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Jedburgh
12-09-2007, 02:31 PM
The Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=436) thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close that thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat:

DNI, 3 Dec 07: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf)

Since its release, there has been a tremendous amount of analysis and debate over its content. Some of it is linked below:

ISN Security Watch, 7 Dec 07: Iran Report's Impact Overstated (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18438)

CNS-MIIS, 6 Dec 07: Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. NIE (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/071206.htm)

CSIS, 6 Dec 07: Understanding the Key Judgments in the New NIE on Iranian Nuclear Weapons (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071206_irannuclearnieanalysis.pdf) and 4 Dec 07: Critical Questions: Iran and the New NIE (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071204_cq_wolfsthal_iran.pdf)

CEIP, 4 Dec 07: Assessing the NIE (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19747&prog=zgp&proj=zme,znpp)

WINEP, 4 Dec 07: How Much Does Weaponization Matter? Judging Iran's Nuclear Program (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2689)

Ron Humphrey
12-10-2007, 02:50 AM
The Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=436) thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close that thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat:

DNI, 3 Dec 07: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf)

Since its release, there has been a tremendous amount of analysis and debate over its content. Some of it is linked below:

ISN Security Watch, 7 Dec 07: Iran Report's Impact Overstated (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18438)

CNS-MIIS, 6 Dec 07: Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. NIE (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/071206.htm)

CSIS, 6 Dec 07: Understanding the Key Judgments in the New NIE on Iranian Nuclear Weapons (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071206_irannuclearnieanalysis.pdf) and 4 Dec 07: Critical Questions: Iran and the New NIE (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071204_cq_wolfsthal_iran.pdf)

CEIP, 4 Dec 07: Assessing the NIE (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19747&prog=zgp&proj=zme,znpp)

WINEP, 4 Dec 07: How Much Does Weaponization Matter? Judging Iran's Nuclear Program (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2689)

If the internatinal and national media and government kickbacks keep up like they are now the intel community is gonna be afraid to release any products unless they simply state we think, but don't know.

Somebody probably should have thought this one through more carefully, then again ?????

Sean Osborne
12-10-2007, 07:06 PM
If the internatinal and national media and government kickbacks keep up like they are now the intel community is gonna be afraid to release any products unless they simply state we think, but don't know.

Somebody probably should have thought this one through more carefully, then again ?????

I think you are correct. This NIE, as all NIEs, are comprised of one or more key judgements and assessments.

The problem with this NIE seems to revolve around the fact that its primary composers have a significant political bias against the Bush Administration which was reflected in the document on the whole. As reported by the Wall Street Journal (Opinion Journal) and The Weekly Standard, one of those writers (Tom Fingar) stated exactly the opposite regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in July 2007 (http://theneinblog.blogspot.com/2007/12/2007-national-intelligence-estimate-on.html).

The MSM keyed on the aspect they desire to hype in their reporting on this NIE - again, for political reasons.

What the NIE says elsewhere has not been reported on by the MSM, particularly that found in Assessment B.

Rex Brynen
12-10-2007, 07:12 PM
As reported by the Wall Street Journal (Opinion Journal) and The Weekly Standard, one of those writers (Tom Fingar) stated exactly the opposite regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in July 2007 (http://theneinblog.blogspot.com/2007/12/2007-national-intelligence-estimate-on.html).

Although I've only had the opportunity to interact with him on relatively rare occasions, at workshops and conferences, I have to say that I've always been enormously impressed with Tom Fingar--he is one very, very bright guy, and an enormous asset to the US IC.

Jedburgh
12-10-2007, 09:36 PM
The problem with this NIE seems to revolve around the fact that its primary composers have a significant political bias against the Bush Administration which was reflected in the document on the whole. As reported by the Wall Street Journal (Opinion Journal) and The Weekly Standard, one of those writers (Tom Fingar) stated exactly the opposite regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in July 2007.
And right up front the NIE states, "Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously. Translation: we've been wrong in our assessments of intentions for at least two years..

Tom Fingar is an old Army MI guy, and a fellow linguist. I doubt that he permitted his personal political beliefs to contaminate his analysis - especially when that would be reflected in a high-profile national-level product. I'm not saying that there isn't any political twist to the NIE - but it isn't an anti-Bush conspiracy either.

selil
12-10-2007, 11:24 PM
If the internatinal and national media and government kickbacks keep up like they are now the intel community is gonna be afraid to release any products unless they simply state we think, but don't know.

Somebody probably should have thought this one through more carefully, then again ?????

According to Steven Aftergood: LINK (http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007/12/nie_on_irans_nuclear_program_n.html)


By challenging the prejudices of the Administration rather than reinforcing them, the NIE on Iran does what earlier estimates on Iraq notoriously failed (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/rtrs/20071204/twl-uk-iran-usa-independence-bd5ae06.html) to do.

It also departs from the judgments of the 2005 NIE on Iran, which is why it has now been publicly disclosed, according to Deputy DNI Donald Kerr.

"Since our understanding of Iran's capabilities has changed, we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available," he said (pdf) (http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/12/ddni120307.pdf).

In fact, however, Congress directed the DNI in the FY 2007 defense authorization act to prepare an unclassified summary of the Estimate.

"Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted." (House Report 109-702, section 1213 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp109&sid=cp109Y0kgW&refer=&r_n=hr702.109&item=&sel=TOC_1293334&), Intelligence on Iran).

It looks to me like the were required to release the NIE as it was attached to a funding bill that had already been signed and such. In other words it was not because anybody was being patriotic, and it was a requirement.

slapout9
12-11-2007, 01:23 AM
Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.[/I] Translation: we've been wrong in our assessments of intentions for at least two years..



Hi Jed I think that is crucial, we have been thinking he is threatening us when he has really been negotiating. He probably thinks America is abunch of Gangsters like we think Iran is all Terrorist. plenty of time to start a war, why not try talking first??

Sean Osborne
12-11-2007, 03:11 AM
And right up front the NIE states, "Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously. Translation: we've been wrong in our assessments of intentions for at least two years..

"Probably" is an estimate. It's not a certainty. We know what we know, and we don't know what we don't know. We estimate and arrive at key judgements on the rest.

Still I think Assessment B is very much overlooked. Particularly with respect to North Korean activities through October 2006:

As stated in this NIE Scope Note:


This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.

The above speaks direct to the 3000 centrifuges producing HEU.

And in Assessment B we read:


We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.

The above speaks directly to either or both North Korea and the AQ Khan network of nuclear weapons technology proliferation.


Tom Fingar is an old Army MI guy, and a fellow linguist. I doubt that he permitted his personal political beliefs to contaminate his analysis -

Someone will have to take the WSJ and WeeklyStandard to task on thier reporting. Nevertheless Tom Fingar's statement (assessment?) on July 11, 2007 on Iranian nuclear weapons was:


"Iran and North Korea are the states of most concern to us. The United States’ concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, including many of Iran’s neighbors. Iran is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and has shown more interest in protracting negotiations and working to delay and diminish the impact of UNSC sanctions than in reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution. We assess that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons--despite its international obligations and international pressure. This is a grave concern to the other countries in the region whose security would be threatened should Iranacquire nuclear weapons."

The man said what he said just five months prior to this NIE.

Rex Brynen
12-11-2007, 03:45 AM
The man said what he said just five months prior to this NIE.

As Ted has pointed out, the predominate view in the IC has changed on this issue (although the internal debate was older than five months).

I would much rather the IC shift assessments when new data and/or analysis suggests a correction is necessary, than that they dogmatically stick to a fixed conceptzia.

Jedburgh
12-11-2007, 03:21 PM
....I would much rather the IC shift assessments when new data and/or analysis suggests a correction is necessary, than that they dogmatically stick to a fixed kontseptsia....
It is an axiom in the IC that it is better to be mistaken than to be wrong. In this context, "mistaken" means that the analyst was wrong, and admitted it, changing his assessment upon the receipt of new information. "Wrong" means that the individual was wrong, received the new evidence, yet refused to change his assessment - whether holding on due to ego or bias, it really doesn't matter. (There's a colorful Army saying about just how "wrong" that is....)

This NIE reflects a change in assessment. To state that a small number of people successfully manipulated the NIE because of a partisan political anti-Bush agenda is itself partisan nonsense.

Mike Tanji over at Haft of the Spear (http://haftofthespear.com/2007/12/gaming-intelligence/) lays it out fairly well:

.....reports that the NIE was drafted by people with a known political agenda – or acute cases of Bush Derangement Syndrome – make for entertaining political hay, but it has been my experience that the principle drafters of such assessments come from one lead agency, not the executives at the top of the food chain. Anyone who can prove that partisan hacks cherry picked the intelligence information they wanted and then strong-armed the rest of the community to go along with their conclusions would have a bombshell on their hands. These executives do play an important role in the NIE process, which I’ll address later.

Finally, building an NIE is not unlike any other bureaucratic exercise that involves multiple agencies of the government. Competing opinions are argued, disputes are mediated, and dissent noted. At the end of the day a deliverable is due – the rough draft – and the involved parties get to sit at their home offices for a period of time, ruminate on the work, and forward to the principle drafter their comments, edits, suggestions and recommendations. What follows are several rounds of review and edit sessions with increasingly more senior members of the agencies involved and the National Intelligence Council, until the final draft is ready for review, approval and dissemination.

I spent almost 20 years in the intelligence community and I have absolutely no idea what the political affiliation or disposition of any of my colleagues or superiors were. No one talked politics; we talked data, methodology and analysis. The idea that a dozen-odd people would sit down for days at a time concocting a piece of work that was purely designed to thwart the efforts of a given administration is more than a little absurd. I have no doubt that I worked with people who did not agree with the Executive’s agenda (regardless of who the Executive was at any given time), but you show up to these things with data and arguments you can defend; you show up with political party talking points and you’re going to catch an intellectual beating.....

Tom Odom
12-11-2007, 04:00 PM
Agreed, Ted. The agendas that come into a NiE session are more reflective of the agencies' collective cultures than the political leanings of the current heads of those agencies. We fought the agency culture battle in the NIEs and SNIEs leading up to Desert Storm. In some ways we have come full circle because one the outcomes of that effort was the complaint from senior leaders--CINCCENT in particular--about the use of caveats. As a result, there was greater emphasis placed on consensus buliding and reducing the number of caveats. I think it went too far. This NIE seems to have swung that particular pendulum back a bit.

The other issue with this NIE is that it does reflect a significant restructuring of the IC and tremendous changes in leadership. Mike McConnel as DNI is just one example. McConnell was the J2 in Desert Shield/Storm. Cambone is gone :p and Jim Clapper :D has replaced him. Clapper was the ACSI of the USAF in Desert Shield and went onto become Director DIA. Gates--a former DCI--is Sec Def. He became the DCI in 1991 after serving as Dep NSA during Desert Shield. All of these guys worked together at a critical time. Now they are doing it again. I have no doubt that McConnell and the other IC leadership wanted this NIE to be apolitical so it could weather the inevitable political battering it was likely to generate.

Best

Tom

J Wolfsberger
12-11-2007, 04:38 PM
Anyone who is shocked that an intelligence product got reversed hasn't worked with intelligence very much (if at all). The new NIE reads as though they got their hands on a lot of new info.

What mystifies me is how the new one is, somehow or another, supposed to be an embarrassment to the Bush administration.

I'd also like to know why the brain surgeons in the punditocracy have decided we should develop policy against intentions rather than capabilities. I don't think we'll be ranking them with Sun Tzu, Clausewitz or Liddell-Hart any time soon.:rolleyes:

JeffC
12-11-2007, 04:42 PM
The above speaks direct to the 3000 centrifuges producing HEU.


Iran hasn't yet revealed an accurate report of it's capabilities to produce HEU. It has old, unreliable centerfuges. If you read the AFCEA Intelligence newsletter NightWatch, the author, John McCreary writes:

Another paragraph of the Key Judgments merits special attention. “We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.” At last this is a judgment that is consistent with what the world knows about Pakistani P-1 centrifuges which is the type they proliferated to Iran and North Korea, according to multiple technical sources – they are engineering nightmares. The rotors break and the centrifuge cascade cannot be stabilized, which explains why the Pakistanis developed and use P-2 centrifuges in their cascades.

The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead. And since that's unlikely, their only other use is to be a negotiating tool for Tehran to bargain with.

Tom Odom
12-11-2007, 04:47 PM
Anyone who is shocked that an intelligence product got reversed hasn't worked with intelligence very much (if at all). The new NIE reads as though they got their hands on a lot of new info.

What mystifies me is how the new one is, somehow or another, supposed to be an embarrassment to the Bush administration.

I'd also like to know why the brain surgeons in the punditocracy have decided we should develop policy against intentions rather than capabilities. I don't think we'll be ranking them with Sun Tzu, Clausewitz or Liddell-Hart any time soon.:rolleyes:

John

Agree. Intelligence is all probability and never absolutes. Pundits regardless of ilk tend to offer absolutes regardless of probability.

Best

Tom

J Wolfsberger
12-11-2007, 04:53 PM
The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead. And since that's unlikely, their only other use is to be a negotiating tool for Tehran to bargain with.


And if anyone really wants to look for hidden motives, the new NIE rather neatly takes Iran's nuke program out of play.

Some people might find that a clever diplomatic move on our part.

Kreker
12-14-2007, 01:51 PM
Newsmax, Thursday, December 13, 2007: Kissinger: NIE Report Misread (http://www.newsmax.com/insidecover/Kissinger:_NIE_Report_Mis/2007/12/13/56810.html)

Former presidential adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that the much-publicized report on the Iranian nuclear weapons program issued last week by the National Intelligence Estimate has been widely misread.

And he asserts that it does not indicate that Iran has abandoned efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

The key passage in the report reads: “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."

In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post, Kissinger states that the passage “was, in fact, qualified by a footnote whose complex phraseology obfuscated that the suspension really applied to only one aspect of the Iranian nuclear weapons program (and not even the most significant one): the construction of warheads. That qualification was not restated in the rest of the document, which continued to refer to the "halt of the weapons program" repeatedly and without qualification.

“The reality is that the concern about Iranian nuclear weapons has had three components: the production of fissile material, the development of missiles and the building of warheads.....

This tosses a monkey wrench into the fray!

tequila
12-14-2007, 04:28 PM
Wasn't Paul Bremer one of Kissinger's boys?

Pat Lang (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2007/12/kissinger-vs-th.html)on Kissinger's editorial.



In this piece Kissinger insists that he (and his friends) know best what is important (and dangerous) in Iran's nuclear program. He insists that the mere enrichment of uranium is the most dangerous part of such a program. He denigrates the focus of the NIE on actual weapon and warhead research and production, claiming that such prodigies of engineering could be achieved with relative ease once the all-important store of enriched uranium is obtained.

In this process of reasoning, Kissinger ignores the fact that uranium enrichment is also necessary to produce fuel needed to have a large number of atomic electric plants. The difference in the two kinds of enrichment is that weapons production requires a much higher percentage of enrichment. The difference is detectable and so far the IAEA has not detected any efforts to produce weapons grade enriched fuel.

Watcher In The Middle
12-14-2007, 08:28 PM
...of the 2007 NIE. Just a few minor "pol" observations.

First (from a pol standpoint), this isn't a "game changer" as much as it is a "playing field changer". It was sort of like trying to play soccer on an ice hockey rink, and now that's been changed to a basketball court. But, now it's not a major priority like it was before, so nobody wants to really play PERIOD.

Second, it's been an early Christmas present for all the political "Body and Fender" shops out there. The 2007 NIE conclusions weren't expected, so all the political punditry had to scramble around and had to acquire all the "expertise" they could get on the QT. Nice little unexpected bonus there, some people made out really well. The spin resulting from all of this has run the full spectrum, with some of it being nothing short of spectacular (from a "spin appreciation" standpoint).

Third, most of the major political candidates are silently counting their blessings. Took an item off the boards that nobody had a really good answer on, and nobody wanted to really run with.

Conclusions (political) I'm hearing: Iran is no longer a front burner International issue, for the domestic political front. And from the looks of it, the pols like it that way.

Thoughts?

JeffC
12-14-2007, 08:34 PM
Despite whatever one may think about the opinions of a given individual I have always found it wise to listen to those to whom many other prominent decision makers listen.

If nothing else you know exactly where they stand in relation to yourself.

I wonder how much support towards Iran's nuclear ambitions Kissinger provided when he was Nixon's National Security Advisor, and if he's having any second thoughts, particularly as regards the loopholes in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty? Here's a bit of Iran's nuclear history back in the 60's and 70's:

Although Iran began developing its nuclear program in the 1950s, it was slow to progress until late in the 1960s, when the U.S.-supplied 5MW thermal research reactor (TRR) went online at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). In 1973, spurred by an influx of oil revenues, the Shah of Iran embarked on an ambitious goal of modernizing the country and building its image abroad. He did this by shifting the country's budgets toward the military and the newly established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The Shah set his goal high: "...get, as soon as possible, 23,000MWe from nuclear power stations."[1] In 1968, Iran signed the NPT in an effort to speed up its negotiations for nuclear agreements, particularly with the United States. In 1970, the government ratified the NPT and its obligations went into force.

In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several contracts for the construction of nuclear plants and the supply of nuclear fuel: with the United States in 1974; Germany in 1976; and France in 1977. In 1976, Iran also purchased a stake in Eurodif's (the European consortium) Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and purchased a stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia. Also in 1976, the government signed a $700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa and sent Iranian technicians abroad for training in nuclear sciences.

(source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html)

Rex Brynen
12-14-2007, 09:40 PM
I'm very far from a Kissinger fan, and as has been apparent on this board I've been critical of (bellicose) Administration handling of Iran (nuclear and other issues).

His editorial does point out an important issue, however.

The enrichment issue is an absolutely key aspect of a weapons programme, and also relates directly to future Iranian strategic power. It is also the hardest part to crash-start, and the hardest part to do covertly.

The unclassified portions of the NIE seems to suggest that it is the weapons design/weaponization portion of the programme has been stopped. Whether the enrichment programme is meant to have civilian, military (immediate weapons production), or strategic-scientific-technical (future weapons potential) goals is still unclear. I suspect the third is at least as important as the first.

JeffC
12-15-2007, 12:54 AM
I'm very far from a Kissinger fan, and as has been apparent on this board I've been critical of (bellicose) Administration handling of Iran (nuclear and other issues).

His editorial does point out an important issue, however.

The enrichment issue is an absolutely key aspect of a weapons programme, and also relates directly to future Iranian strategic power. It is also the hardest part to crash-start, and the hardest part to do covertly.

The unclassified portions of the NIE seems to suggest that it is the weapons design/weaponization portion of the programme has been stopped. Whether the enrichment programme is meant to have civilian, military (immediate weapons production), or strategic-scientific-technical (future weapons potential) goals is still unclear. I suspect the third is at least as important as the first.

But no one has denied that there's still an enrichment issue. It is the single greatest fault that the IAEA has with Iran's other-wise more or less acceptable compliance, and it's still being negotiated as far as I know. Neverthelessr, I don't know of any credible experts who claim that Iran has anything other than ancient centerfuges which might be able to generate enough HEU in 18 months to produce one nuclear warhead - and that's a big "if".

Sean Osborne
12-15-2007, 04:37 PM
The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead.

Given the nature of the Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran, that's one nuclear weapon too many for a regime which has declared its intent to wipe another sovereign state off of the face of the earth.


Nevertheless, I don't know of any credible experts who claim that Iran has anything other than ancient centerfuges which might be able to generate enough HEU in 18 months to produce one nuclear warhead - and that's a big "if".

Graham Allison (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7553) had a good article in the YaleGlobal back in June 2006.

He wrote:


The dog that hasn’t barked is Iran’s covert programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Four huge “known unknowns” lie at the heart of judgments about the threat posed by Iran.

But on the specifics about Iranian centrifuges Allison wrote:


...the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, Dr. A.Q. Khan, sold Iran advanced P2 centrifuge designs that are still unaccounted for.

JeffC
12-15-2007, 05:43 PM
Graham Allison (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7553) had a good article in the YaleGlobal back in June 2006.

He wrote:



But on the specifics about Iranian centrifuges Allison wrote:

"unaccounted for" and "unknown" are all that anyone has on this issue. That being the case, the most reasonable action is to let the designated international body, the IAEA, do its work and to act in collaboration with other nations to encourage Iran to comply with the IAEA. Every nation involved is willing to do that, including, for a change, ours (a vocal minority who still want to bomb Iran notwithstanding). The only exception is Israel who already possesses a developed nuclear capability.

Let me ask you, Sean. If you discovered that your neighbors were Satanists, and that they held rituals in their backyard to glorify Satan and blaspheme Jesus, how would you feel (this is a purely rhetorical question - please don't answer and convert this thread into a religious discussion). My point is that nuclear proliferation is not a simple black and white issue because nobody wants their neighbor who they don't get along with to possess a weapon that they have no defense against. They'll only feel safe if they can have that same weapon to offset their neighbor's possession of one.

That being the case, threats issued by the world's preeminent superpower, not to mention the nation which has more nuclear weapons by a factor of 10 then any other nation except Russia, are counter-productive to say the least.

Ron Humphrey
12-15-2007, 06:19 PM
My point is that nuclear proliferation is not a simple black and white issue because nobody wants their neighbor who they don't get along with to possess a weapon that they have no defense against. They'll only feel safe if they can have that same weapon to offset their neighbor's possession of one.

That being the case, threats issued by the world's preeminent superpower, not to mention the nation which has more nuclear weapons by a factor of 10 then any other nation except Russia, are counter-productive to say the least.

I think your point about nuclear proliferation is extremely valid in that it is the major reason to confront and keep that one neighbor from working so hards towards it rather than not and ending up with twenty neighbors all working towards it with almost impossible odds at stopping them all.

As to who's doing the threatening who else should it be?

JeffC
12-15-2007, 06:48 PM
I think your point about nuclear proliferation is extremely valid in that it is the major reason to confront and keep that one neighbor from working so hards towards it rather than not and ending up with twenty neighbors all working towards it with almost impossible odds at stopping them all.

As to who's doing the threatening who else should it be?

It should be no one. Threats as a negotiating tool are counterproductive in general. Threats by the U.S. are inflammatory. If we want to reduce our number of enemies in the world, we need start exerting our influence in quieter, more effective ways. Otherwise, we as a nation will become more and more isolated, and eventually irrelevant, thanks to Globalization and the burgeoning markets of China and India (2.5 billlion people combined).

Ron Humphrey
12-15-2007, 06:56 PM
It should be no one. Threats as a negotiating tool are counterproductive in general. Threats by the U.S. are inflammatory. If we want to reduce our number of enemies in the world, we need start exerting our influence in quieter, more effective ways. Otherwise, we as a nation will become more and more isolated, and eventually irrelevant, thanks to Globalization and the burgeoning markets of China and India (2.5 billlion people combined).

,but using quiet interaction behind the scenes least out one big part of the picture. The message to others that we are not only serious about something but that we back up what we say. Considering how often the lack of that understanding on the part of others has caused us to get dragged into areas we didn't want to go don't you think a little bluster might not hurt to make sure theres no mis-calculations out there.

JeffC
12-15-2007, 07:43 PM
,but using quiet interaction behind the scenes least out one big part of the picture. The message to others that we are not only serious about something but that we back up what we say. Considering how often the lack of that understanding on the part of others has caused us to get dragged into areas we didn't want to go don't you think a little bluster might not hurt to make sure theres no mis-calculations out there.

An unknown entity might have to show a demonstration of power to be believed. The U.S. no longer has to do that, so why choose a strategy (threats and bluster) that enables our enemies and doesn't further our interests? We can, instead, adopt a different strategy that will yield what we want without adding more fuel to the fire.

bourbon
12-15-2007, 07:47 PM
Given the nature of the Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran, that's one nuclear weapon too many for a regime which has declared its intent to wipe another sovereign state off of the face of the earth.

What is the expression "to wipe [something] off the map” in Persian? I have been told that they do not even have such an idiom. There are some SWC members with significant Iran experience, hopefully they can help here.

Where in the history this “Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran” have they acted not in their interest, and acted irrationally? I am not speaking of rhetoric, but of behavior.

Sean Osborne
12-15-2007, 09:32 PM
"unaccounted for" and "unknown" are all that anyone has on this issue.

Yes, and that gets to, pardon the pun, the fissile core of the covert Iranian nuclear weapons program.


Every nation involved is willing to do that, including, for a change, ours (a vocal minority who still want to bomb Iran notwithstanding).

Can you offer some specifics on who in the United States is the vocal minority who want to bomb Iran?

From my vantage point I see that there are, on one side, those who stand foresquare with outright appeasers, and on another side those who see a window that is inexorably closing to prevent Iran indigenous nuclear weapons production capability. I don't see anyone clamoring to bomb Iran regardless.


The only exception is Israel who already possesses a developed nuclear capability.

Without the 'Sampson Option' Israel would have zero strategic depth. I don't blame them one iota for pursuing and achieing nuclear weapons capability. However, in the 40 years since most assessments have awarded them a nuclear weapons capability - is there any real proof that it exists? Has Israel ever conducted a verifiable nuclear weapons test ala Pakistan, India, U.S., U.K., Russia, France, China and, most recently, North Korea.


Let me ask you, Sean. If you discovered that your neighbors were Satanists, and that they held rituals in their backyard to glorify Satan and blaspheme Jesus, how would you feel.

My "feelings" would be irrelevant. Under the Constitution those neighbors have every right to practice their worship within the laws of the land.

More importantly your selection of the above is the worst possible analogy to attempt. It's a non-starter.

It would have been better to ask a question with a couple of "known knowns" in this manner:

1. I'm a Jew and I possess a hand grenade. But I wish my neighbors no harm from my handgrenade. I have it for purely defensive purposes.

2. I know my Iranian Twelver neighbors hate my family and wish to harm us to the point that they'd blow up our home and kill all of us (INTENT) if they had the CAPABILIY.

3. My friends, other neighbors, and my own sneaky little snoop of a son tell me that my neighbors are building a grenade and they plan to toss it into my backyard at the first OPPORTUNITY during a family meal.

So, I sit with my thumb stuck where the sun don't shine and allow this to happen?

What would you do Jeff?

A. Call the police who sympathize at every turn in townhall meeting with my evil neighbors?

B. Be proactive and begin preemptory planning to ensure that that genade is never built?

Sean Osborne
12-15-2007, 09:48 PM
What is the expression "to wipe [something] off the map” in Persian? I have been told that they do not even have such an idiom. There are some SWC members with significant Iran experience, hopefully they can help here.

Okay, would the Farsi translation of the following suffice instead?


"They are angry with our nation. But we tell them 'so be it and die from this anger'. Rest assured that if you do not respond to the divine call, you will die soon and vanish from the face of the earth," he said (http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=061206101357.8mjamnal&show_article=1).



Where in the history this “Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran” have they acted not in their interest, and acted irrationally? I am not speaking of rhetoric, but of behavior.

US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops? There are other examples of irrational Shi'a Twelver behaior, but this will suffice for now.

JeffC
12-15-2007, 10:28 PM
Can you offer some specifics on who in the United States is the vocal minority who want to bomb Iran?

The most vocal champion is Michael "Iran with the bomb or bomb Iran" Ledeen. And there are a vocal minority of folks who agree with him.



Without the 'Sampson Option' Israel would have zero strategic depth.

Israel has held her own quite well over the years, and her military and intelligence capabilities are well-regarded and respected. Those merits stand on their own as a deterrent without any need for nuclear weapons, especially since using such weapons would undoubtedly result in both Israel's destruction and a World War.


Is there any real proof that it exists? Has Israel ever conducted a verifiable nuclear weapons test ala Pakistan, India, U.S., U.K., Russia, France, China and, most recently, North Korea.

Proof or not; Verifiable or not. Is it your position that Israel does not have nuclear weapons?


It would have been better to ask a question with a couple of "known knowns" in this manner:

1. I'm a Jew and I possess a hand grenade. But I wish my neighbors no harm from my handgrenade. I have it for purely defensive purposes.

You forgot to mention that your house used to belong to your neighbors until they were forced to give it to you by the Home Owners Association. So, naturally, your protestations about wishing your neighbors no harm falls on deaf ears. They've already BEEN harmed. Add to that the fact that you own a hand grenade and they do not, and now they're really mad.

Even though I'm a supporter of Israel, and I have friends who served in the Israeli Army and Mossad, I think Israel should scuttle her nuclear program. It's a huge barrier to finding a peaceful solution for the Middle East.

Rex Brynen
12-15-2007, 10:36 PM
US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops? There are other examples of irrational Shi'a Twelver behaior, but this will suffice for now.

