Neo Challenges the Matrix

[Gian P Gentile]

Douglas Macgregor's latest piece, Will Iraq's Great Awakening Lead to a Nightmare? (http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2007/12/iraq-surge-great-awakening-anbar.html)currently running on "Mother Jones."

[Ron Humphrey]

Tehran is certainly watching developments in Iraq with interest. The Iranian leaders have turned out to be very competent chess players in foreign affairs, carefully calculating each move. As demonstrated by the recent National Intelligence Estimate's reassessment of Iranian nuclear aims, the Bush administration and its generals are, at best, poker players. Every raise and bluff by the Bush administration and its generals in Baghdad has been effectively countered with some very thoughtful, strategic moves by Tehran—moves aimed at cultivating close relationships with Turkey, Russia, China, and even Europe.


For competent chess players they havent done a very good job of keeping their "figurehead" Achmedinajad from opening his mouth and inserting his foot continually. Especially when you consider the position Khomeni finds himself in regarding internal affairs.

I really tire of military allowing themselves to be baited into agreeing with negative long term results in order to feel they are ahead of the pack in pointing out what just about anybody who really matters already knows.

Are there inherent dangers? DUHHH
Will they all just get along? NO DUHHHH
Will the countires around them figure into their long term success or failure? Yes DUHHHHH

How about we ask the one question that matters.

What will the people do?

Noone can predict the future so noone can honestly answer that one.

Noone can affect anyone but themselves through their own actions and the subsequent reactions of others.

So how bout we in the defense force worry about defending and let the cards fall as they may withut giving journalist so much to sideline us with.

By the way I still don't get what the better answer is.
Install another dictator, sure that always works perfectly too.
(RANT, Sorry)

Not meant personally against anyone just frustrated by the trend

[Ken White]

this:


"But the main problem is the belief held by U.S. policymakers and generals that the critical issue in Iraq is tactics, not the overall mission: occupying and trying to control a Muslim Arab country. Given the conventional wisdom that the U.S. counterinsurgency efforts are working, the imperial hubris at the top of the Bush administration, and the complacency in Congress, the conditions are ideal for a spin-off war that could cause us one day to wonder how we Americans could have ever been so stupid as to occupy Iraq."

Macgregor's final paragraph. He asks some good questions as could anyone -- but he posits no answers, so you wonder what he's trying to do -- then he gives it all away in the last paragraph. He's just griping.

We have never really tried to occupy Iraq.

We, foolishly IMO, acceded to diplomatic pressure and said we were an "Occupying power" IAW the GC back in '03 but that passed into history 5 Apr 05. Regardless of semantics we have never had the troop strength to "occupy and control" Iraq and he should know that.

As for an ongoing Shia - Sunni squabble of one degree or another, been that way for 13 Centuries, no news there. I read the link twice, I'm still unsure what his point is...

[Gian P Gentile]

...I read the link twice, I'm still unsure what his point is...

Sometimes you write things to make explicit points; other times you write things more to ask questions that need to be asked or to challenge certain ways of thinking. I think Macgregor in this piece is trying to do the latter two things rather than offering up specific solutions to problems or as you ask make a specific point. In this regard I thought his article was of value because it does view differently the current narrative that explains the lowering of violence in Iraq and suggests that what many think is the road to success may be the road to disaster.

gentile

[Rank amateur]

"But the main problem is the belief held by U.S. policymakers and generals that the critical issue in Iraq is tactics, not the overall mission: occupying and trying to control a Muslim Arab country."

I'm alway thrilled when someone who knows what they're talking about expresses my thoughts.

[Ken White]

Sometimes you write things to make explicit points; other times you write things more to ask questions that need to be asked or to challenge certain ways of thinking. I think Macgregor in this piece is trying to do the latter two things rather than offering up specific solutions to problems or as you ask make a specific point. In this regard I thought his article was of value because it does view differently the current narrative that explains the lowering of violence in Iraq and suggests that what many think is the road to success may be the road to disaster.

gentile

which I did the second time, it makes some sense. Unduly pessimistic I thought, though...

