“’Dishonest Doctrine:’ Or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Coin Doctrine” [Archive]

Gian P Gentile

12-07-2007, 12:30 PM

SteveMetz

12-07-2007, 01:46 PM

If you are a true believer in the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine then don’t read Ralph Peters’s critique of it in the most recent edition of Armed Forces Journal (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/3144330)because your mind won’t be changed.

However, if you believe it is the duty of the intellectual, as Carl Becker once said, “to think otherwise,” then you should. In this piece Peters questions the underlying premises of the new doctrine by pointing out its hyper-reliance and very selective use of certain historical “lessons” while not considering others. Although he does not mention him explicitly, the pen of Peters implicitly lacerates LTC John Nagl and his role in the writing of the new doctrine. According to Peters, certain individuals have used their position as primary writers of the new doctrine to “validate” their own personal theories…at the expense of our men and women in uniform.” In his most strident remark Peters states that “doctrine should be written by successful battlefield commanders, not by doctors of philosophy playing soldier.”

I am not a true believer in the things that Ralph Peters writes. Some of his stuff is quite good but if you follow his writings there are huge inconsistencies and contradictions that he never comes close to trying to resolve. Although in this piece he makes a valiant try at it but he fails miserably. On the one hand he criticizes the American new Coin doctrine but on the other hand he lavishes praise on General Patraeus for moving beyond it and fighting the war in Iraq the way Peters thinks it should be fought. Arguably General Patraeus and his team have been following the new Coin doctrine to a “T.” As I see it Peters’s problem is that he really does believe there are serious problems with the new Coin doctrine but his political interests as a hard-line conservative who writes for a conservative New York City newspaper forces him to write about the successes of the Coin doctrine inspired Surge. You can judge but in my mind in this piece he did not come close to resolving this contradiction.

I am not a true believer in Peters or in FM 3-24 so if you too are not then I commend his article to you.

gentile

As always, I'm green with envy over Ralph's way with words. But this hasn't shifted me from my long held position: in the broadest sense, there are two approaches to counterinsurgency. Treat it like war and either kill or cow those who oppose you (call it the "Roman" method). Or try and minimize the extent to which it is like war, stress the political and economic, and try and win support thereby undercutting the insurgency (call this the "British" method).

My feeling is that history suggests that the Roman method is more effective. The British method takes much longer and has a lower probability of success. But American strategic culture has simply taken the Roman method off the table for us. Where, I think, Ralph and I diverge is that I don't believe that even the most articulate national leadership can sell the American public on it. The British were able to deviate from their own method--South Africa and, to some degree, Kenya--specifically because their public was not as engaged in the course of colonial wars as our public is in small wars. American strategic culture may be a terrible impediment, but we cannot wish it away. So we're left with the British method even given all of its complications and shortcomings.

Of course, my own recommendation is that we not use EITHER method. But that's another story.

slapout9

12-07-2007, 01:51 PM

Steve Metz, so lets here the rest of the story, what method would you use?

SteveMetz

12-07-2007, 02:01 PM

Steve Metz, so lets here the rest of the story, what method would you use?

Being the pathologically lazy son of a firearm that I am, let me just answer by quoting myself:

If, in fact, insurgency is not simply a variant of war, if the real threat is the deleterious effects of sustained conflict, and if it is part of systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the conflict, the objective of counterinsurgency support should not be simply strengthening the government so that it can impose its will more effectively on the insurgents, but systemic reengineering. The most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be a neutral mediator and peacekeeper (even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents). If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances.

Outside of the historic American geographic area of concern (the Caribbean basin), the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition. Unless the world community is willing to form a neo-trusteeship such as in Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor in order to reconstruct the administration, security system, and civil society of a state in conflict, the best that can be done is ameliorating, as much as possible, the human suffering associated with the violence by creating internationally-protected “safe areas.” In most cases, American strategic resources are better spent attempting to prevent insurgency or containing it when it does occur. Clearly systemic reengineering is not a task for the United States acting alone. Nor is it a task for the U.S. military. When the United States is part of a stabilization coalition, the primary role for the U.S. military should be protecting civilians until other security forces, preferably local ones but possibly coalition units, can assume that task.

To summarize, then, American strategy for counterinsurgency should recognize three distinct insurgency settings, each demanding a different response:
•A functioning government with at least some degree of legitimacy can be rescued by Foreign Internal Defense.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government but a broad international and regional consensus supports the creation of a neo-trusteeship until systemic reengineering is completed. In such instances, the United States should provide military, economic, and political support as part of a multinational force operating under the authority of the UN.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government and no international or regional consensus for the formation of a neo-trusteeship. In these cases, the United States should pursue containment of the conflict by support to regional states and, in conjunction with partners, help create humanitarian “safe zones” within the conflictive state.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/img/pubs/PUB790.jpg (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf)

12-07-2007, 02:27 PM

As always, I'm green with envy over Ralph's way with words. But this hasn't shifted me from my long held position: in the broadest sense, there are two approaches to counterinsurgency. Treat it like war and either kill or cow those who oppose you (call it the "Roman" method). Or try and minimize the extent to which it is like war, stress the political and economic, and try and win support thereby undercutting the insurgency (call this the "British" method).

My feeling is that history suggests that the Roman method is more effective. The British method takes much longer and has a lower probability of success. But American strategic culture has simply taken the Roman method off the table for us. Where, I think, Ralph and I diverge is that I don't believe that even the most articulate national leadership can sell the American public on it. So we're left with the British method even given all of its complications and shortcomings.

Of course, my own recommendation is that we not use EITHER method. But that's another story.
Steve,
On another thread I argued that a third option exists, which I won't rehearse here. However, I thnk the following quotation from a 2002 piece by Michael McClintock is very instructive. (I know nothing else about him except what this web (http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about_us/staff/mcclintock_m.htm)site tells me)

The British, like the French and the Portuguese, were fighting insurgencies on territories they claimed as their own and administered on their own authority. U.S. forces were nominally "guests" of counterinsurgency states, while pursing the same ends as their colonialist counterparts. Some of the contrasts—and similarities—of the counterinsurgency doctrines of the European powers and the new U.S. doctrine were, as a consequence, inescapable. Context link (http://www.statecraft.org/chapter11.html)is here. The title page/TOC of the whole work is found here (http://www.statecraft.org/index.html)

Your Roman model probably works when you are in a position like the British, French, and Portuguese--that is you "own the territory"--that's why the anti-Mau Mau campaign in Kenya that Peters cited worked, IMHO.
I think that your "British" method gets applied when you do not have the military resources (or political will) to be come a conqueror who can then use the Roman method. Other pieces for discriminating between the two iinclude issues of how much time one wants to devote to resolving the problem and how long the problem has be going on. We used to talk about Phase I, II, and III insurgencies, and we used to identify that different methids needed to be applied to those different phases--the more entrenched the insurgents were, the more force was needed.

Prevailing against an uprising (I've chosen this term to get around the whole civil war/ insurgency /revolt/rebellion/revolution casuistry) is not a one (or two) size fits all proposition. Doctrine is similar. I was always taught that regulations are a guide for commander--they choose to obey them or not. I submit that doctrine is the same thing. Each of these bodies of knowledge gives leaders and their organizations a baseline from which to improvise as the situation dictates.

Ralph Peters may be right about the selective use of examples. However, I think he does military leaders a disservice by expecting that they will not see that for themselves and adapt the doctrine as required by their current suituation.

SteveMetz

12-07-2007, 02:34 PM

Mike gave me a copy of his book a couple of months ago but I haven't read it, so am not positioned to comment on it.

My big points (using the term loosely) in this thread are:

1) Because the strategic context of counterinsurgency is so frustrating, Americans tend to devolve to the operational and tactical which we're pretty good at. But it doesn't work. Re: Vietnam.

2) Political leadership can change some things about the way Americans view the world but there also some immutable characteristics. One of these is that we aren't going to use the "mailed fist" approach to pacification particularly in today's post-racist, transparent, interconnected world.

Cavguy

12-07-2007, 03:07 PM

Although he does not mention him explicitly, the pen of Peters implicitly lacerates LTC John Nagl and his role in the writing of the new doctrine. According to Peters, certain individuals have used their position as primary writers of the new doctrine to “validate” their own personal theories…at the expense of our men and women in uniform.” In his most strident remark Peters states that “doctrine should be written by successful battlefield commanders, not by doctors of philosophy playing soldier.”

I guess this begs the question I haven't asked you yet - I have read your criticisms of 3-24 and enjoyed our private emails - but what is your alternative? I saw reference to the need to acknowledge the utility of lethal operations in COIN (to wit I agree, if done right), but no alternative doctrine/mindset that should be followed.

On its face, every publicized tactical/operational success we have had in Iraq was essentially based in the FM 3-24 doctrine/mindset. Short list - Tal Afar 05-06, Mosul 06 , Ramadi 06-07, Dialaya mid 07, Baghdad late 07. All employed FM 3-24 at the root of the pacification strategy, and all have seen success. For a "dishonest doctrine" that's a pretty good record.

Arguably General Patraeus and his team have been following the new Coin doctrine to a “T.” As I see it Peters’s problem is that he really does believe there are serious problems with the new Coin doctrine but his political interests as a hard-line conservative who writes for a conservative New York City newspaper forces him to write about the successes of the Coin doctrine inspired Surge.

That's what has been driving me nuts about Peters - a fan of the Roman approach who sings Petraeus who uses the British approach.

And let's be realistic - we could never wage COIN as we did in the Phillipines in today's media enviornment. It might sound nice and we may gnash our teeth at not being able to do street executions, burn villages, and terrorize populace - but we're not going to do that as the USA in the early 21st century. So again I ask, what is the alternative for operational/tactical doctrine?

Steve Blair

12-07-2007, 03:29 PM

And let's be realistic - we could never wage COIN as we did in the Phillipines in today's media enviornment. It might sound nice and we may gnash our teeth at not being able to do street executions, burn villages, and terrorize populace - but we're not going to do that as the USA in the early 21st century. So again I ask, what is the alternative for operational/tactical doctrine?

And as a sort of follow-up to that: how do we craft workable doctrine that allows us to avoid the damned "either/or" mindset that does us so much damage? We seem set on having "either" a COIN force "or" one that can do high-intensity conflict, without examining the possibility that we may be able to configure doctrine and training that would allow for at least some capability in both areas with enough flexibility to come up to speed for COIN or major conflict when required. This is nothing new (the Army fought the entire Indian Wars period with tactics/doctrine modeled on Europe and intended to wage a war against a major power, and we saw it again in Vietnam for at least the first 2-3 years), and I think technology (and the US dependence on same) has accelerated the trend in many ways. And with a realistic view of the world indicating that we're likely to take part in more COIN situations and mid-intensity conflicts (not one or the other, unless we can manage to retreat totally into isolationism...something we've never quite managed to do), it's only wise to prepare for both eventualities and not the one we would most prefer.

With Peters, we've had doctrine written by "successful battlefield commanders" discarded by other "successful battlefield commanders" who didn't agree with it. I think in his quest for absolutes he misses some important historical points.

Gian P Gentile

12-07-2007, 04:37 PM

...So again I ask, what is the alternative for operational/tactical doctrine?

We dont need an alternative for Coin Doctrine because the new FM 3-24 as i stated up front in my "Eating Soup with a Spoon" piece is excellent doctrinal writing. As counterinsurgency doctrine it has its place. But the point i have been trying to make is that now its place in the Army is that it has become our FM 3-0, operational doctrine. And it has come to this without serious question or thought, which is why I have been making thread postings like this one. The American Army needs to acknowledge that we have become a counterinsurgency only force, and then we need to seriously debate this issue and where it is taking us in the future.

Moreover, because 3-24 has become our defacto operational doctrine without thought or serious questioning it has dogmatically determined our actions in Iraq. It also causes us to conclude that results in Iraq are directly due to the application of the Surge and our new doctrine. Your own quote in this thread attests to this:

On its face, every publicized tactical/operational success we have had in Iraq was essentially based in the FM 3-24 doctrine/mindset. Short list - Tal Afar 05-06, Mosul 06 , Ramadi 06-07, Dialaya mid 07, Baghdad late 07. All employed FM 3-24 at the root of the pacification strategy, and all have seen success.

The truth of the matter is that we really dont know what were the necessary causes for the recent lowering of violence. At a minimum it was brought about by a mix of many factors to include the Surge. In the extreme, as Macgregor argues, the Surge has had really nothing to due with the lowering of violence. Your statement, however, shows how Coin doctrine has moved beyond a general guide for action and has become prescriptive for action and it determines how we view the past.

Steve Metz sums things up very well in a previous posting on this thread with a quote that he takes from his excellent article on Coin:

To summarize, then, American strategy for counterinsurgency should recognize three distinct insurgency settings, each demanding a different response:
•A functioning government with at least some degree of legitimacy can be rescued by Foreign Internal Defense.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government but a broad international and regional consensus supports the creation of a neo-trusteeship until systemic reengineering is completed. In such instances, the United States should provide military, economic, and political support as part of a multinational force operating under the authority of the UN.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government and no international or regional consensus for the formation of a neo-trusteeship. In these cases, the United States should pursue containment of the conflict by support to regional states and, in conjunction with partners, help create humanitarian “safe zones” within the conflictive state.

The American Army's consumation with Coin precludes us from seeing the world as Steve describes and makes us think that with just enough competent units using FM 3-24 we can pulverize what are intractable problems that pose distinct limits to the use of American military power that Steve outlines above.

This is why I posted the Peters piece. To get us to start thinking about where we are at as an Army.

gentile

SteveMetz

12-07-2007, 04:48 PM

The American Army's consumation with Coin precludes us from seeing the world as Steve describes and makes us think that with just enough competent units using FM 3-24 we can pulverize what are intractable problems that pose distinct limits to the use of American military power that Steve outlines above.

Excellent point. When I was a kid in Scottsdale, I was getting bullied (actually by Amanda Blake's kids--you old fogies will remember her). So my Dad gave me like two boxing lessons. That made me just confident enough that I managed to get myself beaten up. At this point the USG has had two boxing lessons.

Norfolk

12-07-2007, 05:11 PM

We dont need an alternative for Coin Doctrine because the new FM 3-24 as i stated up front in my "Eating Soup with a Spoon" piece is excellent doctrinal writing. As counterinsurgency doctrine it has its place. But the point i have been trying to make is that now its place in the Army is that it has become our FM 3-0, operational doctrine. And it has come to this without serious question or thought, which is why I have been making thread postings like this one. The American Army needs to acknowledge that we have become a counterinsurgency only force, and then we need to seriously debate this issue and where it is taking us in the future.

Moreover, because 3-24 has become our defacto operational doctrine without thought or serious questioning it has dogmatically determined our actions in Iraq. It also causes us to conclude that results in Iraq are directly due to the application of the Surge and our new doctrine.[]

The truth of the matter is that we really dont know what were the necessary causes for the recent lowering of violence. At a minimum it was brought about by a mix of many factors to include the Surge. In the extreme, as Macgregor argues, the Surge has had really nothing to due with the lowering of violence. Your statement, however, shows how Coin doctrine has moved beyond a general guide for action and has become prescriptive for action and it determines how we view the past.[]

The American Army's consumation with Coin precludes us from seeing the world as Steve describes and makes us think that with just enough competent units using FM 3-24 we can pulverize what are intractable problems that pose distinct limits to the use of American military power that Steve outlines above.

This is why I posted the Peters piece. To get us to start thinking about where we are at as an Army.

gentile

It is the recurring problem, that Doctrine is reduced to prescription or even just "fashion" so to speak. Doctrine has long been treated as much less than a way of helping one to learn about a problem, than to simply condition one to accept a more-or-less generic "solution" to a more-or-less generic problem. And add the political pressure from above to this, and the result is, well, something perhaps more akin to a fad than to even a prescription. And when thinking becomes so proscribed, professional military judgement may become spotty, even blinkered.

