more). When orgainzed and trained around a "community policing" model, the MPs become an interface with the population. The population comes to rely on them for security and access to required services. MPs, because of thier law enforcement training, have the tools to deal with a population better than the Infantry (I have to be careful here, because I believe the infantry has done a hell of a good job in places like Bosnia). This is particularly true if the MPs come to the fight with a pre-set legal apperatus to deal with criminals, which is often where most of the problems FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION come from. I see this as a "hearts and minds" method that will yeild benifits in HUMMINT and a general acceptance of the force by the population.

[SteveMetz]

Most of my data is anedotal also. I am currently at Ft Leavenworth attending CGSC and this tends to be the topic dejur. The infantry understand that they have to do this mission in COIN as well as in any Failed State situation like Bosnia or Haiti. The Armor and Artillery hate the idea, particularly in the current rotation cycle. If you have spent the last three years either training for infantry mission or conducting infantry missions in theater, it means you haven't fired a tank table in that long. At NTC most units do a COIN type rotaion. When a unit asks to do a force-on-force battle the controllers are not prepared. Many of the Majors I have spoken to feel pretty strongly about this.

I take the point but what potential opponent's armored formations are better prepared? This is kind of like Roger Clemens blowing off a week of spring training.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I would tend to agree with you. There is no near-peer competitor as far as a large force-on-force Army on the horizon.

Again, I can only speak to what I have heard from others. Thier concerns were based around the younger soldiers. The guys who came in three years ago, who are now young SGTs, who have never conducted large scale maneuvers as Armor or Artillery. I don't know if this problem is real, but I can see it becoming as issue as we continue in the current cycle and the FA and AR soldiers coming up through the ranks spend most of thier time outside thier primary MOS.

Remember too that the Army has pushed the promotion cycle for LTs up so that now they spend only about three years in that rank before they make Captain.

Normally I would disregard these concerns as "sour grapes". But as I got to know the officers who made these comments I learned that they were not whiners. They were career officers who were genuinely concerned for the long term health of the force.

[Tipy]

Lets see if I can word this right. A soldier, be it an Infantry, Artillery, Combat Arms, or Combat Service Support soldier can do what he is tasked to do if he is trained and led by competent leaders and given the time to train. A commander who violates the basic tenents of combat will get his soldiers killed and may lose the battle and lose the war.
Remember Roberts Ridge in early Afg.? Those guys were killed because the commanders didn't think they needed Artillery. They Air Assualted into those high altitude mtns. with nothing but the things they carried. Where were the Artillery Fire Support bases that could have delivered fire support day and night and in bad weather to those Rangers? The commander who made the decision to not bring or use Artillery should have been shot. A soldier will do as he is ordered, even though he may not like it. A commander who can't even do the basics will get his soldiers killed and in doing so lose the battle and then lose the war.
The thing that made me sick was all of the content of the stories about Roberts Ridge did not even mention the lack of Artillery, "they" just seemed to think it was no big deal to AA into a high altitude mtn. top without Artillery support because the Air Force would take care of the CAS. Never did hear anyone do an AAR about that action and never did hear anyone mention the lack of BASIC COMBINED ARMS tactics (Artillery). We killed those Rangers because we didn't do the basics. Has anyone made sure that that will never happen again? We really are doomed to continue to not learn the lessons of history. I'm not confident that the troops in Iraq will not be sucked into another Indian Revolt of the mid 1800's. Anyone ever even heard of the Indian revolt of the sepoys against the British?
Semper Fi,
Tipy

[davidbfpo]

Tipy,

Having just read 'Battle Company is Out There', the excellent NYT piece on an infantry company in the Kunar region, in a hostile valley, I noticed no references to artillery fire, just airpower. From an armchair I thought after reading your piece, where is the artillery? See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?ref=todayspaper.

There was a similar article recently and that mentioned use of 120mm mortars and airpower.

No doubt someone on SWJ knows the answer!

davidbfpo

[Cavguy]

Tipy,

Having just read 'Battle Company is Out There', the excellent NYT piece on an infantry company in the Kunar region, in a hostile valley, I noticed no references to artillery fire, just airpower. From an armchair I thought after reading your piece, where is the artillery? See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?ref=todayspaper.

There was a similar article recently and that mentioned use of 120mm mortars and airpower.

No doubt someone on SWJ knows the answer!

davidbfpo


I believe that they are so distributed the arty is out of range for most. I know some of the outposts have mortars in support. Also most artillerymen are acting as infantry.

Truly heartbreaking article. I choked up reading it. I really felt for that company commander - few know what that burden feels like, and he seemed to have a worse draw than most - he certainly has a harder leadership task than what I faced. And I know the frustration his guys felt at taking losses with no real result in sight. Not only that, Afghanistan is much much more isolated than Iraq, and they don't have much of an escape.

I also wondered about if their BN was rotating troops off the line - seemed like the situation was priming itself for a Haditha or similar due to the stress and constant casualties - It wouldn't take much for a SL or TL to snap and do something extreme. Having soldiers on Prozac didn't exactly seem like the best idea either.

I'm glad for articles like this - the majority of the American populace never knows what it truly demands of the soldiers in harm's way. God bless all those guys.

[slapout9]

Having soldiers on Prozac didn't exactly seem like the best idea either.



I almost fell out of my chair, I had to read that twice. It also said the commander thought things were so bad that he requested a Psychiatrist!! Those guys need a break.

[Tom Odom]

I believe that they are so distributed the arty is out of range for most. I know some of the outposts have mortars in support. Also most artillerymen are acting as infantry.

Truly heartbreaking article. I choked up reading it. I really felt for that company commander - few know what that burden feels like, and he seemed to have a worse draw than most - he certainly has a harder leadership task than what I faced. And I know the frustration his guys felt at taking losses with no real result in sight. Not only that, Afghanistan is much much more isolated than Iraq, and they don't have much of an escape.

I also wondered about if their BN was rotating troops off the line - seemed like the situation was priming itself for a Haditha or similar due to the stress and constant casualties - It wouldn't take much for a SL or TL to snap and do something extreme. Having soldiers on Prozac didn't exactly seem like the best idea either.

I'm glad for articles like this - the majority of the American populace never knows what it truly demands of the soldiers in harm's way. God bless all those guys.

I read it yesterday and passed it over to Slap via PMs.

The article reinforces some key issues and raises others like the Prozac.

A. Gets right to the issue of manpower, firepower, and COIN. A company is essentially trying to control a valley and in doing so turns to the firepower of aerial fires.

B. That all politics are local and good SU hinges on developing an accurate assessment of those political/tribal currents

C. The fundamental that the company--not the battalion and certainly not the brigade--either wins or loses this fight.

D. That the lack of a viable non-lethal effort with functional security is lethal.


Good piece about great Soldiers dealing with a tough situation

Tom

[Norfolk]

This company is just one really bad day away from another My Lai, and just like the Herd's immediate predecessors from the 10th Mountain Div - they're on the verge.

Western Armies have been coking troops to the gills on anti-depressants and the like, and then sending them back into the field since the Balkans in the 90's. If someone starts seeing stuff that's not there or just flashes back to some place or event that's long gone or is just plain losing control, and he goes to get some help for it, too often they just stick him on pills - and the bomb inside waiting to go off just ticks louder and longer instead. Even if the pills "work" and prevent a guy from losing it and taking out a lot of people in a war zone, what happens when he finally gets out of the military, goes off the pills, and has to deal with civvie life with all that stuff still festering inside him?

This is a very depressing read, so I'm not even going to get into that company's mission in that valley.

[Tipy]

Wash my laundry out in front of everyone.

I was USMC Vietnam late 68 to late 69, grunt with 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines and
4th Combined Action Group, from Dong Ha to Laos and in or on the DMZ, Purple Heart, thirty days on the USS Repose Hospital ship and another thirty days in Da Nang Naval Hospital with P. Falcip malaria. Went to school on GI bill and got an ROTC commission. Two years active 101st,1976-78,
2nd of the 327th. Thought I was maybe a little bit crazy, and did not have a good experience, lot of depression and Jimmy Carter was Cinc.. Didn't have any experience to fall back on. Got out and became a Cop. Kept my mouth shut and tried to do my job. You know how people in the morning say "how are you". I always replied "I'm fine". No one really knew. Depression, child support, three jobs, and "crazy maybe". Couldn't sleep through the night, wake up after three hours and couldn't get back to sleep. Obsessed with reading about Vietnam and military history. Started reading about PTSD and was in denial. Went to my HMO for my depression, that was very hard to do and I didn't tell anyone. Ride around with officers who would fly off the handle about not wanting to work with ofc. on anti-depressants(little did they know) especially an ofc. on anti depressants and carrying a gun.
I WOULD RATHER WORK WITH SOMEONE THAT WAS ON ANTI-DEPRESSANTS THAN SOMEONE WHO NEEDED THEM AND WAS NOT. Did a lot of reading and finally went to my dept. and said "hey I need some help". Another year and I'm convinced I would have been fired. By going in and asking for help that put the burden on my dept. and they couldn't fire me. Five sessions with the Police Psychologist and he gave me 100% police disability. (Forgot I also had a good shoot off duty in a convience store robbery in 1996 and then 911 was very interesting for me.) Hand carried my Police packet to the VA and got my 150%, 100 for PTSD, 20 for diabetes, 20 for parithial neuropathy(sp?) and 10 for my tinnitus. Guess what, the VA only pays 100% no matter how bad you are, unless you are in an ICU permanently.
My VA Psychiatrist (Full Colonel USAR and two tours in Iraq) convinced me that I wasn't crazy, just needed to know what was happening to me and get treatment. Didn't cure me but did put me on the road to not pulling my brain out through my nose. FOR GODS SAKE If YOU BREAK A LEG YOU GO TO THE ER. IF YOU HAVE PTSD YOU GO TO THE PSY.. No one seems to be able to get that little bit of info through their heads. No one is ever completely healed, but at least I'm living an almost good life now. If I hadn't been a reader and Vietnam history buff I would have never figured out what I had to do and I .... who knows. By the way a big part of PTSD is a physical change to your amygdula(sp?) gland in the brain, not a choice that anyone can make or control. If you (or someone) has horrindus combat you are going to have PTSD. Your chain of command has to help you and you can still function and perform as a soldier if you get early treatment and possibly take meds etc.. Group therapy was the biggest help to me because I could see that others were going through the same thing I was, and up till then (group t.) I thought I was the only crazy one suffering. The junior chain of command, Capt. through team leader, needs to know that this monster can be tackled and fixed if they take CARE OF THEIR TROOPS, the exact same thing they are taught to do for "normal" combat. By the way mine, I'm convinced, was bad because I was not treated till thirty some years later.
Apologize for taking up so much bandwidth. The above is only my opinion based on my experience's in the last 40 years of my 58 year life.
Semper Fi,
Tipy