As you know, I share your concern that we'll overdo the COIN bit and I thought and think the so-called surge is of marginal overall value (on a cost benefit basis) so I can agree with him on those points. Further, I certainly don't have any problem rattling anybody's cage and believe that needs to be done on a regular basis, sometimes violent shaking is in order. He generally does that well and I applaud him for it.

I guess my problem with the article is three fold. First is that, IMO, the idea of success in Iraq as originally defined by the idiot sector of the Admin was never going to happen therefor I didn't expect it so am not disappointed. 'Win' is, as I've often said, a bad word to use in application to any COIN operation, thus we were looking at an acceptable solution, no more. I also thought and think a major Sunni - Shia confrontation is inevitable; the question is when. The ME, unlike us, is long on patience and as Macgregor notes and as you and I both know, duplicity (and haggling) are the national pastimes... :wry:

Unlike Macgregor (or unlike that article...), I think that it is probable we will achieve an acceptable solution and that the confrontation will be delayed for a variety of reasons. I also suspect we will be there at about 40K for quite some time -- but then, I've always been an optimist... :D

The second problem is, of course, the 'occupy' set me off as I don't believe we ever tried to do that and know that he knows better -- but that, admittedly, is only mildly disingenuous or semantic and little more.

Finally, I believe that just as dangerous as overdoing the COIN thing is, I think, getting over protective of the institution and I sense he sometimes does that. Could be wrong, have been many times and I hope I am in that sensing.

[tequila]

For competent chess players they havent done a very good job of keeping their "figurehead" Achmedinajad from opening his mouth and inserting his foot continually. Especially when you consider the position Khomeni finds himself in regarding internal affairs.

I agree about this one. The Iranians are far less unified than they are portrayed. Their system has enormous internal tensions that occasionally peek through (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5h_8LEtUzHcMRONjDOEtUfrsCyJBg)to the surface and many highly competitive interest groups. The Iranians certainly have a better grasp of the Iraqi snake pit than we do, especially in the Shi'ite side, but a snake pit is still a snake pit even for the most experienced handlers.

[Gian P Gentile]

...Finally, I believe that just as dangerous as overdoing the COIN thing is, I think, getting over protective of the institution and I sense he sometimes does that. Could be wrong, have been many times and I hope I am in that sensing.

Ken:

thanks for your thoughtful response. I agree that as you have said before the pendulum can swing back too far in the other direction too and we certainly dont want that. Actually I think Macgregor over the years has been trying to obliterate the institution then rebuild it in a way the provides better strategic flexibility. His two classics "Breaking the Phalanx," and "Transformation Under Fire," attest to that position.

I most appreciate Ken your humility and the proposition that you "could be wrong." That has always been the mantra that I lived by; that I might be wrong, that my next screw up is just hanging around the corner but if i work really hard, stay true to my values, and rely on my buddies on my right and left i might get through it. The overall value of Macgregor's piece is that it does poke a finger in the eye of those who are cocksure about things with their positive knowledge about the way ahead in Iraq and what the future holds. Even if he is read as an extreme, the extreme holds value if it reasonably challenges conventional wisdom, which i think this piece does.

no worries

gian

[SteveMetz]

"But the main problem is the belief held by U.S. policymakers and generals that the critical issue in Iraq is tactics, not the overall mission: occupying and trying to control a Muslim Arab country."

I'm alway thrilled when someone who knows what they're talking about expresses my thoughts.

I've been hitting the same theme as I try and finish the insurgency chapter of my book (and everyone just shut up--it's been at least two days since I've mentioned it!!)

[SteveMetz]

I've read the article twice and didn't find a single reference to little, striped cartoon fish.

http://www.oman3d.com/tutorials/photoshop/nemo_conceptoo/reff_pic.jpg

[Gian P Gentile]

I've read the article twice and didn't find a single reference to little, striped cartoon fish.


"Nemo Challenges the Matrix" is a riff off of the movie "The Matrix" where actor Keanu Reeves plays a character named Nemo who along with a group of others have figured out that the world is controlled by machines and that reality is created in the minds of people by these machines; the sad part is that the people are actually imprisoned in horrible little bubbles with tubes coming out of their bodies; in the movie that is the true reality of things although they don’t see it because they are controlled by the disinformation produced by the matrix.