As Col. Gentile points out, FM-3-24 has indeed effectively replaced FM 3-0 as the Army's (and maybe the Marines') capstone operational-level doctrine. The most troubling effect of this is not even how this affects judgements regarding how things are unfolding in Iraq, but how this will affect the professional perspective and judgement of the Army as a whole, across the entire range of military matters. If the Army found itself having to wage a conventional war in the not-so-distant future, it would be ill-equipped in its frame of mind (not to mention training, etc.) for such an event.

It seems the Army just can't break itself out of these mad pendulum swings from one extreme to the other and just be able to reform itself with a true flexible mindset, institutionally (there are plenty of clear, flexible thinkers inside the Army itself), when it comes to thinking in general and the role and application of doctrine in particular. FM 3-24 appears to be just fine for the more specific requirements of COIN, but it must be used as such within the general framework of FM 3-0, and the latter requires that the Army keep its mind fully open to the requirements of, and potential for, non-COIN roles and missions (and thus, requiring the Army to be a general-purpose force in mindset and function - admittedly, far easier said than done). That might help the Army to begin to find its "centre" so to speak. And that in turn might provide a better perspective for looking at and judging the situation in Iraq.

Penta

12-07-2007, 05:49 PM

Stupid question: Why bother with "neo-" trusteeships?

Why not just resurrect the Trusteeship Council?

SteveMetz

12-07-2007, 05:52 PM

Stupid question: Why bother with "neo-" trusteeships?

Why not just resurrect the Trusteeship Council?

Dunno. I just picked up the phrase from the current literature. I think it is to distinguish them from the first generation, post-colonial ones.

walrus

12-07-2007, 06:48 PM

This article contains the same fatal flaw as a great deal of writings on this subject, and it needs to be challenged if others are not to be infected with the same silliness, that will prevent them succeeding in their mission or worse, get people killed.

Here is what Peters wrote:

Although Petraeus has, indeed, concentrated many assets on helping those who need help, he grasped that, without providing durable security — which requires killing those who need killing — none of the reconstruction or reconciliation was going to stick. On the ground, Petraeus has supplied the missing kinetic half of the manual.

This is just plain wrong. What is required for security is an unwillingness on the part of insurgents to provide insecurity (ie violence and crime). Of course, one way to do this is to kill insurgents, but it completely misses the point which is this.

Not every insurgent is an insurgent all the time. As was taught to me, insurgents come in all shapes and sizes, backgrounds and professions. They may never handle a weapon at all, they may be a farmer by day and plant IED's by night, they may simply store gear for others, provide intelligence, medical assistance, money, food, shelter. These people make up the bulk of any insurgency, and they do their work from choice. They can be almost impossible to identify, unless caught in the act, because we can't see whats in their heads.

The key therefore is firstly to give people the choice of supporting you rather than the insurgency, then making it a more attractive choice, and since martyrdom is a feature of the current Islamic insurgency just offering them the chance of getting killed by us is not necessarily an effective option, and I suspect, far less cost effective than the political alternatives.

My limited understanding is that this has been what Dr. Kilcullen has been advocating.

Of course there is always the Roman option as Steve Metz puts it, but lets examine that a little further. After their initial invasions the Romans tried to "Romanise " the ruling elites - the carrot rather than the stick. It was only if that failed or their was rebellion that more drastic methods were used - and these are now precluded by International laws against genocide and the precedents set by the Nuremberg trials.

It's also worth remembering that that the Romans generally intended to settle the land it conquered (or at least extract tribute) and I'm not sure that many Americans would like to settle permanently in Iraq.

As for Mr. Peters reference to Mao, its worthless, but I can't remember where my copy of the Little Red Book is to look up the reference to "The Guerrillas are like fish swimming in the sea of the peasantry" which is, I guess, a more poetic way of stating the true situation rather than this long winded post.

Ken White

12-07-2007, 09:29 PM

...
My big points (using the term loosely) in this thread are:

1) Because the strategic context of counterinsurgency is so frustrating, Americans tend to devolve to the operational and tactical which we're pretty good at. But it doesn't work. Re: Vietnam.

2) Political leadership can change some things about the way Americans view the world but there also some immutable characteristics. One of these is that we aren't going to use the "mailed fist" approach to pacification particularly in today's post-racist, transparent, interconnected world.

Agreed. This is appropriate, I think:

"In default of knowing how to do what they ought, they are led very naturally to do what they know"

Marshal Maurice Comte de Saxe; Mes Reveries, 1756

To the point, there's the old country song "Do what you do do well, Boy." We have strengths. As Steve said, we're better'n the average Bear at the operational and tactical. I cannot believe that we cannot shape things to use our strength and avoid catering to two of our national weaknesses, impatience and dislike of the tedious.

IMO, we do not do COIN that well on a large scale because that causes an over commitment of excessive rank into the theater and smart aggressive people want to do smart aggressive things -- and they are generally impatient, both undue aggressiveness and impatience are not good things in a COIN operation. Admittedly, that can be remedied with better professional education and training at all levels but the proclivity is unlikely to be eliminated. See de Saxe, above.

Add to that the kinder, gentler public persona, the sound bite mentality and instant gratification capability of US society today coupled with immediate mass communication, our bureaucracy versus their flexibility and a major COIN effort is an invitation to problems. As we have seen twice in the last 40 odd years...

Yet, there are those who adapt well to the COIN mentality and we are capable of producing units who can do it well -- the problem is that everyone does not adapt to that environment well. We should use those who do and not send those who do not. To me, that implies small low key and early commitments of dedicated and trained SOF and reliance on large quantities of MPF only in very rare and extreme cases -- which should be avoided if at all possible.

That is not to say that the MPF should not receive some COIN training, they should -- the key word being SOME. They particularly must know what to do in the immediate aftermath of a win in major combat and be able to do it right to forestall an insurgency getting started...

Thus, I think Gian is correct as well; full spectrum for the MPF with an emphasis on high intensity combat -- but there is always a need for some specialists to do special things... :D

Norfolk also has a point, we are bad about that pendulum bit, we tend to overreact to stimuli and go a step -- or a bridge -- too far. We are really old enough to temper that.

That means, post Iraq, that we must not throw COIN out the window -- nor should we adopt it as the new mantra; we need to be full spectrum and our skill and strength lie in the conventional realm; we should play to our strength. While I believe we need to avoid COIN efforts on a large scale (note that is, again, emphasized) for many reasons, mostly US political and societal but also for some very practical geo-political reasons, we need to have the capability to get some low key but fully (even excessively) funded expert COIN efforts going early on.

Where is Global Scout when we need him... ;)

Rank amateur

12-07-2007, 10:07 PM

Ken White

12-07-2007, 11:45 PM

I believe this statement from the article is flat out wrong:

"Given the responsibility of command, he recognized that, when all the frills are stripped away, counterinsurgency warfare is about killing those who need killing,"

I believe we are bribing, negotiating with and even training people who used to attacks us.

We are doing both those things at the same time, the message is "You can get some bucks by chilling or you can be dead -- your choice." Works for me and sounds like a plan. The Byzantines developed it into an art form; the Brits do it well. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, not at all. In fact, they're all part of the effort. The object is to get them to stop attacking; whatever works. Google Chieu Hoi for just one example.

So Ralph is hyperbolic and can be annoying but he isn't wrong in that case.

Rank amateur

12-08-2007, 02:36 AM

can be annoying but he isn't wrong in that case.

To me "killing those who need to be killed" doesn't imply, "unless they'd rather have a check," but I fully admit that I don't understand a lot of the technical military jargon.;)

If I needed to make a list of people who insisted that we keep repeating things that didn't work in Iraq, it would be a long list, but none of the COIN doctrine writers would be on it.

I do, however, think that it's not very productive to argue over tactics. Even I know that the best tactic is whatever works, the more tactics you master, the more likely that you'll be able to handle every situation, an unexpected tactic may work better than a more "textbook" response and repeating tactics makes you predictable and therefore defeatable. Like you said: if killing works great. If writing checks works great too.

Ken White

12-08-2007, 05:00 AM

To me "killing those who need to be killed" doesn't imply, "unless they'd rather have a check," but I fully admit that I don't understand a lot of the technical military jargon.;)

killed." Everyone, particularly in Iraq, who shoots at us is not a die hard enemy (who does need to be killed); if those of light conviction can be turned, everyone is better off. It makes no sense to kill people just because they shot at you -- particularly when, after all, you shot at them. Just nail the ones who aren't willing to quit shooting while turning the others...

If I needed to make a list of people who insisted that we keep repeating things that didn't work in Iraq, it would be a long list, but none of the COIN doctrine writers would be on it.

Actually, there aren't that many people who insisted we keep repeating things that didn't work, less than a half dozen who mattered and could actually make what they wanted happen. You also need to wrestle with the military problem of 'command prerogative' -- he who is in command gets to decide how he (or she) will operate and the system gives them latitude to do that. Thus, Franks (later Abizaid) would not get too dictatorial with Sanchez (later Casey) nor would the CJCS get too rigid with either Franks or Abizaid. While that creates some occasional problems, it is sensible and shouldn't be changed.

What does need to be changed is dumping the foolish idea that all Commanders are equal; they are not. Congress has tied the hands of every Administration since 1980 by making Generals virtually untouchable by the Civilian leadership and by insisting that everyone take their turn at jobs. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) was an effort to correct some ills and to be fair -- as is usual for products of inside the Beltway kneejerk experts, they overdid it. DOPMA makes it difficult to put the right senior person in the right job; DOPMA and some systemic over caution.

I'd also suggest the COIN doctrine writers are not error free; FM 3-24 is far from being the best FM I've seen. They produced a philosophy, not a manual -- and that philosophy had essentially been created in the early 60s -- it just got buried and forgotten in the interim. They just regurgitated most of it...

I do, however, think that it's not very productive to argue over tactics. Even I know that the best tactic is whatever works, the more tactics you master, the more likely that you'll be able to handle every situation, an unexpected tactic may work better than a more "textbook" response and repeating tactics makes you predictable and therefore defeatable. Like you said: if killing works great. If writing checks works great too.

Arguing may not be all that productive but discussion can be informative.

Textbook responses should always be avoided at all costs, Doctrine can be a strait jacket that way -- that's why Gian is worried (as are some others of us) that we will go overboard on the COIN mantra to the detriment of our ability to do other things. That really needs to be avoided...

RTK

12-08-2007, 05:53 AM

Fundamentals are fundamental for a reason. The problem is that we've lost focus of what our fundamentals are. Some go overboard into the TTP realm and miss the boat in terms of the ground basics that formulate the ability to be flexible in a given environment.

As I've told LTC Gentile before, we've made a concerted effort to attempt to stay balanced at the Armor Center. About a third of the culmination FTX missions are COIN based, with about a third HIC and a third a good mix between the two.

Baseline tactics, once understood, can be applied a number of different ways. So long as we focus on teaching entry level Soldiers and Officers the basics of tactics in the form of shoot, move, and communicate we're doing our job. Everything after that is an adaptation of the fundamental principles that guide what we do.

I agree that we've lost focus of the governing doctrine in our neverending quest to look towards the campfire and see what's right in front of our face. The problem is that we often neglect to see the forest fire around us.

SteveMetz

12-08-2007, 10:23 AM

RTK

12-08-2007, 10:31 AM

Speaking of the armor center, anything you can tell me (PM perhaps) about MG Williams since he's going to be our new boss?

PM enroute. Bottom line, I like him a lot. He's genuine and he checks training. He gives a damn about Soldiers. He'll be missed around here.

SteveMetz

12-08-2007, 12:27 PM

PM enroute. Bottom line, I like him a lot. He's genuine and he checks training. He gives a damn about Soldiers. He'll be missed around here.

Thanks. Our concern when getting a new commandant always is how they will adapt to being the leader of a college which is radically different than the vast majority of command slots. Issues like academic freedom, media relations, and dealing with eccentric but extraordinarily talents faculty members can be challenging.

To give one example, some of our past commandants have had a lot of trouble with faculty members writing or saying things critical of official Army positions or administration policies. But that's exactly what the faculty at an accredited, degree granting institution of higher learning is supposed to do.

Time will tell, I guess. Some commandants adjust, others don't.

selil

12-08-2007, 04:06 PM

To give one example, some of our past commandants have had a lot of trouble with faculty members writing or saying things critical of official Army positions or administration policies. But that's exactly what the faculty at an accredited, degree granting institution of higher learning is supposed to do.

I don't know it as fact but I bet your average military affiliated university is a big target for accrediting agencies. If y'all ever made it onto the censure list of AAUP all kinds of heck would roll down hill.

Penta

12-08-2007, 04:21 PM

...They aren't already on it? From what I recall, AAUP basically clubs Catholic universities over the head for stuff which, for Catholic institutions, is either required by ecclesiastical authorities, or an understood part of the atmosphere. (Example: the requirement (only sometimes enforced) that Theology profs receive approval from the local Ordinary (Bishop/Archbishop) before teaching.)

John T. Fishel

12-08-2007, 04:36 PM

that most of what appears in FM 3-24 is not only not new but said quitre well in the 60s - 80s. What I like about the manual is that, unlike the iterations of Army and Joint doctrine in the 90s, this one attempts to hark back to the USMC SWM with the inclusion of TTP. The attempt to put most of what is needed in a single manual is, I believe, useful to the soldier and Marine on the ground.

One problem with all of this is that people tend to forget that doctrine is not - and should not be - dogma. It is, at best, the doctrine writers' best sythesis of lessons and previous writing, both doctrinal and form other sources. (I used to love to say that doctrine is written by "slugs" like us! :wry: And the "slugs" were majors and LTCs just doing a job.) The good part is that this group of slugs had both experience and education. The bad part is that the FM is a doctrine manual (in other words, for the academic types, a textbook) with all the faults of both. The danger, as many here have poited out, is that not only will this FM become dogma but that it will be treated as dogma for the kinds of conflict for which it is not intended. My friend and colleague, Max Manwaring, (Steve's office mate) loves to point out this Clausewitz quote, "The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature."

Sometimes that dead European male was more than a little relevant to contemporary debates.:D

Cheers

JohnT

SteveMetz

12-08-2007, 05:19 PM

I don't know it as fact but I bet your average military affiliated university is a big target for accrediting agencies. If y'all ever made it onto the censure list of AAUP all kinds of heck would roll down hill.

I thought it was ridiculous when we became accredited anyway. Over 80% of our Army students come in with a master's degree, so they leave with two (or more--one of my former office mates had three).

The Naval War College first became accredited simply because with their rotation schedule, it was more difficult for their officers to get a civilian advanced degree. Then since they did it, the Air Force had to. When the Air Force did, we did.

I think, though, if the AAUP became a problem, we'd give up accreditation before we'd bow to an organization that doesn't understand our special mission.

Norfolk

12-08-2007, 05:46 PM

The CGSC is accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools isn't it? Could the AAUP and its ilk become a problem in the future for Service schools somehow anyway, basically tossing out members who teach at Service schools if said schools refuse to conform to AAUP demands? Wouldn't most, if not all Faculty members currently teaching at Service schools take the hit anyway (those that are AAUP members anyway) and remain with the schools? Or could Faculty find themselves caught anyways?

Gian P Gentile

12-08-2007, 05:59 PM

My friend and colleague, Max Manwaring, (Steve's office mate) loves to point out this Clausewitz quote, "The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature."

Sometimes that dead European male was more than a little relevant to contemporary debates.