[jcustis]

I agree that it is a great article, but damn does it seem out of character for NYT reporting. Is it part of an agenda? I mean, if the stuff on page three about Prozac and medications, and the soldier willing to kill an Afghani walking up to the firmbase sticks with us folk here, what is it saying to the general populace who read it?

And while I may not be a public affairs officer, what commanding officer puts that sort of stuff out there in front of a reporter, concerning any medical details about his troops?

It may just be me, but something rubbed me the wrong way about what Kearney either said or was misquoted to have said. The article painted this picture of a guy with a band of high-strung soldiers who (despite claiming to stand on the moral high ground) are being pushed to the brink of snapping. Maybe it was just the slant, but a lot of it rubbed me the wrong way. If the quotes are accurate, what speaks to me the loudest are the words LEADERSHIP CRISIS. But, I am not there and seeing this through a single lens, so I hope the ground truth is something different, more positive.

Irrespective of all that, for me the article highlighted an important truth in COIN and dismounted-centric operations. You have to retain the ability to fix and maneuver. Call it the influence of ROE, but if you can't ascertain whether there are noncombatants in a house you saw a suspected insurgent run to, you've got to retain the ability to put boots on the ground there and work the cordon. Shoot, even if you know you are going to go kinetic, you have to fix and maneuver - stick and move. I know of too many occasions when small elements (plt-sized) of my last TF would make contact with either an IED or SAF ambush, and all of the vehicles would just move to cover and begin engaging the first target called out, rather than maneuvering. Almost to a contact, the kinetic window was closed too quickly because they did not have the sense to maneuver (in some cases the BGs had done a great job of setting the kill zone on terrain that prevented maneuver) and close that gap.

[Ken White]

I agree that it is a great article, but damn does it seem out of character for NYT reporting. Is it part of an agenda? I mean, if the stuff on page three about Prozac and medications, and the soldier willing to kill an Afghani walking up to the firmbase sticks with us folk here, what is it saying to the general populace who read it?Agenda possibly. Being charitable by inclination, I ascribed the general tone of the essentially good article as being an excess of reportorial empathy. Regardless, it is IMO notable for the quite possibly incorrect sense of futility it transmits.
And while I may not be a public affairs officer, what commanding officer puts that sort of stuff out there in front of a reporter, concerning any medical details about his troops?Same thought by me; be totally honest but volunteer nothing; the media will almost always consciously or unconsciously leave something out, misquote or slant their verbiage, generally in a manner not envisioned -- and not desired....
It may just be me, but something rubbed me the wrong way about what Kearney either said or was misquoted to have said. The article painted this picture of a guy with a band of high-strung soldiers who (despite claiming to stand on the moral high ground) are being pushed to the brink of snapping. Maybe it was just the slant, but a lot of it rubbed me the wrong way. If the quotes are accurate, what speaks to me the loudest are the words LEADERSHIP CRISIS. But, I am not there and seeing this through a single lens, so I hope the ground truth is something different, more positive.Agree. Though I suspect that, as Gav Guy noted, there's much more to the tactical picture than came through.
Irrespective of all that, for me the article highlighted an important truth in COIN and dismounted-centric operations. You have to retain the ability to fix and maneuver. Call it the influence of ROE, but if you can't ascertain whether there are noncombatants in a house you saw a suspected insurgent run to, you've got to retain the ability to put boots on the ground there and work the cordon. Shoot, even if you know you are going to go kinetic, you have to fix and maneuver - stick and move. I know of too many occasions when small elements (plt-sized) of my last TF would make contact with either an IED or SAF ambush, and all of the vehicles would just move to cover and begin engaging the first target called out, rather than maneuvering. Almost to a contact, the kinetic window was closed too quickly because they did not have the sense to maneuver (in some cases the BGs had done a great job of setting the kill zone on terrain that prevented maneuver) and close that gap. Sigh. Seen that elsewhere, over and over...

Can I beat my "We do not train the basics well" drum here? :wry:

[jcustis]

Ken, that drum resonates well. What we (I actually picked up the direct observation from the TF Bn Cmdr) saw was that the simplest things aren't "simple" anymore.

And as I read a notation about Kearney again, I noticed that he is 26 years old. A 26-y/o captain leading a company across a 12-month running gunfight...hmmm...

I'm not saying the man is not capable, but by my calculations he probably has 4 years time in service. Is this an example of the Army promotion timings putting guys into command with fewer years of experience than in the past?

[Ken White]

Ken, that drum resonates well. What we (I actually picked up the direct observation from the TF Bn Cmdr) saw was that the simplest things aren't "simple" anymore.What we do is shortchange the basics. That leads to problems doing the big things because the grounding is inadequate. We can cobble together things better than anyone else in the world but a lot of folks outdo us on the basics -- and, as they say, it's the little things that get you... :(
And as I read a notation about Kearney again, I noticed that he is 26 years old. A 26-y/o captain leading a company across a 12-month running gunfight...hmmm...

I'm not saying the man is not capable, but by my calculations he probably has 4 years time in service. Is this an example of the Army promotion timings putting guys into command with fewer years of experience than in the past?Dunno, I'm long retarded -- but that was the case during the unpleasantness in SE Asia some years ago and that rapidity of promotion was a major problem in the day. Wars do that; most of 'em bumped up quickly cope very well and some are simply outstanding, all of them mature a little more rapidly but there is a cost in lack of experience, no question. There are also the few that do NOT cope so well...

Can I now bring out my DOPMA drum? :D

[Cavguy]

I'm not saying the man is not capable, but by my calculations he probably has 4 years time in service. Is this an example of the Army promotion timings putting guys into command with fewer years of experience than in the past?

Yes promotions are faster, but almost every combat arms commander I know is between 5-8 years of service, although most make CPT at 38 months. There's lag for captain's course, and the obligatory staff rowing time prior to command.

Me, I got command 7 years in and finished 9 years in, but I was behind a long command queue. Although I hated the wait, I got almost 2 years command and was much better prepared because of all the time spent on staff understanding how the sausage was made.

[Tipy]

Davidbfpo,
The NY Times is a defeatist paper, the most liberal, anti American, and anti war paper in the US. I would not trust anything they wrote.
I would love to hear what Cpt. Kearny has to say about this article.
Artillery would have been much more flexible and capable then the CAS(Close Air Support) in this article. It was mentioned that the unit's base was only 6 miles from a nearby American base. Why didn't they have artillery support from that nearby base? Mistakes on the writers part make me further doubt her writing. Calling a .556 caliber Saw a heavy machine gun makes me doubt the rest of the authors incompetent writing. I wasn't there so I sure wish Cpt. Kearny was available to comment on this article. Writer mentions that an American Platoon was wiped out, I very much doubt that.

Change the subject. Has anyone read John Masters biographies, "Bugles and a Tiger" and "Road Past Mandalay". He was a junior officer in the Gurka's about eight years before WWII started and then he ended the war as a Brigade commander of one of the Chindit Brigades. My favorite stories (biographical) I wonder what others think of these two volumes.
Semper Fi,
Tipy

[CR6]

Me, I got command 7 years in and finished 9 years in, but I was behind a long command queue.

Exactly my experience as well.

48 months to 03 started to fade about eight years ago, when the jump from 01 to 02 was shortened from 24 to 18 months. We've lost another 4 months of that since then. There's a ripple effect here with guys making 04 quicker as well, combined with accelerated promotion boards. I know of officers pinning oak leaves with less than a decade of officer experience. In and of itself that's not such a bad thing, but with record high promotion rates this could pose problems. Not everyone has demonstrated the potential for promotion at the nine year mark. Some guys never will. Field grade rank, in my mind, connotates some breadth of experience that should facilitate examing issues from more points of view than company/battalion level. The rapidity of promotion does not allow time for that experience to accumulate.

