Targeting

[slapout9]

Thought I might start a thread on targeting since it is so critical. To start here is an EBO planning sheet pretty interesting and I don't know how many have this.



http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/ideas_concepts/ebo_planning_template.xls

It opens as a spread sheet and are controlled from the bottom, 3 sheets total.

[Norfolk]

Thought I might start a thread on targeting since it is so critical. To start here is an EBO planning sheet pretty interesting and I don't know how many have this.

http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/ideas_concepts/ebo_planning_template.xls

It opens as a spread sheet and are controlled from the bottom, 3 sheets total.

Thanks slap!:) I've skimmed 'er and saved 'er - interesting the Marine doctrinal ref's. Gotta say...this looks pretty comprehensive.

[slapout9]

Hi Norfolk, IMO it works even better if you use the Army concept of CARVER for evaluating targets.

[Stan]

Hey Slap !
Interesting, they list Humanitarian Demining under Health and Basic Services. Under NATO and the EU, we normally fall under Security.

Thanks for the chart ! Regards, Stan




Thought I might start a thread on targeting since it is so critical. To start here is an EBO planning sheet pretty interesting and I don't know how many have this.



http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/ideas_concepts/ebo_planning_template.xls

It opens as a spread sheet and are controlled from the bottom, 3 sheets total.

[slapout9]

Here is another point of view with a Navy influence.



http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/freniere.html

[William F. Owen]

The following may usefully inform this discussion

http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo89.en.pdf

Personally I think EBO is the worst type of rubbish, so I am very predisposed to Ron Tira's thinking.

[slapout9]

I think it was tequila that found this paper a while back and posted it for the SWC. I read it back then and thought it was an excellent paper. Particularly the name Stand Off Firepower Operations because that is what EBO has become as opposed to what it was originally trying to be. The paper is well worth the read.

[Tom Odom]

The following may usefully inform this discussion

http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo89.en.pdf

Personally I think EBO is the worst type of rubbish, so I am very predisposed to Ron Tira's thinking.

William

that depends on the goal and the level of implementation. We have used effects based thinking here for the past 5 years as a way of synchronizing lethal and non-lethal means in the full spectrum fight. thet effects process is buit into the targeting cycle as part of concurrent operations and future planning. It works.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

William

that depends on the goal and the level of implementation. We have used effects based thinking here for the past 5 years as a way of synchronizing lethal and non-lethal means in the full spectrum fight. thet effects process is buit into the targeting cycle as part of concurrent operations and future planning. It works.

Tom

OK, I'm listening. Examples? How would the IDF have employed the techniques you describe against the Hezbollah?

...and targeting cycle? Just point me at the doctrine papers.

[Tom Odom]

If you have access you may see relevant studies at the CALL gateway. That is the best I can offer.

IDF operations against Hizballah had a host of problems, not all of which were due to fixation on effects based operations as applied through aerial means.

Many of the problems on the ground were due to poor warfighting skills--some say due to degradation brought about by fixation on operations on the West Bank and Gaza. That may be partially the case; some of the problems sounded very much like what I saw in southern Lebanon in 1987 and harken back to similar issues dating back to the 56, 67, and 73 Wars.

best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Is this the targeting cycle?

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-56_1/3-56_1ch4.htm

Isn't that pure EBO? How is effects based thinking different from EBO? Really, I'm here to learn.

[slapout9]

Wilf, not at all. Targeting is just one step in the EBO process, however it is the one that people usually jump to. This leads to the targeting only mentality which is where you get the everything is a target so let's just blow it up type thinking (Your IDF Paper Example) which can be a disaster. There is a paper from Hurricane Katrina I am goinng to post (when I can find it) about how EBO was used in the Military response to Hurricane Katrina. Later Slap

[Norfolk]

I think it was tequila that found this paper a while back and posted it for the SWC. I read it back then and thought it was an excellent paper. Particularly the name Stand Off Firepower Operations because that is what EBO has become as opposed to what it was originally trying to be. The paper is well worth the read.

With my admittedly very limited grasp of Aerial Warfare in general and Campaign design and planning in particular, I nevertheless see great merit in EBO as a whole, applied judiciously. Designing Aerial Bombardment Campaigns around Systems of directly-related targets rather than merely indirectly- or unrelated individual targets is at least as effective, and much more efficient, than the old way of doing things - where applicable. Systems Targeting - amongst other things - in EBO is definitely an improvement.

[slapout9]

Joint Task Force Katrina by Lt. Gen. Honore' this is largely about command and control planning (big part of EBO) but near the back of the article you will see an EBO planning sheet that was used for part of the operation. They were able to predict very accurately what the situation would be on the ground so when General Honore' finally received the authority to act his response was very good.

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/Publications/Campaigning_Journal_Spring_2006.pdf

[slapout9]

Here is another good article on the adaption of Warden's rings for use in Targeting in an unconventional environment.


http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/grubbs1.pdf

[Norfolk]

Here is another good article on the adaption of Warden's rings for use in Targeting in an unconventional environment.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/grubbs1.pdf

slap, at this rate practically my entire understanding of Aerial Campaigning will have come through reading Billy Mitchell, John Warden, and you and the pieces you put links up to.:)

[slapout9]

Sir, I have not yet begun to fight. :) didn't some navy guy say that? I haven't even gotten to SBW(Slapout Based Warfare) those 4GW guys ain't gonna know what hit em:eek:

[slapout9]

Starting to get into the good stuff here. Special Forces version of Targeting CARVER.


http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_1.pdf

[William F. Owen]

Well I see EBO has yet again changed, and become something else.

All EBO documents I read, I just cross out the words "Effects based", and see if it still makes sense.

Hurricane Katrina? Who was the enemy, the will of which, had to be broken. Who had to be defeated?

I attended a UK EBO workshop three years ago, and eventually got one senior officer to admit, that the logical extension of his premise was that he could legitimately mislead allied forces, if it created the effects he wanted.

That being the case, might someone progress this by giving me the current definition of EBO, or "effects based thinking," or "effects based planning."

