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selil
12-18-2007, 06:26 AM
Interesting article from Government Executive (LINK (http://www.governmentexecutive.com/features/1107-15/1107-15s3.htm))



The Air Force pleads for modernization funds.

In an arresting turn of phrase this fall, Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne suggested that absent more investment, the service might be "going out of business." He noted that on average, aircraft in his fleet are 24 years old. Air Force planes flying in support of coalition ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are fast wearing out, and "at some time in the future, they will simply rust out, age out, fall out of the sky," he told a gathering at a Washington think tank on Sept. 19.

Wynne raised the specter that the days of U.S. air dominance might be coming to an end. In a conflict with Iran, he said, front-line fighters would not be allowed to operate freely for fear of losing them to the Russian-built air defenses Tehran now is deploying.

During an Oct. 30 conversation with Government Executive Editor Timothy B. Clark, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley reinforced the theme. He said air dominance could be preserved only through the new technologies now rolling off Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. assembly lines in the form of the F-22 and F-35 advanced fighter jets. The Air Force is in a bitter fight to gain the funding needed to assemble a fleet large enough to meet the strategic demands of its Air Combat Command.

This fall has seen a rare public display of dissatisfaction with the White House on the part of military leaders, as both Wynne and Moseley have been saying the Air Force is $100 billion short of the money it needs to recapitalize its fleet over the next five years. Echoing other service chiefs, Moseley said on Oct. 30 that the nation should seriously consider devoting more of its gross domestic product to its defense program.

But the extra $20 billion a year the Air Force seeks will not come easily from a Democratic Congress whose defense specialists aren't satisfied that the Air Force has articulated a convincing long-term view of its role in the strategic challenges the country faces.

Moseley and Wynne are disappointed that their plan to help fund their service's recapitalization by eliminating 40,000 uniformed billets has not materially helped the cause. Money freed up by cutting 30,000 positions so far has been eaten up by operating costs in the ongoing wars. Wynne has said the service remains "desperate to figure out how to save money."


More at the link (http://www.governmentexecutive.com/features/1107-15/1107-15s3.htm)

SteveMetz
12-18-2007, 10:57 AM
I'm having a bit of trouble following the core logic here. If I understand, the problem is that it is difficult for manned aircraft to operate where there are elaborate air defense systems. So the solution is that we need to spend more on really, really, really expensive manned aircraft, including ones which are, in the case given, designed to shoot down forty year old Iranian aircraft.

carl
12-18-2007, 01:06 PM
The primary problem is the aircraft are old, very old. Old airplanes are difficult to maintain, hard to update and the operators always live in fear that a major problem, due to problems inherent with aging aircraft, will ground an entire fleet tomorrow. Or if the airplane isn't grounded you ask the crews to roll the dice every time they take off.

Regardless of whose fault it is, the Air Force is faced with having to replace most of its fighters, transports and tankers within a relatively short period of time. They need to be replaced, but whether the will be or not... The things are just flat wearing out. This will cost a LOT of money, and there isn't any easy way around it, not if we want to continue to enjoy the benefits a strong Air Force has given us over the past 65 years.

The secondary problem is it is hard for old manned airplanes to operate against good air defense systems without suffering prohibitive losses. The new ones are quite remarkable in their capabilities and can go where F-15E's fear to tread. Another benefit is a potential opponent is more likely to be "psyched out" by the prospect of having to face F-22's than F-16's.

40 year old Iranian fighters are no problem for 40 year old American fighter designs. They probably wouldn't even take off. But those pesky modern missiles are a different story. The Air Force has to plan to defeat other than the Iranian Air Force too.

People, including me, view the Air Force with great suspicion, a suspicion that the Air Force has done a lot to bring upon it self. But this is a big, real problem that isn't going away and can't be worked around. The only real, and painful, solution is to throw money at it.

SteveMetz
12-18-2007, 01:33 PM
The primary problem is the aircraft are old, very old. Old airplanes are difficult to maintain, hard to update and the operators always live in fear that a major problem, due to problems inherent with aging aircraft, will ground an entire fleet tomorrow. Or if the airplane isn't grounded you ask the crews to roll the dice every time they take off.

Regardless of whose fault it is, the Air Force is faced with having to replace most of its fighters, transports and tankers within a relatively short period of time. They need to be replaced, but whether the will be or not... The things are just flat wearing out. This will cost a LOT of money, and there isn't any easy way around it, not if we want to continue to enjoy the benefits a strong Air Force has given us over the past 65 years.

The secondary problem is it is hard for old manned airplanes to operate against good air defense systems without suffering prohibitive losses. The new ones are quite remarkable in their capabilities and can go where F-15E's fear to tread. Another benefit is a potential opponent is more likely to be "psyched out" by the prospect of having to face F-22's than F-16's.

40 year old Iranian fighters are no problem for 40 year old American fighter designs. They probably wouldn't even take off. But those pesky modern missiles are a different story. The Air Force has to plan to defeat other than the Iranian Air Force too.

People, including me, view the Air Force with great suspicion, a suspicion that the Air Force has done a lot to bring upon it self. But this is a big, real problem that isn't going away and can't be worked around. The only real, and painful, solution is to throw money at it.

What I'm getting at is that if the strategic and operational objective is a strike capability and manned aircraft have problems with AD systems, perhaps the answer is something other than buying another bunch of hugely expensive manned fighter aircraft. Phrased differently, do we need another generation of manned air superiority fighters for strategic reasons or because that's what we've always had and change is hard (particularly for a service largely led by people who flew manned fighters)? I'm certainly open to the argument that we need a new generation of manned fighters but would like to see the strategic rationale.

carl
12-18-2007, 02:08 PM
I am not sure we need a "new" generation of manned fighters either. But we do need the present generation, F-22's, to replace the old which is wearing out. That is the material side. The other side is most of our plans and thinking are based on manned machines and until we have time to really think through an alternative and develop the tools to implement it we have to go with what we have.

There has been considerable discussion about replacing manned airplanes with missiles and drones and ultimately that will probably happen. But I don't think that day is upon us and I don't think emulating the British and their actions in the 50's is a good idea.

One example of good use of manned fighters is psychologically dominate an opponent. The sight of contrails above you that you can't do a damn thing about must be a daunting one. We don't have any drones available now that could do that.

Stealth in the F-22 is a lot more than a nice to have feature. I've been told that modern short range missiles are so deadly that if both sides were equipped with something like Python 5s nobody will come out of a visual fight. The F-22 probably won't be seen so hopefully it won't be hit. At least for the next few (20) years, we need this thing.

Can we agree that the tankers and transports have to be replaced quick?

SteveMetz
12-18-2007, 02:13 PM
One example of good use of manned fighters is psychologically dominate an opponent. The sight of contrails above you that you can't do a damn thing about must be a daunting one. We don't have any drones available now that could do that.

Why does a manned craft have more psychological impact than an unmanned one? Does the guy on the ground know which is which?

Plus, doesn't the idea of visible contrails run counter to the idea of avoiding air defenses?

Seems to me that there is even greater psychological impact when the guy on the ground doesn't see anything and all the sudden stuff blows up.

tequila
12-18-2007, 02:47 PM
Let's not forget the elephant in the room ... :D

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/3/39/Terminator_3_Rise_of_the_Machines_movie.jpg/200px-Terminator_3_Rise_of_the_Machines_movie.jpg

All joking aside, there hasn't been a successful enemy-initiated airstrike on American troops for decades. I don't feel comfortable myself putting that record at risk by automating the pilots. We know the many problems with human pilots and have much experience dealing with them - I don't think they are so myriad as to require getting rid of them.

SteveMetz
12-18-2007, 03:04 PM
Let's not forget the elephant in the room ... :D

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/3/39/Terminator_3_Rise_of_the_Machines_movie.jpg/200px-Terminator_3_Rise_of_the_Machines_movie.jpg

All joking aside, there hasn't been a successful enemy-initiated airstrike on American troops for decades. I don't feel comfortable myself putting that record at risk by automating the pilots. We know the many problems with human pilots and have much experience dealing with them - I don't think they are so myriad as to require getting rid of them.

Austrian body builders?

Steve Blair
12-18-2007, 03:46 PM
Stealth in the F-22 is a lot more than a nice to have feature. I've been told that modern short range missiles are so deadly that if both sides were equipped with something like Python 5s nobody will come out of a visual fight. The F-22 probably won't be seen so hopefully it won't be hit. At least for the next few (20) years, we need this thing.

Can we agree that the tankers and transports have to be replaced quick?

Couple of things with the F-22...it's good and stealthy when it flies, but it's also big. If you're in visual range you can see it. And with its notional SEAD mission, I don't know that bigger is better.

One thing that's biting the AF in the butt here is their own procurement procedures and silver bullet mentality, IMO. Stealth is nice, but do you need it for every platform? We saw the same thing back with the XB-70 when the manned bomber was seen as the backbone of the AF. Dumping tons of money into that program left TAC to make do with aircraft that weren't designed for the mission at hand (the F-100 and F-105) and even borrowing a Navy design (the F-4).

Gonna be tough, but I really don't think that giving the AF a blank check is the answer.

carl
12-18-2007, 04:00 PM
Why does a manned craft have more psychological impact than an unmanned one? Does the guy on the ground know which is which?

Plus, doesn't the idea of visible contrails run counter to the idea of avoiding air defenses?

Seems to me that there is even greater psychological impact when the guy on the ground doesn't see anything and all the sudden stuff blows up.

I was thinking of a show of force short of war. Contrails left by an airplane that can smash you can be pretty effective at that. We don't have any drones that can do that.

Again in a situation short of war, something you can see may be scarier than something you can't. For example, it is hard to do gunboat diplomacy with submarines, aircraft carriers are better.

And in a small war, a low fast run by a fighter in afterburner is, I've read, a good tactic to scare away bad guys. We don't have a drone that can do that either.

This is, of course, a conservative's argument; I am reluctant to give up what I know works for what might work.

SteveMetz
12-18-2007, 04:09 PM
I was thinking of a show of force short of war. Contrails left by an airplane that can smash you can be pretty effective at that. We don't have any drones that can do that.

Again in a situation short of war, something you can see may be scarier than something you can't. For example, it is hard to do gunboat diplomacy with submarines, aircraft carriers are better.

And in a small war, a low fast run by a fighter in afterburner is, I've read, a good tactic to scare away bad guys. We don't have a drone that can do that either.

This is, of course, a conservative's argument; I am reluctant to give up what I know works for what might work.

What I was suggesting is that if it's contrails you want, easier to build drones that make them than to buy more multi bizillion dollar fighter planes.

Tom Odom
12-18-2007, 04:15 PM
Austrian body builders?

yeah they get elected guvnor and you can't get rid of 'em

carl
12-18-2007, 04:21 PM
Couple of things with the F-22...it's good and stealthy when it flies, but it's also big. If you're in visual range you can see it. And with its notional SEAD mission, I don't know that bigger is better.

One thing that's biting the AF in the butt here is their own procurement procedures and silver bullet mentality, IMO. Stealth is nice, but do you need it for every platform? We saw the same thing back with the XB-70 when the manned bomber was seen as the backbone of the AF. Dumping tons of money into that program left TAC to make do with aircraft that weren't designed for the mission at hand (the F-100 and F-105) and even borrowing a Navy design (the F-4).

Gonna be tough, but I really don't think that giving the AF a blank check is the answer.

There is no way to have an airplane with long range (endurance), sensors and an adequate weapons load that won't be big. The F-22 though is about the same size as an F-15, 62'x44' vs. 63'x42' so there is no great change there. Bigger is easier to see but that is why stealth in this fighter is so important; if your radar can't tell your eyes where to look you are going to have a hell of a time finding it. The fact that the F-22 flies 20,000' feet higher than anyone else is rather a help to. Stealth is nice and you don't need if for every mission, but I think it vital to this one.

In full agreement about the Air Force painting itself into a corner, but unfortunately, they painted all the rest of us in the corner with them.

Also agree about not giving a blank check. I wouldn't fund the F-35. But I do think the F-22 is critical as are fast replacement of the transports and tankers.

carl
12-18-2007, 04:24 PM
What I was suggesting is that if it's contrails you want, easier to build drones that make them than to buy more multi bizillion dollar fighter planes.

Given the history of military procurement, I am not sure building a drone with the capability of say, an F-18F, will be any easier or cheaper than continuing to build the fighters on the production line. I am sure it wouldn't be faster.

selil
12-18-2007, 04:29 PM
Bluntly if you run something by computer or remote telemetry (two different things) sooner or later it will be vulnerable and used against you. Buy me a beer and I'll tell you about sooner. :eek:

Ken White
12-18-2007, 04:44 PM
"Also agree about not giving a blank check. I wouldn't fund the F-35. But I do think the F-22 is critical as are fast replacement of the transports and tankers."

My conversations with assorted thinking Grunts * indicate they strongly disagree and most -- not all -- would say:

""Also agree about not giving a blank check. But I do think both the F-22 and F35 are critical as is replacement of the transports and tankers.""

The alternative to the capabilities a mature (note that word) F35 will bring is the Army having its own CAS with UAVs and E-4s flying them. ;)

Your choice, Air force... :D


* Those are the Army types, haven't talked to any Marines on the topic recently but I suspect they feel even more strongly that the F35 should stay (for some strange reason). That's without even addressing the other Nations that have bought into the program and have a right to expect something for their money. I suggest that if the AF wants the air missions required for national defense, it needs ALL the capabilities including the ones it does not like and has consistently tried to ignore over the years...

carl
12-18-2007, 05:00 PM
Bluntly if you run something by computer or remote telemetry (two different things) sooner or later it will be vulnerable and used against you. Buy me a beer and I'll tell you about sooner. :eek:

Are you talking about what the Israelis reputedly did to the Syrians only from the ground up rather than from the air down, so to speak?

wm
12-18-2007, 05:01 PM
Bluntly if you run something by computer or remote telemetry (two different things) sooner or later it will be vulnerable and used against you.

Not only that, but let us not forget about software bugs.
How many times have each of us cursed Bill Gates when we get some kind of glitch associated with a software programming error?

Just think how many KSLOC (thousands of software lines of code) would have to be written and, at best only partially, debugged to get a fully automated or remotely piloted drone capability that comes close to matching what a human does in an aircraft moving at supersonic speeds. "Oops" just doesn't quite cut it when you get a 404 error and your Predator launched Hellfire flies into Hagia Sophia in Istanbul instead of Balla Hissar in Kabul.

carl
12-18-2007, 05:03 PM
My conversations with assorted thinking Grunts * indicate they strongly disagree and most -- not all -- would say:

""Also agree about not giving a blank check. But I do think both the F-22 and F35 are critical as is replacement of the transports and tankers.""

The alternative to the capabilities a mature (note that word) F35 will bring is the Army having its own CAS with UAVs and E-4s flying them. ;)

Your choice, Air force... :D


* Those are the Army types, haven't talked to any Marines on the topic recently but I suspect they feel even more strongly that the F35 should stay (for some strange reason). That's without even addressing the other Nations that have bought into the program and have a right to expect something for their money. I suggest that if the AF wants the air missions required for national defense, it needs ALL the capabilities including the ones it does not like and has consistently tried to ignore over the years...

Both of course would be better, but if the choice had to be made, I would give up the F-35. The Australians are already covering their bet in that regard.

Ken White
12-18-2007, 05:50 PM
Both of course would be better, but if the choice had to be made, I would give up the F-35. The Australians are already covering their bet in that regard.

The Australians are less bureaucratic and more focused than we are. They also have a booming economy (right now) and can afford alternatives. The other JSF partners are not so fortunate -- aside from the fact that we said we would do something (a fact the USAF senior leadership in some cases appears to be willing to ignore)...

History is full of similar examples. Army Ground Forces fought tenaciously for the Tank Destroyer concept in WW II in spite of overwhelming evidence form 1940 forward that it was an extremely stupid idea; as late as 1944 they were still wasting money, material and effort developing Tank Destroyers and trying to derail the M26 Tank. They fought mightily to prevent it being deployed in Europe, it took a personal plea from Eisenhower to Marshall to fix that. Criminal malfeasance in my view.

The USAF fought all through the 70-00 period buying enough Transports to fund more than enough fighters; they tried at least twice to dump the A-10. They don't like the F35 because it 'won't do the air superiority mission...' and siphons funds from the F22. Also criminal malfeasance in my view, perhaps even more so as the USAF has fought tenaciously to retain the CAS mission while avoiding until forced to buy the right gear for the job.

Both aircraft are equally necessary; the workhorse F16 is also a '70s design. so's the A-10 -- all of them are going to wear out soon.

The US Army diligently ignored COIN all through that same 70-00 period -- they paid and are paying a price for that. If you want a job, better be prepared to do it and to do it right you need the right tools for those jobs...

Or someone else will take your job. :cool:

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-18-2007, 07:59 PM
The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

I have sat in meetings where the USAF bemoans insufficient funding to recapitalize its fleet yet has no problem “deploying” 2nd Lts to EUCOM in Stuttgart for four months, paying them TDY, billeting them in hotels, providing them rental cars (at €100 per day) under the guise of “QOL,” and providing them two weeks of leave off the books (to recover from an arduous deployment). All at an estimated cost of around $60,000 per. Now while in the grand scheme of things $60K may be a drop in the bucket, multiply that by the thousands of Airmen who “deploy” under similar circumstances. To me it shows a distinct lack of prioritization and resource allocation skill in a service that often places quality of life issues far ahead of mission capabilities. Yet they are "desperate to figure out how to save money.":confused:

"For the 30 years during which I covered the military, the pattern was to defend the advanced weaponry while neglecting the inglorious low-tech equipment needed in war. There is no constituency for the cheap and mundane. The military prepares to fight an enemy, however imaginary, that justifies the high-tech equipment it wants — not the unglamorous ragtag militia that is actually out there."

Fred Reed
Washington Times
December 15, 2007

Of the all the services the USAF has a serious techno-crack habit (although the USN is close behind).

Penta
12-18-2007, 08:54 PM
I wouldn't call it techno-crack, I'd call it techno-Ketracel White.

See, if not for the continuing march of technology, there'd be minimal reason for the AF to exist as a separate service.

carl
12-18-2007, 09:04 PM
The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

selil
12-18-2007, 09:05 PM
Are you talking about what the Israelis reputedly did to the Syrians only from the ground up rather than from the air down, so to speak?

I can neither confirm nor deny (even though "I" have no security clearance or restriction) the current capability of any state or non-state actor to actively jam and or obtain control of telemetry systems (and or INTERNAL) systems of UAV's.


The answer though is on the Internet. I'm only mildly joking the thrust is quite deadly serious.

selil
12-18-2007, 09:09 PM
Not only that, but let us not forget about software bugs.
How many times have each of us cursed Bill Gates when we get some kind of glitch associated with a software programming error?

Just think how many KSLOC (thousands of software lines of code) would have to be written and, at best only partially, debugged to get a fully automated or remotely piloted drone capability that comes close to matching what a human does in an aircraft moving at supersonic speeds. "Oops" just doesn't quite cut it when you get a 404 error and your Predator launched Hellfire flies into Hagia Sophia in Istanbul instead of Balla Hissar in Kabul.


And the UAV was built by the low bidder. In all honesty I think the aircraft has a role, but the implementation may have issues that can't be overcome.

I'd say this... naw I won't.

Norfolk
12-18-2007, 09:25 PM
Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

I'm a little confused myself: either Air Mobility Command, or Air Material Command - I think it's the former. I still think in terms of SAC, TAC, MAC, etc.:o

There is no question that the AF needs to replace most of its aircraft fleet: but with what, and at what cost, and for what roles?

Given that the AF really, really needs mondo muella to do so, I think that now would be a good time to extract some concessions from them in the form of serious reforms and reorganization on their part - including turning CAS and perhaps some other Army-related roles (such as certain tactical transport roles)to the Army - along with the legal right (have to work on Congress here for that) for the Army to have its own fixed-wing aircraft for such purposes. A worthy replacement for the A-10, under Army control, would be nice.

But when the AF has to ground major portions of its F-15 fleet because their wiring is literally rotting away, it's clear that there's not much time left before the AF is turned from the Kings of the Sky into the world's largest collection of Hangar Queens. But this has to be done smart, and the AF will have to have its feet really held to the fire here, both because of its past practices and because all the other services need to replace tons of old and worn-out stuff too.

Rifleman
12-18-2007, 11:16 PM
See! See! I knew they were going downhill. :p Bad things happen once you give up C7 Caribous and A1 Skyraiders. ;)

LawVol
12-18-2007, 11:41 PM
What is AMC?

AMC is the Air Mobility Command. AFMC is the Air Force Materiel (not material) Command.

AMC has the heavies, the cargo carriers. AFMC (where I am now) does research, testing, development, and evaluation (RTD&E) and acquisitions. It's where we spend all that money that you guys are complaining about us getting!:D:D

SteveMetz
12-18-2007, 11:42 PM
AMC is the Air Mobility Command.

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-18-2007, 11:48 PM
Norfolk and carl I apologize for my dependency. AMC is Air Mobility Command the successor to MAC, the lowly trash haulers and tankers who do Herculean service in theater. SAC and TAC have combined into Air Combat Command, silk scarved fighter jocks and bomber guys.

The AF is scrambling to redefine itself to deal with LIC/COIN and yet yearns for a conventional conflict with China or a resurgent Russia. They are a bit on the defensive, witness Dunlap et al, who write op eds decrying those with "boots on the ground." They are having an identity crises and often fail to play to the strength of their current relevancy in the AOR: ISR and airlift. Predator and Global Hawk are force multipliers that pay huge dividends in COIN, as they are passive/aggressive platforms. Strategic and theater airlift are the lifeblood for those boots on the ground.

The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

Ken White
12-19-2007, 12:15 AM
I agree with your second paragraph but have some questions on the remainder.



. . .
The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

Even allowing for the Air force manipulating the F15 fleet issues for their F22 procurement benefit, the bulk of the fleet is still approaching an age where upgrading is not an option. The real workhorse in your "GWOT" scenario is the F16. even with all the A/B models retired, the C/D fleet median usage is at 4,600 hours out of 8,000 hour life (and some are approaching 6,000 hours). Extensive upgrades to either fleet are not really cost effective.

Ideally, purpose specific platforms would be procured as attempts to go multi mission always impose compromises. Everyone knows that quantity has a qualitative effect. Also ideally, large production runs offering economies of scale would the norm. Unfortunately, in the era of declining budgets we are likely to face, the Air force is going to have to wrestle with those conflicts and produce a solution -- and I'd submit that cancellation of any of their major programs would be a mistake.

The F35 does not offer the fighter capabilities of the F22 -- but it is likely to exceed most anything else out there to include the F15 and F16. It also provides some great CAS and ISR cape that none of those other three offer. Given the time to develop and field new aircraft, it would, I think, be quite wrong to cancel it though the delivery schedule could be stretched a bit and could ramp up if needed. That doesn't even count the allies that are buying it. It isn't going away for those reasons. And it should not.

Same with the F22; right now we are capable of achieving air superiority in most of the world and fairly quickly. That is a capability we should be quite cautious in lessening.


These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Can you assure us that the GWOT is the only conflict we will face in the next 20 years or so -- because it is toward the end of that time period that the aircraft you seem to wish to retain will be falling apart...


Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

Asymmetrical is a buzz word, it means the other guys strikes where you're weak and / or that he's more flexible than you are. The available equipment -- and money -- have little to do with that. That is mind game pure and simple and we're not doing too well at it.

You say the "GWOT" is war of ideals and idealists. Perhaps. I'd be more comfortable if it were a war between dreamers and pragmatists -- with us being the latter. Even one between plots and common sense. Not at all sure we're there yet...

Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

Ron Humphrey
12-19-2007, 12:30 AM
So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

What ever happened to wind turbine cars:confused:

Jedburgh
12-19-2007, 12:37 AM
CSIS, 13 Dec 07: US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071213_oif-oef_airpower.pdf)

The attached chart summarizes the trends in the US use of airpower in the Iraq and Afghan Wars during 2004-2007. While airpower is scarcely a forgotten dimension of both wars, it is clear that it is playing a steadily more important role over time. The data show a steady rise in air activity, with particularly sharp rises in the case of Afghanistan.

The data for total annual close air support/precision strike (CAS) sorties do not show a dramatic increase for Afghanistan between 2004 and 2007, but doubled in the case of Iraq. It is also the number of such strikes that actually used major munitions, however, that measure combat activity, and these data reflect a dramatic increase in both the use of airpower and the intensity of combat in both wars.

Sharp increases took place in the levels of CAS delivery of major munitions between 2004 and 2007, with very sharp rises between 2006 and 2007. In the case of Afghanistan, the total number of close air support/precision strike sorties flown in that dropped a major munition rose from 86 in 2004, and only 176 in 2005, to 1,770 in 2006 (10-fold annual increase), and 2,926 in 2007 (1.7 times higher as of 5 December). The number of CAS sorties that used a major munition in Iraq increased from 285 in 2004, 404 in 2005, and 229 in 2006, to 1,119 in 2007 (Nearly 5 times higher than in 2006 as of 5 December).....

Steve Blair
12-19-2007, 01:35 PM
Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

All true, but I'm becoming more and more wary of giving the AF a blank check to meet its needs. That's been done before, and left us in many cases with a mess. It's always instructive to remember that the AF didn't want the F-16 at first, and we've already gone over their efforts to get rid of the A-10 on multiple occasions.

The more I look at it, the more I really want to strip CAS away from them in total. Let them build F-22s and the next generation manned bomber (and yes, they are looking at one of those), and then mandate that they upgrade and maintain the heavy fleet (tankers, lift, and AWACs). But since the AF as an overall institution has proven very reluctant to actually devote long-term interest and effort to CAS strip it out and give it to the Army and Marines. The Marine air wing system has proven itself over the years..so why not give the Army something similar?

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-19-2007, 02:29 PM
Jedburgh's stats are telling and CAS has become a more effective tool with the use of PGMs. "Surgical" air strikes are possible. Do the stats also show the number of missions flown by AMC to support both OEF and OIF?

While the fast movers certainly have an important role in LIC/COIN the heavier burden is upon the airlift folks.

Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted... :wry:

While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget. ;)

Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.

But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.

carl
12-19-2007, 06:11 PM
I just now read the Navy has had to ground 39 of its 161 P-3Cs for "structural fatigue concerns" and it will take several years to get them all back into the air.

So it is not just the Air Force that is facing a big bill to replace ancient airplanes.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-19-2007, 07:35 PM
The Stars and Stripes additionally states:

"P-3C aircraft were grounded three times in 2005 and 2006, but those aircraft have since returned to service, Davis said. He also said the Navy is confident the P-3C aircraft not affected by the grounding are safe to fly. The Navy has 161 P-3C Orion aircraft,...The average age...is 28 years...The oldest aircraft is 44 years old, and the youngest is 16 years old. The first squadron of the P-3C’s replacement, the P-8A Poseidon, is expected to stand up in 2013..."

While the article mentions 10 of the 39 are deployed it makes no mention of how many total are deployed. The P3C is a platform in search of a mission since the undersea threat has diminished significantly (but could soon rise as China flexes and Russia rearms)

And while structural fatigue will always be a problem for aircraft, and more so as the airframe ages, it is still should not always the ratioanl for replacing the aircraft with a more expensive version. To wit the B-52.

The KC-135 is still doing service and a telling statement made by a senior USAF officer went something like this: "The father of the last KC-135 pilot hasn't been born yet." :eek:

Ken White
12-19-2007, 09:01 PM
. . .
Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted... :wry:

shop -- ours as in the US Government. However, my history books are still available and we have not been great at predicting our next war. We also, historically since WW II have not had very accurate foreign intelligence....


While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

No big argument from me over any of that; Other than a minor quibble or two, I'd say the odds are about 75:25 that will be correct. However, I do have two questions about the probability -- (1) What occurs if we prepare for such conflicts and a Political decision is made not to engage? I suggest that given the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that is a likely prospect. (2) What do we do if that 25% chance occurs ( in the Balkans, in South America, if a bilateral treaty with any of a dozen nations is invoked)?


Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget. ;)

Agreed -- but that doesn't affect my point on the practicalities of potential conflict. To me, that potential is the issue and parochial 'who shot John' arguments don't address that point.


Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Define decisively? :D Who could achieve temporary local superiority to achieve some tactical or operational gains at some cost to us a dozen places in the world? What nut could decide to take on the USAF in an air dominance battle no matter how stupid or doomed is the idea? Who would take advantage of our involvement in, say Afghanistan and Iraq, to foment hatred and discontent elsewhere to further occupy us and create a distraction while they really aim for greater turmoil in a third location?

Decisively is not the issue; avoiding any challenge in the air is to our advantage. Recall also that in both Korea and Viet Nam, proxy wars with small air forces for our opponenets, the opposition managed to shoot down a lot US planes. We prevailed in the air because we had a lot more planes. Given the costs of those things today, we don't have that quantity nowadays...


Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

Agree in part. Totally with respect over reliance on technology and to JIEDDO, less so on the ABL, I suspect we'll gain some good spin offs from that, one of which may be DEW for the AC130 replacement program -- and another for the F35. :)

There are, of course others that meet your criteria, FCS for one (again, some good spin offs but an unnecessary and ill conceived end goal).

We have always tended to reach for technological solutions instead of starting with better and tailored training which would probably be more effective and cheaper. Unfortunately, training dollars don't help numerous Congressional Districts, big ticket hi tech items do.

(quote)I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.(/quote)

Yes, it is and I too realize that. I also know that all the services sometimes do it well, sometimes not -- and it goes in cycles. The Air Force flubbed it for a few years and bought themselves a problem. I'm merely suggesting that, yeah, it IS their problem -- but, like it or not it unfortunately affects us all and it needs to fixed.

(quote)But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.[/QUOTE]

With that, I can totally agree, Perhaps unlike you, my hate list on that topic starts with the Congresses (plural, the last 20 or so...).

Ken White
12-19-2007, 09:02 PM
. . .
Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted... :wry:

shop -- ours as in the US Government. However, my history books are still available and we have not been great at predicting our next war. We also, historically since WW II have not had very accurate foreign intelligence....


While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

No big argument from me over any of that; Other than a minor quibble or two, I'd say the odds are about 75:25 that will be correct. However, I do have two questions about the probability -- (1) What occurs if we prepare for such conflicts and a Political decision is made not to engage? I suggest that given the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that is a likely prospect. (2) What do we do if that 25% chance occurs ( in the Balkans, in South America, if a bilateral treaty with any of a dozen nations is invoked)?


Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget. ;)

Agreed -- but that doesn't affect my point on the practicalities of potential conflict. To me, that potential is the issue and parochial 'who shot John' arguments don't address that point.


Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Define decisively? :D Who could achieve temporary local superiority to achieve some tactical or operational gains at some cost to us a dozen places in the world? What nut could decide to take on the USAF in an air dominance battle no matter how stupid or doomed is the idea? Who would take advantage of our involvement in, say Afghanistan and Iraq, to foment hatred and discontent elsewhere to further occupy us and create a distraction while they really aim for greater turmoil in a third location?

Decisively is not the issue; avoiding any challenge in the air is to our advantage. Recall also that in both Korea and Viet Nam, proxy wars with small air forces for our opponenets, the opposition managed to shoot down a lot US planes. We prevailed in the air because we had a lot more planes. Given the costs of those things today, we don't have that quantity nowadays...


Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

Agree in part. Totally with respect over reliance on technology and to JIEDDO, less so on the ABL, I suspect we'll gain some good spin offs from that, one of which may be DEW for the AC130 replacement program -- and another for the F35. :)

There are, of course others that meet your criteria, FCS for one (again, some good spin offs but an unnecessary and ill conceived end goal).

We have always tended to reach for technological solutions instead of starting with better and tailored training which would probably be more effective and cheaper. Unfortunately, training dollars don't help numerous Congressional Districts, big ticket hi tech items do.

(quote)I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.(/quote)

Yes, it is and I too realize that. I also know that all the services sometimes do it well, sometimes not -- and it goes in cycles. The Air Force flubbed it for a few years and bought themselves a problem. I'm merely suggesting that, yeah, it IS their problem -- but, like it or not it unfortunately affects us all and it needs to fixed.

(quote)But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.[/QUOTE]

With that, I can totally agree, Perhaps unlike you, my hate list on that topic starts with the Congresses (plural, the last 20 or so...).

J Wolfsberger
12-19-2007, 09:02 PM
As an aside, and maybe an important one, both the P-3 and the KC-135 started life as commercial airliners.

Over the years, it's always seemed as though the Air Force defines its mission as flying cool planes. Actually fighting a war is incidental. (Unfair, I know. But I'm presenting my perception.)

They've tried to get rid of the A-10, only to retain it when the Army threatens to end the Key West agreement and take them over. AF people claim that the F-16 is better at CAS. It isn't, we know it isn't, they know it isn't, but it is more fun to fly than an A-10.