The main point to the movie as I see it is that individuals can make a difference and can challenge the way the masses think things are.

Macgregor has been an important challenger of conventional wisdom in the defense establishment for the last twenty years (his two classic works in this regard are “Breaking the Phalanx,” and “Transformation Under Fire.” He was also a brilliant tactician and fighter in the Gulf War and after that war when as a Cavalry Squadron commander he defeated the vaunted opfor at the National Training Center.

So I use the title "Nemo Challenges the Matrix" for this thread as a metaphor to get at what I see as the importance of challenging conventional wisdom and the narrative surrounding notions of "success" in Iraq and where we are headed in the future. Macgregor might be wrong, I might be wrong, but the important point of this article is that the matrix is challenged. In that sense it is worth the read and not labeled as a "rant" by another posting to this thread.

You queried, there it is.

[SteveMetz]

"Nemo Challenges the Matrix" is a riff off of the movie "The Matrix" where actor Keanu Reeves plays a character named Nemo who along with a group of others have figured out that the world is controlled by machines and that reality is created in the minds of people by these machines; the sad part is that the people are actually imprisoned in horrible little bubbles with tubes coming out of their bodies; in the movie that is the true reality of things although they don’t see it because they are controlled by the disinformation produced by the matrix.

The main point to the movie as I see it is that individuals can make a difference and can challenge the way the masses think things are.

Macgregor has been an important challenger of conventional wisdom in the defense establishment for the last twenty years (his two classic works in this regard are “Breaking the Phalanx,” and “Transformation Under Fire.” He was also a brilliant tactician and fighter in the Gulf War and after that war when as a Cavalry Squadron commander he defeated the vaunted opfor at the National Training Center.

So I use the title "Nemo Challenges the Matrix" for this thread as a metaphor to get at what I see as the importance of challenging conventional wisdom and the narrative surrounding notions of "success" in Iraq and where we are headed in the future. Macgregor might be wrong, I might be wrong, but the important point of this article is that the matrix is challenged. In that sense it is worth the read and not labeled as a "rant" by another posting to this thread.

You queried, there it is.


I know. I was just trying to get my day's silliness quota out of the way early.

Doug was a student of mine at CGSC and we've stayed in touch over the years. I haven't had a chance to read his latest though.

[selil]

The Keanu Reeves Character is called "Neo" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo_(The_Matrix)

[Gian P Gentile]

The Keanu Reeves Character is called "Neo" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo_(The_Matrix)

thanks; stupid me; no wonder steve was asking.

perhaps i shouldn't try to be so clever next time.

gian

[SteveMetz]

thanks; stupid me; no wonder steve was asking.

perhaps i shouldn't try to be so clever next time.

gian

Actually, I thought it was brilliantly existential to posit the idea of a little cartoon fish challenging the Architect

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/94/Matrix_architectsittingandchatting.gif/200px-

[Gian P Gentile]

Actually, I thought it was brilliantly existential to posit the idea of a little cartoon fish challenging the Architect

Ah; too bad i didnt think of it in that way but the other yet didn't spend the time to proofread the post. Perhaps i should go easier when grading finals.

thanks

gian

[stanleywinthrop]

Actually, I thought it was brilliantly existential to posit the idea of a little cartoon fish challenging the Architect

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/94/Matrix_architectsittingandchatting.gif/200px-

Yes, but this doesn't leave us to the contingent affirmation of the situation.

[selil]

thanks; stupid me; no wonder steve was asking.
perhaps i shouldn't try to be so clever next time.
gian

Somehow I don't think stupid and Gian P Gentile belong in the same sentence. Now Sci Fi Freak and Selil... those are entrenched.

[Gian P Gentile]

Somehow I don't think stupid and Gian P Gentile belong in the same sentence. Now Sci Fi Freak and Selil... those are entrenched.


thanks for the vote of confidence and thanks secret squirrel for watching my six.

gian

ps: i wonder if SWJ editors might help in correcting the title of the thread to "Neo" from "Nemo"

[SteveMetz]

tps: i wonder if SWJ editors might help in correcting the title of the thread to "Neo" from "Nemo"

SWJ is like marriage: we must learn to live with the reminders of our errors.