To nudge the post back on topic; CAV Guy, excellent post in the The Korengal Thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4973) about how Battle Company may have drawn the short straw in order to shape the battlespace for success elsewhere. It would be interesting to learn what wasn't written in the article. On the whole, I found the tone sympathetic to the experience of the American solider without being hostile.

[Granite_State]

Can Army artillery units hit the side of a barn? Maybe not, according to a troubling internal memo sent this month to Army Chief of Staff George Casey by three former brigade commanders.

“The once-mighty ‘King of Battle’ ” is a “dead branch walking,” write the active-duty colonels in the five-page document obtained by National Journal. With “growing alarm,” they describe “deterioration” in artillery readiness to perform its most basic missions. In training, “firing incidents [occur] during every rotation”; “crew drills are very slow, and any type of [disorder] halts operations”; and, absent instructor intervention, “most” cannon platoons would have fired in unsafe conditions, the memo says.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have drawn experienced artillery troops into other jobs—like infantry and transportation—where soldiers are badly needed, the authors write. Ninety percent of fire-support personnel have been reassigned, leaving behind fewer than 10 percent certified for the mission.

“General Casey seeks out and appreciates receiving feedback [from] commanders and soldiers in the field,” said an Army spokesman, who declined to comment on the memo’s specifics.—Elaine Grossman

http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nw_20080424_3965.php?related=true&story1=nj_20070728_25&story2=nw_20080424_3965&story3=null

Anyone heard anything about the memo in question?

[Cavguy]

http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nw_20080424_3965.php?related=true&story1=nj_20070728_25&story2=nw_20080424_3965&story3=null

Anyone heard anything about the memo in question?

I've got it but can't forward it outside of DoD. Send me a PM if you have a .mil account and are current DoD.

It pretty much laments that the FA has done everything but arty since 2003, and the branch has problems. For example, LTC Yingling's FA BN is deploying - to do detainee ops at Bucca. Other FA units are doing infantry BN work, perimeter guard (particularly MLRS units), or convoy escort. It worked as a short fix in 2003-2004, but after 5 years is now beginning to threaten long term ability of the FA to do their assigned mission. I also think it was written by non-FA because if it came from FA branch it could/would be seen as whining - instead it's maneuver commanders bringing up the issue.

Other branches (tankers, engineers) are in a similar box, but both do most of their core skillsets downrange on a regular basis. Also slight miscalculations with 155mm have worse effects. :eek:

[patmc]

I have been in an airborne 155mm FA battalion for over 3 years now, and went from putting rounds down-range, to training and executing convoy security, to SECFOR training, to cancel SECFOR and relearn rounds down range.

Our BN is finally back into shooting and getting good, but it took a long time and a lot of hard work from every member of the battalion. It is serious business, and takes a lot longer than most people assume, since a lot of FA is perishable skills. Also, with fast promotions, we have Officers and NCOs that have little to no gun time. The constant switch to non-standard missions is having a serious impact on FA as a branch. From the officer side, most LTs and junior CPTs have little if any FA experience. Not necessarily all bad for leadership sake, but definately puts them at disadvantage as battery commander, who needs to know safety, gunnery, and crew drill. The high number of FA on MTT assignments is also hurting the branch, since a lot of CPTs are not staying in or attending the Captains Course. Guys who joined to shoot howitzers may not see one in their first 4-5 years.

[Granite_State]

I've got it but can't forward it outside of DoD. Send me a PM if you have a .mil account and are current DoD.

It pretty much laments that the FA has done everything but arty since 2003, and the branch has problems. For example, LTC Yingling's FA BN is deploying - to do detainee ops at Bucca. Other FA units are doing infantry BN work, perimeter guard (particularly MLRS units), or convoy escort. It worked as a short fix in 2003-2004, but after 5 years is now beginning to threaten long term ability of the FA to do their assigned mission. I also think it was written by non-FA because if it came from FA branch it could/would be seen as whining - instead it's maneuver commanders bringing up the issue.

Other branches (tankers, engineers) are in a similar box, but both do most of their core skillsets downrange on a regular basis. Also slight miscalculations with 155mm have worse effects. :eek:

No .mil, but thanks for the reply. Interesting that it's from maneuver commanders, I'd assumed it was artillery officers that wrote it.

[Maximus]

PATMC,

You mention it takes a long time to re-train artilley. Can you give a rough estimate? Would you be confident firing artillery in support of a maneuver unit in 2 weeks if necessary?

I ask this because there's been a bit of a stir of late suggesting that we're losing our "conventional" warfighting skills. Often with this line of thought comes, be careful or we might find ourselves facing similar problems to those the IDF recently experienced against Hezbollah.

While I think this argument overlooks a whole variety of reasons why Hezbollah posed such a problem for the IDF, I do think it's important nonetheless and something we very much need to keep in mind.

I'm currently reading Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
As I turn the pages I keep thinking about the issue of whether we are indeed losing our "conventional" capabilities and, if this is true, I'm trying to figure out the timeline to become proficient again (I'm a grunt so can't speak much, if at all to arty, tanks, engineers, etc.). The article mentions 6-12 months to become proficient in arty again. To be honest, this seems like an extremely long time considering the Inchon invasion. Early July 1950 the Commandant of the Marine Corps is asked if he can execute a division-sized amphibious invasion at Inchon in September. At the time the Marines are fighting for their very existent and barely have 1 functioning and decently trained regimental combat team in the Corps. Remnants of another exist at Camp Lejeune. Since 1945, the Marine Corps' conducted minimal amphibious training; same for the Navy. Little to no battalion or higher exercises. In fact, the main thing that the Marine Corps' been doing from 1945-1950 is becoming smaller, having the budget cut, and figuring out very creative ways to train with little to no funding.

When the Commandant gives the word "go" around 8 July the barely functional regiment is sent to the Pusan Perimeter, and two other regiments are formed by activating reservists and taking almost all other Marines from North Carolina, Hawaii and elsewhere and sending them to Camp Pendleton to join 1st and 7th Marines. Amphibious vehicles, mothballed at the time, are sent from Barstow, CA to San Diego. Marines that used the vehicles in 1945, 5 years earlier, re-familiarize themselves with them, the Marines get whatever gear they can find, jump on ships, and are off in early Aug for the Pacific. No training at the company level or higher. Ships on the way over are jam packed. This definitely doesn't facilitate training. Typhoons mess up the prep timeline. 5th Marines, which had been fighting in the Pusan (allegedly one of the best, if not the best unit holding the perimeter), is pulled back and sent to link-up w/ the rest of 1MARDIV. Old and barely functional landing craft staged in vicinity of Japan from 1945 onward, piloted in some cases by former Japanese naval officers, take the Marines ashore. No amphibious rehearsal. Almost all odds against the joint-force landing. But in the end, the operation, executed on 15 September 1950, is a resounding success. Heart. Determination. The Will to Win and Only to Win. These rule the day.

I can't help but to think about this when some say we're not ready to fight a "conventional" fight today. If you tell a Marine or Soldier to attack something today, in my heart-of-hearts I know they'd accomplish the mission just as the 1stMar Div (and 7th Infantry Division) did at Inchon and then into Seoul.

[Ken White]

Having been in the 1st Mar Bde at the time, I can testify that what you say is true and that the Bde and later the Div did everything it was supposed to do. I can also say it was not easy; it got done but it was tough and there were excess casualties due to all the factors you cite.

There were two differences then and now which may or may not be significant, only time will tell. The first is that the Officers and NCOs of the Div virtually all were combat experienced in WW II and a large number had prior 'Banana War' experience and all that experience was generally in their nominal field of expertise. The second is that there was a difference in general attitude with respect to acceptance of what the fates wrought then as opposed to now, I believe.

It is pretty well proven that COIN efforts enhance the skill of individual Infantrymen and are neutral to mildly detrimental to the skills of those in the other Combat Arms.

Given all three factors, I think that skill deterioration is a big concern -- but I agree with you that the Troops will make it work regardless under most circumstances.

[Maximus]

Ken,

Thanks for the post. Semper Fi brother!

How small a world it is. I served with 1st Mar in OIF-I. I am also reluctant to say outright that we're not ready to fight a "conventional" fight because my experiences in 2002-2003. I checked into 1st Mar in Nov '02. No platoon. The battalion's at roughly 30% strength. We're all called back from Christmas leave and told we're going to war. All the Lts present, we were still short quite a few Lts at the time, look at each other wondering where the Marines for the platoons are. Marines from the School of Infantry East and West are sent to 1st Mar, specifically, 1st Bn 4th Marines, at the cyclic rate. On 5 Jan 2003, I have a platoon of 30 Marines; my other squad is in Kuwait at the time and I won't link-up with them until 25 Feb, having never met any of the Marines. We get on ship on 17 Jan 2003, having never conducted a platoon, company or battalion live-fire and maneuver exercise. We did what we could on ship. We trained hard but as far as live-fire goes, there's only so much one can do on a "small" deck. We land in Kuwait 25 Feb. Link-up with the other squad. Train for about 3 weeks in the desert, almost exclusively at the platoon and limited rehearsals at the company level. We have no AAVs at the time. All rehearsals are conducted dismounted or using 7-ton trucks. 19 March we get AAVs; many of these AAVs are in a sorry state. All day and night long our AAV warriors, reservists from Texas, burn the midnight oil getting the vehicles up. We cross the LD 20Mar, towing one of my platoon's 3 AAVs.