We've still got a huge number of C-130s that are not only wearing out, they can't carry much, if any, heavy equipment. But I have yet to hear about any effort to expand the fleet of C-17s or C-5s. (Moot by now anyway - I understand the tooling has been destroyed.)

Now the AF has a combat fleet of 1. Fighters that are deteriorating like crazy - but no SEP plan. 2. Bombers way older than their crews, or that can't fly in bad weather. 3. CAS versions of the F-16 that are falling apart because the AF is loading them with 2000 lb bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, then landing again with the unexpended bomb load.

In the meantime, MG Dunlop is complaining that the AF isn't getting its fair share of work in COIN, and we should redefine the doctrine so they can break lots more stuff and kill lots more people.

I agree that the AF is putting itself out of business. They're accomplishing that goal exactly the same way it happens in private industry. They have lost touch with their market and can't provide a relevant product.

If they are going to stay relevant (and in business) they need to redefine the organization around a few major missions:

1. Moving the Army. Transports. Whether anyone likes it or not, we'll be dealing with conflicts of low intensity in areas where there are lots of civilians to be protected. That means moving and supporting infantry.

2. Supporting the infantry. Close Air Support. A-10 type aircraft, not F-16. Long loiter times, lots of low and medium armament. (i.e. 100 lb. bombs, not 2000.)

3. Air superiority/supremacy. The fun planes. F-22, F-35. And extract their heads from the alpha hotels and get effective SEP in place for the F-16s and F-15s before they're grounded permanently.

4. Bombers. Behind the other guys lines. Dumb bombs, smarts bombs, stand off attack missiles, who cares. giver them flexible payloads capability, and make them all weather.

They do that, and they'll find a path forward. They fail, in any of those four areas, and they run the risk of going out of business.

Ken White
12-19-2007, 09:34 PM
fortunately, the A10 is a tough bird and will be around for a long time. The AF ought to be working now on a equally tough and very similar (and at least equally heavily gunned) replacement.

They need more 130Js and the problems need to fixed; and more C17s; and re-engining the C5s...

They just need, as you say, to get their act together and get in touch with their customer base...

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-19-2007, 09:52 PM
Ken: I agree on your 75:25, I hope our planners see it that way as well and not the reverse. If this makes any sense, I think we would "see" a conventional conflict coming. In our last two out of three we had a long build-up time prior to, even though we failed to see the invasion of Kuwait prior to GW I. OEF was executed on our initiation so we saw it coming as well.

Yes, we lost aircraft in Korea and Vietnam to ground fire but those conflicts were set in an era absent the amazing standoff capability we currently have. FACs have nearly been replaced by Predators and even fast movers can "see" from a safer distance. Munitions are virtually pinpoint accurate. Plus detection and countermeasures have improved. So we traded quantity for quality, at a significant cost (wasn't it Stalin who said "quantity has a quality of its own").

While Congress isn't on top of my hate list (liver is) I think Eisenhower's admonition fell short. We must beware the military-industrial-congressional complex!

John: Not to impugn the good general, but Charlie Dunlap is a lawyer, not a pilot. So while he is no doubt expert at making an argument IMO I feel he is a bit too much of a cheerleader for air power as the be all end all (one need only look at the USAF acquisition strategy). He acts like a 21st Century LeMay.

Love your four points for USAF relevancy, very much on the mark. Although they are already organized for those missions what they need to do is change their priority to match yours (although you forgot "space superiority" and "information superiority":eek:).

It would be difficult today to build an "all weather" anything (airframe or weapon sys). Mother Nature just will not allow it. Although I believe your point is more along the lines of we need to build aircraft that are not so susceptible to environmental impacts.

Whoops shouldn't have done all our testing in Nevada during blissfully calm bright sunny days. :wry:

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-19-2007, 10:04 PM
Somebody just needs to make them realize that they are in fact a "service" organization and their customer base predominantly wears combat boots!

SteveMetz
12-19-2007, 10:05 PM
I just had another thought--if the Air Force DOES go out of business, I wonder if they'll have a clearance sale? It would be way cool to own a B2. Or the VIP Q from an air base. One of those with mirrors on the ceiling.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-19-2007, 10:10 PM
B-2's too big, A-10 for me: Hog wild baby! ;)

Which DVQ has the mirrors? I musta missed that one, although Aviano's are pretty primo. :D

Ken White
12-19-2007, 10:23 PM
Ken: I agree on your 75:25, I hope our planners see it that way as well and not the reverse. If this makes any sense, I think we would "see" a conventional conflict coming. In our last two out of three we had a long build-up time prior to, even though we failed to see the invasion of Kuwait prior to GW I. OEF was executed on our initiation so we saw it coming as well.

I'd submit that Korea was missed by the Spooks; Viet Nam was missed by the Army (in a broad sense); Grenada was not foreseen and while you're correct in saying the invasion of Kuwait was not foreseen, it should have been (we virtually invited him to do it). I disagree that OEF was foreseen (Sep to Nov isn't much foreseeing and the executed effort did not at all resemble the ConPlan) and, if you meant OIF, yep, we initiated it -- and totally missed WHAT was bound to happen (Well, WE didn't, a lot of folks knew but the folks in charge didn't want to hear that...).

That's not a very good track record on which to base what's likely to be next... :eek:

(quote)Yes, we lost aircraft in Korea and Vietnam to ground fire but those conflicts were set in an era absent the amazing standoff capability we currently have. FACs have nearly been replaced by Predators and even fast movers can "see" from a safer distance. Munitions are virtually pinpoint accurate. Plus detection and countermeasures have improved. So we traded quantity for quality, at a significant cost (wasn't it Stalin who said "quantity has a quality of its own").

Didn't mean ground fire, that's why I said ""Recall also that in both Korea and Viet Nam, proxy wars with small air forces for our opponents, the opposition managed to shoot down a lot US planes.""(emphasis added / kw) I specifically meant in air to air combat -- which is a part of the air superiority realm. In fairness to the AF (and Navy), once they realized they had an air to air problem, they fixed it rapidly but there were more initial losses than they liked. Air superority is pretty important.

Which is what the F22 is all about -- as for your precision attack, totally true -- and the F35 is optimized for just that. ;)

Stan
12-19-2007, 10:24 PM
B-2's too big, A-10 for me: Hog wild baby! ;)

Which DVQ has the mirrors? I musta missed that one, although Aviano's are pretty primo. :D

I didn't find any with mirrors, but these (http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/products/vq/body/chapter3.html) would be just find by me :p


3-1.6.4 Visual Screening Unattractive views or objects identified by the site analysis will be screened with appropriate plant materials to minimize negative visual impacts....

3-1.6.5 Wind Control Wind is either a pleasant or unpleasant climatic factor depending on ambient air temperature, relative humidity, and velocity.

These folks have obviously never visited an Army base :rolleyes:

SteveMetz
12-19-2007, 10:39 PM
B-2's too big, A-10 for me: Hog wild baby! ;)

Which DVQ has the mirrors? I musta missed that one, although Aviano's are pretty primo. :D


My boss told me that the squadron room of an A10 unit during Desert Storm had a sign that read, "Unleash the Hogs of War"

Maxwell. I seriously expected there to be bondage equipment in the closet next to the ironing board.

selil
12-19-2007, 10:43 PM
Did you ever notice how A10 pilots aren't like other airforce pilots? The airfarce just treats A10 pilots like they should be swept under the rug.

SteveMetz
12-19-2007, 10:47 PM
Did you ever notice how A10 pilots aren't like other airforce pilots? The airfarce just treats A10 pilots like they should be swept under the rug.

That's what happens when you spend too much time in a titanium bath tub.

Ken White
12-20-2007, 01:07 AM
doesn't track at all, they always told me the best place to hide your money from a pilot was under the soap...

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-20-2007, 01:19 AM
Stan: LOL! I loved the link. “Wind is either a pleasant or unpleasant climatic factor depending on ambient air temperature, relative humidity, and velocity.” Really? That’s brilliant!

I've actually stayed in the Osan DVQ! And the USAF wonders why they are scrambling for money when they think nothing of dropping a few thousand Benjamins on what amounts to a five star hotel, then charges $35 to stay there.

Although Maxwell sounds...interesting..to say the least. Maybe the USAF has a hidden "Directorate of BDSM" :p

Ken: Yep we totally missed Korea, and it didn't help that Truman and Johnson totally eviscerated the military, except the nascent USAF who assured them that there was no need for the other three services. Not sure Grenada was "missed" nor could it truly be considered "conventional" (but at least afterwards I could finally claim that I had been on a Caribbean cruise :D). Vietnam was a "gradual" build up, plus LBJ wanted initially to fight it on the cheap. I guess what I meant was that we are typically postured for conventional war and are out of our depth when it's not a nice "clean" war.

Sorry for the mix up on aircraft loss in Vietnam…still, while we did have air-to-air losses, we adapted and increased the kill to loss ratio.

selil: A-10 pilots are considered the knuckle draggers of the Farce, perhaps it’s because they actually put their cojonés on the line supporting us ground pounders. Not quite the image the leather jacket and silk scarf crowd try to promote. :cool:

LawVol
12-20-2007, 02:45 AM
I have to give you guys a great big hat tip. Its been about a month or so since you've had the urge to dogpile on the Air Force. I didn't think you'd make it that long.:)

http://joebrower.com/PHILE_PILE/PIX/FR/hat_tip_sunset.jpg

We still love you "knuckledraggers" though.:D

Norfolk
12-20-2007, 03:35 AM
We still love you "knuckledraggers" though.:D

I've got this warm, "fuzzy", right here.:eek:

120mm
12-20-2007, 05:42 AM
I have to give you guys a great big hat tip. Its been about a month or so since you've had the urge to dogpile on the Air Force. I didn't think you'd make it that long.:)

http://joebrower.com/PHILE_PILE/PIX/FR/hat_tip_sunset.jpg

We still love you "knuckledraggers" though.:D

I don't see this discussion as a "dogpile" at all. There are some very constructive comments in here. And if the Air Force was smart, they'd pay heed to at least some of them.

Want to know how they could get rid of their 40,000 "excess" personnel? Do away with all the expensive QOL crap only the Air Force appears to be able to afford.

And the people who are in the AF for the "goodies" will leave, leaving the warriors behind....

J Wolfsberger
12-20-2007, 01:30 PM
I have to give you guys a great big hat tip. Its been about a month or so since you've had the urge to dogpile on the Air Force. I didn't think you'd make it that long.:)

http://joebrower.com/PHILE_PILE/PIX/FR/hat_tip_sunset.jpg

We still love you "knuckledraggers" though.:D

So, are the rumors about putting greens on C-5s true?:D

Tom Odom
12-20-2007, 01:37 PM
I'd submit that Korea was missed by the Spooks; Viet Nam was missed by the Army (in a broad sense); Grenada was not foreseen and while you're correct in saying the invasion of Kuwait was not foreseen, it should have been (we virtually invited him to do it).



Minor point in this thread. But some of us did see the invasion of Kuwait coming and gave strategic warning. I made that call as soon as he began moving the RGFC south. My DCSINT--who had removed Iraq from the world wide threat list that spring and earned Schwartzkopf's ire by doing so--continued to spout bluff until 2 August.

As for inviting him to invade, too strong a word, Ken. Gallespie screwed up by leaving the door open instead of slamming it in his face. She did not invite him.

Best

Tom

MattC86
12-20-2007, 04:33 PM
I remember my grandfather, a WWII Navy vet, calling the USAF the "junior birdmen" in reference to Tom Lehrer dubbing "Up in the Air Junior Birdman" the USAF official song. . .

I don't see most of this as piling on at all, LawVol. It is somewhat incongruous for the Army and Marine Corps to be stretched absolutely to the limit; dealing with casualties, retention issues, personnel shortages, plus all the equipment and procurement issues that accompany 6 years of sustained war, and then to see the Air Force come along and say, "by the way, we need hundreds of billions of dollars for a spanking-new fighter fleet."

I think that now, more than ever, its imperative that the Army take control of CAS aircraft, and develop a SLEP for the A-10 or a successor. You simply aren't going to convince the USAF that they exist to support the soldier on the ground, and thus without that change in mission and purpose, you aren't going to see procurement priorities that mesh with "what their customers want," namely the CAS and airlift capabilities.

That said, here are my questions. Is the USAF really that worried about its F-15s, F-16s, and so on in a bombing campaign against Iran or maybe North Korea? Or is it because of the general air-worthiness condition of the fleet?

Second, why isn't the Navy offering similar rumblings about their F/A-18Cs, S-3s, etc? Or, for that matter, their ships, some of which are aging rapidly (submarines in particular. . .)

Finally, I'd just like to point out that every service right now is upping their procurement and personnel requirements, as they always do while in crisis mode. The funds demanded right now are enormous (I'm thinking of McCaffrey's call for a 800,000 man active-duty Army, the fighter force recapitalization, and the Navy's Virginia submarine program, among others) and everybody is going to have to live with some cuts. The past has shown how hard it is bureaucratically to minimize a service's role and funding level to support another, and the dangers in doing so (Truman's emphasis on the USAF before Korea; emphasis on the Navy before WWI)

Matt

carl
12-20-2007, 04:47 PM
The Stars and Stripes additionally states:

"P-3C aircraft were grounded three times in 2005 and 2006, but those aircraft have since returned to service, Davis said. He also said the Navy is confident the P-3C aircraft not affected by the grounding are safe to fly. The Navy has 161 P-3C Orion aircraft,...The average age...is 28 years...The oldest aircraft is 44 years old, and the youngest is 16 years old. The first squadron of the P-3C’s replacement, the P-8A Poseidon, is expected to stand up in 2013..."

While the article mentions 10 of the 39 are deployed it makes no mention of how many total are deployed. The P3C is a platform in search of a mission since the undersea threat has diminished significantly (but could soon rise as China flexes and Russia rearms)

And while structural fatigue will always be a problem for aircraft, and more so as the airframe ages, it is still should not always the ratioanl for replacing the aircraft with a more expensive version. To wit the B-52.

The KC-135 is still doing service and a telling statement made by a senior USAF officer went something like this: "The father of the last KC-135 pilot hasn't been born yet." :eek:

That the P-3C has been grounded repeatedly in recent years should not be viewed as reassuring, it should be viewed as alarming; especially if you have to fly the thing or count on it to perform a mission.

One of the missions of the P-3C is maritime patrol. The world is mostly covered with ocean and on that ocean are thousands of boats, that float on the surface. The ability to look for those ships, find them and track them is a pretty obvious mission. Satellites can only go so far. I don't believe there are any that can take a photo of a ship's name at night beneath an overcast, and then sink it on the spot if need be.

The comment by the Air Force officer about the KC-135 was, I'll bet, more a lamentation than an endorsement.

Additionally, the C-17 is still in production but only for a few (2) more years. From what I've read, the Air Force wants more but the DOD won't go along. This is a very critical need, as judged by someone who sees multiple AN-12's and IL-76's landing daily to supply this big base.

We may have some warning of the next conventional war. But it won't be enough to develop and field a superior fighter. 10 years wouldn't be enough.

My take on history is the guy with superior fighters, both numbers and quality, gets to beat up on the other guy's ground troops at will. There may have been a fundamental change to this pattern but I doubt it. And I would hate to see our soldiers have to endure the pounding the Chinese, North Koreans, North Vietnamese and Iraqis had to take.

Too bad there are no old soldiers from those armies commenting here on this topic. I think they could add a lot to the discussion.

Hey, LawVol. How about some help here. I feel outnumbered.

carl
12-20-2007, 04:52 PM
Second, why isn't the Navy offering similar rumblings about their F/A-18Cs, S-3s, etc? Or, for that matter, their ships, some of which are aging rapidly (submarines in particular. . .)

Matt

In the case of the F/A-18Cs, I would guess it is because they are replacing them with FA-18Es and Fs, and F-35 if they can get them.

SteveMetz
12-20-2007, 04:53 PM
I remember my grandfather, a WWII Navy vet, calling the USAF the "junior birdmen" in reference to Tom Lehrer dubbing "Up in the Air Junior Birdman" the USAF official song. . .



Gads!! I remember that song. Sometimes I feel as old as Odom looks.

Tom Odom
12-20-2007, 04:57 PM
Sometimes I feel as old as Odom looks.

Sad to say then you must really feel old...:cool:

LawVol
12-20-2007, 05:02 PM
I don't see most of this as piling on at all, LawVol

"joke /dʒoʊk/ noun, verb, joked, jok·ing.
- a matter that need not be taken very seriously; trifling matter"

It's all good. A company gunny once told me that Marines aren't happy unless they're complaining about something. I guess it's true for Soldiers as well.:D My wife says it's still true for me.:o


Hey, LawVol. How about some help here. I feel outnumbered.

Carl, you're beating your head against a wall. They love us. They just think we live in opulence (damn, I just spilled my latte). If it's good for the AF, it's good for America!

MattC86
12-20-2007, 05:11 PM
In the case of the F/A-18Cs, I would guess it is because they are replacing them with FA-18Es and Fs, and F-35 if they can get them.

The F/A-18E is replacing the F-14 only, I thought. It's far too expensive to replace the F/A-18Cs (right?) One of the goals of the F-35 program, back when it was the JSF was to get the per-unit cost down to something around the F-15/F-14 range ($30-40M a pop) rather than at the F-22 or F/A-18E's $100-200M.

Since F/A-18Cs make up 3 out of the four squadrons of strike fighters in a CVW, I would assume this is a problem.

Matt

Ken White
12-20-2007, 05:13 PM
. . .
As for inviting him to invade, too strong a word, Ken. Gallespie screwed up by leaving the door open instead of slamming it in his face. She did not invite him.

Best

Tom

Miz April's offhand comment was only one factor and a small one at that. Aside from the fact that, culturally in the ME, if one admires / asks for something, the proper response is to offer it up to the requestor which she inadvertently did, there were other earlier clues both to his desire and our willingness to placate, certainly starting with Kuwait's upping of its oil production in '89 and all our touchy feely responses during the subsequent negotiation and bluster haggling phase...

You and others caught the signs. Your Boss and other's of his ilk ignored the signs through IMO ego and hubris; the net result is that we were unprepared thus my "...was not foreseen, it should have been..." As usual, the working guys got it right and the Flags screwed it up.

I know one guy who postulated it in DC early in the spring of '90 but was told it was "not in our lane" by his Boss. Stovepiping and excessive concern for turf is stupid. :mad:

Regards,
Ken

MattC86
12-20-2007, 05:16 PM
"joke /dʒoʊk/ noun, verb, joked, jok·ing.
- a matter that need not be taken very seriously; trifling matter"



Touche, indeed. . .

Matt

Stan
12-20-2007, 05:20 PM
Touche, indeed. . .

Matt

Heh ! Back at ya ! (http://usmilitary.about.com/od/militaryhumor/a/afdict.htm)


FLIGHT RISK - Used to describe troops who are suspected of planning to retire or separate from the service soon. Alternatively, any O-6 or above that gets behind the controls of an airplane.

GENERICA - Features of the Air Force landscape that are exactly the same no matter which base one is at, such as Burger King, Robin Hood, the BX, and AMC terminal. Used as in "We were so lost in generica that I forgot what base we were at."

OHNOSECOND - That minuscule fraction of time after hitting the "enter" key or clicking "ok" in which you realize that you've just made a BIG mistake.

SALMON DAY - The experience of spending an entire day swimming upstream only to get screwed and die in
the end.

more at the llink :D

Tom Odom
12-20-2007, 06:22 PM
You and others caught the signs. Your Boss and other's of his ilk ignored the signs through IMO ego and hubris; the net result is that we were unprepared thus my "...was not foreseen, it should have been..." As usual, the working guys got it right and the Flags screwed it up.

I know one guy who postulated it in DC early in the spring of '90 but was told it was "not in our lane" by his Boss. Stovepiping and excessive concern for turf is stupid. :mad:

Regards,
Ken

Agreed on stove pipes. I wrote a piece called "rumors of war" that centered on the tensions in the region as a whole but emphasizing Iraq and Iraqi efforts to field its SCUDs in the west against Israel. I got called on the carpet and dressed down by a 2-star who told me he could not imagine war in the ME for the next five years. His boss was the 3 star who had removed Iraq from the threat list. 6 months after castigating me for the warning piece, the 2 star was in the desert. Funny how often analysts get "shut the F%$& up" later get told we had "failed".

Indeed after Desert Storm, the 3 star wanted an AAR on how we had failed; my immediate boss was an O6 who put that on the table and asked for a response. I told him that "we" had not missed anything and laid my warning article on the table in front of him. He told me I was going to have to come off of that position. I told him then he had all the input he was going to get from me on the subject. somehow the AAR never got done..:wry:

On reading each other, I really like the JFCOM's report on how the Iraqis read us and how we read them. Saddam really thought we would strike hard when the Iraqi Exocet missile hit our ship in the tanker war. Of course we did not and one can look at interpretations and misinterpretations as a cascade of steps and misteps. Funny though, I would have to say that the Kuwaitis really the worst at understanding their neighbor to the north. They mistakenly believed that they could keep buying him off when he only got hungrier after each feeding.

But back to the thread, I agree that we should not be hasty in surrendering the edge we have in airpower. We are unlikely to ever develop a crystal ball in foreseeing future threats. Even when we get it right at certain levels, the "shut the F#$%k up" syndrome kicks in hard when such warnings butt heads with senior-level agendas. A good friend of mine and I debated via Parameters about the likelihood of large scale armor formations ever charging across another desert after Desert Storm. His position was that such warfare was as outdated as lancers at the Battle of Omdurman. Mine was simply one should never say never. He was pushing for recognition that such warfare was more exception and that we should train for other forms of warfare. Twelve years later we had large armor formations charging north and then we (again) learned there are other ways to fight a war.

In this debate on air forces, we are really talking roles and missions. I believe we are at least 10 years past the due date for another Key West conference. We should have held that conference before we (generic) started crowing about transformation. I attribute the failure to hold such a conference as very much tied to the creation of JFCOM and its own evolution in roles and missions. I still hope that we will hold a come to Jesus meeting on roles and missions because our shortfalls in aging and worn out equipment are increasingly affecting our capabilities to perform them.

Long winded ramble, hopefully of some value

Best

Tom

slapout9
12-20-2007, 06:52 PM
In this debate on air forces, we are really talking roles and missions. I believe we are at least 10 years past the due date for another Key West conference. We should have held that conference before we (generic) started crowing about transformation. I attribute the failure to hold such a conference as very much tied to the creation of JFCOM and its own evolution in roles and missions. I still hope that we will hold a come to Jesus meeting on roles and missions because our shortfalls in aging and worn out equipment are increasingly affecting our capabilities to perform them.

Long winded ramble, hopefully of some value

Best

Tom


Somebody say Amen!!! I am more convinced than ever that a lot of people in the Air Force have know idea what the Army does.:eek: At the same time I am more convinced than ever that there are a lot of Air Force Officers who would like to learn and have a lot to contribute:).....if the Air Force and Army could ever get together and talk to each other...hence Tom's idea of the Key West 2 conference. The nation as a whole would be the winner. And also give the Army back it's Missiles!!!

Ken White
12-20-2007, 06:54 PM
Couldn't agree more with all of it (sadly... :mad: ). Like the old Pennsylvania Dutch saying; "Ve are too zoon alt und too late schmart."

Good post.

Ken

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-20-2007, 07:02 PM
Yes the P-3 is for maritime patrol, but of the long range, long loiter type. For immediate fleet tactical ASW support there are LAMPs and S-3 Vikings. If you are just looking to track surface targets there are active and passive sensors used aboard all surface combatants, coupled with aircraft when available.

While a P-3 would probably have no difficulty sinking a "boat," it might have problems with a real surface warship (subs are poor AA platforms, even on the surface). ;)

Tom hits the X ring: "we should not be hasty in surrendering the edge we have in airpower." No truer statement that. We just need to be fiscally responsible in the maintenance of that edge, and not to the detriment of other equally important warfighting capabilities.

Yet the hard corps airpower advocates (oxymoron perhaps) who still adhere to “airpower can win wars” seem to miss the point that they are a tool that is used as required and there are times when they play huge logistics role and a minor combat one. Fortunately we have evolved from the days of “we had to destroy the village in order to save it.” Our military is the most deadly instrument of war ever seen, but we have chosen to try to employ it with rapier dexterity vice a ham-fisted bludgeon.

Not ganging up on the USAF per say (but that is from whence the thread began), this exercise in "saving DoD" could be done with any of the other services (yes even the oft parsimonious Marine Corps could be, witness the Osprey) and no doubt the COCOMs and few selected agencies (DIA, CIA, etc...).

And should I decide to remove my turban and use my handy scimitar to denude my skull of head and androgenic hair, I would eerily look like Tom. But in color.

Tom Odom
12-20-2007, 07:07 PM
I would eerily look like Tom.

My wife would tell you, one of me is enough :wry:

Besides my hair fell out due to my dirty mind :D

Ken White
12-20-2007, 07:49 PM
. . .
While a P-3 would probably have no difficulty sinking a "boat," it might have problems with a real surface warship (subs are poor AA platforms, even on the surface). ;)

Depends on how many surface warships are out there and how many Harpoons and / or Mavericks the P3 carries for that mission.


... yes even the oft parsimonious Marine Corps could be, witness the Osprey) and no doubt the COCOMs and few selected agencies (DIA, CIA, etc...).

We can again disagree on the Osprey, good and needed bird IMO -- I'd have listed the Commanche, myself. ;)

P.S.

BTW, Umar, not picking on you and I totally agree with your principal point; the quibbles on the specifics are more an attempt to be fair than to surface minor jiggles or just kibitz. ALL the services have their failings in this regard and ALL the services have some justification for the things they do. That the entire process needs to clean up and speed up, I think we can both agree.

Regards,
Ken

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-20-2007, 08:01 PM
LawVol: the rest of the Gunny's saying goes: "and if they're not complaining, they're up to something." ;) Most of mine always required considerable watching, but especially so when they weren't pissing and moaning! :D

pcmfr
12-20-2007, 08:06 PM
Yes the P-3 is for maritime patrol, but of the long range, long loiter type. For immediate fleet tactical ASW support there are LAMPs and S-3 Vikings.

Vikings haven't had ASW capability for a while now and are soon going away altogether. Sadly, with the wings falling off the P3s -- and many of them doing overland ISR anyway -- we have lost most of our airborne ASW assets.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
12-20-2007, 08:27 PM
Thanks for the straight scoop pcmfr! :)

So is there a replacement in the mix for the Viks, or is the burden going to fall on the LAMPS?

MattC86
12-20-2007, 08:34 PM
We can again disagree on the Osprey, good and needed bird IMO -- I'd have listed the Commanche, myself. ;)

Another thread for another topic (perhaps on a different forum) but I have yet to hear a good explanation as to how the Osprey is so much better than a CH-47 so as to make the Osprey worth the inherent risks and added costs.

But as I said, that's a whole 'notha story.

As for the Comanche, the Army's issues with the ARH show that while the specific tank-busting role of the Comanche may be outdated, the concept of a fast, nimble, stealthy armed recon helicopter is not.

Matt

Ken White
12-20-2007, 08:49 PM
Another thread for another topic (perhaps on a different forum) but I have yet to hear a good explanation as to how the Osprey is so much better than a CH-47 so as to make the Osprey worth the inherent risks and added costs.

was better than the Hook -- different birds for different roles --and nests. In this case, mostly nests. The Hook is a great and capable bird but it isn't at all ship or sea-kindly, the MV22 is (as is the CH53 and as will be the new CH53K). Conversely, the Osprey has sea side cape (and speed) that the Army does not need...

The Marines and SOCOM need that capability and we can afford it so we bought it. Makes sense to me.


As for the Comanche, the Army's issues with the ARH show that while the specific tank-busting role of the Comanche may be outdated, the concept of a fast, nimble, stealthy armed recon helicopter is not.

No, and the Army still doesn't have one. That stealth is over capability for most Army ops and thus was / is a luxury. The best recon bird for the here and now was and is the OH6 and its derivatives -- but parochialism killed that...

As it has so many things.

Probably good that's so -- if it was not, there'd be no need for this thread... :D

J Wolfsberger
12-20-2007, 09:49 PM
We all understand that they also serve who stand (or sit in air conditioned offices sipping latte) and wait.:D

MattC86
12-20-2007, 10:15 PM
was better than the Hook -- different birds for different roles --and nests. In this case, mostly nests. The Hook is a great and capable bird but it isn't at all ship or sea-kindly, the MV22 is (as is the CH53 and as will be the new CH53K). Conversely, the Osprey has sea side cape (and speed) that the Army does not need...

The Marines and SOCOM need that capability and we can afford it so we bought it. Makes sense to me.



No, and the Army still doesn't have one. That stealth is over capability for most Army ops and thus was / is a luxury. The best recon bird for the here and now was and is the OH6 and its derivatives -- but parochialism killed that...

As it has so many things.

Probably good that's so -- if it was not, there'd be no need for this thread... :D

That's true; if everything was going great, armchair-generals would be out of a job.

I understand current Chinook variants are not optimized for naval use. But the Sea Knight is similar in configuration (and the Super Stallion is in size) to the Chinook, and I don't see why it couldn't be modified for effective from-the-sea capabilities (though I certainly don't know enough to say for sure - that seems to be a permanent caveat of my posts. . .)

My problem with the V-22 is more a general issue with military procurement - they simply don't understand the concept of a sunk cost. Because of Congressional oversight, they fear having to say, "We spent a few hundred million in development of this, but it turned out to be a mediocre or non-optimal idea, so we bagged it," and thus they essentially force the development of a system. In some cases that has worked - the AMRAAM should, in all fairness, have been killed given its difficulties in the late 1980s - and in some cases it doesn't work; the service would be better off swallowing the lost development costs and moving on.

The Marines seem to be growing as bad at this as the other services; both the V-22 and the EFV are troubled systems that have been or are being ramrodded through because (1) the service claims it needs them and can't use anything else (which may not be entirely true) and (2) the service shows all the money its (usually wastefully) spent on the system already, and says we owe it to the taxpayer to finish the development.

But in the V-22's case (and me and all other Osprey naysayers could turn out to be entirely wrong on this), the development history is terrible, the costs have eaten up 70% of the Corps' procurement budget, and there are still huge questions about the aircraft's dependability, survivability, and reliability even as it enters combat. I can't think of any system procured by the military in recent history that has think-tank papers published urging the military to can the program even after it has entered service.

The per-unit cost of even a modified MH-47 would be less than the Osprey, and the reliability and survivability (at least in terms of armament) would be increased.

That's my concern. Sorry to hijack this thread from our beloved "Good Lord do I hate the way the USAF does its business" message, but I wanted to say it. Saying "Osprey" and "good and needed" was waving a red flag to me. . .

Matt

Ken White
12-20-2007, 10:44 PM
. . .
[quote]I understand current Chinook variants are not optimized for naval use. But the Sea Knight is similar in configuration (and the Super Stallion is in size) to the Chinook, and I don't see why it couldn't be modified for effective from-the-sea capabilities (though I certainly don't know enough to say for sure - that seems to be a permanent caveat of my posts. . .)[quote]

Folding rotor blades for the hook would cost big $ -- the Ch46 had 'em in the design spec. The Hook is too high for the hangars aboarg ship, the CH53 was specifically designed to fit them and its tail boom folds giving it a smaller footprint than the hook.

[quote]My problem with the V-22 is more a general issue with military procurement - they simply don't understand the concept of a sunk cost. Because of Congressional oversight, they fear having to say, "We spent a few hundred million in development of this, but it turned out to be a mediocre or non-optimal idea, so we bagged it," and thus they essentially force the development of a system. In some cases that has worked - the AMRAAM should, in all fairness, have been killed given its difficulties in the late 1980s - and in some cases it doesn't work; the service would be better off swallowing the lost development costs and moving on.

While we can agree there's much wrong with the process, it's not nearly that simple -- that is for a separate thread.


The Marines seem to be growing as bad at this as the other services; both the V-22 and the EFV are troubled systems that have been or are being ramrodded through because (1) the service claims it needs them and can't use anything else (which may not be entirely true) and (2) the service shows all the money its (usually wastefully) spent on the system already, and says we owe it to the taxpayer to finish the development.

All the last two paragraphs of complaint are true -- but much of the meat is the fault of Congress, not the services. The EFV will probably die, OBE and a step too far. The MV 22 will get fixed; any technological leap is gong to have beaucoup bigs initially. Is it overpriced, sure -- but IMO almost ALL aircraft are (including the civil side). Sellers market...


... I can't think of any system procured by the military in recent history that has think-tank papers published urging the military to can the program even after it has entered service.

That settles it. If the Think Tanks are against it, I'm for it!!!

Those turkeys make a lot of noise and while there are unquestionably some good and smart guys working for them; they have zero responsibility and do not have to live with the results of their products.