[Ron Humphrey]

Somehow I don't think stupid and Gian P Gentile belong in the same sentence. .

I agree and would like to make sure there is not a misunderstanding.
I read Macgregors first book in 2006 and started reading Breaking the Phalanx shortly thereafter. Unfortunately the cop I was reading was borrowed from my boss and at some point my children managed to get hold of it. Needless to say it wasn't pretty. I bought another copy for him since the one he had was autographed and have been waiting for a return lecture in order to try and get it autographed.

Anyway I digress, I haven't finished reading it but I have mostly agreed with a lot of what he says. I simply find that we in the military must be careful in how we present analysis to those within the public because as they do not have our experience base from which to contextualize what they read we leave them to accept what they read along with any spin provided by the publishers sans our own common sense knowledge of factors which play into the long term situation.

In this I feel some of the wisdom is lost in the translation or lack thereof

As I believe I have stated before ,
I simply try to present what I think I know while expecting to be taught where I am wrong. :wry:

[Ken White]

Ken:

thanks for your thoughtful response. I agree that as you have said before the pendulum can swing back too far in the other direction too and we certainly dont want that. Actually I think Macgregor over the years has been trying to obliterate the institution then rebuild it in a way the provides better strategic flexibility. His two classics "Breaking the Phalanx," and "Transformation Under Fire," attest to that position.

True. "Breaking the Phalanx" was important (have not read the other) and I've long admired Macgregor for that and for most of his articles. That book was needed and it did much good. I'd actually go further than he would in putting the army (all of DoD...) in a big bag and shaking it thoroughly -- but SGMs have little credibility and a long retired one has even less... :D


I most appreciate Ken your humility and the proposition that you "could be wrong." That has always been the mantra that I lived by; that I might be wrong, that my next screw up is just hanging around the corner but if i work really hard, stay true to my values, and rely on my buddies on my right and left i might get through it. The overall value of Macgregor's piece is that it does poke a finger in the eye of those who are cocksure about things with their positive knowledge about the way ahead in Iraq and what the future holds. Even if he is read as an extreme, the extreme holds value if it reasonably challenges conventional wisdom, which i think this piece does.

Amen to all that. Though I do know a lot of people who'd snicker at the humble bit applied to me. :o

Didn't think the article was extreme, on the contrary, thought it was quite measured -- just on the pessimistic side but acknowledge that may have been done for emphasis. Anything that makes people think and challenges the conventional wisdom is a plus IMO so it may have just been my perverse nature -- when every one else is wet and miserable, I splash about laughing, yet if everyone is content, i've been accused of being able to cast gloom on a MOH ceremony. Not my most endearing trait...


no worries

gian

Keep up the fire... ;)

[Tacitus]

Neo had an easier choice. Neo only had one man offering the red pill. No promises that you are going to like what you end up seeing or will feel better because of it, but then you’ll know the truth about how things are.

But we are confronted with various people (politicians, media, soldiers, writers, indigenous peoples, heck even Al Qaeda) offering their own red pill, which will show you the truth (as they see it) of the matter in this conflict.

So even if you have the will to make the choice to reject the blue pill of comfortable ignorance in favor of the red pill of uncomfortable reality, you have to choose among competing pill pushers. Needless to say, each man offering a red pill is quite confident he has the real one (the one true religion, the way to win the Iraq war, most effective economic policy, etc.)

I think a fair amount of people would gladly choose the red pill. They just can't figure out who's got it. You know what I mean?

[Tom Odom]

I think a fair amount of people would gladly choose the red pill. They just can't figure out who's got it. You know what I mean?

That's why Oprah's (or Chuck Norris') (or Barbara Streisand's) endorsement means so much...

In the late 70's it was Jonestown Koolaid was it not?

[SteveMetz]

I think you guys are using the wrong movie to analyze American strategy making. To me, Beavis and Butthead provides greater insight.