[Ron Humphrey]

Well I see EBO has yet again changed, and become something else.

All EBO documents I read, I just cross out the words "Effects based", and see if it still makes sense.

Hurricane Katrina? Who was the enemy, the will of which, had to be broken. Who had to be defeated?

I attended a UK EBO workshop three years ago, and eventually got one senior officer to admit, that the logical extension of his premise was that he could legitimately mislead allied forces, if it created the effects he wanted.

That being the case, might someone progress this by giving me the current definition of EBO, or "effects based thinking," or "effects based planning."

I'm not sure what to point out other than those in the dome who had to be encouraged to get out the hard way after assaulting and causing pain and suffering to others.

Having been there though I can tell you that there were a lot of effects which would have helped to move things along more smoothly and successfully.

How do you get parish presidents, and above to get off their I own this mentality long enough to address areas where only limited time to try clearing (searching) had been available so that civilian and military orgs could get to addressing them.

How do you get effective cooperation between various orgs ,local,regional,state, and federal when at every level there were entities working on separate agendas rather than one common picture, goal, intent (as it were)

The quickest effects based decision I saw shortly after getting there was the people at dominoe's pizza getting generators, pizza stuff and bottled water thereby openng their doors within three to four days after getting hit.

We got tired of pizza but they made a killing financially. :D

[William F. Owen]

How do you get effective cooperation between various orgs ,local,regional,state, and federal when at every level there were entities working on separate agendas rather than one common picture, goal, intent (as it were)

The quickest effects based decision I saw shortly after getting there was the people at dominoe's pizza getting generators, pizza stuff and bottled water thereby openng their doors within three to four days after getting hit.


So how is any of that a product of "effects based thinking"?

This is leadership and common sense. That is what the military should create. Men who can impose their will on others in dangerous and difficult circumstances, to get them to do things they don't want to do or don't know how to.

I always come back to the same thing. How is anything "effects based" different from anything we ever did that worked? How does calling it effects based, make it better?

[Ron Humphrey]

So how is any of that a product of "effects based thinking"?

This is leadership and common sense. That is what the military should create. Men who can impose their will on others in dangerous and difficult circumstances, to get them to do things they don't want to do or don't know how to.

I always come back to the same thing. How is anything "effects based" different from anything we ever did that worked? How does calling it effects based, make it better?

is to create a standardized system which can be used as a sort of quick reference guide for those of us to whom common sense might not be such a common thing:o

[William F. Owen]

is to create a standardized system which can be used as a sort of quick reference guide for those of us to whom common sense might not be such a common thing:o

Quick reference guide? So EBP and EBT are infact Aide Memoir Formats in the same way as the Five Paragraph orders format is.

Situation, Mission, Execution, Command/Control and Administration. ( SMECA )

IMO, Five Paragraph orders format is good for almost anything, and where even the OODA loop has its home.

[slapout9]

Wilf, here is a little deeper back round on the beginnings of what became known as EBO.

1-I guess this is pretty much the paper that started it all. "The Enemy As A System" by Col. John Warden
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/spr95_files/warden.htm


2-From that original concept of "Systems Warfare" it went to this, which is why EBO has long been associated with Air Power only, which is was never meant to be.
http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, here is a little deeper back round on the beginnings of what became known as EBO.

1-I guess this is pretty much the paper that started it all. "The Enemy As A System" by Col. John Warden
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/spr95_files/warden.htm


2-From that original concept of "Systems Warfare" it went to this, which is why EBO has long been associated with Air Power only, which is was never meant to be.
http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf

Yes, The Warden paper I know well and reject it utterly, for the same reason Tira and whole bunch of other folks do.

Quote: In today's world, strategic entities, be they an industrial state or a guerrilla organization, are heavily dependent on physical means. If the physical side of the equation can be driven close to zero, the best morale in the world is not going to produce a high number on the outcome side of the equation. Looking at this equation, we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable. Conversely, the morale side, the human side, is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other. Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side.

This assumes breaking stuff is decisive. It is not. We have vast amounts of evidence against this.

This is not attacking the will and cohesion of the enemy nor is it anything to do with what many touted as EBO - so how come this is always cited as the Rosetta Stone of EBO? - when Warden is advocating something that is purely physical destruction. Any relevance to COIN?

[Norfolk]

Wilf, here is a little deeper back round on the beginnings of what became known as EBO.

1-I guess this is pretty much the paper that started it all. "The Enemy As A System" by Col. John Warden
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/spr95_files/warden.htm


2-From that original concept of "Systems Warfare" it went to this, which is why EBO has long been associated with Air Power only, which is was never meant to be.
http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf

slap, when I've read enough of your postings, can I claim that as credit towards an MMAS at Maxwell (and if I read your SBW stuff when you've finished it, can I claim that as sufficient for the entire MMAS, or even a PhD?):D

[slapout9]

Hi Norfolk, sure go ahead. In fact if you applied to Maxwell for a degree in SBW it would probably fly:) right through. They wouldn't have a clue what you were talking about but it sounds good. As for my postings the best is yet to come, just laying the ground work so to speak.

Hi Wilf, I am at work getting ready for our Xmas party so I don't have time to respond now, but I will later. You ask good questions. Oh by the way haven't you heard EBO is now called EBA the Effects Based Approach:confused: Later

[slapout9]

Yes, The Warden paper I know well and reject it utterly, for the same reason Tira and whole bunch of other folks do.

Quote: In today's world, strategic entities, be they an industrial state or a guerrilla organization, are heavily dependent on physical means. If the physical side of the equation can be driven close to zero, the best morale in the world is not going to produce a high number on the outcome side of the equation. Looking at this equation, we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable. Conversely, the morale side, the human side, is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other. Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side.

This assumes breaking stuff is decisive. It is not. We have vast amounts of evidence against this.

This is not attacking the will and cohesion of the enemy nor is it anything to do with what many touted as EBO - so how come this is always cited as the Rosetta Stone of EBO? - when Warden is advocating something that is purely physical destruction. Any relevance to COIN?