The per-unit cost of even a modified MH-47 would be less than the Osprey, and the reliability and survivability (at least in terms of armament) would be increased.

Possibly, still won't fit in the hangars, still doesn't have the speed -- and even more importantly, it doesn't have the range.


That's my concern. Sorry to hijack this thread from our beloved "Good Lord do I hate the way the USAF does its business" message, but I wanted to say it. Saying "Osprey" and "good and needed" was waving a red flag to me. . .

Sorry, I guess we can disagree on that. However, do note that I said good and not great; and needed and not irreplaceable... ;)

MattC86
12-21-2007, 04:12 PM
Folding rotor blades for the hook would cost big $ -- the Ch46 had 'em in the design spec. The Hook is too high for the hangars aboarg ship, the CH53 was specifically designed to fit them and its tail boom folds giving it a smaller footprint than the hook.

It's no fun talking to someone who knows specific facts, rather than someone who makes wild, rather unsubstantiated generalizations. . .



While we can agree there's much wrong with the process, it's not nearly that simple -- that is for a separate thread.

No, and I know it's not quite that simple, but the constant willingness to throw good money after bad has to be the most flagrant (and easily-changed) problem in the procurement process. There is an expectation, no - actually a demand, for any R&D effort, no matter how small or how far-fetched to produce a viable system. That's criminally stupid stubbornness.


All the last two paragraphs of complaint are true -- but much of the meat is the fault of Congress, not the services. The EFV will probably die, OBE and a step too far. The MV 22 will get fixed; any technological leap is gong to have beaucoup bigs initially. Is it overpriced, sure -- but IMO almost ALL aircraft are (including the civil side). Sellers market...

Oh, absolutely Congress is to blame in large part. I worked there last summer; I got to see their dysfunctionality in all its glory. My boss forgot to sign a bill he submitted; a member of the transportation committee called our office asking what railroad companies have track or rolling stock in his district, etc.

I don't share your view that the EFV is going to die - mainly because the AAV is both old and is tainted in the current anti-IED hysteria of Congress, and the Marine Corps needs something else, even if its NOT a vehicle for a questionably-relevant mission that's as big as a house in an era of precision-munitions proliferation. . .

. . .and the MV-22 or CV-22 or whatever will undoubtedly have its bugs worked out, but not it's weak armament (1 7.62mm MG on the ramp?), nor (if it turns out to be the case, as some suspect) the inherent fragility of its tilt-rotor mechanism and subsequent susceptibility to battle damage.

You're right about its capabilities and advantages as compared to other options, I think, and probably in regards to the decision made to buy it, but I'm still violently against the way in which its development and procurement occurred as representative of the process as a whole. . .



That settles it. If the Think Tanks are against it, I'm for it!!!

Those turkeys make a lot of noise and while there are unquestionably some good and smart guys working for them; they have zero responsibility and do not have to live with the results of their products.

LOL, fair enough, I was desperate for credibility. You're pretty confident of its eventual success, so I won't argue the point further. I hope you're right.



Sorry, I guess we can disagree on that. However, do note that I said good and not great; and needed and not irreplaceable... ;)

Fair enough - I will admit that I'm more skeptical of the aircraft's performance rather than adamantly opposed. To tie this into the thread's original message, however, I will say that part of the conditions for funding the AF's massive boondoggle should be a change in the procurement system. Not that the costs of the aircraft themselves are going to go down - you're right about that as well - but at least the system should be run better.

And maybe a little foresight, like maybe forcing them to invest in SLEPs or something of that ilk when their new-acquisition programs are cut, wouldn't be such a bad idea.

Matt

carl
12-21-2007, 05:52 PM
Yes the P-3 is for maritime patrol, but of the long range, long loiter type. For immediate fleet tactical ASW support there are LAMPs and S-3 Vikings. If you are just looking to track surface targets there are active and passive sensors used aboard all surface combatants, coupled with aircraft when available.

While a P-3 would probably have no difficulty sinking a "boat," it might have problems with a real surface warship (subs are poor AA platforms, even on the surface). ;)

If surface combatants are available they are grand for tracking ships. But near as I can figure (there is no library near and I'm not that good at using the net) the US Navy has rather less than 300 ships so in most of the world most of the time, one will probably not be available. That is why I think it so handy to have an airplane that can go a long way to a remote part of the ocean and hang around a while to check out a boat... I mean ship. (you know an attempt at clever doesn't work when you have explain it.)

carl
12-21-2007, 06:04 PM
The F/A-18E is replacing the F-14 only, I thought. It's far too expensive to replace the F/A-18Cs (right?) One of the goals of the F-35 program, back when it was the JSF was to get the per-unit cost down to something around the F-15/F-14 range ($30-40M a pop) rather than at the F-22 or F/A-18E's $100-200M.

Since F/A-18Cs make up 3 out of the four squadrons of strike fighters in a CVW, I would assume this is a problem.

Matt

Probably what gets replaced by what depends on what you can talk Congress into buying. The Navy originally wanted near 1,000 FA-18E/Fs. Now they are going to get a little less than 500. And they will get who knows how many F-35s who knows when. I believe the Navy is keeping on the FA-18C/Ds because they have to, not because of a "noble spirit of self-sacrifice" that the Air Force refuses to to evince.

To get back to the issue of aging aircraft; the Navy is having to spend $2 million per FA-18C for structural mods to keep the aircraft going.

George Raihala
12-21-2007, 07:02 PM
The USN is switching out its F/A-18C/Ds for single seat F/A-18Es (although I don't know if they are swapping out all of them; I suspect not), and replaced its F-14s with two-seat F/A-18Fs (although I believe that one F-14 squadron transitioned to the single seat "E" models).

The Marines decided not to buy any Super Hornets (the E/F models), instead deciding to wait for the F-35 to replace their older Hornets and AV-8Bs.

Stevely
12-26-2007, 08:35 AM
When you can no longer afford stuff, you either stop buying it, or go with the cheaper substitutes. This rule applies to institutions as much as to individuals and families. Can't afford the Mercedes and the Chateau Rothschild? Time for a Civic and Three Buck Chuck. Maybe it's time the Air Force sets the F-22 and F-35 aside and start buying cheaper planes. Boeing and Lockmart not offering any? Then buy Eurofighter or Gripen or even Su-37. :D

The defense aerospace industry has had the taxpayer over a barrel for so long, it's time to return the favor. In any event, we have to do something different - we're pricing ourselves out of the war business. F-22 and F-35 are already bankrupting the Air Force.

Steve Blair
12-26-2007, 01:41 PM
Or stop buying spare parts and other items they no longer need. CBS had a story the other day about military stockpiling of obsolete spare parts, and the AF was the worst abuser with something like $18 billion or so this past year. Haven't run this through the "fact check" system, but it does square with some things I used to see on various bases.

Penta
12-28-2007, 09:54 PM
Or stop buying spare parts and other items they no longer need. CBS had a story the other day about military stockpiling of obsolete spare parts, and the AF was the worst abuser with something like $18 billion or so this past year. Haven't run this through the "fact check" system, but it does square with some things I used to see on various bases.

Define obsolete? If it's still in service *somewhere* in the US inventory, the military needs to have spares for it.

Re the V22: Matt may be right. Maybe the aircraft isn't ready for primetime.

However, the V22 is probably better thought of as something like the first tanks. Not necessarily combat-effective or useful themselves, but necessary to prove the technology and figure out where we want to go with RDA activities.

Steve Blair
12-29-2007, 04:47 PM
Penta: The gist of the story was that these were spares for equipment that was no longer in service anywhere in the US inventory.

Ron Humphrey
12-30-2007, 09:19 AM
Penta: The gist of the story was that these were spares for equipment that was no longer in service anywhere in the US inventory.

On the military ad Civil defense side.:(

Penta
12-31-2007, 06:07 PM
Penta: The gist of the story was that these were spares for equipment that was no longer in service anywhere in the US inventory.

Ah. That's much different...And I would completely agree, sell it or destroy it.

Then again, from secondhand experience, we have had a bad habit of PDOing (selling as surplus) stuff that shouldn't be...So perhaps its an overreaction after someone accidentally PDOed a SAM.

wm
12-31-2007, 06:37 PM
Ah. That's much different...And I would completely agree, sell it or destroy it.

Then again, from secondhand experience, we have had a bad habit of PDOing (selling as surplus) stuff that shouldn't be...So perhaps its an overreaction after someone accidentally PDOed a SAM.

But the AF recently almost managed to PDO (BTW, DRMO is the New Age term for the surplus/excess agency) a few missiles with nukes still attached. :eek::D Remember that news item?

MattC86
01-03-2008, 09:34 PM
Spilled my coffee when I saw this in the Chicago Tribune this morning:

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-edcart-multimediagallery,0,5944816.gallery

Go to #8.

Apparently, this boondoggle is catching on. . . the next manned bomber is next, I'm sure.

Matt

Ken White
01-03-2008, 11:06 PM
Spilled my coffee when I saw this in the Chicago Tribune this morning:

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-edcart-multimediagallery,0,5944816.gallery

Go to #8.

Apparently, this boondoggle is catching on. . . the next manned bomber is next, I'm sure.

Matt

The world wonders...

MattC86
01-07-2008, 07:06 PM
You're right of course, it was 9, not 8.

However, "the world wonders?" It's Leyte Gulf and TF 34 all over again! Is that a subtle jab from CINCPAC, or did my computer forget to discard "the world wonders" as message encryption padding? :D

Matt

Ken White
01-07-2008, 07:59 PM
Still wonders.....;)

carl
01-10-2008, 05:35 AM
"Scores of F-15s Likely to Stay Grounded
Los Angeles Times | By Julian E. Barnes | January 09, 2008
The Air Force is likely to order dozens of its F-15 fighter jets permanently grounded because of critical structural flaws, significantly reducing the number of planes available to protect the United States, officials said Tuesday.

After one of the fighters broke apart during a simulated dogfight in November, Air Force officials grounded the entire F-15 fleet, nearly 700 planes, fearing such a defect. The newest versions of the fighter jets were allowed to resume flying shortly afterward, but 440 of the older model F-15s have remained out of service.

The Air Force plans to allow about 260 of the remaining grounded planes to return to duty today. About 180 will remain idle because of suspected structural flaws.

"Many of them may never fly again," said a senior Air Force officer. The officer, like others interviewed, spoke on condition of anonymity because results of the investigation were not to be made public until today.

Many of the F-15s, long the nation's most sophisticated front- line fighters, have been around for 30 years, and the fleet is being replaced gradually. The Air Force still relies on F-15s to protect the continental United States and to fly combat missions abroad. Newer model F-15Es are used in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and were the first of the planes to resume flying after the mishap in November.

The problems with the F-15, Air Force officials argue, have increased the need to buy additional F-22s, a swift and stealthy but expensive new fighter plane.

"This is grave," said a senior Air Force official. "Two hundred of our air superiority aircraft are on the ground, and we are acting like it is business as usual."

An investigation of the Nov. 2 crash shows the F-15 that broke apart in midair had a fault in a crucial support component called a longeron, a structural beam that serves as part of the spine of the aircraft. F-15s have four longerons around the cockpit.

Air Force officials have not yet learned how a defective beam came to be installed in the plane when it was manufactured in 1980. But Air Force officials emphasized that the age of the airframe, combined with the faulty part, put the older F-15s at risk.

There is one squadron of about 20 F-15s based at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton. Langley spokeswoman Lt. Georganne Schultz said Tuesday night that the base has not received any word that its jets will be among those permanently grounded."


...and it is not just some sly Air Force trick.

Ken White
01-10-2008, 06:21 AM
Possibly. It may not be sly and it may not be a trick and I have no doubt the birds need replacement, none at all.

However, all the public utterances of Moseley et.al. recently in the "we're dying here" mode and the Op-Eds by Dunlap along with several major errors in new contracts (or attempts to let new contracts) are not making them look too good to Congress or even the public. Not to mention our ignorant attack dog media...

So I suspect they'll be accused of trickery.

carl
01-10-2008, 01:25 PM
How true again, Ken. Sometimes I think the air force that poses the greatest threat to the United States having air supremacy in the future is the American one. (sigh)

Steve Blair
01-10-2008, 01:41 PM
Possibly. It may not be sly and it may not be a trick and I have no doubt the birds need replacement, none at all.

However, all the public utterances of Moseley et.al. recently in the "we're dying here" mode and the Op-Eds by Dunlap along with several major errors in new contracts (or attempts to let new contracts) are not making them look too good to Congress or even the public. Not to mention our ignorant attack dog media...

So I suspect they'll be accused of trickery.

The biggest issue here is that the AF has a long history of "crying wolf" when it comes to this sort of thing. It's their own PR legacy coming back to bite them in the ass, combined with their own procurement and research practices.

Jayhawker
01-10-2008, 06:06 PM
I'm the first to say (and I've said this to AF cadets in my classes) that the USAF has an awful record and predicting what kind of planes/missions we will need in the next war. B-52s are the most striking example. Purchased for the specific purpose of long range high altitude nuclear bombing they've never done any of that, but instead have more CAS experience under their belt than many other jets. However, while our own record is poor, the fact remains that since I've been in the AF (18 years) only the C-17 and the F-22s have succeeded in seeing an operational flight line. KC-135s, KC-10s, C-5s, F-15s, -16, A-10s, have been in service long before I showed up and will be asked to remain long after I'm gone. Ask the F-15 Air Guard pilot what its like to have your jet disintagrate during flight. http://www.kansascity.com/444/story/438454.html Fortunately for him, it was over Missouri and not Al Anbar. While serving in Germany in the mid-90s the old C-141s developed a similar structural problem (hair line wing cracks) that pulled some of them out of operations and restricted the rest in very meaningful ways. Load restrictions forced very expensive and inefficient practices of transporting stuff across the Atlantic ....but better that than search and recovery ops off the coast of Ireland. :o

When the senior Boeing guy colluded with the Senior AF procurement official to jack up the price on leasing tankers and got caught (only because McCain waved the BS flag on the price) it was another example of doing it to ourselves. The deal sank and now we're enjoying a new round of bidding. The KC-135s aren't getting any younger.

When a large frame jet, falls out of the sky, and its only a matter of time....they'll be an investigation and plenty of blame to go around. But unfortunately we can't avoid the cost of having to buy jets to replace the current 30 - 60 year old planes we currently fly while our maintenance and depot budgets are hemorrhaging. The AF recently cut 6000 manpower billets in order to fund new jets, but had to spend the money on current ops instead so it got us nowhere. Now the AF is the leader in developing synthetic fuel because the price of JP-8 is eating our lunch!

I understand the Army's current stress is bad and perhaps strategically debilitating, but the AF is breaking too. But instead of the stress of combat rotations, it is largely due to things within Congressional and AF control, only exacerbated by the "war time footing" the USAF has been on since 1990. That is making it very frustrating for those in charge now like Wynne and Gen Moseley who have to try to fix it.

Bottom line is we won't know what force we'll need for the next war as our track record on predicting that is a part of the problem manifesting itself now in the AF. Realizing that, we have to have a good mix of capabilities and even me (an AF guy who loves studying small wars) has to advocate for fast movers, efficient air lifters, effective bombers, and other things.

The Air Force is guilty of corruption (the tanker lease debacle) and poor planning in the past. And yes over hyping things, but that doesn't change the very real need to buy new jets. And as for faking F-15 problems in order to have an excuse to buy new planes.... well I'll let that slide as it surely is headed for the conspiracy theorist hall of fame.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-10-2008, 06:45 PM
planes do break and must be grounded for safety reasons. I will posit the USAF (as with all the services) will highlight problems when it is to their advantage and downplay them when it's convenient.

However, the savings from the personnel cuts do not pay for current ops, there are GWOT supplementals to cover those costs. What is not always fully covered is the additional wear and tear on the gear.

Here's where the USAF gets my goat: They whine and cry about recapitalizing the fleet AND buying new, very expensive systems. They continue to sink an inordinate amount of R&D money into go nowhere systems (ABL comes to mind). Finally, they are paying a high price in O&M because they decided to put people first (vice recapitalizing) when they were flush with cash and now have a very expensive infrastructure to maintain coupled with all sorts of monetary “entitlements” to pay Airmen (e.g. while we grunts lose our BAS when deployed, Airmen do not; while Marines are billeted in tents, the USAF uses hotels).

In these fiscally lean times you cannot have the trifecta of high tech gear, recap the old gear, and maintain an overly comfortable life style. As I said in another post the USAF has over the years developed a Champaign and caviar taste but now are faced with a beer and pretzels budget.

They seriously need to do a culture shift.

wm
01-10-2008, 11:11 PM
The AF recently cut 6000 manpower billets in order to fund new jets, but had to spend the money on current ops instead so it got us nowhere. .

PBD 720 may have required an overall AF personnel reduction, but the AF base where I work as a contractor is growing in its government civilian manpower. It also has more GS13-15's than I can imagine are needed (or would be found in a comparable Army activity). I won't even try to count the O-5's and 0-6's that floodd the organization (and this is not a mjaor headquarters. And as far as warm body counts go, how can the AF cry poor mouth when it is in the middle of establishing AFCYBER as a new AF MAJCOM?

AF deployments to SWA are for 6 month not 15 months and are largely done on an individual replacement basis. I wonder how much O&M money could be saved if the deployment technigues were changed.

George Raihala
01-11-2008, 01:55 AM
Well, after 20 years in the USAF, I think I pretty much completely disagree that the USAF has done a bad job of predicting what airplanes they need. After we got our asses spanked over North Vietnam, the USAF went back to the fighter drawing board and came up with the F-15, which has a perfect record in air combat. Its capabilities were one of the things that helped keep the peace in Europe, and it did very well in Operation DESERT STORM, and during SOUTHERN WATCH. The F-16 has done yeoman's service in a variety of roles; the F-117 did its part; and on and on. Which airplane in the inventory do you think we shouldn't have bought? Also, your example of the B-52 doesn't really fly (pardon the pun)...the B-52 did exactly what it was purchased for most of its life. I think it speaks to the adaptability of the B-52 and the B-1 that they have gone from Cold War nuclear bombers to CAS platforms, not the USAF's predictive powers.

There seems to be a perception on this board that the USAF should focus its acquisition efforts on aircraft that are more useful in a COIN fight. Knowing how the DoD does acquisition, by the time such an aircraft entered squadron service, those COIN aircraft would be sitting on a ramp in the states without a job.

Buying aircraft means trying to figure out what the world is going to look like for the next 40 years...it took 20 years to go from concept to squadron service for the F-22, and it will likely serve at least 20 years. And while you can adapt a high end fighter or bomber to a COIN fight, you can't similarly adapt an aircraft that is purchased specifically for that role for high intensity conflict. The USAF has to buy a fleet that can guarantee air superiority against a peer or near-peer competitor, and for something like that, you need aircraft like the F-22. While we can all look at our crystal ball and say that a conflict like that is unlikely, I don't think anyone of us can really predict with any kind of accuracy whether or not we will fight a peer in the next 20 years. If its even within the realm of possibility, then we have to have a fleet that can guarantee that US forces will have complete air dominance.

Jayhawker
01-11-2008, 04:46 AM
To Umar...: I agree on your main point that the Air Force needs to do a culture shift, and certainly has been doing it since about the mid 90s. We used to be a completely stay in our nice "cavier" equipped bases to fly and fight from there. But now we deploy.... The implications of the AEF have settled in and will continue to,...even if we, gasp, have to sleep in a tent. OH, The HUMANITY!!! I see changes like that coming. I don't know how we're going to function otherwise. And I'll see your ABL for one Crusader system. Every service, even the Marines, I imagine have put resources into stuff that gets cancelled.

To WM: You could send squadrons over to SWA for 15 months, but the aircraft have mx cycles requiring attention at a full up base. That tends to mean that the people have training cycles to attend to as well. I'm no expert on this but I know the AF gets grilled on this from time to time by Congress and always seems to answer their inquiries and the cycle is maintained. And Congress, I recall Senator Glenn in particular, has gone after the high number of officers the USAF had compared to the other services. It is a function having a lot of pilots, navs, engineers, scientists, etc. As to the number of field graders at your location....well, walk around Ft Leavenworth. You can't swing a dead cat without hitting an Army O-5 or above. The function drives the grade. I don't care for all the condotterie personally, but you're OK! ;)

To George: Well, OK, as to predicting aircraft types we'd need for the next war: We thought we'd fight the Soviets over Europe and fortunately for us the same kind of planes largely worked out well for us in DESERT STORM.... except for the sand storm grit, persistent high temps, and so on that no one really equipped them for and the mx guys had to improvise in order to overcome. I could say more about the F-16 but that might get me in trouble with classification issues. As to the adaptability of the B-52 and B-1: That same Sen Glenn caused a test WSO I met at Edwards AFB in 1988 no end of heartburn. Glenn insisted, against the AF's wishes, that the B-1 be able to drop conventional munitions or he would kill the program. Held hostage, the AF had to figure out how to do it. Thank God for Glenn's persistence. (I just read in the newspapers some of the tonnage on AQ in Iraq yesterday came from B-1s.) Your other examples of aircraft however are correct. They've all been fair buys. But then again since the Serbs "didn't know the F-117 was invisible" so we had to rescue the pilot in a 40 year old oil leakin' MH-53.... so I should have qualified my comments above by saying the USAF, since 1947, has done a mediocre job of providing the right kind of aircraft. We even have the MV-22 coming on line to handle AFSOC missions, so the old MH-53s can perhaps have much better successor. Wait a minute.... then again the MV-22 was a MFP 11 SOF buy and not out of AF PBD so I have to subtract that comment!

But the lesson for the AF seems to be: have a mix of aircraft and systems so you can do your job, even though you're not sure what that might be!

Sorry this is so long....to paraphrase of James Madison, I didn't have time to write a short post.

Jayhawker
01-11-2008, 04:51 AM
There are now many AF TDY's to CENTCOM for a year. I myself may be taking one. I may be puttin' the I in indigenous, personally!

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-11-2008, 06:16 PM
Jayhawker, totally agree that no service is immune to scrutiny. Can you say V-22? Not sure but I think the USMC expended nearly 70% of its R&D budget on that bird, which still hasn't become IOC. A portion of the blame lies in the Marines don't really do large $ R&D projects so I think they bite off more than they could chew with the Osprey. The USAF, on the other hand, did a great job with its MV-22 program for AFSOF. The USMC would have been smarter to have teamed with the AF in developing the system.

Unfortunately, once a program is created, especially one with Congressional patronage, it is difficult to kill. That needs to be fixed. I hear the term “good stewards of the taxpayer’s dollar” too often uttered by folks who think it should be the other services who should take the cuts. :D

I also question the whole MRAP program. On the one hand they will certainly save lives, on the other what is their usefulness? It has been shown that the best way to combat insurgents isn't to hid in vehicles, it truly is "boots on the ground." Plus the MRAPs are slow and not too maneuverable, which are not exactly good characteristics in MOUT. So $22 billion was spent for a surge in production for what? I read recently that the bad guys are leaning more towards suicide vests vice IEDs. Thanks in part to JIEDDO (although that program sucked up some serious ducats), but I think the main reason we are seeing a decline in IEDs is the fact that we are working with the best weapon to halt the bomb builders: the local people.

George, I don’t think anyone here advocates tossing out the USAF’s conventional capabilities and retool itself into a COIN force. I do think the USAF has given lip service to COIN, but hopefully they will change and now see that it is a viable mission set. In Vietnam the Firefly and Spad were seen as COIN aircraft because they could fly low and slow to add a component of accuracy in munitions delivery that the fast movers didn’t have at the time (the good old days of "we had to destroy the village in order to save it"). PGMs have completely changed that paradigm so the fast movers do have the accuracy, and now the standoff, to support COIN.

Predicting the future is always fraught with chance, even the political pundits can’t get it right. We need to maintain the force mix necessary to deter any peer or near peer adversary, but with the recognition that in doing so we must be prepared to fight conflicts with forces that try to mitigate our strength by attacking our weakness, which is to rely heavily on high tech solutions for what are often low tech problems.

“So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.” Sun Tzu

"Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater." Frederick the Great

Jayhawker
01-11-2008, 07:34 PM
I thought the USMC and AFSOC did work in cooperation. The Marines were the lead and the AFSOC, SOCOM, and the Air Force test guys were doing the tweaks AFSOC needed to make it effective for their mission. And aren't some Marine Squadrons flying? I know they had great difficulty, but aren't they operational now?

CR6
01-11-2008, 07:50 PM
And aren't some Marine Squadrons flying? I know they had great difficulty, but aren't they operational now?

Marines are flying (I've got a good friend who is a V-22 driver, prepping to deploy at some point in the near future); but the formal declaration of IOC has not occured. I was supposed to happen last fall, but has yet to to the best of my knowledge.


Although the "baseline threshold" for initial operational capability (IOC) of the MV-22 is September next year (read 2007: CR6), Taylor says the decisions on declaring IOC and deploying the aircraft are independent. A number of factors determine IOC, including availability of aircraft and trained crews. The first operational squadron, VMM-263 formed in March, will have nine aircraft by November and its required complement of 12 MV-22s by February. "I believe the programme will be ready to deliver IOC no later than summer 2007, possibly as early as spring," he says.

http://www.navair.navy.mil/V22/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&id=155

pcmfr
01-12-2008, 05:04 AM
MV-22s are in combat in Iraq right now. AFSOC's CV-22s won't be too far behind.

Steve Blair
01-12-2008, 04:57 PM
To George: Well, OK, as to predicting aircraft types we'd need for the next war: We thought we'd fight the Soviets over Europe and fortunately for us the same kind of planes largely worked out well for us in DESERT STORM.... except for the sand storm grit, persistent high temps, and so on that no one really equipped them for and the mx guys had to improvise in order to overcome. I could say more about the F-16 but that might get me in trouble with classification issues. As to the adaptability of the B-52 and B-1: That same Sen Glenn caused a test WSO I met at Edwards AFB in 1988 no end of heartburn. Glenn insisted, against the AF's wishes, that the B-1 be able to drop conventional munitions or he would kill the program. Held hostage, the AF had to figure out how to do it. Thank God for Glenn's persistence. (I just read in the newspapers some of the tonnage on AQ in Iraq yesterday came from B-1s.) Your other examples of aircraft however are correct. They've all been fair buys. But then again since the Serbs "didn't know the F-117 was invisible" so we had to rescue the pilot in a 40 year old oil leakin' MH-53.... so I should have qualified my comments above by saying the USAF, since 1947, has done a mediocre job of providing the right kind of aircraft. We even have the MV-22 coming on line to handle AFSOC missions, so the old MH-53s can perhaps have much better successor. Wait a minute.... then again the MV-22 was a MFP 11 SOF buy and not out of AF PBD so I have to subtract that comment!

But the lesson for the AF seems to be: have a mix of aircraft and systems so you can do your job, even though you're not sure what that might be!

Sorry this is so long....to paraphrase of James Madison, I didn't have time to write a short post.

And let's not forget that the AF wasn't overly excited about the MH-53 in the first place and practically had to be ordered by Congress to buy them in sufficient numbers (don't have the book in front of me, but this is discussed in Marquis' Unconventional Warfare). The B-52 really came into its current mission by accident in a way, and it caused no small amount of heartburn in the 1960s when SAC kept certain models (the C if memory serves) restricted to nukes only, hammering the D and G communities for the conventional mission while others only rode alert. They didn't want to buy either the F-16 or the A-10 in the first place, and really restricted the role of the old OV-10 (compare the AF use to that of the Marines).

One thing the AF seems to have really gotten into the 1980s development cycle was the idea of gold-plating. That has driven so many of their projects over budget and put them so far behind schedule. I tend to lump the fascination with stealth in with gold plating...sure, you do need it for SOME aircraft and missions, but I really question the wisdom of delaying and running projects over budget just to make everything 'stealthy.'

Sargent
01-13-2008, 08:46 PM
Bottom line is we won't know what force we'll need for the next war as our track record on predicting that is a part of the problem manifesting itself now in the AF. Realizing that, we have to have a good mix of capabilities and even me (an AF guy who loves studying small wars) has to advocate for fast movers, efficient air lifters, effective bombers, and other things.


This would be less of a problem if the USAF learned to love "need to have" more than "nice to have." If you haven't spent decades trying to develop an aircraft that is the best in the world with every possibly conceived capability that ultimately costs more than the GDP of many small countries than it's not so much a problem if you don't get the future predicting just right.

The US and allies won WWII not with the best aircraft, ships, and tanks, but with the ones that were good enough and that could be gotten to the battlefield in a timely manner without breaking the bank.

I would suggest that the way to get to having this sort of frame of mind is to drop the idea that a force can arrive on the battlefield with "superiority" or "dominance" already settled. If that were the case, then war would be made relatively obsolete. To believe it's possible is not only problematic for R&D, acquisition and procurement, it's also the fast route to hubris.

Cheers,
Jill

wm
01-13-2008, 10:14 PM
I would suggest that the way to get to having this sort of frame of mind is to drop the idea that a force can arrive on the battlefield with "superiority" or "dominance" already settled. If that were the case, then war would be made relatively obsolete. To believe it's possible is not only problematic for R&D, acquisition and procurement, it's also the fast route to hubris.

Cheers,
Jill

Well said. In fact, this is a much better way of making the point I was trying to make about being in a one nation arms race on the "We Still Need the Big Guns" thread in response to a post by Zenpundit. Thanks

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-14-2008, 03:12 PM
it's not just for breakfast anymore. :D

Sargent's point is well made: our techno-crack habit could well head us down the primrose path to financial ruin. The Pentagon needs to show a lot more restraint in its habit of throwing millions, or even billions, at a plethora of potential solutions.

Hey, it certainly worked for the Soviet Union. :eek:

carl
01-14-2008, 05:29 PM
The US and allies won WWII not with the best aircraft, ships, and tanks, but with the ones that were good enough and that could be gotten to the battlefield in a timely manner without breaking the bank.

In the Pacific, at least, the US and its allies did have vastly superior aircraft, ships and tanks; and most everything else too. We had vastly superior numbers too.

In Europe, the qualitative superiority wasn't so marked but I think it still existed. For example the German Army was mostly horse drawn to the end of the war. And there too we had vastly superior numbers of machines.

This was not an exercise in fiscal restraint. The national debt increased six-fold during the war years. B-29s and atom bombs did not come cheap

"I would suggest that the way to get to having this sort of frame of mind is to drop the idea that a force can arrive on the battlefield with "superiority" or "dominance" already settled. If that were the case, then war would be made relatively obsolete. To believe it's possible is not only problematic for R&D, acquisition and procurement, it's also the fast route to hubris.

Cheers,
Jill"

I think it essential that the Air Force arrive on the battlefield more or less certain that it can achieve and maintain superiority or dominance. If that were an open question it would not be prudent to travel to that killing field. If the Air Force doesn't win its fight, the ground forces almost certainly won't win theirs; or rather, ours, the Americans.

Penta
01-14-2008, 06:22 PM
Carl: The problem is hardly that the AF wants superiority.

The problem is that that superiority is a subjective thing, apparently only measurable by the Air Force.

That'd be like the student deciding what the passing grade is on a test.

It's gotten, IMHO, a bit strange that Congress hasn't demanded, say, that the AF quit gold-plating billeting arrangements and other "perks".

Every service's RDA structure is screwed up - however, only the AF has such apparent excesses in the rest of their funding.

That said, it's not good to gripe only. A possible way forward:

1. Joint Accommodation Standards. No more hotels for AF, tents for Marines. Just a bad idea. If the deployed AF servicemember can't live in the same conditions as Marine or Army (Navy, being on ships largely, doesn't count much!) personnel, then perhaps there's problems with the AF.

2. Pays eligibility should be set at the DOD level, not each service. One standard for gain/loss of BAS, one standard for gain/loss of BAH, etc.

carl
01-14-2008, 06:46 PM
Penta:

I think the Air Force is probably in the best position to judge what is required to achieve superiority, since that is their reason for being and they think about it more than the other services. But that is a debatable point and an argument could be made to the contrary.

As far as the billeting goes, it is my understanding the AF does this to enhance their ability to get and keep good people. If that is the case, and if it works, I should think we should be looking to upgrade the standards of the other services to match those of the AF in this respect.

I can't begin to comment on pay because I have zero experience and almost no knowledge of how it all works. I will defer to your judgement.

By the way, at the one big base I have experience with, the Air Force people have exactly the same standard of living as the Army people. It is an Army base though.

Penta
01-14-2008, 07:04 PM
The AF may do it for recruitment/retention - however, your idea (pulling everybody up to their level) is a nonstarter. It would be difficult to afford, to say the least.

Ken White
01-14-2008, 08:42 PM
other services to attempt to match even partly the USAF largess in the TDY / Per Diem / Specialty pay areas has already had an adverse impact on total DoD personnel funding.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-14-2008, 09:43 PM
for the "misery" Carl. :D

The Air Force has what I, somewhat derogatorily, refer to as "putting up with the Army pay.” You see, while the Airmen are living at the Soldier’s level, this is not amenable to “momma” Air Force who claims that the Army’s quarters are “substandard.” Thus they pay Airmen a stipend, as it were, to live on an Army base.