[Ken White]

Most realistic Army TV show... :D

[Tom Odom]

Most realistic Army TV show...

well they were Cav...:cool:

Where are Ryan and Neal? :eek:


Steve Metz: I think you guys are using the wrong movie to analyze American strategy making.

You were the one who brought up a cartoon fish. :rolleyes:

Actually I think Beevis probably has a good grasp of strategy. It's Butthead who keeps giving him bumm advice...:D

[Gian P Gentile]

I think you guys are using the wrong movie to analyze American strategy making. To me, Beavis and Butthead provides greater insight.

Absolutely spot on; I should have named this thread Doug Macgregor "does America." In honor of course of the classic B/B movie.

If there is anyone who has his pulse on America it is Mike Judge.

gian

[wm]

I think you guys are using the wrong movie to analyze American strategy making. To me, Beavis and Butthead provides greater insight.

I suspect that Loyd and Garry from "Dumb and Dumber" may give B & B a good run for their money.
However, in my heart of hearts, I'm sure that our strategic planners are really following the lead of Peewee Herman. The search for terrorists smacks of the search for the stolen bicycle in Peewee's Big Adventure. And, almost every White House press conference is a variant of the "Big Shoe Dance."

[carl]

This article is a very great puzzlement to me.

COL. MacGregor seems to decry the "Anbar Awakening" but what was the alternative to the men on the spot at the time? They adroitly took advantage of a political rift, a big one, in the Sunni community and induced the tribes to overtly join with the coalition forces to mostly destroy AQI; an AQI that was, contrary to a statement in the article, almost wholly composed of Iraqi, not foreign fighters.

From what I've read there is much more too this than cash payments to sheiks. In Ramadi at least, AQI was very much disliked but the tribes weren't strong enough to overthrow them. An alliance with the coalition enabled them to get rid of AQI. If cash were the only incentive to stop attacking the coalition, how come this didn't happen in 2 or 3 years ago?

There is a section in the article about Turkey and the Kurds. It seems to me this is almost a separate issue. It exists regardless. But he suggests that the Awakening may make it worse. Why? The closest thing to an answer I can find in the article is if Turkey invades Kurdistan it "could well embolden the Sunni Arab insurgents to renew the war against the U.S. military." Why? Some of them accrued an advantage by stopping that fight, why throw it away by renewing it?

There are several "What if this happens? What then?" arguments in the article that don't tell us why "this" is likely to happen.

I think too much is made of common religious affiliation. He states Turkey "is the natural leader of the Sunni Muslim world." Why? Turks aren't Arabs. They ruled over large parts of Arabia for a long time and the Arabs didn't like it. And why should the Gulf states look to a country without a big navy for protection?

He states also that "Islam is inextricably intertwined with Turkish identity, culture and history." Yes it is. So is secularism, especially in the Turkish military. To mention the one without mentioning the other seems like cherry picking.

Near as I can figure, his main argument is we should get out of Iraq quick or things will probably go bad. But from everything else I read, the stronger argument seems to be if we get out of Iraq quick, things absolutely will go bad.

But again, my primary objection to the article is the carping about the "Awakening". The men on the spot played the hand they were dealt brilliantly to achieve a good result, at least up to now. If COL. MacGregor is going to caution us about this, he should at least suggest what should have been done instead.

[Cavguy]

This article is a very great puzzlement to me.

COL. MacGregor seems to decry the "Anbar Awakening" but what was the alternative to the men on the spot at the time? They adroitly took advantage of a political rift, a big one, in the Sunni community and induced the tribes to overtly join with the coalition forces to mostly destroy AQI; an AQI that was, contrary to a statement in the article, almost wholly composed of Iraqi, not foreign fighters.

From what I've read there is much more too this than cash payments to sheiks. In Ramadi at least, AQI was very much disliked but the tribes weren't strong enough to overthrow them. An alliance with the coalition enabled them to get rid of AQI. If cash were the only incentive to stop attacking the coalition, how come this didn't happen in 2 or 3 years ago? .... If COL. MacGregor is going to caution us about this, he should at least suggest what should have been done instead.