I'm not sure I would put many, if any, of those in the "irrational" column. Certainly no more irrational that the "topple Saddam Hussein's regime with grandiose ideas of establishing a stable, pro-Western free-market democratic ally in its place" (accompanied by "shift focus away from Afghanistan," "dissolve the Iraqi army," and "initially propose a bizarre system of Iraqi caucuses instead of elections"). Indeed, when in Tehran during the summer I was struck by how often I was asked to explain "irrational" American policy, which many interlocutors seem to have understood as reflecting a mix of Bush's personal views, Israeli influence, a cabal of neocon advisors, and Christian fundamentalism.

One of the most interesting thrusts of the declassified judgements of the NIE is the assessment that Tehran generally does weigh cost and benefit, and thereby acts in a strategic manner. Establishing a potential weapons capability, without actual weaponization, may well be quite rational from their perspective, given both perceived threats and the neighbourhood they live in.

Uboat509
12-15-2007, 11:37 PM
Even though I'm a supporter of Israel, and I have friends who served in the Israeli Army and Mossad, I think Israel should scuttle her nuclear program. It's a huge barrier to finding a peaceful solution for the Middle East.

Given the way things went during their last conflict in Lebanon I think that they may feel differently. The Israeli Army may be powerful but it is not invincible. They proved that during that conflict. Their enemies have certainly taken note. In any case I am having trouble thinking of a historical example where a country benefited from make it's military weaker in the face of its enemies.


US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops?

Are you seriously saying that these are not irrational?

SFC W

bourbon
12-16-2007, 12:07 AM
“In the whole of history, who was more crazy than Josef Stalin?” he asks. “In the whole of history, who was more crazy than Mao Tsetung? I don’t see that Ahmadinejad is more crazy than them. Maybe to the contrary. I listen to Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, but I cannot think of even one case since 1980 and the Iranian Islamic Revolution that this country has behaved irrationally.” - Martin van Creveld

Expert: U.S. Attack on Iran Would Have Terrible Consequences (http://www.newsmax.com/headlines/U.S_Iran_attack/2007/11/28/52858.html). Newsmax, November 28, 2007


Are you seriously saying that these are not irrational?

What did we do in response to any of these? Little or nothing. They further their interests just enough to avoid punishment. In Iraq, I imagine they could really put the screws to us if they wanted to, say flood the place with MANPADS like we did in Afghanistan in the 80's. But they haven't, why not? I believe it is to able to increase / decrease pressure on us.
I think this is rational.

Dr. Trita Parsi has noted that the unstated policy of Iranian leadership is "Simulated irrationality". Reminds me of Nixon's "Madman Theory".

JeffC
12-16-2007, 12:28 AM
Given the way things went during their last conflict in Lebanon I think that they may feel differently. The Israeli Army may be powerful but it is not invincible. They proved that during that conflict. Their enemies have certainly taken note. In any case I am having trouble thinking of a historical example where a country benefited from make it's military weaker in the face of its enemies.


Having nuclear weapons doesn't make a nation stronger, because no one can use them without becoming an international pariah - and that's the best case scenario. The worst case scenario is Israel launches on Iran. Russia launches on Israel. The U.S. launches on Russia. Russia and China launch on the U.S. And the world as we know it is over.

Israel's only hope for long term survival lies with Israel's conventional military and intelligence services, and those of her allies.

As to the other quote in your reply to me, I was not the poster who wrote it.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 12:30 AM
The most vocal champion is Michael Ledeen. And there are a vocal minority of folks who agree with him.

Michael Ledeen speaks from a postion of significant experience. I also agreed with him 100% when he stated, "I have little sympathy for those who have avoided the obvious necessity of confronting Iran." Exactly correct. He was smart enough to recognize the fascistic nature of the Iranian Ayatollah's from the get-go. Guess that places me squarely in your "minority". In some respects Ledeen reminds me of Churchill warning about Hilter in the 1930's. It's probably 1938.



Israel has held her own quite well over the years, and her military and intelligence capabilities are well-regarded and respected. Those merits stand on their own as a deterrent without any need for nuclear weapons, especially since using such weapons would undoubtedly result in both Israel's destruction and a World War.

You appear to be forgetting what nearly occurred in the Yom Kippur War of1973.


Is it your position that Israel does not have nuclear weapons?

No it's not. It's very likely IMHO that Israel has a very robust, thermonuclear deterrent. And I would advise the Israeli government to maintain their deterrent at all costs.

Uboat509
12-16-2007, 12:35 AM
So the rationality of their actions is determined not by the actions themselves but by our response to them? This reminds me of a game my kids like to play sometimes called let's see what we can get away with. It's a dangerous game. You have to find the line with out crossing it. To make things more difficult, the line moves. Sooner or later somebody steps across it and ends up in the corner or their room.

SFC W

Rex Brynen
12-16-2007, 12:35 AM
Are you seriously saying that these are not irrational?
SFC W

Taking them in order:

US Embassy, Tehran.

Largely fueled by the standard hyper-enthusiasm of the early revolutionary stage, this helped to undermine the government of then (relatively moderate) Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and helped to strengthen and ultimately consolidate the power of the hardline revolutionaries in the new regime—thus paving the way for the establishment of the Islamic Republic in its present form. In terms of domestic politics, therefore, it paid off well. Also encouraged other Islamist radicals in the region.

USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon.

Led to US eventual withdrawal from Lebanon, and removed a critical prop of what was seen as the pro-Israeli government of President Amin Gemayil. Ultimately hastened the collapse of the May 17 (1983) Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, substantially benefitting Iran's Syrian ally. Today, Hizbullah is by far the largest and most influential single political party in Lebanon. From Tehran's point-of-view, an immensely successful set of attacks.

Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia.

Complicated one, for a variety of reasons I'll pass.

cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops?

US forces in Iraq are seen by Tehran as a fundamental national security threat, much as Iranian forces in Montreal would be seen in Washington (although at -19 C, I suspect its a bit cold for them today). US casualties have weakened US public support for presence in Iraq, and provision of material support has somewhat strengthened Iranian influence with JAM/Sadr. Has also signaled Iran's ability to retaliate against any US attacks against Iran by targeting US troops in Iraq. Khatemi and Rafsanjani factions argue, in any case, this policy is largely due to Washington's failure to reach a strategic agreement/grand bargain with Iran in 2003.


I'm not arguing that I think all of these were, on balance, the best possible moves for Iran given the costs of international isolation, etc. However, I certainly don't think they were particularly irrational options.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 12:37 AM
Having nuclear weapons doesn't make a nation stronger, because no one can use them without becoming an international pariah - and that's the best case scenario.

Like Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Or what about the implied threat of their use - as caused Nikita K. to pull Soviet missiles out of Cuba (of course we pulled our short range missiles out of Turkey - but that was well after the Russian's had to back down and go home with theirs).

Uboat509
12-16-2007, 12:47 AM
Having nuclear weapons doesn't make a nation stronger, because no one can use them without becoming an international pariah - and that's the best case scenario. The worst case scenario is Israel launches on Iran. Russia launches on Israel. The U.S. launches on Russia. Russia and China launch on the U.S. And the world as we know it is over.


I am guessing that the way that Israelis see it is that it is better to be an international pariah than to be annihilated by one's enemies. I would tend to agree. In any case your worst case scenario seems a bit far fetched.

SFC W

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 12:49 AM
cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in Iraq against US and British troops?

US forces in Iraq are seen by Tehran as a fundamental national security threat...

Nah, I disagree, this is nonapplicable.

What about US Forces in Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan? The Iranian's have not sent Iranian troops into these countries in order to kidnap and assassinate American soldiers while disguised as American soldiers in American vehicles, or to kill American combat troops with EFPs.

The activities of the IRGC Qods force are those of SOLIC forces. Against the military might of the United States these actions are highly irrational. They appear to be begging for our retaliation.

Then again the Iranian's have long demonstrated a tendency towards mass suicide in combat operations. Stupid is as stupid does.

JeffC
12-16-2007, 12:52 AM
Like Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Laying aside the question of whether that action was justified or necessary, do you really think that any nation, including, God forbid, the U.S., could repeat that today and get away with it??




Or what about the implied threat of their use - as caused Nikita K. to pull Soviet missiles out of Cuba (of course we pulled our short range missiles out of Turkey - but that was well after the Russian's had to back down and go home with theirs).

That was a unique moment in time when the U.S. had a huge advantage over the Russians in terms of nuclear warheads and inter-continental ballistic missles. In fact, Russia had none of the latter. Khrushchev was bluffing and had his bluff called. That's no longer the case.

Uboat509
12-16-2007, 01:11 AM
Let's not forget about arming Hezbollah with weapons that were used primarily for the purpose of targeting Israeli civilians.

SFC W

bourbon
12-16-2007, 01:17 AM
So the rationality of their actions is determined not by the actions themselves but by our response to them?

More importantly their ability to estimate and gauge our response before the action. A calculation of risk v. reward.


This reminds me of a game my kids like to play sometimes called let's see what we can get away with. It's a dangerous game. You have to find the line with out crossing it. To make things more difficult, the line moves. Sooner or later somebody steps across it and ends up in the corner or their room.

I do not think anyone would disagree that it is a dangerous game.


Further, I see Iran's 2003 conciliatory outreach to us, after we had just walloped Saddam's Army, as more evidence of Iran's ability to think and act rationally.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 01:27 PM
Laying aside the question of whether that action (the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) was justified or necessary, do you really think that any nation, including, God forbid, the U.S., could repeat that today and get away with it??


Jeff,

"Getting away with" is not the end sum given the specific circumstances of a full scale war like we had with Japan in WWII. Nor is it today. There is no international law against a preemptive or retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in a conflict.

For example. Keep an eye on Damascus should Syria ever hit Israel with the chemical weapon warheads it is known to have been fiddling with recently. The Syrian's have been informed in no uncertain terms that should they perch chemical warheads on their missiles Damascus will cease to exist.

With respect to the U.S. - the stated policy of National Command Authority known as the ""Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" answers your question with crystal clarity.

That warfare involving nuclear weapons will occur at some point in the future, by a state or non-state actor - is widely discussed as not a matter of if but when.



That was a unique moment in time when the U.S. had a huge advantage over the Russians in terms of nuclear warheads and inter-continental ballistic missles. In fact, Russia had none of the latter. Khrushchev was bluffing and had his bluff called.

Your statement is 100% incorrect. It was Soviet Russia that placed the worlds first ICBM on a launchpad. The R-7 (http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/r7.htm) (SS-6) went into operation in 1957.

Jeff - you need to check your facts - the R7 was the ICBM platform which orbited Sputnik.

However, with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis is was the R-7A (http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/r7a.htm) (SS-6 Mod 2) that was on the launch pads at Baikonur and Plesetsk in 1960 which provided Russia with a significant strategic nuclear deterrent.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 01:45 PM
I see Iran's 2003 conciliatory outreach to us, after we had just walloped Saddam's Army, as more evidence of Iran's ability to think and act rationally.

bourbon,

What Iranian 2003 "conciliatory outreach' to the United States are you referring to?

With respect to the NIE we're talking about - the US discovered in 2002 that Iran had covert nuclear weapons research ongoing at Natanz and Arak. An Iranian opposition group was responsible for pointing an accusatory finger at both the covert uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as well as the covert heavy water facility at Arak. At the time of this discovery both facilities were completely unknown to the pros in the U.S. intelligence community.

Moreover, the dual-use (geared for primarily military applications) Iranian HEU enrichment we did know about continued without interuption.

I repeat, what "conciliatory outreach" in 2003 are you referring to?

JeffC
12-16-2007, 03:54 PM
Jeff,

That warfare involving nuclear weapons will occur at some point in the future, by a state or non-state actor - is widely discussed as not a matter of if but when.

Hopefully, smarter minds will prevail.



However, with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis is was the R-7A (http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/r7a.htm) (SS-6 Mod 2) that was on the launch pads at Baikonur and Plesetsk in 1960 which provided Russia with a significant strategic nuclear deterrent.

Granted, Sean, but there was no comparison between Soviet capabilities and U.S. capabilities in 1962. We vastly outnumbered the Soviets, which was why they were trying to base missiles in Cuba - to help them close that gap. Read Dale C Copeland's essay "Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War", part of the collection of essays in "Realism: Restatements and Renewal" (http://books.google.com/books?id=T4mTzYTZ1pcC&printsec=frontcover)

And my error of fact notwithstanding, my point remains that the circumstances around the nuclear showdown of the Cuban Missile Crisis no longer apply today. We are now at nuclear parity with the Russians, and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction is ignored at our peril.

bourbon
12-16-2007, 04:16 PM
bourbon,

What Iranian 2003 "conciliatory outreach' to the United States are you referring to?

With respect to the NIE we're talking about - the US discovered in 2002 that Iran had covert nuclear weapons research ongoing at Natanz and Arak. An Iranian opposition group was responsible for pointing an accusatory finger at both the covert uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as well as the covert heavy water facility at Arak. At the time of this discovery both facilities were completely unknown to the pros in the U.S. intelligence community.

Moreover, the dual-use (geared for primarily military applications) Iranian HEU enrichment we did know about continued without interuption.

I repeat, what "conciliatory outreach" in 2003 are you referring to?

See the thread: May 2003 Iranian Offer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2757)

See also:
Report: Cheney rejected Iran's offer of concessions in 2003 (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0118/p99s01-duts.html), By Tom Regan.
csmonitor.com, January 18, 2007

What We Wanted to Tell You About Iran (http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2006/what_we_wanted_to_tell_you_about_iran_4550), By Flynt Leverett, New America Foundation with Hillary Mann. The New York Times, December 22, 2006

I repeat See the thread: May 2003 Iranian Offer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2757)

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 04:24 PM
Granted, Sean, but there was no comparison between Soviet capabilities and U.S. capabilities in 1962.
This is irrelevant to what you posted above as fact:

That was a unique moment in time when the U.S. had a huge advantage over the Russians in terms of nuclear warheads and inter-continental ballistic missles. In fact, Russia had none of the latter.

We are now at nuclear parity with the Russians, and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction is ignored at our peril.
Parity or not is a debateable issue in its own right. However NOBODY is ignorant of MAD. Nobody and most certainly not the US.

Iran hasn't yet revealed an accurate report of it's capabilities to produce HEU. It has old, unreliable centerfuges.
Jeff,

These two sentences are mutually exclusive. Since Iran has not yet revealed detailed and verified as accurate data about its capability to produce HEU it cannot possibly be deduced as fact that Iran has old unreliable centrifuges.

Additionally, the Intelligence Community knows that AQ Khan (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7553) proliferated/sold Iran detailed plans to produce second generation (P2) centrifuges - those P2 plans remain completely unaccounted for.

To the contrary of your statement above, Iran has minimally informed the IAEA that they were in the process testing P2 centrifuges and even has advanced designs in production for P3 centrifuges.

Moreover, the covert Arak facility is reported to produce plutonium, not HEU.

Bottom line is: we know what we know, and we don't know what we don't know.

Prudence suggests that we assume worst case.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 07:50 PM
See the thread: May 2003 Iranian Offer (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2757)

I see nothing here that proves the verified existence of a viable "offer" from Iran regarding its nuclear ambitions.

I saw that the primary news source was uncertain of the source of the "offer." In fact, I saw something about a "proposal," but nothing specific about an "offer."

The most current report on Iranian nuclear activity comes from Amir Taheri entitled "Appeasement Yesterday and Appeasement Today (http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=11151)".

Excerpt:


In other words, even if we accept the NIE’s claim that the programme was stopped in 2003, something that we have no reason to do, there is no evidence that it has not been resumed.

There is, in fact, quite a bit of evidence to the contrary.

As already noted, the uranium enrichment project has been resumed and continues at much faster pace.

•According to official estimates in Tehran, allocations for the nuclear programme have risen by almost 40 per cent.

•The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that all of Iran’s known nuclear sites remain in full operation.

•The IAEA also reports that it has no access to a number of other industrial sites in Iran that may well be linked to the nuclear programme. In other words, we know what we don’t know but don’t know what we don’t know.

JeffC
12-16-2007, 09:24 PM
This is irrelevant to what you posted above as fact:

How is it irrelevant? That instead of zero ICBMs they had minimal amount? Both go to demonstrate my original point of how the Cuban Missile Crisis is not an example of a nation using the threat of nuclear weapons TODAY is realistic or probable because today we have parity. 40 years ago - no parity.



Parity or not is a debateable issue in its own right.

It is? I'd love to read a reference that you have that claims nuclear parity existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1962.



However NOBODY is ignorant of MAD. Nobody and most certainly not the US.

Good. Then let's hope that cooler heads prevail and nobody launches "preemptively" or for any other reason.



The most current report on Iranian nuclear activity comes from Amir Taheri entitled "Appeasement Yesterday and Appeasement Today (http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=11151)".

Excerpt:

Oh, come on. You might as well be quoting Karl Rove. Show me the IAEA report that verifies the current state of Iranian nuclear production. Verified facts, please.

Ken White
12-16-2007, 09:56 PM
Oh, come on. You might as well be quoting Karl Rove. Show me the IAEA report that verifies the current state of Iranian nuclear production. Verified facts, please.

of the NIE? How can anyone in the US show verified facts on the Iranian nuclear program?

Speculation is speculation, regardless of who prints it, seems to me. Been my observation that most who print speculation and try to couch it as fact have a bias that will come out in their statements and that all too frequently, there's an agenda at work -- and that agenda may not be what seems apparent.

JeffC
12-16-2007, 10:18 PM
Jeff,

These two sentences are mutually exclusive. Since Iran has not yet revealed detailed and verified as accurate data about its capability to produce HEU it cannot possibly be deduced as fact that Iran has old unreliable centrifuges.


We know Iran has P1 centerfuges that they acquired from Pakistan, and we know that P1 centerfuges break down frequently. What we don't know is how much HEU is being produced, however based on what we DO know about the P1's, and about their number, 3000, its unlikely that they're doing much with them.



Additionally, the Intelligence Community knows that AQ Khan (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7553) proliferated/sold Iran detailed plans to produce second generation (P2) centrifuges - those P2 plans remain completely unaccounted for.

To the contrary of your statement above, Iran has minimally informed the IAEA that they were in the process testing P2 centrifuges and even has advanced designs in production for P3 centrifuges.

Iran claims a lot of things, and hyperbole is not in short supply in Tehran. Plans for a P2 is far removed from a functioning cascade. Very far removed.




Moreover, the covert Arak facility is reported to produce plutonium, not HEU.]



Iran's plutonium production has already been verified by the IAEA as peaceful. It's a closed issue.




Bottom line is: we know what we know, and we don't know what we don't know. Prudence suggests that we assume worst case.

No, that would be paranoia, not prudence. Prudence says wait for the facts to come in before launching an attack on WMDs that don't exist.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 10:27 PM
of the NIE? How can anyone in the US show verified facts on the Iranian nuclear program?

Speculation is speculation, regardless of who prints it, seems to me. Been my observation that most who print speculation and try to couch it as fact have a bias that will come out in their statements and that all too frequently, there's an agenda at work -- and that agenda may not be what seems apparent.

I concur. Moreover it seems that at least some to the left of center deem the NIE to be chiseled-in-granite verifiable intelligence fact instead of the multi-faceted compiled intelligence estimate and assessment that it really is. All estimates and assessments are subject to additional review with the application of new data and a subsequent re-estimation and re-assessment as the net result.

JeffC
12-16-2007, 10:38 PM
of the NIE? How can anyone in the US show verified facts on the Iranian nuclear program?

No, Ken, not of the NIE. From the IAEA. I objected to Sean's use of evidence which turned out to be an editorial by Amir Taheri. I'm simply saying to wait until the IAEA finishes it's work and issues a report rather than state editorial positions as if they're facts.


I concur. Moreover it seems that at least some to the left of center deem the NIE to be chiseled-in-granite verifiable intelligence fact instead of the multi-faceted compiled intelligence estimate and assessment that it really is. All estimates and assessments are subject to additional review with the application of new data and a subsequent re-estimation and re-assessment as the net result.

Lots of people use the NIE to support their own agenda, Sean, not just the "left of center", or are you actually saying that members of the political Right are exempt from that error?

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 10:52 PM
based on what we DO know about the P1's, and about their number, 3000...

Really? How do you know all 3000 are of the first generation P1 types? Got proof?

Even more importantly, what the IAEA has consistently demanded of Iran is that it certifiably halt ALL ENRICHMENT PROCESSES. Period. Iran has flat out refused to do so.

ElBaradei as quoted by the Financial Times (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2007/ft190207.html)on 19 February 2007:


...I would report that Iran has not complied with the demand of the international community to suspend [enrichment processes].


Iran's plutonium production has already been verified by the IAEA as peaceful. It's a closed issue.

The IAEA provided Iran with a Q&A for them to fill out. The IAEA then accepted Iran's written response carte blanche. There was no inspection whatsoever to verify the veracity of Iranian answers to the IAEA Q&A.



No, that would be paranoia, not prudence.

That would be in accordance with you own personal opinion; an opinion I obvious do not share.


Prudence says wait for the facts to come in before launching an attack on WMDs that don't exist.

The prudence decision is in the hands of the U.S. National Military Command Authority. Period.

JeffC
12-16-2007, 11:07 PM
Really? How do you know all 3000 are of the first generation P1 types? Got proof?

Yes.It's from your old friend Khan (http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf).


The prudence decision is in the hands of the U.S. National Military Command Authority. Period.

Which is under the control of a civilian Commander-in-Chief, who is elected by the people of the U.S. So my argument is that "we the people" would be well-served to also exercise prudence. Perhaps then so many of us won't be fooled by the fear-mongers that are now occupying and/or campaigning for political office.

Sean Osborne
12-16-2007, 11:10 PM
I objected to Sean's use of ... an editorial by Amir Taheri.

There's absolutely nothing wrong with Amir Taheri's analysis (http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10174190.html) of Iran, the IAEA or the NIE.

From the above link:


The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can also spin the new NIE in favour of its own exercise in diplomatic chiaroscuro. It (the IAEA) has demonstrated that Iran has had a hidden and illegal nuclear programme at some point but refuses to commit itself on whether or not this is still the case.

Bingo. Dead-on correct based upon all available OSINT.


Yes. It's from Khan (http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf).

This is not from Khan and it says nothing about whether or not Iran has used the Khan proliferated P2 designs to build Iranian centrifuges.

JeffC
12-16-2007, 11:39 PM
This is not from Khan and it says nothing about whether or not Iran has used the Khan proliferated P2 designs to build Iranian centrifuges.

It's an excellent analysis of the info gleaned from Khan's network, which is how the P1s came to be in Iran's possession.


There's absolutely nothing wrong with Amir Taheri's analysis (http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10174190.html) of Iran, the IAEA or the NIE.

From the above link:

Bingo. Dead-on correct based upon all available OSINT.


Well, that's your preference and your entitled to use whatever evidence you think supports your point of view.

I prefer original sources for my evidence whenever possible, and short of that, an assessment by an official body, think tank, academic institution, or research organization that's considered reputable and balanced. I put journalists with a clear case of bias (use of emotionally charged words like "appeasement" in the title of an editorial is a good hint) in the round file, but that's just me.

Rex Brynen
12-17-2007, 01:13 AM
I think the thread has started to spin in circles, and break down frequently.

I think we can all agree:


1) That current evidence seems to suggest that Iran has suspended its weaponization programme, for now at least.

2) It does have an active enrichment programme, of uncertain size. This could be civilian, it could be part of a drive to build a weapon, or it could be part of an effort to attain weapons capacity (without actually moving to a weapon).

3) The military option, regardless of its drawbacks or merits, is off the table for now.

Given this, perhaps we can focus on:


1) What ought to be the goal? No Iranian enrichment capacity? Limited under safeguards? With what quid pro quos?

2) Ought current diplomatic efforts be revised in some way?

Ken White
12-17-2007, 01:20 AM
No, Ken, not of the NIE. From the IAEA. I objected to Sean's use of evidence which turned out to be an editorial by Amir Taheri. I'm simply saying to wait until the IAEA finishes it's work and issues a report rather than state editorial positions as if they're facts.

the NIE or the IAEA is likely to be totally accurate -- or factual. IMO, of course. YMMV.

JeffC
12-17-2007, 01:55 AM
I think the thread has started to spin in circles, and break down frequently.

I think we can all agree:


1) That current evidence seems to suggest that Iran has suspended its weaponization programme, for now at least.

2) It does have an active enrichment programme, of uncertain size. This could be civilian, it could be part of a drive to build a weapon, or it could be part of an effort to attain weapons capacity (without actually moving to a weapon).

3) The military option, regardless of its drawbacks or merits, is off the table for now.

Given this, perhaps we can focus on:


1) What ought to be the goal? No Iranian enrichment capacity? Limited under safeguards? With what quid pro quos?

2) Ought current diplomatic efforts be revised in some way?

I agree with your assessment in the first part, and for the second my opinion is (1) no enrichment capabilities anywhere in the Middle East. Instead, go with Switzerland's existing offer to provide the enriched fuel for civilian use by any ME nation who wants it (and the entire GCC does), and (2) yes. They never should have ceased to begin with.

JJackson
12-17-2007, 11:33 AM
This fuel has been IAEA sealed for a while now awaiting shipment.

Russia ships nuclear fuel to Iran
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7147463.stm


The Bushehr plant is a LWR and uses 103 tonnes.

Sean Osborne
12-17-2007, 01:03 PM
I think the thread has started to spin in circles, and break down frequently.

I agree. The thread has gone peripheral to the topic several times which directly led to off topic issues. I began to smell a "blame America" scent insted of focus on the NIE as the thread topic. This is one reason why I simply ceased my posting to this thread last evening.


I think we can all agree:


1) That current evidence seems to suggest that Iran has suspended its weaponization programme, for now at least.

2) It does have an active enrichment programme, of uncertain size. This could be civilian, it could be part of a drive to build a weapon, or it could be part of an effort to attain weapons capacity (without actually moving to a weapon).

3) The military option, regardless of its drawbacks or merits, is off the table for now.

NEGATIVE. I do not agree with Number 1 at all.

There is no conclusive current evidence that seems to suggest that Iran has ceased its nuclear weapons program. The Iranian dual use uranium enrichment cycle cited in this NIE is a primary indicator of Iranian intent.

This continuing dual-use processing of HEU is blatant Iranian defiance of the international community led by the IAEA.

The UNCLASSIFIED National Intelligence ESTIMATE does estimate, does assess, does make key judgements and does make key assumptions (see the NIE "scope note") based upon its overall estimation processes about an Iranian cessation of its nucear weapons program in 2003, and with moderate confidence Iran has not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007.

However, there are agencies within the US Intelligence Community who do not share this assessment. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) have only moderate confidence that the 2003 halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program. The NIC functions as the lead in the effort to product all NIE's for the DNI. This is a significant admission within the NIE with respect to the assessment of an Iranian halt to its active nuclear weapons program.

In my assessment this evidence makes evident that Rex's statement in item number 1 above is not an accurate statement with respect to what we ALL can agree on.

Also and therefore item number 3 is excluded in its entirety.

Need agreement here before moving forward to any other positions.

SWCAdmin
12-17-2007, 02:01 PM
Need agreement here before moing forward to any other positions.
That is unlikely. :D

But I think we can safely say we have documentd the basis of disagreement. And that's a win, which does enable forward movement to address the next level of so what, impacts, etc.

Even if it doing so has to be marginally presumptive based on the disagreement on the underlying assessments, i.e. where one party says "I still don't believe X is true, but accepting for a moment your assertion that it is, then I <---?> with you that the impact will be Y."

Sean Osborne
12-17-2007, 02:34 PM
That is unlikely. :D

Allow me to re-phrase over the course and sum of this post. I think we need agreement on what the NIE does and does not estimate, assess, and hold as key judgements or key assumptions.



But I think we can safely say we have documentd the basis of disagreement.

I concur 100%.



And that's a win, which does enable forward movement to address the next level of so what, impacts, etc.

Identifying the disagreements on the NIE is a win.

However, I still wonder about the possibility of progression to the next level without basic agreement regarding what the NIE does and does not say. What real progress does the thread make in going forward with such a disparity of opinion? We'll repeatedly come back to the basis of the disagreement on the substance of the NIE.

I think it pretty obvious these disagreements on the NIE lie on top of a political or ideological fault line. Some are to the left of the line. Some are to the right.


Even if (in) doing so (it) has to be marginally presumptive based on the disagreement on the underlying assessments, i.e. where one party says "I still don't believe X is true, but accepting for a moment your assertion that it is, then I <---?> with you that the impact will be Y."