In the end, the Marines fought like hell, fixed AAVs under ponchos while on the move at night, executing combined arms, tank/mech-infantry integration, and enduring the elements the whole time... nasty sand-storms, down to 1 MRE a day and very limited water, etc. (Please don't think that I'm even trying to compare this to the Chosin). We even executed a river crossing in the AAVs to get into Baghdad.

I say all this because, as you know, ultimately what we can do comes down to Heart, the Will to Win and Only to Win, Teamwork, Esprit, etc.

All this said, we must be aware of skills that are atrophying and find ways to alleviate this/these problems. I think, at least in the Marine Corps, we're doing this.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[patmc]

Personally, I would not want to be in a maneuver unit receiving danger close rounds from a FA unit with only 2 weeks training, but that being said, it could be done. The crew drills and basic Fire Direction could be done, at least. If you took infantryman or tankers, and gave them 2 weeks non-stop on a howitzer, they could probably emplace and shoot. Could they emplace, shoot low/high angle, out of traverse, march order, move, emplace, and repeat? Probably not. Also, who would train and lead them?

The biggest issue we have is experienced trainers and leaders. A healthy FA unit has NCOs with years of hands on experience. When a FA unit stops shooting for 2 years plus, and as people PCS, ETC, get promoted, etc... you lose your experience level. There is no one to train the trainers.

For the Fire Direction Centers, I do not think you would want to take non-13D's and create a FDC from scratch in two weeks. Soldiers, NCO's and Officers spend months learning gunnery. I don't think you could cut it down to two weeks. Again, you would also find few commanders willing to shoot their rank with that FDC.

For maintenance and support, it takes a U6, the howitzer maintenance expert, several weeks in school, plus months - years of hands-on experience to master their howitzer. The ammo sections also need training in drawing, handling, then preparing the rounds for fire missions.

Can you take a battalion of redlegs, put them in the field for 2 weeks and teach them basic infantry skills? Yes, we've done it. Could they move to an objective, clear it, and move out... yes. Was it pretty? No, but it worked.


PATMC,

You mention it takes a long time to re-train artilley. Can you give a rough estimate? Would you be confident firing artillery in support of a maneuver unit in 2 weeks if necessary?

[Ron Humphrey]

But can someone tell me what the likelihood of Full out and out Ground Arty component being a mainstay in the future. If the USAF gets the 22's and others then when comparing ground arty in relation to Air or Naval Arty which are the more likely to be used in largess. Isn't it a little harder for an enemy to take out supporting assets that are in the air or the ocean than on the ground.

Pound for pound what is the tradeoff between these and is it even something to be considered or can our forces not accomplish the missions without 155's on the ground.

[Cavguy]

But can someone tell me what the likelihood of Full out and out Ground Arty component being a mainstay in the future. If the USAF gets the 22's and others then when comparing ground arty in relation to Air or Naval Arty which are the more likely to be used in largess. Isn't it a little harder for an enemy to take out supporting assets that are in the air or the ocean than on the ground.

Pound for pound what is the tradeoff between these and is it even something to be considered or can our forces not accomplish the missions without 155's on the ground.


Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

[Tom Odom]

Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

All good points

Let me add that you can field a hell of a lot of artillery for the price of an F22

And as for immediacy and the continuing need for arty look at earlier rotations on OEF and how soon units began taking arty with them.

Don't forget either the pricesion revolution is also giving indirect fires with a truly remarkable capability to deliver pinpoint fires.

If I had to pick between CAS and indirect fire from organic redlegs, I will take the indirect. Happily we do not need to make such a choice. We need to make sure that we do not allow such a choice to be framed and crammed down our collective throats.

Tom

[selil]

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

Very well said. Artillery and armor travel with infantry too they are not "requested" or added to an equation.

When was the last Naval bombardment? I thought the Iowa, Missouri, etc.. had all been mothballed? Off to google (the hive mind) again.

[Vic Bout]

However, in Feb 2002, when I asked 10th Mountain staffers at Bagram Air Base why there was no arty on the ground (at least anywhere out in the open that I could see or in fact, I believe, anywhere in country), the response I got was, "CENTCOM/SECDEF believes it sends the wrong message to the locals and the folks at home....we don't want to make it look like we're occupying Afghanistan." Then, not a week later Operation Anaconda kicked off. We sure could have used some 105/155 help up in the Shai Kowt...

[Eden]

I took over as the S-3 of an armor battalion just returning from a six-month tour guarding Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay. The battalion redeployed to Fort Hood where it then lost about 30% of its personnel who had been retained until mission completion.

Anyway, the battalion had not fired a shot in over 9 months, and had not maneuvered at all for nearly a year. The tanks had been packed in cosmoline for about six months. The following timeline reflects our journey back to competence:

Three months to get the vehicles back in shape and achieve minimal gunnery standards.

Six months to reach full gunnery qualification and minimal competence in maneuver at the company level.

Nine months to fully restore our skill set at the battalion level.

Now, I am sure that given unlimited ammunition, training resources, and relief from all the niggling peacetime duties that distract you from training, we could have done it considerably faster. But this was 1995-6, and we were the only battalion on post that had fallen so far behind in our conventional skills. It might have taken considerably longer if the whole division (at that time the 2nd Armored of blessed memory) had been in the same boat. And we had a considerable core of NCOs and officers whose conventional skills had not eroded brought into the unit to help with training and maintaining.

Yes, it may only take a few intensive weeks to put a battalion back on its conventional feet. But what about when you have 100 battalions to put back on their feet? With brigade and division commanders who have not seen a brigade or division maneuver together in the last five years or so?

We have to do the job set before us. But let's not minimize the damage it is doing to our conventional skill sets, or stop seeking ways to mitigate the damage. I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

[William F. Owen]

Yes, it may only take a few intensive weeks to put a battalion back on its conventional feet. But what about when you have 100 battalions to put back on their feet? With brigade and division commanders who have not seen a brigade or division maneuver together in the last five years or so?


...but this is the heart of the problem. The fact that skills will fade while out of role is a known fact and to a degree, measurable.

What training, doctrine and equipment must allow for, is the rapid reacquisition of the required skills sets, or the activity required to maintain a useful degree of currency. This is both clearly possible and viable, but there must be the institutional desire to recognise this and act on it.

British Army Artillery, Armour and Engineer units, came back to Germany from 4 month emergency tours in Northern Ireland and got on with facing the Soviet Army. It is far from easy, it is painful, but it is doable.

...and no one has a choice on this, because just like Vietnam, you may well find yourself facing an enemy armoured formation, with insurgents running around trying to kill you as well.

[davidbfpo]

I too recall the few press stories on the re-adjustment of British Army units deployed from Germany to Ulster, for short tours and then returning to their conventional heavy war-fighting role. In my reading of the journal British Army Review I've not seen any articles describing the process. Hopefully our lessons learnt have been provided via the much lauded British Defence Liaison Staff, in Washington DC and on commands. I know an Engineer Colonel who might be able to comment, so standby.

davidbfpo

[Sabre]

All good points

Let me add that you can field a hell of a lot of artillery for the price of an F22

And as for immediacy and the continuing need for arty look at earlier rotations on OEF and how soon units began taking arty with them.

Don't forget either the pricesion revolution is also giving indirect fires with a truly remarkable capability to deliver pinpoint fires.

If I had to pick between CAS and indirect fire from organic redlegs, I will take the indirect. Happily we do not need to make such a choice. We need to make sure that we do not allow such a choice to be framed and crammed down our collective throats.

Tom

Gah, CavGuy and Tom beat me to the punch.

They're right.
For a conventional war, the numbers aren't favorable for a CAS-only (no arty) force package. If we have X number of troops (say 100,000+) engaging the enemy, and they all need fire support, the USAF just doesn't have the numbers necessary to do it - not even close (especially given the spiralling cost of a modern fighter-bomber).

As I have said in other threads, artillery is dirt-cheap compared to fighter-bombers, considering not only how much an F-22 or F-35 costs, but also how much initial pilot training costs, how much annual training costs... and the support costs: it works out to be a dozen or so ground crew for each plane, maintenance and parts are expensive... There is just no comparison between arty and CAS in terms of cost vs. effectiveness (especially now with precision munitions for the artillery).

I also seem to recall a comment about how arty would be more vulnerable to ground attack by insurgents... that depends on the scenario envisioned.
Artillery units often turn out to be surprisingly hard targets for insurgents or enemy units behind the lines, especially when compared to a sprawling airbase (I'm thinking of examples from Vietnam).

[Tom Odom]

I will admit though that no artillery piece is as cool looking as this:

[Vic Bout]

...this looks pretty cool...

[wm]

I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

I agree completely. That line of "three bags full" (aka, "we the unwilling, led by the unknowing, have done so much for so long with so little that now we are capable of doing anything with nothing at all") stuff smacks of the duPicq/Joffre line of reasoning that eviscerated the French Army in 1914/15 and ended up bleeding France white. I would carry it on to the British at the Somme and the Allies' "successes" through mid-1942 as further examples that most would not contest. I'll not fall on my sword WRT to America's armed forces post 1945.

[Tom Odom]

Does it have a sound system?


...this looks pretty cool...

[Entropy]

Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

All good points, but the weather bit surprises me actually.

I tend to view Aircraft and Arty as complementary, not competitive. Each has strengths and weaknesses - both inherent and situational.

[Cavguy]

All good points, but the weather bit surprises me actually.