Also, when Marines and Soldiers deploy (which usually means they go somewhere hot, cold, wet, nasty, etc…) they lose their BAS. Why, cause they get their sustenance via MRE’s or the chow hall. Sailors also pay the price when they are afloat although this is somewhat offset by sea pay (which Marines can also qualify while afloat). Not so the Air Force, so while they might be eating on the Gubmint’s nickel they also continue to draw BAH.

The Air Force also has a unique definition of the term “deploy.” To the Army, Marines, and Navy this is time away from home often under austere conditions. The AF will “deploy” personnel from the Pentagon to Crystal City (if you didn’t know they’re walking distance apart). After this arduous deployment the Airmen gets the same two weeks of off the books leave as folks returning from the AOR do. That’s fair. :cool:

As to hotels, more QOL hocus pocus, since they could get by with AC tents, and do without the rental cars.

And I know some Airmen who actually resent the level of pampering; most do not enlist knowing their lifestyle “in the field” will approach the lap of luxury when compared to Marines and Soldiers.

The AF whines about it’s aging fleet and inability to recapitalize it, while Dunlap, et al rant about buying more. Yet it is a problem of their own making since they decided years back, when there was plenty of cash, to invest heavily in extra pays, perks, and infrastructure that has no other purpose other than QOL.

Norfolk
01-15-2008, 03:29 AM
Given present and developing budgetary pressures the flyboys may have to economize, such as doing without AC during Air Force Basic Training (http://www.steelbeasts.com/sbforums/showpost.php?p=148007&postcount=4).;)

LawVol
01-15-2008, 03:39 PM
Carl: The problem is hardly that the AF wants superiority.

The problem is that that superiority is a subjective thing, apparently only measurable by the Air Force.

That'd be like the student deciding what the passing grade is on a test.

It's gotten, IMHO, a bit strange that Congress hasn't demanded, say, that the AF quit gold-plating billeting arrangements and other "perks".

Every service's RDA structure is screwed up - however, only the AF has such apparent excesses in the rest of their funding.

That said, it's not good to gripe only. A possible way forward:

1. Joint Accommodation Standards. No more hotels for AF, tents for Marines. Just a bad idea. If the deployed AF servicemember can't live in the same conditions as Marine or Army (Navy, being on ships largely, doesn't count much!) personnel, then perhaps there's problems with the AF.

2. Pays eligibility should be set at the DOD level, not each service. One standard for gain/loss of BAS, one standard for gain/loss of BAH, etc.

Let me see if I understand this correctly. Air superiority should not be determined by the guy that has to strap 14,000 punds of fuel and 2000 pound of bombs to his a$$ and fly off at Mach whatever??? Perhaps it shoudl be left to someone that doesn't fly? What sense does that make? I guess next we'll have some fighter jock tell a battalion commander how to conduct a clear and hold operation? Or maybe one of our C130 trash haulers can go out and establish fields of fire for the smaller Marine/Army posts in Iraq? I realize that alot of Soldiers want to take over CAS or intratheater airlift, but I don't think many argue with USAF expertice in air superiority.

As for living conditions, there wasn't much difference between mine and the Army housing when I was downrange. Maybe you saw something different? Oh, and when I go TDY, I see Marines/Army/Navy in the same hotels I'm staying in (they get free massages too, right?:D)(sorry, couldn't resist).

As for the "perks" that we get, another poster indicates that these are for retention purposes. Perhaps he is right. Those decisions are beyond my pay grade, but assuming they are, wouldn't this be comparable to enlistment bonuses and the like that the Army has been giving out? Just asking.

And a final thought: We (i.e. the AF) don't want superiority. We already have that. We want to maintain it. Actually, air supremacy would be much better and, personnaly, I want it anywhere in the world. It tends to help out our grunts when the chips are down. OohRah.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-15-2008, 04:30 PM
Whether we have attained air superiority/supremacy is decided by the Air Force and no one else. That’s why we keep them around. :D

I agree that while base housing doesn’t vary widely between the services and yes TDY/TAD accommodations are similar (except the Marines rarely spring for rental cars) the largest disparity I see is in the service definitions of “deployed.” The Soldier/Sailor/Marine often finds deployed living conditions austere and their BAS rescinded for the length of the deployment. :(

On the other hand, Airman “deploy” to several interesting places like Stuttgart, Crystal City, and Tampa. Even when they are being fed by Uncle Sugar, they retain their BAS. It’s a quality of life issue, you see. :p

One of the concerns in recent USAF resource allocation discussions is BOS. The majority of Airmen, once out of basic and tech school, live in barracks (oops, I mean dormitories) in which there is a single person to a room. This is a far cry from the typical billeting arrangements for the Soldier/Sailor/Marine. So be it, back in the day the AF had the positive cash flow to make it so, and made the conscious choice to invest in creature comfort rather than recapitalization.

But now, as the great money pool shrinks, due in part to more parsimonious TOAs, GWOT funding, and the rapidly increasing cost of doing business (especially in fuels), the AF finds that it has created for itself a very large, very resource hungry infrastructure that requires funding and an aging fleet that is growing expensive to maintain. It will only get tougher unless they seriously reexamine their lifestyle approach. I’ve noted in other threads here that their Champaign and caviar diet is now confronted by a beer and pretzels budget. In other words: Welcome to the Marine Corps. :D

I just don’t see how single person rooms and a largess of creature comforts lavished upon people can be tied to achieving air superiority/supremacy.

carl
01-15-2008, 07:34 PM
There is a larger question here. All the services need to "go into drydock" so to speak. All need large amounts of money to be spent to address genuinely critical needs. The larger question is: are the American people willing to pay what needs to be paid to maintain the military they are accustomed to? If we are, the bill is coming due very soon. If we are not, we had better rethink what we want to do and where we want to do it. We won't be able to keep it up unless we pay that big bill. Fussing over rental cars does nothing to answer this big question.

What does BAS and TAD mean?

Lawvol: I'm glad you showed up to help. I was outnumbered.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-15-2008, 08:03 PM
BAS is "Basic Allowance for Subsistence." In essence, service members who do not normally eat at the chow hall (or in AF parlance the dining facility) are paid to cover their meals (and like BAH it is tax free). Typically BAS is paid to enlisted married folks, although single service members may receive it if their work schedule doesn't permit them to eat during the regularly scheduled meal times. Officers always draw BAS regardless of marital status. If you deploy to a place where you are fed by the military (either MRE's or field mess) you lose your BAS for that time (except the AF). Basically the service recoups it to use for the provided meals.

From the DoD site: "BAS is meant to offset costs for a member's meals. This allowance is based in the historic origins of the military in which the military provided room and board (or rations) as part of a member's pay. This allowance is not intended to offset the costs of meals for family members."

The 2007 monthly rate was $279.88 for enlisted, $192.74 for officers. The enlisted rate is actually a daily rate of $9.33, the theory being if you ate all three meals at the chow hall it would cost the government $9.33. Breakfast was always the best deal since it ran (in my time) about $.75 or so.

TAD is the Navy/Marines acronym for "Temporary Additional Duty" but some wags have been known to refer to it as "Traveling Around Drunk." When you are TAD you are paid extra to cover the cost of lodging, meals, and incidentals. Normally TADs are short in duration, and less than 6 months.

While fussing over rental cars might seem pointless it does add up. A friend "deployed" for four months to Stuttgart lived in a hotel and had a rental car that ran 100 Euro per day. She estimated that her "deployment" cost about $75K for her as a 2nd Lt. There were quite a few others there on "deployment" as well. Multiply that by hundreds, if not thousands, then you have a hefty sum of cash being spent for...what? :eek:

I feel that it is the frivolous expenditures on boondoggles that eats up a lot of money better spent elsewhere. Not that I never went on a boondoggle TAD or two in my time, but Marines will also do their best to make due even when deployed. ;)

Ken White
01-15-2008, 08:13 PM
so-called Separate Rations, the money enlisted folks in all service receive if they have permission to not eat in the mess hall. If you receive it,and eat in the mess hall anyway, you have to pay for your meals. Essentially it was designed for married enlisted guys but it generally applies in the Army, Navy and Marines to anyone authorized to not live in the Barracks, a minority. Don't know what the USAF does now but years ago they used to give it to almost everyone which always caused problems if you were in another service and not drawing BAS because the USAF Headcount guys refused to believe that you were not drawing it and were therefor entitled to eat for free...

TAD is the Navy and Marine same thing as USA / USAF TDY, Temporary Additional Duty / Temporary Duty. The money factor is that while on such orders people are paid a Per Diem rate that varies from locale to locale. Drawing that Per diem can include rations, quarters and incidentals $55 up to $300 or more a day, generally around a hundred and some change). If you are gone more that 180 days, it's not TAD /TDY ordinarily; thus the Marines and Navy with 7 month tours and the Army with 12-15 month tours do not draw per diem; that Air Force does 90 and 179 day tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and thus they get to draw per diem for the whole trip. A considerable windfall...

That, I think is changing. Dunno.

Ken White
01-15-2008, 08:15 PM
on the board... :wry:

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-15-2008, 08:32 PM
the Per Diem scam!

I think your info is good to go Ken and adds to my lengthy missive. :)

wm
01-15-2008, 08:42 PM
Just heard that in the latest round of PBDs, the F15 repair problem is getting funds diverted from F22 production facility closure funding that was slated to start in 2010 (not clear whether it is actual closure or closure studies being cut/reprogrammed. I'm sure I don't have the story completely correct.

Norfolk
01-15-2008, 09:36 PM
Just heard that in the latest round of PBDs, the F15 repair problem is getting funds diverted from F22 production facility closure funding that was slated to start in 2010 (not clear whether it is actual closure or closure studies being cut/reprogrammed. I'm sure I don't have the story completely correct.

It is clear that the Air Force requires a comprehensive replacement of its aircraft fleet. There is no question about it. But it is ultimately self-defeating to spend money to shut down or study shutting down the very replacement for aircraft that are literally coming apart in the air. How ironic then that the Air Force is compelled to draw funds from allocations for shutting down or planning to shut down the F-22 production line in order to use it to keep the old F-15 flying.

In a twisted sort of way, maybe this might actually end up keep the F-22 line open; after all, with only 183 F-22s ordered and 2/3rds of those delivered, there just aren't going to be enough F-22s in existence to take losses in a shooting war, let alone to replace the F-15. And the F-35 JSF, when (if) it comes on-line, is unlikely to be procured in sufficient quantity to fully replace the F-16, let alone make up for the shortfall in F-22s for the Air Superiority role. And none of this even touches Tankers, Transports, Reconnaissance and EW planes, Bombers, etc., etc., etc.

But if the Air Force is to be taken really seriously, and not just to be seen to be the squeakiest wheel, it is really going to have to reform itself as an institution and become noticeably more basic and ascetic in its QOL expectations (amongst other things). Even if the Air Force did more or less prevail in the budgetary battles to come, the sheer cost of re-equipping the Air Force would almost necessarily reduce the other Services to relative penury. Something has to give over the next few years.

George Raihala
01-15-2008, 11:45 PM
There seems to be a lot of gnashing of teeth on this board with regard to the USAF and QOL. Just a quick use of the calculator shows that paying everyone deployed their BAS is really a drop in the bucket when compared to acquisition costs of a new aircraft program (assume 20,000 or so deployed, at $200 a day, and it costs $48M a year...that is chump change in the world of acquisition for almost any program in any service). Do those costs stack up? Sure, to some extent, but not nearly to the extent of what buying new aircraft do, which is what some are charging. Sure, there are some questionable "deployments", but those number in the hundreds, if that many, and are not creating the budget hole that everyone on here thinks. One would be very generous to assume that the USAF spends about $100M a year more than the other services on QOL issues, and that is nothing compared to what is required for almost any major aircraft modernization program (for example, the program to put a fully integrated datalink on the B-1 fleet is around a $300M program...that's one modification to one aircraft), much less what it costs to develop and field a new aircraft, which is well into the billions of dollars. The USAF could cancel everything that is annoying to all of you and not be any nearer to its goals.

In the 1990s we went on a "procurement holiday", buying very few new aircraft. That is now catching up to us. The USAF is finding itself in a tight spiral of ever increasing maintenance costs while trying to develop and field new aircraft. Every year you keep old aircraft around decreases the amount of money you have to spend on new aircraft. So we pull money from F-22 accounts to pay for F-15s because we don't have anywhere else to source it.

If you want to save some real (read: billions) money, than you have to look hard at the military repair depots. But you'll never save money there. Why? Because in order to save money at the depots, you need efficiency, and that means less jobs. Civilian jobs...voter jobs. The USAF tried mighty hard to get a handle on aging aircraft costs about a decade ago, and got nowhere because no one in the depots would sign up to anything that used less people (and thus less money) because that would piss off their Senator and their Congressmen.

Anyway, that's just my opinion, I could be wrong (apologies to DM)....

George

LawVol
01-16-2008, 12:54 AM
The money factor is that while on such orders people are paid a Per Diem rate that varies from locale to locale. Drawing that Per diem can include rations, quarters and incidentals $55 up to $300 or more a day, generally around a hundred and some change). If you are gone more that 180 days, it's not TAD /TDY ordinarily; thus the Marines and Navy with 7 month tours and the Army with 12-15 month tours do not draw per diem; that Air Force does 90 and 179 day tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and thus they get to draw per diem for the whole trip. A considerable windfall...

That, I think is changing. Dunno.

I'm a little confused. My "per diem" while deployed to Iraq was roughly $3 per day (its called incidentals). If I went TDY to Maxwell AFB, AL I'd get $44 per day not including hotel costs (if memory serves). So any argument that I received some sort of windfall would be incorrect. Now, that said, "deployments" to somewhere in CONUS and the like is probably different. I'm not sure why we get incidentals, but there you have it.

One of my old company gunneys used to say that Marines aren't happy unless they're bitching about something. Maybe its the same with Soldiers. So we AF guys are just keeping the Marine/Soldier morale high.:D

George: they're just venting. It's a cyclical thing here. About once a month, someone has to complain about the AF. No worries, they love us.:)

Rob Thornton
01-16-2008, 01:45 AM
Hey John - Of course we love the USAF - now Lawyers on the other hand.....:D

Best Regards, Rob

Ken White
01-16-2008, 02:30 AM
I'm a little confused. My "per diem" while deployed to Iraq was roughly $3 per day (its called incidentals). If I went TDY to Maxwell AFB, AL I'd get $44 per day not including hotel costs (if memory serves). So any argument that I received some sort of windfall would be incorrect. Now, that said, "deployments" to somewhere in CONUS and the like is probably different. I'm not sure why we get incidentals, but there you have it.

You get incidentals because the law says if you're TDY you are entitled to TDY less those items that do not apply. In Iraq you could not legally draw ration or quarters per diem because one is pretty much confined to one of the bases. Had you gone to Kuwait or Doha...

Also, length of tour is the issue. I did not say that the AF did 179 day tours specifically to avoid NOT paying per diem; just noted that is the practical effect.

Different strokes.

I hear what you're saying and do not radically disagree -- recall that I said early in this thread the F15 needed to go and that I strongly support the purchase of both the F22 (needed) and F35 (more important IMO) -- but I made my points to show that the Air Force bashing you guys frequently experience is a largely a result of envy at your somewhat more affluent lifestyle; what goes around comes around as they say...


One of my old company gunneys used to say that Marines aren't happy unless they're bitching about something. Maybe its the same with Soldiers. So we AF guys are just keeping the Marine/Soldier morale high.:DThere is that. That bitching with respect to the AF points to a rightly or wrongly perceived double standard of personnel treatment and compensation. You in blue get the bennies of that so you just get some flak (harmless type flak in this case) to go with it. Seems fair...

All the services are necessary and I for one have been places I could've attracted bad guy aeroplanes with evil intent. I thank the Navy, the Marines and the USAF that I never had to deal with that. There's enough work for us all.


George: they're just venting. It's a cyclical thing here. About once a month, someone has to complain about the AF. No worries, they love us.:)Generally when someone in the AF whines about something... :wry:

We do love you. Just not as much as many in AF Blue seem to love themselves. :D

NOTE: That last paragraph is not directed at anyone and certainly doesn't apply to anyone here; just too good a line offered to not use...

Sargent
01-16-2008, 03:23 PM
In the Pacific, at least, the US and its allies did have vastly superior aircraft, ships and tanks; and most everything else too. We had vastly superior numbers too.

In Europe, the qualitative superiority wasn't so marked but I think it still existed. For example the German Army was mostly horse drawn to the end of the war. And there too we had vastly superior numbers of machines.

This was not an exercise in fiscal restraint. The national debt increased six-fold during the war years. B-29s and atom bombs did not come cheap

"I would suggest that the way to get to having this sort of frame of mind is to drop the idea that a force can arrive on the battlefield with "superiority" or "dominance" already settled. If that were the case, then war would be made relatively obsolete. To believe it's possible is not only problematic for R&D, acquisition and procurement, it's also the fast route to hubris.

Cheers,
Jill"

I think it essential that the Air Force arrive on the battlefield more or less certain that it can achieve and maintain superiority or dominance. If that were an open question it would not be prudent to travel to that killing field. If the Air Force doesn't win its fight, the ground forces almost certainly won't win theirs; or rather, ours, the Americans.

Pardon my lack of clarity. What I meant was that supremacy of weaponry was not the objective of the WWII building programs -- the Liberty ship program would tend to support this inference. The short duration of the war would also tend to support my contention -- had the US applied the sort of process it does these days the war would have dragged on for years. Again, I don't think it's inconsistent with the history to suggest that the philosophy of the various weapons' programs was "need to have," that they felt it was better to have a weapon on the battlefield that was good enough rather than one that was dominant on the drawing board.

As for specific cases, I think the Japanese situation points to the fatal flaw in their strategic situation. They never intended to fight it out with the US -- they knew that they were at a sever disadvantage with respect to industrial capacity and resources. They did however enter the war with numerous advantages -- they had realized, before the US, that the aircraft carrier was going to be the important platform in the war, they were vastly superior in nighttime naval operations (see Frank's _Guadalcanal_), and, at least until they suffered irretrievable losses in their pilot corps, had a real strength in their naval aviation based around the Zero.

Your reference to the German use of horse drawn carriages is not the slight you might have meant. In dealing with the terrain they faced on the Russian front, horses might have been the better option than trucks. (I've just picked up Wood's _Mud: A Military History_ -- what a great premise for a history.)

Your final point about requiring air supremacy prior to entering a war is simply untenable historically. The US/Allies did not enter the war with air supremacy -- they had to fight for it. Take the Guadalcanal campaign -- the Allies had to contest for that piece of real estate against Japanese air power. They had to fight for control of Henderson field. That the past fifty years of experience has seen the US enjoy a level of air superiority is most likely an anomoly based on the wealth disparity between the US and its opponents in conflicts. However, when in the future the US must contend with an opponent of roughly similar resources, then the air battle will need to be fought -- and the outcome of the war may, or may not, depend on who wins that battle outright. War is comprised of many battles, not all of which must be won to prevail in the total struggle.

In the short run, it also must be recognized that air defenses are far cheaper to build, and it's fairly easy to keep up with the advances in aircraft technology. There is also the added bonus in the American case that every advance in defensive capability forces the US to spend exponentially more to improve their aircraft -- it's like what we did to the Soviets. At the end of the day, we cannot spend huge sums of money to maintain superiority in any realm of warfare ad infinitum.

Regards,
Jill

Sargent
01-16-2008, 03:28 PM
"Fussing over rental cars does nothing to answer this big question."

Personnel costs are the second largest chunk of the defense budget (behind O&M), so spending habits in this area do matter.

Regards,
Jill

LawVol
01-16-2008, 03:50 PM
Many of you have heard about the F15 breakup from the MO Guard. Here (http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=23452) is the story.


Witnesses to the incident said the 27-year-old Boeing jet appeared to split in two immediately behind the cockpit. Seconds later, Stilwell's parachute eased him to the ground with relatively minor injuries - a busted shoulder, a broken arm and a host of cuts and bruises.

What happened during those few seconds between breakup and ejection is the stuff of wonder and providence. Fortunately, Stilwell survived to offer his story to accident investigators.

The cracking of the upper right hand longeron was the culprit, according to the Air Force. Longerons are horizontal metal bars that hold the fuselage together. Once the break occurred on the upper right side, the other three longerons could not carry the load.

now back to my latte...

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-16-2008, 04:36 PM
I like the Air Force, in fact to paraphrase a movie line:

"No, I like all you Air Force boys. Every time we've gotta go someplace and fight, you fellas always give us a ride." :D

Seriously, crunching the cost of TDY numbers, haggling over rental cars, and determining what the definition of "deployed" is, is purely an academic exercise. As Jill points out O&M and personnel are huge expenses. If you build it you gotta operate and maintain it (whether it's a gazillion dollar aircraft or just a million dollar barracks). If you hire them you gotta pay them. And the more you decide to pay them the less you have for other stuff. :wry:

The personnel issue really is an issue. One thing that hurts the military as a whole are dependents, or more accurately the ever increasing size of them. I don’t mean that pejoratively, I mean it in the practical sense. ;)

The US military is one of the few (maybe the only) organizations that rewards marriage. Civilian corporations don’t dramatically increase a worker’s pay because he or she gets married. So in addition to the added pay there is an increase in infrastructure: more base housing, better base facilities, more schools, child care facilities, expanded health care, etc… It seems more and more new service members are married when they enter the service, some with children as well. This phenomenon placed a burden on the service budgets that was unforeseen. Yet when the Marine Corps’ Commandant recommended not allowing first termers to be, or get, married during their first enlistment he was pilloried. I didn’t get married until I was a sergeant (the second time) and on my third tour. The life of most junior Marines is pretty active and tough without having the addition stress of worrying about a wife and maybe kids as well.

LawVol
01-16-2008, 05:33 PM
The personnel issue really is an issue. One thing that hurts the military as a whole are dependents, or more accurately the ever increasing size of them. I don’t mean that pejoratively, I mean it in the practical sense.

Ahhh, shades of "if the Corps wanted you to have a family, it would've issued you one!" From my experience, this is a theory that has gained traction. I get a number of calls from non-USAF personnel and their dependents (I won't say which branch) in search of help because their own command/base support structure, etc. is either nonexistent or doesn't care. It's a shame really. A number of these folks have expressed a desire to get out after their hitch. I wonder how many good folks we lose because of this?

The simple fact is that recruiting and retention have been difficult, especially in light of the ongoing war. If you want a large pool to pull good people from you need to take married folks. And if you want those folks to stay in, you'll need to address those family concerns.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-16-2008, 05:52 PM
LawVol! :D

For years momma MC made it somewhat difficult for families. I had to request permission from my CO to get married and had to attend mandatory classes run by the chaplin's office then a year of paperwork. But here I am 29 years later still married to the same woman. :)

You're right on the mark about the recruiting aspect, in an all volunteer force you have to be much more aware of the personal aspect of personnel.

Let's bring back the draft and institute Draconian measures!

Ken White
01-16-2008, 06:34 PM
in all services are married at the 18-22 year mark while among their civilian peers, the age for marriage continues to rise...

The services financially reward marriage and thats dumb, IMO. Recall when Mundy tried to suggest that enlisted Marines were better off not being married -- a true statement -- that the Sociologists and Churches of America found common cause for once and thus that Congress had one of their well known knee jerks. Probably as much because piddling with DoD Pay and Allowances is as complex as would be messing with the Tax Code...

Regardless, no marriage is a good idea, I think. I'd even go with a bonus for staying single, all ranks... :D

My wife does NOT agree with the foregoing and has refused to endorse the statement. She does agree with marriage being pay and allowance neutral, thus, that is the Official Position of the REAL White house.

Distiller
01-17-2008, 01:27 PM
Well, maybe supporting families that way helps with the demographic issues that we experience in Europe!


Re that air force business and some daydreaming:

Besides equipment issues (see down below) the Pentagon really should re-do the whole forces structure.
There was a debate (one of them, actually) in the late 1950's about a U.S. General Staff. I think that is overdue. The structure with SecNavy, SecArmy, SecAF, Forces, multi-tier technical, global and regional Commands is way too unruly. And the Joint Commands are basically a GenStaff, but w/o abolishing the old structures. Maybe a structure like General Staff (with couple of directorates) -- Strat ISR Cmd, Strat Weapons Cmd, Strat Logistics Cmd, Spec Ops Cmd -- Theatre Commands -- Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, Maritime Forces (as forces pools, nothing more). Actual operations (like basically already now, but with way too many other "commands" playing into) managed by the Theatre Commands via permanent or ad-hoc Task Forces, Groups and Units.

Applied to the aerial forces I more and more like the idea of something like a "Tactical Aviation Corps" plus a re-established "Army Aviation Corps". The TacAvCorps as a unified structure, and I think all tactical aircraft should be carrier capables, since I'm not sure that the tactical aviation community will have the ressources in the future to maintain three aerial forces. Close Air Support goes to Army Aviation, Tactical Aviation is tasked only with theatre level ISR, air supremacy and interdiction. I mean, the reason for the Air Force to exist was SAC and LeMay, nothing else. If the strategic nuclear mission go to a strategic command (together with ICBMs, SSB/GNs, BMD) and close air support back to the Army, the reason to maintain the Air Force is not so clear any more. And looking at the NavAir mess and ever less ressources there I'd say a unified tactical aviation would prove more flexible than what there is now.


On to equipment:
I think everything that is spent now on "old" equipment is basically lost money.
The only shooters worth spending money on in the Air Force are F-15E. Those should be kept as up-to-date as possible until some UCAV takes over that role.
In if the USAF is getting short on fighterbombers - the EFA-18EFG is in production. And those are carrier capable, too.
F-15ABCD should be replaced as fast as possible, whereby a evolutionary and navalized F-22B version (F-22 was developed in the 1980s!) could follow the F-22A as standard fighter (these 180 could be sold).
F-35A should be cancelled, only F-35C and B built.
And then a UCAV to fill the gap the A-6, F-111 left and as F-15E replacement.
Plus a Combat Support Platform for ASW, Sensors/Relays, for COD, and as aux tanker, optionally manned/unmanned.
The A-10s should go to the Army.
And any more dicking around with the tanker competition should end and the KC-767 built.

On the strategic aviation side probably the B-52 should be retired. Or the B-1B. But whatever is left should be thoroughly upgraded (incl engines). And I also question the decision to basically retire the heavy manned bomber from the nuclear ALCM carrier role (see AGM-129). Nothing like a bomber gives you such a multitude of attack vectors, vehicles and warheads. The Russians know that.
Strategic air mobility should be supported be at least 350 C-17, an evolutionary B model might be an idea. The C-5 fleet upgrade should be expanded, but kept to the absolute minimum of airframes (40 to 50), the rest retired.

One of the most important aspect would be to maintain a steady (and evolutionary) production, even if it comes somewhat more expensive, after the current elderly equipment is replaced by rather steep production rates. Otherwise the same mess as today shows up again in 15 to 20 years.

As I said - daydreaming.

carl
01-17-2008, 05:17 PM
Jill:

I think it inappropriate to compare weapons acquisition and development in WWII and now. Then, everybody it was a breakneck race to acquire a small advantage that would last for a few years or months even; with the knowledge that something better was just behind. But still a lot of effort and expense was put into gaining even that small advantage because it made a big difference in the outcome of the individual fights. Also, the level of technology was much lower so it was just easier, a lot easier, to bring a weapon from from conception to battle (for airplanes at least).

Now thought has to be given to what must be fought 20 years down the road knowing that a replacement isn't just behind. "Good enough" now may be disaster in 15 years if you don't get it right. That plus the higher level of technology means it is going to take longer and cost more. Running it through the modern defense bureaucracy doesn't speed things up either.

The Japanese were a strategic disaster. Their very few and slight equipment advantages didn't get avail them much once we got our torpedo depth settings right and they ran into well trained, determined pilots. Then when we fielded vast numbers of superior equipment they were done for.

I entirely disagree the American Navy was behind the Japanese in realizing the importance of carriers. Most of the big carrier battles occurred in the first 10 months of the war and we wouldn't have done as well as we did if we had only just figured it out.

Horse drawn transport can be an advantage at times I suppose. But the advantage can't be much since every single army that could, has traded in their horses for trucks. The Germans I think would have liked to have had truck borne infantry divisions in 1941. The Russians were probably glad they had so many trucks in the summer of 1944.

The Allies entered the war without advantage in the air because they were attacked. They had to fight with what they had. That they won had as much to do with German and Japanese strategic stupidity as with anything else. One of the lessons many people drew from WWII is if you have superiority and the enemy is convinced of that, there may not be a war. I agree our past 65 years of advantage in the air is a historical anomaly. But we can keep that anomaly going for another 20 or thirty years by making the right decisions today. That 20 or 30 years is worth the investment. Us fighting without control of the air isn't something we've had any practice with lately. If we had doubts about our ability to control the air, it might be more prudent not to fight at all.

Air defenses may or may not be cheaper to build. The Soviets spent an awful lot on them. And I don't know that it is so easy to counter advances in
aircraft tech. and the other things related to defeating air defenses, the Syrians didn't do well at all against the Israeli attack in Sept.

Norfolk
01-17-2008, 06:32 PM
Today's edition of Air Force Magazine (http://dailyreport.afa.org/afa/) is reporting some interesting news:



Presents in January?: The Air Force yesterday released its weapon system “roadmap (http://dailyreport.afa.org/NR/rdonlyres/B628013A-0CAA-4785-8121-E545F08E23E7/0/roadmap011608.pdf)” describing all the bases at which the service’s new hardware could be based over the next 30 years. The roadmap, crafted with input from all Adjutants General, details the bases at which the F-22, F-35, KC-X, C-27, and other systems might “potentially” bed down, according to the USAF release. Nothing’s certain, though, because: a) environmental impact studies would have to be passed, and b) the Air Force actually has to get the equipment. The EIS process is not a given, because the F-35 and F-22 are noisier than the F-16s and F-15s they replace, for example. Moreover, the roadmap lists bases where USAF would put F-22s if it were to get all 381 it wants, as opposed to the 183 that have been approved. The F-35 would go largely to bases that now have an F-16 or A-10 mission. With few exceptions, bases that already have transitioned from the F-16 to another system—like the MQ-1 Predator—would not go back to flying fighters, senior USAF officials said. That’s because the Predators offer Air National Guard pilots an opportunity to participate in deployed operations without actually deploying, as the crews “fight” by remote control at their home base.

It seems that even the Air Force Association thinks something is a little dubious about the Air Force "Roadmap" (scroll down to the bottom of the same page):


One Last Word: Although senior Air Force leaders won’t say so in so many words, the service’s new beddown roadmap (see above) is a map of constituencies and effectively puts members of Congress on notice that if they want an Air Force mission in their district, they better support the buying of the new systems. If they don’t, and inventories continue to shrink, the missions—and the bases, and Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command units associated with them—will surely go away.

Sargent
01-17-2008, 07:38 PM
Ahhh, shades of "if the Corps wanted you to have a family, it would've issued you one!"

From my experience as a resource draining dependent (insert wry smiling emoticon here), and from what I understand about the Corps, the truth of that quote would be, "If the Corps didn't want you to have a spouse and family, there'd be a rule against it."

There are costs and benefits associated with military dependents. Me, I'm a force multiplier, so I'm not worried about the paltry amount the Marine Corps coughs up to support us.

Cheers,
Jill

LawVol
01-17-2008, 07:47 PM
The Air Force also has a unique definition of the term “deploy.” To the Army, Marines, and Navy this is time away from home often under austere conditions. The AF will “deploy” personnel from the Pentagon to Crystal City (if you didn’t know they’re walking distance apart). After this arduous deployment the Airmen gets the same two weeks of off the books leave as folks returning from the AOR do. That’s fair. :cool:

I've wondered about this as well. I asked about this and the unconfirmed consensus I get on this is that it is termed a deployment because it is in support of operations downrange. This allows GWOT money to pay for it rather than unit O&M funds.

I know you guys probably won't like that either, but don't kill the messenger. I don't know about the timoff thing, but I was told that the time off was for the member to take care of family issues that resulted from being gone. I owuld assume that whether the member is across the pond or across the country, they're still gone. I don't know.

LawVol
01-17-2008, 07:50 PM
From my experience as a resource draining dependent (insert wry smiling emoticon here), and from what I understand about the Corps, the truth of that quote would be, "If the Corps didn't want you to have a spouse and family, there'd be a rule against it."

There are costs and benefits associated with military dependents. Me, I'm a force multiplier, so I'm not worried about the paltry amount the Marine Corps coughs up to support us.