((Sorry, if I overstepped bounds in slight editing above... it's the intent of meaning that I think you intended to convey.))

Okay, then it looks as if this is to be a debate with each side free to claim victory at some unknown point which would be based upon their pre-existent postion on the "fault line;" and that the ongoing argument/debate will be for the arguments/debates sake. I doubt a consensus can be achieved in this manner, but let's see where it goes and whether or not this prognositcation is ultimately correct or incorrect.

Stan
12-17-2007, 07:49 PM
Center for American Progess writes... (http://www.americanprogress.org/)

Rebuilding a Coherent Policy Toward Iran (http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/iran_event.html)
CAP brings in two authors on recent books about Iran to suggest a new policy for the United States in light of the new NIE report.


“If the U.S. had seen the same opening Iran did after 9/11, there wouldn’t be 3000 centrifuges spinning right now,” said Barbara Slavin, a senior diplomatic reporter at USA Today and author of Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation. (http://www.amazon.com/Bitter-Friends-Bosom-Enemies-Confrontation/dp/0312368259/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197662331&sr=1-1)

Slavin, who is also on leave this year as a fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, joined Trita Parsi, author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (http://www.amazon.com/Bitter-Friends-Bosom-Enemies-Confrontation/dp/0312368259/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197662331&sr=1-1) and president of the National Iranian American Council, in a discussion at the Center for American Progress titled “Nuclear Meltdown: Rebuilding a Coherent Policy Toward Iran.” Joseph Cirincione, Senior Fellow and Director of Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress and co-author of Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis (http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/iran_report.html), moderated the panel.

The books, said Cirincione, are “very complementary,” and provided a good starting point for a discussion about what would constitute a new U.S. policy toward Iran in light of the new National Intelligence Estimate that cast doubt on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The authors painted a complex history of U.S.-Iranian relations.

All agreed that the U.S. needs to find a diplomatic way forward with Iran. Parsi thought the turmoil in Pakistan was an issue the United States and Iran could work together on. “Yes, Pakistan has nuclear weapons and instability is great. That is an area where the U.S. and Iran have a common interest, which we should recognize and use to build trust.”

Ultimately, “we should try to get diplomats back to Iran,” said Slavin. “We can’t influence the country from the outside. We need some kind of dialogue and relationship.”

More at the link...

Sean Osborne
12-17-2007, 08:07 PM
Center for American Progess writes...

Center for American Progress (http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?grpid=6709)

Excerpts from the above link:


Leftist think tank run by Hillary Clinton and former Clinton chief of staff John Podesta
Helped launch Media Matters for America

The Center for American Progress (CAP) describes itself as "a nonpartisan research and educational institute" aimed at "developing a long-term vision of a progressive America" and "providing a forum to generate new progressive ideas and policy proposals."


One of CAP's primary missions is to carry out "rapid response" to what it calls conservative "attacks" in the media. To this end, CAP maintains more than a dozen spokespeople ready to appear on short notice on national talk shows to debate or respond to conservative commentators.

It is my opinion that CAP represents a very slick, left of center political front that is more interested in the appeasement of Iran and its own political agenda than serious debate on the issue of ongoing Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons per the (2005 &) 2007 National Intelligence Estimates.

As referenced in my post above.

Stan
12-17-2007, 09:00 PM
It is my opinion that CAP represents a very slick, left of center political front that is more interested in the appeasement of Iran and its own political agenda than serious debate on the issue of ongoing Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons per the (2005 &) 2007 National Intelligence Estimates. As referenced in my post above.

Yup, political agendas tend to take center stage. However, I think what this does represent is yet another view (whether you and/or I ever agree with it), that we shouldn’t ignore it, and we definitely should at least be prepared for it, if the Democrats win this next election (God forbid).

I do agree that we should be back ‘there’ at ground zero in any form or function rather than being dependent upon other world organizations monitoring the situation, which will preclude more knee-jerk reactions and pathetic gaps in our ‘intelligence’.

I submit only one naive thought about this - collectively we have exhausted this thread, and I still conclude that there's little evidence that makes me think Iran will ever be able to put a nuke in functioning order. They remind me of rich Africans.

bourbon
12-17-2007, 09:01 PM
It is my opinion that CAP represents a very slick, left of center political front that is more interested in the appeasement of Iran and its own political agenda than serious debate on the issue of ongoing Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons per the (2005 &) 2007 National Intelligence Estimates.

As referenced in my post above.
First of all Joe Cirincione and Trita Parsi are experts who transcend common stock partisan bickering. Besides, Dr. Parsi is card carrying member of the Realist school of international relations which conflicts with Senator Clinton's neo-liberal/liberal interventionist camp.

Which leads me a second point, It is not an obvious left/right matter. Paleoconservatives for the most part fall on what you ascribe to the where the left is on this matter. They at best fail to see how neoconservative hawkishness on Iran is in the national interest, and worst question the neocon's motives. Not to mention view the neocons disdainfully as an ideology spawned by red-diaper babies, that has more in common with the Jacobin's and Bolsheviks than with conservatism. Further some fail to see much difference between Sen. Clinton and the likes of Rudy Guiliani or Mitt Romney on the Iran matter and Foreign Policy.

Watcher In The Middle
12-18-2007, 12:51 AM
Originally posted by Stan:

Yup, political agendas tend to take center stage. However, I think what this does represent is yet another view (whether you and/or I ever agree with it), that we shouldn’t ignore it, and we definitely should at least be prepared for it, if the Democrats win this next election (God forbid).

I do agree that we should be back ‘there’ at ground zero in any form or function rather than being dependent upon other world organizations monitoring the situation, which will preclude more knee-jerk reactions and pathetic gaps in our ‘intelligence’.

I submit only one naive thought about this - collectively we have exhausted this thread, and I still conclude that there's little evidence that makes me think Iran will ever be able to put a nuke in functioning order. They remind me of rich Africans.

Which leads right back to Rex Brynen's point of:


Given this, perhaps we can focus on:

1) What ought to be the goal? No Iranian enrichment capacity? Limited under safeguards? With what quid pro quos?

2) Ought current diplomatic efforts be revised in some way?

Dumb suggestion in order here, perhaps?

Assume that you guys (who have a whole lot of very practical, real life field expertise) are now faced with having a whole bunch of really dumb pols (yeah, I know, an Oxymoron if there ever was one) who know that they done "screwed the pooch" big time, but now they're saying "Help us out here, guys. We haven't done too well so far on our own, so it's time for a change". Suggestions?? (and don't just say "negotiate" - anybody can do that). Give us something that means something".

Right now, the pols out there are scrambling. They don't know what to do, and right now, all the SIG's (special interests, on all sides, and you can imaging who they all are) are pushing their agendas like mad. Problem for them is, most of them are obviously dripping with agendas and this makes them suspect.

SWJ can be an invaluable resource. This is one of those times where it is needed.

Simple question:

Let's say we (US) wants to start talkin to them good folks over there Tehran way? What's the plan?

Ron Humphrey
12-18-2007, 01:36 AM
Originally posted by Stan:


Which leads right back to Rex Brynen's point of:



Dumb suggestion in order here, perhaps?

Assume that you guys (who have a whole lot of very practical, real life field expertise) are now faced with having a whole bunch of really dumb pols (yeah, I know, an Oxymoron if there ever was one) who know that they done "screwed the pooch" big time, but now they're saying "Help us out here, guys. We haven't done too well so far on our own, so it's time for a change". Suggestions?? (and don't just say "negotiate" - anybody can do that). Give us something that means something".

Right now, the pols out there are scrambling. They don't know what to do, and right now, all the SIG's (special interests, on all sides, and you can imaging who they all are) are pushing their agendas like mad. Problem for them is, most of them are obviously dripping with agendas and this makes them suspect.

SWJ can be an invaluable resource. This is one of those times where it is needed.

Simple question:

Let's say we (US) wants to start talkin to them good folks over there Tehran way? What's the plan?

Have them sell oil to china through pipelines in countries within which we are allied

Have Russia take the responsibility for providing them with the power which is something they both want but which places a necessity for transparent dealings by both parties and puts pressure on a certain someone who wants to work behind the scenes to be on the line for what happens with anything involved in that process.

Call for referendum vote in Iran giving Khomenei the chance to get butt-head out of the way so that those we used to work with before get another chance or at worst shows how confident they aren't in their internal power base right now. Give none of the above approval until the conspirations of the last 12 years amongst aforementioned parties are brought to light and defined to the satisfaction of those nations which stood to lose the most as a result.

Oh and for China,, Naner naner boo boo ,anything you can do we and our friends can do better:D

Look it's a bird , no it's a plane , no it's the japanese shooting a balistic missile out of the sky.:D

You just asked for suggestions you didn't say they had to be good one's;)

Stan
12-18-2007, 09:01 AM
Dumb suggestion in order here, perhaps?

Assume that you guys (who have a whole lot of very practical, real life field expertise) are now faced with having a whole bunch of really dumb pols (yeah, I know, an Oxymoron if there ever was one) who know that they done "screwed the pooch" big time, but now they're saying "Help us out here, guys. We haven't done too well so far on our own, so it's time for a change". Suggestions?? (and don't just say "negotiate" - anybody can do that). Give us something that means something".

Right now, the pols out there are scrambling. They don't know what to do, and right now, all the SIG's (special interests, on all sides, and you can imaging who they all are) are pushing their agendas like mad. Problem for them is, most of them are obviously dripping with agendas and this makes them suspect.

SWJ can be an invaluable resource. This is one of those times where it is needed.

Simple question:

Let's say we (US) wants to start talkin to them good folks over there Tehran way? What's the plan?

I like Rex’s Option 1) Limited under safeguards with quid pro quos.

Since Ron came up with a darn good answer --get Russia and China more involved-- I’ll respond with a little expansion :).

You’re correct; we already negotiated our way into nowhere and looked pretty stupid coming back. I don’t see any immediate military involvement; it has to be a diplomatic effort :wry:. DOE (http://www.energy.gov/) has literally 100s of programs that deal with just this situation. Get them involved in providing materials and assistance in the construction. There’s no need for spying (and I don’t think we actually have intel types with degrees in nuclear physics) and more political brew ha ha’ing.

Offer them free assistance with rocket scientists at the helm.

Key this assistance package to release of sanctions and to joining the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepMinisterialMtg.html). There are enough influential players on the GNEP board and I doubt anyone on that board wants to be nuked by Iran :D


Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, China, France, Ghana, Hungary, Italy Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, The Ukraine and United States.

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 11:02 AM
Yup, political agendas tend to take center stage. However, I think what this does represent is yet another view (whether you and/or I ever agree with it), that we shouldn’t ignore it, and we definitely should at least be prepared for it, if the Democrats win this next election (God forbid).

We should be prepared like a Boy Scout is prepared.


I do agree that we should be back ‘there’ at ground zero in any form or function rather than being dependent upon other world organizations monitoring the situation, which will preclude more knee-jerk reactions and pathetic gaps in our ‘intelligence’.

We need covert HUMINT in almost every area of intelligence collection. As evidenced by the 2005 and 2007 NIE we desperately need covert HUMINT assets in Iran reporting on core capabilities. No more estimations, assessments, judgements or assumptions - just good solid intelligence data.


I still conclude that there's little evidence that makes me think Iran will ever be able to put a nuke in functioning order. They remind me of rich Africans.

My Intelligence Estimate

The Shah's "Surge" nuclear weapons program was progressing until the unfortunate Islamic revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini came along and halted it. Then after Khomeini died Rafsanjani resurrected the nuke program. Ahamadinejad gets elected in 2005 and the "Surge" is back on again - in Iran and in North Korea.

I conclude that Iran paid handsomely for and received priceless data they could not otherwise obtain from the North Korean nuclear program (Ballistic missile program as well). Iran received a half-dozen Kh-55 Granat's sans their 200kT warheads from the Ukraine with Russian assistance in 2001. The warheads are the missing components Iran is surging to complete.

With respect to the 2003 hiatus, (the Iranians assumed the US or Israel would learn of the halt) North Korea was the Iranian ace-in-the-hole. The payoff came with the North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Mission accomplished. The North Korean's then agree to dismantle their program, and have the dismantling paid for with foreign cash among other bonuses. This is of no concern to Iran - they have what they paid for. A year later North Korea gets caught red-handed in Syria. The US and Israel send a message to the Iranian's from deep in the Syrian desert. The Iranian's are surging ahead to process indigenous HEU for the warhead to put on their missiles. The have AQ Khan's Paki designs and North Korean test results. Ahamdinejad has a bigger mission ahead and a nuke or two is what he needs to create the conditions for his al-Mahdi to pop out of the well.

Jedburgh
12-18-2007, 02:20 PM
LA Times, 9 Dec 07: CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-usiran9dec09,0,3638197.story?coll=la-home-center)

The CIA launched a secret program in 2005 designed to degrade Iran's nuclear weapons program by persuading key officials to defect, an effort that has prompted a "handful" of significant departures, current and former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation say.....

.....Intelligence gathered as part of that campaign provided much of the basis for a U.S. report released last week that concluded the Islamic Republic had halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003. Officials declined to say how much of that intelligence could be attributed to the CIA program to recruit defectors.

Although the CIA effort on defections has been aimed in part at gaining information about Tehran's nuclear capabilities, its goal has been to undermine Iran's emerging capabilities by plucking key scientists, military officers and other personnel from its nuclear roster......

.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

JeffC
12-18-2007, 02:45 PM
I like Rex’s Option 1) Limited under safeguards with quid pro quos.

Since Ron came up with a darn good answer --get Russia and China more involved-- I’ll respond with a little expansion :).

You’re correct; we already negotiated our way into nowhere and looked pretty stupid coming back. I don’t see any immediate military involvement; it has to be a diplomatic effort :wry:. DOE (http://www.energy.gov/) has literally 100s of programs that deal with just this situation. Get them involved in providing materials and assistance in the construction. There’s no need for spying (and I don’t think we actually have intel types with degrees in nuclear physics) and more political brew ha ha’ing.

Offer them free assistance with rocket scientists at the helm.

Key this assistance package to release of sanctions and to joining the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepMinisterialMtg.html). There are enough influential players on the GNEP board and I doubt anyone on that board wants to be nuked by Iran :D

U.S. companies with experience in delivering nuclear power as an energy source could flourish in the Middle East. Every nation there wants nuclear energy facilities.

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 03:24 PM
LA Times, 9 Dec 07: CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-usiran9dec09,0,3638197.story?coll=la-home-center)


.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

Dang... there goes my coveted HUMINT. POOF!

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 03:35 PM
The Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=436) thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close that thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat:

DNI, 3 Dec 07: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf)

Since its release, there has been a tremendous amount of analysis and debate over its content.

Rasmussen (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_current_events/general_current_events_toplines/toplines_iran_nuclear_program_december_5_6_2007) conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).


Toplines - Iran Nuclear Program - December 5-6, 2007
National Survey of 800 Likely Voters

1* How closely have you followed recent news stories about Iran’s nuclear program?

43% Very closely

40% Somewhat closely

2* A U.S intelligence report found that Iran stopped their nuclear weapons program in 2003. Do you believe that Iran has stopped their nuclear weapons program?

66% No

3* Is Iran still a threat to the national security of the United States?

67% Yes

4* Should the United States continue to impose economic sanctions on Iran?

59% Yes

5* How likely is it that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon in the future?

47% Very likely

34% Somewhat likely

Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with respect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

Rex Brynen
12-18-2007, 03:39 PM
Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with repect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

The target of the NIE was not, however, the American voting public, and its "failure" can therefore hardly be assessed in those terms.

Steve Blair
12-18-2007, 03:49 PM
Rasmussen (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_current_events/general_current_events_toplines/toplines_iran_nuclear_program_december_5_6_2007) conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).



Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with repect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

And I'm not a big fan of trusting an 800 person survey as reflecting much other than the mindset of those 800 people. Sorry, but most polling organizations shroud their methods and certain key points of information (like response rate, refusal rate, polling locations, times called, and so on) in so much secrecy that it's impossible to tell what they really reflect.

Polls can be an interesting general indicator, but at the end of the day they reflect little more than the opinion of the people who actually answered the phone and stuck with the survey all the way through.

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 04:10 PM
The target of the NIE was not, however, the American voting public, and its "failure" can therefore hardly be assessed in those terms.

Au contraire, the unclassified version of the NIE was most assuredly intended for public consumption. With this National Survey of the public reaction to it the purpose of the unclassified NIE most assuredly can be assessed as a failure. We'll see come November '08 just how much of a failure.

Rex Brynen
12-18-2007, 04:32 PM
Au contraire, the unclassified version of the NIE was most assuredly intended for public consumption. With this National Survey of the public reaction to it the purpose of the unclassified NIE most assuredly can be assessed as a failure. We'll see come November '08 just how much of a failure.

The unclassified portion of the NIE is presumably precisely that--the key judgements of the NIE that could be unclassified with prejudice to means/sources/techniques, or to key US interests.

Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 04:45 PM
A more salient point would be to note what GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-timeline.htm) has to say, with the acknowledgement that this NIE confirmed the existence of Iranian WMD of the nuclear variety.


The success of strikes against Iran's WMD facilities requires both tactical and strategic surprise, so there will not be the sort of public rhetorical buildup in the weeks preceeding hostilities, of the sort that preceeded the invasion of Iraq. To the contrary, the Bush Administration will do everything within its power to deceive Iran's leaders into believing that military action is not imminent.

With respect to the role of the upcoming election, and the barometer of public perception of the Iranian nuclear threat, I submit the poll posted above is most germane to this issue. To quote one of my favorite columnists (http://www.davidlimbaugh.com/032304.htm):


I think the election results will turn as much on perceptions as reality, and political campaigns are all about creating perceptions, so the campaigning will be highly relevant. Don't get me wrong, there is not always a major disconnect between perception and reality. The electorate will often perceive things as they objectively exist.

From the same link as above:


4 November 2008
The US presidential election of 2008 is scheduled to occur on November 4, 2008. If the White House judges that military strikes would rally the country around the President and his party, it would argue for timing strikes as little as a week before the election, a pre-planned October Surprise.

This might be the bottom line if the current NIE was in fact politically motivated.

Ken White
12-18-2007, 04:46 PM
The target of the NIE was not, however, the American voting public, and its "failure" can therefore hardly be assessed in those terms.

In totality, I mean. The Intel community both has leanings and likes synergies... :D

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 04:56 PM
The unclassified portion of the NIE is presumably precisely that--the key judgements of the NIE that could be unclassified with prejudice to means/sources/techniques, or to key US interests.

As I noted above, the unclassified NIE notes within its text that it contains estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions.


Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.

This one is assuming nothing but has noted above and will note now that in the text of the unclassified version of the NIE were the objections of the DOE and the NIC to some of the estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions made in the document.

wm
12-18-2007, 05:23 PM
Rasmussen (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_current_events/general_current_events_toplines/toplines_iran_nuclear_program_december_5_6_2007) conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).



Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with respect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

I'm not sure what the relelvance of this post is. The NIE is not targeted at the GAP (great American public). Its purpose, like any intelligence product, is to answer questions asked by deicsionmakers in order to help inform the decisions that they make.

I earlier tried to make a post about the problem of getting any kind of consensus about the NIE's meaning/truth. However, it was eaten by etherspace. I'll try again now.

Statements are not true in a vacuum. They are true in a complex of a question and an answer. The question itself is framed against a backdrop of presuppostion held by the questioner. If the NIE does not provide an answer to the question asked by the decisionmaker in the context of those presuppostions, then it is neither true nor fals. It is simply irrelevant.

Here's an example. I see a paper on a bulletin board. I ask myself, "Why did someone post that paper on the bulletin board?" I am seeking an answer that provides me with someone'as motivation for putting the paper on the board and have presupposed that it was indeed posted on the board by someone. Now if the answer I get is that the paper lists the hours of operation of the local pizza shop or that no one posted the paper, it just appeared mysteriously by an act of divine providence, I will not have an answer that I accept as true. Neither response answers my question in the context of my presuppostions.

I suspect that this may be why the poll results are so negative. The GAP idn't get its questions answered in a way that accorded with their presupposition, built up since 1978 by the US MSM, that the Iranians are deceitful scoundrels. But, of course, they were not the customer.

As a further point, I think the above analysis (for which I cannot take credit--it comes from R.G Collingwood in his Essay on Philosophical Method and his Essay on Metaphysics) probably explains most of our so-called "intelligence failures." Decisionmakers dismissed the intel they received because it didn't answer their question or did not fit their presuppositions. Then they acted on instinct rather than with reason.

Stan
12-18-2007, 05:49 PM
I just plain give up herein :confused:



My Intelligence Estimate


Dang... there goes my coveted HUMINT. POOF!


Rasmussen (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_current_events/general_current_events_toplines/toplines_iran_nuclear_program_december_5_6_2007) conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).

Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with respect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).


A more salient point would be to note what GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-timeline.htm) has to say, with the acknowledgement that this NIE confirmed the existence of Iranian WMD of the nuclear variety.

Are we to conclude that your HUMINT is based on a 800-Joe-Delta-Everyday-Civilian's opinion and top that with Global Security ?

How 'bout addressing the issue. What's your fix, Sean ?

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 06:38 PM
Stan,

Regarding HUMINT as pertains to this topic I wrote:


We need covert HUMINT in almost every area of intelligence collection. As evidenced by the 2005 and 2007 NIE we desperately need covert HUMINT assets in Iran reporting on core capabilities. No more estimations, assessments, judgements or assumptions - just good solid intelligence data.

In the very next post to this thread Jedburgh had quoted some text from an LATimes article.


.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

I re-submit my response:

Dang, there goes the coveted HUMINT. POOF! ;)


How 'bout addressing the issue. What's your fix, Sean ?

My fix is tied to the necessity of getting well-placed HUMINT to determine the real status of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and go from there.



I'm not sure what the relelvance of this post is.

Bottom line: The enfranchised American public will elect the next chief executive decisionmaker and those who control the funding of the national policy the IC attempts to guide through their product.

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 07:46 PM
... in the text of the unclassified version of the NIE were the objections of the DOE and the NIC to some of the estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions made in the document.

One of our main allies in the Middle East also had objections to the current NIE. Those objections resulted in an "unusual visit" to Israel by C-JCS Admiral Mike Mullen on Monday, 10 December.

According to a report published the next day by the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/world/middleeast/11mullen.html?ref=todayspaper):


Israeli intelligence estimates say Iran stopped all its nuclear weapons activities for a time in 2003, nervous after the American invasion of Iraq, but then resumed those activities in 2005, accelerating enrichment and ballistic missile development and constructing a 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor in Arak that could produce plutonium.

The LA Times (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mullen11dec11,1,952256.story) also reported on that day what Admiral Mullen told his Israeli hosts:


Mullen said after the meetings that both Barak and Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, the new head of the Israeli defense staff, expressed a desire to work with the U.S. on analyzing American intelligence on the Iranian program.

Mullen said he expressed similar U.S. concerns about the enrichment program, calling it the "center of gravity" of the Iranian program that needs to be stopped with the help of international pressure.

He also reiterated American views that Iran continues to mislead nuclear regulators about the extent and intentions of its program.

"I wanted to reassure them that I still consider Iran a threat," Mullen said in an interview with The Times aboard his aircraft.

"Their hegemonic views, their regime's rhetoric, still speaking to the elimination of Israel, is all very disturbing to me. I intended to leave the impression with them that I wasn't taking my eye off the mark."

The Jerusalem Post (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847300343&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull) also published a report that included a significant detail from the Israeli perspective:


During their meetings, Mullen and Ashkenazi discussed the Iranian threat. Israel believes Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon and will be ready to manufacture such a device as early as the end of 2009.

Question: If the US NIE is accurate and Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and had not re-started it as of mid-2007, how can Iran be capable of manufacturing a weapon in about two years time?

The unclassified NIE states on its last page the basis of the US and Israeli differences:


We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

The details regarding these differences would appear to exist in the classified version of the NIE.

wm
12-18-2007, 07:47 PM
Already posted my own in-a-nutshell "fix" on the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons development, from the Shah to the present. Here it is again.
I think Stan wanted a solution not some other opinion about the current state of play vis-a-vis Iranian nuke weapons development, which is what you have now posted twice.

Bottom line: The enfranchised American public will elect the next chief executive decisionmaker and those who control the funding of the national policy the IC attempts to guide through their product.
I doubt very seriously that the majority of the American electorate will have sufficient longevity of memory to harken back to this NIE as a major issue when they step into the voting booth next November. I suspect that votes will be cast primarily for that Presidential candidate who makes the "biggest and bestest" promises to improve average citizens' creature comforts by allowing them to have as much discretionary use of their paychecks as possible.
As to the election of those who control the budget (the Congress)--the incumbents will generally get re-elected unless they happen to do something viewed as particularly heinous by their constituents. Congressional elections are not won and lost over intel estimates--Tip O'Neil' saying that all politics are local is particularly right when it come to Congressional elections. Incumbency and bringing home the bacon, AKA pork, of government funded activities are generally pretty huge. (How about that $1Million earmark for a Woodstock museum?) What else explains the continuance in office of folks like Ted Kennedy? Now, if the case could be made that this NIE causes a lot of Congressional districts to lose a lot of Federal money, voters might have something to consider. I wish you good luck making that argument stick.

By the way, in my experience the IC does not try to guide national policy with its products. When asked to do so, it tries to provide advice and information to those who create and implement national policy. Please do not confuse intelligence dilettantes who worked in cabinet positions with the true intelligence professionals of the IC.

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 08:10 PM
I think Stan wanted a solution not some other opinion about the current state of play vis-a-vis Iranian nuke weapons development, which is what you have now posted twice.

Sorry wm. I fixed it.


I doubt very seriously that the majority of the American electorate will have sufficient longevity of memory to harken back to this NIE as a major issue when they step into the voting booth next November. I suspect that votes will be cast primarily for that Presidential candidate who makes the "biggest and bestest" promises to improve average citizens' creature comforts by allowing them to have as much discretionary use of their paychecks as possible.

I think you are correct. We'll have to wait and see what real-world event(s) occur between now and then which might bring this NIE back into the spotlight it now has.


By the way, in my experience the IC does not try to guide national policy with its products. When asked to do so, it tries to provide advice and information to those who create and implement national policy.

I was attempting to nut-shell in a sentence what is stated in the NIE:


National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.

NIE says "help" and I wrote "guide". The Intelligence Community product is a guiding light for national policy.

Stan
12-18-2007, 08:14 PM
Question: If the US NIE is accurate and Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and had not re-started it as of mid-2007, how can Iran be capable of manufacturing a weapon in about two years time?

The unclassified NIE states on its last page the basis of the US and Israeli differences:

The details regarding these differences would appear to exist in the classified version of the NIE.

Sean, the unclas version here (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf) is slightly different from your quote.


• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.


Condensing quotes is misleading and should be avoided.




My fix is tied to the necessity of getting well-placed HUMINT to determine the real status of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and go from there.

Bottom line: The enfranchised American public will elect the next chief executive decisionmaker and those who control the funding of the national policy the IC attempts to guide through their product.

Thanks for the quick fix !
Correct me if wrong herein, but covert intel from in-country would be performed by whom ? As I opined in my previous post, I doubt we have intel types with degrees in nuclear physics, and now is certainly not the time for more sneaky Sierra. They already don't trust us, and now we slip a few rocket scientists..wanna be..spies in with beards speaking arabic ?

Sean Osborne
12-18-2007, 08:27 PM
Sean, the unclas version here (http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf) is slightly different from your quote.


Stan,

I was being specific with respect to the 2009 date ("about two years time") and how the US and Israeli estimates currently judge/assign confidences to the Iranian nuke weapons capability or lack thereof.


Thanks for the quick fix !

I apologize for misunderstanding what you had asked.


Correct me if wrong herein, but covert intel from in-country would be performed by whom ?

A guess - someone of similar insider access as Iran's former deputy defense minister and most recent defector Gen. Ali Reza Asghari? I was just engaged in some wishful thinking recently that with his defection he might have given the US or a closely allied intel agency someone else inside the Iranian nuke program as a potential POC/HUMINT source to pursue/exploit? Hope so.

Stan
12-18-2007, 08:56 PM
Stan,

I was being specific with respect to the 2009 date ("about two years time") and how the US and Israeli estimates currently judge/assign confidences to the Iranian nuke weapons capability or lack thereof.

I've now read the pdf three times and cannot understand why the 2009 date is even remotely significant. I can see and appreciate why Israel would have a differing view, as they sit on the border. I have no doubt they have some serious concerns, but that should not influence hard intel.


F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

Sean Osborne
12-19-2007, 03:17 AM
I've now read the pdf three times and cannot understand why the 2009 date is even remotely significant.