I tend to view Aircraft and Arty as complementary, not competitive. Each has strengths and weaknesses - both inherent and situational.

Agreed. Aboive was not meant to reduce role/effect of airpower in the slightest. I was responding to Ron's question in specific about why Arty was still needed in the age of JDAMs.

Re: Bad weather. Had a number of occasions aircraft were off station due to sandstorms in Iraq. At least they were unwilling to support when the pilot couldn't see the target. Good example was the sandstorm a few days ago when the Green Zone got barraged because A/C weren't on station. Not that we could do arty counterfire in urban though.

[William F. Owen]

I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

I concur with WM

This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.

The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.

[Sabre]

I concur with WM

This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.

The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.

Agreed.
I've seen that argument used in other areas as well, not just in missions assigned, but in weapons development, organization and force structure - it's pernicious.

The things that the soldier has to face, the enemy, terrain, weather, supply problems, inaccurate intel (in spite of all that the US Army throws at intel), are often tough enough to overcome as it is, without having any additional difficulties piled on. As the general said "I don't want a fair fight, I want every possible advantage that I can get"...

[Jedburgh]

Anyone heard anything about the memo in question?
The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders (http://www.npr.org/documents/2008/may/artillerywhitepaper.pdf)

As BCT commanders we have watched the deterioration of the Field Artillery Branch with growing alarm. We are former maneuver commanders who recognize the importance of having reliable, fast and accurate fire support and wish to provide our Army's leadership with a "customer's perspective" on this issue.........

[Sabre]

The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders (http://www.npr.org/documents/2008/may/artillerywhitepaper.pdf)

Interesting paper. While I agree with the spirit, I take issue with some of the suggestions.

One thing that I find endlessly infuriating is the supposition that somehow you "need" battalion and brigade commands, and commanders, to get good training and good officers in a branch. The authors suggest that there need to be formed Artillery brigades, and any place where there are separate batteries now must instead be grouped under a battalion headquarters. Battalion and brigade headquarters are very expensive in terms of personnel, especially multiplied over the numbers that we are taking about in the Artillery - depending on how you do the math, it could equate to perhaps a entire brigade's worth of troops. Most of those additional personnel are *not* there to increase the institutional knowledge or training quality of the artillery. Personnel in the battalion and brigade S1, S2, S4, etc are not going to be focused on improving the quality of artillery training. The battalion/brigade commander and his XO will also probably spend plenty of time worrying about "command" issues like maintenance, discipline, the family support group, etc. Grouping batteries into a battalion also requires a forward support company and/or an HQ battery, which at the very least will require additional personnel to command these company(/ies), even if the rest of the support personnel are realigned from the current organization, the same can be said of grouping battalions into brigades. This is quite a few extra personnel, when the whole reason for it, in the white paper, is to get some additional, senior artillery experts - an inordinately high price to pay, when there are other, more direct ways to accomplish it.

I wouldn't be nearly as quick to dismiss the FSE section. In the 3rd ACR, this was a Field Artillery major (no real reason that the billet couldn't be an LTC), a captain, a chief warrant, a senior NCO and a couple of support troops. They could focus solely on the quality of training, and didn't have to worry about all of the other things that a commander, and his staff, do (and some officers are all too happy to focus purely on the training, and not have the headaches of command). The batteries certainly did have time to train, and in tests/arteps often outperformed their "standard" counterparts in the other FA battalions, and even the FA brigades at Sill, in mission that was measurable.

Heck, King Battery (1st How, 1/3 ACR) just set a new record for most rounds fired by a battery in Iraq, over 5,000 rounds safely delivered to their targets, which is much, much more than the average battery gets for training in a year. The FSE sections also picked up the role of the battalion or brigade FDC (battalion and brigade FDC's are not nearly as useful today as they were back in WWII, before the advent of computers and battle command software.)

Other branches (say, MI) have a career progression path that involves staff jobs at the higher levels, where being an S2 on a brigade level staff is a qualifying job, the same could be done with the Field Artillery. I also think that it misses the point that, grouping into brigades, they will simply be an easier target for the "bean counters" to cut. At least in the current scheme, there are still plenty of howitzer batteries out there. A few iterations of reorgs, and that would change if they were in artillery brigades. Finally, the opposition to the two-man crew of the N-LOS C is... misleading. Batteries today have an ammunition carrier (CAT) to resupply each gun, and some flavor of HEMTT to resupply each CAT. Both of those vehicles have Artillery MOS soldiers that are trained as gun crew. (Perhaps the FCS batteries do not have these - if so, then that IS a serious mistake.)

This also ignores the serious training problems that arise from "stovepiped" units. The officers and NCO's in the Cav Howitzer batteries KNOW what their maneuver counterparts need, and have (or at least, had) developed unique TTPs to accomplish their mission and support the line troops.

We simply don't have the personnel to stand up entire brigades, just to get an FA Colonel. If you really want to spend that kind of money, make the N-LOS C as good as, say, the PzH 2000, and highlight the independence and awesome responsibility of a howitzer battery, or even make a few maneuver brigade commands available to (gasp) artillery officers, and you will (continue to) get good officers and NCOs into the branch.

[patmc]

Battalion and brigade headquarters are very expensive in terms of personnel, especially multiplied over the numbers that we are taking about in the Artillery - depending on how you do the math, it could equate to perhaps a entire brigade's worth of troops. Most of those additional personnel are *not* there to increase the institutional knowledge or training quality of the artillery. Personnel in the battalion and brigade S1, S2, S4, etc are not going to be focused on improving the quality of artillery training.

I've served almost 4 years in a new "Fires" Brigade as a FA and MI officer, with over 1.5 years on BN staff. I agree that as far as FA training goes, aside from BDE 3, the BDE staff does not contribute. However, I would say this is the same for all Brigade level staffs. They do the thankless work that gets stuff done. Fires Brigades are also intended to be deployable and modular like BCTs, requiring them to have sufficient internal support.


One thing that I find endlessly infuriating is the supposition that somehow you "need" battalion and brigade commands, and commanders, to get good training and good officers in a branch. The authors suggest that there need to be formed Artillery brigades, and any place where there are separate batteries now must instead be grouped under a battalion headquarters.

As the paper states, FA is hurting. My BN has only 1 CCC grad in Command, the rest are first/second year captains, and after OIF convoy security, and a SECFOR deployment trainup, few have large amounts of FA experience. The BN CDR spent his company grade years doing FA, and his field grade doing non-standard missions, so he has the expertise to guide the young commanders. The creation of BCTs ended "DIVARTY" which served an oversight role for all fires units in a division. The only FA COL in position of authority on Bragg is the Fires Brigade commander. The BCT Fires BNs have to seek out non-FA commanders for experience and guidance. Maybe not a deal breaker, but FA requires enough technical knowledge that most non-FA officers probably don't know. Emplacing, crew-drills, and gunnery are probably out of their realm.


Grouping batteries into a battalion also requires a forward support company and/or an HQ battery, which at the very least will require additional personnel to command these company(/ies), even if the rest of the support personnel are realigned from the current organization, the same can be said of grouping battalions into brigades.

BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else. The FSC is also a great enabler in the field, and has definately improved how we train and work day to day. It does take more personnel, but it allows sections and units to specialize.


This is quite a few extra personnel, when the whole reason for it, in the white paper, is to get some additional, senior artillery experts - an inordinately high price to pay, when there are other, more direct ways to accomplish it.

I agree that these structures shouldn't exist just to justify a senior billet, but they do serve a purpose. 18th Fires just reflagged under 82nd Airborne Division, so we have not seen how this will impact the BCT Fires BNs, but the consensus with most FA Officers I've talked to here is they think it is a good move.


I wouldn't be nearly as quick to dismiss the FSE section. In the 3rd ACR, this was a Field Artillery major (no real reason that the billet couldn't be an LTC), a captain, a chief warrant, a senior NCO and a couple of support troops. They could focus solely on the quality of training, and didn't have to worry about all of the other things that a commander, and his staff, do (and some officers are all too happy to focus purely on the training, and not have the headaches of command).

The FSE does serve an important function, but with a MAJ or even LTC filling it, would he really have authority or real influence over a Fires BN Commander? I am a Captain on staff, and Captains are Captains, but a Captain in Command does not always listen to the staff. Would a LTC in command listen to a MAJ or another LTC giving suggestions? "I'm the commander."


The batteries certainly did have time to train, and in tests/arteps often outperformed their "standard" counterparts in the other FA battalions, and even the FA brigades at Sill, in mission that was measurable.

Heck, King Battery (1st How, 1/3 ACR) just set a new record for most rounds fired by a battery in Iraq, over 5,000 rounds safely delivered to their targets, which is much, much more than the average battery gets for training in a year. The FSE sections also picked up the role of the battalion or brigade FDC (battalion and brigade FDC's are not nearly as useful today as they were back in WWII, before the advent of computers and battle command software.)

Sadly, most FA batteries are not shooting, and some are not even pretending to train FA, instead focusing on their next OIF/OEF security or infantry mission. There are only a handful of batteries shooting at Bragg right now, just the reality addressed by the paper. That said, those that are shooting in Iraq or Afghanistan, are shooting a lot. One of our sister BN's has been living the Artilleryman's dreams and destroying Taliban with HE. Also, due to the lost FA skills, BN Level Master Gunner and FDC oversight have been essential in our unit safely returning to the FA mission.