Hi Wilf, You just ask the question of all questions. That is one reason I called this thread Targeting instead of EBO. The reason in my opinion is that almost all EBO documents somehow reference the 5 rings Targeting model at least the older ones do. The other reason is that now General Deptula used to work for Warden as a Major as part of the Checkmate Team. Warden left the Air Force and Deptula is still in and was a big push behind what came to be known as EBO hence the posting the Article by him.


Warden at the time had know real title for his theories. He played with several, some of which were Parallel-Warefare and Hyper-Warfare, none of which he kept, but his primary purpose was to develop a process, a systematic way of thinking about how to develop a war winning Strategy. A process that could be taught and repeated as a Campaign Planning Model.

Here is a link to a short article that pretty much describes that process. This will seem like common sense to you but at the time inside the Air Force this was radical stuff.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/hunerwadel.html

He was and is a big proponent of using non-lethal weapons to avoid breaking stuff. At the time he wrote that article he was still in the Air Force so I suspect he had to tow the party line so to speak. His insistance on development of less lethal weapons would end up being very costly to his career.

His model can and does work in UW type situations in some ways better than in conventional warfare as I will point out in later post. But generally he thinks that special forces should be handling it, much like the Afghan Campaign at least at the start of it.

In general reference to your primary question Norfolk answered it a long time ago when he said he felt he had been Horn Swoggled:) (I think this is a UK expression) by all this EBO stuff.

[slapout9]

Excellent paper on how Warden's Rings can be used to Target any organization.


Urban Warfare at the Operational Level: Identifying COG's and Key Nodes.

http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA397036

[slapout9]

5 Rings Targeting of a terrorist organization. Absolutely one of the best papers on Warden's theory and how it can be applied to any organization. Warden left as commandant of the Air Command and Staff College in 96 and this is one of the last really good papers on his theory. After this period things started to switch to EBO theory and have not really done that well since then. Chapter 3 has the targeting scheme that nearly 10 years later the Grubbs article brings up ("Is There a deep fight in COIN "posted earlier on this thread). As so often happens with theories they get changed when they just really need to be understood. The amazing thing is that an Airman wrote this and it is as valid today as it was then if not more so.


http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf

[William F. Owen]

5 Rings Targeting of a terrorist organization.


http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf

Well I'll give it a look, but I am very doubtful, because:

a>) The RAF is trying to claim some insights into COIN, which are just woeful and play very fast and loose with the historical record to try and support their arguments.

b>) I think the overwhelming lesson of the 2nd Lebanon War is that Air Power has extremely limited utility in COIN, as concerns "kinetic" effects. The RAF is actually now trying to claim that AIR POWER did not fail in the Lebanon, but that it was given an impossible task, thus did not fail, per se.

c>) I also suspect that there are some very unhealthy pre-emptive USAF agendas in play in this paper.

[slapout9]

Here is a PDF file on how CARVER can be adapted to almost to any situation. This one is CARVER+Shock used in the food industry. The first time I saw this in LE was with the NYPD some years back. This should be an Interagency Gold Standard right after the 5 Rings IMHO.



http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Carver.pdf

[Eden]

Generally, I'm all for piling on whenever EBO is criticized, but after a tour as a planner I've realized a few things.

1. In its essence, EBO (or EBP or EBAO or whatever the acronym consultants are using now) is a useful tool in planning. We've been doing it for years; artillerymen, like Proust's gentleman, were pleased to discover they had been using it for decades when they asked us whether we wanted to "neutralize", "suppress", or "destroy" a particular target. In concept, it is much like backward planning. I know where I want to be at the end of the operation; how do I get there? Personally, I found it to be a good way to recharge my planning brain cells and incorporate innovative thinking.

So, what's the problem?

2. It is not moron-friendly. Many officers I worked with were unable to articulate feasible, definable, measurable effects, let alone figure out what "causes" needed to be employed to bring them about. When you add in unintended effects, second and third order effects, etc., you quickly develop migraine headaches and intellectual shutdown amongst your staff. In other words, effects-based planning is hugely difficult, especially in hideously complex environments such as your average COIN op.

3. It has been hijacked by knuckleheads and LOM-scroungers. Whereas early works on the subject suggested that EBO might be a nice way to approach problem solving and an aid in planning, its recent enshrinement in the buzzword pantheon has effectively crippled its utility. We have taken an interesting idea and transformed it into a panoply of spreadsheets, bullet points, MOPs, MOEs, mandatory annexes, and new staff sections. As one who has waded through charts of desired effects, sub-effects, sub-sub effects, and apparently randomly-selected (see para 2, above) actions, methods, enabling tasks, etc., ad nauseum, I can testify that EBO are already as dysfunctional as IPB ultimately became. Unfortunately, EBO is a perfect catalyst for our proclivities toward endless analysis, false precision, and overornamentation.

4. It is often dominated by targeteers, artillerymen, and bomber pilots, none of whom are noted as a class for their excellence in strategic planning. As a result, we have too often replaced meaningful campaign plans with target lists. In the end we chase targets rather than our chosen end-state.

It's too late to stuff the genie back in the bottle, guys. The only way to escape the insidious uses to which this good idea is being used is through education and professional discussion. Or maybe we could come up with a new buzzword. But what would be the second and third order effects...

[Ken White]

the process confirmed my suspicion:

Violations of K.I.S.S. are not advisable; or "We can overcomplexificate ANYthing..."

[slapout9]

It's too late to stuff the genie back in the bottle, guys. The only way to escape the insidious uses to which this good idea is being used is through education and professional discussion. Or maybe we could come up with a new buzzword. But what would be the second and third order effects...

Maybe not, since General Mattis took over JFC the handbook on the Effects Based Approach has been pulled :wry:

It is also nice to have someone agree with me because I have been saying this since I got here and I learned EBO (wasn't called that then) as it was taught to LE to attack drug gangs. Although that has been several years now I have never talked about it in detail except to commnet on articles because I am not sure of the current OPSEC rules, but if you want to know just how powerfull this type of planning can be read "Killing Pabelo" by Mark Bowden how he got away with saying what he did I don't know but the detail is amazing. I posted a page number from the book on another thread that gives almost a perfect 5 rings analysis of what to hit and how to hit IF!!!! your really want to win.