Cheers,
Jill

My wife is a force multiplier too! I've always said that the family doesn't get enough credit.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-18-2008, 06:22 PM
LawVol you might be right about it being a which pot-o-money issue.

But there are always rules! The two weeks of free time off is very restrictive, it is not leave, the service member must remain in the local area of their assigned unit. It is time to "decompress" from the stress of a combat zone.

As to "time with the family" I don't see how someone "deploying" from the Pentagon to Crystal City (3/4s of a mile) involves missing the family and needing two weeks to make it up. :eek:

Somehow I do not see the stresses imposed by deploying four months in Stuttgart to be quite the same as those found in Fallujah.

Not that there are not considerable stresses to be found in southwest Germany during Oktoberfest. Like which drinking tent to go to next and stepping around all the "Bierleichen". :D

LawVol
01-18-2008, 06:41 PM
LawVol you might be right about it being a which pot-o-money issue.

But there are always rules! The two weeks of free time off is very restrictive, it is not leave, the service member must remain in the local area of their assigned unit. It is time to "decompress" from the stress of a combat zone.

As to "time with the family" I don't see how someone "deploying" from the Pentagon to Crystal City (3/4s of a mile) involves missing the family and needing two weeks to make it up. :eek:

Somehow I do not see the stresses imposed by deploying four months in Stuttgart to be quite the same as those found in Fallujah.

Not that there are not considerable stresses to be found in southwest Germany during Oktoberfest. Like which drinking tent to go to next and stepping around all the "Bierleichen". :D

Concur with your thoughts on the differences in a "deployment" vs. a deployment. If I'm ever "deployed" to Germany during Oktoberfest, can I just get a beer coupon instead of a GWOT ribbon?:cool:

Sargent
01-20-2008, 02:43 AM
I think it inappropriate to compare weapons acquisition and development in WWII and now.

The second favorite quote of anybody is the old saw about not learning the mistakes of history. The obvious corollary is that the failure to learn how things were done or happened in the past is that one is doomed not to be able to take advantage of the successes.

I don't know many people who would point to the contemporary American weapons' development system as a model that ought to be followed. There are obviously flaws that have crept into it. Thus, it seems eminently useful to me to look at a time when the system worked differently and to good effect. None of the problems you cite are objectively so -- for example, a platform that wears out in 15 years is only a liability if it take 30 years to develop, manufacture, test, and procure the next one. However, if you have a 2-5 year cycle, then the 15 year life cycle becomes not so much a problem.

I've already stated that the Japanese were at a loss from word go. They couldn't compete, and I know that.

While the US had certainly gotten into the carrier business prior to WWII, the USN was not nearly as far along in carrier-centric aviation operations as the IJN. This was their bread and butter.

I don't think extant superiority suits the US. The American culture of warfare is Rocky -- take a beating and then struggle back to fight and win. It suits us. We like to be (or at least seem to be) the underdog. It makes us more likable. Why do folks love the Marine Corps and have qualms with the Air Force? Because the Marine Corps image is about making due with less, of relying upon hard work and perseverance, whereas the Air Force's is about buying the best. These stereotypes might not be fair, but the American preference for the former rather than the latter is what matters. There is a place for technology, but I don't think it needs to be the leader of the parade. Oh, and to be the leader costs an (expletive deleted) load, and that could become a real problem -- it was a lot of the reason that Vietnam was ended, the dollar outflows could no longer be supported.

Cheers,
Jill

Distiller
01-20-2008, 09:16 AM
Difference is that these days enabling technology with kind of binary character progresses so fast, that you simply have no other choice as to apply and integrate it. Otherwise your equipment becomes irrelevant. Digitalisation, computers, networking, automatisation, &c. Every time it's almost like starting from zero again with RD&T, integration, and real-world application. Just that there is the advantage of the industrial base. In old times it was not so fast; maybe the best comparison is the Dreadnought race, when within a few years brand new ships became an obsolete money-hole.

And for the aerial forces the next revolution is already in the making with the unmanned/autonomous vehicles. Besides the propulsion aspect this seems on of the times where a new power can catch up with the old powers.

Also the chance for old airframers and system integrators (like e.g. NGCO, Vought) to get back into business again, and for new companies with innovative ideas to get into business.

I think a lot of troubles that we see now with accquisitions, except from ever intrusive politics, stem from the rapid technological progress. You can already can see where it will go, but what you should order now to replace your tatty legacy equipment does not even bring you halfway there. So you try to wait just a little longer, try to stretch the programme just a little more.

Rumsfeld was not so wrong. He had the right ideas. His time preference was askew and his concept of realization were a disaster, but he had the right instincts.

carl
01-21-2008, 06:01 AM
While the US had certainly gotten into the carrier business prior to WWII, the USN was not nearly as far along in carrier-centric aviation operations as the IJN. This was their bread and butter.


The Akagi was commissioned in 1927, the Kaga in 1926. The Lexington and the Saratoga were both commissioned in 1927. At the end of 1942 the American and Japanese carrier forces had fought each other to a standstill and didn't fight again until 1944. That seems pretty even-steven to me.

A 2-5 year development cycle for a fighter or fighter equivalent would be a nice thing, but I think it is impossible. There hasn't been a high performance fighter anywhere in the world in the last 20 or so years that has come even close to that. None that I can think of anyway.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
01-22-2008, 03:28 PM
despite their "innovative" use of carriers to execute a long range attack against Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy's primary strategic focus throughout the war was to fight a Mahan influenced decisive main battle fleet action (a la Tsushima), which didn't occur until Surigao Strait in Oct '44. Which by then was too late.

Some naval historians posit that Pearl Harbor was actually a good thing, since our main Pacific battle fleet was put out of action it forced us at the Coral Sea and Midway to use carriers as a weapons system unto themselves, vice as an adjunct to the main battle fleet.

While Japan did launch the first purpose built aircraft carrier in 1921 she concentrated a much larger share of her naval program to developing the main battle fleet (Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, and two others laid down but never completed). Once the war started many Japanese Naval aviation units operated from land bases, with the carriers used more as shuttles. So to say that carrier-centric operations were the "bread and butter" of Japanese fleet operations is overly simplistic. If one looks at the composition of the Japanese Navy's Hawaiian attack force it includes a large number of submarines and two battleships (the Hiei and Kirishima). They were almost as surprised by their stunning success as we were of the attack.

Norfolk
01-26-2008, 12:29 AM
Here's some news on the proposed new bomber (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/01/25/221126/boeing-and-lockheed-martin-team-for-next-usaf-bomber.html) for the Air Force:


Boeing and Lockheed Martin team for next USAF bomber
By Stephen Trimble (stephen.trimble@flightglobal.com)

Boeing (http://www.boeing.com/ids/advanced_systems/index.html) and Lockheed Martin (http://www.lockheedmartin.com/aeronautics/index.html) have teamed to compete against Northrop Grumman (http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/) for development and production of the US Air Force’s Next Generation Bomber, planned to enter service in 2018.




In May 2007, the US Air Force revealed it preferred a manned, subsonic next-generation bomber. Requirements include an unrefuelled combat radius of 3,700km (2,000nm) and a payload ranging from 6,400-12,700kg (14,000-28,000lb). These makes the bomber more comparable to the General Dynamics F-111 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Dynamics_F-111) than either the Boeing B-52 (http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=83) or Northrop B-2 (http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82).




Pratt & Whitney has disclosed plans to offer an engine derived from the F119 that powers the F-22. General Electric may consider offering a version of the F135 under development to power the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, or the variable-cycle F120 that power Northrop’s rival to the F-22, the YF-23.

An all-new engine design is not likely to be available to meet the air force’s 2018 in-service date. The US Air Force Research Laboratory has launched the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology programme to demonstrate a variable bypass turbofan in 2012, but it is not scheduled to enter production until after the new bomber is fielded.



No word on how much the program will cost, nor even on how many bombers are required. If this bomber is to be something in the class of the F-111 as the article suggests, then it seems that this will likely be a tactical bomber rather than a strategic one. If so, what's going to replace the B-52 and the B-1? Keeping the B-52 in service until 2043 or whatever strains belief beyond any reasonable bounds.

Distiller
01-26-2008, 05:38 PM
The weight (and thus size) limitations have to do with the desired stealth characteristics. It will be a strategic bomber in the sense can it act as platform for nuclear armed cruise missiles classified as strategic.

That it will not be a giant like the B-52 or Tu-160 is also clear I think.
If your mission does not require to drop large quantities of free-falling bombs you can build a cruise missile carrier quite small (depending of course on the size/weight of a yet-to-be-developed cruise missile). 10 to 12 metric tons give you four to six ALCMs. A hundred bomber (and fewer are not probable) make it 100 platforms with 400 to 600 vectors with 400 to 600 warheads. More than strategic arms reduction allows/needs, taking the triade as basis.

Also the question will it be supersonic. Given that all technology used has to be available now, it will probably have supercruise capability like the F-22. But also loitering capability will be important for long-range CAS, perhaps resulting in some kind of variable aerodynamic geometry (and variable cycle engine).

Should I guess I'd say a supercruising stealth bomber between 80 and 100 tons, manned but optionally or in a later version also autonomous ops capable, 4 engines w/o afterburner, armed with four to six ALCMs, or whatever fits for the conventional mission. And the airframe might also used as stealth buddy-buddy tanker and intelligence platform. -- Basically a modern day Avro Vulcan.

SWJED
01-27-2008, 01:49 AM
Via Tom Ricks's Inbox (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2008/01/25/GR2008012502859.html) (Washington Post)


Here, the Air Force uses the jargon of modern warfare to discuss its competition with the Army and Navy. Usually, it is China that U.S. officers describe as a "peer competitor" -- that is, a real or potential adversary...


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/usafupdate.jpg

Norfolk
01-27-2008, 01:59 AM
The Budget Battle is Zero-Sum Gain?!:eek::confused:

Unreal. The Air Force comes right out and declares "war" on the other services. Even if the AF wins, the Armed Services as a whole will still lose. Just unbelievable that some of them would actually come right out and publish it - maybe the AF should be disbanded after all?:(

LawVol
01-27-2008, 04:22 AM
Someone please explain to me how the budget battle is not a zero sum gain. The amount of money Congress will assign to the defense budget is finite and all branches cannot get everything they want. In the scramble for dollars, every service presents its arguments and woes supporters on the hill. If you see this as a declaration of war, you're reading too much into it.

Although Tom Ricks indicates that the AF refered to the Army and Navy as "peer competitors," a term usually reserved for China, I didn't see that in the posted material. I did see the term "peer," which according to dictionary.com is defined as "a person of the same legal status" or "something of equal worth or quality." Again, please explain to me how this is not true.

Step away from the Kool-aid.:)

Rob Thornton
01-27-2008, 05:25 AM
Old Eagle and I were talking about the lead up to the next QDR and the politics that are going with it. The whole thing is more then a little sad - much more debate and focus by the services on getting what they want vs. tackling the tough, common problems that face us all.

Maybe that is the nature of the beast, but its telling of a lot more then just how the pie gets cut. It speaks to fear, paranoia, mistrust, influence of people not worried about the same things we are (the folks who stand to really profit in terms of $$$, and a host of other things that drive us to ignoring our common sense about what we should be doing, and instead figuring out the best ways to short sheet the other guy without really considering how it might effect our over-all capability to defend the constitution form our enemies foreign and domestic.

I hate the way this makes us dance to a tune barely related to what we profess to be; argueing over money makes us less then we are capable of being. Maybe its the just the best we can do, and maybe its a requirement, but I don't have to like it.

Best, Rob

Ski
01-27-2008, 11:57 AM
This is no surprise.

The services care about two things - resources and force structure.

I always thought it was crap, and then I read the initial draft of the first Army campaign plan, and it stated "The resourcing process is the center of gravity for the Army."

Not winning wars, not defending the country, but the resource process. It's all about protecting the institution gents, and that means resources and force structure. If anyone has ever done time on the HQDA staff and gone through a POM build, they will understand exactly what I mean.

Totally repugnant.

The fact the Air Force has codified the message and send it out to their beancounters is no surprise.

What this should tell every officer is that it is indeed a zero-sum game, and that money does not grow on trees.

Presley Cannady
02-02-2008, 01:02 AM
Isn't this why the US has an Office of Secretary of Defense? OSD does sit atop NSS and NMS chains and ultimately submits the budget. Isn't the idea to shape the adversarial process of budgeting to serve unified national security objectives?

Ken White
02-02-2008, 01:40 AM
Unfortunately, that reasonable and logical idea runs into the parochialism of the services and, far more importantly, into Congress which can and will skew the process to insure their priorities are addressed. As Congress changes due to elections (or retirements, since we now seem to have Congroids for life) and as Committee members change, those priorities change. Congress mumbles and DoD heeds...

Neither their priorities nor changes to them are often reasonable and logical. Amazing amount of DoD stuff in PA and WV...

Presley Cannady
02-02-2008, 02:27 PM
My point isn't that the system consistently tends towards the optimal force, but that it at least produces an acceptable one given the foreseeable range of missions with considerably more reliability than prior to 1986 and definitely prior to 1947. The United States hasn't fielded a military that could conceivably be defeated operationally in any of non-nuclear scenario in at least since the Gulf War, possibly more so, and has done so at expenditure that never exceeded 10 percent of the GDP. Beyond the admittedly vast space for cost and risk optimization, what more can you ask for than that?

Ken White
02-02-2008, 04:09 PM
As I've often said, it really works better than it has right to... :D

Systems are clean and generally precise. Humans are inherently messy and are are rarely precise. Fortunately it mostly works out. :wry:

carl
10-10-2008, 12:00 AM
I just read a newspaper story stating that the USAF has grounded 130 of its approximately 400 A-10s for wing cracks.

That makes 3 first line aircraft in the last year or so that have had major structural problems, the F-15, P-3 and now the A-10. These old airplanes are wearing out and will have to be replaced, not modernized or upgraded because the aluminum is just giving up the struggle.

There is no cheap way out of this. It will cost a lot of money and if we don't pony up I don't see how we can keep our activities overseas going at the present rate.

(Depriving the Air Force of golf courses and swimming pools won't solve this.)

Steve Blair
10-10-2008, 02:15 PM
The A-10 is an aircraft that the Air Force didn't want in the first place, flying a mission that is still unpopular in the higher quarters of the service (NOTE THAT I DIDN'T SAY THE LOWER LEVELS). A great deal of this mess is of the AF's own making, and until they fix the way they develop and field aircraft (creating realistic goals and specifications for airframes, not wanting to make everything stealth and ultra-high tech, for just two examples), throwing them more money will NOT fix the problem. It will just ensure that we get more of the same.

The AF is not alone in this mess, of course, but they happen to be one of the higher-profile contracting misfits.

William F. Owen
10-10-2008, 02:48 PM
These old airplanes are wearing out and will have to be replaced, not modernized or upgraded because the aluminum is just giving up the struggle.

There is no cheap way out of this. It will cost a lot of money and if we don't pony up I don't see how we can keep our activities overseas going at the present rate.


Not true. It is both doable and cost effective to build new parts such as wings. An A-10 wing costs very little to build, as long as you have the right Jigs, materials, and design authority clearances. Any aluminium aircraft, such as A-4, A-10's, F-5, etc etc can be kept flying indefinitely. The same can be done with Helicopters as well. The biggest challenge is keeping the engines going.

A lot of Air Forces don't want to admit this, but it's fact. Granny's knife. Replace the blade every five years and the handle every ten.

Entropy
10-10-2008, 03:18 PM
This isn't a huge deal. It calls for inspections only on 130 aircraft - probably the oldest planes. It's not that unusual for these kinds of things to crop up on aircraft this old. At this point, the issue doesn't seem to be too severe and just requires an inspection regimen.

carl
10-12-2008, 04:14 AM
F-15, C-130, KC-135, A-10, P-3 etc., all old airplanes, all wearing out. You can keep airplanes, individual examples, flying indefinitely. People keep P-51s and Spitfires flying, at huge cost and effort. It would be inexpensive to build new A-10 wings on production tooling, if it existed. I would be very surprised if it did.

KC-135s are already at the "warbird" point. They go into heavy maintenance and the guys have to fabricate parts from scratch cause they aren't made anymore.

Some of these airplanes, especially the tac fighters, have life limited airframes. I am not that familiar with details but I imagine you can extend it, with an inspection regimen, as Entropy says. But how severe does the inspection regimen get as more and more hours are put on the airframe?

And this just addresses the airframe. The avionics get old too. Those are the things that are hard to replace, or get parts for, or manuals for. Sometimes the company that made them is long out of business.

These airplanes are wearing out. This latest A-10 problem may or may not be that severe but to me it is an alarm bell ringing far off in the night. Something big is coming and we had better heed these warnings.

These thing wear out and if you push them too far you have a spectacular result like the C-130A airtanker crash.

William F. Owen
10-12-2008, 08:35 AM
F-15, C-130, KC-135, A-10, P-3 etc., all old airplanes, all wearing out. You can keep airplanes, individual examples, flying indefinitely. People keep P-51s and Spitfires flying, at huge cost and effort. It would be inexpensive to build new A-10 wings on production tooling, if it existed. I would be very surprised if it did.

Back in another life I was the manager for an A-4 and F-5 upgrade project.

Avionics was never a problem, as avionics are the first thing that gets replaced. Saves, weight, maintenance costs, and manpower. - and the biggest costs are those associated with training that comes from a capability increase, such as PGMs, Radar or NVGs.

Airframes are just a matter of cost versus effect. All aircraft are collection of consumables. If you have the materials, jigs and design authority, you can keep the airframe flying, while it is operationally effective to do so. EG: - Don't keep F-86's going when the role requires an F-4. The physically lighter the airframe, the lest cost is associated. There is a cross over. What is cost effective for an A-4 is not for a C-130.

Engines are by far the biggest challenge. With the F-5 and A-4 you had engine upgrade kits, that extended the TBO, and overall life of the engine. For the A-4s there were more upgrade kits than there were A-4s in existence.

The real problem is the organisational, human/political and emotional bias against extending the life of inservice aircraft. Yes, there comes a point where it is futile to do so, but that point is not often reached.

Entropy
10-12-2008, 12:12 PM
Wilf,

Much of your last comment is entirely true. I would add that two big factors, besides organizational, are cost and readiness rates. It's true that we can keep aircraft flying almost indefinitely, but the maintenance costs to do can become prohibitively expensive and reduce the readiness rates for the airframe. As an example, in my air wing in the Navy during the mid- 1990's, only about 1/2 of the aircraft in our F-14 squadron were flyable at any one time. In both my deployments, one aircraft hard broke, sat in the hanger deck for the rest of deployment and was craned off the carrier at the end. And these were the upgraded D models. By contrast, the 3 F-18 squadrons all had readiness rates of 80-90 percent. In addition, depending on circumstances, older aircraft have limits put on because of structural issues. They're either G-restricted or take-off/landing weight limited (which limits ordnance, fuel, etc.). These restrictions complicate planning obviously. They aren't a huge deal in Iraq and Afghanistan because there's no air threat except the occasional manpad so such limits aren't as big of an issue.

You're right that engines are a big deal, but they are also relatively easy to replace. Engines can be replaced on the ramp in theater, for example. If you have a crack in a wing spar, though, it will probably have to go to depot or, just as likely, the boneyard as a parts queen. There's no fixing that kind of problem anywhere but depot.

One reason I'm not particularly worried about the A-10 is that most of the upgrades to the C variant are taking place at the depot level. That's actually where these wing problems were discovered in the first place. As aircraft go to depot for the C upgrade any structural problems will be addressed.

William F. Owen
10-12-2008, 01:28 PM
Entropy,

Yes, there is a point where the whole exercise become futile. The F-14 and F-111 are good examples. I am pretty sure it's weight thing.

Some of the techs I had on the A-4 Program had come from an F-18 Squadron, and all said that what we were doing for A-4's and F-5's could not be done for F-18's or even F-14s.

The list of aircraft that can be readily and cost effectively upgraded is quite extensive but the bigger and more complex the aircraft, the more this goes away.

Ken White
10-12-2008, 02:36 PM
...The list of aircraft that can be readily and cost effectively upgraded is quite extensive but the bigger and more complex the aircraft, the more this goes away.purposely headed in that direction to insure product replacement instead of product refurbishment...

selil
10-12-2008, 03:16 PM
Any system will decay over time regardless of the amount of replacement (including complete replacement). Systemic decay over time is just going to happen. The higher the quality of materials and workmanship the slower that occurs. Design, capability, structure, engineering and tolerances can not all be perfect and eroded by time.

There is another point but I'm not sure how to say it. I can't imagine a military keeping the main battle tank unchanged for 100 years like they plan on some air frames. The Navy is already planning on replacing entire ships even though hulls are a well defined science for over 100 years. It just seems like poor management to plan on keeping air frames flying for over 100 years.

120mm
10-13-2008, 07:51 PM
To be sure, aircraft design has a lot to do with how "time-limited" an airframe (or any other machine) is. Case in point: I can economically keep a CJ or even XJ Jeep in operation for 50 years or more, because they are simple, can be easily maintained, and had long production runs.

An ordinary unibody front-drive car, though, is done, as soon as it gets body cancer or has a major mechanical problem. Just wasn't designed to be refurb'd.

The F-14 is complex and difficult to maintain. The A-4, F-5 or A-10 are archetypes for simple, easy to maintain aircraft. Same with the Piper "Cub" and "Super Cub" series of aircraft. They're just made to be upgraded and maintained for a service life of 100 years, or more (despite Bill Piper's original advice to throw the aircraft away at 10 years age...)

selil
10-13-2008, 08:08 PM
....Case in point: I can economically keep a CJ or even XJ Jeep in operation for 50 years or more, because they are simple, can be easily maintained, and had long production runs.

An ordinary unibody front-drive car, though, is done, as soon as it gets body cancer or has a major mechanical problem. Just wasn't designed to be refurb'd.....


Pretty much the exact analogy I had in mind.

Cliff
10-14-2008, 04:25 AM
To be sure, aircraft design has a lot to do with how "time-limited" an airframe (or any other machine) is. Case in point: I can economically keep a CJ or even XJ Jeep in operation for 50 years or more, because they are simple, can be easily maintained, and had long production runs.

An ordinary unibody front-drive car, though, is done, as soon as it gets body cancer or has a major mechanical problem. Just wasn't designed to be refurb'd.

The F-14 is complex and difficult to maintain. The A-4, F-5 or A-10 are archetypes for simple, easy to maintain aircraft. Same with the Piper "Cub" and "Super Cub" series of aircraft. They're just made to be upgraded and maintained for a service life of 100 years, or more (despite Bill Piper's original advice to throw the aircraft away at 10 years age...)

The way a plane is used has a huge effect on it's service life. Aircraft's lives are indeed defined by age and hours... but a bigger factor is how the airplane is used. Spectrum Life is a common way of measuring the age of the aircraft. It is a mix of hours, g-loadings, loads carried, etc.

The Jeep is not a good comparison. The difference between your Super Cub and an F-15C is like the difference between your CJ jeep and a HMMWV. The Hummer starts its life as a bigger jeep, but then gets weighed down with armor that increases its weight by 50%. Add new radios, datalink, and weaponry and now your Hummer is seriously weighed down. Now drive that Hummer at nearly top speed twice a day 5 days a week, every day of the week when it is deployed. After about 20 years of this, your HMMWV might break down a little.

The jets in question fly at 9gs every day, and to contend with the newer fighters that you say they are as good as, F-15s and F-16s have to carry new avionics and weapons. These only add to stress on the airframes.

The simple fact is that there is only so much you can do with an old airplane. Throw in the state of SAM technology and you have a problem that can only be solved with new aircraft.

V/R,

Cliff

120mm
10-14-2008, 03:46 PM
<snip>
The Jeep is not a good comparison. The difference between your Super Cub and an F-15C is like the difference between your CJ jeep and a HMMWV. The Hummer starts its life as a bigger jeep, but then gets weighed down with armor that increases its weight by 50%. Add new radios, datalink, and weaponry and now your Hummer is seriously weighed down. Now drive that Hummer at nearly top speed twice a day 5 days a week, every day of the week when it is deployed. After about 20 years of this, your HMMWV might break down a little.

It's not how much they wear, or break down, it's how rebuildable/maintainable they are. I would suggest that your typical Alaskan Bush Super Cub gets treated more roughly, and with less maintenance, than your typical F-15C. But that's not the real issue. The real issue is how the aircraft is designed, and whether they're easily maintained.


The jets in question fly at 9gs every day, and to contend with the newer fighters that you say they are as good as, F-15s and F-16s have to carry new avionics and weapons. These only add to stress on the airframes.

new avionics are smaller and lighter than old avionics. How does this stress old airframes? And what new weapons are there out there, that create new and unmanageable stresses on old airframes?

You're mixing up the concept of "wear and tear" with "maintainability".


The simple fact is that there is only so much you can do with an old airplane. Throw in the state of SAM technology and you have a problem that can only be solved with new aircraft.

V/R,

Cliff

Since most airplanes, including high-performance fighters, can be relatively easily built from the dataplate up, the only real limiting factor in a COIN environment is cost of maintenance versus cost of new production.

120mm
10-14-2008, 07:26 PM
http://www.olive-drab.com/images/mvg_www_jeep_origin_375.jpg

versus:

http://www.motorsportseats.com/customers_seats/images/Rick%20Wolldung's%20Jeep/Rick-Wolljung_Jeep_Lg.jpg

And:

http://www.aviation-history.com/taylor/owner.jpg

versus:

http://www.turbinecubs.com/images/stories/news_images/Mackey-SQ2.jpg

reed11b
10-14-2008, 07:57 PM
120...did you just say dissin??:confused: P.S. does 120 refer to "high Angle Hell" 120mm? Are you an 11 chuck? On a more serious note, does the US have remaining the manufacturing ability to build new wings?
Reed

Cliff
10-15-2008, 04:50 AM
It's not how much they wear, or break down, it's how rebuildable/maintainable they are. I would suggest that your typical Alaskan Bush Super Cub gets treated more roughly, and with less maintenance, than your typical F-15C. But that's not the real issue. The real issue is how the aircraft is designed, and whether they're easily maintained.

Less maintenance, maybe. Show me a super cub that has to deal with the Q and G a fighter goes through and I'll agree on the roughness.

The F-15 is one of the most maintainable fighters ever built - the airplane falling apart has nothing to do with maintainability. Flying aircraft for multiple times longer than originally planned is the problem.


new avionics are smaller and lighter than old avionics. How does this stress old airframes? And what new weapons are there out there, that create new and unmanageable stresses on old airframes?


Avionics are not neccessarily lighter. When you add new systems (usually RWR, EW gear, AESA radar) there is often a cost in terms of weight. The weapons are an even bigger issue - aircraft like the F-16 were not designed for some of the missions forced on them - but then again the USAF can no longer afford to have specialized aircraft for every mission.




You're mixing up the concept of "wear and tear" with "maintainability".

Since most airplanes, including high-performance fighters, can be relatively easily built from the dataplate up, the only real limiting factor in a COIN environment is cost of maintenance versus cost of new production.

I'm not mixing up anything. With all due respect, I've had firsthand experience with the depot process - it is not as easy as you think to rip apart and rebuild any aircraft. High performance fighters cannot be easily built - doing it takes a skilled workforce with years of training and help from people that know what they are doing. Just ask Korea, China, or any other country trying to learn to build their own fighters. Even doing depot level MX on these aircraft takes years to set up, and even longer to get set up so you can do it well.

Metal fatigue is a real phenomenon, as is corrosion. Even the best aircraft will suffer from these issues. High performance fighters suffer from it more than other aircraft - the same issues occur on all aircraft though.

120mm
10-15-2008, 12:53 PM
120...did you just say dissin??:confused: P.S. does 120 refer to "high Angle Hell" 120mm? Are you an 11 chuck? On a more serious note, does the US have remaining the manufacturing ability to build new wings?
Reed

It's 120mm as in M256 Smooth-bore.

I'm curious as to what kind of agit-prop you are paying attention to that you'd believe that the US lacks the manufacturing ability to build "wings". Sounds like someone needs to lay off of the populist web-sites to me.

I did some consulting a few years back to help a Romanian company make wings for the Liberty XL. It took about a week for them to master the concept.

And, yeah, the Wichita plant AND the St. Louis plant still produce wings.

You could set up and start producing wings and airframes for ANY of the current military aircraft in under 90 days, if you wanted to. Jigs aren't that hard to manufacture. If worse came to worse, you could "reverse-engineer" the jigs and manufacturing site.

120mm
10-15-2008, 01:17 PM
Less maintenance, maybe. Show me a super cub that has to deal with the Q and G a fighter goes through and I'll agree on the roughness.

You land your F-15 on a glacier full of 10 feet tall rocks, carrying a TON of equipment and passenger, (That's 1000 pounds over gross) and I'll put a G-meter in a Super Cub.


The F-15 is one of the most maintainable fighters ever built - the airplane falling apart has nothing to do with maintainability. Flying aircraft for multiple times longer than originally planned is the problem.

Again, you aren't listening to me. Aircraft maintainability = the ability to replace each and every item except for the data plate. If the F-15 cannot be relatively easily completely rebuilt from the data plate, it is not that maintainable by aircraft terms.


Avionics are not neccessarily lighter. When you add new systems (usually RWR, EW gear, AESA radar) there is often a cost in terms of weight. The weapons are an even bigger issue - aircraft like the F-16 were not designed for some of the missions forced on them - but then again the USAF can no longer afford to have specialized aircraft for every mission.

Didn't the USAF CHOOSE the F-16 for those missions? Doesn't the USAF CHOOSE to fund high performance fighters to do missions they aren't suited for? Answer why the USAF doesn't/didn't purchase some low-performance, cheaper aircraft for COIN, to keep the wear and tear down on high-performance aircraft....

And now they're crying about CHOICES they have consistently made? How about we fire the USAF guys who made these choices, and while we're at it, let's see some retired officers involved in these programs brought back to active duty for courts martial, stripped of rank and their retirement.



I'm not mixing up anything. With all due respect, I've had firsthand experience with the depot process - it is not as easy as you think to rip apart and rebuild any aircraft.

HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!! I'm an A&P, and I've done heavy checks and rebuilds. (some on Air Farce aircraft) Please, tell me all about your "experience".



High performance fighters cannot be easily built - doing it takes a skilled workforce with years of training and help from people that know what they are doing.

Bull ####. The majority of the work can be done by drunken, poo-flinging monkeys. (And it is, in heavy rebuild shops across the world) With proper supervision, of course....


Just ask Korea, China, or any other country trying to learn to build their own fighters. Even doing depot level MX on these aircraft takes years to set up, and even longer to get set up so you can do it well.

Metal fatigue is a real phenomenon, as is corrosion. Even the best aircraft will suffer from these issues. High performance fighters suffer from it more than other aircraft - the same issues occur on all aircraft though.

Thanks for the lecture, Cliff. Fortunately, the US has all sorts of facilities that can do these things. (maintenance, that is.) I'm not saying that aircraft aren't life-limited, I'm saying that "life-limited" is only defined by a) the cost of heavy maintenance/rebuild, b) the real capabilities need, versus the USAF Bull#### one and c) the cost of new airframes.

Mainly, though, this is about the the USAF wanting more and new toys to play with, that coincidentally, contribute very little to the actual defense of the US or fighting it's wars.

I'd be good with the USAF actually picking up a few extra COIN airframes to economically decrease wear and tear on the high performance aircraft, but the USAF would never ask for those airframes, as they don't fit the "Buck Rogers, Gofaster, Boom and Zoom" image of the USAF wonks....

davidbfpo
10-15-2008, 07:48 PM
Having visited Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona years ago and toured the aircraft reserve stockpile; with the current demands for COIN aircraft, have any of the stored aircraft been re-activated? Showing my age I recall dozens of Bronco's and Skyraiders. Yes, neither are a sleek jets, but surely useful today?

Meantime back to my armchair viewpoint and no air force affiliation.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
10-16-2008, 05:28 PM
I recall dozens of Bronco's and Skyraiders. Yes, neither are a sleek jets, but surely useful today?


The OV-10 Bronco, would probably sell faster than you could build them, if you re-started production, on a new build product improved version.

The A-1 Skyraiders, though one of the greatest combat aircraft ever built, are not as good as an A-10. The A-10 does all attack things, better than the A-1 ever could.

... and I say, scrap the Apache and build more Cobras!! :)

Ken White
10-16-2008, 05:35 PM
Misunderstood and misused but very valuable aircraft both

120mm
10-16-2008, 07:22 PM
Now that I've "simmahed down some" and had a nice 8 mile run, I have some ideas for discussion.

First, I'm not an enemy of the USAF; in fact, I think we should continue to shovel large amounts of money into programs like F-22 and JSF, as those two programs alone will go a long ways toward deterring anybody else on earth from thinking about getting frisky with us in a conventional way. But we build darned few of them, because they're expensive.