Other branches (say, MI) have a career progression path that involves staff jobs at the higher levels, where being an S2 on a brigade level staff is a qualifying job, the same could be done with the Field Artillery.

Making more staff jobs KD may help retain people, but truth be told, if you come in knowing you are only going to go so far and be stuck on staff, that does not appeal to everyone. MI, as you mention, is now non-command oriented, basically telling CPTs not all of you will command, and that is OK (though we all know that is false). That will likely be the deciding point for me a few years down the road. Being a BDE S2 is KD because there are only a handful of actual MI BNs left. MI is up there with FA having the biggest officer retention problems (CSRB). This is due to deployments and happiness with career.


This also ignores the serious training problems that arise from "stovepiped" units. The officers and NCO's in the Cav Howitzer batteries KNOW what their maneuver counterparts need, and have (or at least, had) developed unique TTPs to accomplish their mission and support the line troops.

Agree with you here, coming from a General Support (GS) FA unit. They don't teach FA LTs what GS actually means in practice, where you will get more (aka all) your time in the FA battery, and no time with IN or AR or the like. This was not a huge issue for me because I got to do a convoy security mission as a PL and got my maneuver on, but not training in direct support of IN or AR impacts units. That said, you can get exposed to more Joint operations. It is also a reality though, that 155mm and rockets are meant to reach out and touch the enemy, so keeping them one mile from the front may not make sense (conventional Fulda Gap thinking here).


We simply don't have the personnel to stand up entire brigades, just to get an FA Colonel. If you really want to spend that kind of money, make the N-LOS C as good as, say, the PzH 2000, and highlight the independence and awesome responsibility of a howitzer battery, or even make a few maneuver brigade commands available to (gasp) artillery officers, and you will (continue to) get good officers and NCOs into the branch.

Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems. Sill just released the draft FA Plan on AKO, its worth a read to see where branch is trying to go.

Long Live the King!

[Ken White]

First, a caveat, not an Artillery type but have a fair amount of Infantry and Cavalry experience and observing Artillerists at work for fun an profit during the period 1948-1995; post '95, I have a little knowledge.

Second, I'm quoting Patmc not to pick on him but because he makes good cogent points in a logical sequence.
...As the paper states, FA is hurting. My BN has only 1 CCC grad in Command, the rest are first/second year captains...In the 48-95 period, that was pretty much the norm -- unless the other BCs were First or even, rarely, Second LTs. The game at all Carreer Course was to ask how many had Co/By/Trp command before arrival and typically it was about 2/3. Thus, I'm not sure that is a problem.
...The creation of BCTs ended "DIVARTY" which served an oversight role for all fires units in a division.Which also changed about 85 years of excessively (?) centralized organization -- bound to be rumbles.
...Maybe not a deal breaker, but FA requires enough technical knowledge that most non-FA officers probably don't know. Emplacing, crew-drills, and gunnery are probably out of their realm.Simple solution there is to upgrade By Cmd to Major.
BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else.Support is support and the ACRs make it work.
Making more staff jobs KD may help retain people, but truth be told, if you come in knowing you are only going to go so far and be stuck on staff, that does not appeal to everyone. MI, as you mention, is now non-command oriented, basically telling CPTs not all of you will command, and that is OK (though we all know that is false).Valid point. What if we did away with Branches? Yes, I'm totally serious.
Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems. Sill just released the draft FA Plan on AKO, its worth a read to see where branch is trying to go.Here's my Grenade:

Seen a lot of FA GOs and worked for several. All were good and smart guys but IMO none was a particularly successful maneuver unit commander because of a strong tendency to over centralize, lack of maneuver experience and an, again IMO, lack of trust of subordinates (Aviators suffer the same problems ;) , gotta use that Checklist...). Thus, I again ask, why branches?

[reed11b]

Even though I am a combined arms advocate and obviously the BCTs need organic arty, I do see the need for Fire Brigades. If you place enough arty in a BCT for major combat operations, you have a lot of dead weight when those operations end. Fire brigades make arty enchantment easy and "modular" :p
Also reduces work load on already over tasked BCT commander. Of course I like the idea of CSS Brigades too, as opposed to trying to shoe-horn everything into a BCT (similar thought here LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5967&page=4)

[Sabre]

BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else. The FSC is also a great enabler in the field, and has definately improved how we train and work day to day. It does take more personnel, but it allows sections and units to specialize.


In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...) Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???

The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.

[jkm_101_fso]

In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...) Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???

The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.

Many consider an ACR battery command pretty coveted, primarily because of the autonomy, but also the sheer size (personnel & equip) and capability. It's almost like a mini battalion itself. I would only be so lucky to command one.

[Sabre]

Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems.



Seen a lot of FA GOs and worked for several. All were good and smart guys but IMO none was a particularly successful maneuver unit commander because of a strong tendency to over centralize, lack of maneuver experience and an, again IMO, lack of trust of subordinates (Aviators suffer the same problems ;) , gotta use that Checklist...). Thus, I again ask, why branches?

I have to agree with Ken. However, I would point out that, as young Field Artillery officers "grow up" in the BCT's, they will be much more "in tune" with their maneuver counterparts, so that aspect of the situation should improve.

In any case, soon the Battalion and Brigade FDC's will cease to be training assets, but another frustrating, and frustrated, disfunctional link in the FA/FS chain, that needs to sort itself out, as the personnel who rotate into those positions have been performing non-standard, non-artillery missions for the last X years.

To turn an argument on its head: instead of grouping all the batteries into Fires Brigades to improve artillery training, that only occasionally get to train with maneuver units, instead have mobile training teams, with the mission of bringing batteries that have been doing non-standard missions "back up to speed" for shooting the big guns? This is a much more efficient method, and should prove just as effective.

A more worisome aspect of the problem is that right now, the Army "buys off" on one howitzer battery per maneuver battalion (with another per, somewhere in "GS"). Grouping into Fires Brigades just leaves the artillery ripe for cutting, when some "beancounter" goes about preparing to fight the last war. The remaining batteries would probalby be well trained - that problem might be solved - but there simply wouldn't be many batteries left. This is an Army looking to cut and re-align - there simply isn't room for luxuries that add up to thousands of personnel, and the decisions aren't between "good" and "bad", but are between "bad" and "dead end".




The FSE does serve an important function, but with a MAJ or even LTC filling it, would he really have authority or real influence over a Fires BN Commander? I am a Captain on staff, and Captains are Captains, but a Captain in Command does not always listen to the staff. Would a LTC in command listen to a MAJ or another LTC giving suggestions?


Fires Battalion commanders would fall under a division FSE, with a full COL who had "been there, done that". In an Armored Cavalry Regiment, the FSE had a MAJ, who the CPT's commanding the howitzer batteries had to call "Sir". Upgrading that position to an LTC would result in it carrying even more weight with the Regimental Commander. Sure, the possibility exists for pi**ing contests with the maneuver battalion-level commanders who actually own those batteries, but they certainly didn't want to be seen denying training time to a battery that subsequently shot out, so they allowed ample time for the artillery community to do what it needed to do.

[patmc]

In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...)

I'm no longer a S4, so I've lost my instant access to MTOEs, but my understanding is the ACR's have recently switched to the BCT structure? Is this correct, or did they retain their unique CAV organization? If anyone can provide link or rollup, it would be appreciated.

If it works for you guys, go with it. We are an Airborne howitzer battalion. Before transforming, we had a large 150+ HHS that did all non-firing tasks and supported the smaller firing batteries. Under Fires Brigade, we added a robust FSC and cut the HHB in half, leaving the staff sections, BN TOC, medics, and a couple other sections in HHB and putting all the support in FSC. The Firing Batteries have firing platoons, ammo sections, FDCs, and HQ element.

For Drop Zone missions, one battery controls the DZ and aircraft, one - three jump and drop howitzers, HHB sends an assault CP and medics, and the FSC pre-positions ammo and equipment as needed, then recovers. Its controlled chaos, but it works. In the field, same deal, with the BN TOC leading the FDCs and movements, FSC supplying and fixing, and the Batteries shooting.
Could batteries do it all on their own? If you gave them the pax and equipment.

Should every Artillery Battery move to independent action? Why have a FA Battalion if Batteries can do it all? Its the way MI, MP, EN, etc are moving, would it work for FA?


Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???

I trust my parachute packing to someone else. I don't pack it. I trust the mechanics in the support company to fix trucks, I don't fix them. As a former battalion ammo officer, I know how much of a pain in the ass ammo is, but again, the support folks draw and transport it (which works better than the individual units each drawing ammo, learned the hard way at ASP). A FA battery exists to quickly and accurately put rounds on target. If an FSC eases that Commanders burden, why is that bad? Everyone in the Army relies on everyone else. There is nothing that is not important, and it all has to get done. If people are professionals, they do their job, and you can count on them.


The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.

Here at Bragg, the BCT Artillery Battalions are mainly doing non-standard missions. FA is not their priority, as directed by the BCT commanders that want them for maneuver. This is an OIFism, but true.

Agree on stovepiping, but again, you are talking Direct Support (DS) vs General Support (GS). In COIN, it may make sense to move big guns and rockets down to BCTs and BNs and companies in DS role, as we are largely doing in Afghanistan. In full on conventional fight though, are you going to place your deep-fighers up with the near fight, or let them focus on the enemy's rear and C2, as they do in GS? Fires Brigades originally formed out of the existing GS units. You could add a GS BN to each BCT, then another BTRY to each BN, but I think that would detract more than add, and limit the use of their capabilities


In any case, soon the Battalion and Brigade FDC's will cease to be training assets, but another frustrating, and frustrated, disfunctional link in the FA/FS chain, that needs to sort itself out, as the personnel who rotate into those positions have been performing non-standard, non-artillery missions for the last X years.