[Bill Moore]

Slapout I find myself in disagreement with you, which is out of character, since I am normally a cheerleader for your posts. The mnemonic CARVER has been around for over 50 years. I was taught it was developed by the OSS during WWII, and it was called CRAVER (a french verb), because it was developed to assist the French underground in determining the best targets to hit based on their capabilities and desired results. I have found it to be very useful over the years. My heartburn with the use of CARVER is based on two concerns:

First, I'm troubled with our persistant effort to quantify everything. Not all the factors in CARVER can be "accurately" quantified, so the highest sum of each proposed target will not always (and usually doesn't) equate to the target you deisre to hit based on logic and experience; however, since our officers need metrics for everything, the operator must adjust his numbers, so the target he wants to hit has the highest sum. In short we're spinning our wheels trying to quantify each factor, yet the important thing is to "consider" and think each factor through.

Second, and much more serious, is the attempt to apply CARVER to insurgencies and terrorist groups as an effective tool to identify the "silver bullet" solution. This is complete hogwash, insurgencies are complex social networks or movements, and there is no silver bullet solution or shock and awe effect that will equate to victory. CARVER was defined for simple networks, such as a power plant, where hitting gadet X will predictably result in Y. You cannot conduct targeting of human nodes and expect to have a predictable result. Social networks will readjust and keep on ticking, as we seem to painfully relearn each time we get into one of these conflicts. As a matter of fact, after Pablo was killed, the Columbia drug cartels became more decentralized and exported more crap to the U.S. than they did when Pablo was alive. I'm not arguing that killing Plabo was a bad thing, but it was simply justice, not a decisive victory.

Targeting stupid is an attempt to define all our security challenges as targets. We simply can't dumb our problems down to targets. Targets will remain part of the solution, but winning insurgencies requires creating desired effects and avoided undesired effects. Winning requires winning over the support of the population, isolating the insurgent from the population, and neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure. CARVER doesn't facilitate this, effects based thinking does. EBO targeting doesn't facilitate this, effects based thinking does.

EBO targeting is a terrible concept, because EBO shouldn't be linked with targeting. Targeting should remain traditional targeting, where we apply lethal fires to create the specific effects that lethal or destructive fires can create, but the main effort in COIN, and even the so called drug war, isn't targeting. It is much more complex than that, yet we're always striving for a simple answer and that frequently takes us down the wrong road.

CARVER is an outstanding tool for what it was designed to do, but it has limited use in countering insurgencies.

[slapout9]

Bill, you hold on to them cheerleaders cause I haven't finished yet.

1-My intention was to show how well CARVER would work when you are figuring out how to defend large physical systems with various agencies at the state-country level. I have posted this before but this looked like a newer version so I put it up here.

2-On trying to quantify everything I absolutely agree. It is the questions that are asked in the CARVER acronym that are of the greatest value IMHO. Besides knowing what you know about me you think I am gonna fill in all them numbers:rolleyes:

3-The SHOCK in this version has nothing to do with the Shock and Awe stuff you are used to. I could have explained it better by saying it is more like being aware of the CNN effect. Again this is from a defensive point of view while a LE/NG/RA unit is protecting a state-city-countries critical infrastructure.

4- Killing Mr.Pablo. I agree that is was justice and not Victory. But killing Pablo makes some very good points about where EBO came from. The Enemy is Always the System! It is Systems thinking more than effects thinking that makes Warden's theory so powerfull.........



Get them cheerleaders ready cause this is some important very important stuff. It is also one of the biggest mistakes I see in what are being called EBO operations. Write this down...being good at achieving desired target effects doesn't matter unless you also achieve the desired System level effect!!!

So WTF does that mean and why is that so important. As you pointed out Pablo went to hell and all the other drug gangs made more money and actually increased production/shipments to the US:eek: Why? because we did not attack the Drug problem at the system level...just the target level.
What happened was entirely predictable. Let me explain another way.

Your enemy is the Automobile system of the US. So what do you do...you attack General Motors that's what you do.. right?....they are the Center of Gravity right? So you go bomb the hell out of GM...what happens? people buy more Fords and Toyota's!!! Why because you only attacked at the target level (even if it is a huge target) to achieve a Systems Effect you would have had to attack ALL of them!! In some way (even if it was non-lethal).

In order to change the entire System..... especially a human oriented System. You must attack the whole system or you will see the system adapt and come back as you pointed out.

If we had wanted to end the Drug War in Columbia quickly you would have needed to form a Task Force for every known gang there, do a 5 rings analysis of each gang and then try to synchronize and attack all the gangs in parallel.

In Guerrilla/Insurgency warfare it is the same way. You need to change/attack the whole system in parallel or as close to it as possible or it will adapt or more likely repopulate!!! and you are back to square one.

So where are them cheerleaders at:D

[William F. Owen]

Your enemy is the Automobile system of the US. So what do you do...you attack General Motors that's what you do.. right?....they are the Center of Gravity right? So you go bomb the hell out of GM...what happens? people buy more Fords and Toyota's!!! Why because you only attacked at the target level (even if it is a huge target) to achieve a Systems Effect you would have had to attack ALL of them!! In some way (even if it was non-lethal).

In order to change the entire System..... especially a human oriented System. You must attack the whole system or you will see the system adapt and come back as you pointed out.


The utility of military force is to break will, either by annihilation of exhaustion.
That's it! Armies are not systems and nor are any human organisations. It's a nice myth. Breaking one critical part, will rarely cause collapse. The Germans lost an entire Divisional HQ to an air strike in Normandy and no one noticed!