Stan,

It has to do with what our unclassifed NIE specifically states about that year and what the Israeli intel assessment says about that year regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Maybe I should also bring to this 'table' what the French, British and Italian intel folks have to say on the matter of this NIE.

(Hmmmm, that sounds like a great idea to me at this point... broaden the scope of this thread to include other foreign intelligence assessments on the same Iranian nuclear weapons program as referenced in this current NIE!)


I can see and appreciate why Israel would have a differing view, as they sit on the border.

Actually Israel lies a significant number of miles west-southwest of the Iranian border with Iraq, and come to think of it, west of Jordan and southwest of Syria. The distance is nothing a theater ballistic missile like the Shahab-3/4, BM-25 or Kh-55 cruise missile can't handle though.


I have no doubt they have some serious concerns, but that should not influence hard intel.

There is NOTHING relating to "hard intel" with respect to the unclassified NIE. Sources and methods are thoroughly protected/sageguarded through the declassification process of the estimate by DNI, et al. More to the point, there's nothing about the words "estimate" or "assessment" or "judgement" or "assumption" even remotely related to "hard intelligence". Hard intelligence is what vetted, viable HUMINT is supposed to provide.

Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.

JeffC
12-19-2007, 03:41 AM
There is NOTHING relating to "hard intel" with respect to the unclassified NIE. Sources and methods are thoroughly protected/sageguarded through the declassification process of the estimate by DNI, et al. More to the point, there's nothing about the words "estimate" or "assessment" or "judgement" or "assumption" even remotely related to "hard intelligence". Hard intelligence is what vetted, viable HUMINT is supposed to provide.

Do I understand you to say that no HUMINT intelligence contributes to any of the sources used to write an NIE, Sean? That really isn't what you mean't to say, is it?

Ken White
12-19-2007, 03:49 AM
. . .
Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.

Why do that-- it's broadly irrelevant in any case. Sure. the Unclas version of NIE was tailored for a purpose; so what? It's been released, the good and bad intended has been done and isn't going to be undone and all that's being accomplished here, it seems to me is the flaying of a dead Jackass for no good reason.

I don't think it's near big enough to rise to Horse status.

We've been playing silly games with Iran since 1979 and are likely to continue to do so for a good many years. They don't mean us well (some of them, not all) and they do odd things on occasion but they aren't stupid.

Much ado about nothing.

Stan
12-19-2007, 08:44 AM
Stan,

It has to do with what our unclassifed NIE specifically states about that year and what the Israeli intel assessment says about that year regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Maybe I should also bring to this 'table' what the French, British and Italian intel folks have to say on the matter of this NIE.

(Hmmmm, that sounds like a great idea to me at this point... broaden the scope of this thread to include other foreign intelligence assessments on the same Iranian nuclear weapons program as referenced in this current NIE!)


Sean,
While I understand that the NIE utilizes many sources when developing their products, I didn't draw the same conclusion (that Israel's contribution was the overall impetus). I'll assume you're going to invite these fine folks to join the SWC and participate.


Actually Israel lies a significant number of miles west-southwest of the Iranian border with Iraq, and come to think of it, west of Jordan and southwest of Syria...

Thanks for the geography lesson. I think you know what I was saying :wry:


Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.

We already have many distinguised SWC members from every corner of the world (including NATO members), and some have in fact posted on this very thread.

Sean Osborne
12-20-2007, 11:21 AM
Roy Gutman's OpEd in yesterdays Post-Bulletin (Rochester, Minnesota) had a rather unique conclusion regarding the NIE, Iran and HUMINT.

U.S. intelligence can be spectacularly right -- or wrong (http://www.postbulletin.com/newsmanager/templates/localnews_story.asp?a=319944&z=12)


This brings us to Iran. The Bush administration could have deduced months ago that Iran had no active nuclear weapons program. The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency reached that conclusion by talking with Iranian officials, sending in inspectors and verifying the facts.

Under the mullahs, Iran is a notoriously difficult country for recruiting top-level spies. True, there are phone intercepts, satellite images and walk-in defectors. But human, on-the-ground contact is best facilitated by having an embassy, full diplomatic relations and a program of exchanges and visits. The IAEA did that. While an IAEA inspection regime is not infallible, it is, when supplemented by intelligence (and journalism), the most plausible way to monitor any threat from Iran.

Reporters and the public ought to view intelligence findings and National Intelligence Estimates as a starting point for an investigation rather than the conclusion to it. Until we can examine the sources and methods on which such findings are based and understand the context in which those sources are operating, we should treat such pronouncements with caution.

bourbon
12-21-2007, 05:17 PM
No More Slam Dunks: A reality-based assessment of Iran’s nuclear capability (http://amconmag.com/2008/2008_01_14/article2.html), by Philip Giraldi. The American Conservative, January 14, 2008.

Ron Humphrey
12-21-2007, 05:44 PM
This whole acting rationally thing is really confuses me.

" By demonstrating that Iran has acted as a rational player, the report gives advocates of negotiations without preconditions a stronger hand."

Since when and in whose mind would such things as the following fall in the category of rational thinking:

1: Taking Hostages at Embassy (Sure if you want to take a wholistic view that their guiding light in this action was to accomplish what was better in the long turn; you would have to however illustrate that it was, and good luck with that)

2: Having a nuclear weapons program in the first place if you haven't even gotten to the place where you could use it without nefarious actions to obtain the materials /which in turn would point to nefarious intent

3: Using all governmental assets to keep the entire populous under restrictions which discourage any uprising or even simple disagreement with government.

4: The need for review of historic happenings to which there is no doubt and mainly because right now so many who actually lived it are still alive to tell about it. ( Wouldn't it have been more rational to wait until the witnesses are gone before trying to rewrite history?)

5: Anything that comes out of the mouth of the current leadership such as-
We dont have any vs We eliminate any ( If i'll blow smoke in your face on TV about something so notably identifiable as the existence of those with alternative lifestyles, are you really sure you want to take my word on something like nuclear power?)

Just a few things which make it really hard for me to buy the rationality argument.

That being said there is still nothing wrong with negotiating as long as we remember:

The quote from JFK that rings true

" Let us never fear to negotiate , but let us never negotiate from fear "

bourbon
12-21-2007, 06:54 PM
This whole acting rationally thing is really confuses me.

" By demonstrating that Iran has acted as a rational player, the report gives advocates of negotiations without preconditions a stronger hand."

Since when and in whose mind would such things as the following fall in the category of rational thinking:


1: Taking Hostages at Embassy (Sure if you want to take a wholistic view that their guiding light in this action was to accomplish what was better in the long turn; you would have to however illustrate that it was, and good luck with that)
See post #48 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=34920&postcount=48) by Rex Brynen:

US Embassy, Tehran.

Largely fueled by the standard hyper-enthusiasm of the early revolutionary stage, this helped to undermine the government of then (relatively moderate) Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and helped to strengthen and ultimately consolidate the power of the hardline revolutionaries in the new regime—thus paving the way for the establishment of the Islamic Republic in its present form. In terms of domestic politics, therefore, it paid off well. Also encouraged other Islamist radicals in the region.



2: Having a nuclear weapons program in the first place if you haven't even gotten to the place where you could use it without nefarious actions to obtain the materials /which in turn would point to nefarious intent
Nefarious activities to obtain materials? Lets substitute 'nefarious' for 'illegal', what have they done illegally?
How did Israel obtain its nuclear program? The terms 'nefarious' and 'illegal' come to mind. Actually there are some great stories there; massive hijackings, extortion, and more black bag jobs then a John le Carré novel. Needless to say, did their nefarious proliferation activities imply nefarious intent?


3: Using all governmental assets to keep the entire populous under restrictions which discourage any uprising or even simple disagreement with government.
Dictatorships are not irrational, it is a fallacy of liberals and neoconservatives to think they are inherently irrational. Further it is a moot point on a realpolitik matter such as this.


4: The need for review of historic happenings to which there is no doubt and mainly because right now so many who actually lived it are still alive to tell about it. ( Wouldn't it have been more rational to wait until the witnesses are gone before trying to rewrite history?)
I assume you are referring to the whole Holocaust denial thing. Thats a complicated topic, beyond the scope of this thread, listen to Ahmadinejad though, he says it for a reason. Its not just Holocaust denial at face value, he uses it in a nuanced argument against Zionism.


5: Anything that comes out of the mouth of the current leadership such as-
We dont have any vs We eliminate any ( If i'll blow smoke in your face on TV about something so notably identifiable as the existence of those with alternative lifestyles, are you really sure you want to take my word on something like nuclear power?)
This is a moot point.

Jedburgh
12-23-2007, 02:02 PM
As has been noted by others, this thread began to go in circles while taking a nosedive a little while ago. In an attempt to clean things up, I've removed the last few posts and changed it up. None of the deletions are targeted at the posters invidiually - just trying to get this rebooted in a more substantive manner.

This is an important subject, but I will lock the thread if it goes off-kilter or becomes stridently partisan.

Thanks

Galrahn
12-24-2007, 04:53 PM
I'm not an expert on negotiations, but I've been largely unimpressed with the US approach of unconditional terms with Iran. It seems counter intuitive to me that the US should expect any results other than failure with the “unconditional terms” approach.

I'd negotiate with Iran, and bring to the table every issue, even the most complicated or controversial. I'd also put the media microphone in front of the Iranian negotiators every day for as long as I could in the process. My observation on Iran is their government has a very difficult time articulating their message in person without advertising an obvious disconnect with the west that is very difficult to conceal in media spin. The thing about Iran’s message is, their talking points work for either an audience in the Middle East or the West, but almost never does the same hard line message work for both audiences at the same time.

The region in general is less open to the hardliner message than in the past, too many economic interests counter to the hard line old school message Iran touts, so I'd let them talk. Their rhetoric adds little to their position in the region today, how would it be any different at the negotiating table.

The examples are the UN over the last few years (which largely goes uncovered by the media), but an even better example was Columbia University earlier this year. I get the impression that negotiations and plenty of public attention would strengthen the west’s position more than it would hurt it, because while Iran's message is appealing to hard liners, the hard line message is losing its steam regionally among the major players.

If it really is about talking, then let Iran speak. They really aren't very good at talking when they have to improvise, they are only good at it when they can package the message. That is my observation anyway.

bourbon
12-24-2007, 07:25 PM
Post
Very well said.

Agree 100% about the Columbia University event. That worked out very bad for Iran. The only people who came away looking more of a buffoon then Ahmadinejad, were Bollinger and the people who complained so much about having him speak. Ahmadinejad came off more like a clown then a pariah, and I imagine his performance and how he was essentially laughed at in the west hurt his domestic standing.

PS: The "I-Ran" song parody (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=doetCtoBunY) about Ahmadinejad in NYC this fall was probably the best sketch Saturday Night Live has done in a few years.

Rex Brynen
12-24-2007, 09:50 PM
Agree 100% about the Columbia University event. That worked out very bad for Iran. The only people who came away looking more of a buffoon then Ahmadinejad, were Bollinger and the people who complained so much about having him speak. Ahmadinejad came off more like a clown then a pariah, and I imagine his performance and how he was essentially laughed at in the west hurt his domestic standing.

I heard the opposite from many Iranians (including opponents of Ahmadinejad)--the open hostility of Bollinger was seen as so rude and contrary to the norms of hospitality that it overshadowed the content of Ahmadinejad's speech. As a result, he came off (remarkably!) looking like the statesman to domestic mass audiences...

While many in the Iranian foreign policy elite cringe at the President's antics and declarations, don't underestimate the way it plays with both hardliners and his broader voter base, among whom tweaking the US can score domestic points.

JeffWolf
12-24-2007, 11:57 PM
Hi,



1) It's unclear to me whether the drafters of the NIE had any political motivation one way or the other. I can think of many, all plausible, but in the absence of additional information, it seems to me impossible to infer the drafters' intentions from the finished product. Additionally, people might not be angels, but they also often take pride in their work and their identity as "professionals." Maybe this betrays incredible naivete, but it does not seem beyond the realm of the possible that the drafters assessed the best available evidence, and made their conclusions accordingly. I recognize this may well not be the case, but I do think, as with all these hypotheses, it is probably difficult to rebut absent additional information.

2) I think the NIE does a reasonably good of acknowledging it is assessing issues that are uncertain - that is, cannot be quantified with any degree of precision. Moreover, I think the NIE does a reasonably good job of acknowledging, and trying to overcome, the difficulty of trying to convey that uncertainty via inevitably imprecise language. I think Sherman Kent once wanted percentages placed on intelligence estimates. I'm not sure about the practicality of that, but again, I think the scope conditions at the beginning of the NIE move in that direction.

3) Because of 2) I think to a certain extent, it is probably not particularly useful to parse particular word choices too much, and even less useful to do so without reference back to the scope conditions outlined at the beginning of the documents.

4) To use the same reasoning as to 1), I'd be wary of inferring a state's motives from its actions, just as I'd be wary of inferring drafters' intentions from the final product. Aggregates can produce different outcomes than individuals simply acting together. (Put more simply, the sum can be different than the whole of the parts.) A state's motives may not be transparent. Moreover, "states" consist of suborganizations, and their interplay (e.g., bargaining, conflict) may result in actions neither suborganization (or only just one suborganization) intended. (See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, for the classic cite on this.) To me, it's actually easier to find a rational explanation for every state's behavior, than it is to determine every (or any) action taken by a state is "irrational." And I can think of lots of rational reasons why people within a state, rather than the state per se - say, Ahmadinejab - might display given behavior. And finally, my suspicion is that since I know little about Iran or Ahmadinejab, and have never been Ahmadinejam, most of those rational reasons would probably be wrong.

My $.02.

Regards
Jeff

Galrahn
12-26-2007, 03:50 PM
While many in the Iranian foreign policy elite cringe at the President's antics and declarations, don't underestimate the way it plays with both hardliners and his broader voter base, among whom tweaking the US can score domestic points.

I agree. In negotiation this is part of the give though. I'm not sure I believe this hurts those in opposition though. I do not see building domestic support for the civilian nuclear program within Iran as zero sum against a coalition opposition to a nuclear weapons program, because to sell domestic support for peaceful civilian nuclear eneergy, Iran is selling the absence of a nuclear weapons program.

That makes any future IAEA discovery of a weapons program in Iran a silver bullet for both internal and external supporters and critics. Too bad the track record for uncovering silver bullets is checkered, at best.

Iran has played their cards very smart. They have in effect been mostly legal in their process, which will allow them to achieve nuclear energy without a nuclear weapons program even under sanctions, and leave them in a position where a nuclear weapons program would only require a few months to convert into should they so desire in the future.

Stan
12-26-2007, 03:56 PM
Iran has played their cards very smart. They have in effect been mostly legal in their process, which will allow them to achieve nuclear energy without a nuclear weapons program even under sanctions, and leave them in a position where a nuclear weapons program would only require a few months to convert into should they so desire in the future.

Hey Galrahn !
How exactly will they achieve a weapons program in only a few months when the site and Russian-provided fuel are estimated as 'in-place and ready' in 2009?

Regards, Stan

Steve Blair
12-26-2007, 03:58 PM
Stan,

I think he means "a few months" from when the reactor is completed...but I could be mistaken (happens all the time).

Stan
12-26-2007, 04:13 PM
Hey Steve !
The fuel being provided to Iran is something to the tune of 3 or 4% enriched and as I understand it, HEU or weapons grade is around 90%.

God, where are the scientists and anthropologists when you need them ?

Galrahn
12-26-2007, 04:41 PM
Hey Galrahn !
How exactly will they achieve a weapons program in only a few months when the site and Russian-provided fuel are estimated as 'in-place and ready' in 2009?

Regards, Stan

I'm sorry, was written a bit confusing. I'm not talking a few months from now; I'm talking about a few months from a point in the future when they have their civilian nuclear program up and running.

Probably about 5-8 years from now, but what I was thinking when I wrote it is basically Iran putting them in the same position nations like Japan and Brazil are in today, except Iran is much further along on some of the missile side aspects of nuclear tech than say a nation like Brazil.

JeffC
12-26-2007, 04:48 PM
I'm sorry, was written a bit confusing. I'm not talking a few months from now; I'm talking about a few months from a point in the future when they have their civilian nuclear program up and running.

What evidence is there to support that theory? What's required to be in place and operating (technical details please) in order for your prediction to occur?

Stan
12-26-2007, 04:49 PM
I'm sorry, was written a bit confusing. I'm not talking a few months from now; I'm talking about a few months from a point in the future when they have their civilian nuclear program up and running.

Probably about 5-8 years from now, but what I was thinking when I wrote it is basically Iran putting them in the same position nations like Japan and Brazil are in today, except Iran is much further along on some of the missile side aspects of nuclear tech than say a nation like Brazil.

Thanks for the clarification. No harm, no foul.

I would agree, they are ahead in their missile program and caution as we proceed in negotiations is prudent.

Steve Blair
12-26-2007, 04:56 PM
What evidence is there to support that theory? What's required to be in place and operating (technical details please) in order for your prediction to occur?

He's not making a prediction (note his use of the phrase "should they so desire in the future") as much as presenting a possibility. A prediction would use the construction "when they move to weapons-grade materials" or something quite similar.

As Jed pointed out, this is an important subject. And most important subjects require clarity in communication. Let's all keep it clear and respectful.

JeffC
12-26-2007, 05:06 PM
He's not making a prediction (note his use of the phrase "should they so desire in the future") as much as presenting a possibility. A prediction would use the construction "when they move to weapons-grade materials" or something quite similar.

As Jed pointed out, this is an important subject. And most important subjects require clarity in communication. Let's all keep it clear and respectful.

I'm all in favor of clarity, and I agree with you that Galrahn suggested a possibility rather than making a prediction (my bad).

Since defense of one's position, whether it's a possibility or a prediciton, is a time-honored tradition in military academies and civilian educational institutions, I'm looking forward to hear Galrahn's take on what technical requirements must be in place in order for any nation, including Iran, to convert enriched uranium supplied by Russia to HEU for use in a warhead, should Iran desire to do that in the future.

Stan
12-26-2007, 07:02 PM
I continue to have my doubts when it comes to true Iranian enrichment capabilities. Even modest Russian views state openly Iran’s technical inability to make a WMD, as well as IAEA inspectors monitoring current activities and deliveries. Russia claims that the fuel being delivered has been enriched to 3.62%...far from weapons grade U-235. In fact, the number of large commercial enrichment plants in operation since 2002 are quite small (and those are all developed countries).

I would also like to see more technical stats that conclude Iran’s capabilities.

Honestly, I’ll continue to tread lightly but remain skeptical about feelings and press reports. I need a more logical approach…something to chew on.

Stan
12-26-2007, 09:20 PM
Russia sees no economic need (http://www.kommersant.com/p-11820/Uranium_enrichment/) for Iran to proceed with its uranium enrichment program, on which termination the international community insists, said Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.


“We think Iran has no economic need whatsoever to proceed with uranium enrichment program. We are trying to convince the Iranians that freezing this program will be of benefit to Iran itself, as it will immediately lead to negotiations with all six [states], including the United States,” Lavrov said in an interview with Vremya Novostei.

Russia that helps Iran construct its first Bushehr nuclear plant, has supplied to it the first consignment of nuclear fuel this month.

“These negotiations [with Russia, the United States, China, Britain, France and Germany] will be aimed at eliminating once and forever all suspicions that there are any other components in Iran’s nuclear program in addition to the purely peaceful ones. Iran’s agreement to this proposal will serve the interest of all,” Lavrov emphasized.


And, just a little more to add to the pile...

Russia Helps Iran Keep Balance of Power (http://www.kommersant.com/p839198/r_500/arms_sales/)


A delay in the U.S.-Iranian war is implied by the recent publication of a U.S. intelligence report indicating that Iran closed down its military nuclear program in 2003. Russia is clearly taking advantage of the situation to sell as many weapons as possible. Dmitriev stated that “Russia and Iran are strengthening stability in the region.” He added that “We are talking about defensive types of weapons… Iran has never asked for and Russia would never give Iran offensive weapons to encourage any, conditionally speaking, aggression against anyone.”

Ron Humphrey
12-26-2007, 09:41 PM
Russia sees no economic need (http://www.kommersant.com/p-11820/Uranium_enrichment/) for Iran to proceed with its uranium enrichment program, on which termination the international community insists, said Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

wants to have a possy(term used very loosely):D



And, just a little more to add to the pile...

Russia Helps Iran Keep Balance of Power (http://www.kommersant.com/p839198/r_500/arms_sales/)

And I'm sure any mob boss would tell you those aren't as much fun as one would like. Kinda like family. You have to feed em , cloth em, Shelter Em, and worst of all you actually have to take responsibility for their actions because your where the buck stops:eek::wry::D




I love it when a plan comes together

MattC86
12-26-2007, 09:44 PM
And, just a little more to add to the pile...

Russia Helps Iran Keep Balance of Power (http://www.kommersant.com/p839198/r_500/arms_sales/)

Apparently everything that is not a ballistic missile is now a defensive weapon. . .

. . .the Russians are so full of Sierra. Lest we forget, it was the acquisition of "defensive" SA-6 missiles that allowed the Egyptians to launch an offensive across the Suez Canal in 1973 and not be slaughtered by the IAF.

Frankly I'm surprised the Russians care this much to make even such a weak denial. The plain fact is the government will sell weapons to anybody (remember the mysterious appearance of new Russian-made NVGs in Iraq in 2003?) and if they don't, they'll look the other way while weapons are smuggled out of decrepit bases. . .

Matt

selil
12-26-2007, 09:53 PM
Since defense of one's position, whether it's a possibility or a prediciton, is a time-honored tradition in military academies and civilian educational institutions, I'm looking forward to hear Galrahn's take on what technical requirements must be in place in order for any nation, including Iran, to convert enriched uranium supplied by Russia to HEU for use in a warhead, should Iran desire to do that in the future.

Ah an epistemological mistake in the process of science. We are not in the testing or instruments phase of our discussion. We are in the hypothesis generation phase.

We can't say whether Iran has the capability 100 percent, and we most certainly can't say that they can't refine nuclear materials.

What can we say (y'all will have to help me here):

We know that Russia has given them power generation level nuclear fuel (3.9 percent pure).

Weapons grade fuel requirements are in the 99th percenatile (99.99999 percent pure or lower I imagine).

Refinement processes so far only exist in tier 1 countries (and I guess North Korea).

Refinement processes and tolerances for a device are vastly understated in most intelligence materials. Knowledge of how to do something, and capability of how to do something not being the same thing.

The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).

Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.

Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb.

Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot. That is the issue with jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready. We need more facts on currency of the situation and less discussion on the end result. How is it currently occurring, what is the situation, then we can tear apart the points for and against a point. But, we need the common point to argue about first. We're not there yet.

Stan
12-26-2007, 10:26 PM
wants to have a possy(term used very loosely):D
And I'm sure any mob boss would tell you those aren't as much fun as one would like. Kinda like family. You have to feed em , cloth em, Shelter Em, and worst of all you actually have to take responsibility for their actions because your where the buck stops

Yepper ! I'm more than certain having watched them for years, it's turf. Hell, they hung those buds out to dry over 'financial' issues til the time was right. Now with a green light from intelligence, time to proceed unabated :D

The larger cycle of homies. (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=possy) People you dont really know but you greet them at least when you see them.

JeffC
12-27-2007, 12:09 AM
Ah an epistemological mistake in the process of science. We are not in the testing or instruments phase of our discussion. We are in the hypothesis generation phase.

In this case, considering how far afield this thread has gone, and how many posts have been deleted for straying off-topic, I think that asking folks to defend their "hypothesis" is both valid and timely.


We can't say whether Iran has the capability 100 percent, and we most certainly can't say that they can't refine nuclear materials.

But we can say what equipment Iran or any nation would require in order to produce HEU. We can also say how much HEU is needed; how large a cascade operating over how long a period is needed to create that amount; what the requirements are (facility-wise) to maintain such a cascade.

This is a valid consideration because the entire membership of the GCC has expressed an interest in building nuclear power plants within their own nations borders. Perhaps if more people knew how technically challenging it was to convert nuclear fuel for military use, future threats debates about a nuclear-powered Middle East could be even more helpful to all who participate.


What can we say ....


By "What can we say" I'm assuming that you mean "What do we know to be true". Is that correct?



Refinement processes so far only exist in tier 1 countries (and I guess North Korea).

That depends on how you define "Tier 1". I would not put Pakistan, India, and North Korea in the same category as the U.S., Britain, and France, for example. And for weapons use or energy use? There are only 9 nations that possess nuclear weapons, while 30 nations utilize nuclear energy.


Refinement processes and tolerances for a device are vastly understated in most intelligence materials.

Are you including this as a "known" fact? If so, I'd be interested in seeing your source for it.


The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).

This sounds like it should be in the conjecture column, rather than the "known fact" column.


Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.

Again, while this "may" be true, it also may not be true, so it doesn't qualify as a "known fact".


Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb.

Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot.

I'm sorry, but the logic of your last statement has escaped me. How do you make the jump from your personal opinion that it's inevitable that Iran will one day possess nuclear weapons to declaring all discussion on that point "moot"?



That is the issue with jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready. We need more facts on currency of the situation and less discussion on the end result. How is it currently occurring, what is the situation, then we can tear apart the points for and against a point. But, we need the common point to argue about first. We're not there yet.

I can certainly agree on the need for more facts. And I look forward to reading your reply to my above-mentioned points before I concede your point about "jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready".

selil
12-27-2007, 02:15 AM
But we can say what equipment Iran or any nation would require in order to produce HEU. We can also say how much HEU is needed; how large a cascade operating over how long a period is needed to create that amount; what the requirements are (facility-wise) to maintain such a cascade.

Johnson, C., “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal options for surplus weapons-usable plutonium". 1997 CRS

Page not given. “Plutonium is considered weapons-grade if it contains at least 93 percent Pu-239. Fuel-grade plutonium contains from seven to less than 19 percent Pu-240, and power reactor-grade plutonium contains levels of 19 percent and greater Pu-240.1' Distinguishing plutonium by its grade, however, obscures the fact that all grades are weapons usable. Less than six kilograms of plutonium, about the size of a baseball, is needed to make a bomb.l2”

We do know the amount and likeliness of that grade being made. The recent NIE gave a substantial view into the issues. We know that any amount of fuel can create a dirty bomb, with not nearly the bang, but just as effective psychologically.

Page not given “Concerns have been raised that converting U.S. weapons plutonium to commercial reactor fuel could undermine U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, which discourages the civil use of plutonium throughout the world. Plutonium is created in all of today's commercial reactors and can be chemically separated from other elements of spent fuel to make new fuel or weapons. Opponents of the MOX option contend that widespread commercial use of plutonium for fuel would increase the risk of plutonium diversion for weapons.”

Of course there is a lot of already created plutonium around the world ready to be refined from a much higher state than you might expect. Guarded by the lowest bidder and subject to guards falling asleep on the job (http://healthandenergy.com/nuclear_power_and_terrorism.htm).

Page not given “Unlike the United States, Russia has not made a specific declaration of excess plutonium. Unclassified sources estimate Russian holdings of approximately 200 tons, with 30 tons separated for civilian purposes and never designated for weapons use.l6 To achieve equal levels of military plutonium stockpiles, a goal the United States and Russia share, Russia will need to declare more than 100 tons of weapons plutonium surplus as well as the 30 tons of civilian material, according to DOE.l7”
[BREAK]

selil
12-27-2007, 02:16 AM
As I said the fuel already exists and is available but how in the heck would it get here, there, or somewhere that we don’t want it?



By "What can we say" I'm assuming that you mean "What do we know to be true". Is that correct?

I’m saying that somebody in this thread, the NIE, or publicly available literature has said any of the following statements within the context of the original post.


That depends on how you define "Tier 1". I would not put Pakistan, India, and North Korea in the same category as the U.S., Britain, and France, for example. And for weapons use or energy use? There are only 9 nations that possess nuclear weapons, while 30 nations utilize nuclear energy.

Quentin, M,. “The evolution of nuclear export control regimes: From export control list to catch-all clause”, 2005, Atoms for Peace: An international journal Vol 1, No 1, 2005

Page 79 “The Wassenaar Arrangement dual-use list is divided into a basic list (Tier 1) containing nine categories of items and two annexes (Tier 2) containing, in the first, a number of sensitive items and in the second case, a number of highly sensitive items. All transfers of dual-use list items are submitted to an export authorisation.”