John:

This is one of Clausewitz's greatest one-lines and one of my favorites too. And I agree with your point about the continuing relevance of the Prussian. Which is why I was very much bothered by FM 3-24 when its writers chose--chose--to leave Clausewitz off of the classics reading list. This was more than a simple omission but instead an intentional mechanism by the writers of the FM to "rewire" the thinking of soldiers and marines away from "conventional warfare" toward the light of Counterinsurgency operations. What else could explain the omission from an important doctrinal manual of war of one of the greatest theorists of war of all time?

gian

SteveMetz

12-08-2007, 06:32 PM

John:

This is one of Clausewitz's greatest one-lines and one of my favorites too. And I agree with your point about the continuing relevance of the Prussian. Which is why I was very much bothered by FM 3-24 when its writers chose--chose--to leave Clausewitz off of the classics reading list. This was more than a simple omission but instead an intentional mechanism by the writers of the FM to "rewire" the thinking of soldiers and marines away from "conventional warfare" toward the light of Counterinsurgency operations. What else could explain the omission from an important doctrinal manual of war of one of the greatest theorists of war of all time?

gian

Because our comfort zone is treat counterinsurgency like war. Then we lose.

Ken White

12-08-2007, 06:54 PM

one liner:

"Principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference."

One we too often forget...

selil

12-08-2007, 07:05 PM

Because our comfort zone is treat counterinsurgency like war. Then we lose.

Looking at some bibliometrics spikes the research suggests that COIN/LIC/Guerilla warfare roles around every two or so decades, 60's (Vietham), 80's (Drug War), 00's (OIF, OEF).

Penta

12-08-2007, 07:31 PM

Wouldn't most, if not all Faculty members currently teaching at Service schools take the hit anyway (those that are AAUP members anyway) and remain with the schools? Or could Faculty find themselves caught anyways?

Current faculty might. But it puts enormous pressure on faculty considering recruitment to the schools, I'd imagine; most undergraduate and graduate-level instructors are members of AAUP, I'm given to understand (from chatting w/ my former prof).

Also, more critically, attacking the service schools could well put the accreditation of the service academies into question, as well. -Those- institutions absolutely need accreditation for their degrees.

Steve: Does anybody even -look- at the accreditation of a degree? I understand it's required for civilian schools that want federal funding, but how does accreditation even help NPS?

SteveMetz

12-08-2007, 08:09 PM

Looking at some bibliometrics spikes the research suggests that COIN/LIC/Guerilla warfare roles around every two or so decades, 60's (Vietham), 80's (Drug War), 00's (OIF, OEF).

I think the 80s were more El Salvador. I once compared American capability to a phoenix that periodically dies a dramatic death and then is reborn out of the ashes.

The current debate, though, is different in some important ways. During those earlier manifestations, no one (or almost no one) argued that counterinsurgency, small wars, pacification, stabilization, low intensity conflict, operations other than war, irregular conflict, or whatever should be THE primary mission of the American military (or at least the ground forces). It was always seen as an additional added task. The debate was over what portion of the effort, funds, and personnel it required. But that portion was always small.

Now there is darned near a consensus that it should be THE focus of at least the ground forces. (And, if Charlie Dunlap has his way, the Air Force as well lest its budget and force be adjusted to better reflect its diminished role in American strategy).

Ken White

12-08-2007, 08:42 PM

"Now there is darned near a consensus that it should be THE focus of at least the ground forces. (And, if Charlie Dunlap has his way, the Air Force as well lest its budget and force be adjusted to better reflect its diminished role in American strategy)."

You're closer to the Pentafont of all knowledge than I am -- if that thought is running around E-Ring, we'll be in trouble. We need to be able to do it, I don't question that -- but any 'focus' on less than full spectrum is not at all smart.

Ron Humphrey

12-08-2007, 08:51 PM

You're closer to the Pentafont of all knowledge than I am -- if that thought is running around E-Ring, we'll be in trouble. We need to be able to do it, I don't question that -- but any 'focus' on less than full spectrum is not at all smart.

As the overwhelming capabilities of any nations defense rely on its ability to defend but also to project its power to much realignment could very quickly translate into loss of some of the international momentum gained thus far.

Just as the point behind having overwhelming force is to encourage lack of a need for it, if it doesn't exist it is almost guaranteed to be needed

Dr Jack

12-08-2007, 09:42 PM

John T. Fishel

12-08-2007, 11:44 PM

Gian--

I pulled the quote from Max and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which is a book about small wars of all kinds. We think that not only Clausewitz but Sun Tzu as well are as eminently relevant to small wars as they are to large ones.

I truly do not understand why the authors of FM 3-24 failed to mention Saint Carl as they should have. But, in the words of Hanford's Law, "Never attribute to malice what is adequately explained by stupidity." Not that I think the authors are/were stupid but rather, I suspect they just didn't think of it and nobody caught the omission. Perhaps, someone who was in on the vetting of the manual can offer a more profound explanation.

Cheers

JohnT

Surferbeetle

12-09-2007, 06:47 AM

To the point, there's the old country song "Do what you do do well, Boy." We have strengths. As Steve said, we're better'n the average Bear at the operational and tactical. I cannot believe that we cannot shape things to use our strength and avoid catering to two of our national weaknesses, impatience and dislike of the tedious.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
- Sun Tzu

Keeping in mind that 12-month combat tours are a marathon and 15-month combat tours are not wise, IMHO ‘Big Army’ would benefit from adopting the SOF model of regional specialization for both ‘small wars’ and large ones. By this I suggest that units, and key leaders in particular, return to the same AO again and again.

My boots on the ground view during 03’-04’ in Mosul was that the application of sufficient and carefully targeted security, respect, and resources led to the establishment of personal relationships with those inhabiting local power structures. Effective cultural and linguistic skills were key to this effort. Ongoing maintenance of these relationships led to relative stability. OIF 1 had time to ‘get up to speed’.

The rotation of all key US personnel during 04’ however, completely disrupted these relationships and this disruption was further compounded by the replacement of a Division sized force by a BCT sized force. The fragile equilibrium was shattered and key Iraqi’s began to leave or were killed. Local power structures crumbled and a downward spiral began: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2004) .

3-24 and COIN practice at JRTC, NTC, & Hohenfels take into account current conditions and are needed for our ‘full spectrum capabilities’ however, a balance needs to be found instead of an almost exclusive small or large war focus.

Strategically, effective teamwork skills are lacking and ‘those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.’ still applies. It’s a tough nut.

Gian P Gentile

12-09-2007, 01:20 PM

Because our comfort zone is treat counterinsurgency like war. Then we lose.

I say this respectfully to you, Steve; but I believe that you are wrong. As soon as we develop theories and arguments to show that a "counterinsurgency war" like Iraq is not war that it is something else then that is what causes us to loose and not the other way around as you say. Would, say for example, Cavguy, or RTK, or former operator Tom Odom agree that counterinsurgency is not war, or even except your premise that even if it is then we need to adjust our thinking in how we view it and change it into something else so that we can mire ourselves in places like Iraq for generations?

And I don’t think you can parse things so neatly as to say well at the tactical level for the lieutenant or captain it is war but at the higher strategic and political level it is not. That sort of thinking is wrongheaded and attempts to place war into a neatly compartmentalized analytical box with no true meaning as to the inter-connected relationship of millions of variables that defines war in all of its levels and conditions.

gian

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 02:31 PM

I say this respectfully to you, Steve; but I believe that you are wrong. As soon as we develop theories and arguments to show that a "counterinsurgency war" like Iraq is not war that it is something else then that is what causes us to loose and not the other way around as you say. Would, say for example, Cavguy, or RTK, or former operator Tom Odom agree that counterinsurgency is not war, or even except your premise that even if it is then we need to adjust our thinking in how we view it and change it into something else so that we can mire ourselves in places like Iraq for generations?

And I don’t think you can parse things so neatly as to say well at the tactical level for the lieutenant or captain it is war but at the higher strategic and political level it is not. That sort of thinking is wrongheaded and attempts to place war into a neatly compartmentalized analytical box with no true meaning as to the inter-connected relationship of millions of variables that defines war in all of its levels and conditions.

gian

War entails organized violence but not all phenomena that involve organized violence are war. War is a political conflict that can be resolved by organized violence. There are other types of political conflict that involve organized violence but cannot be resolved by it alone.

As brilliant as Clausewitz was (and with a bow to my friends who are Clausewitzeans like Chris Bassford and Colin Gray), I don't consider him an astute grand strategist.

I believe Americans elect to treat political conflicts that are not amenable to resolution solely or primarily by armed force as if they are simply because we are good at warfighting, not because that reflects reality or is the most effective option. To slightly revise the old canard, when the best tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat everything like a nail. In counterinsurgency, we attempt to do carpentry by relying on a hammer. You need a hammer to do carpentry but if you rely on it, you're going to be a pretty lousy carpenter.

selil

12-09-2007, 03:50 PM

I'd say that stating that all conflict using the military is war is a slippery slope. War other than war, insurgency, law enforcement and border protection all bring up specters of military action short of "war". Layered onto that is the rampant political aspect of "constitutional declaration of war". The methodical spectrum of conflict as war being just an extension of diplomacy suggested by Clausewitz is elegant. In reality though it seems that border protection, drug interdiction, disaster relief (and security), and finally COIN can all be at different levels. In Iraq (I'm guessing) the conventional conflict switched towards COIN when we didn't remove troops immediately.

I'm struggling with the ideas of a ladder of force (old cop talk coming out). COIN seems to be much a part of the ladder of force within conventional non-nuclear conflict. I'm aware of the types of war (conventional, catastrophic, attrition, etc.), but within that conventional formulation it seems that there different types or levels. On the law enforcement ladder of force you start out with presence, work yourself through batons, to tasers, to lethal force. COIN would seem to be analogous to tasers (sometimes lethal, but usually it just hurts to bejesuz).

When I was a LEO working court room services the ASP expandable baton had just come out. It was the bees-knees of non-lethal force. Where we might have used goose neck holds, or even choke holds to take somebody down the baton became the tool of choice. My reasoning on the explosion of baton use (night sticks never had the same popularity) is that the ASP was new, it was effective, and as such it sucked up situations above and below it on the ladder of force for quite awhile. I see COIN as the military equivalent by analogy.

All that being said COIN is not bad it is not new, but it does have a place. COIN is however very effective and politically palatable for some kinds of conflict. As an LEO we never threw away shot guns or duty side arms to use the baton. The Army should not throw away armor or heavy infantry when developing new doctrine either. All good analogies fall apart quickly but after the expandable baton came along pepper spray (Capiscium Oleo Resin) and when that happened everybody started getting sprayed. The same will happen with the army and its force du jour.

Doctrine to me seems to be the capture of lessons learned and methods that are acceptable in accomplishing missions as a framework for future conflict. The soldier may stay within the framework and also leave it when the need arises (but do so knowingly). It would be a bad thing to see doctrine devolved into simply the newest thing on the block as the only way to fight a war.

Global Scout

12-09-2007, 03:58 PM

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 05:16 PM

Webster's definition, War:
1a: a state of usu. open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations.
2a: a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism b: a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end

Warfare: 1. Military operations between enemies. 2: Struggle between competing enities.

Interesting enough I couldn't find a definition for war or warfare in the DoD Dictionary? I guess it is one of those words that is assumed to be common knowledge, yet that obviously isn't the case.

We had the Cold War, the War on Drugs, the War on Terrorism, the Long War, the Civil War, etc., and many of these don't necessarily fit the state versus state model.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was definitely a war by the classical definition, but did the war end in phase III? If it did, what is it now?

Steve you have made numerous brilliant points throughout, and I think you are on to something here, but your leaving us hanging. If it is war, then what type of conflict is it? If the military is charge is it war, and if the State Department is in charge it is something else? There are at least categories of conflict, state versus state, state versus a non-state actor, and non-state actor versus non-state actor. All them can involve aspects of what some call total war where we target each other with kinetic strikes, information, diplomacy, economic actions, and the list goes on and on. It is basically any action or combination of actions used to persuade the competitor to behave acceptably (or destroy him completely). When is it normaly statecraft and when is it war?

Let's say your right, and what we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere to support the Long War is not war, what is it? If we give it another name, what advantage does that give us?

I think euphemistic uses of the word "war" to connote anything we take seriously is a mistake (drugs, terrorism, poverty, etc). As someone at the RAND conferences as I at last week points out (it may have been Bruce Hoffman), the phrase "war on terror" is particularly absurd since our opponent is an emotion. At least with the "war on terrorism" our opponent is a tactic or operational method (which is slightly less absurd).

I'll admit that what I'm suggesting is consummately American conceptualization. But to me, the defining factor is whether a political conflict is predominantly or solely resolvable by armed force. That means that that the military plays a greater role in strategy formulation than during a period of "not war." Wars have a discernible beginning and end (although the participants may define those differently). A state of war is differently than a state of "not war" even though armed force may be used during "not war."

Rob Thornton

12-09-2007, 07:24 PM

I think we've reached a point to agree to disagree - that is not only OK, but maybe healthy in some ways as it keeps us looking from different perspectives - this may not be one of those things that requires "unity" - conflicting views within the broader community might not be disingenuous from progress on problems and conditions.

I tend to fall more on the Clausewitzian side - no real surprise there, but I'm not totally out of sync with what Steve has put forward either - perhaps that is part of the value of being a SWC member is exposure to various perspectives, and the synthesis of good ideas. I think war is unique within a broader spectrum of "conflict", and I also believe that we are at war in Iraq. I think this has to do with the use of military forces or military like organizations using violence in pursuit of a political objective(s) - defined broadly as those of an organized body politic. We have a political end to which we've applied military forces and the majority of those forces (certainly at the tactical level) are in keeping with traditional roles and missions normally assigned to the military.

I also agree that the use of the word "War" has been used inaccurately to garner political support for a broad range of causes, often because no other word existed which communicated effectively the level of importance the user wished to import upon the object.

I heard Dave Kilcullen use the term "counter-war" within his Charlie Rose interview. I thought this pretty thoughtful, in terms of considering how to direct resources (time, people, $$$, military means, etc.), however, it still puts multiple entities employing large scale (relative - maybe scaled, tailored or estimated is better?), organized violence to achieve a political objective - which I believe is war. Throughout OIF (and within the context of many other larger wars) we've seen some groups with more means and refined purpose then some of the others - the smaller groups have often taken advantage of the greater instability to pursue more limited political objectives. There have also been regional players using the conditions created by OIF to pursue their political objectives.

To me, all of these are in keeping with what Clausewitz describes as the rationale and political context for war - and while we may describe the exact reasons for going to war in 2003, the greater political context which gave rise to employing military means to achieve that object i.e. our own long term health and security (be it sustained global access to the strategic energy resources of the Persian Gulf, or be it promotion of political philosophies which potentially promote more stability) are enduring.

To divorce COIN from war to me is a greater danger then only keeping one tool in the tool box. I think the former is a political danger, while the latter is a military one. What I mean is that while we've been able to adapt our military to conduct COIN (and I do believe 3-24 is both a recognition and a part of that adaptation), we've had to do so because of our initial constrained thinking at the policy level in terms of what the outcome of employing military force to achieve a political objective would be. I think we've overcome some of that now.

Its a kind of dichotomy, but the "short term" business investment philosophy proffered by the then SECDEF and others that predicted sunshine on the back-end of the invasion was out of step with the objective nature of war as described by Clausewitz (and some other military theorists and philosophers who've pondered war). Again it goes back to the consequences and non-linearity that run rampant within war (they exist wherever there is complexity and interaction - but are perhaps at their highest in war due to the stakes in the outcome, and the degree of finality to which it is pursued).