What you say about targeting is entirely correct, and in line with what Ron Tira writes. (met him recently. heck of a nice guy... for a fighter pilot!). Sooner or later someone has to plant a flag on a hill or a building. How would Hezbollah have felt if every village in the Southern Lebanon got covered in Blue and White flags? - and then live in the knowledge the Jews can come back anytime and use your toilet... and it'll cost you many lives to stop them.

Ironically, your handle says it all. I subscribe to the "stay down or get F**ked up," school of military thought.

[Bill Moore]

Hey Slapout, I'm sorry buddy, but I'm not taking my poms poms out of the closet yet. This topic is worth signficant discussion and debate, but I'll be short on time for the next few weeks, but here is a quick response.

First, you said the enemy is a system. O.K. we can say the enemy is a system, the enemy is a network, the enemy is a group of people, the enemy is nation, all are perceptional models to help us understand the problem. The problem is if we use the wrong perceptional model we misrepresent the problem, and thus develop the wrong strategy, but I digress.

Let's use the system model (note you can perceive systems in a number of ways). If the enemy is a nation-state such as Germany during WWII, then the nation is the ultimate the system we want to target. The nation is a system composed of several subsystems (economic, political, social, defense, legal, etc.) that interact with one another in various ways. Using the example provided by W Owen of a German Infantry Division, the Inf Div "could" be classifed as a node of a component (Infantry) of a subsystem (Army) of a subsystem (defense) of a system (Germany). Framing it this way, it would seem apparent that the loss of a division was simply the loss of a node of a component two subsystems down from the over archng system, so the effect while painful wouldn't be decisive in itself. If we destroyed all the nodes, that would cause the Infantry subsystem to collapse, which would make the rest of the Army system much less effective, thereby weakening the nation state system. That is one way to look at it, but I think it is a stretch. I think it can argued there are effects derived from destroying this node that are acculmative in nature on the nation's morale that the system model doesn't address. On the other hand, where the system approach may have made a difference was if we went after Germany's ability to generate electric power, we would have crippled their industrial production capacity, which many German officers thought would have ended the war two years earlier.

I agree that presenting problems as systems so we can understand them may be useful for certain situations, but I also think using the system paradigm has serious limitations, especially when applied to insurgencies, Al Qaeda networks, and the drug cartels. Of course it does have "some" use, but Warden's five ring model will not provide us with sufficient understanding of the problem set to develop a comprehensive strategy. We have tried this approach numerous times throughout history to no avail, as this is the American way of war (or the industrialist way of war). I guess you could argue we were doing it wrong (perhaps), but you can also argue that this approach while useful is not a targeting pancea, and it doesn't come close to providing a complete strategy for defeating the enemy. I think we should apply multiple models to the same problem set to see what we come up with, use Warden's system approach, use PMESII analysis, use ASCOPE, and others, all provide a different way to understand the problem and factors influencing the problem(s).

[slapout9]

Hi Wilf, I was rather confused at your response about systems. A short definitions os a system is persons,places,and things using a process to accomplish some purpose. The Army has the purpose of breaking the enemies will to fight by using the processes of Annihilation and or Exhaustion would be an outstanding definition of the Army as a system.

Agree on my handle Wilf SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) is about how to get the Enemy Slapout of town.;)



Hi Bill, what is usually called 5 rings analysis Warden calls mapping the system. The 5 rings are meant to be a map that shows all the persons,places and things that are in your AO. Somehow over time people just stopped calling it that or explaining it that way and usually just call it a 5 rings analysis. The point being whether you use PEMSII (i keep wanting to say Pepsi) or ASCOPE doesn't really matter. The fact that you are mapping the a system is the important thing. ASCOPE isn't that different than the 5 rings to me but either one is fine. CARVER is just tool that I would use to analyze the 2nd ring (System Essentials) instead of doing an entire fractal 5 rings map. Adaption or evolution of a process is life:wry:

The Rand Corp. did a study called "Street Smarts" where they suggested that OAKCO be used to create a human terrain map long before human terrain teams were talked about. The same acronym would go hand in hand with the physical terrain analysis. Example Key Terrain would be VIP's, avenues of approach would be people who could introduce you to or influence key terrain. obstacles could be crowds or individuals that were working against you to block access or influence key terrain you were also trying to influence. If I can find the link to the paper I will post it here. So you are are busy have enjoyed the debate and education throughly.


PS: All you other smart folks out there jump in at any time. where's them Air Force dudes hiding at:D

[William F. Owen]

Hi Wilf, I was rather confused at your response about systems. A short definitions os a system is persons,places,and things using a process to accomplish some purpose. The Army has the purpose of breaking the enemies will to fight by using the processes of Annihilation and or Exhaustion would be an outstanding definition of the Army as a system.


OK, so maybe I am missing something. What is the antithesis of a system? Based on your definition, everything is a system. I see Armies as organisations, with varying degrees of hierarchy. I would also debate the use of the word "process." This implies procedures - which brings us to drills, etc.

My understanding of "System" is that poorly demonstrating by Fuller and Liddell-Hart with the "bullet to the brain" analogy that gives us all the Manoeuvre Warfare silliness.

[slapout9]

Everything is a system Wilf. And every system connects to another system all the way up to the universe. Below is one of the best introductions to systems thinking I have ever read. it is short and easy to read. To first understand a system you have to know it's purpose the original cause for it to be created. Sounds you talking dosen't it;) Give it a read I think you will like it.



http://www.forseekers.com/Meaning-Ch2.pdf

[Bill Moore]

Slapout you've become a desperato if you're openly calling upon the Air Force to come to your rescue. I'm sure some will because Warden's Five Rings was a successful ploy to squeeze mo money from Capital Hill for their attack craft, while letting their lift capacity go underfunded and dwindle, so they could then coerce the Army into helping them buy the C-17. You have to give it to them, they know how to play the game on Capital Hill.

The bottom line is Warden's system has merit in some situations, he is obviously an intelligent man with great insights, but my rub is the tendency to think there is one tool out there that will answer the mail for all of our security challenges. I don't think Warden's system effectively addresses targeting for insurgencies and other irregular threats. An opinion based on some experience; however, if you can provide examples where this methodology was actually "effective" in targeting an insurgency please provide them. If you can do that, I'll get my poms poms out of the closet again.