My fault for not using clear language. I’m thinking of those nations that have the apparent agreements to handle fissionable tools and materials without censure by the International community. Of course the issue has become that many items get dumped into dual use categories. Thus making that list fairly useless for discussion. Of specific interest is the fact that materials are not the only issue. In fact there are other rating systems in place already that look at topics, discussions, etc.. That are also based on tier system such as this document (https://www-export.llnl.gov/subjects.html) at LANL. I think though we can find a point of agreement in that there are four categories of nuclear nations; non-nuclear; nuclear energy only; nuclear weapons only; energy and nuclear energy capable.

How we split the tiers apart is less important I think than we can describe the various faces of the differing tiers. When I’m talking about Tier 1, I’m talking about those nations that currently have the capability to create and build nuclear weapons not simply possess them.


Are you including this as a "known" fact? If so, I'd be interested in seeing your source for it.

As to my statements “The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).” & Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.”

Rensselear, L., “Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy”, Updated October 22, 2002, CRS

Page 2 “ …Nevertheless, concerns remain that more investment by itself will not translate into increased effectiveness against serious proliferation episodes, especially those organized by well-placed nuclear insiders and corrupt officials in response to a lucrative offer from states or groups of concern.”

Page 6 “The diminished economic circumstances of Russia’s nuclear workers were in themselves a source of proliferation concern. In addition, the lifting of Communist political controls, the opening of borders and the ushering in of a market economy made the potential theft and sale of nuclear materials both thinkable and possible. The result was an emergent traffic in radioactive substances of various descriptions, some of which found their way into international smuggling channels.”

Page 7 “Yet literally hundreds of thefts of radioactive substances have occurred at nuclear enterprises and industrial installations across the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s. Traffickers in such materials have looked for buyers abroad – mostly in Europe, where radioactive seizures are commonplace.”

Page 12 “Also, the case can be made that aspiring nuclear states prefer to manufacture fissile ingredients of atomic weapons independently rather than pursuing the risky and difficult course of acquiring them abroad. Hence, their purchasing strategies focus on the means of production. For instance, Iran’s attempts to obtain gas centrifuge enrichment and laser isotope separation technologies from Russia have been well-publicized."

Page 22 “Difficulties arise in trying to monitor the effectiveness of U.S. programs in deterring or stopping nuclear smuggling from the NIS. The GAO has noted, with respect to the MPC&A programs, that “DOE has not established a means to systematically measure the effectiveness of the security systems that it has installed at Russian nuclear sites.” Measures of effectiveness are not the same as measures of performance.”


In a nutshell you don’t have to worry about the Iranians getting the knowledge, skills and abilities, they can just import the talent from people who already have the skills. It is also likely that the raw materials are not only available but that those who have them are not motivated to keep fissionable materials out of the Iranians hands. That being said the literature suggests that if the Iranians really wanted a nuclear weapon they might only have to ask. It was mentioned earlier in a thread about soviet missiles suddenly showing up. It is almost impossible to stop proliferation unless there is a better option provided to the rogue state.



I'm sorry, but the logic of your last statement has escaped me. How do you make the jump from your personal opinion that it's inevitable that Iran will one day possess nuclear weapons to declaring all discussion on that point "moot"?

As to my statement “Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb. Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot.”

If you have a hypothesis all things being equal, and you have another hypothesis at least one thing is not equal. I only need one contrary example. We have a situation where a perfect storm is required to keep proliferation from occurring. One small chink in that armor and we lose that point. I only need one example to nullify the hypothesis (refute).


I can certainly agree on the need for more facts. And I look forward to reading your reply to my above-mentioned points before I concede your point about "jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready".

I think we’re worried about the wrong things. On the one hand nuclear is the method to break the beast of foreign oil. Nuclear is the cleanest energy in modern PBR systems. In comparison to coal nuclear looks like free energy. Situations like the drought in Atlanta could be solved by nuclear energy desalinating seawater and providing almost limitless water to the reservoirs of Atlanta. Texas is looking at adding 25 nuclear reactors ASAP. Europe is creating more nuclear facilities.

The specter of [url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1662889.ece=nuclear floating power plants[/url] and the security risks of fissionable materials of any grade making it into the chains of crime are staggering.

As many articles in the literature say the nuclear genie is out of the bag. As I say the politics of high handed political machismo will no longer work to stop proliferation. The very concept and foundations of small wars follow the uncorking of that genie in the restricted warfare aspects that follow the nuclear age.

Agree or disagree I think if we examine the facts and we have looked at just a set of them non-proliferation was a great idea but it is “moot” as a policy point now.

JeffC
12-27-2007, 03:16 AM
Johnson, C., “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal options for surplus weapons-usable plutonium". 1997 CRS

This address Plutonium disposal, not the technical requirements of completing a nuclear fuel cycle, which was my point. It's not as simple as simply buying the plans for a P2 centerfuge, as some have inferred, for example. If you're interested in debating the availability of Russian stockpiles, that might make for an interesting new topic and thread on its own, but I think it's off-topic for the subject of this thread.

JeffC
12-27-2007, 04:17 AM
As I said the fuel already exists and is available but how in the heck would it get here, there, or somewhere that we don’t want it?

How available it is, is debatable. If it was so easy to get, why haven't we seen, at a minimum, the use of a dirty bomb by any terrorist groups?

I’m saying that somebody in this thread, the NIE, or publicly available literature has said any of the following statements within the context of the original post.

OK, then it's a mix of fact and opinion. I'm not sure how much value that offers the discussion, though.

When I’m talking about Tier 1, I’m talking about those nations that currently have the capability to create and build nuclear weapons not simply possess them.
OK, now I see what you mean't by "Tier one". I mis-understood.

As to my statements “The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).” & Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.”

Rensselear, L., “Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy”, Updated October 22, 2002, CRS
Thanks for the reference. That looks interesting. However, my query as to your source was for your statement "Refinement processes and tolerances for a device are vastly understated in most intelligence materials."

In a nutshell you don’t have to worry about the Iranians getting the knowledge, skills and abilities, they can just import the talent from people who already have the skills.

It is also likely that the raw materials are not only available but that those who have them are not motivated to keep fissionable materials out of the Iranians hands. That being said the literature suggests that if the Iranians really wanted a nuclear weapon they might only have to ask. It was mentioned earlier in a thread about soviet missiles suddenly showing up. It is almost impossible to stop proliferation unless there is a better option provided to the rogue state.
And yet, even though this has been a long-standing goal of Iran for fifty plus years, they have yet to achieve it thanks to a variety of factors, and pending final verification by the IAEA. Which implies that either the Iranians don't want it (does anyone really believe that?) or that it's not nearly so easy to get as your evidence suggests.

As to my statement “Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb. Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot.”

If you have a hypothesis all things being equal, and you have another hypothesis at least one thing is not equal. I only need one contrary example. We have a situation where a perfect storm is required to keep proliferation from occurring. One small chink in that armor and we lose that point. I only need one example to nullify the hypothesis (refute).

So you're equating the "all things being equal" hypothesis to your statement that Iran will get the A bomb? If so, you have yet to prove that statement true. As I said earlier, Iran has not achieved that goal in over 50 years. That doesn't portend well for the arguments that it's both easy and inevitable.

Agree or disagree I think if we examine the facts and we have looked at just a set of them non-proliferation was a great idea but it is “moot” as a policy point now.

You can have nuclear power reactors for energy use without creating nuclear weapons. There are 30 nations that currently have nuclear power for energy. The 9 that have nuclear weapons (and in WIDELY varying amounts) don't make the case that it's an all or nothing proposition. In fact, just the opposite is the more reasonable and apparently likely scenario.

Stan
12-27-2007, 11:49 AM
Although I don't fully agree with this article (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119862828617249709.html?mod=googlenews_wsj), F. B. Smith, Santa Rosa, Calif. and Miles Pomper (Editor, Arms Control Today) strike some interesting points. Some of their assumptions would have me worried sick if one of the two ever went into office (far too 'right from center' as a former SWC member opined for my 'too left from center' politically-charged American lifestyle) :rolleyes:


The thoughtful commentary by ex-CIA chief and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger regarding the National Intelligence Estimate's stunning reversal on Iranian nuclear proliferation is right on the mark ("Stupid Intelligence on Iran," op-ed, Dec. 19).

As Mr. Schlesinger points out, it's well known that it's a short, easy path from uranium enrichment (the hard part) to an operable nuclear weapon (the easy part -- it's just a simple pipe bomb). Thus Iran continues full-bore developing the hard part right under our noses.

If President Bush can't overcome the NIE's intelligence "estimates," his hands will effectively be tied, leaving it solely up to Israel to challenge Iran's nuclear weapons capability.


I agree with much of the thrust of what James Schlesinger wrote in his commentary. The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear programs -- and even more so the press coverage of that assessment -- did not give sufficient weight to the danger posed by Iran's uranium enrichment program (nor its missile programs I would add) in its narrow emphasis on an apparent 2003 halt in Iran's weaponization activities.

However, Secretary Schlesinger is inaccurate and misleading in his analysis of the factors that may have led to Iran's 2003 decision.

Much more at the link...

Galrahn
12-27-2007, 02:52 PM
What evidence is there to support that theory? What's required to be in place and operating (technical details please) in order for your prediction to occur?

It isn't really a prediction as it is an observation. All indications point to Iran appearing to be remarkably patient.

My observations on the particulars of what we have heard have been shaping my perspective. It is theory, I do not have 'special insight' on this subject.

1st, it was stated in the NIE that the Iranians stopped working on thier weapon program in 2003. Many people jumped on this information to imply the Iraq invasion was the reason Iran ceased its weapon program.

However, it was also in 2003 that the IAEA got wind of the AQ Khan connection, we just didn't hear about it publicly until 2004. From what we gathered from the Lybians, AQ Khan delivered just about all the technical knowledge needed for weaponization, meaning Iran could afford to suspend military research at that time having achieved all discoveries necessary until such tmie they were in possession of the physical capabilities.

That would lead to centrifuges, enrichment, and other activities all of which are legal and part of a civilian nuclear program. I for one am not worried about the LW reactor Iran is partnered up with Russia on, in fact I'd question if Iran wanted a weapons program at all if they were building all LW reactors.

It is the work on the heavy water reactor near Akak, and the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz that concerns me. That is the part of the program that represents the next step if you were building from the data supplied by AQ Khan, and btw, despite our objections, both are legal.

The way I see it, the civilian program can carry the Iranians almost to the finish line if they indeed got everything we suspect the recieved from AQ Khan. They have no reason to take chances with the IAEA or US right now, because everything they are doing is both legal and required before the next steps of weaponization.

Their patience is what I find remarkable. At this rate, they can finish all the challenging aspects of their nuclear program legally, in front of our face, and leave themselves months away from a nuclear weapon.

JeffC
12-27-2007, 04:23 PM
It isn't really a prediction as it is an observation. All indications point to Iran appearing to be remarkably patient.

My observations on the particulars of what we have heard have been shaping my perspective. It is theory, I do not have 'special insight' on this subject.

1st, it was stated in the NIE that the Iranians stopped working on thier weapon program in 2003. Many people jumped on this information to imply the Iraq invasion was the reason Iran ceased its weapon program.

However, it was also in 2003 that the IAEA got wind of the AQ Khan connection, we just didn't hear about it publicly until 2004. From what we gathered from the Lybians, AQ Khan delivered just about all the technical knowledge needed for weaponization, meaning Iran could afford to suspend military research at that time having achieved all discoveries necessary until such tmie they were in possession of the physical capabilities.


I think that you're conflating what the Khan network sold to Libya with what it sold to Iran. From the evidence I've read here (http://www.wmdinsights.com/I3/G1_SR_AQK_Network.htm) and here (http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf), Iran only purchased old P1s and plans for P2 centerfuges. Eventually, Iran will cooperate with the IAEA and we'll know for sure what the state of those centerfuges are. My guess is that the P1's are a mess, and the P2's were never successfully built.

Stan
12-27-2007, 05:20 PM
The way I see it, the civilian program can carry the Iranians almost to the finish line if they indeed got everything we suspect the recieved from AQ Khan. They have no reason to take chances with the IAEA or US right now, because everything they are doing is both legal and required before the next steps of weaponization.

Their patience is what I find remarkable. At this rate, they can finish all the challenging aspects of their nuclear program legally, in front of our face, and leave themselves months away from a nuclear weapon.

Technically speaking, I'm having a hard time with "months away" from a weapon. Mathmatically, going from 3.62% to 90% enriched uranian is exactly how long when they do not have the right equipment or ability to accomplish said ?

We need a rocket scientist on the board :D

selil
12-27-2007, 05:39 PM
Technically speaking, I'm having a hard time with "months away" from a weapon. Mathmatically, going from 3.62% to 90% enriched uranian is exactly how long when they do not have the right equipment or ability to accomplish said ?

We need a rocket scientist on the board :D

The guys not far off thinking months: (link (http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/plutonium.htm))


1 megawatt-day (thermal energy release, not electricity output) of operation produces 1 gram of plutonium in any reactor using 20-percent or lower enriched uranium; consequently, a 100 MW(t) reactor produces 100 grams of plutonium per day and could produce roughly enough plutonium for one weapon every 2 months

Stan
12-27-2007, 05:55 PM
The guys not far off thinking months: (link (http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/plutonium.htm))

Thanks, Sam.

A bit of a long read, but seems to be just as much evidence for, as against.


The point of this discussion is, not to contend that a nuclear explosive device could not be made from reactor-grade plutonium, or that reactor-grade plutonium is unattractive for potential proliferants, but rather to note that the argument about the efficacy of reactor-grade plutonium has obscured the case for a more rigorous approach to plutonium having an isotopic composition much closer to that actually used in nuclear weapons.

No offense, but I'd like a member from the DOE to comment :cool:

selil
12-27-2007, 06:04 PM
No offense, but I'd like a member from the DOE to comment :cool:

Good luck on that. I believe that would be Q-clearance stuff. You'll have to find it open source.

JeffC
12-27-2007, 10:12 PM
The guys not far off thinking months: (link (http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/plutonium.htm))

Good find on that summary article for Plutonium production. From the same article comes this clarifying section :


Reactors are generally purpose-built, and reactors built and operated for plutonium production are less efficient for electricity production than standard nuclear electric power plants because of the low burnup restriction for production of weapons grade plutonium.

The types nuclear fission reactors which have been found most suitable for producing plutonium are graphite-moderated nuclear reactors using gas or water cooling at atmospheric pressure and with the capability of having fuel elements exchanged while on line. Several distinct classes of reactor exist, each optimized for one purpose, generally using fuel carefully chosen for the job at hand.

This, of course, begs the question, what kind of reactor are the Russians building for Tehran at Bushehr?

From GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr-reactor.htm):


In January 1995, Russia and Iran signed a contract under which Russia would provide one VVER-1000 [aka WWER-1000] 950-1,073 MWe (electrical) light water reactor at Bushehr. The VVER-1000 reactor would be similar in configuration to Unit Four of the Russian Balakovskaya plant at Balakovo, Saratov. The Russian reactors will be installed in the original structures designed for the German 1,200-1,300 MWe reactors. Since the horizontal VVER-1000 steam generators are larger than the original German design, the project will require an enlargement of the existing reactor building, though the finished reactor dome will still resemble the German design.

Though Soviet-designed nuclear power plants differ from Western nuclear power plants in many respects, including safety systems -- only the VVER-1000 design has a containment structure like that of most nuclear power plants elsewhere in the world. Although it shares a basic engineering concept with its counterparts in the United States, France and Japan, the Soviet VVER pressurized water design is very different. VVER is an acronym for Vodo-Vodyannoy Energeticheskiy Reactor (water-cooled, water-moderated).

The VVER-1000 design was developed between 1975 and 1985 based on the requirements of a new Soviet nuclear standard that incorporated some international practices, particularly in the area of plant safety. The evolutionary design incorporates safety improvements over earlier VVER-440 Model V213 plants, including a steel-lined, pre-stressed, large-volume concrete containment structure similar in function to Western nuclear plants. Four primary coolant loops (providing multiple paths for cooling the reactor), each with a horizontal steam generator (for better heat transfer), this design is more forgiving than Western plant designs with two, three or four large vertical steam generators.


This type of reactor, a Light Water reactor, is one of the least efficient ways of producing weapons-grade Plutonium and, in fact, doesn't produce the correct type of Plutonium anyway (http://www.wrmea.com/archives/sept03/0309028.html).


Simply put, the reactor at Bushehr is the wrong kind of nuclear reactor for producing weapons-grade fissile material. It will produce the wrong kind of plutonium (all uranium-fueled nuclear reactors produce some plutonium as a byproduct, but only one isotope is desirable for weapons). It can be operated only in the wrong way with regard to yielding plutonium, and it is the wrong kind of reactor as well, in the sense that a facility such as Iran's is easily amenable to close surveillance, not lending itself at all to any covert diversion—of even the wrong kind of plutonium.

This isn't to say that Iran shouldn't be closely monitored. It should be. Nor am I suggesting that Iran doesn't want nuclear weapons. They've wanted them for a very long time. The only point that I'm hoping to make with this information is that the facts do not support a rapid development path towards acquiring nuclear weapons. A lot of very tough obstacles have to be overcome, and a lot of eyes, including those of Iran's neighbors in the Middle East, are watching to ensure that that doesn't happen.

JJackson
12-29-2007, 05:57 PM
A less rosy view of the difficulties of making a bomb using Pu239 with significant Pu240 contamination. If you are in no great hurry you could just wait Pu240 has a shorter half-life (you will need to be patient thought - allow 10,000 years or so depending on starting isotope mix).

(from Appendix 2 of http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/pdf/wouldairstrikeswork.pdf )




The use of plutonium produced in a civil nuclear-power reactor to
fabricate nuclear weapons

In a civil nuclear reactor, generating electricity, plutonium is inevitably produced. Reactor-grade plutonium
(R-Pu) will generally consist of 60% of the isotope plutonium-239, 24% plutonium-240, 9% plutonium-241
and 1% plutonium-238. Plutonium produced in plutonium-production reactors - used to produce
plutonium specifically for nuclear weapons (W-Pu) - will generally consist of at least 93% of plutonium-239
and less than 7% plutonium-240.
Eminent and highly competent physicists, with extensive knowledge of the characteristics and production
of nuclear weapons such as Richard L. Garwin,41 Theodore Taylor, J. Carson Mark, Harold M. Agnew,
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky and Michael M. May have stated that effective nuclear weapons can be
fabricated from reactor-grade plutonium.
Carson Mark, the head of the Theoretical Division at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for many years, stated:
“The difficulties of developing an effective design of the most straightforward type are not appreciably
greater with reactor-grade plutonium than those that have to be met for the use of weapons-grade plutonium”.42
The US Department of Energy has also warned about the weapon-usability of R-Pu,43 as did Hans Blix when
he was Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.44
In fact, as Matthew Bunn of Harvard University explained at an International Atomic Energy Agency
conference in Vienna in June 1997, it may actually be easier for a terrorist group or a small country to make
a nuclear weapon from R-Pu than from W-Pu because no neutron generator would be required to initiate
the explosion.45 A neutron from spontaneous fission of Plutonium-240 would initiate it instead.
A major difference between reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium is that the critical mass
(the minimum amount needed to sustain a fission chain reaction and produce a nuclear explosion) of a
bare sphere of R-Pu is thirteen kilograms compared with ten kilograms for W-Pu (both for alpha-phase metal
with a density of 19.6 grams per cubic centimetre). This means that about 30% more R-Pu is needed
than W-Pu to fabricate a nuclear weapon.
Iran’s experiments with plutonium
If plutonium is produced in the heavy water reactor planned at Arak and used to produce nuclear weapons,
it will be necessary to chemically separate the plutonium from the irradiated reactor fuel elements. Similarly,
if Iran decided to use plutonium produced in the Bushehr nuclear-power reactor in nuclear weapons, it would
need to separate the plutonium from the unused uranium and fission products in the fuel elements.
Therefore, the experiments performed by the Iranians in plutonium separation are significant.
The Iranian government acknowledged to the IAEA that it irradiated uranium dioxide targets with neutrons
in the Tehran Research Reactor and subsequently chemically separated the plutonium produced in the targets.
According to the Iranians, only a small amount of plutonium was separated.
Removing plutonium from spent reactor fuel elements (known as reprocessing) is straightforward chemistry.
The elements are very radioactive and adequate shielding against radiation is required. The PUREX (an acronym
standing for plutonium and uranium recovery by extraction) process is the standard chemical method for
reprocessing. Unused uranium, plutonium, and fission products are separated from each other and
from the fission products.


Edit: Sorry about the formating when cut and pasted. Please read from the original .pdf - whole document is worth reading. N.B. Obviously predates the start of shipments of 103 tonnes of fuel to Bushehr which would have serious implications for any kind of airstrikes.

JJackson
12-29-2007, 06:09 PM
What I should also have mentioned from the same report



If operated to generate electricity, the Bushehr reactor will produce about 250 kg of plutonium per year. If diverted for military use, this amount of Plutonium would be enough to build between 40 and 50 nuclear weapons a year. There would be enough plutonium in four irradiated fuel assemblies to produce a nuclear weapon.

JeffC
12-29-2007, 09:43 PM
What I should also have mentioned from the same report

What your quote doesn't show are the footnotes for those statistics. Here's the quote from the .pdf that you cited with the footnotes intact (in parens):


The Bushehr reactor will use low enriched uranium (about 3.5%in uranium-235) as fuel. The core of the reactor will hold about 103 tonnes of uranium contained in 193 fuel assemblies. If operated to generate electricity, the Bushehr reactor will produce about 250 kg of plutonium per year.(19) If diverted for military use, this amount of plutonium would be enough to build between 40 and 50 nuclear weapons a year.(20) There would be enough plutonium in four irradiated fuel assemblies to produce a nuclear weapon.(21)

Now all three of those footnotes are attributed to the same source, which is "Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/NPEC/perspex-npec-CheckingIran-0104.pdf)" by Henry Sokolski and Patricia Clawson, published by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

I found that document on the Net, and it includes language like the following: "Too much has been made of the difficulty of reprocessing light water reactor (LWR) fuel, especially by a country with Iran’s industrial base." And that's in the opinion of Henry Sokolski, former Bush 41 appointee and military aide to Dan Quayle, as well as a visiting scholar at the Heritage Foundation. In other words, he's not a nuclear physicist, nor does he have a degree in science. He has an M.A. from the Univeristy of Chicago, and he's clearly writing with an agenda.

This is a complex subject. I'd be happy if more people would just recognize that and not be too hasty in jumping to conclusions about what Iran can do, or will do with a technology that even the experts can disagree about.

Watcher In The Middle
12-30-2007, 04:59 AM
just technical, they are mostly economic. Got to be able to afford it. That's why this article is so extremely interesting (and the timing is even more so):


Inflation Fuels Anger Toward Ahmadinejad
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI – 2 days ago

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — A sharp rise in inflation has provoked fierce criticism of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — not only from his reformist opponents, but also from senior conservatives who helped bring him to power but now say he is mismanaging the economy.

Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a populist agenda promising to bring oil revenues to every family, eradicate poverty, improve living standards and tackle unemployment. Now he is being challenged for his failure to meet those promises.

Reformists and even some fellow conservatives say Ahmadinejad has concentrated too much on fiery, anti-U.S. speeches and not enough on the economy — and they have become more aggressive in calling him to account.

In a rare gesture, Ahmadinejad admitted last week that inflation existed but blamed it on his predecessors, the conservative-dominated parliament, state-run media and bank managers who misused their power and printed too many bank notes.

"Inflation has its roots in the past," Ahmadinejad said in a televised speech.

His comments were denounced from all sides, with economists and some fellow conservatives saying it is his policies that have led to higher prices.

Ahmadinejad's critics point out that more than 80 percent of Iran's government revenues come from crude exports and that inflation has risen under him despite sharp increases in oil prices to near $100 per barrel currently.

The growing discontent comes less than three months ahead of crucial parliamentary elections slated for March 14.

Hard-line conservatives gained control of the parliament in the February 2004 elections after the country's constitutional watchdog barred thousands of reformists from running. But in local municipal elections a year ago, the president's allies suffered a humiliating defeat after a majority of the seats were won by reformists and anti-Ahmadinejad conservatives.

Central Bank of Iran figures for November showed prices of basic commodities and services rising at a 19 percent while overall inflation is running at a 16.8 percent rate annually — double the pace it was when Ahmadinejad took office in 2005. But independent economists and experts put the inflation rate well above 30 percent.

Link (http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g9-X2AVpyA6KgR15oNvrwcAQ_TIwD8TPVE700)

You see a news article like this one, it's a "Message sender" in every sense. It's a real simple one - "It's the economy, stupid".

If you are an oil producer (Iran) who is flying flat out producing at $100 per Bbl., and you've got these type of inflationary economic problems due to self-inflicted runaway currency issues, you are cruising for unbelievably serious problems down the road (because economic conditions are unlikely to improve from where they are currently), and spending boatloads of cash on a nuclear program isn't helping.

I'm wondering if this article isn't the lead act in a play by the power structure to "explain" to President Ahmadinejad that he's had his time tweaking the "Great Satan" and all the Western power establishment, but ok, that's done, and now it's time to get back to internal business or he's gone.

From the above article:

...government increased liquidity, or the amount of money in circulation, from $72.3 billion in 2004 to $148.9 billion...

Btw, if those are real numbers on the money supply for Iran, that's just nuts. That's huge problems, and doing it in just 36 months.:eek:

Ron Humphrey
12-30-2007, 05:44 AM
just technical, they are mostly economic. Got to be able to afford it. That's why this article is so extremely interesting (and the timing is even more so):



Link (http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g9-X2AVpyA6KgR15oNvrwcAQ_TIwD8TPVE700)

You see a news article like this one, it's a "Message sender" in every sense. It's a real simple one - "It's the economy, stupid".

If you are an oil producer (Iran) who is flying flat out producing at $100 per Bbl., and you've got these type of inflationary economic problems due to self-inflicted runaway currency issues, you are cruising for unbelievably serious problems down the road (because economic conditions are unlikely to improve from where they are currently), and spending boatloads of cash on a nuclear program isn't helping.

I'm wondering if this article isn't the lead act in a play by the power structure to "explain" to President Ahmadinejad that he's had his time tweaking the "Great Satan" and all the Western power establishment, but ok, that's done, and now it's time to get back to internal business or he's gone.

From the above article:


Btw, if those are real numbers on the money supply for Iran, that's just nuts. That's huge problems, and doing it in just 36 months.:eek:

but I got a huge feeling there is going to be a lot more than him changing in the near future, and watching those who most ardently supported him in the recent past; distance themselves may be a key give away on what and how that change will happen.;)

JJackson
12-30-2007, 02:24 PM
JeffC, firstly thanks for chasing down the footnotes and I would wholeheartedly agree that we all should be very careful about agendas on everything and particularly on anything to do with Iran.

On the whole I liked the Oxford groups report and found it very un-neocon and the main block in my first post about Plutonium contamination seemed to be using nuclear physicists as its source (although I am not in a position to judge their academic credentials or politics) the second post with the dubious providence was to give an indication of how much Pu might theoretically be recovered from a Bushehr LWR if Iran were that way inclined. The point I would take from all of this is that once Iran, or any country, has a working nuclear reactor and a reasonably advanced industrial base if they wish to withdraw from the NPT and join the club they are free to do so and the only thing that can stop them is a war of aggression by another country. The thing I find most worrying is not that the Oxford group quoted a US Army report but that a US Army report included assessments of reactor nuclear isotope yields based - and their weapons potential - on a non-scientist political appointee; now that really is scary.

I have one - an agenda that is - and it is to attack claims that make it look as if Iran is either close to developing a weapon, or a particularly great danger if it had one. I personally am far more concerned about Israel and the US being nuclear powers than Iran joining the club. For those reading my posts in the future it may be helpful to know I think the five original nuclear 'haves' are in breach of the NPT for failing to move towards disarmament fast enough, not being willing to share technology with states they have ideological problems with while helping non signatories who they view as friends (India). Furthermore were I Iranian I would want to develop a nuclear weapon as I would not trust the US & allies not to attack my country on false charges - a la Iraq - and would view nuclear weapons as the only viable deterrent against a country with overwhelming conventional might and a doctrine of the use of preemptive force. Fear of the US, and its long term intentions, is also the reason I have reversed my view that my country (the UK) should not replace its deterrent.




This is a complex subject. I'd be happy if more people would just recognise that and not be too hasty in jumping to conclusions about what Iran can do, or will do with a technology that even the experts can disagree about.

Ron Humphrey
12-30-2007, 09:41 PM
JeffC, firstly thanks for chasing down the footnotes and I would wholeheartedly agree that we all should be very careful about agendas on everything and particularly on anything to do with Iran.