I believe there is a significant political danger in calling it something other then war. It denies the possibilities which come into being within war (doesn't matter what we call it if the conditions mimic war), and can create an atmosphere in which politicians make decisions to employ military forces without respect for the consequences. I realize that by calling it war we might create the conditions where the hammer is reached for - but I prefer to live with that only because I want no (maybe less is more realistic) misunderstanding between those who decide to use military force to pursue said objective and the increasing range of risk and possibilities subject to chance by doing so; and also because I think we can adapt our hammer in relatively short order - as long as we invest in good leaders. The former calls for adaptation, the latter for commitment.

Finally, I'd say that there is room for debate here, in fact I think its healthy - we're never going to reach absolute consensus, and in maybe we shouldn't. I'd also say that if political decision makers insulated by the "Beltway" (to varying philosophical and physical degrees) are not going to have military service, then we owe them the very best objectivity about the consequences of using military forces (itself a hammer among the elements of national power) to achieve a political objective, they owe it to those who elect them to listen, and it would behoove them to study and think about war as something more then a distraction or domestic political tool.

Best Regards, Rob

Rob Thornton

12-09-2007, 08:05 PM

Hey Steve - that last paragraph has brought me back to a theme that has interested me with regard to how we use history.

From Steve:

I'll admit that what I'm suggesting is consummately American conceptualization. But to me, the defining factor is whether a political conflict is predominantly or solely resolvable by armed force. That means that that the military plays a greater role in strategy formulation than during a period of "not war." Wars have a discernible beginning and end (although the participants may define those differently). A state of war is differently than a state of "not war" even though armed force may be used during "not war."

When do you know how the enemy(ies) discern the beginning and the end? I think its easier to do so when we consider when looking backwards (this was also what interested me in MG (ret) Scales' bit on culmination). However, I believe whenever we do so there is the risk of simplifying it to a very linear view. Consider the view of the Vietnam War - we have an entry date and exit date that largely biases our view of that war. However, would the Vietnamese see it the same way? Would they see their rationale for commitment of military force as broader, and inclusive of the need to resist the Japanese, fight the French and then fight us? Would they also include their border wars with China? When we entered in pursuit of a political objective and then decided to withdraw from pursuit of that political objective - how does that mesh with their own political objectives?

With regard to what might have been in any historical consideration of war - I think there are some questions which just cannot be answered because the conditions that might have provided them answers, never came into being - as such they are to hard to gauge what the opponents reaction might have been, or the various possibilities that might have occurred as a result.

British involvement on the European continent during the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries also bring up an interesting point with regard to how rivals with opposing interests view themselves and each other. How did those powers view the state of their relations - what decisions were made as a result of their own perspectives?

With regard to the Ancient world - I think Athens and Sparta in deciding who was to dominate the Greek world, and the smaller political/military rivals which that contest gave rise to, also offer a relative perspective - and interesting one to boot since the exhaustion which occurred to both principal antagonists offered up a new possibilities, and a future strategic situation that might never have come into being if those two city-states had seen things differently.

Within those centuries and decades you could consider there was broader periods of "not war" punctuated by periods of "war" which sometime decided nothing, other then the possibility (maybe probability) of returning to war with each other.

I think this important to understand that different sides may not agree on where a war begins or ends, or the even the proximate and long term causes of why they waged war. I think when we do so we risk a kind of historical bias - however it may be the best we can do given our predisposition to look for final answers - its just who we are.

Anyway sorry to digress a bit - but I wanted to explore it.

Best, Rob

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 08:51 PM

Hey Steve - that last paragraph has brought me back to a theme that has interested me with regard to how we use history.

From Steve:

When do you know how the enemy(ies) discern the beginning and the end? I think its easier to do so when we consider when looking backwards (this was also what interested me in MG (ret) Scales' bit on culmination). However, I believe whenever we do so there is the risk of simplifying it to a very linear view. Consider the view of the Vietnam War - we have an entry date and exit date that largely biases our view of that war. However, would the Vietnamese see it the same way? Would they see their rationale for commitment of military force as broader, and inclusive of the need to resist the Japanese, fight the French and then fight us? Would they also include their border wars with China? When we entered in pursuit of a political objective and then decided to withdraw from pursuit of that political objective - how does that mesh with their own political objectives?

With regard to what might have been in any historical consideration of war - I think there are some questions which just cannot be answered because the conditions that might have provided them answers, never came into being - as such they are to hard to gauge what the opponents reaction might have been, or the various possibilities that might have occurred as a result.

British involvement on the European continent during the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries also bring up an interesting point with regard to how rivals with opposing interests view themselves and each other. How did those powers view the state of their relations - what decisions were made as a result of their own perspectives?

With regard to the Ancient world - I think Athens and Sparta in deciding who was to dominate the Greek world, and the smaller political/military rivals which that contest gave rise to, also offer a relative perspective - and interesting one to boot since the exhaustion which occurred to both principal antagonists offered up a new possibilities, and a future strategic situation that might never have come into being if those two city-states had seen things differently.

Within those centuries and decades you could consider there was broader periods of "not war" punctuated by periods of "war" which sometime decided nothing, other then the possibility (maybe probability) of returning to war with each other.

I think this important to understand that different sides may not agree on where a war begins or ends, or the even the proximate and long term causes of why they waged war. I think when we do so we risk a kind of historical bias - however it may be the best we can do given our predisposition to look for final answers - its just who we are.

Anyway sorry to digress a bit - but I wanted to explore it.

Best, Rob

The fact that participants in a war define its beginning and end different does not, in itself, change my point. The important feature, in my opinion, is that the participants do see it as "abnormal. Whether they agree on when it began and when it ends is important in terms of crafting effective strategy, but not in terms of deciding whether something was or was not a war.

Vietnam is actually a difficult case. Using the conceptualization I've proposed, it WAS a war for the North Vietnamese since they could attain their strategic objectives solely or predominantly through military means. But was it for the United States? Harry Summers, of course, argues that we could have won militarily. Others believe we could not because of strategic constraints. Is it possible, then, to have a half war where one combatant is at war and the other is not?

My instincts tell me yes. Our conflict with AQ may be an example.

Bill Moore

12-09-2007, 08:55 PM

My head hurts when I read and think about this. So why doesn't the DoD dictionary have a definition for war? I would assume that war carries with it some legal authorities, so you would think we could define it.

We have fought declared and undeclared wars, so if the President and Congress declare war what does that mean?

I don't believe the Cold War was ever declared, it was just assumed, and we conducted a variety of offensive and defensive diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities to ultimately prevail. Framing the ideological challenge as a war proved useful, because it forced our nation to strategize and use all our elements of National power to prevail. If we called it a "Not War" (waiting on the new term), I doubt we would have had as much synergy as we did.

While I also think the phrases, "War on Terror", and the “Long War” are misleading, the reality is we still have a global movement motivated by ideology to destroy our way of life. I think that qualifies as a significant threat to our nation; and the appropriate response is something similar to what we call war, even if we can’t define it. To me, that doesn’t mean the military is always the primary tool, as a matter of fact I think we are waging this war globally primarily diplomatically and politically and economically, but of course the hot spots make the news, so the other good work our government is conducting is largely invisible. I doubt that the State Department wants to describe what they’re doing as waging war, but if we change the common perception of war to include all the elements of DIME to counter serious threats to our national security, then why isn’t it?

Iraq confuses the issue, so for sake of this discussion let's assume that OIF didn't happen.

Would our activities against the Islamists in Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Philippines, South Asia, SE Asia, the Pan Sahel, South America, and throughout the world diplomatically, informationally, and economically be better defined as conflict than war?

I agree that winning is hard to define in this conflict, and that the military definitely can't win a war of ideology, at best we may can hope to mitigate the serious military threats, and perhaps set conditions for a diplomatic or informational victory of sorts, but does that mean because the military can’t win it, that it isn't a war?

Rob Thornton

12-09-2007, 09:04 PM

Steve,

I see what you are saying. It interests me when wars extend beyond the life of the authors within the body politic who might have provided the original rationale for it (could be out of power or it could be by death - just plain outlasts them). How does that happen - trans-generational struggles? Is the substance of the threat so obvious that its undeniable; is it the inability to distinguish current objectives from previous ones; is it the greater context created by the original rationale that gave birth to more reason to continue, vs. discontinue - kind of a sunk cost argument? Maybe its some or all depending on the nature of the war?

Anyway, its got me thinking.

Ken - You are the only guy I know who has the combined experience, the institutional knowledge to have lived it, thought about it, read about and wrote about it. What do you think?

Best Regards, Rob

Ken White

12-09-2007, 09:39 PM

. . .
Ken - You are the only guy I know who has experience, the institutional knowledge to have lived it, thought about it, read about and wrote about it. What do you think?
Best Regards, Rob

LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=33812#post33812).

An aside; I think the thread is getting wrapped around semantics; an issue on which there'll be many different approaches or answers -- and there probably is not a 'correct' answer... :wry:

Only slightly more concisely than my previous comment :rolleyes:; what I think is that 'war' implies conflict or combat. When you're in one you know it but aren't concerned about the esoteric arguments of what 'it' is. One does not engage in (as opposed to provide aid or efforts in support of) COIN unless one is at war; COIN entails killing and dying at base or tactical level and political finesse at that and higher levels (not, BTW, one of the US' strong points...). A COIN campaign IS the operational level of war for the Nations involved, no more and no less. The strategy put us in the Nation wherein the campaign takes place, the operational level is the COIN effort and it and the Tactical level operations and all the TTP must be tailored to achieve the political ends of that particular National effort -- and each COIN campaign is different (thus we have to be careful not to draw too many 'lessons' from a specific campaign).

Most insurgencies end up being wars of attrition with the insurgents simply trying to outlast their opponents (see American Revolution; Malaya,Viet Nam; AQIZ and many others).

Given the above generic strategy by insurgents, our political ineptitude, the national trait of impatience, todays communications capability, our unwillingness to train properly and completely and a few other factors, I believe we should avoid COIN efforts unless there is no other option and we should try to shape conditions to use our strengths in breaking things and people, fixing things, cobbling solutions together and doing all that rapidly.

To do that we need far better intel than we have had before -- thus my request for Global Scout (the missing capability, not the specific poster here ;) ).

Regardless of my belief that we should avoid COIN if possible, it may not always be possible and we must acknowledge that and be prepared. Our first effort should be to send in the specialists at as low key as is possible. We may have to commit the GPF / MPF and they must have some COIN training but they MUST remain a full spectrum force and while COIN is demanding, HIC is even more so thus our doctrinal and training focus must reflect that.

We are capable of doing that and doing it well. Whether we do it or not remains to be seen...

slapout9

12-09-2007, 09:43 PM

To me, that doesn’t mean the military is always the primary tool, as a matter of fact I think we are waging this war globally primarily diplomatically and politically and economically, but of course the hot spots make the news, so the other good work our government is conducting is largely invisible. I doubt that the State Department wants to describe what they’re doing as waging war, but if we change the common perception of war to include all the elements of DIME to counter serious threats to our national security, then why isn’t it?

Hi Bill, nice to see you back. I think you hit it on the head. Our concept of use of force is to narrow. Changing a system by injecting positive energy is just as much a use of force as using negative energy to change it, and positive energy is usually longer lasting because you don't have to worry about the revenge factor.

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 10:02 PM

LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=33812#post33812).

An aside; I think the thread is getting wrapped around semantics; .

You're not anti-semantic, are you?

Ken White

12-09-2007, 10:06 PM

are or were Semen. er, Seman. Semants? Sem -- them... :cool:

Gian P Gentile

12-09-2007, 10:20 PM

You're not anti-semantic, are you?

No, but he might be an anti-dentite.

Ken White

12-09-2007, 10:41 PM

A board of biting wit...:D

Bill Moore

12-09-2007, 11:48 PM

Slapout you slay me. The Army put out that the terms kinetic and non-kinetic are non-doctrinal, and we're now supposed to use lethal and non-lethal. I see a whole bunch of problems with these, and as flawed as kinetic and non-kinetic were, they seem better than lethal and non-lethal (I'm either going to kill ya, or I'm not), especially for COIN and IW.

I like your use of positive and negative force instead of lethal and non-lethal. However, if you conduct a lethal activity against a real bad a..wipe, is that positive or negative force? Of course I'm joking, but you can see where this could lead....

I'm getting out of the anti-semantic debates for a while, there just isn't enough aspirin to quiet my headaches when I really start thinking hard about this, and for me any degree of thinking is hard.

It's good to be back from a short sabatical downrange and to see that the SWJ is still the best site on the web.

slapout9

12-10-2007, 12:49 AM

I like your use of positive and negative force instead of lethal and non-lethal. However, if you conduct a lethal activity against a real bad a..wipe, is that positive or negative force? Of course I'm joking, but you can see where this could lead....

Hi Bill, it's a good point..so good I asked that question myself. It depends on the target. Positive energy produces something,negative energy consumes something. So killing a bad guy is negative energy all around but it was necessary to protect your system, but you still consumed ammunition maybe had casualties,used up equipment,etc. Everything has a cost the trick is to keep it balanced in your favor. That is why positive energy is so good because it can produce a profit or benefit to both systems. Remember your Coke executive example and Cuba we talked about a while back on another thread. Put positive energy into a bad system and it can become good over time. But once in a while there is always some jerk who just will not get with the program so you have to put the 100% Alabama Whoop Ass on him (negative energy)to make things work out.

It's like that yingy yangy stuff from Kung Fu...You know Grasshopper talking to his master who flung dung and stuff.
:)

selil

12-10-2007, 01:08 AM

Hi Bill, it's a good point..so good I asked that question myself. It depends on the target. Positive energy produces something,negative energy consumes something. So killing a bad guy is negative energy all around but it was necessary to protect your system, but you still consumed ammunition maybe had casualties,used up equipment,etc. ......It's like that yingy yangy stuff from Kung Fu...You know Grasshopper talking to his master who flung dung and stuff.
:)

If'n y'all start swinging crystals around and chanting ommmmmm. I'm going to puke in your tofu.

Maybe the laws of thermodynamics as a model I've seen it used for security before why not the army?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_thermodynamics

changed for here (it's likely been done before)

The zeroth law

When two entities come into contact with each other energy will be exchanged.

First law

Energy can not be created or destroyed it can only be transferred.

Second law

Systems have a tendency to become more chaotic or seek entropy.

Third law

As things get really cold systems become quiescent.

You can move them around but as to their relative simplicity they've been applied all over the place. Basically because they're so dang simple. Even I understand them.

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 01:44 AM

If'n y'all start swinging crystals around and chanting ommmmmm. I'm going to puke in your tofu.

Maybe the laws of thermodynamics as a model I've seen it used for security before why not the army?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_thermodynamics

changed for here (it's likely been done before)

The zeroth law

When two entities come into contact with each other energy will be exchanged.

First law

Energy can not be created or destroyed it can only be transferred.

Second law

Systems have a tendency to become more chaotic or seek entropy.

Third law

As things get really cold systems become quiescent.

You can move them around but as to their relative simplicity they've been applied all over the place. Basically because they're so dang simple. Even I understand them.

I heard that Alberto Gonzales decided that the laws of thermodynamics were, umm, "negotiable."

Ron Humphrey

12-10-2007, 02:04 AM

I heard that Alberto Gonzales decided that the laws of thermodynamics were, umm, "negotiable."

I have been keeping up with this thread but you guys are so on top of it I'm not sure I can keep up so I will just bring up the one major concern I have.

As the military has always done we look wherever we can to get better ways of accomplishing the mission. In current operations there has been a big movement towards academization in just about every facet of our forces. While this is not a bad thing I do wonder if perhaps we have moved too much towards fighting wars academically vs using knowledge and academic lessons to better fight wars.