Agree in theory, as our BN learned the hard way after deployment, but someone has to set the standard and provide guidance. Our BN FDC took an officer and NCO that had shot during the deployment, and they created a plan to recert the unit. One BC had been an instructor at Sill, and he ran a FDC university for all FDC pax and all FA officers. All took Saftey tests and underwent a MTT from Sill, if memory serves me. Agree that MTT are valuable, but limited due to the numbers, logistics, and time involved.

As far as actual warfighting, BN and BDE FDC's are limited because of the realities of COIN. We condcuted a Korean War 2 scenario during a BDE TOCEX, and believe me, a LT in a battery FDC needed the higher filters in that one. If we eliminate BN and BDE control, how do we bring it back? Can argue either way.



Fires Battalion commanders would fall under a division FSE, with a full COL who had "been there, done that". In an Armored Cavalry Regiment, the FSE had a MAJ, who the CPT's commanding the howitzer batteries had to call "Sir". Upgrading that position to an LTC would result in it carrying even more weight with the Regimental Commander. Sure, the possibility exists for pi**ing contests with the maneuver battalion-level commanders who actually own those batteries, but they certainly didn't want to be seen denying training time to a battery that subsequently shot out, so they allowed ample time for the artillery community to do what it needed to do.

My understanding is that all Captains call MAJ's sir or mam, but besides point. My issue was with LTC to LTC which I see here on staff, when BDE level LTCs tell BN level LTC what to do. Human nature and Army nature.

How large would the DIV FSE be? Would there be BDE or BCT FSE? It could work, but in reality, it would drive some officers away or out, if there last chance of command is as a captain, and they have 10+ years staff ahead. With the lower manning requirements under this change, maybe it would not be an issue for branch.



As stated earlier, I think this all boils down to DS vs GS in the FA, and maybe FA needs to re-examine this distinction. For the COIN fight, where the entire AO is battlespace, pushing FA down to the lowest level makes sense. In a conventional fight with relative lines or fronts, it makes sense to keep assets focused beyond the front line. An enemy can't fight if his reserves, C2, fuel, ammo, radars, signal, etc are out of the fight. Fires Brigades took GS units and made them modular. Moving BCT fires Bns under them replaces the DIVARTY function whose elimation is considered a mistake by most of the field grades I've spoken with. The Army has specialized units for different roles and missions. DS units may be stovepiped into thinking that they are the only way as well.

Good discussion.

[jkm_101_fso]

As stated earlier, I think this all boils down to DS vs GS in the FA, and maybe FA needs to re-examine this distinction. For the COIN fight, where the entire AO is battlespace, pushing FA down to the lowest level makes sense. In a conventional fight with relative lines or fronts, it makes sense to keep assets focused beyond the front line. An enemy can't fight if his reserves, C2, fuel, ammo, radars, signal, etc are out of the fight. Fires Brigades took GS units and made them modular. Moving BCT fires Bns under them replaces the DIVARTY function whose elimation is considered a mistake by most of the field grades I've spoken with. The Army has specialized units for different roles and missions. DS units may be stovepiped into thinking that they are the only way as well.

Great points.

In regards to training, there is one major issue for consideration: It's no secret that there is a degredation of FA-specific skills among junior NCOs and officers.

DS fires BNs now and will continue to train themselves in the current BCT footprint. Without a DIVARTY to mandate or validate training, it's plausible that we will critically lack the expertise to train ourselves.

That's why I think it would behoove Fort Sill to plan for this and anticipate creating and dispatching MTTs to travel to posts to assist the FA BNs and validate training in the near future.

[Ken White]

As a one time purveyor of of a mission and skill set alien to Infantry (and even most Armor) units; specifically Cavalry reconnaissance in all its permutations, it was my observation that the direct and general support by the major unit to, and the technical competence of, said Reconnaissance elements was exceptionally good.

What was far too often totally lacking was a knowledge of how to use the asset. Even that was a double edged sword; one could often set up and run one's own missions with minimal interference...

[Sabre]

Agree on stovepiping, but again, you are talking Direct Support (DS) vs General Support (GS). In COIN, it may make sense to move big guns and rockets down to BCTs and BNs and companies in DS role, as we are largely doing in Afghanistan. In full on conventional fight though, are you going to place your deep-fighers up with the near fight, or let them focus on the enemy's rear and C2, as they do in GS? Fires Brigades originally formed out of the existing GS units. You could add a GS BN to each BCT, then another BTRY to each BN, but I think that would detract more than add, and limit the use of their capabilities

As stated earlier, I think this all boils down to DS vs GS in the FA, and maybe FA needs to re-examine this distinction. For the COIN fight, where the entire AO is battlespace, pushing FA down to the lowest level makes sense. In a conventional fight with relative lines or fronts, it makes sense to keep assets focused beyond the front line. An enemy can't fight if his reserves, C2, fuel, ammo, radars, signal, etc are out of the fight. Fires Brigades took GS units and made them modular. Moving BCT fires Bns under them replaces the DIVARTY function whose elimation is considered a mistake by most of the field grades I've spoken with. The Army has specialized units for different roles and missions. DS units may be stovepiped into thinking that they are the only way as well.


To answer your question, I believe that the 3rd ACR has not, and will not actually transition to the BCT org. I will have to double-check that one, though. That they were ever going to was perhaps the most dumb-founding part about the whole BCT-reorg, that the Army set out to so completely dismantle the capable and proven Cavalry organizations, in the name of modularity, of all things. Absurd!

If there are those who want a few more modular Fires Brigades, sure, go for it, just as long as the BCT's still own their artillery battalions - they can have some sort of habitual relationship to the "divisional" Fires Brigade, with its FDCs. The batteries in the ACR certainly did our share of high intensity exercises, and the FDC work was no easier or more difficult than usual - the FSE's did their job, and I never saw a reason for a battalion or higher FDC. But to take away the batteries from the Cav Squadrons and take away the Fires Battalion from the BCTs, now that would be a grave error. Any maneuver commander knows that the only support that you can count on, in "crunch time", is the support that you OWN.

A maneuver battalion facing a "high threat" combat situation (one that carries with it a reasonable chance for heavy casualties, to differentiate between COIN in OIF and COIN in say, Vietnam, where even the VC had formed battalions) can almost certainly make good use of an artillery battery, for the critical suppression and smoke missions, if nothing else. The battalion mortars, while quite useful in some scenarios, simply do not have the range, accuracy, and weight of fire (at least in the heavy/mech world). A GS Fires Brigade can work to affect the deep fight, but to commit all available artillery to that work courts disaster.

Which is, in a nutshell, also why I believe that howitzer batteries, at least in DS should have their own support organic to their organization. As units are cut, sliced, chopped, etc to other units in other AO's, usually "on the fly", that seems to be the best way to guarantee (as near as that is possible) that they will have the support that they need. (Heh, a good read on the aspect of things is any book about the tank battalions and div cav squadrons in Vietnam - those units were scattered to the winds, it seems, although I would defer to those who were there.)

I agree with Ken that one of the perennial problems with artillery (albeit perhaps not a common complaint at the moment) is that the maneuver community sometimes doesn't know how to use it. Having artillery organic to maneuver battalions and brigades certainly goes a long way towards correcting that deficiency. Indeed, were it not for the dearth of artillery training right now, I am guessing that would become a matter of more concern for the maneuver commanders. While the artillery is getting little or no training in artillery, and given a war that requires rather less artillery than many other conflicts did, I suppose that I shouldn't be terribly surprised that they want training improved, and may be willing to give up their artillery to do it (I find it quite interesting that the authors of the paper did NOT come out and say that, but stated that "we leave to a separate discussions whether there should be some sort of command relationship..."). In a different war, they would probably want some artillery that they OWNED, even if it meant that there was a training penalty to be paid to get it.

As it is, the paper advocated one Fires Brigade for every "division" of 4 BCT's, with one or two Fires Battalions organic to the brigade. Sure. I think that they will be an easy target for force realignment (as the branch already is).

However, I don't feel that goes very far towards answering the training, retention, and morale problems. What would the alternative be? If all artillery were grouped into Fires Brigades, and restricted only to performing artillery missions, how many would end up being deployed to OIF? Most would probably stay back at their home station, training, since the requirement for artillery is somewhat less in this particular war. How would the Officer and NCO corps feel about being "left out" of the big show? I think that is a Catch-22. The NLOS-C is due soon, but the US artillery has managed, once AGAIN, to have a sub-par SP howitzer - short range, and with even LESS on board ammunition stowage (at least we have an excuse this time: the chimera of deployability) - still, the artillery can be excited about a new cannon system, but it could have been better. (I have to admit the M777 is neat, in some ways.) Meanwhile, the future doesn't look as bright as it should for the artillery, as this war is seen as not requiring much artillery, and we all know that the one thing we are good at is preparing for the last war.