On the whole I liked the Oxford groups report and found it very un-neocon and the main block in my first post about Plutonium contamination seemed to be using nuclear physicists as its source (although I am not in a position to judge their academic credentials or politics) the second post with the dubious providence was to give an indication of how much Pu might theoretically be recovered from a Bushehr LWR if Iran were that way inclined. The point I would take from all of this is that once Iran, or any country, has a working nuclear reactor and a reasonably advanced industrial base if they wish to withdraw from the NPT and join the club they are free to do so and the only thing that can stop them is a war of aggression by another country. The thing I find most worrying is not that the Oxford group quoted a US Army report but that a US Army report included assessments of reactor nuclear isotope yields based - and their weapons potential - on a non-scientist political appointee; now that really is scary.

I have one - an agenda that is - and it is to attack claims that make it look as if Iran is either close to developing a weapon, or a particularly great danger if it had one. I personally am far more concerned about Israel and the US being nuclear powers than Iran joining the club. For those reading my posts in the future it may be helpful to know I think the five original nuclear 'haves' are in breach of the NPT for failing to move towards disarmament fast enough, not being willing to share technology with states they have ideological problems with while helping non signatories who they view as friends (India). Furthermore were I Iranian I would want to develop a nuclear weapon as I would not trust the US & allies not to attack my country on false charges - a la Iraq - and would view nuclear weapons as the only viable deterrent against a country with overwhelming conventional might and a doctrine of the use of preemptive force. Fear of the US, and its long term intentions, is also the reason I have reversed my view that my country (the UK) should not replace its deterrent.

I would like to respond in as elegant a style as you have in your post I'm afraid I would just flub it up and in the process lose whatever point I might be trying to make.

That said; How would you define agenda

And then in relation to that exactly which counterpoints would you offer to substantiate your opinion that there would not be any danger of Iran possessing nuclear weapons.

I may be mistaken but it seems somewhat hard to understand how proliferation is something which should be important enough for the original five "Haves" as you put it to be required to have followed through on disarming yet the statement that with or without for a country (IRAN) which has not and by most world leaders standings should not have one comes out.

I do confuse easily however so if you could lay it out in laymans, assistants terms:confused:

(NOTE: even Irans "friends" and most of their neighbors don't want them to have it)

JeffC
12-31-2007, 12:18 AM
JeffC, firstly thanks for chasing down the footnotes and I would wholeheartedly agree that we all should be very careful about agendas on everything and particularly on anything to do with Iran.
You're welcome, although it isn't always an "agenda" that's at fault. It might just be faulty evidence (which is a lot harder to spot).

On the whole I liked the Oxford groups report and found it very un-neocon and the main block in my first post about Plutonium contamination seemed to be using nuclear physicists as its source (although I am not in a position to judge their academic credentials or politics) the second post with the dubious providence was to give an indication of how much Pu might theoretically be recovered from a Bushehr LWR if Iran were that way inclined.
As Stan pointed out several times, we really need a nuclear physicist to help sort out theory from fact, and fact from opinion.

The point I would take from all of this is that once Iran, or any country, has a working nuclear reactor and a reasonably advanced industrial base if they wish to withdraw from the NPT and join the club they are free to do so and the only thing that can stop them is a war of aggression by another country.
I'm of the camp that believes that Tehran is essentially a rational actor and will bow to global economic pressure. Any military action performed against Iran will be a LOSE-LOSE for everyone involved due in part to the global economic repercussions of closing the Straits of Hormuz, as well as hostile counter-actions by China (who I don't believe would support any military strike against Iran except in the most extreme circumstances).

The thing I find most worrying is not that the Oxford group quoted a US Army report but that a US Army report included assessments of reactor nuclear isotope yields based - and their weapons potential - on a non-scientist political appointee; now that really is scary.
I don't think I'd consider an SSI report as an official U.S. Army doc. They solicit articles from civilians and academia, according to their website.

I have one - an agenda that is
Well, I'd probably call that your opinion rather than your agenda. As posters, we all have opinions, but we don't all have agendas. I could be wrong in my definition, but I typically ascribe an agenda to someone who has an ulterior motive where they profit or benefit in some way.

Surferbeetle
12-31-2007, 12:47 AM
All,

I offer a couple of websites for your reading pleasure (and make no claims what-so-ever about them) .

Hopefully this one is not so out there (www.fas.org, nuclear weapons tab, resources tab )....

http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=315&projectId=7&projectName=Nuclear+Weapons&contentTypeId=41&contentTypeDesc=Resources

Global Security, good on some things, however......

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/070906-airstrike.htm

Hmmm.....

http://pundita.blogspot.com/2007/12/news-quiz-during-october-what-official.html

JJackson
12-31-2007, 10:51 PM
That said; How would you define agenda?


Ron:

Mea culpa. If you are feeling charitable you might accept I was employing poetic licence as I shifted the meaning between "we all should be very careful about agendas" (Political) and "I have one - an agenda that is" (Business - list of things to be discussed). Although my meaning may fall between the two in that I would like to discuss these things because I am unhappy with some of the more hawkish views I have seen and want the issues aired.

On the proliferation issue I wish to be quite clear, I do not want Iran to have the bomb; in-fact I don't want anyone to have one. My problem is that I would like the US, UK & the other original 'haves' to occupy the moral high ground, lead the way to disarmament and not create an environment which leads to proliferation. I do not think this has been occurring; on the contrary I believe US foreign policy is having exactly the opposite affect and is the cause of massive destabilisation and uncertainty globally with attendant pressure on non nuclear states to go nuclear. The UK is a minor player but has disastrously pandered to the US's wishes giving a veneer of legitimacy when it should have fought hard against the US. The US/EU3 position is hypocritical and without justification under the NPT. By singling out Iran, basically because we have a historical beef, when we do not hold other nations up to the same standards we weaken the treaty and our position. The US is trying to get sanctions against Iran and the existing sanctions have already caused havoc to their economy. They have been threatened with military action and still are by Israel. Yet Israel is widely accepted to have a bomb and are threatening to attack Iran just for the suspicion they may try and follow suit yet they are not under an economic blocked. Ignoring the niceties of international law, which is moot if you don't have the muscle to enforce it, there is no natural justice in the US's position. Until the US, and its allies, at least attempt to implement international treaties in an evenhanded manner - or if they can't manage that at least be a little less blatantly partisan - there is no hope for the NPT or much else in terms of global stability. The US's military supremacy is letting it get away being a global bully.

So to answer the question 'How would you offer to substantiate your opinion that there would not be any danger of Iran possessing nuclear weapons.' I don't think there would be 'no danger' I just don't think there would be any more danger than that posed by Pakistan, Israel or the US. I have selected those three as examples as of the existing nuclear states I would view as being no greater threat than Iran. I have no reason to believe Iran would view a bomb as an offencive weapon, I would expect it to feel safer as it would act as a deterrent to the US and Israel. Israel I fear as it seems quite comfortable projecting its military might into other states territory, it is also sufficiently paranoid to feel it needs to use its weapons early if it was not getting things all its own way. Pakistan I fear because it has a long term enemy in India that is beyond it militarily and industrially capacity to match conventionally and the US because it has tactical nuclear weapons and seems to believe that accepted norms in international law and behaviour do not apply to it.

Jeff:

I am in complete agreement with your assessment of Iran's intentions and the chances of anything 'good' emerging from a military intervention. As to the nuclear physics; it isn't all that complicated as physics or chemistry for that matter. Where it all gets murky is as engineering. Setting aside the question of intention most of the questions regarding Iran's capabilities resolve around how close they are to solving engineering problems like keeping their cascades operating and increasing their efficiency. The real question is IMHO to do with intentions; they can eventually workout the technical problems. If all else fails they could just keep the existing Natanz cascades running until they had enough HEU, everything else is to do with time. The aim should be not to keep threatening them and boxing them into a corner so they feel they need a bomb.

Surferbeetle
01-01-2008, 09:31 AM
JJ,

I too wish that people and countries would just do the ‘right thing’. However we as humans have been happily running around wacking each other over various juicy scraps since Australopithecan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australopithecus ) days and I foresee no changes to this strategy of ours. Our collective history documents that the victors of our conflicts continually use ‘better’ clubs and tactics.

If we were to accept that humans are hard wired to find and exploit resources, I think we can construct a resource centric model (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm ) which predicts that future actions in the Middle East (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_east ) and the Caucasus Region ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus ) will continue to be driven by the needs of the Great Powers. This is not to say that other resource rich parts of the world ( http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0406/feature5/ ) do not merit the same model, I am just limiting things to our general geographical area of discussion. ***The map link towards the bottom left of the National Geographic website is one that helps me to get a scale of things***

Nuclear war is certainly a deterrent to the actions of the Great Powers. Various authors do a better job of assessing and addressing this than I can, so I will list a few that have caught my eye. Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (www.amazon.com ) is one I continually come back to, with his question of whether America can “…preserve a reasonable balance between the nations perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments…” Lawrence Freedman in the book Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age makes a strong statement with his observation that “…the nuclear strategist had still failed to come up with any convincing methods of employing nuclear weapons should deterrence fail that did not wholly offend common sense…” Robert D. Kaplan evidences a good grasp of our continual drift towards entropy in his book The Coming Anarchy.

As an engineer I prefer systems with the least amount of variables and moving parts possible. As a solider I note that ‘effective leadership’ in times of chaos is a rarity. As a student of history I note that periods of stability allow for mankind to make improvements in his condition.

Pandora’s box has been opened; my vote is for non-proliferation and a balance of power. That opinion and five bucks will get you a latte.

Cheers,

Steve

Stan
01-07-2008, 07:08 PM
Head of IAEA to visit Iran in attempts to clear up questions about Tehran's nuclear past (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/01/07/europe/EU-GEN-Nuclear-Iran.php)


VIENNA, Austria: The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency will visit Tehran this week in attempts to add momentum to his agency's investigation of Iran's past nuclear activities and to seek additional knowledge of present programs, the IAEA said Monday.

IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei will visit Friday and Saturday "with a view of resolving all remaining outstanding issues and enabling the agency to provide assurance about Iran's past and present activities...

There has been growing impatience on the part of the U.S. and its allies about the pace of the IAEA's probe into Iran's past nuclear programs.

But diplomats accredited to the agency, who demanded anonymity because their information was confidential, told The Associated Press recently that the agency had run into unspecified obstacles, and that Iranian officials were now talking about March as the new deadline — something they said the United States and its allies would be unlikely to accept.

Jedburgh
02-03-2008, 02:18 PM
The Economist, 31 Jan 08: Iran's Nuclear Programme: As The Enrichment Machines Spin On (http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10601584)

If you are locked eyeball to eyeball with an adversary as wily as Iran, it does not make much sense to do something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends. But that, it is now clear, is precisely what America's spies achieved when they said in December that, contrary to their own previous assessments, Iran stopped its secret nuclear-weapons programme in 2003.

Iran's jubilant president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, immediately called the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) a “great victory” for his country. Subsequent events suggest that he was right. Western diplomats are despondent and international efforts to get Iran to stop enriching uranium and working on plutonium have been thrown into confusion.

Already difficult diplomacy has got harder. The steadily pumped up pressure that led to two United Nations sanctions-bearing resolutions, in December 2006 and March 2007, calling on Iran to suspend the offending work, suddenly deflated. Unprecedented, if grudging, co-operation from Russia and China at the UN Security Council had been about to lead to a third, tougher resolution. But the NIE produced an abrupt softening in the positions of the Russians and Chinese. The draft America, Britain, France and Germany had to settle for when all six foreign ministers met last week in Berlin is a feebler one, designed to shore up their fraying unity rather than set Iran quaking in its boots.....

Watcher In The Middle
02-03-2008, 05:16 PM
...Just isn't selling.

"Wonderland" (Washington, DC) doesn't care, and doesn't care to care. Imagine a whole bunch of arms control types sitting by the side of the road with a busted limo wailing to high heaven, saying "Yes, we are still important".

Now, add to the chorus, all the European types who were critical every step of the way saying "Those crazy Americans, who knows what they will do". Well, now it's "Where are the Americans?"

Real Simple: We are back home, and it's back to politics as usual (mostly domestic politics, with a little bit of Iraq, and maybe some China). And unless there's a dramatic change, it will be that way all the way through March, 2009 (confirmation hearings).

Bottom Line: The 2007 NIE "solved" Iran's nukes issues until it doesn't. Iran's going to have to "prove" one way or another where they are going, but any substantive changes in any direction regarding Iran are going to be on the shelf.

The Economist article reminds me of a rejoinder saying "America, get back in the game, but this time, do it our way". Hate to drop it to them, but the US pols aren't at all interested, and are unlikely to be anytime soon. The 2007 NIE settled the issue for them, as far as they are concerned.

For the pols to get concerned again, Iran is going to have to prove that the 2007 NIE is flat out wrong in it's assessments. Nitpicking on bits & pieces here and there in the 2007 NIE isn't going to do it. And anyway, why would Iran want to prove that the 2007 NIE is wrong?

Stan
02-06-2008, 08:49 PM
Iran General Staff (http://en.rian.ru/world/20080206/98564293.html)fear U.S. attack while Bush in power


"The threat from the U.S. has existed ever since the Islamic Revolution in Iran [in 1979]. And the threat only got worse during the Bush presidency era," the General Staff said in a statement.

"While Bush is in power, that is throughout 2008, U.S. military action against the Islamic Republic is still likely..."

Russia concerned (http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080206/98527854.html) over Iran's work to develop long-range missile


Russia is concerned over Iran's attempts to develop a long-range ballistic missile following the recent launch of a research rocket into space...

Losyukov said the test demonstrated the advances the Islamic Republic had made in ballistic missile technology that "raise suspicion towards Iran about its possible desire to create a nuclear weapon."

Long-range ballistic missiles are generally designed to deliver nuclear weapons because their payload is too limited for conventional explosives to be efficient. They have a range of 2,500-5,000 kilometers (1,600-3,100 miles).

"Long-range missiles are one of the components of such a [nuclear] weapons system. Naturally, this raises concern," he said.

Iran says space program poses no threat to peace (http://en.rian.ru/world/20080205/98407883.html)


A spokesman for Iran's government gave assurances on Tuesday that the country's achievements in space technology and research pose no threat to peace and stability in the world.

Gholam-Hossein Elham's comments come a day after Tehran's successful launch of the Explorer-1 research rocket, which is reportedly capable of carrying a satellite into orbit, and the unveiling of the country's first domestically built satellite, named Omid, or Hope.

"The launch of the Explorer rocket into space was conducted strictly for scientific purposes," the spokesman told a news conference in Tehran. "Our achievements in space research, as well as our progress in nuclear research, serve peace and justice."

Iran's official news agency IRNA said the Omid advanced research satellite was designed to operate in a low earth orbit and provide a variety of scientific data. It may be launched by March 2009.

Galrahn
02-08-2008, 05:36 AM
Stan, it is noteworthy I learn about that news here instead of flashed all over google news or drudge.

As I look back on the NIE, I find that it delivered more than what was in the writing. I observed the testimony of the writer the other day who didn't expect the public consumption reaction and would have preferred a more serious tone, but all that really tells me is that the spooks haven't taken their eye off the ball.

I don't know if the change in tone between the US and Iran was intended or not, but from my POV the most important aspect of the NIE in the sphere of public consumption was to change the tone between the US and Iran so public rhetoric doesn't interfere with private discussion. If that was an intended side effect of the NIE release, well done.

JJackson
02-08-2008, 05:08 PM
The great thing about the unclassified NIE summary was its brevity and that it got the coverage that it did. Agenda based Op-eds and think-tank reports were able to stir up near hysterical fear about Iran's capabilities and intentions but the NIE was able to re-focus the discussion based on reality - or at least the intelligence communities best estimate of same. The brevity meant there was a much greater chance of the document being accessed by a wider public; the more usual access being via second hand media interpretation with selected quotes. People seem rarely to read original documents these days despite the internet making so many of them available, they will spend much longer watching news on, or reading the analysis of, something like an IAEA report or Kyoto protocol than it takes to read the documents.

Stan
02-08-2008, 08:40 PM
Stan, it is noteworthy I learn about that news here instead of flashed all over google news or drudge.

As I look back on the NIE, I find that it delivered more than what was in the writing. I observed the testimony of the writer the other day who didn't expect the public consumption reaction and would have preferred a more serious tone, but all that really tells me is that the spooks haven't taken their eye off the ball.

I don't know if the change in tone between the US and Iran was intended or not, but from my POV the most important aspect of the NIE in the sphere of public consumption was to change the tone between the US and Iran so public rhetoric doesn't interfere with private discussion. If that was an intended side effect of the NIE release, well done.

Would have to agree with you, Galrahn. I spend more time reading here than most news sources. I have a few favorites, but none with the scope, depth and experience herein.

This blog, Sources and Methods (http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.com/2008/01/part-12-final-thoughts-revolution.html)came recommended and must admit, I liked the refreshing change and/or point of view.

Jedburgh
02-19-2008, 03:25 PM
WMD Insights, Feb 08:

Iran’s First-Generation Chemical Weapons Evaporate, as Certainty Declines in U.S. Intelligence Reports (http://www.wmdinsights.com/I22/I22_ME2_Iran1stGenCW.htm)

....The assessment that Iran possessed a secret CW stockpile and was seeking to enhance its quantity and quality through the acquisition of technical knowledge, precursor chemicals, and process equipment from abroad was regularly reinforced by new revelations of Iranian imports of dual-use chemicals and process equipment. The fact that the significance of these imports and attempted purchases depended on the presumed existence of a covert CW program was frequently overlooked. Since 2003, however, the U.S. intelligence community has progressively reduced the scope and certainty of its claims regarding an Iranian CW program, and U.S. officials have made fewer references to the existence of such a program. This shift in publicly stated assessments appears to have gone largely unnoticed and there has been little change in the judgments and assessments of members of Congress, NGOs, or private think tanks on the issue.

The primary objective of this essay is to outline the changing public statements of U.S. intelligence agencies regarding Iran’s CW program. Several possible explanations for the changes will be offered and some tentative conclusions drawn. At this time it may be difficult or impossible to draw firmer conclusions about the changes without access to classified intelligence assessments and records of the internal debates associated with the preparation of the unclassified public documents and statements. Although biological and chemical weapons are often discussed together, for the sake of clarity, this article will confine itself to CW assessments and will not address changes in assessments of Iran’s biological warfare activities and intentions.....

Jedburgh
02-22-2008, 02:58 PM
IMINT & Analysis, 20 Feb 08: Iranian Missile Silos (http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/02/iranian-missile-silos.html)

There has been a great deal of recent open-source reporting dealing with a purported missile site near Tabriz in northwestern Iran. While these reports may or may not be true, they have all failed to note the presence of another missile facility in the region. The difference is that this facility can be identified with much greater certainty: this facility houses Iran's first missile silos.....

JJackson
02-22-2008, 05:15 PM
While his report to the board has not been released into the public domain ElBaradei has done a Q & A which can be found at the link below.

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Multimedia/Videos/DG/QandA220208/index.html

Jedburgh
02-26-2008, 02:03 PM
While his report to the board has not been released into the public domain....
Here's the report, dated 22 Feb 08:

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_22Feb2008.pdf)

Stan
04-17-2008, 07:34 AM
MOSCOW (http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080416/105251460.html). (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - The working group of the Luxembourg International Conference on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe held its first meeting in Moscow.


... attended by Russian and American experts on nuclear non-proliferation and devoted to Iran's nuclear program.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has elevated it to the rank of national priority, and it has already become a global headache.

Why does Tehran need its own uranium-enrichment program if Iran's uranium ore deposits are so scarce? They are sufficient for providing a limited amount of enriched uranium for research, but this is about all. Moreover, any nuclear reactor exported to Iran can only use the fuel of the supplier country.

So, why does Iran need enriched uranium?

There are more serious grounds to assume that Iran has been consistently trying to acquire nuclear weapons. For example, it is stepping up the production of medium- and long-range missiles. Why would Iran need carriers with a range of 2,000 km-6,000 km, if it cannot equip them with nuclear warheads? Using one warhead against area targets is simply absurd if it is conventional rather than nuclear.

Experts reviewed all potentialities of this carrot-and-stick policy.

Experts also considered another option - perhaps it is time to recognize that Iran is a nuclear power. In this case, Iran will have to join relevant international agreements, the world community will closely watch it, and apply to it completely different deterrents.

In the next few days, the Luxembourg forum will publish its Moscow proposals on Iran's nuclear file for the UN Security Council.

JJackson
04-17-2008, 11:44 AM
Moreover, any nuclear reactor exported to Iran can only use the fuel of the supplier country.

So, why does Iran need enriched uranium?


This seems a very strange statement. Why is a nuclear reactor only able to burn fuel supplied by the country that built it? If it were true I would have thought someone (IAEA,EU or US) would have pointed out that Iran's self-sufficiency arguments were fatuous before now and arguments based on the logic of building long range missiles would not be needed.

Stan
04-17-2008, 06:32 PM
Hmmm, could it be something so minor as measurements in inches versus metrics, or is our fuel something like high octane being pumped into a Russian Lada :D

This recent article points to potential problems with Westinghouse selling Ukraine fuel rods, and even leads the reader to believe our fuel rods may be inferior to that of Russia's :eek:

Ukraine’s nuclear authorities are playing with fire (http://eurorus4en.wordpress.com/2008/04/06/ukraines-nuclear-authorities-are-playing-with-fire/)


Although diversification is a noble goal, the operation of nuclear power plants is highly complicated. Safety alone should encourage Ukraine to use nuclear fuel for which its nuclear power plants were designed, i.e. fuel made in Russia.

Khusein Chechenov, a member of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee on nuclear energy, said, “It was a political decision taken without due regard for economic or scientific considerations.”

According to him, the contract is a mistake made deliberately to spite Moscow.

Westinghouse’s fuel assemblies are 25% more expensive than those provided by Russia’s TVEL Corporation and their quality is questionable.

Experts say that the use of Westinghouse assemblies in Russian-made reactors will considerably increase the risk of an accident at the Yuzhnoukrainsky nuclear power plant.

Finland has recently decided to continue buying Russian fuel for its Russian-built reactors and declined Westinghouse’s offer, and the use of American fuel at the Temelin plant in the Czech Republic nearly caused an accident. Accordingly, Czech authorities have decided to use Russian technologies despite political considerations.

The management of the Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary entrusted the cleaning of fuel assemblies at its second block to the French-German company Framatome ANP. The use of an “alien” technology resulted in the malfunction of 30 fuel assemblies and almost caused an accident. The Hungarian authorities called on Russian specialists for help, who managed to remedy the situation only three and a half years later.

Entropy
04-17-2008, 09:47 PM
This seems a very strange statement. Why is a nuclear reactor only able to burn fuel supplied by the country that built it? If it were true I would have thought someone (IAEA,EU or US) would have pointed out that Iran's self-sufficiency arguments were fatuous before now and arguments based on the logic of building long range missiles would not be needed.

My understanding is that most who sell reactors stipulate a fuel-supply agreement as well because it brings in a continuous stream of revenue over the long term.

As for Iran's self-sufficient arguments, they have been brought up many times. Iran has very poor uranium reserves which will be exhausted within a couple of decades. Some DOE scientists wrote a paper on the economics of Iran's nuclear program, a summary of which can be found here (http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2006/Apr/24-797508.html).

JJackson
04-18-2008, 11:14 AM
My understanding is that most who sell reactors stipulate a fuel-supply agreement as well because it brings in a continuous stream of revenue over the long term.

As for Iran's self-sufficient arguments, they have been brought up many times. Iran has very poor uranium reserves which will be exhausted within a couple of decades. Some DOE scientists wrote a paper on the economics of Iran's nuclear program, a summary of which can be found here (http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2006/Apr/24-797508.html).


Researchers from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory issued the report, The Economics of Energy Independence for Iran, in March. It examines Iran’s nuclear program and alternative energy investments strictly on their economic merits.


And there in lies the problem.
If you are living in an unfettered global market place and can pop out and buy what you need when you want this kind of analysis makes sense. In the Shah’s time Iran lived in this world and bought the worlds toys, as the Saudis do today. We bought their oil and they bought our oil extraction and refining technologies, nuclear reactors and weapons. Dump the tyrant and become an Islamic state and you have a problem no spare parts and all that investment leaves you with a half built German reactor, lots of shiny military hardware you can not use to the full when Iraq attacks – because you can not repair or replace – and an oil industry that’s aging hardware needs sanctioned spares. Iran’s solution – DIY. Build up your Universities, engineering capacity do as much as you can in house. This is a nation that is building their own fighter jets and does not want to be beholden to the whim of any external power if it can avoid it. The memory of the Iraq war is burned deep; self sufficiency is a matter of national security and both the US and Iran seem willing spend what ever it takes where that is concerned.
As to ore reserves even if they are not going to be self-sufficient indefinitely they will be long enough to settle the ‘is all this aimed at building a bomb’ debate and after that there are plenty of countries they can buy from - assuming sanctions are lifted or circumventable. If they get totally stuck we have some very nice second hand kit just up the road from me including reprocessing facilities and a fast breeder reactor (Sellafield (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windscale)).

Stan
04-18-2008, 03:36 PM
I got to wonder if there's anything more to this than future energy deals as Entropy points out. Smoke and mirrors ?


Westinghouse wins Ukraine fuel supply deal (http://89.151.116.69/ENF-Westinghouse_wins_Ukraine_fuel_supply_deal_310308. html)


The new contract includes special terms to protect both the supplier and the buyer, national electricity utility Energoatom. Should Energoatom fail to gain regulatory approval for the use of Westinghouse fuel assemblies on a large scale, the American firm could terminate the contract with no penalty. On the other hand, if Westinghouse failed to meet technical standards, Energoatom could cancel.

In reaction to the announcement, Russia's Rosatom released a series of expert comments which roundly denounced the move. The various dignitaries agreed the contract was technically dubious and could be a negotiation tool during talks between Energoatom and TVEL for the remainder of nuclear fuel supplies. Furthermore they linked it to Ukraine's relationship with the European Union and its desire to join the Nato defence pact.

Chechenov Hussein, a member of the Russian Federation Commission on Natural Monopolies' subcommittee on atomic energy, said such contracts 'will bring Ukraine more harm than good.' He continued: 'I think this is a political decision not backed by economic and scientific considerations. The operation of a nuclear power plant involves the use of sophisticated, interconnected technology which can not introduce anything foreign.'

Stan
04-18-2008, 04:06 PM
A quick and revealing read. It would appear that Iran is a long way from doing anything that would produce electricity, yet alone weapons grade materials.

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor (http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/644/9.php)


In the USA, reactor builders have not been awarded a single new contract since 1973 that was not subsequently cancelled. In Western Europe - with the exception of France - reactor builders waited a quarter of a century before receiving a contract for a new plant in 2004. Now they have one at Olkiluoto in Finland.

Almost half of these projects have been plodding along for 18 to 30 years now. As far as a number of them are concerned, no one believes they will ever generate electricity - in fact, the normal term for such projects is "abandoned". The remaining plants that are expected to be completed in the near future are almost all in East Asia, and are being built under conditions that have little or nothing to do with a market economy. In short, the order situation for nuclear power plants is calamitous. All the more so when one considers the competition.

The decades of decline in the nuclear power industry have by no means come to a halt. There is a single new construction site in the USA and Western Europe combined, namely on the Baltic Sea coast of Finland. This site is treated in more detail below.

The major drawback of these studies is that they convince no one except their authors and publishers - and certainly not potential funders of new plant projects. This is the main reason for the unprecedented degree of uncertainty about what exactly a new generation of nuclear power plants would cost.

Hardly any reliable data is available on the large cost blocks, especially construction, waste disposal and decommissioning, or for that matter on operations and maintenance. One reason for this is because analysts greet nearly all published estimates with a high degree of scepticism. After all, these figures generally come from vendors seeking to build power plants, who therefore tend to set their estimates on the low, rather than high, side or from governments, associations and lobbyists trying to sway reluctant public opinion by holding out the incentive of supposedly low electricity costs.

Entropy
04-18-2008, 06:35 PM
Well, there are more reasons than just economic for fuel supply agreements. Since most of the world's fuel supply comes from the 5 nuclear-weapons-states, they want to control the fuel because of proliferation concerns. All such agreements include provisions for return of spent fuel to the providing country. Additionally, historically there have been few nations with the capability to produce fuel that is economically competitive. This is beginning to change, though we'll have to see what happens when the massive Russia-Kazakh project comes online and floods the market.

As for Iranian self-sufficiency that is the perception Iran would like to project, but it's not quite the reality. For example, Iran is not building it's own fighter jets, it's taking old jets and modifying them.