I think this is probably along the lines of what you have been saying but for myself placing it in this context might be easier in understanding the future of our defense forces.

selil

12-10-2007, 02:26 AM

I heard that Alberto Gonzales decided that the laws of thermodynamics were, umm, "negotiable."

Can you get a presidential pardon for violating the laws of nature?

JeffC

12-10-2007, 02:33 AM

As the military has always done we look wherever we can to get better ways of accomplishing the mission. In current operations there has been a big movement towards academization in just about every facet of our forces. While this is not a bad thing I do wonder if perhaps we have moved too much towards fighting wars academically vs using knowledge and academic lessons to better fight wars.

Particularly when the academicians involved have no military experience. I realize that I'm probably stepping on a whole slew of toes with that statement, and I mean no disrespect to the people to whom this applies, but shouldn't military experience be part of the "advanced degree leading to consulting the military" gig?

Rob Thornton

12-10-2007, 02:57 AM

Hi Jeff,

but shouldn't military experience be part of the "advanced degree leading to consulting the military" gig?

Hmmm, I don't think so - and here is why. I think its wise to consider a person's experiences when it comes to weighing out their opinion - that may mean given a certain set of conditions one piece of advice might outweigh another, but I still want to hear it. If it comes to communicating an idea, it may be that the ability to think critically and logically is more valuable then an idea that feels right based on experience, but remains isolated and unspoken.

There is also an allot of things that are going to come up in military operations that will require niche, but specialized knowledge - sometimes that is hard to come by - this is part of what attracted me to the SWC a year ago - it provided me access to folks who were different, who had spent years developing their skill sets, but who were also interested in helping out.

So while I feel military service is helpful in bridging the communications gap - a good idea can and should stand on its own. Likewise, I think there is something to be said for those who've spent their lives in the military, who might also be able to contribute to other fields (private, civil or otherwise).

I do think if more veterans will communicate their military experience we can better leverage and prepare those folks who have not had the opportunity to serve, or for whatever reasons have pursued other vocations; as well as prepare those appointees, executives and lawmakers elected or appointed over us who might make decisions regarding the military.

Best, Rob

Ron Humphrey

12-10-2007, 03:05 AM

Particularly when the academicians involved have no military experience. I realize that I'm probably stepping on a whole slew of toes with that statement, and I mean no disrespect to the people to whom this applies, but shouldn't military experience be part of the "advanced degree leading to consulting the military" gig?

Jeff

I agree with Rob about how important it is to allow and even seach for input from all sectors and in doing so use what works regardless where it came from.

I guess sometimes I just get concerned that we may forget which horizons we are in, while searching for the answers.

Bill Moore

12-10-2007, 03:36 AM

This thread started because Ralph Peters criticized the new COIN doctrine. Now we're talking about bringing more academia into the military, and I know howling Ralph did an article on that also previously, where he said too much education can make a man stupid. Actually that wasn't exactly what he said, but not suprisingly he wasn't overly thrilled about the concept of Harvard educated officers. I am beginning to see a common thread in his rants, they all seem to be indirect attacks on Gen Petraeus, so it makes one wonder if howling Ralph lost a push up contest to him once upon a time?

I heard that entrophy law is once again a theory, but I can't recall my source, but it was probably People Magazine or Sports Illustrated. We all know if you put energy into an insurgency (is it a system, a series of systems, or the by product of a system[s]) that the insurgency will either crumple, or become increasingly powerful. I guess that goes back to the positive and negative energy thing that Slapout is preaching. If you put positive energy into it the insurgency gets weaker (Yin and Yang), but if you put negative energy into the insurgency (leg 3 of the McCormick Diamond Model) it gets stronger (Yang and Yin). There is something here, but I will address it on Slapout's targeting thread.

Slapout, do you drink white lighting or green tea with your Tofu? Not that's there anything wrong with that.

Granite_State

12-10-2007, 03:39 AM

Sorry if I'm dragging the conversation in another direction, but just wanted to say that from what little I've seen of him Ralph Peters seems like a heck of a Johnny One-Note. About three years ago I saw him and some other big names (Christopher Hitchens was one) speak on a panel about Iraq in DC somewhere. His message was, our Army is really good at killing people, the only thing keeping us from winning is the media/political correctness, this could be wrapped up in a few months if we took the gloves off. He was very gracious and helpful when I hung around to ask him a question about the Stryker vs. M-113, but his basic speech seemed pretty much the same as "Dishonest Doctrine."

Tons of political hacks and polemicists make the same points (John Podhoretz advocating mass killings of Sunni males a while back, then backtracking, for example), but isn't Peters, unlike those idiots, too smart and experienced not to understand the current moral and media climate we live in?

slapout9

12-10-2007, 03:48 AM

Bill, white lightning or tea I can handle but forget the tofu stuff, to me seems like eating Play-Dough. The targeting thread is an ongoing project I am going to add stuff to it as part of my SBW theory (Slapout Based Warfare). So jump in on the targeting thread anytime, anybody else to.

JeffC

12-10-2007, 03:51 AM

Hi Jeff,

Hmmm, I don't think so - and here is why. I think its wise to consider a person's experiences when it comes to weighing out their opinion - that may mean given a certain set of conditions one piece of advice might outweigh another, but I still want to hear it. If it comes to communicating an idea, it may be that the ability to think critically and logically is more valuable then an idea that feels right based on experience, but remains isolated and unspoken.

I do agree with that, particularly in terms of gauging advice based on conditions, what the issue is that's being advised, etc. However, I'm not sure I would make the assumption that an advanced degree equals the ability to think critically (if that's what you were implying).

There is also an allot of things that are going to come up in military operations that will require niche, but specialized knowledge - sometimes that is hard to come by - this is part of what attracted me to the SWC a year ago - it provided me access to folks who were different, who had spent years developing their skill sets, but who were also interested in helping out.

Good point.

So while I feel military service is helpful in bridging the communications gap - a good idea can and should stand on its own.

Agreed

Thanks for your thoughts, Rob.

Jeff

JeffC

12-10-2007, 03:54 AM

Jeff

I agree with Rob about how important it is to allow and even seach for input from all sectors and in doing so use what works regardless where it came from.

I guess sometimes I just get concerned that we may forget which horizons we are in, while searching for the answers.

Yes, Rob added some clarity to my thinking around this issue, too.

Thanks, Ron.

Jeff

JeffC

12-10-2007, 03:58 AM

Bill, white lightning or tea I can handle but forget the tofu stuff, to me seems like eating Play-Dough.

Ah, that's because you haven't had Mongolian Tofu - Mmmmm, Mmmmm, good.

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 10:17 AM

Can you get a presidential pardon for violating the laws of nature?

I suggest you pose that question to Senator Craig's office.

Rob Thornton

12-10-2007, 11:30 AM

Hi Jeff,

I do agree with that, particularly in terms of gauging advice based on conditions, what the issue is that's being advised, etc. However, I'm not sure I would make the assumption that an advanced degree equals the ability to think critically (if that's what you were implying).

We agree here - I've seen plenty of folks with advanced degrees and/or with experience in a given field who professed expertise, but were unable to think critically. There is a good thread on the SWC somewhere about "experts" that highlights the question of "what makes and "expert" qualified to call themselves an expert. Whenever I hear someone claim expertise, be introduced as an expert I start looking for their bias to emerge.

Best Regards, Rob

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 11:37 AM

Hi Jeff,

We agree here - I've seen plenty of folks with advanced degrees and/or with experience in a given field who professed expertise, but were unable to think critically. There is a good thread on the SWC somewhere about "experts" that highlights the question of "what makes and "expert" qualified to call themselves an expert. Whenever I hear someone claim expertise, be introduced as an expert I start looking for their bias to emerge.

Best Regards, Rob

I always identify myself as an ex spurt.

Rob Thornton

12-10-2007, 11:42 AM

Morning GS,

I've never met MR Peters (although I know we have some SWC members who have), but I think he is largely sincere in the remarks he makes. I also think that however one-sided he may be in making his arguments (again I think this is probably a product of conviction and sincerity - I'm a "benefit of the doubt" kinda guy), it never fails to sponsor good debate that burns up more then a few brain cells.

Tons of political hacks and polemicists make the same points (John Podhoretz advocating mass killings of Sunni males a while back, then backtracking, for example), but isn't Peters, unlike those idiots, too smart and experienced not to understand the current moral and media climate we live in?

I think he does understand it, he just seems to have his own perspective on what it means and what its useful for. From the pieces he's written that I've read, he often starts with one issue, then purposefully applies it to other broader issues that I think concern him. I think in his own way he's tried to retain his objectivity about a variety of issues. I have seen him reshape (not retract) some of his previous pieces once he's had a chance to observe something and reflect on new information.

Anyway, without writers like R. Peters we'd have less reason to challenge our thinking, and express our own thoughts in writing:)

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton

12-10-2007, 11:45 AM

Steve,

I always identify myself as an ex spurt. - In that regard we all had to begin somewhere:D - although some here might refer to themselves as a "former-spurt":D
Best, Rob

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 11:57 AM

Morning GS,

I've never met MR Peters (although I know we have some SWC members who have), but I think he is largely sincere in the remarks he makes. I also think that however one-sided he may be in making his arguments (again I think this is probably a product of conviction and sincerity - I'm a "benefit of the doubt" kinda guy), it never fails to sponsor good debate that burns up more then a few brain cells.

I think he does understand it, he just seems to have his own perspective on what it means and what its useful for. From the pieces he's written that I've read, he often starts with one issue, then purposefully applies it to other broader issues that I think concern him. I think in his own way he's tried to retain his objectivity about a variety of issues. I have seen him reshape (not retract) some of his previous pieces once he's had a chance to observe something and reflect on new information.

Anyway, without writers like R. Peters we'd have less reason to challenge our thinking, and express our own thoughts in writing:)

Best, Rob

I have had the honor of spending a bit of time with Ralph over the years (hanging around Garmisch, for instance). I'm a huge fan. We agree on a lot but even when we disagree, I find him passionate, brilliant, and challenging. I just like people who are unabashedly what they are and make no bones about it. Heck, I like Cindy Lauper for that precise reason.

Ski

12-10-2007, 01:48 PM

I was watching a clip of John Boyd the other day - fascinating stuff by the way - and he had some fascinating ideas about doctrine. Two things stood out to me:

1. He said "I don't talk much about doctrine because the day after it's written it tends to become dogma." Heh.

2. He also said - " I don't care much about German, or Russian, or British doctrine. You should learn all of them and have them in your kitbag so you can use them when the situation dictates."

Little bit of paraphrasing there but you get the point.

That's why it's nice to read FM 3-24 and the rest of the Army manuals once, and highlight the stuff that matters to you as an individual. Then it goes back on the personal library shelf until I need to pull it out again.

Doctrine is a guide nothing more, nothing less. The day people start preaching to the choir about doctrine is the day I turn the channel and watch the Teletubbies. Nothing worse in the Army than a field grade officer who pontificates about doctrine. I can read and process information and formulate ideas and conclusions like anyone else.

Steve Blair

12-10-2007, 01:54 PM

That's why it's nice to read FM 3-24 and the rest of the Army manuals once, and highlight the stuff that matters to you as an individual. Then it goes back on the personal library shelf until I need to pull it out again.

Doctrine is a guide nothing more, nothing less. The day people start preaching to the choir about doctrine is the day I turn the channel and watch the Teletubbies. Nothing worse in the Army than a field grade officer who pontificates about doctrine. I can read and process information and formulate ideas and conclusions like anyone else.

That's also why, to me, some of the best doctrine I've ever read is the USMC Warfighting series. It's intended to be exactly what you're saying: more a framework for thinking about conflict than prescriptive, box-checking methods. You also saw some of this during the early days of air cav, when the scout units in Vietnam were pretty much making it up as they went and passing it back for use and study. Sadly, most of the stuff they came up with seems to have been lost, along with the loose attitude that allowed them to even create the stuff in the first place.

Ski

12-10-2007, 03:02 PM

Steve

Yeah, agree about the USMC Warfighting series - I have the entire original collection - and use them a great deal more than any Army doctrinal publication.

Tom Odom

12-10-2007, 03:08 PM

Ski

12-10-2007, 07:40 PM

Bingo! Especially when he writes for the New York Post.

Rob,

Ralph Peters panders to raw emotion and that is not a good platform for rational discussion. We can handle it here but in the larger US community Peters touches base instinct with deft fingers. That puts him firmly in the ideologue for money camp.

Best

Tom

SWJED

12-10-2007, 09:59 PM

Peace, Love, COIN? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/peace-love-coin-1/)

The December ’07 issue of Armed Forces Journal contains two commentary pieces that are harbingers of a debate brewing “inside and outside the beltway” concerning Counterinsurgency (COIN) / Irregular Warfare (IW) operations “after Iraq.” While the two AFJ articles focus on Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine approved last December and its execution in Iraq, the issues the authors raise will most certainly carryover into a larger debate that will shape our National Security Strategy and military capabilities for decades to come.

The first article, Dishonest Doctrine by Ralph Peters, accuses the Army and Marine Corps of selective use of history in writing FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. Arguably the most damning of Peters’ claims is his accusation that the primary authors took an “academic approach” – formulating conclusions up-front in the writing process and conducting biased research in search of historical examples that supported those conclusions...

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 10:30 PM

Peace, Love, COIN? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/peace-love-coin-1/)

Yanno what I think the problem is? Because the U.S. has no written strategy for counterinsurgency or which encompasses counterinsurgency, the doctrine sought to fill that void and be both operational and strategic. Tactical and operational doctrine can (and should be) built bottom up, by collecting the experience and insights of those in the field. Strategic doctrine (to the extent that phrase makes sense) cannot. It is, in some ways, developed through a MORE academic methodology (although not a pure one, as our wingbat friends in anthropology remind us).

So, the doctrine was born both with top down and bottom up analysis. Anything that is that much of a polyglot is likely to provoke criticism from people more comfortable with one approach or the other. Schizophrenics like me, though, have no problem holding multiple diametric approaches and positions simultaneously. Sometimes it helps to be crazy.

Gian P Gentile

12-11-2007, 12:40 AM

So, the doctrine was born both with top down and bottom up analysis. Anything that is that much of a polyglot is likely to provoke criticism from people more comfortable with one approach or the other. Schizophrenics like me, though, have no problem holding multiple diametric approaches and positions simultaneously. Sometimes it helps to be crazy.

Oh please I hope you are not telling me that I can only handle one thing at a time and that I like my doctrine simple because unlike people like you who can multi-task, I can not. If that is what you are saying and the literal meaning of your words suggests that you are, you are way off base!!

This post drips with intellectual arrogance on your part.

Maybe you dont need to be as you say "crazy," but experienced!!

gentile

Ron Humphrey

12-11-2007, 12:48 AM

Gian P Gentile

12-11-2007, 12:51 AM

Tell us how you really feel:D

That is how I really feel since his words were aimed directly at me because i had one of the two articles that he refers to in the post "Peace, Love, and Coin?"

gentile

SteveMetz

12-11-2007, 12:54 AM

Oh please I hope you are not telling me that I can only handle one thing at a time and that I like my doctrine simple because unlike people like you who can multi-task, I can not. If that is what you are saying and the literal meaning of your words suggests that you are, you are way off base!!

This post drips with intellectual arrogance on your part.

Maybe you dont need to be as you say "crazy," but experienced!!

gentile

That's not what I said at all. I clearly did not express my point accurately.

I suggested that the process for developing strategy and theory is different than the process for developing operational and tactical doctrine. Because there is no other official strategy and theory, this doctrine tried to perform both functions. That created an inherent bifurcation in it.