"It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the
strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better.
The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face
is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs
and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without
error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great
devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best,
knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the
worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his
place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither
victory nor defeat."
Theodore Roosevelt
Source:Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910

Couldn't resist one of my favorite quotes. Thanks for the lead in. Hopefully I will be able to answer some of the questions addressed soon - COL MacFarland and I just finished the final edit of an article on the subject to be published in Military Review during the next months.

Carl captures the facts (from my seat) correctly regarding the Awakening. It was not about money, and money was not the instrument used to convince the tribes. Really it came down to interest and power (of which a component is money). Money was/is used to sustain the effort through reconstruction projects in areas friendly to coalition forces. Money is a weapon system as well, to be used judiciously.

When I first arrived in Baghdad in May 2003, you could hire an Iraqi laborer for $2/day, a king's ransom at the time. ($60/mo was 4x the average Iraqi's salary at the time). We tried to start employment programs (cleaning trash, repairs, etc) to employ the masses of unemployed, especially the poor Shia. We ran into roadblock after roadblock from CPA, who was opposed at New Deal style programs and scoffed at mass employment programs to otherwise occupy idle hands that may be recruited to the devil's work.

Flash forward to April-May 2004. My BN is killing these same poor, unemployed, uneducated Shia by the hundreds during the Sadr rebellion. In two months we expended over 200,000 rounds of 7.62, over 300 tank rounds, and an unbelievable amount of maintenance funds to sustain an Armor BN during a three month extension. For a fraction of those costs I could have employed several thousand people and addressed one of the root causes of the Sadr rebellion.

I know we can't directly correlate cause to effect on this, but I still believe that if we had employed the masses early we wouldn't have faced the Sadr problem, and worse, we knew that at the tactical level in 2003. Not even 20/20 hindsight, in my opinion.

I digress into the path of what might have been.

I am with Carl though - for the critics - what is the alternate COA that SHOULD have been done? Would an Anbar in chaos actually be of greater benefit to the USA than one at peace? I personally don't see how, and make no apologies for what we did. It was good for Iraq and good for the USA, and had transformative effects on Baghdad and Dialaya.

[Rank amateur]

I am with Carl though - for the critics - what is the alternate COA that SHOULD have been done? Would an Anbar in chaos actually be of greater benefit to the USA than one at peace? I personally don't see how, and make no apologies for what we did. It was good for Iraq and good for the USA, and had transformative effects on Baghdad and Dialaya.

I agree. You did an excellent job playing the hand dealt you. Professional poker players fold: frequently and quickly. Strategically, it seems to me that we just keep upping the ante.

[Uboat509]

Why was it not possible to extend the Anbar model to the rest of Sunni-held Iraq? Or did the generals in Baghdad begin cutting deals with the Sunni insurgents only when the mounting casualties from the surge in the spring and early summer of 2007 compelled them to do so?

As a matter of fact the Sawah has spread to other parts of Sunni Iraq. I know this for an absolute fact because I was there at the beginning. Granted it is not on the same scale as Anbar but then the realities on the ground are much different. I can't speak to the situation in Anbar, I haven't been there, but I have been in the North. Up there, the Sawah has arisen primarily in response to an ineffective/biased/corrupt military and police force. It was already showing some early successes when I left in October. It has been slow to get started in the North in part because of resistance by some US military comanders who do not understand tribalism and also some local political/tribal leaders who feel their power threatened by the Sawah.

By the way, can someone explain to me how Turkey is the is the "natural leader of the Sunni Muslim world"? Did I miss something? I have yet to hear an Arab say anything nice about the Turks. That would seem to be somewhat of an obstacle to "natural leadersip."

SFC W

[Ken White]

. . .
By the way, can someone explain to me how Turkey is the is the "natural leader of the Sunni Muslim world"? Did I miss something? I have yet to hear an Arab say anything nice about the Turks. That would seem to be somewhat of an obstacle to "natural leadersip."

SFC W

Turks are even more hated than the Iraniha. There is no leader of the Arab world because it is so fractured, every potential 'leader' has adverse historical events that preclude any leadership in that sense. Just look at all who've tried in the last 60 years or so to assume that position from Nasser forward -- all failed.