Personally, I find it strange that Iran is pouring billions of dollars into nuclear infrastructure while it imports gasoline - spending a fifth of its income on those imports along with gasoline subsidies. If the price of oil were to precipitously drop, Iran would face a true energy crisis as it could no longer pay for imports and subsidies as well as all the other aspects of government funding. If the US wants "regime change" it might try to get oil back down to $30 a barrel for 4-5 years and watch the Iranian economy implode.

Stan
04-18-2008, 10:25 PM
From The Economist (http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11058550) print edition - Is there still time for a miracle?


MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD, Iran's ebullient president, enjoys a boast. He particularly likes to crow on what he calls national nuclear day: the anniversary of the first production two years ago of low-enriched uranium to fuel yet-to-be-built civilian nuclear reactors. (That is Iran's description; others suspect weapons intent.)

Meanwhile, Iran hopes to convince the world that pressing for suspension of enrichment is pointless. Two retired American diplomats, William Luers and Thomas Pickering, agree. They propose instead helping Iran's enrichment effort, in a sort of joint venture, in the hope that inspectors may keep better track of the uranium that way. But teaching Iran the (militarily useful) enrichment skills it still lacks hardly seems the way to build confidence that its nuclear work is peaceful.

In any case, though Iran suggests it is racing ahead, the first 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz have not worked that well. The new ones can spin up to three times faster but will be tricky to operate. Between the NIE report, which reduced any temptation by America to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, and these technical problems, may there be time for diplomacy?

Meanwhile Israel, most threatened by Iran's rockets and claimed nuclear prowess, has just had its first “strategic dialogue” with Britain; talks with America have intensified. Despite the diplomatic activity, for Israel the clock still ticks.

Stan
04-19-2008, 07:35 AM
Philip H. Gordon (http://www.brookings.edu/experts/gordonp.aspx), Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Senate Finance Committee




Pros and Cons of S970 (http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0408_iran_gordon.aspx)

The merit of the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act is that it is designed to tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran for refusing reasonable compromises over the nuclear issue and to encourage other major international players to do the same. The bill recognizes the reality that only a broad set of diplomatic, political and economic measures – imposed by a wide coalition of states – has any hope of changing Iranian behavior.

Iran’s development of a nuclear enrichment capability will, in all honesty, be difficult to prevent. But I believe the only way to halt or even limit it involves presenting Iran with an enhanced set of incentives and disincentives to change its cost-benefit analysis of the issue. Some of the measures in the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act (S970) help to advance this goal in constructive ways. I do have reservations, however, about some aspects of the bill (addressed below) and would urge Congress to be particularly careful about measures that could divide the international community or lead to legal challenges from U.S. allies or partners. A major legal clash with allies – at the World Trade Organization or elsewhere – over efforts to contain Iran would divide the international community and undermine, rather than bolster, the recent progress made towards strengthening multilateral sanctions.

Efforts to increase the price Iran must pay for pursuing this program – which is the worthy objective of S970 – remain the best option, largely because all the other options are so bad. Acquiescing to Iran’s activities without responding would tilt Iran’s cost-benefit analysis of building a nuclear weapon in favor of doing so.

The policy option at the other end of the spectrum – military force – is equally unpalatable. Targeted U.S. air strikes probably could destroy many of Iran’s critical nuclear facilities and set back the program for a number of months or years. But U.S. intelligence about Iran is far from perfect, and even the known elements of the Iranian program are dispersed at multiple sites around the country, protected by extensive air defenses, often located near civilian areas, and sometimes buried under thirty feet of dirt and reinforced concrete. Air strikes against the nuclear program, therefore, would not be “surgical” but rather widespread, sustained, and likely to kill a number of Iranian civilians.


Much more at the link...

marct
04-19-2008, 06:00 PM
A rather useful page on sources of uranium and fuel production is available here (http://www.cameco.com/uranium_101/markets/). The distribution of Uranium production is quite interesting.

http://www.cameco.com/common/images/u101/world_u_production.gif

Entropy
04-19-2008, 08:46 PM
Yeah, that's a good chart, but it doesn't address enrichment so only tells part of the story. Most power reactors use LEU and so require uranium enrichment. A list can be found here (http://www.wise-uranium.org/efac.html) - scroll down to the relevant section. For example, Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia are the three biggest uranium suppliers, but none of them have enrichment or fabrication facilities to make the LEU fuel most of the world uses. One of Russia's goals is to become the largest fuel supplier and to achieve that it recently penned a deal with Kazakstan to enrich Kazakh uranium in a new facility in Russia for export, primarily to the third world. If and when it's completed as planned, it has the potential to increase world supply by almost 10%.

bourbon
06-02-2008, 03:46 PM
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/gov2008-15.pdf). IAEA, 26 May 2008. (PDF)


F. Summary

26.The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

27.The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme. Iran has agreed to address the alleged studies. However, it maintains that all the allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.

28.The Agency’s overall assessment of the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme also requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications by Iran concerning some procurement activities of military related institutions, which remain outstanding. Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension. Iran’s responses to the Agency’s letter of 9 May 2008 were not received until 23 May 2008 and could not yet be assessed by the Agency. It is essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications and access outlined in this report without further delay. It should be emphasised, however, that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

29.Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP and the installation of both new cascades and of new generation centrifuges for test purposes. Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR–40 reactor.

30.The Director General urges Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including the Additional Protocol, at the earliest possible date.

31. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Ron Humphrey
06-02-2008, 03:55 PM
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/gov2008-15.pdf). IAEA, 26 May 2008. (PDF)

Thanks for posting it

I think this part is interesting too


26.The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.(emphasis added)

Has the agency been able to verify anything to do with any NON-declared nuclear material?

JJackson
06-02-2008, 04:21 PM
while I have not read it all yet it seems much like the previous ones and they are being pressed to account for the 'plans' supplied by an anonymous source which they claim are fabricated. Either they are lying or an unfriendly intelligence service is muddying the waters how do you tell which?

Ron have you any reason to believe they have any non-declared nuclear material?
Would the US like to prove they have no aliens at area 51 (and never have had)?

Ron Humphrey
06-02-2008, 04:28 PM
while I have not read it all yet it seems much like the previous ones and they are being pressed to account for the 'plans' supplied by an anonymous source which they claim are fabricated. Either they are lying or an unfriendly intelligence service is muddying the waters how do tell which?

Ron have you any reason to believe they have any non-declared nuclear material?
Would the US like to prove they have no aliens at area 51?

Anyone who wants can come see 51, ( the key is will you really remember if you saw anything by the time you leave. ;)

Something about us and toys we just gotta play with them:D

on the other matter ,
I like poker, Do you like poker
only one thing that gets my gander like nothing else and thats cheaters .
We got a guy who comes to play every week for a while and always does real well, problem is one night he gets caught with an Ace up his sleeve.
Well you can guess he wasn't invited next time.

Now if he wants to play with us again the likelihood that we require him to prove that he isn't hiding any cards is gonna be about 230%

JJackson
06-02-2008, 05:35 PM
but I wondered is it Iran who has been telling fibs and western intelligences agencies that are pure as the driven snow, or the other way around or is it just possible that neither are above a little skulduggery? Sorry all obviously MI6, the CIA or Mossad would be incapable of doing anything underhand (being on the good-guy team) so it must be Iran.

Ken White
06-02-2008, 05:49 PM
All of the above. So?

Entropy
06-02-2008, 05:51 PM
Has the agency been able to verify anything to do with any NON-declared nuclear material?

From both a technical and legal sense the IAEA is only able to definitively verify the absence of non-declared material when the additional protocol (AP) to the NPT is in force. Iran has signed but not ratified the AP and is currently not implementing it, though it did for about two years from 2004-2006.

The crux of the situation is that acceding to the AP is ultimately voluntary since it's not part of the NPT. IOW, Iran cannot be forced to adopt the AP. However, the Agency cannot fully clear Iran of its past deception without implementation of the AP along with some additional transparency measures the Agency has continually asked Iran for, so there is an impasse.

Steve Blair
06-02-2008, 05:53 PM
All of the above. So?

Concur. C it is. And that and $1.25 or so will buy you a crappy cup of overroasted Starbucks coffee....;)

Entropy
06-02-2008, 05:59 PM
but I wondered is it Iran who has been telling fibs and western intelligences agencies that are pure as the driven snow, or the other way around or is it just possible that neither are above a little skulduggery? Sorry all obviously MI6, the CIA or Mossad would be incapable of doing anything underhand (being on the good-guy team) so it must be Iran.

That depends on what you mean by underhanded. As I noted above, there is currently a legal dispute over exactly what Iran is required to do to account for its past clandestine activities. Most countries are on the US side, but not everyone.

When the MEK-supplied laptop came into the hands of US intelligence, I was initially skeptical and questioned it's provenance. However, the latest IAEA report shows the laptop is not the only source of information on Iran's weaponization activities (emphasis added):


16. At follow up meetings in Tehran on 28–30 April and 13–14 May 2008, the Agency presented, for review by Iran, information related to the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project (See Annex, Section A). This included information which Iran had declined to review in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4, paras 35, 37–39 and 42). This information, which was provided to the Agency by several Member States, appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent. The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran.

Iran has claimed all along the information on the laptop was fabricated, but if there are multiple sources from multiple member nations pointing the same direction, then that damages the fabrication argument.

JJackson
06-02-2008, 06:06 PM
Ken the 'so' is we are already fighting one war because Iraq could not prove a negative and I don't want to go there again. I took Ron's post to imply they were not declaring materials (sorry Ron if it was not your intention to sow that seed of doubt) which I wanted to challenge. If anyone has evidence great, else show me the aliens.

JJackson
06-02-2008, 06:26 PM
That depends on what you mean by underhanded. As I noted above, there is currently a legal dispute over exactly what Iran is required to do to account for its past clandestine activities. Most countries are on the US side, but not everyone.

When the MEK-supplied laptop came into the hands of US intelligence, I was initially skeptical and questioned it's provenance. However, the latest IAEA report shows the laptop is not the only source of information on Iran's weaponization activities (emphasis added):



Iran has claimed all along the information on the laptop was fabricated, but if there are multiple sources from multiple member nations pointing the same direction, then that damages the fabrication argument.
I had noticed that but had assumed that if the evidence was fabricated the fabricators would be reasonable competent and the documents would look credible and would be 'found' by various sources preferably not only by those who seemed to want to pick a fight with Iran anyway. The ability to leak convincingly seems to be in most governments skill sets. I have no clearance so I am never going to see the documents so it is all down to trust and as mine has been abused before so I am looking for a smoking gun this time around.

Ken White
06-02-2008, 06:32 PM
that cat being out of the bag long ago, I don't see that as an actual casus belli for us in spite of all the rhetoric.

Though I acknowledge it could be used as a pseudo case. :wry:


Ken the 'so' is we are already fighting one war because Iraq could not prove a negative and I don't want to go there again.But JJ, you just went there... ;)

(Rhetorically, I mean. If you meant you don't want to go there again, physically, that's understandable though it may not be your decision that makes the determination)

Suffice to say I'm extremely doubtful that WMD / proliferation had much of anything to do with our attack on Iraq in spite of the politically inspired double speak or obfuscation on the issue.
I took Ron's post to imply they were not declaring materials (sorry Ron if it was not your intention to sow that seed of doubt) which I wanted to challenge. If anyone has evidence great, else show me the aliens.Dunno. Don't care. Both sides will maneuver and lie while seeking advantages and leverage; way of the world. We have been playing intel and verbal games with the Iraniha since 1979 and I suspect we'll continue to do so for some time. Not concerned with Aliens, either (immigrants or extraterrestials).

What I would suggest is that if there is an attack on Iran, it also will have very little to do with WMD.

JJackson
06-02-2008, 06:48 PM
I do not think Iraq was about WMDs either but that was the justification to the domestic public and foreign states. My question is; am watching a little bit of history repeating itself to soften up the ground for an attack on Iran?

Steve Blair
06-02-2008, 07:01 PM
If you want to think so, then I guess it's so. Also, one might reasonably expect Iran to have learned something from Saddam's failed saber-rattling exercise.

There's been much speculation about the (supposedly) impending attack on Iran. Personally I'm not inclined to believe that one is in the offing, but I've been wrong before.

Entropy
06-02-2008, 07:10 PM
I had noticed that but had assumed that if the evidence was fabricated the fabricators would be reasonable competent and the documents would look credible and would be 'found' by various sources preferably not only by those who seemed to want to pick a fight with Iran anyway. The ability to leak convincingly seems to be in most governments skill sets. I have no clearance so I am never going to see the documents so it is all down to trust and as mine has been abused before so I am looking for a smoking gun this time around.

While it's certainly possible for someone to inject false intelligence to a variety of nations all pointing one direction, I think it's quite improbable to do that and make the sourcing credible at the same time.

Your larger point about "proving a negative" is a good one, but keep in mind that confidence and transparency go along way toward erasing the doubt that creates a situation of having to prove a negative in the first place. For example, even though it was impossible to verify with complete certainty the dismantlement of South Africa's weapons and nuclear material (in fact, there were some discrepancies in South Africa's materials declaration), the fact that South Africa was completely open and transparent with the process essentially erased doubts that the discrepancies were the result of intentional deception. Contrast the conduct of South Africa or South Korea or even Egypt with that of Iran and Iraq and I think the problem more clearly becomes not one of proving a negative but providing adequate transparency and openness to resolving the issue. Had Iraq verifiably destroyed its stockpiles instead of doing so secretly and unilaterally, and had Iraq provided the kind of access and transparency to inspectors that it was required to do, there would not have been a need for it to "prove a negative" in the first place to say nothing of OIF.

The same is true with Iran and all the IAEA has asked for all along is adequate transparency to do its job. Like it or not, lack of transparency in all human endeavors, whether a nuclear program or an unfaithful spouse, tends only to raise doubts about motivation and cause ambiguous information to be interpreted negatively. In short, it's not up to the Agency or any intelligence service to prove a negative - rather its up to the member state to fulfill its obligations and provide the access and transparency the Agency says is necessary for it to do its job, which Iran is clearly not doing. This lack of cooperation does not prove Iran has a nuclear weapons program, but keeps the issue in doubt and unresolvable. It's therefore hard to have sympathy for Iran's complaints of having to prove a negative when its continuing lack of cooperation is the very thing that is keeping those doubts alive.

Ken White
06-02-2008, 07:32 PM
I do not think Iraq was about WMDs either but that was the justification to the domestic public and foreign states. My question is; am watching a little bit of history repeating itself to soften up the ground for an attack on Iran?Truly doubt it -- but like Steve Blair, I've been wrong before...

Iraq made sense (not in the way or at the time it was done but in overall context); Iran does not on many levels.

JJackson
06-02-2008, 07:37 PM
If you want to think so, then I guess it's so.
I do not want to think anything of the kind and even if I did it would not make it so. I want to be able to trust my government and yours as it is the only party I have any faith in is the IAEA.



Also, one might reasonably expect Iran to have learned something from Saddam's failed saber-rattling exercise.
True but which lesson. That you may get accused of trying to acquire WMDs and then get attacked regardless of validy of the charge? May as well acquire what weapons you can and dig in.


There's been much speculation about the (supposedly) impending attack on Iran. Personally I'm not inclined to believe that one is in the offing, but I've been wrong before
I don't think it will happen either but not because their are not those in high places in Israel and the US who do not believe it is needed but because the don't have enough support and the NIE helped.

I am not trying to be awkward (it just comes naturally - boom boom). If there is a genuine problem with Iran and they have hostile intent then fine lets go coalition building and I hope the UK signs up but please this time lets be sure they are guilty of the crime before we meter out punishment.

RTK
06-02-2008, 07:41 PM
Truly doubt it -- but like Steve Blair, I've been wrong before...

Iraq made sense (not in the way or at the time it was done but in overall context); Iran does not on many levels.

Not to mention that big ass mountain range in the west of the country that will be a fairly big obstacle belt.

Ken White
06-02-2008, 07:46 PM
I do not want to think anything of the kind and even if I did it would not make it so. I want to be able to trust my government and yours as it is the only party I have any faith in is the IAEA.I'd like to do the same thing -- though I have far less faith in the IAEA than you do -- but I suspect that trusting any of the three is a step too far, IMO.
I don't think it will happen either but not because their are not those in high places in Israel and the US who do not believe it is needed but because the don't have enough support and the NIE helped.I strongly doubt that would deter ANY US President
I am not trying to be awkward (it just comes naturally - boom boom). If there is a genuine problem with Iran and they have hostile intent then fine lets go coalition building and I hope the UK signs up but please this time lets be sure they are guilty of the crime before we meter out punishment.Huh? If you agree that WMD were not the true reason for the invasion of Iraq, and I think you did, then isn't this a dichotomy?

Ken White
06-02-2008, 07:51 PM
Not to mention that big ass mountain range in the west of the country that will be a fairly big obstacle belt.Makes the moon look hospitable... ;)

These (LINK) (http://maps.google.com/maps?q=iran&ie=UTF8&oe=UTF-8&client=firefox-a&cd=1&ll=33.509339,54.137878&spn=1.085493,1.601257&t=h&z=9) are almost as bad...

Norfolk
06-02-2008, 10:06 PM
It conjures up images of a noticeably agitated contingency planning staff somewhere with bad hair, red eyes, coffee nerves, and a distinct tendency to staring off into the far distance...and a J-4 repeating over and over to himself, "this will never proceed beyond the .ppt Phase, this will never proceed beyond the .ppt Phase..."

JJackson
06-02-2008, 10:40 PM
If you agree that WMD were not the true reason for the invasion of Iraq, and I think you did, then isn't this a dichotomy?
I am not sure we can/should get overly self righteous if Iran wants a nuclear weapon if we did not do so for Israel, India, Pakistan etc.
The Hostile Intent was the thing I would view as a cause for war.

Watcher In The Middle
06-03-2008, 12:02 AM
, because it's just not there (See caveat below). The NIE initially took the winds totally out of those sails, and there's also an additional (different) factor at play these days.

The Iranian economy is literally on the verge of experiencing Argentinian style hyper-inflation in their economy (some would say they are already there), in particular with the vast increase in the money supply (almost a tsunami) pushed by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.

It's literally creating such vast internal inflation that Iran is being crippled financially, the Persian "street" looks to be highly unhappy, and if oil prices do top and then fall back, they are in big trouble. In this light, why should we do anything stupid (like attacking Iran)? We couldn't possibly do a better job of crippling the Iranian economy than they are doing right now. Just keep enforcing (and tightening, if possible) the economic sanctions, and let Iran do the rest (to themselves). Now if they pissed us off bad enough, well then all bets would be off (Hint to President Ahmedinejad: NEVER, EVER give a bunch of pissed off rednecks a really good reason to go out looking for a fight).

Besides, it's an election year on this side of the pond, so the remainder of 2007 is hereby officially dedicated to general election foolishness by all concerned parties, so Iran is just going to have to wait their turn. We can't have anything serious get in the way of our electioneering. Just the way it is.

Sorry Iran, just going to have to wait your turn. Besides, we need a good International Econ case study over how a nation can destroy their own economy through rampant, uncontrolled inflation. Iran as a case study will do just fine.

Ken White
06-03-2008, 01:39 AM
I am not sure we can/should get overly self righteous if Iran wants a nuclear weapon if we did not do so for Israel, India, Pakistan etc. The Hostile Intent was the thing I would view as a cause for war.Agreed. Which is why I said ""Not being a great worrier about non-proliferation -- that cat being out of the bag long ago, I don't see that as an actual casus belli for us in spite of all the rhetoric."" and ""Though I acknowledge it could be used as a pseudo case.""

However, I think you missed my point.

I asked "If you agree that WMD were not the true reason for the invasion of Iraq, and I think you did, then isn't this a dichotomy?" in relation to your comment agreeing with me that WMD were likely not the real reason for invading Iraq followed by this:
If there is a genuine problem with Iran and they have hostile intent then fine lets go coalition building and I hope the UK signs up but please this time lets be sure they are guilty of the crime before we meter out punishment.Point being that I thought we sort of agreed that Iraq was not guilty and we invaded anyway. Ergo, why should Iran have to be guilty to be invaded? :wry:

Entropy
06-03-2008, 03:02 AM
I am not sure we can/should get overly self righteous if Iran wants a nuclear weapon if we did not do so for Israel, India, Pakistan etc.
The Hostile Intent was the thing I would view as a cause for war.

The difference is, of course, that none of those three countries signed and ratified a treaty that specifically forbade nuclear weapons, while Iran did. Is it something worth another war? Not in my opinion, but YMMV.

JJackson
06-03-2008, 02:05 PM
However, I think you missed my point.

I asked "If you agree that WMD were not the true reason for the invasion of Iraq, and I think you did, then isn't this a dichotomy?" in relation to your comment agreeing with me that WMD were likely not the real reason for invading Iraq followed by this:Point being that I thought we sort of agreed that Iraq was not guilty and we invaded anyway. Ergo, why should Iran have to be guilty to be invaded? :wry:
I am sure your are right and I see your point. I was just hoping Iraq would be viewed as a mistake/salutary lesson rather than a setting of precedent.

Entropy re post #184. Great post and you are quite right I have no idea how difficult it would be to make disinformation look credible. I have eventually finished reading the latest IAEA report and, having read a few of these now, felt it was more pessimistic about Iran’s compliance than before – without actually accusing them of anything specific. I also agree that Iran are not doing themselves any favours in doing the minimum they can get away with. I have some sympathy for their position regarding the APs but am mainly fighting double standards which seems to have put me in their corner.
I note in a number of reports that from the Iranian point of view the UK are actually the bad guys and the US also rans.

Ken White
06-03-2008, 04:20 PM
I am sure your are right and I see your point. I was just hoping Iraq would be viewed as a mistake/salutary lesson rather than a setting of precedent.That presumes it was a mistake -- and it's too soon to tell. As to a salutary lesson, that was the intent; to provide one for the ME to consider. I believe they are in process of doing so; also too soon to tell how effective it was...

JJackson
06-03-2008, 04:35 PM
... we are not going to agree about this Ken, but.

For me the mistake has already been made and is not dependent on the outcome. The invasion without adequate justification and an adequate mandate was the mistake and that makes me have mixed feelings about the outcome. While I hate the destruction, loss of life (on all sides) and the general increase in hatred and mistrust, I fear too happy an ending lest it become an excuse for further similar ventures. This is not the disagreement for this thread and we have been around this bush a few times in other threads and I am not sure either of is going to wholly convince the other about where the line should be drawn. I see Ethiopia/Somalia in the same light, I am rooting for the Islamic Somalis because I don't want the invasion to work and be rolled out as a template

Ken White
06-03-2008, 06:19 PM
... we are not going to agree about this Ken, but.Not at all necessary for us to agree so long as we avoid beinf disgreeable.
For me the mistake has already been made and is not dependent on the outcome. The invasion without adequate justification and an adequate mandate was the mistake and that makes me have mixed feelings about the outcome. While I hate the destruction, loss of life (on all sides) and the general increase in hatred and mistrust...Perfectly understandable and I know many agree with you; I and others have different views on some of those aspects; most notably in my case on the matter of justification.
I fear too happy an ending lest it become an excuse for further similar ventures.I truly do not foresee that as a problem; things go in cycles and I suspect that interventions will be avoided for some time. A generation at least.
This is not the disagreement for this thread and we have been around this bush a few times in other threads and I am not sure either of is going to wholly convince the other about where the line should be drawn. I see Ethiopia/Somalia in the same light, I am rooting for the Islamic Somalis because I don't want the invasion to work and be rolled out as a templateTrue on the thread, probably also on the line location though I can and do respect where you draw yours. On Somalia, interesting conundrum; that too, we'll have to wait and see.

Ron Humphrey
06-04-2008, 02:15 PM
I truly do not foresee that as a problem; things go in cycles and I suspect that interventions will be avoided for some time. A generation at least.

Thats going to excuse you from having to be around to help with the next cycle:D

Ken White
06-04-2008, 03:23 PM
Thats going to excuse you from having to be around to help with the next cycle:DI was supremely lazy... :D

JJackson
06-06-2008, 07:28 PM
how can they get away with this.


Israeli minister threatens Iran

A top Israeli official has said that if Iran continues with its alleged nuclear arms programme, Israel will attack it.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7440472.stm

If Israel did attack Iran I hope my government would put together a coalition of the willing and launch a retaliatory strike. If they continue to make threats against another state like this then they should be subject to sanctions and if the US or UK sell them weapons then they should also be subject to sanction.

What other nation could get away with making threats based on unsubstantiated allegation of a crime (if it is that) of which they are themselves guilty.

I look forward to your comments.

Ken White
06-06-2008, 07:45 PM
LINK (http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080602124328.f6eyi8y1&show_article=1) and LINK (http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/26/news/iran.php).

Ron Humphrey
06-06-2008, 08:24 PM
how can they get away with this.



http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7440472.stm

If Israel did attack Iran I hope my government would put together a coalition of the willing and launch a retaliatory strike. If they continue to make threats against another state like this then they should be subject to sanctions and if the US or UK sell them weapons then they should also be subject to sanction.

What other nation could get away with making threats based on unsubstantiated allegation of a crime (if it is that) of which they are themselves guilty.

I look forward to your comments.

With guys like this over there you might get your wish.
LINK (http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1785.htm)



LINK (http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080602124328.f6eyi8y1&show_article=1) and LINK (http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/26/news/iran.php).

By the way have you seen some of his latest stuff.

Link (http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1784.htm)

They can't even seem to get more than one quarter of the audience to chant for them.
The rest just stand around looking pissed off that they had to attend:wry:

Ken White
06-06-2008, 08:30 PM
...By the way have you seen some of his latest stuff.

They can't even seem to get more than one quarter of the audience to chant for them.
The rest just stand around looking pissed off that they had to attend :wry: Probably less than a quarter. The mass of folks are fed up -- not to the point of taking to the street but it's headed that way.

bourbon
07-01-2008, 05:12 PM
Ex-Agent Says CIA Ignored Iran Facts (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/30/AR2008063001940.html?hpid=moreheadlines), By Joby Warrick. Washington Post, July 1, 2008.


The onetime undercover agent, who has been barred by the CIA from using his real name, filed a motion in federal court late Friday asking the government to declassify legal documents describing what he says was a deliberate suppression of findings on Iran that were contrary to agency views at the time.

Rex Brynen
08-13-2008, 05:26 PM
"U.S. puts brakes on Israeli plan for attack on Iran nuclear facilities (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1010938.html)," Haaretz, 13 August 2008.



The American administration has rejected an Israeli request for military equipment and support that would improve Israel's ability to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

A report published last week by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) states that military strikes are unlikely to destroy Iran's centrifuge program for enriching uranium.

The Americans viewed the request, which was transmitted (and rejected) at the highest level, as a sign that Israel is in the advanced stages of preparations to attack Iran. They therefore warned Israel against attacking, saying such a strike would undermine American interests. They also demanded that Israel give them prior notice if it nevertheless decided to strike Iran.

As compensation for the requests it rejected, Washington offered to improve Israel's defenses against surface-to-surface missiles.


The report mentioned is David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, "Can military strikes destroy Iran’s gas centrifuge program? Probably not (http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/Centrifuge_Manufacturing_7August2008.pdf)" ISIS, 7 August 2008:



From the time that Iran halted the suspension of its centrifuge manufacturing efforts and its adherence to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing complex has degraded dramatically. U.S. and other intelligence agencies appear to have only partial information about Iran’s centrifuge complex and its ability to reconstitute its program following an attack. Iran’s decision to disperse and keep secret several of its key sites further hinders the development of a full picture of its centrifuge complex. Considering the modular, replicable nature of centrifuge plants, we conclude that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program is unlikely to significantly degrade Iran’s ability to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program.

(Apologies to anyone also on MESHnet, since I've made the same post there.)

William F. Owen
08-14-2008, 07:42 AM
If Israel did attack Iran I hope my government would put together a coalition of the willing and launch a retaliatory strike. If they continue to make threats against another state like this then they should be subject to sanctions and if the US or UK sell them weapons then they should also be subject to sanction.

What other nation could get away with making threats based on unsubstantiated allegation of a crime (if it is that) of which they are themselves guilty.

I look forward to your comments.

I have delayed comment deliberately, but here goes. Moderators look in!

Would you advocated international military retaliation against India for attacking Pakistani WMD facilities? Yes? No?

The ONLY reason Israel "threatens" Iran is because of both the stated and implied intention of Iran to "wipe Israel off the face of the map". Israel is acting purely out of self defence. What the Iranian President "says for effect", Israel also says for "effect."
Thanks to both a substantial Iranian population and 3,000 years of anti-semitism, Israel has a far better grasp of this, than the BBC.