Second, Tankers aren't brain surgery. The .gov needs to quit being stupid and replace the KC-135, tomorrow. Those airframes are too old. Period. In fact, there should be a rolling budgetary plan to retire old airframes like that and replace them, periodically, just like the airlines do.

Third, for COIN, buy cheaper, less capable aircraft, and use the crap out of them. Alternatively, develop a highly maintainable "surveillance, gun and bomb bus" and use that like you rented it. Design it so you can replace everything but the data plate every couple thousand hours. It's cheaper than beating on high performance fighters in air to mud.

Fourth, quit using as many heavy UAS in low risk environments. Put more thinking pilots in low-tech rigs with the ability to dynamically retask and make decisions. In fact, I'd LOVE to see the USAF flood the operational guys with info in a full court press of collecting data and pushing it down to them.

Fifth, put MORE light UAS in the hands of lower-level troops to assist in the immediate fight.

I could go on, but people might think I'm "pro-USAF" or something...:rolleyes:

Cliff
10-17-2008, 05:09 AM
You land your F-15 on a glacier full of 10 feet tall rocks, carrying a TON of equipment and passenger, (That's 1000 pounds over gross) and I'll put a G-meter in a Super Cub.

This use of your super cub still doesn't put the same stress that frequent high g loadings and high Q put on the aircraft.


Again, you aren't listening to me. Aircraft maintainability = the ability to replace each and every item except for the data plate. If the F-15 cannot be relatively easily completely rebuilt from the data plate, it is not that maintainable by aircraft terms.

The F-15 can be easily rebuilt from the data plate when compared to any other high performance fighter ever made. The entire aircraft can be disassembled relatively easily with a few common tools. For example, the same trailer that holds engines can be used to remove the wings. That trailer can be used to rapidly replace an engine. One speed screw tool can be used for almost every job on the aircraft. The F-15 has an uprecedented number of doors on it to access various areas, and was designed to have landing gear tall enough to put most commonly maintained components at eye level. You cannot have an aircraft that can contend with modern air to air fighters without having the high performance. To get the high performance you need more than a super cub's steel tube frame. That said, the F-15 was a revolution in maintainability. My point, 120, is that you can't have your cake and eat it too - there is no magic jet that can perform well AND be easily rebuilt - if that were the case, everyone would be able to build high performance fighters, not just a few countries.



Didn't the USAF CHOOSE the F-16 for those missions? Doesn't the USAF CHOOSE to fund high performance fighters to do missions they aren't suited for? Answer why the USAF doesn't/didn't purchase some low-performance, cheaper aircraft for COIN, to keep the wear and tear down on high-performance aircraft....

The Air Force chose what it could afford... it is much easier to adapt an aircraft you already own rather than buy a new one. Reference the F-105G, F-4G, USAF A-1, AC-47/119/130.... The USAF HAS purchased aircraft for COIN, and is buying more - RC-12, PC-12, NSA, T-6A, Predator, Reaper, numerous other light UAVs...


And now they're crying about CHOICES they have consistently made? How about we fire the USAF guys who made these choices, and while we're at it, let's see some retired officers involved in these programs brought back to active duty for courts martial, stripped of rank and their retirement.

Not sure what your beef is here. My point is that airplanes wear out. Additionally the state of the art is constantly advancing - there is an effective limit to how much better you can make a 30 year old aircraft. This is the way it is - no one CHOSE to not be able to buy new aircraft.



HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!! I'm an A&P, and I've done heavy checks and rebuilds. (some on Air Farce aircraft) Please, tell me all about your "experience".


I have supervised the depot process for aircraft from all four services. Work done included SLEPs, rebuilds, repair of damage post mishaps, modifications, and routine phase maintenance. Also supervised production of multiple fighter and helo components.

Are personal attacks neccessary to make your point? I mentioned my experience only to point out that I had first-hand knowledge of what I was talking about.


Bull ####. The majority of the work can be done by drunken, poo-flinging monkeys. (And it is, in heavy rebuild shops across the world) With proper supervision, of course....

Thanks for the lecture, Cliff. Fortunately, the US has all sorts of facilities that can do these things. (maintenance, that is.) I'm not saying that aircraft aren't life-limited, I'm saying that "life-limited" is only defined by a) the cost of heavy maintenance/rebuild, b) the real capabilities need, versus the USAF Bull#### one and c) the cost of new airframes.


There is a major difference between working civil aircraft and high performance military aircraft. Different repair facilities/companies and factories have different levels of skill. You can tell who maintained an aircraft without being told based on the condition of it.

Anytime a new company begins working on an aircraft they haven't dealt with before you have a 1-2 year learning period where things will not be done well or correctly. I have supervised some of these processes and trust me - there is a huge learning curve. Technical and training assistance is neccessary. Yes anyone could do the work - but then the jets would have huge problems (they still have some!) and you'd lose a lot more jets.


Mainly, though, this is about the the USAF wanting more and new toys to play with, that coincidentally, contribute very little to the actual defense of the US or fighting it's wars.

I'd be good with the USAF actually picking up a few extra COIN airframes to economically decrease wear and tear on the high performance aircraft, but the USAF would never ask for those airframes, as they don't fit the "Buck Rogers, Gofaster, Boom and Zoom" image of the USAF wonks....

Already in progress. Oh by the way sent hundreds of fighter pilots to fly the new UAVs and COIN aircraft. The AFs point is that you need balance - the COIN capes and the high end. As you have pointed out previously, we need the F-22s and F-35s to make sure the war is small enough that the COIN aircraft (RC-12, PC-12, T-6 etc) can work.

Not trying to lecture anyone, just offering my opinions.

V/R,

Cliff

120mm
10-17-2008, 12:29 PM
<snip> To get the high performance you need more than a super cub's steel tube frame. That said, the F-15 was a revolution in maintainability. My point, 120, is that you can't have your cake and eat it too - there is no magic jet that can perform well AND be easily rebuilt - if that were the case, everyone would be able to build high performance fighters, not just a few countries.

The Air Force chose what it could afford... it is much easier to adapt an aircraft you already own rather than buy a new one. Reference the F-105G, F-4G, USAF A-1, AC-47/119/130.... The USAF HAS purchased aircraft for COIN, and is buying more - RC-12, PC-12, NSA, T-6A, Predator, Reaper, numerous other light UAVs...

Not sure what your beef is here. My point is that airplanes wear out. Additionally the state of the art is constantly advancing - there is an effective limit to how much better you can make a 30 year old aircraft. This is the way it is - no one CHOSE to not be able to buy new aircraft.


Here is the crux of the problem. The Air Force has, in its history, chosen the airplanes it wanted, which has rarely equalled the aircraft the country needed for its defense. The F-105 is a great example of a boondoggle, that the USAF mismanaged into a role it was extremely ill-suited for.

And they are still trying to push an agenda to buy even more aircraft there is no evidence that it really needs. Which is why the Air Force chief is acting like a teenaged drama queen.

And the personal attack was in response to the "I'm the only one in this room professional enough to use this Glock Foh-tay" comment you made about depot maintenance. I found that assumptive, demeaning and mildly offensive.

Entropy
10-20-2008, 04:49 AM
...and this thread has taken an interesting turn. Some comments:

Ken said,

Not that I'd expect the manufacturers to be purposely headed in that direction to insure product replacement instead of product refurbishment


Well, in the "good old days" manufacturers would design an aircraft then try to sell it to the military - now the military tells the manufacturers (only 2 now, sadly) what they're looking for which has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that upgradeability is built into today's designs. The services expect aircraft to be in the inventory for 3-4 decades at least so upgrades are part of the package now. That's not to say that I support the current procurement process, which I think is completely broken, but I don't think it's completely accurate to suggest there is planned obsolescence in current designs - rather the opposite is often true as many upgrades are planned well in advance. Even so, it's simply impossible to design an airframe that will be guaranteed to meet military needs in 30 years time, whatever technical do-dads you can add on along the way.

120mm:


Answer why the USAF doesn't/didn't purchase some low-performance, cheaper aircraft for COIN, to keep the wear and tear down on high-performance aircraft....

and


Here is the crux of the problem. The Air Force has, in its history, chosen the airplanes it wanted, which has rarely equalled the aircraft the country needed for its defense.

and


And they are still trying to push an agenda to buy even more aircraft there is no evidence that it really needs. Which is why the Air Force chief is acting like a teenaged drama queen.


BTW, is that your jeep? If it is, huge props to you!

Let me ask you a question - since Goldwater-Nichols or the establishment of the AVF, was there ever a requirement for the Air Force to develop a "COIN Aircraft?" The simple fact of the matter is that all the services to include both the Army and Air Force did not consider COIN important enough to fund specific capabilities in that area for the conventional forces. COIN capabilities were relegated to the special forces. If you want some COIN-specific USAF aircraft, I suggest you take a gander at the AFSOC inventory.

So you ask why didn't the AF make a "cheaper" COIN aircraft - well, ISTM the answer is pretty obvious. DoD and Congress had no interest in a COIN capability. The AF can certainly be faulted for this oversight, but no more than any other service, or the defense leadership, or Congress; particularly since the AF role in COIN is minimal compared to the Army. It's not a particularly good argument to single out the AF when the service the AF supports in COIN had no interest in COIN either. It's kind of like ordering and paying for cable TV without owning a television - actually, without owning a television and without any intention of buying one anytime soon. That doesn't make much sense and neither did a large fleet of specialized COIN aircraft without a force for it to support. (more on a COIN aircraft in a minute)

As for your second quote, it seems to reflect a view or perhaps wishful thinking that the AF is either a subordinate service or not qualified to decide matters in it's military sphere. Yes, the AF has chosen the airplanes it wanted (with DoD and Congressional approval) just like the other services get to choose what equipment they want. You expected something different? Whether or not what was actually chosen (by any or all the services) was needed for the country's defense at a particular point in time is ultimately a subjective exercise particularly in regards to potential future conflicts.

Your third quote takes us down another rhetorical road of supposition where opinion is presented as fact. Frankly, what continually annoys me whenever the Air Force comes up here are the often vacuous criticisms of service priorities, but what really gets old is the questioning of motives. Cogent and informed criticism of the AF will always be welcomed by me - simplistic declarations that something is "needless" and is only being pursued because of some "agenda" is not only unhelpful in any debate but is also offensive. What is also tiring is that this kind of unhelpful criticism appears, to me at least, to be largely one way. I find myself compelled to defend the Air Force from these kinds of attacks (that sometimes appear as the collective Army view due to the frequency they're espoused in a variety of fora) despite the fact I'm about as far away from the fighter mafia as one can get having served in most of the red-headed stepchildren roles in my AF career (airlift, CSAR and special ops).


Finally, this whole discussion on whether or not the US can reproduce this or that seems pretty pointless. The question is not whether or not the US can built more F-15's (an aircraft which is still in production) or whether we can go back and build more or refurbish F-5's, P-51's or whatever. Of course we could - the question is whether it is wise to do so. I would suggest it's not wise for all the same reasons it's not wise to do so with old tanks, trucks, guns or ships - it's simply not cost-effective in terms of military capability and economics. In the case of aviation, one only needs to look at civilian aviation for evidence. If refurbishment were such a great idea we'd all be flying around in upgraded 707's, L-1011's, DC-10's and 727's instead of A320's, 757's, 737-800's, 777's etc. It's not exactly a secret in the aviation community that there comes a point when upgrading to a new design is the better option than upgrading or maintaining an existing aircraft. The same principles apply to military aviation and we haven't even discussed threats, which the civvies don't have to deal with. Just ask anyone who's been stuck in Dover, Manas, Kuwait or wherever when the POS low-bid rotator contractor (inevitably flying one of those older airframes) breaks for days and leaves you or your unit stranded.

Additionally a modern jet fighter or, really, any advanced piece of military gear, is more comparable to a Formula 1 race car than a jeep or a super cub. Most advanced military equipment (not just planes), like race cars, require a relatively high ratio of maintenance hours to operational hours. That's the price of performance. While it's certainly true that high-performance (and, by extension, expensive to operate and maintain) equipment is not necessary for COIN, COIN-specific, cheap, low-performance equipment is almost useless in other types of conflict. The OV-10, A-1 and T-6 fit that bill IMO. I frankly don't see why so many are enamored with these aircraft. They are great for indigenous forces and they are capable in a COIN environment, but what advantage do they really bring?. They don't provide any greater capability than existing aircraft and one can easily argue they provide less capability in many situations compared to existing airframes. They do cost less to operate, but one has to consider that such aircraft are one-trick ponies and will sit on the sidelines in any environment with any kind of significant surface-to-air threat because they have such low survivability. Seriously, explain why these aircraft would be so great - I really do not see it.

Ken White
10-20-2008, 02:29 PM
...I don't think it's completely accurate to suggest there is planned obsolescence in current designs - rather the opposite is often true as many upgrades are planned well in advance.Upgrade does not equal refurbish or rebuild
Even so, it's simply impossible to design an airframe that will be guaranteed to meet military needs in 30 years time, whatever technical do-dads you can add on along the way.I question that and would also offer that, even if true, it is very much mission dependent in application.
...Frankly, what continually annoys me whenever the Air Force comes up here are the often vacuous criticisms of service priorities, but what really gets old is the questioning of motives. Cogent and informed criticism of the AF will always be welcomed by me - simplistic declarations that something is "needless" and is only being pursued because of some "agenda" is not only unhelpful in any debate but is also offensive.I'm not at all sure why it should be offensive. People have agendas; bureaucracies have agendas. The services ALL have their own agendas -- and some of the motives of ALL the service are not pure as the driven snow...

I believe the cliche "Where there's smoke..." probably applies. Do note that I am specifically saying ALL the services are guilty of this, it's a human nature thing
...If refurbishment were such a great idea we'd all be flying around in upgraded 707's, L-1011's, DC-10's and 727's instead of A320's, 757's, 737-800's, 777's etc.It is, of course, superfluous of me to note that a good many folks with less money to waste than the US seem to be doing just that -- and pretty successfully.
...While it's certainly true that high-performance (and, by extension, expensive to operate and maintain) equipment is not necessary for COIN, COIN-specific, cheap, low-performance equipment is almost useless in other types of conflict.True. Need both capabilities. Uh, what other kinds of air battle have we waged in the last 50 years? ;)
...The OV-10, A-1 and T-6 fit that bill IMO. I frankly don't see why so many are enamored with these aircraft. ... Seriously, explain why these aircraft would be so great - I really do not see it.Because they'll take a licking and keep on ticking; contrary to your assertion, they are all very tough durable aircraft that have proven the ability to take combat damage and continue missions as well as get the crew back home. They also are 'upgradeable' -- and refurbishable. :cool:

120mm
10-20-2008, 02:49 PM
BTW, is that your jeep? If it is, huge props to you!

Naw, just an example of how "modded out" a base concept can be, and still share a common heritage.



Let me ask you a question - since Goldwater-Nichols or the establishment of the AVF, was there ever a requirement for the Air Force to develop a "COIN Aircraft?" The simple fact of the matter is that all the services to include both the Army and Air Force did not consider COIN important enough to fund specific capabilities in that area for the conventional forces. COIN capabilities were relegated to the special forces. If you want some COIN-specific USAF aircraft, I suggest you take a gander at the AFSOC inventory.

So you ask why didn't the AF make a "cheaper" COIN aircraft - well, ISTM the answer is pretty obvious. DoD and Congress had no interest in a COIN capability. The AF can certainly be faulted for this oversight, but no more than any other service, or the defense leadership, or Congress; particularly since the AF role in COIN is minimal compared to the Army. It's not a particularly good argument to single out the AF when the service the AF supports in COIN had no interest in COIN either. It's kind of like ordering and paying for cable TV without owning a television - actually, without owning a television and without any intention of buying one anytime soon. That doesn't make much sense and neither did a large fleet of specialized COIN aircraft without a force for it to support. (more on a COIN aircraft in a minute)


It's not just COIN; it's the USAF consistently killing CAS aircraft, or attempting to kill CAS aircraft throughout their existence. While that may have changed, the USAF is currently suffering from a negative perception, and not doing enough to correct for that negative perception. And even when they attempt to, they come off as being "high-handed", such as their arrogance with the UAS issue.


As for your second quote, it seems to reflect a view or perhaps wishful thinking that the AF is either a subordinate service or not qualified to decide matters in it's military sphere. Yes, the AF has chosen the airplanes it wanted (with DoD and Congressional approval) just like the other services get to choose what equipment they want. You expected something different? Whether or not what was actually chosen (by any or all the services) was needed for the country's defense at a particular point in time is ultimately a subjective exercise particularly in regards to potential future conflicts.

News flash, here. The USAF IS a subordinate service. They exist to support the Army in the fighting of our nation's wars. Period. Just like the Navy exists to get the Army to theater, and keep them resupplied. Which is the fundamental issue here. If I am a customer service provider, and I fail to ANTICIPATE for a change in customer demand, I GO OUT OF BUSINESS. It's not the customer's job to know what they will want tomorrow; it's the job of the customer service provider to anticipate the customer's needs and fulfill them.

I know what I'm saying here will completely blow the mind of the hide-bound and the "top-down" thinkers, but the military services don't need to be totally reactive in their planning for war-fighting. Of course, it's working so good for the military so far....


Your third quote takes us down another rhetorical road of supposition where opinion is presented as fact. Frankly, what continually annoys me whenever the Air Force comes up here are the often vacuous criticisms of service priorities, but what really gets old is the questioning of motives. Cogent and informed criticism of the AF will always be welcomed by me - simplistic declarations that something is "needless" and is only being pursued because of some "agenda" is not only unhelpful in any debate but is also offensive. What is also tiring is that this kind of unhelpful criticism appears, to me at least, to be largely one way. I find myself compelled to defend the Air Force from these kinds of attacks (that sometimes appear as the collective Army view due to the frequency they're espoused in a variety of fora) despite the fact I'm about as far away from the fighter mafia as one can get having served in most of the red-headed stepchildren roles in my AF career (airlift, CSAR and special ops).


Finally, this whole discussion on whether or not the US can reproduce this or that seems pretty pointless. The question is not whether or not the US can built more F-15's (an aircraft which is still in production) or whether we can go back and build more or refurbish F-5's, P-51's or whatever. Of course we could - the question is whether it is wise to do so. I would suggest it's not wise for all the same reasons it's not wise to do so with old tanks, trucks, guns or ships - it's simply not cost-effective in terms of military capability and economics. In the case of aviation, one only needs to look at civilian aviation for evidence. If refurbishment were such a great idea we'd all be flying around in upgraded 707's, L-1011's, DC-10's and 727's instead of A320's, 757's, 737-800's, 777's etc. It's not exactly a secret in the aviation community that there comes a point when upgrading to a new design is the better option than upgrading or maintaining an existing aircraft. The same principles apply to military aviation and we haven't even discussed threats, which the civvies don't have to deal with. Just ask anyone who's been stuck in Dover, Manas, Kuwait or wherever when the POS low-bid rotator contractor (inevitably flying one of those older airframes) breaks for days and leaves you or your unit stranded.

You'll note that this all started when I pointed out that USAF aircraft don't get "worn out", they become less economically feasible to fix than to build new. Therefore, hysterical references to aircraft being "worn out" and drama queen references to "The USAF going out of business" generally expose bad intent and/or lack of competence on behalf of the individual making them.



Additionally a modern jet fighter or, really, any advanced piece of military gear, is more comparable to a Formula 1 race car than a jeep or a super cub. Most advanced military equipment (not just planes), like race cars, require a relatively high ratio of maintenance hours to operational hours. That's the price of performance. While it's certainly true that high-performance (and, by extension, expensive to operate and maintain) equipment is not necessary for COIN, COIN-specific, cheap, low-performance equipment is almost useless in other types of conflict. The OV-10, A-1 and T-6 fit that bill IMO. I frankly don't see why so many are enamored with these aircraft. You mean, besides the fact that they are useful for the great majority of forseeable conflicts?
They are great for indigenous forces and they are capable in a COIN environment, but what advantage do they really bring?. They don't provide any greater capability than existing aircraft and one can easily argue they provide less capability in many situations compared to existing airframes. They do cost less to operate, but one has to consider that such aircraft are one-trick ponies and will sit on the sidelines in any environment with any kind of significant surface-to-air threat because they have such low survivability. Seriously, explain why these aircraft would be so great - I really do not see it.

So, high performance aircraft are too finicky to use in COIN, but COIN suitable aircraft aren't useful for other "fictitious and highly improbable forms of warfare that the USAF PREFERS to prepare for?

You, sir, make my case.

Entropy
10-21-2008, 12:21 AM
I question that and would also offer that, even if true, it is very much mission dependent in application.

Well, ISTM until one can predict the future one can't guarantee that some piece of equipment won't become OBE for one reason or another. It's certainly possible to design in a certain amount of flexibility and you're right that it's all mission dependent. That's a big reason why the Navy and Air Force in particular favor multipurpose equipment and not one-trick ponies.


I'm not at all sure why it should be offensive. People have agendas; bureaucracies have agendas. The services ALL have their own agendas -- and some of the motives of ALL the service are not pure as the driven snow...

Never suggested people and organizations didn't have agendas, nor did I ever suggest anything was pure as the driven snow - quite the opposite. The problem for me is that some seem to believe in these agendas as the root of Air Force thinking to the exclusion of alternative motivations. It implies a certain amount of dishonesty and that's what I find offensive. For example, in most discussions here Air Force motivations are perceived as, variously, attempts to maintain "relevance" (as if that were a bad thing), or justifying the AF budget, or satisfying the whims of the zipper-suited sun gods that (until recently) run the AF. The possibility that perhaps the AF leadership simply has a different perspective on whatever issue is not commonly entertained as a possibility.

FWIW, I freely admit I may be reading too much into it and might be overly sensitive.


I believe the cliche "Where there's smoke..." probably applies. Do note that I am specifically saying ALL the services are guilty of this, it's a human nature thing

Where's the smoke? A bunch of people making claims the Air Force only wants (insert name of unpopular system/decision/policy) because of whatever agenda du jour doesn't mean much to me. Maybe if there was a little more substance we might have some smoke.


It is, of course, superfluous of me to note that a good many folks with less money to waste than the US seem to be doing just that -- and pretty successfully.

The major carriers don't seem to have a lot of money to waste considering many are perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy, nevermind that most new civilian aircraft production goes to non-US customers.

The bottom line is that in the majority of cases buying new aircraft is the better choice than refurbishing old aircraft. If refurbishing aircraft were such a great idea I would expect to see businesses that do exactly that and I would expect to see airlines refurbishing their existing aircraft or purchasing refurbished aircraft instead of new aircraft. The fact that these businesses do not exist in a major capacity and the fact that airlines the world over prefer to retire old aircraft and buy new indicates to me the refurbishment model is generally not a good one.

The same principle applies to military aircraft, only moreso because military aircraft have to take threats and combat performance into account. Those additional factors only serve to make the choice between buying new and refurbishing all the more apparent. And this principle doesn't just apply to aircraft since we see the same preference to buy new after a certain point in most kinds of equipment.

If anyone has some evidence to the contrary, then by all means, let's hear it. For a real-world example one can look at the debate currently going on whether to upgrade the C-5 fleet with new engines and avionics or retire the fleet and buy more C-17's to replace the capacity the C-5 provided. Cost-wise, going with C-17's is actually much cheaper over the long run, but of course one must factor in things besides cost - such as the value of the C-5's larger single-aircraft capacity. The KC-135 is another example. Most of the fleet has already gone through various refurbishments to include structural work, engines, avionics, wiring, reskinning, etc. This has increased the life of the airframe but has not made readiness rates and O&M costs even closely comparable to what a new tanker would provide - so rather than refurb the 135 yet again, the AF wisely wants a new tanker. A new tanker will be cheaper, more reliable, less risky and provide more capability, all at reduced long-term cost over keeping the 135 for eternity.


Because they'll take a licking and keep on ticking; contrary to your assertion, they are all very tough durable aircraft that have proven the ability to take combat damage and continue missions as well as get the crew back home. They also are 'upgradeable' -- and refurbishable. :cool:

Durability is only one factor - one that certainly has importance but is countered by better threat mitigation of higher-performance aircraft, to say nothing of greater utility. And then there are UAS' which appear better-suited to COIN in many cases than manned aircraft of any type. If durability is the only reason to procure and sustain a specialist COIN aircraft then I don't find it all that compelling of a justification.

Entropy
10-21-2008, 12:21 AM
120MM:


It's not just COIN; it's the USAF consistently killing CAS aircraft, or attempting to kill CAS aircraft throughout their existence. While that may have changed, the USAF is currently suffering from a negative perception, and not doing enough to correct for that negative perception. And even when they attempt to, they come off as being "high-handed", such as their arrogance with the UAS issue.

I've written here a few times that basic criticism and suggested many times the AF basically sucks at explaining itself. I've said before that the AF is it's own worst enemy. However, A lack of capability at effective communication and persuasion does not automatically make the AF wrong or its priorities "needless."

And please define "CAS aircraft." What aircraft are providing CAS in theater today? Pretty much everything from UAS' to "strategic" bombers. The main problem with CAS support to the Army was not about a lack of suitable platforms, but bad blood between the services that resulted in hardly any CAS training and coordination prior to the conflict. Once the problems in air-ground coordination were worked out, complaints about CAS largely went away. Procedures, coordination and training for CAS is ultimately much more important than the particulars of the delivery platform. Some of the AAR's and lesson's learned I've read from soldiers talk about preferred CAS platforms and they are as likely to be an F-15 or B-1 as an A-10. So it seems that the reality of AF support for CAS in recent decades is a bit different than the perception.


News flash, here. The USAF IS a subordinate service. They exist to support the Army in the fighting of our nation's wars. Period. Just like the Navy exists to get the Army to theater, and keep them resupplied.

Uh, no it's not. Support does not equal subordination. You think when the Navy and Marine Corps were created shortly after the Army in 1775 their purpose was to support the Army? Or were they created to support the national security of the United States, which required the capabilities of all three? There is no senior service to which the others must prostrate themselves because all the services are subordinate to the same master. The Navy, Marine Corp and yes, Air Force all have missions - important ones - separate from the Army. However, in the vast majority of cases military operations require more than one service in mutual support which is why we rely on joint doctrine to inform our warfighting. That the Army relies on the support of others and that the ground element most often represents the main military effort does not make the Army or ground element superior and the others subordinate.


Which is the fundamental issue here.

No, the fundamental issue is not the superiority of one organizational construct over another. The fundamental issue is how should we organize military forces to do what we want them to do, which is to deter wars and, if necessary, win them. Unless you can come up with a superior organizational model, the one we have, where expertise resides in organizations that operate in different physical elements, seems like a good one. Unsurprisingly, it's the model most nations use. The problem with your false hierarchy that it implies and supports arguments the Army/ground force knows best the content character and means to provide the support it receives.


If I am a customer service provider, and I fail to ANTICIPATE for a change in customer demand, I GO OUT OF BUSINESS. It's not the customer's job to know what they will want tomorrow; it's the job of the customer service provider to anticipate the customer's needs and fulfill them.

So let me get this straight. Not only is the Army the superior service, but the responsibility to identify the Army's future support needs rests not with the Army but with the other services? That strikes me as absurd on its face. Regardless, your characterization is incorrect because support requirements are made collectively by all the services, depending on their particular stake in the issue.


You'll note that this all started when I pointed out that USAF aircraft don't get "worn out", they become less economically feasible to fix than to build new. Therefore, hysterical references to aircraft being "worn out" and drama queen references to "The USAF going out of business" generally expose bad intent and/or lack of competence on behalf of the individual making them.


Agreed. If you look up thread you'll see I stated at the outset that this A-10 wing problem wasn't that big of a deal.


You mean, besides the fact that they are useful for the great majority of forseeable conflicts?

Great majority of foreseeable conflicts? If the great majority of forseeable conflicts will be LIC/COIN with little to no air threat then you might be right. That kind of definitive judgment is quite debatable, however. My point is not that those aircraft are not useful, it's that they are no more useful than existing aircraft and because they don't have much utility outside LIC/COIN they should only be acquired in limited numbers, if at all.


So, high performance aircraft are too finicky to use in COIN, but COIN suitable aircraft aren't useful for other "fictitious and highly improbable forms of warfare that the USAF PREFERS to prepare for?

Not what I said at all. I never claimed so-called hi-pro aircraft are too finicky for COIN. Furthermore, I'd be careful about making claims that certain types of warfare are "fictitious or highly improbable" since it was similar claims that, in part, left us unprepared for our current conflicts.

Ken White
10-21-2008, 02:43 AM
...That's a big reason why the Navy and Air Force in particular favor multipurpose equipment and not one-trick ponies.That and Congressional pressure, that and a desire to have state of the art ++ birds in the vein of "Best is the enemy of good enough," that and the ability to fill only X pilot seats...

One is still confronted with the fact that multipurpose = compromises. :wry:
...FWIW, I freely admit I may be reading too much into it and might be overly sensitive.All things are possible. I may be too cynical and thus accepting of parochialism as a fact of life; no big thing, I think...
Where's the smoke? A bunch of people making claims the Air Force only wants (insert name of unpopular system/decision/policy) because of whatever agenda du jour doesn't mean much to me. Maybe if there was a little more substance we might have some smoke.You want smoke? Look at the USAFs record on dedicated CAS aircraft... :eek:
The major carriers don't seem to have a lot of money to waste considering many are perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy, nevermind that most new civilian aircraft production goes to non-US customers.All true but that doesn't negate my point; L1011s and DC-10/11s have a lot of years left. Does maintenenance cost more? Sure but that's partly because manufacturers have no need to build in long life unless the customer specifies it. Airlines have a valid customer appeal reason to not necessarily do that; do Air Forces have such a need?
The bottom line is that in the majority of cases buying new aircraft is the better choice than refurbishing old aircraft...True today -- my point was and is that that is not a graven in stone truth, it is simply the way things are. Many things that 'are' do not happen to be optimum.
Durability is only one factor - one that certainly has importance but is countered by better threat mitigation of higher-performance aircraft, to say nothing of greater utility. And then there are UAS' which appear better-suited to COIN in many cases than manned aircraft of any type. If durability is the only reason to procure and sustain a specialist COIN aircraft then I don't find it all that compelling of a justification.I don't find it compelling either. However, when that factor is added to mission capability certainly a case for the aircraft exists. Does to those of us who've been on the ground and happy that birds were available but I gotta tell you I've watched too many Fox 4s, a great bird by any standard, get terribly embarrassed by little bitty Skyhawks and REALLY embarrassed by some Spads. Capability is as or more important than durability. Both would be nice where attainable... :cool:

Cliff
10-21-2008, 06:12 AM
That and Congressional pressure, that and a desire to have state of the art ++ birds in the vein of "Best is the enemy of good enough," that and the ability to fill only X pilot seats...

But when the enemy has state of the art+ birds and state of the art+++ SAMs, you need something to counter that threat.



One is still confronted with the fact that multipurpose = compromises. :wry:All things are possible. I may be too cynical and thus accepting of parochialism as a fact of life; no big thing, I think...You want smoke? Look at the USAFs record on dedicated CAS aircraft... :eek:


When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose. Consider this - what is more effective at CAS - a trained JTAC, working with a B-1 or B-52 with a targeting pod that can stay on station for hours and a Predator that can stay on station for 24+ hours, or an A-10 that bingoes out after an hour or so and has to be replaced?

What's the difference between them? The former requires a more permissive SAM environment, as well as a lower air threat - but the similarity is that neither of them can happen if your opponent has double digit SAMs and advanced Flankers... Unless you have 5th gen fighters like the F-22 to take care of those threats first. The A-10 is the expert at CAS, no question... but they are not the only answer.

Bottom line, a few cheap SAMs can make all your A-1s, OV-10s, etc useless...



All true but that doesn't negate my point; L1011s and DC-10/11s have a lot of years left. Does maintenenance cost more? Sure but that's partly because manufacturers have no need to build in long life unless the customer specifies it. Airlines have a valid customer appeal reason to not necessarily do that; do Air Forces have such a need?True today -- my point was and is that that is not a graven in stone truth, it is simply the way things are. Many things that 'are' do not happen to be optimum.I don't find it compelling either. However, when that factor is added to mission capability certainly a case for the aircraft exists. Does to those of us who've been on the ground and happy that birds were available but I gotta tell you I've watched too many Fox 4s, a great bird by any standard, get terribly embarrassed by little bitty Skyhawks and REALLY embarrassed by some Spads. Capability is as or more important than durability. Both would be nice where attainable... :cool:

First, as to F-4s being embarassed - the CAS mission was not adequately trained for or resourced in Vietnam. I think most people would agree with that. But that was 30 years ago... Today the USAF has institutionalized CAS, and trains to it quite a bit. Even multi-role fighters like the F-16, as well as bombers like the B-52 and B-1 train to the mission. In addition, the Army and USAF has developed new and better ways of training to the mission. Finally, new technology like full motion video, UAS, and JDAMs have made CAS a completely new game. I am not saying the USAF is perfect, but you cannot ignore the progress that has been and continues to be made.