People who are more comfortable with the bottom up process that was used to develop the operational sections of it are going to find those sections most satisfying. People who are more comfortable with the more conceptual process of developing strategy and theory are going to be more comfortable with the sections of the manual which do that.

So my point was no one is happy with every word (including the authors) because, as something that had to cover a huge amount of ground, the manual represents compromise and consensus building. It is a "sausage." Hence everyone doesn't like parts of it.

Ron Humphrey

12-11-2007, 01:19 AM

Tom Odom

12-11-2007, 01:37 AM

Peace, Love, COIN? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/peace-love-coin-1/)

Dave

Great work. Write more and more often.

Best

Tom

selil

12-11-2007, 02:12 AM

I would just like to state that "they took the academic’s path of first setting up their thesis, then citing only examples that supported it." said by Mr. Peters is not the "academic path" it is part and parcel the scientific method. The bedrock of which is built on the path of logic, reason and western thought. I guess refuting logic and syllogism along with the process of hypothesis and refutation is interesting but I fail to see how his thesis is supported in reality. Any well versed academic would know that an ad hominem attack on the academic (and therefore process) would be a logical fallacy.

Ron Humphrey

12-11-2007, 02:17 AM

selil

12-11-2007, 02:21 AM

:confused:

Mr. Peters is saying that the 'academic process' is invalid, and the academic process he states is actually the scientific method. Yet of all processes it is the only one that is legally recognized, it is the only one that is proven to give a valid output (agree or disagree with the result), and it is the primary method of ensuring a product that is not corrupted. Valid responses would be to go after the methods, but not after the process itself.

ETA: I actually think the process of the doctrine was more a (oracle of) Delphi study captured and their could be validity questions with that but they're not discussed.

Norfolk

12-11-2007, 03:07 AM

if a lot of times the major issue isn't so much anyone's unwillingness to accept given doctrine so much as it may be the major discomfort associated with our ability to visualize enacting / translating it.

Most of the time individuals lead with any given directive from which ever perspective they have an experience base in.

For example how is it that a commanders intent given equally to all subordinate commands may be followed in many different ways.

Doctrine coming from a much more mixed source may represent concern for many simply because our traditional way of seeing where it is in relation to where we're coming from may be rather new territory for both sides of the field.

As such no one is really sure what others will make of it

Sometimes doctrine takes some time to accept; elements within the US Army took some time to come to terms with AirLand Battle for a while in the 80's, and that was after some griping over DePuy's Active Defense introduced in the mid-70's. The whole Attrition - or Manoeuvre-Warfare thing was getting going back then in the English-speaking world, but at least that was a debate between two rival camps about the general fundamentals of Operations.

This time it's about a confusion of the general fundamentals of Operations writ large, and the specific fundamentals of COIN Operations. So I don't think that it's so much a case of resistance to doctrine as just getting lost in its minutiae.

In my experience, the problem with doctrine wasn't so much ignorance of it, as it was that thinking about the doctrine, indeed thinking at all, had pretty much gone out the door in practice, and very often the commander's intent was less the mission objective than the simple, unthinking acquiesence in following a rote tactical prescription.

Ron, you bring up a good point about the problem of not being able to visualize or conceptualize putting doctrine into practice. That derives from two related things: 1. the notion that Doctrine is what to think and do; and 2. that Doctrine is a replacement for the development and use of judgement. Ski was right: Doctrine is just a guide, to be more specific, a guide to learning about a given aspect of war; it should not be what we necessarily must think about that particular aspect of war or how we should react to it. It is a guide to educating oneself and developing one's judgement on a matter. It is self-defeating when it is used as a substitute for proper judgement.

And in the absence of the development and use of that judgment, you may end up in situations like we have now, where a combination of insufficient thinking about COIN before the fact, and judging prudently in the midst of the fact, the distinctions between a doctrine intended for specific operations (in this case COIN) and a doctrine intended for operations in general, can become muddled and confused. Even to the point of the lower-level doctrine partially displacing the higher-level doctrine within whose framework the former is supposed to operate. As to commander's intent, well, that will be understood by those who have developed good judgement, and perhaps not so well understood by those whose judgement may not be so.

As to Ralph Peters: I've been reading his stuff on and off for twenty years, and he has his good points, and not so good points. Twenty years ago he was saying that NATO was something of a spoiled child taking a free ride on the back of the US; to a considerable extent he had some valid points there. Now's he's taking aim at the current COIN situation. Whether he's landing on target or not, Peters is always firing for effect, to shake people out of their complacency - he's been perhaps the most persistent Socratic gadfly buzzing around the US Army for the last 20-25 years.

Perhaps the most important thing to bear in mind with Ralph Peters is not so much what's he's saying, as why he's saying it. And he's basically trying to warn the Army against its present trend of getting lost in the PC world which he sees in the COIN forest and losing sight of the Army's larger warfighting roles; in other words, he doesn't want to see it become a politically-correct peace-building organization, which is what he sees in the doctrine, but wants the Army to drop that kind of talk and go back to the kind of thinking expressed in FM 100-5 circa 1982 - warfighting. And that's what his article is really about, and why he can castigate FM 3-24 for its PC tones while praising Petraeus' own warfighting skill.

120mm

12-11-2007, 06:09 AM

I guess the problem I see with COIN is the political dimension. To win at COIN, you need to operate effectively across a bunch of non-traditionally military dimensions.

Unfortunately, this starts to approach, uncomfortably (for me) the "civil control of the military" line, where to achieve military mission accomplishment, you need "civilian" battlefield multipliers. And, what happens when military leaders seek control of the political aspect of war?

I think there is a slippery slope, here. The military shouldn't focus on what type of war, forsaking all others. They should be in the business of providing "flexible military options", but should also be in the business of saying "no" to inappropriate military missions.

Gian P Gentile

12-11-2007, 12:05 PM

...I think there is a slippery slope, here. The military shouldn't focus on what type of war, forsaking all others. They should be in the business of providing "flexible military options", but should also be in the business of saying "no" to inappropriate military missions.

Unfortunately since the American Army's defacto operational doctrine (FM 3-0) has become Coin (FM 3-24) we are not in the business as you say of providing flexibility in military options to our political masters. In fact the domination in the American army by the Coin Cabal with all of its seminars, how to panels for senior statesmen, appearances on high-vis TV shows, are creating in the minds of many influential Americans that hey, Coin might not be that hard after all and if we just get some competent units practicing correct Coin doctrine then we can win in any Coin fight. Hence lets go down this path many, many more times.

Too, our consummation in the American Army with Counterinsurgency has clouded our ability to read things in Iraq now as they really are. How often do you see statements by pundits and Iraq veterans that the Surge and its concomitant use of new Coin doctrine was the fundamental reason for the lowering of violence in Iraq? The truth of the matter is that the recent lowering of violence was due to a complex mix of causes.

Where is our consummation with Coin taking the American Army in the future?

gentile

Ski

12-11-2007, 12:40 PM

When was the last FM 3-0 published? I think it was June 2001.

Fix the culture and cut the gigantic levels of bureaucracy so manuals can get released just a little quicker than every six years (or longer in the case of FM 3-0) - especially since we've been fighting two wars for over 6 years - and you won't have to worry about FM 3-0 being sent to the ashcan of history by FM 3-24.

Nature abhors a vacuum.

SteveMetz

12-11-2007, 12:42 PM

Unfortunately since the American Army's defacto operational doctrine (FM 3-0) has become Coin (FM 3-24) we are not in the business as you say of providing flexibility in military options to our political masters. In fact the domination in the American army by the Coin Cabal with all of its seminars, how to panels for senior statesmen, appearances on high-vis TV shows, are creating in the minds of many influential Americans that hey, Coin might not be that hard after all and if we just get some competent units practicing correct Coin doctrine then we can win in any Coin fight. Hence lets go down this path many, many more times.

Too, our consummation in the American Army with Counterinsurgency has clouded our ability to read things in Iraq now as they really are. How often do you see statements by pundits and Iraq veterans that the Surge and its concomitant use of new Coin doctrine was the fundamental reason for the lowering of violence in Iraq? The truth of the matter is that the recent lowering of violence was due to a complex mix of causes.

Where is our consummation with Coin taking the American Army in the future?

gentile

Let me suggest another point--it's important to understand the degree to which the emphasis on COIN within the Army (and, to a lesser degree, the Marines) is because that is really going to be what it takes to make the United States more secure in the future, and how much is because the revival of COIN had added force structure and budget to the ground forces. Remember that in the late 90s and early 00s, the trend was toward greater reliance on precision, standoff methods. If not for September 11, I'm convinced the Army would have undergone a significant downsizing while the Air Force and the Navy would have grown. So, from an institutional perspective, the Army benefits from a COIN focus.

Ski

12-11-2007, 12:58 PM

Steve

I can confirm that the Army was going to lose a substantial chunk of it's force structure and budget pre-9/11. The Army was going to lose two divisions - down to 8 -and the ARNG was going to lose 4 Division HHC's and 8-12 Brigades (and they've lost 6 anyway - the only time in recorded history where combat power was deliberatley and voluntarily cut during wartime that I can find).

Sargent

12-12-2007, 01:10 AM

This “academic process” Peters cites is not the historian's method. Ok, maybe it’s the bad historian’s method. However, if you’re interested in doing quality work what you do is start with a question (or several) -- Why did X happen, and so forth. Then you get at the source material, primary sources and accounts as well as the secondary narratives of the event in question. Your analysis of that material according to the question you have posed will lead to your thesis, which ought to pass the "So what?" test. Then you just write it up.

This has been made painfully clear to me in my dissertation. Because I am an idiot, I chose a topic that, until the point at which I wrote my proposal, was wholly new to me. This meant I'd be working with material that was unfamiliar to me. However, in order to be allowed to write a dissertation, you have to write a proposal. That proposal must include the question and the thesis. So, because I was in uncharted territory, the question and thesis I came up with then have had to evolve significantly as I have completed more of my research. (Which means that the “just write it up” part becomes a wee bit more difficult. However, I think I’ve reached the point where I can terminate major reconstruction of the thesis -- and therefore the text. Hallelujah!)

If Ralph Peters wants to say that the writers of the doctrine used bad historical processes, then he can have at it. However, to describe “the academic’s path” as “first setting up their thesis, then citing only examples that supported it” is just this side of whacky.

Best,
Jill

Gian P Gentile

12-12-2007, 02:47 AM

...If Ralph Peters wants to say that the writers of the doctrine used bad historical processes, then he can have at it. However, to describe “the academic’s path” as “first setting up their thesis, then citing only examples that supported it” is just this side of whacky.

But Jill, Peters does point out the fact that FM 3-24 is hyper-reliant on two historical cases: the British in Malaya; and the French in Algeria specifically the writings of David Galula. In this regard his critique, I think, is valid. The manual turns A theory of Coin into a principle that has become law to the point of dogmatism. That is to say in any counterinsurgency operation the people must be the "center of gravity." Why does that, in theory and in practice, have to be so all of the time? When I attended the Coin Academy in Taji in December 2005 prior to assuming our battlespace we were told that very thing by the teachers of the course. When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy I was told that that is just the way it is.

I think one can envision a counterinsurgency fight where the people are not the center of gravity at all but the enemy force is. But because our Coin doctrine is so heavily focused on the Galula model it prescribes how we will understand any given Coin environment and then direct action accordingly in line with this principle; hence we become dogmatic and non-creative.

always good to be in touch with my old WP Seminarian friend.

no worries

gian

Ron Humphrey

12-12-2007, 04:43 AM

But Jill, Peters does point out the fact that FM 3-24 is hyper-reliant on two historical cases: the British in Malaya; and the French in Algeria specifically the writings of David Galula. In this regard his critique, I think, is valid. The manual turns A theory of Coin into a principle that has become law to the point of dogmatism. That is to say in any counterinsurgency operation the people must be the "center of gravity." Why does that, in theory and in practice, have to be so all of the time? When I attended the Coin Academy in Taji in December 2005 prior to assuming our battlespace we were told that very thing by the teachers of the course. When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy I was told that that is just the way it is.

I think one can envision a counterinsurgency fight where the people are not the center of gravity at all but the enemy force is. But because our Coin doctrine is so heavily focused on the Galula model it prescribes how we will understand any given Coin environment and then direct action accordingly in line with this principle; hence we become dogmatic and non-creative.

always good to be in touch with my old WP Seminarian friend.

no worries

gian

The problem with acceptance of people as the COG is something which one can become so easily sidetracked by the semantics of it and two I have never really understood.

If one is to look at the three main areas of interaction
-Tactical
-Operational
-Strategic

I think about tactical actions and how they involve movement or action in, around, with or against the populous.

At the Strategic level I think anyone has seen the damage which can be done by either strategic privates or one local with a camera, blog, or simply large family network.

Given that the Operational Level is generally in and out of both the other two Where are the People not the largest part of any long term COG.

I will agree that in any given situation or operation this may not be the case but I would think reasoning minds differentiate the when and who.

Please let me know what I'm missing in my thinking.
I am always eager to learn what I don't know

Granite_State

12-12-2007, 05:42 AM

Takes a bit of a shot at you here Steve, the way I read what you wrote was that you were talking solely about utility, not morality.

As delightful as it is to see anybody deflate Ralph Peters (although Peters has trumpeted his “kill them all” tough guy rhetoric for so long that he’s become a parody of himself), it’s disturbing that as astute an observer as Steve Metz has forsworn counterinsurgency and is pining away for tactics based on mass killings and genocide (… that the Roman method is more effective).

Van Creveld makes a strong case in his latest book, The Changing Face of War, that this is true where local governments are fighting local insurgencies (which also covers Peters’ case of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya. Even there, however, the British were eventually forced out).

When it comes to suppressing insurgencies that are fighting foreign occupiers, however, nothing has worked very well since about the middle of the 20th century. The Belgians probably hold the modern record for use of the Roman method, killing by some estimates 50% of the local population in the Congo, but were still driven out. The Soviets didn’t hesitate to use it, and where is their empire? We killed several million people in Southeast Asia. Gen Hermann Balck told Boyd that shifting the Schwerpunkt towards Leningrad would probably have worked, but in the end, the excellence of the German Army couldn’t compensate for the fanatical opposition generated by Hitler’s racial policies (van C notes that forces available to Germany for long-term occupation would have amounted to less than 1% of the population of the planned Nazi empire).

As Gen Sir Rupert Smith writes in The Utility of Force, if you’re going to use coercion as your C/I tool, you can never, ever let up. The moral and financial toll this extracts eventually saps the moral foundation — in a democracy, popular support — for continuing the war. OK, it’s true that if you can kill 100% of the inhabitants, the job is easier, but somewhere along the line we have seriously degenerated into fantasy.

But I have a bigger bone to pick. American strategic culture is not “a terrible impediment.” It is our best counterinsurgency tool, perhaps our only effective one.

http://dni2.wordpress.com/2007/12/10/ave-caesar/

Granite_State

12-12-2007, 05:48 AM

I have had the honor of spending a bit of time with Ralph over the years (hanging around Garmisch, for instance). I'm a huge fan. We agree on a lot but even when we disagree, I find him passionate, brilliant, and challenging. I just like people who are unabashedly what they are and make no bones about it. Heck, I like Cindy Lauper for that precise reason.

I'd like to agree with you, because at least Peters is unafraid to challenge the orthodox view, but I just don't see the brilliance. The piece of his that most stayed with me was the pie-in-the-sky one about reshaping all the borders of the Middle East, with a Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Mecca and Medina as a state, etc., an article that was a "creative destruction" neo-con's dream. But I've only read articles of his, mostly Parameters and opinion pieces. If you were going to recommend one of his books as being most worthwhile, which one would it be, his newest?