[RJ]

I had a nephew with the 11th Marine Regt. in the march up to Baghdad, and he spoke about them trying to stay as close to the grunt Regiments as possible to provide support. He was a Marine Cook who left his stoves in Kuwait and did multi-tasking as a Ammo truck driver, Fuel and water hauler, and Battery Security. When the 11th Marines rotated back to Pendelton, he and others from the artillery units volunteered to fill Infantry slots to replace combat losses. He made Cpl. E-4 with one of the Infantry Regts. and didn't cook a meal until he returned with them to Pendelton.

Has there been a comparison of the activities of the Marine Artillery in that maneuver warfare portion of the Iraq War and the US Field Artillery supporting the ID units in that fight.

Is there a difference in Marine Artillery and US Army Artillery application in that kind of warfare?

If this question is off subject, or will side track the thrust of this thread, don't bother to answer.

[Sabre]

I had a nephew with the 11th Marine Regt. in the march up to Baghdad, and he spoke about them trying to stay as close to the grunt Regiments as possible to provide support. He was a Marine Cook who left his stoves in Kuwait and did multi-tasking as a Ammo truck driver, Fuel and water hauler, and Battery Security. When the 11th Marines rotated back to Pendelton, he and others from the artillery units volunteered to fill Infantry slots to replace combat losses. He made Cpl. E-4 with one of the Infantry Regts. and didn't cook a meal until he returned with them to Pendelton.

Has there been a comparison of the activities of the Marine Artillery in that maneuver warfare portion of the Iraq War and the US Field Artillery supporting the ID units in that fight.

Is there a difference in Marine Artillery and US Army Artillery application in that kind of warfare?

If this question is off subject, or will side track the thrust of this thread, don't bother to answer.

I work with some Marine Cannon-cockers. I'll have to ask that specific question.
The perenial problem of (US) artillery is keeping up with maneuver (both a function of the speed of mechanized forces and the relatively short range of the guns), which, as nephew said, means being as absolutely close to the front line trace as practical, since once a meeting engagement starts, you will probably have fire missions being called in non-stop, and as a consequence won't be able to move, even as the line units are continuing to push.

[Xenophon]

I'm a Marine artillery officer, sorry it took so long to join the conversation.

Obviously, Marine artillery focuses more on providing fire support during amphibious operations and thus are set up as DS artillery units (by doctrine anyway). Judging by the comments above, the Army still has a focus on DS vs. GS roles that is just not present in the Corps. We've been doing the GS thing in Iraq, but only at the battery (-) level. (Full battery by personnel, but only utilizing two guns.) This is viewed as "not the way its supposed to be."

Having spoken to many people who were in 11th Marines or in C Battery 1/10 (attached to 11th Marines for the invasion), it seems like at times the grunts and the batteries were leapfrogging North. I've heard from multiple people that VT missions were fired in support of infantry companies directly across the highway from the firing battery. It doesn't seem like keeping up was a problem.

I'm seeing two large issues in the artillery community right now. (I'm sure Army Redlegs are dealing with the same)

1) Non-artillery missions have seriously degraded the competency level of the artillery community.

2) While artillerymen have been doing these non-artillery missions, the technology has changed drastically in the meantime.

Artillerymen are returning to the artillery trade to find a new weapon system, new methods of communication, and new skill sets. (M777 and all the digital communications that go with it, StrikeLink, and the M327 EFSS) What little they remember of the artillery trade is out of date. Most of these new systems are not being taught at MOS schools yet. So we have a training system that hasn't caught up with the current gear, and a lack of institutional knowledge to make up the difference with on-the-job training. (This problem is especially bad with digital comms and the StrikeLink system)

Both of these problems exacerbate the other one, and they are making today a very frustrating time to be in the FA community.

[patmc]

Xenophon,

As a former Army FA officer (switched to Intel in June), you are correct in your statement. My BN spent half a year training to do convoy security, then deployed for a year. Upon return, we received a West Point training mission to train infantry skills, then received a warno for a SECFOR deployment. One battery actually touched its howitzers that year, but only for a few months. The SECFOR mission was scratched one month out, and the BN then had to relearn FA after almost 3 years off. As a senior 1LT, junior CPT with 3 months as a FDO, I was one of the most experienced Artillery officers. Sad, but true.

It took a lot of hard work, time in the classroom, MTTs, and many days in the field to relearn what was lost. Adding to that, they fielded the new m777 and all its systems, having to learn the new platform. When the unit finally received a DEPORD, the mission changed again, adding a Radar battery, and Security platoon missions. So now, only half the BN will get FA experience, and quite a few NCOs and 13B's are now reclassed for radar or are guarding a compound.

I just heard from a friend that the BN is putting steel on bad guys as I type this, so the work paid off, but it was not an easy path. There are a couple yeargroups of junior officers, Soldiers, and NCO's that did/will not get Artillery training for several formative years. Soldiers accomplish the mission they are given, but with all the talk of growing the force, there are not enough Infantry or Armor units to perform all the required tasks, so FA and other branches will continue to pay the price.

Fort Sill released the Army FA Campaign Plan last year, and it offers fixes to the problem, but unless FA is allowed to refocus and stop bill-paying, the problem will get worse. As for the technology, as with every new system, a MTT "trains the trainer" who serves as the unit SME until they PCS. It is assumed leaders and Soldiers will figure out the technology as they go along. Just like CPOF.



I'm seeing two large issues in the artillery community right now. (I'm sure Army Redlegs are dealing with the same)

1) Non-artillery missions have seriously degraded the competency level of the artillery community.

2) While artillerymen have been doing these non-artillery missions, the technology has changed drastically in the meantime.

[davidbfpo]

Patmc,

Some of these points have appeared in this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6702

The UK Army during the Northern Ireland campaign, thirty years long, at the height of deployment regularly had artillery and other specialist arms on six month tours. I am sure (hope) lessons learnt are documented and available via UK liaison. IIRC a Royal Artillery officer is always at your HQ (Fort Sill?).

davidbfpo

[Xenophon]

It is assumed leaders and Soldiers will figure out the technology as they go along. Just like CPOF.

That's the worst part about it. Not that I think all of this digital communication is a good idea or anything, but if we HAVE to use it, teach us how.

[RJ]

The Marines are testing for deployment a new lightweight system that fits inside a V-22 Osprey. He is the lead in to the article.

Check out the Marine Corps Times today 2/26/2002

Posted : Wednesday Feb 25, 2009 9:49:07 EST

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. — Even in field artillery, known for its big guns towed by big vehicles, the concept of “smaller is better” has hit home, or so say the first Marines to receive the Corps’ new Expeditionary Fire Support System.

“They’re a lot faster than the triple sevens,” Cpl. James Boyle, a field artillery canoneer said during a live-fire exercise in mid-February aboard Camp Lejeune. He was referring to the M777A2 Lightweight 155mm Howitzer. “You can get into places that you couldn’t with the triple seven.”

That’s the idea behind the EFSS, a mortar-based system designed to provide mobile fire support for expeditionary forces. It is lightweight and small enough to fit snugly into the MV-22 Osprey, an aircraft designed to get Marines farther inland faster, and the CH-53 Sea Stallion.

Members of Lejeune’s Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, began training on the systems in January. Since then, Marines have learned to drive the new Internally Transportable Vehicle, a type of jeep that also fits inside an Osprey, while simultaneously learning to use the 120mm mortar that fires smoothbore or rifled ammunition.

[Xenophon]

Yeah, I was FDO for the EFSS test battery in '07. Awesome weapon system. Not so awesome prime mover.

[patmc]

My buddies are in A-stan shooting m777's right now, and from I've heard, the Soldiers like them, and they're shooting fast and accurate. We were an Airborne m198 battalion, and heavy dropped that hunk of steel. Army FA is embracing the lighter m777 though.

Is this new system a cannon or a mortar system? If it is just a newer mortar, it will have its benefits like weight and mobility, but will it have the range of a tube howitzer? I would think not, but I don't know anything about this new one.

[RJ]

Xenophon and patmc.

I picked this part of a news story about a Marine Reserve unit serving in Helmand Province, from the online edition of the Marine Corps Times.

We have come a long way since I was a 60mm mortar gunner in the NYNG and spent a little time with a Marine Bn 81mm Mortar Section in the 50's.

2/14 touts advanced artillery system (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/03/marine_himars_030709w/)

Staff report
Posted : Saturday Mar 7, 2009 9:33:44 EST


The reservists with Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, had been at Camp Barber only three weeks in February when they conducted a successful field test of their High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, a first for any Marine unit operating in Afghanistan and a sign of what’s in store for the insurgency there, officials said in a news release.

HiMARS is more advanced than a traditional howitzer, Maj. Frankie P. Delgado, battery commander, said in the release. With its three-man crew, the system cradles six 200-pound rockets. Its range can exceed 40 miles, and the rockets, guided by a Global Positioning System, are accurate to within 26 feet.

One of HiMARS’ six rocket tubes can inflict the same damage as one artillery cannon, and it’s a more subtle alternative to airstrikes, he said. The enemy won’t ever see the rocket until it’s too late.

The FO's for that unit must be in pucker factor one most of the time if they are spotting shots 40 miles down range.

[patmc]

I saw HIMARS at Bragg, it is a cool system with a lot of capabilty. It is an improvement on the MLRS, with wheels for mobility, but half the payload. It can get in fast, shoot, and get out. I also know some guys who have called in the guided rounds, and had great things to say about it. FA is moving towards more precision and mobility, but still has its tubes for mass fires which will be needed someday unfortunately.