Second, it is not possible to build fighters with as long of a life as you are talking about without reducing performance. Weight is one of the #1 factors in fighter performance, and the longer the life of the airplane for a given G/airspeed capability, the beefier the structure must be... or you can pay a lot more money to develop new materials.

As Entropy has mentioned, pretty much all airlines replace their aircraft way more often than any of the military services... because it is not economical to continue upgrading them. You can refurbish/update military aircraft to a point, but once the enemy's technology reaches a certain point you can no longer economically compete.

By your arguements, the Army should still be using M-113s and M-60A2/A3s and just keep upgrading them... after all, they did fine in the past and should be good enough to have parity with the current threat, right? I think even most COIN enthusiasts would say agree that only having a credible COIN capability and no high end capability is a bad idea.

As I have said before, the Army and Marines need to focus on the current fight, and COIN is a huge part of that. In this fight the USAF is definitely the supporting service... hence why the USAF is maxing out Predator capes, using fighters and bombers to supplement ISR, and buying NSAs, RC-12s, PC-12s, and T-6s.

The Air Force and Navy, however, need to keep a certain level of high-end capability... the only reason wars in the near term will be small is because we have made it very expensive to fight us at the high end. There are a lot of countries who have not completely given up on the high end, however... the USAF and USN need balanced capabilities, as do the Army and USMC, so that we can deter the high end conflict and keep future wars small.

Steve Blair
10-21-2008, 01:47 PM
The Air Force and Navy, however, need to keep a certain level of high-end capability... the only reason wars in the near term will be small is because we have made it very expensive to fight us at the high end. There are a lot of countries who have not completely given up on the high end, however... the USAF and USN need balanced capabilities, as do the Army and USMC, so that we can deter the high end conflict and keep future wars small.

And this is the key. The AF wants to be almost totally high-end, and only look to the lower end of the scale if pushed or forced by an external agency. If SAMs are a big concern, maybe the best answer is to do away with all those high-end wonder planes and go with a drone force. Think of all the money you'd save by getting rid of those expensive pilots and replacing them with ground controllers....;)

In all seriousness, I still think the biggest problem is that AF procurement (and they aren't the only ones that do this...but they are the subject of this thread) always wants to go for the silver bullet special. If it's got whatever the "latest and greatest" is, they want it. And they want lots of them, and seem perfectly willing to let the rest of the operational fleet degrade while they focus on developing the wonder-system (one plane to rule them all). And quite often they end up with a system that is compromised to tack on one of the lower-end missions that they wanted to ignore in the first place (see the F-105, F-4, F-16) or the money effectively ends up flushed when the system never quite comes on-line (XB-70). Again, this is a problem throughout the procurement system, but it's the AF we're talking about now.

And with those advanced Flankers, what's to prevent us from coming up with either a good SAM or advanced drones? How many good drones could you get for the cost of one F-22? And how many advanced Flankers have actually been fielded? I know they're the poster child for the high-end threat market, but I also get the distinct feeling that there are far fewer of them actually operational.

Historically the AF has, when pushed, made great strides in CAS and similar fields, only to lose those capabilities and lessons as soon as the situation passes and they can return to focusing on their dream conflict (and yes, the Army does this, too). I, for one, get tired of seeing this same institutional slide show repeating itself. It's the institutional response side of Iraq that most closely resembles Vietnam, not the battlefield side or even the domestic response side. And that's where I fear we will once again see history repeat itself.

wm
10-21-2008, 02:18 PM
I think we need to stop bashing the AF here. Acquisition programs require the approval of a cast of thousands across the entire Federal Government. You might reflect that programs have to be vetted through the JCS organization and the DoD organization as well. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves requirements documentds and the USD (AT&L) is usually the approval authority for the kind of big ticket procurement programs that seem to be of concern to folks in this thread.

Please note that the current USD (AT&L),Mr. Young just killed a couple of programs, like the Army new armed recon helo (Link (http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20081017634629.html)) and the new SATCOM system (TSAT) that was going to get used by both the AF and the Army's FCS systems (Link (http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20081021635279.html))

William F. Owen
10-21-2008, 03:24 PM
When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose.

The stated requirement to make aircraft "multi-role" has been used to justify the high cost of aircraft since about 1965 onwards. It's also a selective argument, and one that doesn't really account for the role creep we have seen since about 1942.


Bottom line, a few cheap SAMs can make all your A-1s, OV-10s, etc useless...

OK, the A-1 is no longer an act of war, but the OV-10 would just fly to the threat profile, same as any other CAS aircraft. The work done to weapons fit the Predators, makes the OV-10 argument all over again.

As concerns SAMs, so what? You can drop JDAMs off a P-3, or AC-130 as long as they fly above 16,000ft and out of the MANPAD threat umbrella.

Ken White
10-21-2008, 03:49 PM
everyone that I'm not an AF basher and that I strongly support the need to buy the F-22 and the F-35 as well as a new tanker and new bomber.
But when the enemy has state of the art+ birds and state of the art+++ SAMs, you need something to counter that threat.True; that assumes that the SAMs do what's advertised -- a problem that our erstwhile opponents have long had. On the birds, simply do the math. In other words; yes, you're right -- but don't overstate the case. ;) .
When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose.Agree that's reality but it doesn't change the equation
Consider this - what is more effective at CAS - a trained JTAC, working with a B-1 or B-52 with a targeting pod that can stay on station for hours and a Predator that can stay on station for 24+ hours, or an A-10 that bingoes out after an hour or so and has to be replaced?Too many variables on the ground and in the air, not least the level of combat on the spot at the time can affect that. Thus, that's a disingenuous question. The answer as always is METT-TC and "it depends."
The A-10 is the expert at CAS, no question... but they are not the only answer.No, they aren't the only answer but they remain the best answer to date; all else is compromise.
Bottom line, a few cheap SAMs can make all your A-1s, OV-10s, etc useless.Which is why you guys put so much effort into taking them out -- and why the Army is will ing to help do that by whatever means.
First, as to F-4s being embarassed - the CAS mission was not adequately trained for or resourced in Vietnam. I think most people would agree with that.I don't agree with it one bit and I had two grunt tours there. CAS was good, my point was simply that a great multipurpose platform cannot do as well what a purpose designed platform can do.
...I am not saying the USAF is perfect, but you cannot ignore the progress that has been and continues to be made.I do not and am not; this is a pseudo-philosophical argument on my part and I'm merely pointing out that, as both you and Entropy acknowledge, sometimes the AF senior leadership is it's own worst enemy. That BTW is also true of the other services and I've bashed them all including the Army regularly. My point was that the AF, subject of this thread, has made decisions on priorities that reflect reality and their view of the world but there are other ways to look at those priorities. I make no pretense at having all the answers -- but I'm firmly convinced no one else has them all either...
Second, it is not possible to build fighters with as long of a life as you are talking about without reducing performance.True
You can refurbish/update military aircraft to a point, but once the enemy's technology reaches a certain point you can no longer economically compete.Also true.
By your arguements, the Army should still be using M-113s and M-60A2/A3s and just keep upgrading them... after all, they did fine in the past and should be good enough to have parity with the current threat, right?Only if the Army had specified and desired that capability. I'd submit that it's appropriate for the 113 but not for the Tank. By the same token, that philosophy is IMO, appropriate for CAS and transport aircraft as I alluded but it is not for air to air fighters.
I think even most COIN enthusiasts would say agree that only having a credible COIN capability and no high end capability is a bad idea.No argument there, full spectrum capability is required of all the services. I will suggest that both the Army and the AF would rather not have COIN to worry about but that at this time, the AF -- in the persons of Dunlap and Deptula -- is seemingly way out front in wishing COIN would go away; I think that's a strong impetus for this thread.
There are a lot of countries who have not completely given up on the high end, however... the USAF and USN need balanced capabilities, as do the Army and USMC, so that we can deter the high end conflict and keep future wars small.I think we just said the same thing a different way... :cool:

Entropy
10-21-2008, 04:24 PM
That and Congressional pressure, that and a desire to have state of the art ++ birds in the vein of "Best is the enemy of good enough," that and the ability to fill only X pilot seats...

Well, the rumor among some of my AF friends is that part of the reason the AF leadership wants more than 183 F-22's is because with so few aircraft there won't be many pure fighter pilots in the future and so the fighter mafia won't take almost all the leadership positions. :wry: There is probably a grain of truth to that, but there are also legitimate reasons, IMO, to increase the F-22 buy. One thing to keep in mind is that capping production at 183 aircraft and closing the line, the AF will probably want an F-22 follow-on sooner than might otherwise be the case ;)

And I agree with you on the problem with a mentality that demands the best at the expense of the good enough - something that seems to afflict military procurement in general. Part of the thinking however, at least with the F-22, is that it will be the principle air superiority weapon for four decades and that it must be state-of-the-art now to ensure it remains competitive against potential threats 30 years from now (particularly the surface-to-air threat, which I see as much more of a problem over the next decade or two than enemy fighters). There is some legitimacy to that argument, but I think the AF has oversold it. As I said in another thread, if I could set the wayback machine to the mid-1990's and made myself procurement Czar, I would have halted F-22 development for 10-15 years and bought updgraded F15's instead and worked on an alternative for the important SEAD mission. We could have safely waited another decade before fielding a fifth-gen fighter IMO, while continuing basic R&D to mature some of the technologies before full development which would (hopefully) save some on development cost.


One is still confronted with the fact that multipurpose = compromises.

Everything = compromises. Specialized aircraft have compromises too, just different ones. It's much harder, for example, to min/max capabilities on the fly with specialized aircraft and adjust to changing needs. And specialized aircraft will require a bigger Air Force with more airplanes and people - something that doesn't seem likely given financial realities. I would agree, however, that for some things you really do need a specialized aircraft, though we might disagree on what those needs might be.



Look at the USAFs record on dedicated CAS aircraft...

Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft - at least based on what I've read in AAR's and LL's. The Marine's seem to get by just fine with an airframe not designed for CAS - the one that lost to the F-16 in the Air Forces lightweight fighter competition. ;) The point being that training and coordination are more important than a dedicated airframe.

Maybe what the AF needs to do is allow different units of multi-role aircraft to specialize their training in certain areas while maintaining minimum qualifications in everything else instead of pursuing a standard qualification routine. For example, out of all of the F-16 squadrons we have, some percentage would specialize in CAS, some air strikes, some air-to-air, etc. Such a scheme could prevent CAS from atrophying after OIF/OEF are over and provide other benefits as well.




All true but that doesn't negate my point; L1011s and DC-10/11s have a lot of years left. Does maintenenance cost more? Sure but that's partly because manufacturers have no need to build in long life unless the customer specifies it. Airlines have a valid customer appeal reason to not necessarily do that; do Air Forces have such a need?

Yes, and for similar reasons: readiness and sortie generation rates. Airlines cannot afford unreliable aircraft because that means canceled or delayed flights, disruption of the sensitive hub system most airlines use, etc. The military cannot afford much of it either because lower readiness rates negatively impact the ability to meet mission requirements and severely impact the ability to surge forces for any length of time. This is because of two factors: Older aircraft breakdown more often and older aircraft require more maintenance time per flying hour. These factors compound on each other to significantly reduce the number of aircraft you can have in the air at any one time and the ability to turn those aircraft around in a timely manner for the next sortie. Such issues can be planned for and worked around in the relatively static air environment that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan today, but can really spoil your dinner in air operations with greater uncertainty and higher optempo.

Take my F-14 experience from earlier where out of a squadron of 14 aircraft only about 8 were considered "up" at any one time on average. That means only 2 or maybe 3 aircraft can be kept in the air constantly (say for a CAP). But, since those airplanes break more often and since turn-around time is longer (because more maintenance is required per flying hour), the ability to keep those 2-3 aircraft in the air diminishes more rapidly over time than for a newer aircraft like the F-18. So by contrast, a 12-plane F-18 squadron typically had ten aircraft "up" at any one time and so could keep more aircraft in the air and sustain that for a much longer period of time.

The flip side of this is exploiting those factors on our enemies, which is something you usually don't hear much about. Most world air forces have low readiness rates compared to western air forces. This is great for us because it reduces the number of aircraft we'll have to deal with and, in the case of a long conflict, those air forces will run out of steam quickly through maintenance attrition even if all other factors are equal (which they never are). When talking about air threats a lot of people seem to like to list the OOB - look, country X has a gazillion Mig-29's!, but as I'm sure you know, inventory =/= capability.


So in short, newer aircraft with better readiness rates allow you to do more and do it for a longer period of time and usually at less cost economically.


True today -- my point was and is that that is not a graven in stone truth, it is simply the way things are. Many things that 'are' do not happen to be optimum.I don't find it compelling either. However, when that factor is added to mission capability certainly a case for the aircraft exists. Does to those of us who've been on the ground and happy that birds were available but I gotta tell you I've watched too many Fox 4s, a great bird by any standard, get terribly embarrassed by little bitty Skyhawks and REALLY embarrassed by some Spads. Capability is as or more important than durability. Both would be nice where attainable... :cool:

Well, I agree with F-4's getting embarrassed by Skyhawks, etc., but that was 40 years ago. As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time. It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

Cliff,


When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose.

I don't really agree with you here. The main driver toward multipurpose aircraft was to provide greater operational flexibility and to realize cost savings by reducing maintenance, logisitics and support costs through having to support fewer airframe types. That's a big reason driving the F-35, for example, an aircraft attempting to maximize commonality while still satisfying a diverse set of requirements from a diverse set of customers.

Overall, I think we have realized savings in O&M costs but at a price, part of which is increased development cost. It remains to be seen whether the F-35, for example, will prove cheaper over the entire lifecycle than three separate aircraft.

Wilf,


You can drop JDAMs off a P-3, or AC-130 as long as they fly above 16,000ft and out of the MANPAD threat umbrella. Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

120mm
10-21-2008, 06:17 PM
Entropy,

I agree with your entire post, including the need for F-22, up until I get here:




Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft -

<big ole snip>

Well, I agree with F-4's getting embarrassed by Skyhawks, etc., but that was 40 years ago. As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time. It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

The original post, if I recall correctly, had to do with the Air Force wearing out combat aircraft during a prolonged COIN campaign. I don't think you can rule out "cost" as an advantage. In fact, due to the lack of counter-air threat, and the prolonged nature of successful COIN efforts, "cost" which is a component of maintainability, is possibly the most important advantage an airframe can have.


Cliff,

I don't really agree with you here. The main driver toward multipurpose aircraft was to provide greater operational flexibility and to realize cost savings by reducing maintenance, logisitics and support costs through having to support fewer airframe types. That's a big reason driving the F-35, for example, an aircraft attempting to maximize commonality while still satisfying a diverse set of requirements from a diverse set of customers.

The F-35 is too capable to waste on COIN. I know it sounds counter-intuitive, but a successful COIN effort needs to look hard at the bottom line, and satisfy the customer as cheaply as possible.

The kinds of aircraft that could do this, could, provided the institutions would let them, be funded completely, from the "pencil dust" that falls to the floor when signing the check from just one F-22 or F-35.


Wilf,

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

They're cheap, and more than capable enough. And they prevent Air Force officials from embarrassingly create asses of themselves in taudry theatrics, when maintenance and aging high-performance airframes start eating their budgets alive.

Ken White
10-21-2008, 06:45 PM
First off, I agree with more F-22s; i just don't think the AF has gone about it very well.
And I agree with you on the problem with a mentality that demands the best at the expense of the good enough - something that seems to afflict military procurement in general.True, it's the American way.
Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft - at least based on what I've read in AAR's and LL's.Who writes those??? :D
The Marine's seem to get by just fine with an airframe not designed for CAS - the one that lost to the F-16 in the Air Forces lightweight fighter competition. ;)Heh, not a great example. The Marines would prefer more Harriers or even better, an all JSF fleet because the F-18 while adequate is not a great CAS aircraft (not to mention that it would also blunt the AF demand for total theater control...). I'd also point out that the F-16 won the competition mostly because the USAF trusted Consolidated (GD) and didn't trust Northrop while the F-18 got the Navy nod mostly because it wasn't the F-16. Even then the Navy insisted it had to be built by a "Navy familiar house" thus the production contract went to McDonnell vice Northrop (before there was Northrop-Grumman).
The point being that training and coordination are more important than a dedicated airframe.I'd say almost equally but we are both entitled to our opinions.
So in short, newer aircraft with better readiness rates allow you to do more and do it for a longer period of time and usually at less cost economically.True but best is the enemy of... :D
As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time.and as I pointed out and all three of us know, that's very much situation dependent.
It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.If you disregard ability to be based close to the action in a rough austere environment (anathema to the USAF, I know...), loiter and scan capability, repairability, training ease (and thus the ability to take less than premium grade Jocks) and a few other things, you're probably correct *.
Wilf,

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?See * above :D

120mm
10-21-2008, 07:45 PM
Not to be too much of an Everready rabbit on this, but I don't think you can overstate the value of ground and air guys being able to go face-to-face on post-mission analysis or pre-mission planning.

The OV-10 was created primarily to accommodate this very thing.

Entropy
10-21-2008, 07:58 PM
The original post, if I recall correctly, had to do with the Air Force wearing out combat aircraft during a prolonged COIN campaign. I don't think you can rule out "cost" as an advantage. In fact, due to the lack of counter-air threat, and the prolonged nature of successful COIN efforts, "cost" which is a component of maintainability, is possibly the most important advantage an airframe can have.

Here's where you may be onto something, which adds to Ken's point:


If you disregard ability to be based close to the action in a rough austere environment (anathema to the USAF, I know...), loiter and scan capability, repairability, training ease (and thus the ability to take less than premium grade Jocks) and a few other things, you're probably correct

Ok, I can see there are specific situations where that kind of aircraft would be more valuable and as Ken says, everything is situation dependent. Now, is it worth it to create a capability to fill that niche (and how much to create), as Ken might say, would doing so be a case of the best being an enemy of the good? I guess it comes down to how likely one thinks we'll be operating for long periods in austere, low threat environments in the future. Definitely something to think about.

Entropy
10-21-2008, 08:20 PM
Not to be too much of an Everready rabbit on this, but I don't think you can overstate the value of ground and air guys being able to go face-to-face on post-mission analysis or pre-mission planning.


That's definitely true, though obviously not always possible. The joint procedures developed a few years ago have helped immensely, but IMO there is still too little communication between lower levels and air and ground units are too often not on distro for each others basics like mission summaries, etc. My unit in OEF (CSAR, HH-60's) supported the Army quite a bit and it was like pulling teeth sometimes to get information on what the Army was doing (CSAR was a CFACC asset ostensibly there in case a pilot went down but we were used almost exclusively for medevacs, especially high-risk ones the Army couldn't do). At the same time, I'm not sure if the Army ever got our products (since they went up to the CFACC first), but I did forward them to people I thought might be interested if I had a POC. Anyway, I could launch into a long tirade but that is probably best for another thread. At least that was the case back in 2005 - hopefully things have changed.

120mm
10-21-2008, 08:33 PM
Here's where you may be onto something, which adds to Ken's point:



Ok, I can see there are specific situations where that kind of aircraft would be more valuable and as Ken says, everything is situation dependent. Now, is it worth it to create a capability to fill that niche (and how much to create), as Ken might say, would doing so be a case of the best being an enemy of the good? I guess it comes down to how likely one thinks we'll be operating for long periods in austere, low threat environments in the future. Definitely something to think about.

Agreed. It would take a revolutionary approach to acquisition, though, as once you add on requirements and specs, your cheap, effective COIN aircraft becomes an expensive, duplicated effort incredibly quickly, because the current acquisition system is built to do exactly that.

I smell a research project, there....:D

120mm
10-21-2008, 08:48 PM
That's definitely true, though obviously not always possible. The joint procedures developed a few years ago have helped immensely, but IMO there is still too little communication between lower levels and air and ground units are too often not on distro for each others basics like mission summaries, etc. My unit in OEF (CSAR, HH-60's) supported the Army quite a bit and it was like pulling teeth sometimes to get information on what the Army was doing (CSAR was a CFACC asset ostensibly there in case a pilot went down but we were used almost exclusively for medevacs, especially high-risk ones the Army couldn't do). At the same time, I'm not sure if the Army ever got our products (since they went up to the CFACC first), but I did forward them to people I thought might be interested if I had a POC. Anyway, I could launch into a long tirade but that is probably best for another thread. At least that was the case back in 2005 - hopefully things have changed.

I was force branched from Armor to Transportation because my unit needed a Terminal Transportation Officer during the latter part of OIF I.

I swear, if another Army officer demands that they be given control of an Air Force asset, my head will physically explode. There is definitely a culture clash and language separation between the services.

And to a certain respect I feel your pain.

Ken White
10-21-2008, 09:24 PM
Agreed. It would take a revolutionary approach to acquisition, though, as once you add on requirements and specs, your cheap, effective COIN aircraft becomes an expensive, duplicated effort incredibly quickly, because the current acquisition system is built to do exactly that.

I smell a research project, there....:Dbecause not only the acquisition process (Heh -- little humor there...) but the big manufacturers (as I originally said ;) ) are attuned to obsolescence creation.

We ended WW II with three sizes of tracks and roadwheels and five power packs that had over 50% parts commonality throughout the range for all tracked vehicles. Rationalization to cut costs and increase efficiency and effectiveness. More to the point, the Navy ended up designing small classes of aircraft and ships to explore various approaches wherein rationalization and commonality were emphasized in an effort to get ideal and easily mass produced, durable and effective fighting equipment with no gold plating (think F8F) built in the future. Try that today and the Lobbyists would have a field day buying Congroids. BAE systems does not want to pay a license fee to GD for a track nor does Bath like paying one to Northrop Grumman...

Same thing applies with aircraft; gotta be proprietary in all things to minimize the competitors (and suppliers) profit.

I'm afraid we're stuck where we are... :(

Umar Al-Mokhtār
10-22-2008, 01:45 AM
The way a plane is used has a huge effect on it's service life. Aircraft's lives are indeed defined by age and hours... but a bigger factor is how the airplane is used. Spectrum Life is a common way of measuring the age of the aircraft. It is a mix of hours, g-loadings, loads carried, etc.


The above is true and I agree.


The jets in question fly at 9gs every day, and to contend with the newer fighters that you say they are as good as, F-15s and F-16s have to carry new avionics and weapons. These only add to stress on the airframes.


This IMHO is not so true. No fighter is flown to pull 9Gs every day. In fact, most fighters don't even fly every single day. Plus repeatadly pulling 9Gs (http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/voshell/gforce.pdf) is not too good for the pilots either.

William F. Owen
10-22-2008, 08:34 AM
Wilf,

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

The OV-10 can be based at FOBs, so close to AO, and can do a bunch of other tactical missions, such as transport, casevac, and some of things we currently get AH-64s to do. In 1995, an OV-10 operated by the Philippines AF cost only about $350 per/hour to run, exclusive of weapons.

Entropy
10-22-2008, 03:10 PM
Ran across this article this morning (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a9e97388d-a3d1-44a2-8028-7e29756767da) which linked to this Air Force Association analysis (http://www.afa.org/ProfessionalDevelopment/IssueBriefs/Why_AF_Needs_RECAP.pdf) (pdf file). Pretty interesting stuff (at least to a geek like me). AFA isn't exactly unbiased in their analysis, but I think the numbers support what I said earlier about aircraft age and readiness rates.

Ken White
11-09-2008, 06:04 PM
of the living dead... :D

In previous discussions on the topic, Cliff has implied or said that there's very little or no difference in CAS efficiency between platforms and Entropy has said this:
Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft - at least based on what I've read in AAR's and LL's. The Marine's seem to get by just fine with an airframe not designed for CAS - the one that lost to the F-16 in the Air Forces lightweight fighter competition. The point being that training and coordination are more important than a dedicated airframe.Adding this a little later:
Well, I agree with F-4's getting embarrassed by Skyhawks, etc., but that was 40 years ago. As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time. It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

The implication of all that being that the USAF is getting better at CAS -- no question form me on that. The further implication was that platforms were seen by the CAS recipients as immaterial and thus there was no reason not to go for multipurpose birds.

Based on experience, that latter was counter intuitive -- but I'm old and not current so I couldn't weigh in on that other than broadly philosophically. Until I did some unscientific research and talked to soldats and Marines recently returned from both theaters and asked specific questions. Anecdotal results for your edification follow:

● The perception of CAS being platform immaterial is dependent on who is asked. Joe could care less as long as satisfying booms are heard; Staff Officers are even less concerned with anything other than the end result. Thus the people most likely to be asked and to answer will say, ala the M4 which is the only rifle most have used; "It's good..." OTOH, ask the Officers and NCOs who ask for, use and see up close CAS and they'll almost universally tell you that the platform they select, given a choice by the JFAC / TACP or whomever, will be in order: The A-10, or then an Apache; then a Cobra and then any other -- with the Afghan guys putting in B1 /52 after the Hoptiflopter gunships and before fast birds.

● They do this because the Hog and Gunship pilots fly slower, fly lower, are far more accurate and, very importantly, are used to doing the mission and can and will talk to guys on the ground in depth and in knowledgable terms about what they see from the air. They're willing and able to talk in terms the ground guys identify with and this is not true with respect to any of the fast movers.

● An interjection we did not discuss on the thread was the AC-130; they were ranked, both theaters, directly behind or even in front of the Whirlyguns and their great sensors, willingness and ability to talk to and respond to guys on the ground were considered very important -- still, the A-10 came out way ahead, hands down.

● The Marines are still perceived as doing CAS a little better than the USAF (by both Army and Marines and as is only to be expected, it is after all a doctrinal tenet for the Corps as opposed to a must do but unloved mission) and a part of this is their total willingness and ability to use their pods to provide eyes in the sky, they routinely volunteer to do it. They see it as part of the job while the perception is that most USAF fast movers don't like to bother with it. The British and Dutch also got good comments (and their Apaches particularly so).

● This also confirms what both Cliff and Entropy said, that training and coordination are important. I'd merely add that while that's certainly true, the type of training is most important.

● I think it does however, certainly raise a significant question on platforms; not least that the type and planned use of the platform affects the mindset of its operator... :eek:

I raise the unwanted dead not to debate the need for the Air Force or for air superiority -- those are givens -- nor to pick further squabbles or argue about or for platforms (reminder; I'm an F-22 and an F-35 supporter :cool:) but merely to add some more information to the discussion. It is, as I said, totally anecdotal information and from a small (but I think knowledgeable and reliable) sample, however, it tracks to me and is probably worth at least some consideration by you guys in Blue...

Cavguy
11-09-2008, 06:16 PM
With a 10 digit grid and JDAMs the bombs can be put where needed as long as the guy on the ground is accurate.

I think the main argument for a prop or simpler plane is that the USAF is flying the wings off of expensive fighters to do a job a cheaper airframe (both cost/maint) could do the same, given the capability of precision munitions.

Ken White
11-09-2008, 06:56 PM
With a 10 digit grid and JDAMs the bombs can be put where needed as long as the guy on the ground is accurate.I can see several problems with that. First, your statement is correct as long as GPS is up insofar as own location is concerned. Distant locations are not ALWAYS that precisely located. Then, if your GPS (or the JDAMs...) is out...

Second, your statement is correct for the most part for Iraq where there are more JTACs per capita and the possiblity of using the laser terminal guidance in bad weather is not too significant. It is more problematic in Afghanistan. Who knows what conditions will be in the next one...

The Marines -- sensibly IMO -- want to train Rifle Squad Leaders to call in air. There will be many who object to that (the USAF already has...) on safety grounds. Lack of trust and faith in training, I say, I know too many NCOs who called in Air in too many places -- including both current theaters of operations -- to think other than that is a good idea. However, good idea or not, the likelihood of all those guys being able to comsistently provide accurate ten digit target grids is not good. I also submit that it doesn't usually have to be that good in most combat situation and it certainly will be unnecessary in MCO or more intense operations than in Iraq -- which aren't going away.

One thing that almost all the A-10 and AC 130 plus the gunships praise I heard cited was the gun. Everyone liked the gun but particularly the guys from the 'Stan where there isn't an urban constraint and firefights with large groups in the open are more common. As a couple of people said, "the others have one but it's only a 20mm for the fast kids and they aren't nearly as accurate as due to speed and altitude." The A-10, the AC-130 and the AH-64 can lay down 25 or 30mm shells tens of meters from you, the others cannot do that. Given the vagaries of weather, electronic glitches and such, the gun is a reassuring capability and it gets a lot of use.

ADDED: Consider also that a JDAM or other precision munition can take out a room or a building and, by definition, most everyone in said structure or part thereof. OTOH, given a ragged line of 50 bad guys with minimal cover in a field environment (much less in mountains) and that weapon might get five to ten of them. Conversely, the gun can do a far better job in that environment -- and bigger, lower and slower is better...
I think the main argument for a prop or simpler plane is that the USAF is flying the wings off of expensive fighters to do a job a cheaper airframe (both cost/maint) could do the same, given the capability of precision munitions.True provided the limitations of the precision munitions aren't factors.

Cavguy
11-09-2008, 08:20 PM
Don't get me wrong Ken - I LOVE the AC-130, and haven't ever used an A-10. Great airframe. For COIN/Small wars I guess I wonder about the economic advantage of flying F-15E's and F-16's to do what a cheaper airframe could do instead.

Ken White
11-09-2008, 08:31 PM
Don't get me wrong Ken - I LOVE the AC-130, and haven't ever used an A-10. Great airframe. For COIN/Small wars I guess I wonder about the economic advantage of flying F-15E's and F-16's to do what a cheaper airframe could do instead.One could probably buy three or four "Son of Hog" for the price of one F-16 Block 50/60 or one F-35. Hmm. 'zat mean six or so for an F-22? (Kidding, AF guys; we need 22s and 35s as well as Tankers. It's just future bombers I'm less sure about :wry: ).

Maybe some day they'll get the UAVs flexible and reliable enough to do an unmanned dedicated CAS type mit Maschinenkanone... ;)

Entropy
11-09-2008, 09:16 PM
Ken,

Thanks for the helpful comments and insight. I don't think your anecdotal information is far off the mark. I also think this is very important:


Everyone liked the gun but particularly the guys from the 'Stan where there isn't an urban constraint and firefights with large groups in the open are more common.

Astan is a lot different and gun employment can be used far more often. And when it comes to that, the A-10 and AC-130 (and helos) are king. I would add there is a capabilities gap (for lack of a better term) between a JDAM and gun for fixed-wing assets, though this has been partially addressed with the SDB.

And, like you have said many times before, everything is situational. Unfortunately, the guys on the ground may not have the ideal platform on station for a particular situation. I think once the A-10C is out there then it will again become the premier CAS platform since it will have all the capabilities of the fast-movers (integrated EO/IR/targeting pod, datalink, etc.) plus the gun and ability to employ at low or high altitude, etc. I really do hope the aircraft gets a new lease-on-life or a dedicated replacement before its scheduled 2028 retirement.

The AC-130 is a wonderful aircraft (105 with prox fuse especially), but it is quite vulnerable and so is really a night-only platform. And that's one danger I see with adding a prop plane (like a T-6) for the CAS mission. I'm concerned it wouldn't be survivable which would restrict its use, even in the relatively low air threat environments we're now in.

So that's good info - even anecdotal info is very valuable. Thanks for taking the time and interest to put that together!

Entropy
11-09-2008, 09:21 PM
Maybe some day they'll get the UAVs flexible and reliable enough to do an unmanned dedicated CAS type mit Maschinenkanone... ;)

I think that is where we are headed personally. Who knows, maybe one day the JTAC will BE the CAS pilot. Wouldn't that be cool?

Ken White
11-09-2008, 09:31 PM
with your last -- that would be the height of kewel... :cool::cool:

On the thanks they're really due to several folks who put up with my inane questions; H/T and thanks are really due them, I are merely a retarded conduit. I'm still trying to track down a local acquaintance nephew who's a S/Sgt AFSOC JTAC; we keep missing each other. That boy doesn't stay at Hurlburt very long at a clip.. :wry:

Icepack6
11-17-2008, 03:49 PM
In 1997, we (I was assigned to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office) suggested DoD significantly invest in UCAVS. The CONOPS was not the "tastes great-less filing" arguments of manned (expensive) vs un-inhabited (less expensive) aircraft for CAS, but a combining capabilites using both. Think F/A-18F or F-15E, and tethering 4-6 UCAVS to the mother ship via TADILC or Link 16. As mission requirements surface, a single UCAV is handed over to a terminal controller for employment. By using UCAVS with a human-in-the-loop in a tactical air commander (airborne) mode, one could stretch defense dollars while, arguably, increasing availability exponentially. After a lot of money was spent in analyzing this possibility and assessing the maturity of technologies required (they were ready), the USAF Heismanned the idea during the 1997 QDR by ignoring the results of the study. Eleven years later, we see UCAVs only on the advertising pages of of professional journals. . . . and now have the F-22/F-35 discussion butressing the "Old think" of the USAF as they see new aricraft only in the context of legacy missions (i.e., replacements for Eagles and Falcons).