SteveMetz

12-12-2007, 11:21 AM

Takes a bit of a shot at you here Steve, the way I read what you wrote was that you were talking solely about utility, not morality.

http://dni2.wordpress.com/2007/12/10/ave-caesar/

Well, actually I wasn't pining. Just pointing out that it works. Full scale thermonuclear war would be an effective method of counterinsurgency as well. But I don't advocate it. What I was trying to say is that we select strategies based not simply on effectiveness (which Ralph and Ed Luttwak seemed inclined to do), but also on acceptability.

SteveMetz

12-12-2007, 11:24 AM

I'd like to agree with you, because at least Peters is unafraid to challenge the orthodox view, but I just don't see the brilliance. The piece of his that most stayed with me was the pie-in-the-sky one about reshaping all the borders of the Middle East, with a Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Mecca and Medina as a state, etc., an article that was a "creative destruction" neo-con's dream. But I've only read articles of his, mostly Parameters and opinion pieces. If you were going to recommend one of his books as being most worthwhile, which one would it be, his newest?

I'm currently reading the newest one but it is a collection of previously published pieces. I really like the Parameters articles. When I was on the editorial board for it, we'd get manuscripts with identifying information removed but I could identify one of Ralph's within 4 or 5 sentences.

I'm also a huge fan of his Owen Parry novels.

Rank amateur

12-12-2007, 11:35 PM

Again it goes back to the consequences and non-linearity that run rampant within war (they exist wherever there is complexity and interaction - but are perhaps at their highest in war due to the stakes in the outcome, and the degree of finality to which it is pursued).

I think the unpredictably and non linearity of war comes from the fact that warriors receive a tactical and strategic benefit from surprise. "All warfare is based upon deception." War won't go as planned, because the enemy will make sure that it won't go as planned. (And we'll make sure that their efforts don't go as planned.) Your political agenda is as likely to be ambushed as your troops.

Consider the view of the Vietnam War - we have an entry date and exit date that largely biases our view of that war. However, would the Vietnamese see it the same way? Would they see their rationale for commitment of military force as broader, and inclusive of the need to resist the Japanese, fight the French and then fight us? Would they also include their border wars with China?

If there's one thing I think our military needs to do better it's understanding why our opponents fight: not why we think they fight, what they believe to be the reasons for their actions. Your example is textbook. If we understood the Vietnamese point of view, we would've known that no matter what we said or did we'd be perceived as occupiers. We went to fight Communism. It turns out the best way to do that was letting the Vietnamese try it for a decade or two. The shoes I'm wearing now were made in Vietnam.

Where is our consummation with Coin taking the American Army in the future?

While I understand the problems caused by "fighting the last war," I really think that getting this one right is a higher priority than worrying about the next one.

When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy

Kilcullen explained that in a way I could understand. "Enemy centric" only works if you can kill them faster than they can recruit them. The enemy can ensure that doesn't happen by employing the tactic Monty Python calls "running away." I believe Killcullen referred to it as "the enemy controls their loss rate."

On the other hand, asymmetric tactics only work if the enemy can hide from our firepower. In the desert, the civilian population is the only place they can hide. Control the population, remove their hiding places, blast the $%#$ out of them.

And as Mr. Dilegge points out, if your beef is that you never get to kill the bad guys, you're misreading the doctrine. Once the population is controlled you can let er rip. If you can't control the population, you're inspecting every pile of #$%$ to see if it contains an IED.

shouldn't military experience be part of the "advanced degree leading to consulting the military" gig?

Personally, I think that the only requirement should be an Internet connection and a wife who doesn't care how much time you waste on line as long as you're not downloading porn.

Ken White

12-13-2007, 12:45 AM

. . .
While I understand the problems caused by "fighting the last war," I really think that getting this one right is a higher priority than worrying about the next one.

Consider the fact that this one will work out okay. More importantly, consider that during and after the last one (Desert Storm) we did NOT worry about the next one and that's one of several reasons why we are where we are with this one...

SteveMetz

12-13-2007, 01:02 AM

Consider the fact that this one will work out okay. More importantly, consider that during and after the last one (Desert Storm) we did NOT worry about the next one and that's one of several reasons why we are where we are with this one...

Ahhh, but this is the exact point of my book--after Desert Storm we spent a decade and untold amounts of money on "transforming" in order to throw Iraq out of Kuwait even better the next time.

It used to amaze me throughout the 1990s that EVERY war game I participated in (and there were a lot of them) had some scenario that entailed expelled a Soviet equipped, normally Muslim aggressor from a neighboring, oil producing state.

Ken White

12-13-2007, 01:09 AM

Norfolk

12-13-2007, 01:55 AM

Mostly because the Army would love to take RA's advice, finish this one and put it to bed and do little or nothing to think about the next one...

We have GOT to break that 'prepare for the last war' cycle...

Much agreed. Just when planners realize that "the next war" may be one fought on the dreaded Mainland of Asia (or at least directly adjacent to it), they may be less than enthusiastic to embrace it, and to seek "the next war" somewhere where it is perhaps less likely to occur. It would be all to easy to either revert back to a pre-2003 planning model (and retaining many of the asumptions that went with that), or to go the other way and embrace COIN (and related missions) to the detriment of planning and preparing for mainly (but not exclusively) conventional warfare.

It will be interesting to see what strategic course is set by the new Administration in Jan. 2009.

Ken White

12-13-2007, 02:13 AM

. . .
It will be interesting to see what strategic course is set by the new Administration in Jan. 2009.

I foresee a 1.74 (that's one point seven four) degree course correction. If that much.

We aren't a Parliamentary Guvmint; the new Administration will little affect the course of the Ship of State. We operate on autopilot and that's why I could care less who gets elected -- it'll make little to no difference. :mad:

I've watched this monster from the inside for almost fifty years, off and on. Lived through the changes afterr WW II, after Korea, after Viet Nam, after Desert Storm -- and I expect little difference after OIF (which in any event I suspect will outlast the next two or three Administrations in point of troops there though I expect the combat to taper down pretty steadily).

The Candidates talk a lot of trash, then they get elected and in November and December, get all the Classified briefings. Thus they generally spend January through June explaining why they've changed their minds about matters strategic... :D

That's why I say the Army and DoD have to do this; the bureaucracy has to shift.

Norfolk

12-13-2007, 02:49 AM

I foresee a 1.74 (that's one point seven four) degree course correction. If that much.

We aren't a Parliamentary Guvmint; the new Administration will little affect the course of the Ship of State. We operate on autopilot and that's why I could care less who gets elected -- it'll make little to no difference. :mad:

I've watched this monster from the inside for almost fifty years, off and on. Lived through the changes afterr WW II, after Korea, after Viet Nam, after Desert Storm -- and I expect little difference after OIF (which in any event I suspect will outlast the next two or three Administrations in point of troops there though I expect the combat to taper down pretty steadily).

You're a hard man, Ken.:D

Rank amateur

12-13-2007, 02:54 AM

Mostly because the Army would love to take RA's advice, finish this one and put it to bed and do little or nothing to think about the next one...

We have GOT to break that 'prepare for the last war' cycle...

A) One thing you never need to worry about is anyone taking my advice.

B) Isn't fighting this one by definition different from preparing for the last one?

slapout9

12-13-2007, 03:30 AM

I wrote this some time ago about how Police work relates to COIN operations. Which is how I tend to view everything in COIN operations. If you read all the great masters like Galula they always talk about Police operations. Try reading about this Police model and the concepts of COG and Saint Clausewitz Holy Trinity.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=4647&highlight=crime+triangle#post4647

Ken White

12-13-2007, 04:18 AM

. . .
B) Isn't fighting this one by definition different from preparing for the last one?

After the last one, we prepared to fight this one. That seemed to be fine -- for about a month. Then, because we had not thought it through and prepared for a war that was like the last one, we got caught with our shorts down when this one turned out to be different from that last one. :mad:

It then took us 18 month to figure out we were fighting the wrong war, another 18 months to figure out what we needed to do and then 18 more months to turn this big bureaucratic monster around -- so we are only now, four and a half years later, getting our act together. That is not good.

Fortunately, as wars go, this one is relatively low key and low violence. Had it been a big, bad one, we would have been in a world of trouble. We cannot predict what the next one will be like; we've got to be full spectrum capable and prepared for anything.

Those who think he next one (or few) will be a COIN effort may be right. They also may be wrong. Don't know about you but I've got a kid in there and I'd prefer better all round competence than a focus on just the last war...

Wasn't picking on you, BTW, you did say we should worry about this one and not the next (in so many words), I'm merely pointing out that the Army would love to do that, they certainly don't want to have to think too hard -- besides, change is such a drag... :rolleyes:

They'll try to sluff it if their feet aren't held to the fire. Whoops, that's unfair -- SOME will try that, most will work for the right thing; the problem is in a bureaucracy, inertia gets rewarded all to often... :(

Sargent

12-13-2007, 04:17 PM

But Jill, Peters does point out the fact that FM 3-24 is hyper-reliant on two historical cases: the British in Malaya; and the French in Algeria specifically the writings of David Galula. In this regard his critique, I think, is valid. The manual turns A theory of Coin into a principle that has become law to the point of dogmatism. That is to say in any counterinsurgency operation the people must be the "center of gravity." Why does that, in theory and in practice, have to be so all of the time? When I attended the Coin Academy in Taji in December 2005 prior to assuming our battlespace we were told that very thing by the teachers of the course. When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy I was told that that is just the way it is.

I think one can envision a counterinsurgency fight where the people are not the center of gravity at all but the enemy force is. But because our Coin doctrine is so heavily focused on the Galula model it prescribes how we will understand any given Coin environment and then direct action accordingly in line with this principle; hence we become dogmatic and non-creative.

I am not well-versed enough in the manual to spar with you on Peters' critique of the content. I simply bristle at his description of the "process." Unless there is some brilliant argument in support, on principle I don't see the wisdom of relying up only one school of thought on a subject. (Interestingly, academic review of the work would tend to reveal such weaknesses.)

Ultimately, the singular focus on "the people" is neo-Maoist. Call it that often enough and I bet it would lose it's cache.

Interestingly, I think they are right in identifying the people as the COG in Iraq -- for the American side in the Iraqi conflict, that is. If we can't keep the Iraqi people in support, the mission is untenable. And because we are a large foreign presence in Iraq, the already difficult situation of having simultaneously to develop it as a strength and defend it as a weakness is compounded by the normal friction between locals and foreign troops. Furthermore, the people in Iraq are key to the ultimate American policy of establishing a government there that is relatively compliant to American needs.

This does not even consider the strategic implications of the American people and the necessity of their support as part of that COG in its larger sense. Nor does it consider how American policy put the effort half a bubble off plumb from the get go by alienating large segments of the international people with the manner in which the operation kicked off in '03.

Considering all three levels of "the people" as they relate to the situation in Iraq, I'm not certain whether American strategic objectives are served with an OPTEMPO driven by an aggressive effort to get the bad guys. The collateral damage issues alone argue against it.

On a lighter note, will you be working the Seminar this year? I get a little misty-eyed when I think of my time there. It really is like Disneyworld for military history.

Cheers,
Jill

Gian P Gentile

12-13-2007, 06:00 PM

Jill:

I will be involved in it; but not the day-to-day running of it like when you were here. Yeah, that was a great experience; I especially liked the staff ride to Saratoga when we made Simon Frasier's line "Oh Fatal Ambition" as our motto. That was my favorite tee-shirt too until my son absconded with it.

thanks for your thoughts.

gian

Eden

12-13-2007, 08:53 PM

It's hard to disagree that we should train for the next war, not the last, but I have very little faith that we (and by that I mean TRADOC) will be able to divine just where and when we will fight the next war. Maybe I just traveled in the wrong crowd, but I don't remember anybody in 2000 suggesting it was time to start training for counterinsurgency in Iraq. In fact, do a little thought experiment.

Starting in 1900, imagine how likely it was that we would properly envision the next war, or set of wars, as we planned out the next two decades of training for the Army.

1900 - Next US War after the recent unpleasentness in the Philippines will be a major conventional war on the continent of Europe.
1920 - Next US War will be a virtual repeat of the recent major conventional war, with the Pacific thrown in for good measure. Oh, and the Army will need to become expert at amphibious operations.
1940 - OK, this one is an exception - or is it? Who would have forseen after WWII that our next war would be a limited one on the Asian continent?
1960 - 500,000 men need to be trained on semi-conventional counterinsurgent warfare.
1980 - Our next opponents will be the Sov...oh, several insignificant Latin American countries.
1990 - Coming up, we get a chance to employ all those wonderful tanks after all!

"Prepare for the next war, not the last" is one of those true but useless aphorisms. Unless our prognostication skills radically improve, preparing for the last war will be just as useful as preparing for what we imagine the next might look like.

By the way, I have "major conventional war in Europe" in the office pool.

selil

12-13-2007, 09:26 PM

By the way, I have "major conventional war in Europe" in the office pool.

I have sino russian conflict with whimsical money on russian canadian

Norfolk

12-13-2007, 09:29 PM

I have sino russian conflict with whimsical money on russian canadian

They're itching for a re-match of '72.:D

Ken White

12-13-2007, 09:42 PM

It's hard to disagree that we should train for the next war, not the last, but I have very little faith that we (and by that I mean TRADOC) will be able to divine just where and when we will fight the next war...
That's the point -- we cannot, therefor we have to be prepared to operate in all spectrums. If there is excessive concentrarion on the last, then something will generally be omitted that is applicable to the next one as I'll show below.

...Maybe I just traveled in the wrong crowd, but I don't remember anybody in 2000 suggesting it was time to start training for counterinsurgency in Iraq...

The issue is not what was done in 2000. The issue is that the Army deliberately downplayed and tried to ignore COIN and nationbuilding after Viet Nam because they concentrated on THAT war and did not want to do that again.
In fact, do a little thought experiment. Starting in 1900, imagine how likely it was that we would properly envision the next war, or set of wars, as we planned out the next two decades of training for the Army.

Your list in italics

1900 - Next US War after the recent unpleasentness in the Philippines will be a major conventional war on the continent of Europe.

Exactly. And the Army which had for years been training at distributed operations and had only one division levle exercise took excessive casualties in France due to that lack of focus on mass.

1920 - Next US War will be a virtual repeat of the recent major conventional war, with the Pacific thrown in for good measure. Oh, and the Army will need to become expert at amphibious operations.

Actually, it was the Marine Corps who foresaw the phib problem and the Army's concentration on WW I tactics and techniques caused a lot of excess casualties in Norht Africa and in Sicily. an Army that had trained for the static warfare of WW I found itslef fighting a mobile, fasst paced war and it did not do that well. Armies who don't do things well always suffer excessive casualties.

1940 - OK, this one is an exception - or is it? Who would have forseen after WWII that our next war would be a limited one on the Asian continent?

No one and that again is the point...

1960 - 500,000 men need to be trained on semi-conventional counterinsurgent warfare.

Yet an Army trained for your previous item as well as the next item went to SE Asia and tried to fight a land war in Europe while stuck in Rice paddies...

1980 - Our next opponents will be the Sov...oh, several insignificant Latin American countries.

Yes on the Soviets but being in the Army then, I recall absolutely no concern with Latin America other than for a few SF types.

1990 - Coming up, we get a chance to employ all those wonderful tanks after all!

Yes, we did -- and got lulled into thinking the next one would be similar. It was not...

"Prepare for the next war, not the last" is one of those true but useless aphorisms. Unless our prognostication skills radically improve, preparing for the last war will be just as useful as preparing for what we imagine the next might look like.