[William F. Owen]

Everything is a system Wilf. And every system connects to another system all the way up to the universe. Below is one of the best introductions to systems thinking I have ever read. it is short and easy to read. To first understand a system you have to know it's purpose the original cause for it to be created. Sounds you talking dosen't it;) Give it a read I think you will like it.

http://www.forseekers.com/Meaning-Ch2.pdf

OK, but how is this useful. It's all wonderfully logical, but I'm not sure I see it's relevance to Military Thought. How does considering the enemy, "a system" help me break his will? How would thinking of Hezbollah as a system help? Clausewitz's trinity helps me understand how to defeat Hezbollah, but this system thing is all a bit abstract.

[Ken White]

is (or will react as) a 'system' will get a surprise. Warden's theory has never been effectively proven simply due to that fact. Bill summed it up well with this:

"The problem is if we use the wrong perceptional model we misrepresent the problem, and thus develop the wrong strategy..."

[slapout9]

Hi all, Bill I don't exp ext the Air Force to bail me out nor do I need them to. I know how to Strike and Hold:D ( for those who don't know that was my unit motto from 2/504 of the 82nd Airborne Division)

The Air Force generally thinks we should not be involved in COIN, there are exceptions and don't sell the Air Force short on this. If they ever decided to really work on COIN like the Army does I think you would be surprised. But this generally conflicts with XB-55 super duper bomber fighter programs so they are not going to get involved to much.

As for examples of Warden's theory being used against an Insurgency...I don't know of any! It hasn't been around that long compared to other theories. Plus Warden has said and continues to say that he thinks COIN is the purview of Special Forces and they should be in charge of it and if the Air Force can support (Like Afghanistan) that is probably their best role.


As for the theory in general being useful to fight against Insurgencies/ Terrorist Organizations that is mine and mine alone, any fault with that belongs at my doorstep and no one elses.

The best current example I can think of is 911. They attacked across the rings just like they would have done if they had been taught the system. All the targets were Ring1 leadership targets...they were also Ring2 process targets...and Ring3 infrastructure targets. And we are still feeling the effects of the attack. The only reason it wasn't more successful was because apparently he could not continue the attack.....a very good thing from our point of view!!

Bill if you want to and you can keep everything open source I will build one for you right here. The only restrictions would be the information has to be open source and I be allowed to use his whole methodology ( Targeting/System mapping is only one partSystem) is only one part. Also I have a day job so it would have to be done in chunks of time when I could work on it.

So name your Insurgency and forget the pom poms I want to see what is holding them up.:wry:

[marct]

Hi Slap,

I suspect one of the problems is that when many people think of systems they use mechanical analogies. Systems theory, at least in its original form, was based on biological, not mechanical, analogies. At the same time, the original formulations of it (forget F.W. Taylor, he's a twit who doesn't count) implicitly include some form of evolutionary theory (through time) as well as process theory (at a spot in time). Shifting to a mechanistic analog, for which Taylor deserves to be reincarnated as a dung beetle, destroys the change over time component (evolution) and devalues the usefulness of the model to a large degree.

[slapout9]

Hi Slap,

I suspect one of the problems is that when many people think of systems they use mechanical analogies. Systems theory, at least in its original form, was based on biological, not mechanical, analogies. At the same time, the original formulations of it (forget F.W. Taylor, he's a twit who doesn't count) implicitly include some form of evolutionary theory (through time) as well as process theory (at a spot in time). Shifting to a mechanistic analog, for which Taylor deserves to be reincarnated as a dung beetle, destroys the change over time component (evolution) and devalues the usefulness of the model to a large degree.


Hi Marct, I am not surprised you noticed that... being a Anthro Man and all;) The first book I think that became known to the General Population in th 60's was the one by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy's (General Systems Theory) who was a biologist if I remember correctly who was trying to make that exact point. Open systems are living systems and closed systems are usually mechanical. Living systems adapt and quickly if they are going to survive, closed ones don't until a living system acts to change it.
Somehow over time people have forgotten that systems theory started with living/biological systems....except our enemy hasn't forgotten and they seem to understand it very well.

[marct]

Hi Slap,


Hi Marct, I am not surprised you noticed that... being a Anthro Man and all;) The first book I think that became known to the General Population in th 60's was the one by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy's (General Systems Theory) who was a biologist if I remember correctly who was trying to make that exact point.

From the back cover of General Systems theory (1968):

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, recognized throughout the world as a pioneer in promoting the organismic view in biology and the role of symbol-making in the interpretation of human experience, is also acknowledged as a founder of General Systems Theory

Exactly. He was also drawing on earlier work (1957) by Alfred J. Lotka - Elements of Mathematical Biology (http://www.amazon.com/Elements-Mathematical-Biology-Alfred-Lotka/dp/0486603466) - a great text that I find myself going back to fairly often.


Open systems are living systems and closed systems are usually mechanical. Living systems adapt and quickly if they are going to survive, closed ones don't until a living system acts to change it.

They other thing that most people forget is that "open" and "closed" and labels of convenience that really refer to the boundary conditions of the system. All boundary conditions are "fuzzy" in reality and this tends to be forgotten (one of the key observations from Chaos Theory).


Somehow over time people have forgotten that systems theory started with living/biological systems....except our enemy hasn't forgotten and they seem to understand it very well.

Sure they do - they are culturally predisposed to think of reality as a biological system rather than a mechanistic system :D. Personally, I blame Descartes for our mechanistic views; then again, I never really liked that guy ;).

[slapout9]

They other thing that most people forget is that "open" and "closed" and labels of convenience that really refer to the boundary conditions of the system. All boundary conditions are "fuzzy" in reality and this tends to be forgotten (one of the key observations from Chaos Theory).

I almost brought this up yesterday. Systems are evrything inside and evrything outside with the material that seperates them, and that material can be nothing more than a mental idea or a personal beleif System


Sure they do - they are culturally predisposed to think of reality as a biological system rather than a mechanistic system :D. Personally, I blame Descartes for our mechanistic views; then again, I never really liked that guy ;).