That's really good news of a sort, though we weren't smart enough to exploit it. The West finds the ME thought processes so very different they cannot get their arms around the monster. Few in the west are willing to accept that an entire nation will do something that is antithetical to itself out of pride or that the western art of compromise is seen as a glaring weakness in the ME...

[carl]

"Few in the west are willing to accept that an entire nation will do something that is antithetical to itself out of pride or that the western art of compromise is seen as a glaring weakness in the ME..."

I am not sure the peoples of the Mid-East have a monopoly on warring for prideful reasons. The War of 1812, WWI&II, the Argentine attack on the Falklands, the Succession of the Southern States and others might well fall into that class of conflict.

[tequila]

Just look at all who've tried in the last 60 years or so to assume that position from Nasser forward -- all failed.


Well, Nasser is the only one who really tried. Even Saddam, despite his bombast, never really took such things seriously - the seizure of Kuwait, for example, was an Iraqi nationalist dream since Qasim. As for the inscrutable mind of the Arabs - the spectacle of local rulers scrambling for power and advantage to the detriment of the ruled combined with constant and violent intervention by foreign powers is a tableau repeated throughout history, including in the West - the examples of pre-unification Italy, pre-Bismarck Germany, Poland, and other such unhappy lands comes to mind.


Up there, the Sawah has arisen primarily in response to an ineffective/biased/corrupt military and police force.

Uboat - without violating any OPSEC, could you provide a little more detail in this respect? In your experience, is this viewed primarily as a local rising against corrupt forces imposed by a national government, or is it seen through a sectarian lens: i.e. the Shi'i militias acting through the government are seen as the enemy? What time period are we talking about, and what about the recent movement of AQI-blamed attacks to Salahuddin and Nineveh?

[PhilR]

I've been following the discussions on Iraq and the COIN doctrine from my desk and computer in the International Zone (I want to say in the bowels, but I do have a window). While I'm definitely not doing tactical stuff, I've had the opportunity to get out and listen to what BCT and battalion commanders are saying on the ground.
I guess I need to go back and re-read the COIN manual. What I see are commanders making the pragmatic decisions along kinetic (kill/capture) and non-kinetic lines (support services, support local security efforts, support local governance). I don't sense that the new COIN doctrine has shied people away from military action, its just they may be viewing it from a more comprehensive lens--and its not that the commanders before did any less, its just that there's been some more thought and doctrinal guidance put into place over the elapsed time.
With regards to the Awakening and whether we caused it or we were just lucky, I'd say yes to both (and recall which type of General Napoleon would have rather had). I don't think that you can discount our presence in Iraq, and in Anbar, fighting over the past years. It was a part of the calculation that tribal leaders made when they decided to fight AQI. it wasn't the only factor, but I think it ranks pretty high up there--as I've seen it written, they realized that we were the really strong tribe in the region and we weren't going away.

[Ken White]

...
I am not sure the peoples of the Mid-East have a monopoly on warring for prideful reasons. The War of 1812, WWI&II, the Argentine attack on the Falklands, the Succession of the Southern States and others might well fall into that class of conflict.

People are people -- there are indeed other examples -- just that the ME provides so many in the last half century. That and the seeing compromise as weakness factor in combination...

Tequila said:
"Well, Nasser is the only one who really tried. Even Saddam, despite his bombast, never really took such things seriously - the seizure of Kuwait, for example, was an Iraqi nationalist dream since Qasim. As for the inscrutable mind of the Arabs - the spectacle of local rulers scrambling for power and advantage to the detriment of the ruled combined with constant and violent intervention by foreign powers is a tableau repeated throughout history, including in the West - the examples of pre-unification Italy, pre-Bismarck Germany, Poland, and other such unhappy lands comes to mind."

Gamel may be the only one that tried in your book but I think you're selling the goals and delusions of everyone from the Shah of Iran through the Al Sauds to the Assads and the odd Egyptian or two -- not to mention our friends Ruhalla and Muammar -- a little short. Perhaps what you meant was that Nasser was the only who who was overt and said it aloud and publicly; we could agree on that.

As for the only one? We can disagree on that.