Israel could not care less if the UK, Pakistan, India, or even North Korea has Nukes. If Iran is trying to get nukes, then that is a clear threat against the Jewish people and their homeland.

If Turkey got Nukes, Israel wouldn't bat an eye.

Israel has nukes purely for self defence eg:- to deter those who seek to destroy them. Non Nuclear pre-emption is also clearly and logically (as with NATO) associated with that strategy.

I accept that these realities are not going to sway your particularly "British view" - one I understand, as I grew up with it - but you are essentially advocating attacking a country (which did not act against yours) for actions which fall a long way short of the both the current and historical actions of your own Government (and people), and from a country under considerably less threat than the one in which I live (albeit by choice).

davidbfpo
08-14-2008, 10:24 PM
Wilf & JJackson,

Not a hope in hell. Even more so with a Labour government in power in the UK. Nor would we seek to locate others to join a coalition, I exclude diplomacy in the UN for a vote of censure.

Then there is our much trumpeted "special relationship" with the USA, who is currently Israel's closest ally. Another reason for the UK to stand aside.

I shall leave aside the whole question of whether Iran has a nuclear capability.

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
09-16-2008, 02:02 PM
CEIP, 16 Sep 08: Iran Says “No”—Now What? (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb63_perkovich_iran_final.pdf)

Summary

- Neither Iran nor the United States can achieve all it wants in the current nuclear standoff.

- Iran has demonstrated its unwillingness to comply with IAEA and UN Security Council demands to cease its enrichment activities or to negotiate seriously toward that end.

- The United States and other interlocutors should offer Iran a last chance to negotiate a suspension of its enrichment program until the IAEA can resolve outstanding issues in return for substantial incentives.

- If that package were rejected, the P-5 plus Germany should withdraw the incentives and commit to maintaining sanctions as long as Iran does not comply with IAEA demands.

- Simultaneously, the U.S. should take force “off the table” as long as Iran is not newly found to be seeking nuclear weapons or committing aggression.

h2harris
09-19-2008, 03:46 PM
Interesting.

"Iran is just a heartbeat away from the A-bomb. Last Friday the Daily Telegraph reported Teheran has surreptitiously removed a sufficient amount of uranium from its nuclear production facility in Isfahan to produce six nuclear bombs. .... The IAEA's report claimed that Iran has taken steps to enable its Shihab-3 ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads. With a range of 1,300 kilometers, Shihab-3 missiles are capable of reaching Israel and other countries throught the region."

Cont. at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1221745565484&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Rex Brynen
09-21-2008, 03:44 AM
Interesting.

"Iran is just a heartbeat away from the A-bomb. Last Friday the Daily Telegraph reported Teheran has surreptitiously removed a sufficient amount of uranium from its nuclear production facility in Isfahan to produce six nuclear bombs. .... The IAEA's report claimed that Iran has taken steps to enable its Shihab-3 ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads. With a range of 1,300 kilometers, Shihab-3 missiles are capable of reaching Israel and other countries throught the region."

Cont. at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1221745565484&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

I've never found Caroline Glick to be a very reliable columnist, and in this case she seems to be spinning a Daily Telegraph story that itself has no foundations. As Arms Control Wonk reports (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2040/iaea):


“The article, entitled ‘Iran renews nuclear weapons development’ published in [Friday’s] Daily Telegraph by Con Coughlin and Tim Butcher is fictitious,” IAEA Spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said in a statement.

“IAEA inspectors have no indication that any nuclear material is missing from the plant,” reads the statement….

h2harris
09-21-2008, 05:07 PM
Caroline Glick has an interesting vita. 5 1/2 years as an IDF officer. The last three years of military service, Glick was a core member of Israel's negotiating team with the PLO. She later served as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's assistant foreign policy advisor. The foreword to her book, "Shackled Warrior" was written by R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence.

For myself, I never follow any one person's words and try to view all with a critical eye. However Glick seems to have a vita which suggest access to sources

bourbon
09-21-2008, 10:12 PM
For myself, I never follow any one person's words and try to view all with a critical eye. However Glick seems to have a vita which suggest access to sources
Hi h2harris,

If Benjamin "Clean Break" Netanyahu and R. James Woolsey (http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/000775.php) are indicative of Glick's sources, then your critical eye, imho, should be working overtime. Also, given recent history, I consider anything by the Telegraph's Con Coughlin to be of dubious veracity. Just my $.02

Ron Humphrey
09-22-2008, 01:47 AM
But it would be nice if someone could show me where IAEA actually has been able to tell for sure how much exactly Iran does have in the first place, let alone where it's at?

h2harris
09-22-2008, 02:00 AM
Bourbon,

Agree on the questioning of references. However in the fog of it all - it is generally agreed that Iran is weaponizing plutonium and delivery systems. The interesting question is what actions can or should be taken. Can no action be a policy? Personally I enjoy Glick's biweekly columns.

Howard

Entropy
09-22-2008, 12:39 PM
Wow, agree with Rex. The Glick article is very bad.

William F. Owen
09-22-2008, 02:40 PM
Caroline Glick has an interesting vita. 5 1/2 years as an IDF officer. The last three years of military service, Glick was a core member of Israel's negotiating team with the PLO. She later served as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's assistant foreign policy advisor. The foreword to her book, "Shackled Warrior" was written by R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence.


I wondered when somebody was going to brink this up. For me personally, that CV puts her about a quarter of the way up the tree of trusted sources on issues such as these, but then due to locality, I am spoiled!

h2harris
09-23-2008, 05:47 PM
The Wall Street Journal - September 22, 2008

EVERYONE NEEDS TO WORRY ABOUT IRAN
by Richard Holbrooke, R. James Woolsey, Dennis B. Ross and Mark D. Wallace

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122204266977561331.html

"We believe that Iran's desire for nuclear weapons is one of the most urgent issues facing America today, because even the most conservative estimates tell us that they could have nuclear weapons soon."

"A nuclear-armed Iran would likely destabilize an already dangerous region that includes Israel, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and pose a direct threat to America's national security. For this reason, Iran's nuclear ambitions demand a response that will compel Iran's leaders to change their behavior and come to understand that they have more to lose than to gain by going nuclear."

"Tehran claims that it is enriching uranium only for peaceful energy uses. These claims exceed the boundaries of credibility and science."

[U]Counter-balancing and balancing all that needs to be do so, would it be interesting to have a discussion on policy and action?/U]

Jedburgh
10-06-2008, 08:54 PM
CSIS, 23 Sep 08: The US, Israel, the Arab States and a Nuclear Iran (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear.pdf)

The detailed 178-page brief at the above link can also be accessed in individual pdf files for its separate sections:

Part I: Iranian Nuclear Programs (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part1.pdf)

Part II: Iranian Missile Programs and Missile Defense Options (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part2.pdf)

Part III: Iranian CBRN Options (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part3.pdf)

Part IV: Military Options for Dealing with Iranian Threat (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part4.pdf)

Part V: Iranian Capabilities to Respond to Preventive Attack (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part5.pdf)

Part VI: The Warfighting Implications of An Iranian Nuclear Force (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part6.pdf)

Part VII: The Problem of International Response and Arab Attitudes (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear_part7.pdf)

Jedburgh
10-16-2008, 11:43 AM
CSIS, 16 Oct 08: Iranian WMD: Capabilities, Developments, and Strategic Uncertainties (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081015_iran.wmd.pdf)

....Iran‟s progress towards a nuclear weapons capability has had additional major effects. Every state dealing with Iran must decide whether some form of accommodation is possible, and consider its relations with Iran in the context of dealing with a future nuclear power. While a state like Israel may focus on warfighting, other states – particularly Iran‟s neighbors -- must increasingly deal with an Iran which can use nuclear weapons as a tacit or overt threat to bring pressure upon them. Even the future prospect of an Iranian weapon, gives Iran added leverage in the “wars of intimidation” that shape much of the real-world behavior of nations in the region.

Iran's progress towards nuclear weapons capability also interacts with its growing capability for irregular or asymmetric warfare. It is one thing to deal with Iran‟s use of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) when Iran is a relatively weak conventional power. It is another thing to risk taking decisive action, or retaliating in force against Iran‟s use of irregular warfare, when this risks creating lasting tension with a future nuclear power – or the risk of escalation if Iran actually deploys a nuclear capability. Furthermore, Iran‟s ties to Syria, influence in Iraq, links to the Hezbollah, and relations with Hamas raise the specter that Iran not only can use proxies to help it fight irregular wars, but also to help it in some future covert delivery of nuclear weapons.....

Jedburgh
12-17-2008, 03:49 PM
CH, 17 Dec 08: Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12903_bp1208iran.pdf)

The dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is deadlocked. Five years of negotiations, proposals, UN resolutions and sanctions have failed to achieve a breakthrough. As diplomacy struggles and Iran continues to advance its nuclear capabilities, the issue becomes ever more grave and pressing.

There is some encouragement for progress in 2009. Iran’s economic and political weaknesses could make it receptive to US president-elect Barack Obama’s willingness to consider new approaches.

This report examines the Iranian and regional context for decisions that the US and Europe will take on shaping their relations with Iran. It goes on to explore options for the nuclear negotiations and offers recommendations to policy-makers to break the deadlock.....

goesh
05-20-2009, 02:03 PM
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520779,00.html

Iran Says It Test Fired Missile That Could Hit Israel, U.S. Bases in Mideast

The U.S. has criticized Iran's missile development and said such launches stoke instability in the Middle East.

The solid-fuel Sajjil-2 surface-to-surface missile tested has a range of about 1,200 miles, far enough to strike at southeastern Europe......."

AmericanPride
05-20-2009, 02:55 PM
That a country which perceives itself under siege is developing more advanced weapons systems should be of no surprise to anyone. It'll certainly make the Israelis uncomfortable, but I don't think that would be out of character for the Israeli security establishment. Should we expect any belligerency from Iran while its capabilities continue to develop? Or is this development an Iranian response instead of a provocation (though it'll definitely be interpretated as the latter)?

Ken White
05-20-2009, 04:51 PM
They want the Empire back -- Darius and Cyrus are ever present in their thoughts. Yet they know that is unlikely to happen. Conflicted people are hard to figure on occasion. They generally do not like to be dismissed as irrelevant.

They are also natural born hagglers and chips or rhetorical points in bargaining are prized. They tend to make hyperbolic statements and claims that they have no intention of backing up. They'll offer merchandise they do not possess. They make a lot of and things out of pot metal and then tin or copperplate them; they look good initially but too much polishing shows the poor quality underneath...

Different strokes.

bourbon
05-20-2009, 08:59 PM
They want the Empire back -- Darius and Cyrus are ever present in their thoughts. Yet they know that is unlikely to happen. Conflicted people are hard to figure on occasion. They generally do not like to be dismissed as irrelevant.
Is this the same Cyrus that rescued the Jews from Babylonian captivity? The same Darius that let the Jews rebuild the Temple?

Ken White
05-21-2009, 01:43 AM
point? Germane questions do not always obviously show the point of their being asked...

bourbon
05-21-2009, 02:53 AM
point? Germane questions do not always obviously show the point of their being asked...
Given the historically cordial relationship between Persian nationalism and the Jews, and the fact that Israel and Iran are natural allies; I find proclamations that an Iran armed with nuclear missiles is an existential threat to Israel to be dubious. Yet the calls for American intervention continue. Why?

IMHO, a nuclear Iran is a threat to Israel because it threatens Israel’s regional hegemony. Israel basing its security around the strongest tribe principle views this change in regional power as the threat, not the nukes in and of themselves. It becomes a matter of power politics, and not a matter of apocalyptic religion. The aim now for Israel is to thwart or slow Persian resurgence, be it through air strikes or increasing international sanctions.

Frankly I think it is hogwash; and they are trying to manipulate us.

Ken White
05-21-2009, 03:23 AM
Frankly I think it is hogwash; and they are trying to manipulate us.RE: that historical relationship. History is what was...

Things change. When I was in Iran, there were well over 75,000 jews in Iran and the Shah did business with Israel to the extent that Israeli firms had offices in Tehran, Shiraz and Ahwaz. After Khomeini took over, the attitude changed and IIRC, the Jewish population in Iran in 2007 was between 20 and 40K with most sources opting for a lower number. Most who departed emigrated to Israel, the UK or the US.

Thus I'm not sure that today the 'natural allies' are feeling all that much rapport.

Calls for the American intervention continue for a host of reasons, not least this at the LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=70519&postcount=37). Surely you remember that thread... ;)

Proclamations by politicians are always dubious -- makes no difference where they are or what party they belong to -- thus I would agree -- the Iranians and the Israelis are indeed trying to manipulate us (that begs the question who is not doing so -- but that's another thread, I guess...)

I was just answering American Pride's question on whether the Iraniha were responding or provoking. I think I said a little of both. So too are the Israelis doing the same thing -- it's a middle eastern game. Haggling skills are more important some places on earth than others... :D

Valin
07-09-2009, 01:36 PM
From the NYT by Brian Knowlton: Biden Suggests U.S. Not Standing in Israel’s Way on Iran (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/us/politics/06biden.html?ref=world)



From the Times Online by Uzi Mahnaimi in Tel Aviv and Sarah Baxter: Saudis give nod to Israeli raid on Iran (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6638568.ece)

Israeli sub sails Suez, signaling reach to Iran (http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090703/wl_nm/us_israel_iran_submarine)
Dan Williams Dan Williams – Fri Jul 3, 6:55 am ET

JERUSALEM (Reuters) – An Israeli submarine sailed the Suez Canal to the Red Sea as part of a naval drill last month, defense sources said on Friday, describing the unusual maneuver as a show of strategic reach in the face of Iran.
Israel long kept its three Dolphin-class submarines, which are widely assumed to carry nuclear missiles, away from Suez so as not to expose them to the gaze of Egyptian harbormasters.

(Snip)

EGYPTIAN POSITION

Egyptian officials at Suez said they would neither confirm nor deny reports regarding military movements. One official said that if there was such a passage by Israelis in the canal, it would not be problematic as Egypt and Israel are not at war
(Snip)

Ken White
07-22-2009, 05:04 AM
"President Obama has committed to trying diplomacy to stop the Iranian bomb. Time, though, is on the mullahs' side, not least because so much of it was wasted after the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate made the improbable case that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. This assessment not only contradicted previous U.S. intelligence consensus but -- as recent court documents show -- also the conclusions of a key U.S. ally with excellent sources in Iran -- Germany."From The Wall Street Journal at the LINK (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124803669414063037.html).

Rex Brynen
07-22-2009, 05:55 PM
From The Wall Street Journal at the LINK (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124803669414063037.html).

The WSJ article suggests that the US intelligence community ignored information coming from the Germans.

Another plausible explanation is that the US intel community has access to information that the Germans don't....

Ken White
07-22-2009, 06:20 PM
Another plausible explanation is that the US intel community has access to information that the Germans don't....Equally possible is that the German information did not fit preconceived notions.

Is there some reason you advance your theory of plausibility?

Entropy
07-22-2009, 08:34 PM
...but I wouldn't draw too many conclusions based on an oped with an obvious agenda.

Looking at the meager evidence provided in the oped, I don't think there's necessarily an inconsistency between the German intel and the NIE, but I haven't read the actual court report that's referenced, or the May 2008 BND report (if anyone could provide links, that would be great).

To begin with, the NIE conclusion was limited to Iran's work on warhead design and testing and not other, necessary, parts of a weapons development program. The article, however, makes no mention of that aspect in the NIE. Instead, it quotes from the report:


the development of a new missile launcher and the similarities between Iran's acquisition efforts and those of countries with already known nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea

Work on a missile system does not conflict with the NIE conclusions on warhead work, nor does nuclear-related acquisition efforts. There is a lot of selective quoting about "development of nuclear weapons" but what does that mean exactly? The oped leaves us wondering and assumes we will draw the appropriate conclusions after leading us partway down the path.

That Iran is continuing work on enrichment, building a research reactor (which is, coincidentally, a perfect design for plutonium production), and working on delivery systems is enough for many to conclude Iran is "developing nuclear weapons" even if there isn't currently an effort on the actual warhead. So until I see more information, I don't see any serious conflict between the NIE and what is quoted in this opinion piece.

Ken White
07-22-2009, 08:57 PM
People in surprising places have agendas.

I'm not drawing any conclusions -- nor did I draw any from the published unclas NIE at the time. In both cases, due to the agenda effect and because I don't have enough information to form conclusions. No comment on a public board is likely to offer more information. I posted it knowing that and that all you say is correct without comment for only one reason. ;)

Tukhachevskii
06-12-2010, 11:13 AM
Amitai Etzioni's take on the Iran nuclear issue from the PoV of deterence and rational actor theory, ‘Can a Nuclear Armed Iran be Deterred?’ (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art016.pdf), Military Review, May-June, 2010;


Rationalist champions of deterrence often draw on the same assumption as mainline economists do: that people are rational. One way economists protect this assumption from obvious criticism is by using one data point to assess both the intentions and the actions of the person involved. Thus, economists have argued that if a person who never drank wine—and had no intention of drinking wine—suddenly purchased a bottle of wine, this must have been a rational choice—because otherwise why would he have bought it? And they state that when a person chooses to become a criminal, he “must have” weighed the pros and cons and made a rational decision that being a criminal was the optimal choice. As Nobel Laureate George Stigler pointed out, “A reason can always be found for whatever we observe man to do,” which “turns utility into a tautology.”(p.118)

In short, engagements and sanctions are very unlikely to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Hence, increasing attention is devoted to containment. It may well work, but given the high disutility of a nuclear strike by Iran, even a relatively small probability that Iran may use its nukes is unacceptable. The argument that the rulers of Iran are not irrational disregards that quite a few national leaders have in the past “bet” their lives and regimes and lost. Hence, a military option should not be off of the table. However, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites might not be the most effective one.(p.125)


By the way, does the picture on the first page look like the same old 60's vintage HAWK SAMs (though, perhaps, the airframe may be reverse engineered perhaps the guidance system is new?)?

rborum
06-29-2010, 08:00 PM
In April of this year, there was hoopla surrounding SECDEF Gates' statement in a memo that he did not think the US had an effective strategy to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Others have expressed similar sentiments, perhaps extended a bit further - essentially lamenting that the U.S. does not have an "Iran strategy."

I'm trying to understand if the essence of those concerns is really about strategy or more about policy.

I have always understood "strategy" to refer primarily to a plan for how to accomplish an objective through specific means (e.g., Liddell Hart's definition of strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”).

The U.S. has been pretty clear, I think, that it does not want Iran to possess "nuclear capability." And it seems to me that the plan - at least for now - about how to accomplish that is to use the quasi-coercive lever of sanctions to get them to stop.

In that sense, it seems that a plan exists to employ identifiable means to fulfill the ends of policy. Would that constitute a "strategy"?

Now, whether it is an effective strategy is certainly a more complicated and debatable matter, but is it not a strategy -- or is there a broader connotation (or definition) of what can be called strategy than what I have used here?

If it is a strategy - generally speaking - then I wonder if the underlying deficit might really be that the specific goal (i.e., Iran will not possess "nuclear capability") is insufficient as a matter of U.S. (foreign) policy. It is stated as something we do NOT want rather than as an out we do wish to achieve. And the "no nuke" goal does not transparently reflect the U.S.'s underlying interests, either in deterring Iran nukes specifically or in prevailing in this battle of wills. Without a focus on "interests", it seems we get reduced to a struggle of "positions"?

When a nation outlines a policy objective, shouldn't it be able to answer the questions of "why?" "so what if we accomplish it?" and "so what if we don't accomplish it?" -?

I cannot recall reading anywhere a clear explanation of what the U.S. wants from Iran or what the U.S. would like for Iran to be or to do. Only what it should not be or not do. Perhaps I'm not reading the right things. I would very much welcome any guidance from fellow Council members.

Thanks - Randy

slapout9
06-29-2010, 09:04 PM
When a nation outlines a policy objective, shouldn't it be able to answer the questions of "why?" "so what if we accomplish it?" and "so what if we don't accomplish it?" -?


Thanks - Randy

Thats why I have serious issues with the framework of Strategy being Ends-Ways-Means. I think a better framework is Motive-Method-Opportunity. Or why will you do it. Do you have a method to do it. And most important is there an opportunity in the enemy for your method to work.

rborum
06-29-2010, 10:25 PM
is there an opportunity in the enemy for your method to work.

That's a very interesting point and adds another dimension to that series of questions. The "why" and "so what" questions I asked about interrogate the *purpose of pursuing the particular objective*.

Your point - with which I agree - interrogates the *rationale for the "means"* or proposed plan for pursuing that objective - "why do you think that objective will be accomplished in that way."

Rex Brynen
06-30-2010, 01:59 AM
Randy:

I think there is a clear objective (no Iranian nuclear weapons), and a clear-ish strategy (which you correctly identify as using "the quasi-coercive lever of sanctions to get them to stop," while offering the hint of greater future engagement in trade and other forms as an implied incentive if they do).

Whether it is a strategy that is likely to work--and indeed, whether there is any possible strategy that is likely to work--is another question.

Why it is the West doesn't want a nuclear Iran raises some interesting questions about motives (Slapout) and the inherent contradictions of the policy. Typically, three reasons are put forward for attempting to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power:

1) Iranian nukes would strengthen Iran's regional influence. Obviously, this rationale is one which, on the Iranian side, only makes the prospects of of nuclear capacity more appealing.

2) Iranian nukes would go rogue, whether because the Iranian leadership are reckless, or due to some future instability. No one in Iran actually believes this, so it has little traction there even if it plays well elsewhere.

3) Iranian nukes would spark a regional arms race that would leave everyone less secure. This is an argument which finds some receptivity in Tehran as well as Washington.

Compounding all of this is the probable absence of a clear policy on the Iranian side. It is not at all clear that Tehran has taken the decision to build a weapon, as opposed to the decision to build the things that would one day allow it to build a weapon should it decide to do so. The issue is also overlaid with Iranian domestic politics--to the point that when Ahmedinejad appeared to be signalling some flexibility, he was criticized by the Green movement reformist for appeasement of the West.

Bob's World
06-30-2010, 04:28 AM
So our "strategy" is based on one aspect of our relationship with one nation? Pretty much. We do far to much of this "pinpoint strategy." We need to stop sniping at issues that upset us and step back and take a broader, longer timeline, perspective.

This requires the development of a broad, simply stated, Grand Strategy that is easily understood by everyone at home and abroad. Then nested under this needs to be sub strategies for regions, then states/non-states, then specific pinpoint issues such as Iran's (reasonable for them) position that they require nuclear weapons in order to best promote their own national interests.

Another problem with our approach to strategy is the tendency to bin states out as "friend" or "foe." This causes us to abuse our friendships by expecting those allied nations to share our national interests (and subjugate their own to the same); and also to approach every issue with our "enemies" as a challenge, even when we often have major shared interests (such as Iran and the US both desiring stability in Afghanistan free from an extremist Sunni agenda). Far better that we see all others as "competitors" with varying degrees of shared and conflicting interests, and approach each with an understanding of where those points of concurrence and friction are; maximizing opportunities while minimizing risks.

Currently too much of strategy is about countering threats rather than on promoting advancement. In other words, most strategies are negative in nature, focused on preventing some other from advancing rather than on promoting our own advancement. You see this mindset in our approach to Iran. (And China, and Russia, and...etc)

William F. Owen
06-30-2010, 04:43 AM
I have always understood "strategy" to refer primarily to a plan for how to accomplish an objective through specific means (e.g., Liddell Hart's definition of strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”).
Yes, Strategy is "The use of all instruments of power, including force, to gain a policy objective." Military Strategy is just the use of force, but it almost never operates in isolation.
IMO, Liddell-Hart was a clown, who did a good amount of damage to the academic study of military power.

BUT, what fails to be addressed is that as a Strategy can only be realised by Tactics, a Policy can only be realised by Strategy. There is no point in having a policy that lacks a strategy to apply it. - and no point in having a Strategy that cannot be realised in tactics.

When a nation outlines a policy objective, shouldn't it be able to answer the questions of "why?" "so what if we accomplish it?" and "so what if we don't accomplish it?" -?
It should, but the US always fails to do that. Vietnam, Iraq, A'Stan, Pakistan Nukes, etc etc etc.

I cannot recall reading anywhere a clear explanation of what the U.S. wants from Iran or what the U.S. would like for Iran to be or to do.
The US wants Iran to become a peaceful, pro-western, secular, Gulf State, who will buy lots of goods and services from the US. When was that ever not made clear? :eek:

rborum
07-01-2010, 02:06 PM
These comments are all very helpful and appreciate your insights.

Though I am still unclear about what WILF thinks of Liddell Hart's contributions since he was clearly hedging and holding back on his true feelings :-)

But you're right, this question is not about parsing his specific definition - it is about whether the azimuth deficit in US engagement with Iran is really one of strategy or more of policy.

BW - as usual - makes a noteworthy point. "Grand Strategy" - is the distinction between having a strategy for a specific objective (like no nukes) and a broader strategy for pursuing national interests (perhaps in relation to a specific country) what is meant by "Grand Strategy"?

WILF - very nice summary of a big picture objective "The US wants Iran to become a peaceful, pro-western, secular, Gulf State, who will buy lots of goods and services from the US." Perhaps that could be the basis for a grand strategy, perhaps not. I don't know.

I suppose what I'm missing is the connection between national interests, objectives and plans (strategies). Maybe as WILF says we should but don't think explicitly though policy questions of "why?" "so what if we accomplish it?" and "so what if we don't accomplish it?"

Without that, though, it seems easy to get mired in a battles over positions (I want to do X. We don't want you to do X) rather than pursuing interests. An interest-based approach might open up a wider range of solutions ... and perhaps be less likely to escalate conflict.

But at least from your responses, it seems like I'm thinking of the concepts in the right way even if there is not a commonly used language to separate them.

Thanks again everyone.

(p.s. Rex- nice to see you here).

rborum
07-01-2010, 02:12 PM
Oh yes. And "Happy Canada Day!"

Entropy
07-01-2010, 03:20 PM
There's also simply a lot of historical bad blood between the US and Iran which constrains our options. Neither one of us can afford to be perceived as appeasing or giving into the other. This makes substantive engagement very difficult for either side. Given events over the past year, I think it's turned out to be much more difficult for the Iranians.

Rex Brynen
07-01-2010, 03:25 PM
There's also simply a lot of historical bad blood between the US and Iran which constrains our options. Neither one of us can afford to be perceived as appeasing or giving into the other. This makes substantive engagement very difficult for either side. Given events over the past year, I think it's turned out to be much more difficult for the Iranians.

On of the supreme ironies is that many Iranians are actually rather pro-American, at a certain level. As a consequence, many US policies get popularly blamed on British manipulation of Washington. It is a very bizarre thing to experience.

Rex Brynen
07-01-2010, 03:40 PM
Oh yes. And "Happy Canada Day!"

Thank you! There's a certain irony in the fact that Canadian Confederation in 1867 was in large part intended as an alliance against American expansionism.

When I was lecturing in Tehran a couple of years ago, and would get the occasional (but rare) fiery anti-imperialist question/speech from an audience member, I would launch into a mock tirade about how Iranians had no right to lecture me about American imperialism until they had fought two wars with the US, had their two major cities occupied by American troops (1775 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Canada_(1775)#Occupation_of_Montreal_b egins) and 1812 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_York)), and had burned down the White House (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burning_of_Washington).

The audience reaction was priceless :D

Entropy
07-01-2010, 08:00 PM
Rex,

I hope you Canadians stay in line. I would hate to have to dust off and update War Plan Red. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red) :D

Rex Brynen
07-01-2010, 08:07 PM
I hope you Canadians stay in line. I would hate to have to dust off and update War Plan Red. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red) :D

I'll see your War Plan Crimson, and raise you a Defence Scheme #1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Scheme_No._1). :D

rborum
07-01-2010, 08:18 PM
Rex,

I hope you Canadians stay in line. I would hate to have to dust off and update War Plan Red. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red) :D

I have actually had a theory for quite some time that Canada has slowly been moving its border southward - while America sleeps - at a rate of about an inch each year. ;)

rborum
07-01-2010, 08:19 PM
When I was lecturing in Tehran a couple of years ago, and would get the occasional (but rare) fiery anti-imperialist question/speech from an audience member, I would launch into a mock tirade about how Iranians had no right to lecture me about American imperialism until they had fought two wars with the US, had their two major cities occupied by American troops (1775 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Canada_(1775)#Occupation_of_Montreal_b egins) and 1812 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_York)), and had burned down the White House (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burning_of_Washington).

The audience reaction was priceless :D

That is hilarious by the way and I wish I could have been there. - R