I agree, Descartes had to ride the little short yellow bus to school:wry: had to break everything down for him to learn it.

[wm]

I agree, Descartes had to ride the little short yellow bus to school:wry: had to break everything down for him to learn it.

That's what a Jesuit education does to you.:D

Actually, I think that Descartes was a very strong systems thinker. His problem was just that his systems needed a deus ex machina to make them all work. He never could get past the dualism and adequately explain how that mind-body interaction thing (a system of systems as the buzz phrase goes these days) really worked. Maybe its a genetic disposition in the French--look at how badly they botch their COIN opportunities.

[marct]

Maybe its a genetic disposition in the French--look at how badly they botch their COIN opportunities.

I will not mention Foucault, Derrida or Bourbaki - nope, I will just sit here and hold my tongue. Yup, oh c%!p......

Ever since the northern French played Attila on the Southern French, they have been trying to impress everyone and only showing the truth of PT Barnum's famous dictum :cool:.

[slapout9]

I have several of these human system maps that I was going to post later on but since we are well into this I will put them up now. You will have to scroll down several pages to see the map but it is pretty interesting. Also there are psychological/psychiatric methods based upon systems theory. Would be interesting to see how they would map a family from another cultural.

http://home.earthlink.net/~mattaini/Ecosystems.html

[slapout9]

The Crony Attack Strategic Attacks Silver Bullet:eek:


http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/Tolbert/Tolbert.pdf


Read this carefully before the flamethrower attacks..there is some really good stuff in here...if you read it with an open mind and realize all this could be done by the Army/Marines as well as the Air Force...except land forces have the option to capture an objective.... something Air Forces can not do.

[Tom Odom]

The enduring promise of airpower since its inception has been the ability
to capitalize on the third dimension. Flying over surface forces offers the
opportunity to penetrate into the heartland of enemy territory and attack
those key targets the enemy holds most dear. Unfortunately, the record of
strategic attack in practice has been mixed at best.1 There have been cases
where strategic attack made significant contributions to victory.2 However,
the mechanism by which the enemy was moved to grant concessions has
always been somewhat fuzzy. Put prescriptively, is it better to target facilities
that affect the capability of the enemy to continue fighting, or is it
more profitable to strike targets that, if lost, will cripple the enemy’s will to
continue?


see my book related book review (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/no-silver-bullet-no-brass-ring/)

[slapout9]

Hi Tom, I did that is why I posted the report that I did. The lines you quote are almost identical from ones that appear throughout the Crony Strategy as to how best to affect the enemies will. It's a short read and worth the effort. I don't have 35.00 dollars for the book so can you elaborate on the part where you say his review of the 5 rings was very damning?

[Tom Odom]

hey Slap

The lines I quoted are from the crony study. Where and why I would say Kiras' description of the 5-Rings theory is damning is quite simple: it is very much an extension of the annihilation theory/strategy inherent in earlier and parallel strategies. In my own experience, reality offers no counter to someone whose determination to prove a theory is more important than US troops lives on the ground. As Kiras relates Horner fired Warner and sent him home.

Targeting, effects, D3A, etc as we use it here is holistic and used to drive operations through assessment and retargeting. Where the 5-rings goes astray is its application/promulgation as an absolute. That is what I ran into in Checkmate when Instant Thunder was put on the table as a war winning solution that ignored ground reality.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

As Kiras relates Horner fired Warner and sent him home.
Best

Tom

Hi Tom, I thought you were quoting from the book and I was thinking to myself I just read that:confused:



Warden was asked by Swartzkopff (spelling) and Powell to brief Horner. Yes he was asked to leave (fired...don't think I would call it exactly that) because the then Major Deptula stayed behind and maintained continuous contact with Warden who was picking targets from back in Washington. Also less than half of the targets survived from the orginal plan and Warden I am sure was rather vocal about that. It was almost 1/2 instant thunder.

[Tom Odom]

Hi Tom, I thought you were quoting from the book and I was thinking to myself I just read that:confused:



Warden was asked by Swartzkopff (spelling) and Powell to brief Horner. Yes he was asked to leave (fired...don't think I would call it exactly that) because the then Major Deptula stayed behind and maintained continuous contact with Warden who was picking targets from back in Washington. Also less than half of the targets survived from the orginal plan and Warden I am sure was rather vocal about that. It was almost 1/2 instant thunder.

In saying he was fired (Warden) I was relating what Kiras said. Since Kiras interviewed Warden and said that Warden and Horner got into a shouting match that lead to Warden being sent from theater, I would say "fired" describes it.

best

Tom

[slapout9]

said that Warden and Horner got into a shouting match that lead to Warden being sent from theater, I would say "fired" describes it.

best

Tom

I have talked to Warden about that and the shouting match is probably a polite way to describe it compared to what actually happened.:eek: Also he did have a situation where he actually was fired from his command in Germany. Which most people say that is actually what kept him from becoming a general officer, not the incident during Desert Storm as is sometimes portrayed. Horner even did a nice review of his book after it was all over. Later

[slapout9]

Very good paper on Targeting with SBW. Appears the Army has been doing EBO all along;)


http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=938

[William F. Owen]

Very good paper on Targeting with SBW. Appears the Army has been doing EBO all along;)


http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=938

Key Leader Engagements (KLE) ? Something the Brits have were doing in Northern Ireland for 30 years.

If you read history you save a lot time. :)

[slapout9]

Key Leader Engagements (KLE) ? Something the Brits have were doing in Northern Ireland for 30 years.