Presley Cannady
11-22-2008, 04:26 PM
Not only that, but let us not forget about software bugs.
How many times have each of us cursed Bill Gates when we get some kind of glitch associated with a software programming error?

Microsoft has a different, more expansive set of problems to deal with than the embedded arch required for UAV control.


Just think how many KSLOC (thousands of software lines of code) would have to be written and, at best only partially, debugged to get a fully automated or remotely piloted drone capability that comes close to matching what a human does in an aircraft moving at supersonic speeds.

On the order of 1e5. Outside of the front-end web developer space, debugging is only the first, most basic step in a test path. Given a defined envelope of requirements, unit, functional and performance testing harnesses ensure to at least a high degree of reliability (compared to a human) in a target system. And these test suites run in seconds to hours, as opposed to months and years for similar validation in manned pilot programs.


"Oops" just doesn't quite cut it when you get a 404 error and your Predator launched Hellfire flies into Hagia Sophia in Istanbul instead of Balla Hissar in Kabul.

If a contractor's selling you onboard software that interoperates via web services, you probably should drag him, his contracting officer and DASD Acquisitions into court. Beyond that, a lot of things would have to go wrong for a computer to mistake two targets thousands of miles away and successfully prosecute to full error. It's the equivalent of a human pilot, his combat commander, and dozens of others going full retard. On the other hand, the real problem is whether unmanned software is better able than a human being (who is undoubtedly relying on software anyway) to discriminate a target from a school a few dozen yards away. Or, barring that, if a computer can abort as reliably as a man.

tankersteve
11-23-2008, 05:27 AM
OK, I have read this thread from end to end.

Certainly the hang-up or beef many of us have (those of us in the dirt world) is the AF crying for funding after years of watching them have facilities worlds beyond the other services. I think the other services see the Air Force as having forgotten that it is in the military and the mission, not people, come first.

The idea of a limited capability aircraft for COIN is outstanding. An aircraft along the lines of an OV-10 would be very useful. As you stand up the indigenous forces of the host nation, you could turn those aircraft over to them and buy new ones for yourself with the latest avionics/electronics, at a fraction of the cost of a new fighter jet. Wikipedia has some descriptions of what the original OV-10 design specs were to be and I think that would be an interesting aircraft. Perhaps a biplane to fit the 20 foot wingspan?

You have to wonder what we were thinking with F15/F16s providing aerial reconnaissance over Iraq and Afghanistan. We wanted the observation but the tradeoff of wear and tear on the airframes is questionable.

The Air Force likes to talk about having been on a war-time footing since Desert Storm. Well, we certainly didn't hear that back in the 1990s. Perhaps if they had mentioned it, they could have gotten new fighter aircraft (same models, just newer) through Congress. I suspect they didn't want to raise the issue too loudly because it would hurt recruiting and support for newer models of aircraft. Of course, as many here have mentioned, war-time footing for the Air Force (when not in an actual aircraft) means the danger of intermittent satellite TV...:p

We won WWII not by having the best stuff but having the most of pretty good stuff. Since the Air Force pilots are top notch, how about getting more 'good enough' birds, like upgraded F15/16 and having the ability to flood the airspace with more of them. The sheer numbers and their pilot's ability would outweigh the lack of technical uber-superiority.

Of course, to keep the cost of all these extra pilots down, we might have to have warrant officers flying them - not sure if AF could stomach that - institutional prejudice.

Perhaps the real beef here is the appearance (and likely just appearance) that the AF is much more interested in protecting it's sexy image of flying off in the wild blue yonder. Unmanned aircraft are not sexy. I truly think any officer could be trained to make the decision of shooting/not shooting, thus killing the AF hangup of having flight-qualified officers commanding armed UAVs. But the AF has a strange class/caste system where the flight-rated folks dominate and are treated differently. This could be a real upset to the culture. The AF will reply that the Army Chief of Staff and the key general officer commands only comes from the combat arms branches. True, but for the most part, in the Army, unless you are a commander, you really are not that special unless you have a lot of rank. In the AF, a rated officer is operating in a different sphere than his non-rated counterparts (not peers - they aren't).

I don't think the AF is going out of business. I do believe in the need for air superiority. I just think the AF doesn't have all its priorities in proper alignment and the very culture of the AF will have to change to properly affect this.

We need limited numbers of air superiority frames, and lots of drones for ISR and bombing. We might have to get by on simpler airframes, but we could use more of them. The AF might need warrants. Maybe they fly the drones.

I just hope the next administration and AF secretary take a realistic approach to this mess.

Tankersteve

120mm
11-23-2008, 12:51 PM
Tankersteve -

I've corresponded with one of the USMC types who developed the OV-10, and the 20 foot wingspan is completely achieveable using a large chord wing, and avoiding malicious USAF efforts to kill the program/air craft through over-speccing. Ironically, though the USAF tried to kill the concept, they ended up buying them and using them during VN.

The original aircraft did not resemble the finished aircraft. But the concept of a rough field/no field aircraft that can be used (at low cost) to FTF with forward ground forces, drop ordnance, carry personnel and mark targets, without the typical rotary wing support issues is tempting.

Entropy
11-23-2008, 03:03 PM
Tankersteve,


The Air Force likes to talk about having been on a war-time footing since Desert Storm. Well, we certainly didn't hear that back in the 1990s.

I was in the Navy during the 1990's and I certainly heard the AF make those kind of complaints. In particular, I remember the AF complaining about the "gruelling" 3 month deployments to OSW, how it was negatively affecting their equipment and training, how they need more money to offset those effects, and their suggestion the Navy should do more. It made us Navy guys laugh because we were probably on month 4 or 5 of a six-month deployment - something we got to do every 18 months with lots of little deployments in between. Of course, at that time, the Navy and Marines were the only true expeditionary services and the AF didn't really have the mindset or organization to conduct OSW in the most effective and efficient manner.

Stevely
11-24-2008, 04:24 PM
The idea of a limited capability aircraft for COIN is outstanding. An aircraft along the lines of an OV-10 would be very useful. As you stand up the indigenous forces of the host nation, you could turn those aircraft over to them and buy new ones for yourself with the latest avionics/electronics, at a fraction of the cost of a new fighter jet. Wikipedia has some descriptions of what the original OV-10 design specs were to be and I think that would be an interesting aircraft. Perhaps a biplane to fit the 20 foot wingspan?


This won't happen because it would greatly upset the patronage system of the military-industrial-congressional complex. This would mean a lot less $$$ flowing into congressional districts and aerospace contractors' coffers, which would mean political death before the idea could ever really take hold.

Of course, this idea may sound more attractive as the reality sinks in that the nation (not just the government) is flat broke, but by then even el cheapo OV-10 style aircraft will seem like an extravagance.

Cliff
11-25-2008, 08:58 AM
so I am still catching up here.



In previous discussions on the topic, Cliff has implied or said that there's very little or no difference in CAS efficiency between platforms...

The implication of all that being that the USAF is getting better at CAS -- no question form me on that. The further implication was that platforms were seen by the CAS recipients as immaterial and thus there was no reason not to go for multipurpose birds.


Ken-

My point wasn't that platforms aren't immaterial - but that the effects are the most important issue. If an A-10 bingoes out before it can get the job done, even if it has the best pilot, the B-52 that still has gas will be better.



Based on experience, that latter was counter intuitive -- but I'm old and not current so I couldn't weigh in on that other than broadly philosophically. Until I did some unscientific research and talked to soldats and Marines recently returned from both theaters and asked specific questions. Anecdotal results for your edification follow:

● The perception of CAS being platform immaterial is dependent on who is asked. Joe could care less as long as satisfying booms are heard; Staff Officers are even less concerned with anything other than the end result. Thus the people most likely to be asked and to answer will say, ala the M4 which is the only rifle most have used; "It's good..." OTOH, ask the Officers and NCOs who ask for, use and see up close CAS and they'll almost universally tell you that the platform they select, given a choice by the JFAC / TACP or whomever, will be in order: The A-10, or then an Apache; then a Cobra and then any other -- with the Afghan guys putting in B1 /52 after the Hoptiflopter gunships and before fast birds.

● They do this because the Hog and Gunship pilots fly slower, fly lower, are far more accurate and, very importantly, are used to doing the mission and can and will talk to guys on the ground in depth and in knowledgable terms about what they see from the air. They're willing and able to talk in terms the ground guys identify with and this is not true with respect to any of the fast movers.


Your reference to being used to doing the mission, talk in depth/knowledgable terms, etc are, in my opinion, the key. Being low and slow is an advantage, I agree... but TRAINING is the key. Hawgs are awesome at CAS because it is what they train to. Eagles are good at Air Superiority because it is what they train to... in flying the pilot and his training is huge. Yes the jet matters.... but pilot skill is worth at least as much, if not more. I've seen the best jets out there get schooled by guys driving obsolete jets... because the guy in the older jet knew what he was doing.

Interestingly enough, A-10 and F-15C folks get along really well, because they are both single-mission communities that train really hard to be good at one thing.



● The Marines are still perceived as doing CAS a little better than the USAF (by both Army and Marines and as is only to be expected, it is after all a doctrinal tenet for the Corps as opposed to a must do but unloved mission) and a part of this is their total willingness and ability to use their pods to provide eyes in the sky, they routinely volunteer to do it. They see it as part of the job while the perception is that most USAF fast movers don't like to bother with it. The British and Dutch also got good comments (and their Apaches particularly so).


It's unfortunate that this attitude pervades... in particular the work-ups of fast jet units for the desert have been focusing lately on NTISR and CAS... to the exclusion of almost all else. Trust me, USAF crews WANT to do these missions... sounds like a perception problem for us.




● This also confirms what both Cliff and Entropy said, that training and coordination are important. I'd merely add that while that's certainly true, the type of training is most important.

● I think it does however, certainly raise a significant question on platforms; not least that the type and planned use of the platform affects the mindset of its operator... :eek:



Definitely agree on the training part - that is huge. Also need to work on the coordination- that is a huge part of the training.



I raise the unwanted dead not to debate the need for the Air Force or for air superiority -- those are givens -- nor to pick further squabbles or argue about or for platforms (reminder; I'm an F-22 and an F-35 supporter :cool:) but merely to add some more information to the discussion. It is, as I said, totally anecdotal information and from a small (but I think knowledgeable and reliable) sample, however, it tracks to me and is probably worth at least some consideration by you guys in Blue...

Awesome words Ken. I wonder what kind of capture of data like this is going on from the folks down at Maxwell? I hope they are looking at things like this.

Entropy said:


I think that is where we are headed personally. Who knows, maybe one day the JTAC will BE the CAS pilot. Wouldn't that be cool?


I've mentioned it before, and I know folks may not have heard, but the USAF for the last 2 yrs has been hugely ramping up the number of UAVs we have deployed. Part of that was taking guys from all fighters and sending them to UAVs at younger ages. The good part has been that we have taken a bunch of guys with great experience at CAS, NTISR, CAS, etc and transfered it to the UAV communities. Prior to this the majority of UAV folks didn't have a lot of experience with this sort of thing. My understanding is the UAV as a Killer Scout is already happening. It would be tough to have a UAV be a FAC, only because the UAV has a hard time evaluating the run in for the striker... but it probably isn't far off either.

120 said:


I've corresponded with one of the USMC types who developed the OV-10, and the 20 foot wingspan is completely achieveable using a large chord wing, and avoiding malicious USAF efforts to kill the program/air craft through over-speccing. Ironically, though the USAF tried to kill the concept, they ended up buying them and using them during VN.

The original aircraft did not resemble the finished aircraft. But the concept of a rough field/no field aircraft that can be used (at low cost) to FTF with forward ground forces, drop ordnance, carry personnel and mark targets, without the typical rotary wing support issues is tempting.


The OV-10 isn't survivable except in a very low threat environment. The AF is actively buying T-6s for the COIN role.... in AFSOC. If the enemy has any reasonable SAM capability, OV-10s aren't much of an option... and when I talk SAMs, I am not talking MANPADs, although for AC-130s and OV-10s those are bad enough. SA-11s or SA-13s are even more bad news...

The other problem with the OV-10 or T-6 is that its advantage in many folk's mind is a drawback... the slow speed means that CAS jets take a long time to get to the right folks unless they happen to be right there. To get the same response time, you need a lot more aircraft... and the ones who aren't employed are wasted effort. In a COIN fight this isn't as big an issue... in a hotter war (I would argue even a small war in the medium range - say OIF 2004 or so) you will lose out on capability.

CAS is definitely an art... requiring a lot of training for both the FACs and the flyers. Both sides need to continue working at it.

V/R,

Cliff

William F. Owen
11-25-2008, 11:38 AM
The OV-10 isn't survivable except in a very low threat environment. The AF is actively buying T-6s for the COIN role.... in AFSOC. If the enemy has any reasonable SAM capability, OV-10s aren't much of an option... and when I talk SAMs, I am not talking MANPADs, although for AC-130s and OV-10s those are bad enough. SA-11s or SA-13s are even more bad news...

OV-10s operated successfully in and over one of the most dense air defence environments ever seen, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From my own research, I see nothing to indicate that OV-10 loss rates were excessive. In think only 12 were lost to enemy action, in the SEA theatre in 1970.


The other problem with the OV-10 or T-6 is that its advantage in many folk's mind is a drawback... the slow speed means that CAS jets take a long time to get to the right folks unless they happen to be right there. To get the same response time, you need a lot more aircraft... and the ones who aren't employed are wasted effort. In a COIN fight this isn't as big an issue... in a hotter war (I would argue even a small war in the medium range - say OIF 2004 or so) you will lose out on capability.

OK, but OV-10 can operate far further forward and from far more austere environments than ever AH-64s. IIRC an OV-10 could deploy carrying it's ground crew tech, two pilots and all it's spares for >100 hours of operation. It could also drop 500lbs of re-supply by parachute.

The USMC also did formation flying trials for the OV-10 to flight re-fuel from a KC-130.

A modern OV-10 could easily have a sensor and weapons fit comparable or even better than an AH-1W, or AH-64. The OV-10 also has far better visibility than a T-6, and two engine safety.

The OV-10 is also a far better blend of cost versus effect, for the conflicts we see in Afghanistan and Iraq. This also applies to some UAV capabilities.


CAS is definitely an art... requiring a lot of training for both the FACs and the flyers. Both sides need to continue working at it.

Isn't all combat flying an art? CAS was pretty much perfected in SEA and then actively forgotten by the USAF.

120mm
11-25-2008, 12:07 PM
I still have an article somewhere about the Army's ARES trials back in the '80s, and according to their data, if memory serves, small, simple fixed-wing aircraft can maintain flight profiles that make them surprisingly survivable in even high threat environments.

But unfortunately, that article is in a box, having moved 10 times since I last read it, and no digits....:(

Bottom line, the USAF position vis-a-vis a true utilitarian COIN aircraft has been, and continues to be that they are not survivable enough to buy. I agree with WILF on this, though.

Rifleman
11-25-2008, 02:16 PM
The coolest plane the high tech, high speed USAF has ever had:

http://skyraider.org/skyhead.jpg

Anyone know how survivable it was in Vietnam?

Ken, surely you've had your hide saved by one of these before?

Ken White
11-25-2008, 05:09 PM
Ken, surely you've had your hide saved by one of these before?That's been done by F4U, F2H, F9F, F86, AT-28, A4D, F4B and C, F51s (one of which we inadvertently shot down...:eek: :( :o), Meteors, F100, B26, B57 and even B52s plus several kinds of Helicopters at one time or another but no Spads...

Presley Cannady
12-15-2008, 05:50 PM
Perhaps the real beef here is the appearance (and likely just appearance) that the AF is much more interested in protecting it's sexy image of flying off in the wild blue yonder. Unmanned aircraft are not sexy. I truly think any officer could be trained to make the decision of shooting/not shooting, thus killing the AF hangup of having flight-qualified officers commanding armed UAVs. But the AF has a strange class/caste system where the flight-rated folks dominate and are treated differently. This could be a real upset to the culture. The AF will reply that the Army Chief of Staff and the key general officer commands only comes from the combat arms branches. True, but for the most part, in the Army, unless you are a commander, you really are not that special unless you have a lot of rank. In the AF, a rated officer is operating in a different sphere than his non-rated counterparts (not peers - they aren't).

We're missing a couple game-changing caveats here:

1. There is no multi-role UCAV in existence yet. The technology can handle reconnaissance, some deep interdiction and that's it. Autonomous or even remote strategic bombing, air-to-air and mid-air refueling remain a long way off. Hell, we haven't even automated similar tasks in the Navy onboard ships traveling slower than a Plymouth Horizon going up hill.

2. UCAVs today are essentially retrievable cruise missiles with human training wheels. The real debate isn't over shoot authority--both Navy and USAF reconciled themselves to that fact decades ago--but over how expendable those platforms are. And given the susceptibility of remote control to such environmental factors such as lightspeed lag and weather, the less expendable your UCAV the more likely you're going to have somebody in the sky looking out for it. Remote-control only narrows the scope of knowledge involved by eliminating flight medicine from training. You still need someone with a graduate understanding of aviation, and the reqs of effective flying haven't changed much in over a century. You're still going to have people with skill sets ranging from navigation to meteorology to aerodynamics with hands on the stick.

3. Full autonomy even in the ground attack and reconnaissance missions lies twice beyond USAF's 2025's vision of the future. That has nothing to do with a resistant culture, it has to do with the fact that there isn't yet an AI smart enough for cheap enough to integrate terrain mapping, threat evaluation and aircraft status to reliably implement countermeasures in deviance from the mission. Hell, there may never be. If these things are to be anything more than expensive cruise missiles or RC aircraft, then this is a hurdle we have to overcome.

Bob's World
12-15-2008, 07:15 PM
Don't save all of your abuse for our brothers in blue.

Co-worker and friend is a Marine F/A-18 pilot, who was gently, but firmly told to stand down when he put together a paper making the case that Marine air was going the wrong direction in seeking stealth capability and Joint Strike Fighters, (how stealthy can you be below 1000' supporting ground troops) and should be considering platforms such as the Skyraider.

reed11b
12-15-2008, 07:40 PM
Don't save all of your abuse for our brothers in blue.

Co-worker and friend is a Marine F/A-18 pilot, who was gently, but firmly told to stand down when he put together a paper making the case that Marine air was going the wrong direction in seeking stealth capability and Joint Strike Fighters, (how stealthy can you be below 1000' supporting ground troops) and should be considering platforms such as the Skyraider.

Unfortunately that whole argument has been deeply tainted w/ Sparkyisms and it will take time to heal the damage caused there. At one point I was working on a paper to compare cost efficiencies of using less expensive to operate helicopters in decentralized taskings compared to higher operating cost helicopters in more centralized taskings. Sparks caught wind of it and contacted me and insisted that the story needed to be about the then current LUH program and trailer mounted helicopters. Of course that was not something that could work, and I was annoyed to the point of dropping the idea before completion. Now whenever I see an idea supported by Sparks and crew, I have a tendency to reject it out of hand. Some of the ideas are good, even if Sparks et al. really do not understand them.
Reed

Fuchs
12-15-2008, 10:37 PM
OV-10s operated successfully in and over one of the most dense air defence environments ever seen, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From my own research, I see nothing to indicate that OV-10 loss rates were excessive. In think only 12 were lost to enemy action, in the SEA theatre in 1970.



OK, but OV-10 can operate far further forward and from far more austere environments than ever AH-64s. IIRC an OV-10 could deploy carrying it's ground crew tech, two pilots and all it's spares for >100 hours of operation. It could also drop 500lbs of re-supply by parachute.

The USMC also did formation flying trials for the OV-10 to flight re-fuel from a KC-130.

A modern OV-10 could easily have a sensor and weapons fit comparable or even better than an AH-1W, or AH-64. The OV-10 also has far better visibility than a T-6, and two engine safety.

The OV-10 is also a far better blend of cost versus effect, for the conflicts we see in Afghanistan and Iraq. This also applies to some UAV capabilities.



Isn't all combat flying an art? CAS was pretty much perfected in SEA and then actively forgotten by the USAF.

A three-barrel 20mm Gatling gun in a turret below the fuselage was tested, together with the OV-10D's gimballed thermal sensor. That was pretty much a gunship capability, but the turret and gun proved to be a bit too much (drag and weight) IIRC.
A modern OV-10 could be a phenomenal aircraft.

The British had some activity in the area of a SAC/COIN aircraft as well:
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread186160/pg1

William F. Owen
12-16-2008, 12:15 PM
Now whenever I see an idea supported by Sparks and crew, I have a tendency to reject it out of hand. Some of the ideas are good, even if Sparks et al. really do not understand them.


Concur.

Jedburgh
01-02-2009, 01:45 PM
CSIS, 19 Dec 08: America's Self-Destroying Air Power: Becoming Your Own Peer Threat (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081219_aircraft_modernstudy.pdf)

.....Almost every major aircraft development program is in so much trouble that the replacements are stuck in a morass of procurement and development problems, cost explosions, and rifts within the Department of Defense. Fifth-generation tactical aircraft are affected by significant delays and cost increases.

The F-22 has almost tripled in unit cost. Meanwhile, the planned procurement quantity has been reduced from 750 to 183. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter faces a similar fate, and may not be ready in time to replace aging legacy fighters, creating a ―fighter gap in the Air Force‘s and Navy‘s inventories. The strategic capabilities are not less affected by these problems. A new bomber is planned, as the previous B-2B program escalated in cost by a factor of at least 300 percent, and was reduced to roughly one fifth of its original force goal. Finally, a program to replace the almost 50-year old air refueling tanker is stuck in a political tug of war caused by the Air Force‘s mismanagement of the program. Meanwhile, maintenance costs to keep the legacy fleet operational are increasing rapidly.

There now are fewer program alternatives if any key program runs into trouble, failed methods of cost analysis are still in play without adequate cost-risk analysis or use of regression analysis.The pressure to ―sell‖ programs by understating cost and risk have all combined to push air modernization to the crisis point. Current plans for aircraft modernization are not affordable unless aircraft costs are sharply reduced, deliveries are delayed years longer than planned, or funding shifts to lower cost variants or upgrades of older types. The only alternative is a major increase in real defense spending.

This report examines how these problems affect the tactical, strategic, and enabling capabilities of US air power. It draws on recent government data and news reports to reveal the state of current strategic air power and identify the challenges the next administration will face for future force planning and budgeting......
Complete 54-page report at the link.

Stevely
01-03-2009, 09:27 PM
That is a fascinating and depressing find, Jedburgh, thanks for posting the link. It seems it's one of those things where everyone knows at some level things are seriously out of whack and have for some time (just read back to the beginning of this thread), but seeing a systematic exposure of the details doesn't fail to shock.

Surferbeetle
01-04-2009, 12:32 AM
Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aGMy_XFWN_VY&refer=home) Website, posted 2 Jan 2009.


To boost cooperation between NASA and the Pentagon, Obama has promised to revive the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which oversaw the entire space arena for four presidents, most actively from 1958 to 1973.

The move would build ties between agencies with different cultures and agendas.

“Whether such cooperation would succeed remains to be seen,” said Scott Pace, a former NASA official who heads the Washington-based Space Policy Institute. “But the questions are exactly the ones the Obama team needs to ask.”

carl
02-14-2009, 08:56 PM
There is a very interesting article in the current Atlantic magazine about air combat, F-15s and F-22s. Regardless of your position in our F-22 vs. the world debate, it is a very good read.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903/air-force/5

(moderator: i don't know how to set up a link. this is the best i could do. Added by Moderator, works fine thank you).

davidbfpo
02-14-2009, 09:25 PM
Carl,

A good catch and being written by Mark Bowden, doubly worthwhile. Others will identify the lessons for the USAF, but I liked the comment on an exercise with the Indian AF in 2005.

davidbfpo

Starbuck
02-15-2009, 06:02 AM
I think the push to accept unmanned planes has the same psychological effect on the Air Force that the push to eliminate horses had for the Army. (To a small extent, this is true across the broad range of the aviation community, I would say)

Think of how prevalent the image of the fighter pilot is in our society. The Air Force leadership grew up with images of Chuck Yeager. Today's Gen-Yers grew up wanting to be Maverick and Goose, or Luke Skywalker. Think of the plot of JAG--a Navy JAG lawyer also, from time to time, has to pilot F-14 Tomcats to fight terrorists. In order to pilot something, you need to have been (before laser surgery) born with superior eyesight, etc. It's almost as if you're born with a magical "gift".

I will agree that in the USAF's culture, being a rated aviator is everything. It's rare to see someone rise to high ranks and NOT be a rated aviator (although it looks as if this has changed in the last year or two). UAV operators are continually made fun of by the entire aviation community (The fact that UAV operators have received DFCs hasn't helped the resentment, either), and are treated as "less than aviators". But the interesting point of the matter is that UAVs are, in fact, becoming a much more prevalent portion of the aviation community, and is doing so rapidly. I'm not pushing for the complete removal of manned aircraft from the inventory, but we could conceivably add many more unmanned aircraft to the fleet.

The decision to place them under ground or aviation units is a good one, as is whether or not to place them under the control of rated aviators. In my opinion, as congested as the airspace is now, I'd rather have them under the control of rated aviators instead of people who have never experienced a near mid-air incident, which is "game over" in a UAV, but not so much in a manned aircraft.

selil
02-15-2009, 06:18 AM
I'm not pushing for the complete removal of manned aircraft from the inventory, but we could conceivably add many more unmanned aircraft to the fleet.

I don't think anybody will ever push for a total removal of manned aircraft from the inventory. I still have reservations about close air support for troops being done with UAVs. There is to much situational awareness a human can process that a computer can not communicate. I think UAVs like other new toys are riding a wave of rapid acceptance while people who point out there problems or limitations are ignored.

I will just say that trusting any technology (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/02/07/Computer_virus_grounded_French_fighters/UPI-47691234032521/) to much can bite you quick. I can't imagine the C2 systems of drones is that hard to understand. Might be an interesting project to red team.

Entropy
02-15-2009, 02:08 PM
I think the push to accept unmanned planes has the same psychological effect on the Air Force that the push to eliminate horses had for the Army. (To a small extent, this is true across the broad range of the aviation community, I would say)

Disagree completely. For one thing, I don't think the analogy is applicable. Horses, when one gets down to it, are a technology and horses were replaced when better technology came along. People cannot so easily be replaced and not every mission or capability should get rid of people.

Furthermore, the Air Force IS, in reality, embracing UAS. For more, see this (http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/Mathewson.pdf).

The cultural impediments in the AF against UAS' are actually not that great, IMO. The cultural problems are not with UAS' themselves, but other factors, like planning and command-and-control.

UAS' have a lot of promise, but one must realize that they can increase vulnerabilities, not decrease them. UAS are completely dependent on C2, which becomes the critical vulnerability. Secure, redundant C2 is very expensive and something that is rarely considered when comparing costs to manned aircraft. There's also situational awareness to consider, especially for highly complex warfighting skills like air-to-air engagements. The Mark 1 eyeball is still the best sensor out there. The challenges are immense and it will be a while before unmanned systems are capable of performing many missions currently performed by humans in cockpits.

carl
02-15-2009, 04:23 PM
I don't think it is completely fair to attribute any reluctance there is in the USAF to go the drone route to them not wanting to give up the glamourous flyboy image. As Entropy suggests, there is a lot that hasn't been worked out yet and will take a long time to work out. I believe the Air Force is genuinely concerned about mounting complex airstrikes with drones in the mix or nothing but drones.

The story in the Atlantic starts by describing an air battle in which controllers assigned some F-14's to intercept 2 Iraqi fighters. The F-14's missed the intercept and the F-15 driver interviewed had to start the fight with no real warning at 13 miles. People probably worry about winning a fight like that with drones at the current stage of development.

One of the points of the story is it will be years until all this is worked out and in the meantime we had better have F-22s (i have to get my plug in) around to win the air battles with a minimum of fuss.

As a personal observation, I have been flying a long time and I just can't see some of the more complicated things you do in airplanes being done without the ability to directly look at the sky and the ground and whatever else is out there.

George L. Singleton
02-16-2009, 04:01 AM
The Air Force has been in a state of change away from pilots for at least 25 years.

Technology and engineering are the way forward today, in addition to piloting.

And, seeking to kill more and loose fewer of our own, unmanned aircraft and drones are highly desirable.

What DOD now has to oversee and manage well is a revival of the late 1950s style of who will build and get credit "for the missiles" which found the Navy allowed the lead, which flopped; then the Army due to Werner Von Braun being an Army missle expert got the ball and with Van Braun and his carried over ex-German scientists won the day, with great long distance visions.

Those old enough to remember COLLIERS MAGAZINE, LIFE, LOOK, MECHANICAL SCIENCE MAGAZINES saw visionary sketches, plans, and ideas from Von Braun only some of which have already been carried out, others of which are yet to be done, and these are still very doable.

Carriers still have sound tactical roles, but even carriers can use some unmanned aircraft, and non-carriers can and do well at launching guided missiles in today's world.

Rated USAF officers are not always the best managers or leaders of working groups vs. high personal skills in the cockpit.

Written by a non-rated retired USAF (Reserve) 06 who turned down consideration for 07 due to then pressing family needs which did and always would come first, which is why I retired reserve instead of active duty.

The day of the uniservice as in Canada is not that far away, either.

Behave.

carl
02-16-2009, 10:47 AM
The late 50's should be remembered for a cautionary tale also. That is when the British decided to halt development of manned aircraft because of the promised capabilities of missiles. The missiles still haven't lived up to the promise and the British ended up having to buy manned airplanes anyway, some of them from us. They still are. A main effect of the decision was to badly hurt their aircraft business.

I worry we may go down the same road because of promise that has yet to be demonstrated.

tankersteve
02-16-2009, 04:08 PM
OK, let me see if I have this straight.

The Air Force needs super-million dollar aircraft that are very stealthy and high performance in order to establish air superiority because the enemy has fighters that are high performance and/or the enemy has lots of surface-to-air missiles.

The enemy, whoever they are, probably can't train their fighters as well as ours and probably can't afford to have them fly as much as ours. So they resort to lots of SAMS.

SAMS don't get you air superiority. However, if you have alot of them, do you need it? At what point would the expense of dozens of F22s pay for a 'good enough' deployable SAM defense for ground forces?

If we can't afford the aircraft that the Air says they need, do we need to do what other nations do in a similar context: buy cheaper planes and put lots of money into SAMS? Or are we afraid our SAMS wouldn't be good enough?

I think lots of very good (not the best) planes, piloted by the very best pilots (better trained, more capable), in conjunction with some good SAMs, would be cheaper and provide a more layered and effective approach than 381 F-22s. Just think, the pilots are happy because their uber-skill is the deciding factor, so they have to be s***-hot and know it. The congress and contractors are happy because we have planes and missiles to build and buy. And the ground troops are happy because the skies are essentially safe.

We, the U.S. military, have been using and winning with 'good enough' systems for years. Sometimes our greatest advantage is being focused on having sustainable and logistically simple systems to maintain, something I think some nations (Germany in WWII, Russia) forget to emphasize. The Air Force may just have to recognize that the gold-plated objective isn't attainable.

Tankersteve

George L. Singleton
02-16-2009, 05:39 PM
Sometimes our greatest advantage is being focused on having sustainable and logistically simple systems to maintain, something I think some nations (Germany in WWII, Russia) forget to emphasize.

This pretty much says it all.

My growing up life long friend General Ron Yates, USAF, Ret., was a darn good pilot, heavy in the Pentagon during his career in driving procurment of new fighter aircraft, but would I suspect not be afraid to admit to the above simplified logic.

I did a few weekender only reservist years of drill in the Pentagon in LGXW and say no more than that on the topic myself.

Ken White
02-16-2009, 06:38 PM
We, the U.S. military, have been using and winning with 'good enough' systems for years. Sometimes our greatest advantage is being focused on having sustainable and logistically simple systems to maintain, something I think some nations (Germany in WWII, Russia) forget to emphasize. The Air Force may just have to recognize that the gold-plated objective isn't attainable.Those good enough systems -- the M4 Tank comes to mind -- allowed us to win because we could produce many thousands of them. That made up, in tanks, for the losses that a 'good enough' tank took because it was out gunned by its opponents.

That doesn't necessarily make up for the excess casualties taken due to 'good enough' as opposed to better.

I'll also point out that the good enough airplanes of today were the 'gold plated' and 'excessively costly' airplanes of yesterday. Quality has a quantity all its own...

You willing to give up the M1A2 SEP(V2) for upgraded Leopard 1A5s or M60A3s :D