Partly correct -- the real requirement is to prepare to fight a war; that's what Armies get paid for. Preparing for the next war is rarely possible because one rarely knows where and what it will be. Being fully prepared to fight the next war, whatever and where ever it is, is an entirely different thing -- and is always going to be more promising than preparing to fight a repeat of the last.

By the way, I have "major conventional war in Europe" in the office pool.

If that's a pool on the next, I expect you'll lose... :wry:

Sargent

12-14-2007, 01:19 AM

Maybe I just traveled in the wrong crowd, but I don't remember anybody in 2000 suggesting it was time to start training for counterinsurgency in Iraq.

I think the 1990s were all about how to contend with failed states, irregular warfare, insurgencies, and so forth. Van Creveld's On Future War suggested that such conflict as we face in Iraq would be the norm -- ironically, by arguing that the conflict we faced against Iraq in 1990/1 was "the last scream of the American eagle." Certainly Mogadishu was a prelude to Fallujah. Because of everything that was going on, I and a few others tried to put together a course on American experiences in small wars in m final semester at SAIS (1995) -- the bureaucracy couldn't handle it, so we did it as an ad hoc brown bag.

I seem to recall that the military was not entirely keen to divert their attention from the primary mission of preparing for conventional war to pay much attention to this end of the conflict spectrum.

Fast forward to 2003, and I would submit that Euro experience in the various missions of the 90s was a basis for their reticence re taking action in Iraq -- they knew the problems of trying to simply take care of a broken Humpty, let alone trying to put him back together again.

Best,
Jill

Eden

12-14-2007, 01:50 PM

Ken White

12-14-2007, 05:31 PM

Ken,

I think we both agree that the institutional army, for the past one hundred years at least, has been pretty abysmal at predicting the nature, demands, and location of our next war. While there have always been voices in the wilderness, with few exceptions our forces have rarely matched the mission when the balloon went up. Even the Gulf War, where we had the right type of Army, was more serendipity than strategic foresight.

I'd expand that to say most all Armies. There are a couple of exceptions but they're rare indeed.

Where we disagree is on what to do about it. You say - I think - that we have to be fully prepared to fight across the spectrum of conflict, so that whatever contingency arises, we will be ready. I say that is impossible.

Difficult but far from impossible. We were very near that state in the late 50s-early 60s; then came McNamara and the Brothers Kennedy...

My own thinking on the subject is that:

1. The reason why we have the luxury of fighting small wars is that no one can challenge us in a big one. The foundation stone of our security is not success in Small Wars but unrivaled capacity for Big Wars.

Absolutely.

2. The stakes in the present crop of and future potential Small Wars are low. I'm sorry, I know a lot of the avid readers of this blog don't want to hear it, but defeat in, say, Iraq, while discomfiting and humiliating, would not have a huge effect on our national security.

Agreed on the last item, on the first, possibly but thats an unknown unknown...

With a serving son, I've got a vested interest in no repetition of the Army screwups in Iraq and Afghanistan; those he had to deal with in both theaters were broadly unnecessary. While the errors made were understandable, they stemmed from an attitude that essentially mirrors yours; "we do big wars." That attitude did not do the Army, the Nation or anyone involved any favors. Aside from which with a bunch of years in or near the green machine it was an embarassment to me, a microscopic concern. It embarassed the Army (or should have). It was flat unnecessary.

It took us seven years to stop fighting a big war in Viet Nam before we got smart. We're getting better, this time it only took 18 months -- I contend that had the theater been more volatile, we would not have had that ime.

We're on the way to fixing that, the fear that we will go overboard is real and that needs to be resisted. We do not need to go down the COIN only route, that would be far worse than going down the big war only route and I suspect we'd agree on that.

My contention is that we are more than capable of doing the full spectrum and that it is not nearly as difficult as you seem to think. It is also that if we fail to do that, we are not taking care of the Troops -- nor are we providing the nation the capabilities that may be required.

3. Preparing an army to fight both major conventional battles and to fight wars requiring distributed, small unit operations, is not possible, no matter how much money you throw at it. There simply isn't enough time. This stuff is hard, on both ends of the spectrum.

Quite strongly disagree. I've done both and so have literally millions of others. It ain't that hard...

Do you mean preparing an Army -- or preparing a unit?

Money is not the main issue, innovative thinking (anathema to today's bureaucracy), trust (ditto) and freedom to fail in training (ditto again) are the keys to it. Time is always an issue and training distractors are rampant but with a little will, they can be ameliorated.

4. Since losing Big Wars is much more dangerous, and since a larger percentage of skills learned in preparing for conventional wars are transferrable to Small Wars than vice versa, focusing on conventional warfare seems to have the biggest payoff.

Good bureaucratic and metric based answer... :D

Who in the Army focuses on what is the issue...

So, the objective should be to maintain your conventional warfighting skills and keep your powder dry. Human nature and bureaucracies being what they are, this usually means your training program looks like the last war. But this is usually a closer match with the future than our prognostications have ever been.

Agree on the prognosticators, agree on human nature and bureaucracies -- strongly disagree on the prescription.

That's safe and easy but looking at the world scene, likely to cause undue casualties (of all types to all side and to civilians) early on before the force adapts (see: Korea, Viet Nam, Iraq). Full spectrum is only in the too hard box if you assume every unit would be so qualified. That is difficult enough to approach impossibility and would be inordinately resource consumptive.

Having the Army trained and capable of being a full spectrum force by providing appropriately trained and equipped units and full spectrum doctrine and training capability is a very different thing...

Steve Blair

12-14-2007, 06:20 PM

4. Since losing Big Wars is much more dangerous, and since a larger percentage of skills learned in preparing for conventional wars are transferrable to Small Wars than vice versa, focusing on conventional warfare seems to have the biggest payoff.

This sounds suspiciously like the Army's position right before major units were committed to Vietnam.

Gotta agree with Ken in that it's perfectly possible to have a force with properly trained and equipped units that is capable of full-spectrum operations. The problem is that such a force goes against the Army's entire institutional history. That and the simple fact is that low- to mid-level intensity operations are much more likely than the major war that the Army has traditionally trained to fight. What is (IMO) causing the culture shock is that prior to the end of the Cold War the Army was often able to avoid the smaller commitments...which were taken on by the Marines. This forced them to look seriously at full-spectrum operations (and they've been doing them in one shape or form since before World War I).

This isn't to say that the Army as an institution isn't capable of them: they've demonstrated this capability many times throughout our history. It's that as an institution they don't LIKE to do them. Large force-on-force combat has been preferred since the Revolution (if not before)...no matter what the actual conflict potential happened to be.

We tried centering our national defense on only major conflict at least once: Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation. It didn't work too well. Limiting your options to only a handful of preferred cases almost never does.

Ron Humphrey

12-14-2007, 07:05 PM

I may have missed something because these threads get really long, and really deep , really quick ,but

Isn't the AF supposed to be that major multiplier which turns general boots on the ground, and mech infantry into major conflict fighting assets quickly by diminishing the opponents overt capabilities.

Then you throw in the navy with everything from coms, to marines, to missiles
add a BIG sprinkling of big tanks and there you go full spectrum.

I realize this is a vast oversimplification but I am sometimes confused by how often I hear the term Full Spectrum Ops yet see or hear little reference to those other forces in that picture.

Tom Odom

12-14-2007, 07:38 PM

Ron

Full Spectrum Ops is an Army term designed to meld all levels and all means of combat into a understandable framework. Differences with past efforts is the idea that various levels/types of warfare are occurring at the same time.

Combined arms is again ground forces centric but includes fires and that means fires by all means includiing aerial fires.

Joint warfare keys on the combination of multi-service capabilities in war. Combined warfare extends that idea to multi-national. I still here lots of guys talking combined when they really mean joint and vice versa.

Best

Tom

Norfolk

12-14-2007, 08:13 PM

In order to achieve and maintain a Full-Spectrum Operations capability, how does the US Army subsequently structure and apportion its forces (once - and if - Iraq is more or less reduced to a much more modest deployment)? Does it task, for example, XVIII Airborne Corps with most of the LIC and COIN missions, along with the requisite equipment and training for those roles? Would III Corps eschew LIC and COIN missions entirely and focus training and equipment on MIC and HIC? How would I Corps fit into this; after (presumably) focussing mainly on MIC, where would its swing capability go to - LIC and COIN, or HIC? Given this example, if the Army did go such a route in the future, how capable of fighting a major or even a general war might it really be?

Tom Odom

12-14-2007, 08:57 PM

Norfolk,

Look at FM 3-0 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/index.html) for the discussion of Full Spectrum Operations (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch1.htm#par5)

Once you read that section, you will see that performing full spectrum operations is very much METT dependent. Big surprise, I know. :wry:

Best

Tom

Ken White

12-14-2007, 09:10 PM

... Given this example, if the Army did go such a route in the future, how capable of fighting a major or even a general war might it really be?

the late 50s. The XVII Abn Corps was training on about an 80 / 20 ratio of LIC / HIC. The III Corps was purely heavy (and reinforcing for V and VII) a couple of loose Infantry Divs were not assigned to either stateside corps and had a swing role.

The training regimen for XVIII Corps included cultural and language training (101st f/Asia, backup to Korea) and the 82d for South America and Africa (backup to Europe).

Fast forward to 2000. There was little real difference other than fewer Divisions (and the ones that were gone were from Europe) and the 101st was Airmobile and not parachute. It trained pretty much full spectrum with an emphasis on HIC. The 10th Mtn guys did the same as did the 82d who also did airfield seizure as a backup to the Ranger Regt who then had that mission as primary. The LIC mission for XVIII Corps was, shortsightedly, gone.

Without going into an overlong dissertation, the answer to your question IMO is it would not adversely impact the HIC capability at all; that's nowadays a heavy div chore (unless we get into a war in urban Europe which is an interesting if unlikely scenario for many reasons).

As I've said before, I spent 45 years training for or helping train for a land war in Europe. Never been to Europe but I sure have eaten a lot rice... :D

Eden

12-14-2007, 09:22 PM

Guys,

When you say that it is possible for units to be trained for full-spectrum operations, you are saying that you can produce units trained to do all things and do all things well. In my experience that is not possible. Units can only become proficient at a certain number of tasks in the real world and those skills are highly perishable. I took over as the S3 of a maneuver battalion just as it returned from six-months guarding Haitians at Guantanamo Bay. The unit was incapable of operating above the platoon level, and didn't recover fully for 18 months. Fighting in Small Wars saps your skills at fighting in Big Wars - just ask any artillery battalion commander or air defender coming back from Iraq or Afghanistan.
The higher you go the worse the problems. Brigades and above need to train together to be proficient; they don't do that when preparing for Small Wars. Oh, they may all go to the JRTC at the same time, but they are not practicing operating together, just operating in the same general area.
Now, you can have an army where half of the units are trained and equipped for the low end of the spectrum, and half are trained and equipped for the high end. This has its own problem set, but I will admit it is possible and may even be desirable - I remain an agnostic on that issue.

Ken White

12-14-2007, 09:49 PM

Guys,
When you say that it is possible for units to be trained for full-spectrum operations, you are saying that you can produce units trained to do all things and do all things well. In my experience that is not possible.

I generally agree with that but suggest that these kids today are capable of doing a lot more than they're asked to do by an anachronistic training regimen (which is admittedly improving). I'd also suggest they are, generally, several orders of magnitude ahead of my day and a couple ahead of the early to mid 90s. A lot of the post Viet Nam deadwood departed in the 1999-2002 period.

However, I've been very careful to emphasize we need a full spectrum Army, not full spectrum units (though there will be very few units that have to do that -- and can; they've done it before).

The higher you go the worse the problems. Brigades and above need to train together to be proficient; they don't do that when preparing for Small Wars. Oh, they may all go to the JRTC at the same time, but they are not practicing operating together, just operating in the same general area.

Agreed. :cool:

Now, you can have an army where half of the units are trained and equipped for the low end of the spectrum, and half are trained and equipped for the high end. This has its own problem set, but I will admit it is possible and may even be desirable - I remain an agnostic on that issue.

Cool. However, I think you'll find that we're headed for a low end, a high end and a swing center. I also think you'll find that it works... ;)

Norfolk

12-15-2007, 12:19 AM

Hmmph...METT-C (I'm like Ken, I still haven't adapted to the last "T" yet - besides, my old Ranger Handbook was the '84 version, and only this year did I dispose of it in favour of the '01 and '06 versions). But I am concerned about Units and Formations having the time and resources for training for whatever roles they are tasked with. I suspect that the best, practical way to ensure that is to dedicate entire formations to primarily one level of warfare, with a modest leavening of the other two included to round things out. I can understand about determining Formations roles by the anticipated METT-C of the areas that their superior Regional Commands have responsibility for, but you shouldn't have to pick your Formations apart in order to assemble something to deal with a situation that ignores the anticipated METT-C of each Regional command. Like V Corps pulling COIN Ops with Heavy Divs (and SBCTs' and Abn/AirAslt/Light Divs/Bgds) in Iraq. You do what you gotta do, with what ya got, but...

In the 90's, the Canadian Army went for over a decade with no Formation-level training at all (they've tried to restore it in the past few years), and no Unit-level training either for nearly a decade. Company/Squadron/Battery-level was it, because we were bogged down in Stability Ops in the Balkans, Africa, and Haiti. And I don't need to go any further into those because a lot of the people on this board 'bin there and did that. It was incredibly destructive to morale, discipline, and training. I'm definitely with Eden on this.

Ken White

12-15-2007, 02:59 AM

. . .
In the 90's, the Canadian Army went for over a decade with no Formation-level training at all (they've tried to restore it in the past few years), and no Unit-level training either for nearly a decade. Company/Squadron/Battery-level was it, because we were bogged down in Stability Ops in the Balkans, Africa, and Haiti. And I don't need to go any further into those because a lot of the people on this board 'bin there and did that. It was incredibly destructive to morale, discipline, and training. I'm definitely with Eden on this.

You didn't have the gross strength to have people train for three specific portions of the spectrum and present a credible force in any one the three at a given time. We are fortunate enough to do so.

Ron Humphrey

12-15-2007, 03:25 AM

You didn't have the gross strength to have people train for three specific portions of the spectrum and present a credible force in any one the three at a given time. We are fortunate enough to do so.

as we don't lose the battle to internal territorial forces which always seem to contribute to the success or failure of anything attempted :o

Penta

12-15-2007, 03:56 AM

A thought: While many of the military skills are perhaps focused on one end of the spectrum of warfare, there's a lot of the LIC/COIN skillset that would only be helpful in MIC/HIC situations.

Example: Language training. Cultural awareness training. Somehow, I think it'd only help combined operations (at any level of conflict) if we could get to the point where most of the officer corps can at least speak one language besides English fluently.

Jedburgh

06-17-2008, 01:28 PM

Canadian Army Journal, Spring 08: Manoeuvre Warfare Theory and Counterinsurgency Doctrine (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_1/CAJ_vol11.1_05_e.pdf)

....The key to manoeuvre warfare, as expressed by proponents like William Lind and Robert Leonhard, was the defeat of the enemy by attacking his criticalvulnerability rather than going toe-to-toe with his strength. By the mid 1990s, most Western armies had converted to this school of thought, at least in their doctrine manuals, and were teaching their young officers the principles and techniques of this ‘new’ form of warfare. However, since only recently adopting this new theory, Western armies are faced with insurgencies rather than mid to high-intensity wars. Does this mean that manoeuvre warfare theory is no longer valid or applicable? This essay will attempt to answer this question by first defining manoeuvre warfare theory and COIN theory as they exist today, and then determining if the former is in any way applicable to the latter. The intent is to examine whether the campaigns of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) do necessitate starting from scratch with regards to doctrine.....