If you read history you save a lot time. :)


Close Wilf, it is the Air Policing Strategy applied from the ground. Which I am a strong advocate of. Much to do was made about the Air Policing Strategy because of bombing villages......very little was made of the fact that an Air Force Intelligence officer went to the village elder first! and told them what would happen if they did not comply. They also went back afterwords to see if they had changed their mind, and when they did good things followed.
Bullets and Bribes can be very effective.:wry:

[MikeF]

Close Wilf, it is the Air Policing Strategy applied from the ground. Which I am a strong advocate of. Much to do was made about the Air Policing Strategy because of bombing villages......very little was made of the fact that an Air Force Intelligence officer went to the village elder first! and told them what would happen if they did not comply. They also went back afterwords to see if they had changed their mind, and when they did good things followed. Bullets and Bribes can be very effective.:wry: Emphasis added.

Too true. I think of that as common sense, but then I realize that I learned it through the trial and error of experience. Carrot and stick, coerce, influence, and negotiate.

Great article Slap. The author is one of my big-brained classmates. She was picked up as part of Patraeus' Dream Team in Iraq.

Mike

[slapout9]

Emphasis added.

Too true. I think of that as common sense, but then I realize that I learned it through the trial and error of experience. Carrot and stick, coerce, influence, and negotiate.

Great article Slap. The author is one of my big-brained classmates. She was picked up as part of Patraeus' Dream Team in Iraq.

Mike

Hope after all, there is a thread on here somewhere from a few years ago where I recommended doing that based upon what Warden taught on how to target leaders inside companies with the 5 rings method and then influence them. It is called triangulation.

[SWJ Blog]

The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/the-targeting-process-d3a-and/)

Entry Excerpt:

The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD
by Jimmy A. Gomez

Download the Full Article: The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/816-gomez.pdf)

Since October 2001, combat operations in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations have presented the U.S. Army with constant evolution of complex situations that have routinely highlighted shortfalls in current doctrinal solutions. At every echelon, the Army has adapted to the complex situations within the Operational Environment (OE) by revising doctrine to reflect the adaptive responses to the ever-evolving spectrum of threats. The spectrum of threats within the operational environment range from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. In some possible conflicts (or in multiple, concurrent conflicts), a combination of these types of threats could be especially problematic to a one-dimensional, all inclusive Targeting Process.

Download the Full Article: The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/816-gomez.pdf)

CW4 Jimmy Gomez is currently the Course Manager and Senior Instructor for the Field Artillery Warrant Officer Instruction Branch at Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He served with the 25th Infantry Division Staff in Afghanistan 2004-2005 and in Iraq 2006-2007.



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/the-targeting-process-d3a-and/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

There is a live exchange on SWJ entitled 'The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD', which IMO should be linked, if only as Slapout is in his element:wry: and this thread has his earlier contributions.

SWJ Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/the-targeting-process-d3a-and/#c022455

[slapout9]

And somebody is doing a pretty good job against Iran on this one...of course we don't know who is doing this:rolleyes:


http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/01/11/10118910-nuclear-killing-is-west-waging-covert-war-against-iran

[ganulv]

And somebody is doing a pretty good job against Iran on this one...of course we don't know who is doing this:rolleyes:

http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/01/11/10118910-nuclear-killing-is-west-waging-covert-war-against-iran
That one seems pretty loud for something executed by SAD or Mossad types, though even the monkey falls from the tree from time–to–time (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704479404575087621440351704.html). I suppose those or similar organizations might have meant to send an unmistakable message. But my personal preference is the stiletto rather than the bludgeon whenever possible (figuratively as far as my own actions go, of course :)).

[bourbon]

That one seems pretty loud for something executed by SAD or Mossad types, though even the monkey falls from the tree from time–to–time (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704479404575087621440351704.html).
Not that loud. Took the guys head off but left his limbs and torso intact; little damage to vehicle, driver died in the hospital.

[slapout9]

That one seems pretty loud for something executed by SAD or Mossad types, though even the monkey falls from the tree from time–to–time (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704479404575087621440351704.html). I suppose those or similar organizations might have meant to send an unmistakable message. But my personal preference is the stiletto rather than the bludgeon whenever possible (figuratively as far as my own actions go, of course :)).

It is like the old style Mafia, they were sending a message along with the attack.;)

[ganulv]

It is like the old style Mafia, they were sending a message along with the attack.;)
Bibi likes people to think, “That guy’s just waiting for an excuse to knock my front teeth out.” A useful survival strategy where he’s from (by which I mean Philadelphia).

[bourbon]

It is like the old style Mafia, they were sending a message along with the attack.;)
The Israeli message here is: we can’t pull-off an airstrike to take out your nuclear program, and we can’t convince the Americans to do it for us – so we are just going to provoke you into retaliation so the Americans will attack you.

[slapout9]

The Israeli message here is: we can’t pull-off an airstrike to take out your nuclear program, and we can’t convince the Americans to do it for us – so we are just going to provoke you into retaliation so the Americans will attack you.

Yes, a very dangerous game going on here:(

[kowalskil]

Yes, a very dangerous game going on here:(

Americans will follow their own plans, as other countries do.

Ludwik Kowalski (see Wikipedia)
.

[SWJ Blog]

F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion “Feeds” The SOF Targeting Process (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-sof-targeting-process)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-sof-targeting-process) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Targeting Challenges in the Advising Environment (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/targeting-challenges-in-the-advising-environment)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/targeting-challenges-in-the-advising-environment) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Adding the Warrant to Your Quiver: Ten Tenets of Warrant Based Targeting (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/adding-the-warrant-to-your-quiver-ten-tenets-of-warrant-based-targeting)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/adding-the-warrant-to-your-quiver-ten-tenets-of-warrant-based-targeting) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a SWJ Tweet here is a surprising US document now in the public domain, with my emphasis:
Last week without fanfare, a 230-page military document (http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/cjcsi3370_01.pdf) (PDF) appeared in the public domain. The document, authored in May 2016, is a comprehensive list of rules, standards, and definitions governing the heart of what the military does: picking targets, and making sure those targets are valid and within the bounds of the laws of war. The Pentagon isn’t exactly sure how the document ended up online.Link:http://www.popsci.com/pentagon-targeting-manual-released-online

IIRC we have debated the RoE, but just where was hard to identify - hence being posted here. Lawfare I know has spent time on this subject.